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I_0.fm; str. 1
I Osnovna tema
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Pravo i privreda br. 5-8/2001.2
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I_1_Mirko Vasiljevic.fm; str. 3
Prof. dr Mirko Vasiqevi,Pravni fakultet, Beogradpredsednik
Udruewa pravnika u privredi SRJ
Novi propisi i zatita investitora
1. Uvodna odreewa
U zemqi koja jo ne zna ni svoj dravni, ni svoj politiki okvir,
izgleda nisamo ime (kao da smo sve druge poslove sa dravom i
privredom pozavravali isamo nam je to jo ostalo da naciju i dravu
zabavqamo oko imena), razumqivo dane moe biti jasan i
privrednopravni okvir. Zvanino, nove dravnopolitikevlasti, to je
svakako pohvalno, za razliku od ranije neodreenosti i preputa-wa
nasluivawu, proglasile su primarnu dravnu strategiju - lanstvo u
EU.Ovim je dat jasan putokaz za sve nae propise, posebno
privrednopravne wihovput je put usklaivawa sa propisima EU. Istina,
poto naa zemqa (ako doistaiko kod nas jo uvek zna ta je to uistinu)
jo uvek nije formalno zakquila saEU tzv. Sporazum o asocijaciji i
stabilizaciji (SAS) takva formalna obavezaza nas jo ne postoji, ali
mislimo da nema sumwe da i bez toga treba se kretatiputevima zemaqa
iz okruewa, koje su takoe prihvatale usklaivawe svog zako-nodavstva
i pre formalnog pristupa ovom sporazumu.
Dakle, osnovna ideja vodiqa naeg prava i filozofija naeg prava
trebalobi da bude uklapawe u veliku evropsku porodicu prava, kojoj
mi ne samo terito-rijalno, ve i civilizacijski i vokacijski
pripadamo. Uostalom, naa pravnatradicija nije u tom pogledu ba
sasvim "tikva bez korena" i s pravom moe, sobzirom na dimenzije
zemqe i naroda, biti ponosna na svoj doprinos toj porodiciprava i
toj kulturi. Ne mogu se danas sporiti vrednosti, ne samo s obzirom
navreme kad su doneti, naih vodeih spomenika pravne kulture, poput
Srpskog
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Pravo i privreda br. 5-8/2002.4
graanskog zakonika (sredina XIX veka), Opteg imovinskog zakonika
(kraj XIXveka), kao ni Zakona o obligacionim odnosima (sredina
druge polovine XX veka)i wihov doprinos evropskoj pravnoj tradiciji
i kulturi.
Ideja vodiqa naeg prava, dakle, vie nije sporna. Ipak,
neoekivano i utakvim uslovima, sve ostalo kod naeg prava danas je
sporno. ini se da ve duevreme, za nikog kod nas nije sporno da se
nae pravo ne kree rukovoeno takvomidejom vodiqom, ve da se nalazi
na viestrukim razmeima.
2. Razmea naeg prava
Prvo razmee je poplava anglosaksonskog prava, posebno amerikog,
u naempravu. Takav utisak odaje veina propisa koji se donose u
posledwe vreme. Iakonema sumwe da se i samo anglosaksonsko pravo
mewa, sa dominacijom pisanih iz-vora prava i slabqewem precedentnog
uticaja, te iako nema sumwe da se sve viemeunarodnih i regionalnih,
kao i autonomnih, izvora donosi sa sve snanijimuticajem ove pravne
porodice, ini se da smo u ovom pogledu postali "vei kato-lici od
pape". Kontinentalno evropsko pravo (civil law) nasloweno na
tradicijurimskog prava i wegove recepcije jo uvek ima snanu
potrebu, ne samo civili-zacijsku, da ostane svoje na svome, ime e
svakako i svetska pravna batina bitibogatija. Treba li podsetiti
nae zakonopisce i zakonodavce da ideja vodiqa na-eg prava nije put
ka anglosaksonskom pravu, ve put ka pravu EU, a ono je jouvek i
nadamo se da e i ostati, posebna pravna porodica i kultura (civil
law) u od-nosu na anglosaksonsku pravnu porodicu i kulturu (common
law). U protivnom isama ideja prava i pravna civilizacija bili bi
osiromaeni, u svojoj unisonostii obeskorewenosti.
Drugo razmee naeg prava je poplava pragmatizma i apsolutne
suverenostisamo jedne vlasti-izvrne. Iako se, naime, mora priznati
da vreme privatizacijeu izvesnom smislu namee ad hoc propise, ipak
se ini da smo u tom pogledu oti-li u sasvim drugu krajnost umesto
zakona naom privrednom scenom sve vie sevlada raznim podzakonskim
propisima, ime izvrne vlasti preuzimaju zakono-davnu vlast, to ve
ozbiqno ugroava i samu ideju podele vlasti i vodi bezostatka
jedinstvu vlasti (ni povrno kritikom posmatrau kod nas nee
ovouverewe pokolebati formalno postojawe tzv. sudske vlasti, kao
posebne vlasti,s obzirom na wenu institucionalnu, materijalnu i
svaku drugu zavisnost od iz-vrne vlasti, koja jo uvek demonstrira
praksu da samostalnost sudske vlastitreba ostaviti za neka druga
vremena).
Tree razmee naeg prava je postojawe dva (negde i tri) paralelna
pravnasistema, posebno privrednopravna: pravni sistem Srbije (u kom
delom vlada ipravni sistem Jugoslavije) i pravni sistem Crne Gore
(u kom uopte ne vladapravni sistem Jugoslavije, posebno ne
privrednopravni). Jedinstveno tritepretpostavqa jedinstvene bar
privrednopravne propise, kako bi se omoguioslobodan protok robe,
qudi, kapitala, vrewa usluga (tzv. etiri "velike slo-
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5M. Vasiqevi: Novi propisi i zatita investitora (str. 3-19)
bode" u pravu EU). I nedavni Sporazum o preureewu odnosa u SRJ
izmeu Srbijei Crne Gore u osnovi je dao peat zateenom stawu, u kome
Crna Gora ima zaokru-enu privrednopravnu regulativu, dok se Srbija
ispomae saveznom regulati-vom. Stvarawe svojevrsnog dravnog
provizorijuma (tzv. "Solanija") sa odvoje-nim spoqnotrgovinskim,
carinskim, deviznim i monetarnim reimima i siste-mima svakako da ne
znai jedinstveno trite. Otuda, na put ka usklaivawuprava sa pravom
EU mora izgleda biti ne direktan, ve zaobilazan: internousklaivawe
i tek nakon toga eksterno usklaivawe (da li je "preko pree,
nao-kolo blie"?). Uostalom, kako bismo mi izneverili sebe vremena
smo uvekimali vika na raspolagawu i taj nam resurs nije bio toliko
bitan, te smo stogai vie u prolosti nego u budunosti.
etvrto razmee naeg prava je vladavina neprava i pravne
nesigurnosti,umesto vladavine prava i pravne sigurnosti. Obeleja
ovog razmea su svako-dnevna, sveprisutna i sveuticajna. Uverqivosti
radi, ovde e biti pomenuta samokarakteristina, koja bez ikakve
sumwe optereuju nau nasunu nacionalnu po-trebu stvarawa povoqne
investicione klime za poverewe investitora svih bojaza investiciona
ulagawa. Na terenu zakonodavstva: nezaokruena regulativa, po-sebno
privrednopravna, kao i sve ee vladawe uredbama i drugim
podzakon-skim propisima umesto vladawa zakonima; na terenu sudstva:
brojni primeri sle-pog i po sudski sistem kompromitujueg izvravawa
naloga politike vlasti,kao i razliitog postupawa sudova nie i vie
instance u istovetnim stvarima(Potanska tedionica, Galenika ICN,
Mobtel, Pionir, brojne banke i sl.); naterenu izvrne vlasti:
primeri otvorenog stavqawa do znawa sudskoj vlasti koje istinski
jedina vlast u zemqi (Telekom, Galenika ICN, Mobtel i dr.).
Peto razmee naeg prava je sukob prava i institucija koje ga
primewuju.Naime, tano je da je nae zakonodavstvo jo uvek
neizgraeno, posebno privred-nopravno, to je ozbiqno optereewe za
sigurnost investitora i investicionopoverewe i to svakako treba u
to je mogue kraem roku, ali ne na utrb kva-liteta propisa,
otkloniti donoewem adekvatnih propisa. Ipak, s druge strane,iwenica
je da i u uslovima prisutnosti i relativno adekvatne regulative
(npr.Zakon o preduzeima) postoji netolerantan nesklad izmeu
zakonskih reewa iinstituta i stepena wihove primene. Na
tradicionalni sindrom povike napropise, s jedne strane, i neprimene
propisa, s druge strane, ovim se na svojevr-stan nain cementira.
Najmawe dvadesetak pravnih instituta iz ovog propisaima svoje
adekvatno pravno utemeqewe, zasnovano na univerzalnosti ovih
insti-tuta u uporednom pravu, ali se ipak u naoj praksi neadekvatno
primewuju ili seuopte ne primewuju: princip odrawa osnovnog
kapitala, zabrana vraawauloga akcionarima i lanovima drutva,
klauzula nedozvoqene konkurencije,klauzula sukoba interesa, prava
mawinskih akcionara i lanova drutva, poseb-na pravila za jednolano
drutvo, odgovornost osnivaa za tetno postupawepri osnivawu drutva
kapitala, zabrana prekoraewa unakrsnog sticawa akcijamatinog i
zavisnog drutva i stvarawe drutava kapitala bez kapitala,
zabra-
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Pravo i privreda br. 5-8/2002.6
na tzv. sistema vodopada i kruewa istog kapitala u vie drutava
za simula-ciju postojawa osnivakog kapitala, ulagawe preostalog
obaveznog osnivakogkapitala u roku od dve godine od osnivawa drutva
kapitala, dostava sudskom re-gistru bilansa poslovawa i izvetaja
uprava o poslovawu i nalaza revizora kodotvorenih drutava, iskquewe
prava glasa zbog sukoba interesa, dominacija in-teresa drutva
kapitala nad interesom veinskog akcionara ili lana drutva,solidarna
odgovornost osnivaa za uplatu ugovorenog uloga, zatita
poverilacakod smawewa kapitala, zatita poverilaca kod fuzija
drutava kapitala, pravoizlaska iz drutva kod zloupotrebe prava
veinskog akcionara ili lana, lik-vidacija drutva kapitala po
zahtevu mawinskih akcionara ili lanova u slua-ju zloupotrebe prava
veinskog vlasnika itd.
I da ne nabrajamo daqe, i ovo je vaqda uverqivo da nam bar do
sada pravnakultura nije bila jaa strana, te da smo umesto kulta
primene prava razvijalikult svojevrsne neprimene zakona ("evegu
rupa u zakonu"). I tamo gde postoje ja-sni pravni instituti,
nesporno utemeqeni, univerzalno prisutni, sve institu-cije koje
primewuju pravo, ukquujui i dravnu upravnu, sudsku i izvrnu sfe-ru,
paradravne institucije, privredne subjekte i graane, kao da se svi
trude da(ne)primeni propisa daju svoj peat i svoju relativizaciju
znaewa pravnog in-stituta. Sve to pojedinano i u celosti uzev
stvara jednu lou sliku stawa pravai pravne kulture kod nas, to
razumqivo ima snane reperkusije na investicio-no poverewe i
investicionu klimu za ulagawe kod nas. Sve ee je investitor
upoziciji da strepi kako e organ primene prava primeniti pravo,
budui da seinstitucije primene prava sve vie pretvaraju u
institucije kreatore (ne)prava,to je samo korak do potpunog pravnog
voluntarizma i bespravqa, a samim tim ido razvojnog beznaa i
potpunog investicionog nepoverewa.
3. Pravni standardi zatite investitora
Strani investitori (ulagai) i investitori uopte zainteresovani
su po-sebno za pravno ureewe sledeih oblasti: prvo, reim svojine
(kod nas nedostajeposeban Zakon o svojini, postoji jo drutvena
svojina, titular dravne svojinesu samo republike, sa neto svojine
savezne drave, a u svakom sluaju nema komu-nalne svojine, po
republikom Ustavu Srbije postoji monopol dravne svojinena
graevinskom zemqitu i ovo zemqite je praktino izvan prometa,
nejasani nedvoqno stimulativan reim sticawa svojine na zemqitu
stranih lica);drugo, reim pravila o privrednim drutvima (pokriven
je vaeim Zakonom opreduzeima koji je u dominantnoj meri
harmonizovan sa pravom EU i sa zavret-kom postupka privatizacije
treba da se "transformie", sa odreenim izmenamau Zakon o privrednim
drutvima); tree, reim stranih ulagawa (pokriven ne-davno donetim
relativno dobrim zakonskim aktom, mada bi zbog principa
nacio-nalnog tretmana stranih lica trebalo ovaj projekt
ukomponovati u Zakon o pri-vrednim drutvima); etvrto, reim steaja
(predstoji donoewe novog zakona,
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7M. Vasiqevi: Novi propisi i zatita investitora (str. 3-19)
koji bi posebno trebalo da uredi tzv. forme prestrukturirawa
preduzea krozsteajni postupak, kako se ovo vano pitawe privrednog
sistema ne bi reguli-salo uredbom kao to je to sada sluaj, to u
najmawu ruku ostavqa ozbiqnu sum-wu u wenu ustavnost i
zakonitost)1); peto, reim zatite poverilaca (kod nas uozbiqnoj
krizi i pored u svemu uzornog zakonskog projekta Zakona o
obligacio-nim odnosima, posebno zbog potrebe ozbiqnog unapreewa
reima ureewa iprakse funkcionisawa sredstava obezbeewa); esto,
devizni spoqnotrgovin-ski reim (oekuju se novi zakoni za
liberalizovawe ovih reima u pravcu ispu-wavawa uslova za prijem u
STO); sedmo, reim antimonopolskog zakonodavstva(kod nas
nezadovoqavajui i na planu norme i na planu prakse); osmo, reim
pri-vatizacije (kod nas nestabilan izmeu ostalog i zbog estog
mewawa zakonskogmodela i nedostatka kredibiliteta institucija koje
ga sprovode); deveto, reimzakona o radu i trajku (kod nas znaajno
unapreen u skladu s odgovarajuimkonvencijama MOR-a i
uporednopravnim tendencijama donoewem republikogZakona o radu, ali
koji je delom otiao i nedozvoqivo i neprihvatqivo daqe,to jo uvek
nije sluaj sa reimom trajka); deseto, reim prava
industrijskesvojine (kod nas ureen relativno dobrim zakonima, ali
sa izuzetno loom di-sciplinom primene); jedanaesto, reim arbitranog
reavawa sporova (kod nasrelativno funkcionie i pored potrebe za
donoewem posebnog zakona); dvana-esto, reim sudskog reavawa sporova
i nezavisnost sudske vlasti (poznata spo-rost naih sudova, delom i
zbog potrebe ozbiqne revizije procesnog zakonodav-stva i nedovoqna
faktika nezavisnost i samostalnost); trinaesto, reim izvr-ewa
sudskih i arbitranih odluka (poznata neefikasnost, delom i zbog
neza-tite poverilaca uopte, a posebno zbog potrebe ozbiqne revizije
propisa o iz-vrewu); etrnaesto, fiskalni i poreski reim (i pored
estih tzv. poreskih ifiskalnih reformi i daqe relativno nejasan,
nestabilan i investiciono nesti-mulativan u brojnim segmentima);
petnaesto, reim socijalnih prava (neuskla-enost kreiranih prava i
buxetskih mogunosti, s jedne strane, i , s druge
strane,neadekvanost nekih socijalnih prava).
Ureewe ovih pravnih oblasti, koje su od prvenstvenog znaaja za
stabilnuinvesticionu klimu za ulagawe kapitala u jednoj zemqi,
treba da bude rukovo-eno sledeim pravnim naelima: prvo, naelo
pravne sigurnosti2) (stabilnostpropisa, neretroaktivnost propisa,
jasnost propisa, fleksibilnost propisa zaposlovne ideje,
nedvosmislenost propisa "to svak jednako razume tome tumaane treba"
rekao bi znameniti pravnik Bogii); drugo, naelo vladavine zakonakao
pravilo i podzakonskih propisa kao izuzetak; tree, naelo
samostalnosti,nezavisnosti i efikasnosti institucija koje primewuju
propise (u mnogim slu-ajevima potrebno je propisati obavezne
rokove, sa sankcijom tzv. utawa admi-nistracije, kao npr. kod
registracije preduzea, izdavawa raznih dozvola i sagla-snosti i
slino); etvrto, naelo ravnopravnosti stranih i domaih lica pod
1. Uredba o postupku i nainu restrukturirawa preduzea i drugih
pravnih lica, "Slu-beni glasnik RS", br. 1/2002.
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Pravo i privreda br. 5-8/2002.8
uslovima uzajamnosti; peto, naelo konkurentnosti propisa sa
drugim relevan-tnim zemqama; esto, naelo trajnosti propisa, posebno
privrednopravnih, ineuticajnost politikih promena na izmenu
propisa; sedmo, naelo usklaeno-sti (harmonizacije) pravnih
instituta sa relevantnim zemqama trine pri-vrede; osmo, naelo
pravne edukovanosti i kulta primene prava i ponaawa popravu;
deveto, naelo kredibilnosti uopte i nekorumpiranosti posebno
insti-tucija koje kreiraju i primewuju pravo; deseto, naelo
publiciteta i jedinstve-nih registara kao naina sticawa prava
(zemqine kwige kao registri nepo-kretnosti, registri zaloga na
pokretnim stvarima i udelima, registri hartija odvrednosti i prava
treih lica na wima, registri privrednih subjekata i drugihpravnih
lica, registri preduzetnika, registri boniteta privrednih
subjekata,kreditni registri privrednih subjekata, registri
koncesija, registri prava in-dustrijske svojine i dr.).
4. Zatita investitora i relevantni reformski zakoni
Zatita investitora u naoj zemqi (za trenutak se neemo osvrtati
na i-wenicu da nikome izgleda i nije jasno ta je to ustvari)
nastoji se znaajno po-boqati donoewem niza novih tzv. reformiskih
zakona, kako bi se poboqalainvesticiona klima i podstakao
investicioni talas. U tom pogledu, u posledwihgodinu dana doneto je
niz relevantnih propisa i na saveznom i na republikomnivou, koji uz
evidentno otvarawe nae privrede, imaju i oiglednu usmerenostka
jaawu trine pravne infrastrukture i stepena pravne sigurnosti kod
nas.Ipak, u tom pogledu se nije uvek dosledno, to e za potrebe ovog
rada biti poka-zano na tri u dobroj meri kontroverzna pristupa.
Prvo, Zakon o stranim ulagawima.3) Iako je re o dobrom zakonskom
projek-tu, koji svakako treba da doprinese dizawu nivoa
investicionog poverewa stra-nih investitora kod ulagawa u nau
zemqu, prvenstveno zbog datih garancija(sloboda stranog ulagawa,
nacionalni tretman stranih lica, pravna sigurnost
2. Imajui u vidu na stepen pravne kulture, ini se izlinim
postavqawe pitawa da li jedoprinos jaawu principa pravne sigurnosti
npr. Zakon o privrednim drutvima CrneGore ("Slubeni list RCG", br.
6/2002), koji trgovako ortako drutvo svodi naklasini graanski
ortakluk bez subjektiviteta i upisa u sudski registar (l. 6.),
ili"sindromom liberalizma" propisuje osnivawe drutva sa ogranienom
odgovornou sasimbolinih jedan evro (l. 66 - da li se moe oekivati
da e stepen ozbiqnosti vlas-nika pri namernom bankrotstvu ovog
drutva nakon prevare nekog poverioca biti viiod ozbiqnosti pri
osnivawu ovog drutva sa takvim kapitalom?!), ili koji
privrednadrutva kapitala i komanditno drutvo (preduzee) izjednaava
sa automobilom i pro-pisuje im, bez obzira to se ak i
pretpostavqeno osnivaju na neodreeno vreme,obavezno produewe
registracije svake godine i pretwu likvidacijom ako to ne uine
upropisanom roku (l. 86.-87. - eleli bismo da verujemo da to ipak
nije uiweno izfiskalnih razloga, iako drava za svako godiwe
produewe registracije naplauje"simbolinih" 100 evra).
3. Zakon o stranim ulagawima, "Slubeni list SRJ", br.
3/2002.
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9M. Vasiqevi: Novi propisi i zatita investitora (str. 3-19)
sa steenim pravima, principijelna zabrana eksproprijacije ili
drugih mera dr-ave sa jednakim dejstvom, sloboda konverzije domae u
stranu valutu, slobodantransfer dobiti i slino), ipak i ovaj
projekt dajui nacionalni tretman stra-nim licima i izjednaujui ih u
tom pogledu sa domaim liima u poslovawu u na-oj zemqi, nije odoleo
iskuewu da poveden za svojom osnovnom ciqnom fun-kcijom (privlaewe
stranih investitora i stranih investicija) i ustanovqewemosnova za
podsticaje za strana ulagawa (sloboda uvoza, carinske i poreske
olak-ice i carinska osloboewa) u osnovi kreira sistem nacionalnog
(ne)tretma-na za domaa lica. Nema pravnog ni ekonomskog opravdawa,
kad je o poziciji do-maih lica re, da ista uivaju ove podsticaje
ako su "domai stranci" (prekosvog preduzea osnovanog u inostranstvu
ili preko svog boravita u inostran-stvu dueg od godinu dana, kada u
smislu ovog zakona prestaje da bude domae li-ce), a de ne uivaju
kad nisu stranci.4) Nacionalni (ne)tretman domaih lica po-jaava i
Zakon o privatizaciji5) propisujui da "domae fiziko ili pravno
li-ce moe biti kupac kapitala ili imovine po ovom zakonu tek poto
prui doka-ze da je izmirilo obaveze prema Zakonu o jednokratnom
porezu na ekstra dohodaki ekstra imovinu steene iskoriavawem
posebnih pogodnosti, ili prui do-kaze da nije obveznik poreza (da
li je mogue pruawe negativnog dokaza u pravu primedba M.V.) po tom
zakonu,"dodajui da je ugovor o prodaji koji se zakquiprotivno ovoj
odredbi nitav. Verujem da smo se ovakvim reewima legitimi-sali kao
jedina zemqa u svetu koja vie "voli" strani kapital i strane
graaneod domaeg kapitala i domaih graana?! Aferim!
Drugo, tzv. Zakon o jednokratnom porezu na ekstra dohodak i
ekstra imovinusteene iskoriavawem posebnih pogodnosti6), koji bez
obzira na motive dono-ewa, u ekonomskom smislu je naneo vie tete
nego koristi, a u pravnom smi-slu ponovo je reaktivirao praksu
donoewa propisa sa retroaktivnim obeleji-ma, koji se kako je i sam
rekao primewuje "do dana donoewa", to je svakako rip-lijevski
pravni novum koji kao takav zasluuje da bude "patentiran". U
psiho-lokom smislu ovaj zakon je imao maksimalni efekat odvraawa od
invesirawa unau zemqu, kako stranih investitora, tako i domaih
investitora (koji bi ponaem viewu i trebalo da budu jedna od
glavnih ciqnih investicionih grupa,jer kako je to zamena stranih
valuta u evro pokazala raspolau svakako pawevrednom uteevinom od
oko devet milijardi DEM, koja se uglavnom nalazi u"slamaricama" a
ne u investicionim tokovima, u dobroj meri i zbog ovog zakon-skog
projekta i svakako zbog institucije tzv. stare devizne tedwe. Sve
dok uovoj zemqi kod nosilaca politike vlasti i zakonodavaca
dominira komunisti-ki sindrom olien u metafori "drte lopova" (lepe
reeno "utvrivawe po-rekla imovine"), sa snanim ideolokim nabojem
koji mewa samo svoj predznak,
4. "Svi u strance", poruio je jedan dovitqivi novinar posle
donoewa ovog zakona. Vidi:Politika, 13.02.2002. godine.
5. Zakon o privatizaciji (lan 12. st. 3.i 4.), "Slubeni glasnik
RS", br. 38/2001.6. Zakon, "Slubeni glasnik RS", br. 36/2001.
-
Pravo i privreda br. 5-8/2002.10
nema trajnog i nepoquqanog investicionog poverewa. Ako vrioci
politikevlasti, bilo ko to bio, smatraju da je mogue ustanovqewe
posebne vrste porezasamo za razdobqe prethodne politike vlasti, te
da time uspostave trajno in-vesticiono poverewe onda su oni u
neizviwavajuoj i opasnoj zabludi. Promocijajednog takvog koncepta i
recepta od strane jedne vlasti za prethodnu vlast zgodanje mamac i
za neku novu vlast, koji onda dotie i same autore tog koncepta i
re-cepta. Onda nema kraja. Ako su i postojali politiki razlozi za
uvoewe jednetakve vrste poreza, to je strano naoj vokaciji, onda su
wegovi osnovi trebalida vae, ako ih naravno bude, to se ne moe
unapred iskquiti, pravno posma-trano bar u istoj ravni od momenta
donoewa ovog tzv. zakona (to zakonodavacoigledno nije hteo jer bi i
sam mogao ui u wegovo "vidno poqe"), ako ne i pr-venstveno to je
vokacija svakog zakona, kao i do momenta donoewa ovog zakona(to je
oigledno zakonodavac samo i hteo). Ako se ovom doda i evidentna
praksawegove selektivne primene, onda se doista mora zakquiti da je
re o svojevr-snom "pravnom monstrumu". Uz to, i navodno odluivawe
Saveznog ustavnog sudao wegovoj ustavnosti (bio je toliko
samostalan da je mogao da se izjasni o neustav-nosti znakova
interpunkcije u ovom zakonu), te i javna uloga izvrne vlasti utom
procesu (dovoqno je podsetiti na izjave vie ministara, koji se nisu
libilida se javno porugaju i samoj potrebi nezavisnosti
ustavnosudske vlasti u ovom do-menu), u svoj svojoj otrini i
ogoqenosti pokazali su svim investitorima da smomi daleko od
pravnih standarda zatite investitora.
Umesto ovakvih poruka svim investitorima, posebno domaim, koji
se plaeovakvim zakonskim reewima, koji ih svakako nee uveriti u nau
odlunost ukreaciju jednog stabilnog pravnog poretka, koji obezbeuje
kompatibilno i kon-kurentno okruewe za trajan investicioni interes,
ini se da nam treba, a posleovakvih zakonskih polureewa u to smo jo
vie uvereni, jedna javna manife-stacija politike voqe da su svi
investitori kod nas slobodni i sigurni da ula-u svoj novac, da im
drava nee pretiti retroaktivnim propisima ili "zaviri-vawem u
tawir". Jedna takva manifestacija bi bila mogua preko posebne
Dekla-racije Skuptine, kojom bi se izvrila neka vrsta javne
amnestije svih naihgraana koji bi svoj novac, ma gde se on nalazio,
investirali u zemqi u odreenomroku (kako se projekt ne bi
razvodnio), sa zapoqavawem domaih graana i uzodreeno maksimalno
stimulativno poresko "razduewe" sa dravom (jediniizuzetak, pod
uslovom da se ne pretvori u pravilo i da doista i ostane
izuzetak,mogao bi se eventualno ostaviti za novac steen izvrewem
odreenih krivi-nih dela). Samo na taj nain bi se onih devet
milijardi DEM nalo u veini uinvesticionim tokovima, kao i inih
milijardi (domaih graana i nae tzv. di-jaspore) verovatno van
zemqe. U protivnom, ostaemo zarobqenici ideje"lova navetice" i
uverewa da se tzv. donacijama (pitawe je samo za koju stranu!)
moekonkurentno razvijati, to je sigurna garancija definitivnog
privrednog ko-lapsa i nacionalnog samoponiewa.
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11M. Vasiqevi: Novi propisi i zatita investitora (str. 3-19)
Tree, Zakon o privatizaciji (republiki). Ne sporei iwenicu da je
ovajzakon promovisao trini model privatizacije, oroenost,
obaveznost i jav-nost procesa, to je svakako wegov kvalitet, ini se
da se i ovom projektu sa sta-novita sigurnosti i zatite investitora
mogu staviti ozbiqne primedbe. Pr-vo, to je konstatacija samo
iwenice a ne odbrana prevazienog Ustava, nadovim zakonom u najmawu
ruku visi ozbiqna senka (ne)ustavnosti i (ne)zakonito-sti. Drugo,
zakon iako je ocewen kao trian u osnovi promovie samo jedan mo-del
privatizacije (model prodaje kombinovan sa elementima poklona), to
je uosnovi dravni monopol, kao van ustavna kategorija. U najavama
izmene Zakona opreduzeima ovaj model e biti i doista jedini, budui
da e se ukinuti zajedni-ka ulagawa, dokapitalizacije, konverzije
potraivawa u ulog, statusne promenei slino, preduzea sa (veinskim)
drutvenim i dravnim kapitalom bez sagla-snosti vlade republike. Ovo
bez sumwe, i pored potrebe jaawa odreenih oblikakontrole ovih
procesa (ostaje, meutim, pitawe "ko e kontrolisati kontrolo-ra?"),
nije u skladu sa trinim potrebama, sputava inicijativnost
privrednihsubjekata i ukida atribut trinosti ovom zakonu. Umesto
ovog ini se da je po-trebno otvarati vie prostora za nesporno i
druge trine modele izmene svo-jinske i upravqake strukture
preduzea, makar i ne bili direktno privatizaci-onog karaktera, kako
bi se shodno osnovnoj trinoj logici otvorila mogunostizbora.
Direktna preferencija dravnog interesa kroz model prodaje
(puwewebuxeta) ima svoja objektivna ograniewa (mala trawa, kupovina
trita krozkupovinu preduzea i zatvarawe kupqenog preduzea ovo model
direktne doka-pitalizacije iskquuje, otvarawe pitawa da li treba
prodavati najboqa preduze-a koja su i potencijalno
najinteresantnija,7) mali broj potencijalno interesan-tnih preduzea
za kupovinu, potreba dokapitalizacije preduzea i nakon kupovi-ne i
slino), koja po svojoj logici trae "napade sa svih strana" i drugim
mode-lima privatizacije, kako bi se proces zavrio bar veinski u
zakonskom roku (sobzirom da vie nema dileme da je privatizacija
svojevrsni aksiom "svakastvar svoga gospodara trai" rekao bi
Bogii). Tree, ovaj zakon promoviemaksimalno centralizovan model
privatizacije (centralizovana sredstva, po-stupak, model, organi,
kontrola), to je pravno posmatrano opet monopol koji jeizvanustavna
kategorija. U Srbiji je u svemu opti trend decentralizacije, a
sa-mo se privatizacija u potpunosti centralizuje (uz to ovaj model
spada i u izuzet-no skupe modele privatizacije i u izuzetno spore
modele). Iako se govori o jav-nosti (transparentnosti) ovog modela,
to u stvari ne moe biti wegova odlikaupravo zbog tolike
centralizacije (centralizacija i tzv. transparentnost ne mo-gu biti
u prevelikoj qubavi). Najboqi primer za to je privatizacija tri
cemen-tare u Srbiji, gde su na tri tzv. tendera uestvovala samo
etiri potencijalnakupca (da li javnost postoji u toj meri kod
odnosa 4:3, kad je samo jedan potenci-jalni kupac ostao bez
"kolaa"!). etvrto, ovaj zakon kao da tei da sva privati-
7. Slovenake dileme- zato strancima da prodajemo neto to ne
moramo, "Politika",4. 02. 2002. godine.
-
Pravo i privreda br. 5-8/2002.12
zovana preduzea izvede na berzu (princip "svi na berzu i sve na
berzu"), to jeopet kreirawe monopola koji je izvanustavna
kategorija. Ovo je takoe i protiv-no svetskim trendovima dominacije
zatvorenih drutava (koja ne idu na berzan-sko trite akcija) i
izuzetka otvorenih drutava (koja idu na berzansko tr-ite). ta vie,
pravilo je da se donose i posebni zakoni kojima se tite i ot-vorene
kompanije od neprijateqskih preuzimawa (hostile takeover), to jo
uveknije sluaj sa naom zemqom i gde su u posebnim rizicima veinski
privatizo-vana preduzea po ranijim zakonima.8)
5. Zatita investitora i sredstva stvarnopravnog obezbeewa u
naem pravu
Investitori koji ne ulaze u oblike korporativnog ulagawa (trajni
kapitalulozi u raznim formama privrednih drutava opteg i
specijalizovanog tipa),ve ulaze u razne forme u osnovi kreditnih
poslova imaju posebnu potrebu za si-gurnou svojih potraivawa, koja
se postie raznim stvarnopravnim i obliga-cionopravnim sredstvima
obezbeewa. Za razliku od obligacionopravnih sred-stava obezbeewa,
koja u naem pravu bar normativno ne zaostaju za relevantnompravnom
infrastrukturom uporednog prava, stvarnopravna sredstva obezbeewau
naem pravu zahtevaju znatno unapreewe ne samo prakse ve i same
regulative,koja u dobrom delu zaostaje za odgovarajuom regulativom
relevantnih zemaqa uuporednom pravu. Ovo se ogleda kako na planu
usavravawa nekih postojeih in-strumenata stvarnopravnog obezbeewa,
tako i na potrebu kreacije nekih novihtakvih instituta u naem
pravu.
Prvo, stvarno pravo na nepokretnostima (kao i brodovima i
avionima) uosnovi je kod nas ureeno zadovoqavajue. Ipak, osnovni
problem kod sigurnostiovog sredstva obezbeewa sastoji se u tome to
zemqine kwige ne postoje na ve-em delu zemqe9), a i gde postoje
nisu aurne (problem pretpostavke apsolutnetanosti javne kwige i
problem sukoba kwinog i vankwinog vlasnika), i naj-zad, hipotekarni
poverilac ne moe vriti prodaju zaloene nepokretnosti vemora voditi
spor po hipotekarnoj tubi i tek po dobijenom izvrnom naslovumoe
traiti izvrewe prodajom hipotekarnog dobra, to po pravilu traje
veo-ma dugo i to je svakako za poverioca nepovoqno. Da li katastri
nepokretnosti,
8. Takvo dramatino upozorewe dolo je nedavno i od Asocijacije
akcionarskih preduzeaSrbije. Vidi: "Politika", 4.02. 2002.
godine.
9. Zemqine kqige postoje u Srbiji na 23% teritorije, dok
katastar nepokretnosti kaooblik svojinske evidencije , koji je
ustanovqen tek 1992. godine postoji samo na 9% weneteritorije, dok
je na ostalom podruju jedini oblik javne evidencije o
zemqitukatastar zemqita, koji je auriran i osnovan je za celu
republiku (u kome su podaci ozemqitu, wegovim korisnicima i o
katastarskom prihodu, ali se u wega ne mogu upi-sati svojina na
nepokretnosti, kao ni same sagraene nepokretnosti, iako one po
vred-nosti, po pravilu, prevazilaze vrednost zemqita, a u wih se ne
moe upisati samim timni hipoteka). Izvor: "Politika",
3.02.2002.
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13M. Vasiqevi: Novi propisi i zatita investitora (str. 3-19)
najavqenim promenama i aurirawem u smislu ukwibe svojine zemqita
i svo-jine na izgraenim nepokretnostima, pa samim tim i hipoteke,
koje u osnovi vodeupravni a ne sudski organi10), mogu po svojoj
sigurnosti zameniti zemqine kwi-ge, veliko je pravno pitawe, na
koje izgleda nije teko dati odgovor (to se nastie, pre smo za
reafirmaciju zemqinih kwiga, uz izvesnu savremenu reformui glavne
zemqine kwige, kako bi se omoguila i automatska obrada podataka,kao
i za sudsko voewe evidencija nepokretnosti, s obzirom da su sudovi
kompe-tentniji za ove poslove i uivaju vie poverewa kod graana i
investitora odupravnih organa).
Drugo, u Srbiji, za razliku od Crne Gore gde je donet poseban
zakon, ne posto-ji institut fiducijarnog prenosa prava svojine kao
oblik stvarnopravnog obez-beewa, uz upis u javni registar koji vodi
Direkcija za nekretnine. Predmet fi-ducijarnog prenosa svojine mogu
biti i pokretne (pa i robni lager) i nepokretnestvari. Ovaj oblik
stvarnopravnog obezbeewa, kao oblik nedravinske zaloge,moe da bude
relativno povoqan oblik zaloge i sa stanovita dunika (zadra-va
stvar i moe je ekonomski za to vreme koristiti) i sa stanovita
poverioca(po neplaenom dugu o roku ovako obezbeenom moe postati
vlasnik predmetatakvog obezbeewa ili se moe iz prodajne cene
namiriti). Ipak, ini se da po-stoje, za sada, ozbiqne ustavne
smetwe za ustanovqewe ovog oblika stvarnoprav-nog obezbeewa, budui
da Ustav ne poznaje pojam tzv. privremene ili deliminesvojine, to
je u osnovi ovaj institut.
Tree, naa zemqa jo nije ustanovila institut bezdravinske zaloge
na po-kretnim stvarima, hartijama od vrednosti, potraivawima,
udelima. Za ustanov-qewem ovakvog instituta postoje ozbiqni i
ekonomski i pravni razlozi, s timda se razviju mehanizmi javnih i
jedinstvenih registara, koji bi naelom publi-citeta obezbeivali
sigurnost investitora sa ovim sredstvom obezbeewa.11) Uzto, trebalo
bi znaajno korigovati naelo oficijelnosti (sudskog izvrewa)kod ovog
obezbeewa i to tako to bi se vansudsko namirewe u postupku
javneprodaje (izuzetno i neposredne prodaje u skladu sa Zakonom o
obligacionim odno-sima) iz ugovora u privredi proirilo i na
graanskopravne ugovore.12) Ovo va-i i za naelo specijalnosti, koje
striktno primeweno znai da samo odreenopotraivawe moe biti predmet
obezbeewa zalonim pravom i samo odreenestvari mogu biti predmet
zalonog prava i to u pravcu reewa da svako lice mo-e zaloiti svaku
stvar (ili pravo) svakom poveriocu radi obezbeewa
svakogpotraivawa.13) Isto se odnosi i na princip nedeqivosti zaloge
i nedeqivosti
10. Vidi: Pet godina za ukwibu, "Politika", 3.02. 2002. 11. Prvi
je Jednoobrazni trgovaki zakonik SAD (1962.) uveo ovakvu
bezdravinsku zalogu,
l. 9109. u vezi l. 9203. Nedavno ga je uvela i Poqska (1998.) i
Republika Srpska (Zakono registrovanim zalogama na pokretnim
stvarima i lanskim udelima, "Slubeni glas-nik RS", 16/2000). Za
pravo Poqske vidi: Medi, "Zalog kao realno sredstvo
obezbjeewagraanskopravnih i privrednopravnih ugovora", mag. rad,
Bawa Luka, 2001., str. 158166.
12. ZOO, l. 981983.
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Pravo i privreda br. 5-8/2002.14
udela. Uz to, potrebno bi bilo odrediti i rang prioriteta izmeu
ugovorne, za-konske i sudske zaloge. Najidealnije bi bilo
izjednaewe po rangu i prioritetusvih vrsta zalonih prava, a zalonim
pravima dati prvenstvo na osnovu momen-ta sticawa kao osnovnog
kriterijuma, ali treba biti svestan iwenice da ovo popravilu nije
mogue. S druge strane, registrovanoj zalozi trebalo bi obaveznodati
prednost nad neregistrovanom zalogom.
Konano, kod zaloge hartija od vrednosti bilo bi neophodno
korigovati re-ewe Zakona o obligacionim odnosima, po kom zaloni
poverilac hartija odvrednosti moe tom hartijom raspolagati samo
punomonikim indosamentom,ali ne i svojinskim, to je ozbiqna smetwa
za sigurnost investitora obezbee-nog ovim sredstvom obezbeewa,
budui da ne bi mogao da se namiri prodajom ovogsredstva obezbeewa
(osim na osnovu svojinskog indosamenta samog zalogodavcaili na
osnovu sudske odluke, to obesmiqava ovaj predmet zaloge), a ne bi
mo-gao ni da konstituie podzalogu svojim zalonim
indosamentom.14)
I najzad, potrebno je ozbiqno razmotriti pitawe eventualne
opravdanostiuvoewa u na pravni sistem instituta engleskog prava
(retko se sree kod kon-tinentalnih zemaqa) tzv. lebdee zaloge
(floating charge), koji u stvari predstav-qa jedan oblik
nedravinske zaloge kapitala drutva (trajnog ili obrtnog) iliwegovog
dela, upisom u javni registar, doputajui zalogodavcu ak i
raspola-gawe wime, s tim da na otuenim delovima kapitala zaloga
prestaje, za razliku odevropskog koncepta (gde zaloga na otuenoj
stvari ne prestaje do potpunog nami-rewa potraivawa obezbeenog
takvom zalogom), ali s druge strane ova zaloga se,takoe za razliku
od evropskog koncepta, automatski bez posebnog upisa odnosi ina
svako poveawe kapitala zalogodavca. Lebdea zaloga se pretvara u
pravu za-logu kad namirewe tako obezbeenog potraivawa bude ugroeno
(pad u docwu saplaawem tako obezbeenog potraivawa), kada zaloni
poverilac zahteva na-mirewe iz predmeta zaloge postavqajui duniku
prinudnog izvriteqa (recei-ver), radi prodaje optereenog kapitala
ili stvari i prava iz kojih se sastoji.
6. Zatita investitora u hartije od vrednosti
Meunarodna organizacija za komisije za hartije od vrednosti
(IOSCO) nasvojoj godiwoj konferenciji u Najrobiju 1998. godine
usvojila je tri ciqa regu-lative hartija od vrednosti15) i trideset
principa ove regulative, grupisanih uosam kategorija.16)
Osnovni ciqevi regulative hartija od vrednosti su:
13. Ovo, na primer, predvia model Evropske banke za obnovu i
razvoj zakona za obezbeewepotraivawa konstituisawem nedravinske
zaloge na poketnim stvarima.
14. ZOO, l. 247. Vidi i: N. Jovanovi, Ugovorno zalagawe udela i
akcija, "Privrednik", 114/2001,s. 915.
15. Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation,
International Organization of Securities Com-missions, september,
1998.
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15M. Vasiqevi: Novi propisi i zatita investitora (str. 3-19)
prvo, zatita investitora;
drugo, obezbeewe da trite hartija bude fer, efikasno i
transparentno;i
tree, smawewe sistemskog rizika.
Osnovni principi regulative hartija od vrednosti koji treba da
obezbedeostvarewe ovih ciqeva grupisani su u osam kategorija.
Prvu kategoriju ine principi u vezi sa regulatorom, kojih je
ukupno pet(prvo, odgovornost regulatora treba da bude jasno i
objektivno iskazana; drugo,regulator treba da bude operativno
nezavisan i odgovoran u izvrewu svojihfunkcija i ovlaewa;tree,
regulator treba da ima adekvatna ovlaewa, sop-stvena sredstva i
kapacitet da izvrava svoje funkcije i svoja ovlaewa; et-vrto,
regulator treba da usvoji jasne i dosledne regulatorne postupke;
peto,slube regulatora treba da potuju najvie profesionalne
standarde, ukquu-jui odgovarajue standarde poverqivosti).
Drugu kategoriju ine principi samoregulative, kojih je ukupno
dva (pr-vo, regulatorni reim treba da obezbedi odgovarajue koriewe
samoregula-tornih organizacija, koje omoguuje direktnu odgovornost
za wihove nadleno-sti, u zavisnosti od obima i sloenosti trita;
drugo, samoregulatorne orga-nizacije treba da budu podvrgnute
kontroli regulatora i treba da potuju stan-darde potewa i
poverqivosti u izvravawu ovlaewa i delegiranih odgovor-nosti).
Treu kategoriju ine principi izvrewa regulative hartija od
vrednosti,kojih je ukupno tri (prvo, regulator treba da ima
sveobuhvatna ovlaewa izvr-ewa; drugo, regulator treba da ima
sveobuhvaatna inspekcijska, istrana i nad-zorna ovlaewa; tree,
regulatorni sistem treba da obezbedi efikasno i po-verqivo koriewe
inspekcije, istrage, nadzora i ovlaewa izvrewa i im-plementaciju
odgovarajueg efektivnog programa).
etvrtu kategoriju ine principi saradwe u regulaciji, kojih je
ukupnotri (prvo, regulator treba da ima ovlaewa za razmenu javnih i
nejavnih in-formacija sa domaim i stranim istovetnim telima; drugo,
regulator treba daustanovi informacioni mehanizam koji omoguuje
razmenu informacija, javnih inejavnih, sa domaim i stranim
istovetnim telima; tree, regulatorni sistemtreba da obezbedi
stranim regulatorima, koji treba da izvre neku istragu, po-mo,
oslobaawem izvrewa funkcija i ovlaewa).
Petu kategoriju ine principi u vezi emitenta, kojih je tri
(prvo, emitentitreda da u potpunosti, pravovremeno i tano objave
finansijske rezultate i dru-ge informacije koje su bitne za odluku
investitora; drugo, akcionari kompanijetreba da budu tretirani na
fer i ravnopravan nain; tree, standardi rauno-
16. Na strogost u primeni ovih principa, te rizike ulagawa u
hartije od vrednosti u sluajuwihove neprimene dramatino je
upozorila i uvena Komisija za hartije od vrednostiSAD (SEC) vidi:
"Finacial Times", 7. 03. 2000, str. 1.
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Pravo i privreda br. 5-8/2002.16
vodstva i revizije treba da budu najvii i meunarodno
prihvatqivog kvalite-ta).
estu kategoriju ine principi u vezi kolektivnih investicionih
ema,kojih je ukupno etiri (prvo, regulatorni sistem treba da
postavi standarde zalicence i regulaciju za one koji ele da trguju
ili posluju kao kolektivna inve-sticiona ema; drugo, regulatorni
sistem treba da obezbedi pravila koja ureujuzakonsku formu i
strukturu kolektivnih investicionih ema i podelu i zati-tu imovine
klijenata; tree, regulacija treba da zahteva objavqivawe
informa-cija po pravilima koja vae za emitente, koje su nune za
procenu stabilnostikolektivnih investicionih ema za posebne
investitore i vrednost investicio-nog interesa u toj emi; etvrto,
regulacija treba da obezbedi prikladnu i tran-sparentnu bazu za
procenu imovine i cene i otkupa investicionih kupona u ko-lektivnoj
investicionoj emi).
Sedmu kategoriju ine principi za posrednike na tritu hartija od
vred-nosti, kojih je ukupno etiri (prvo, regulacija treba da
obezbedi minimum stan-darda za ulaz na trie hartija od vrednosti u
svojstvu posrednika; drugo, po-trebno je obezbediti poetni i
osnovni kapital i druge prudencijalne uslove zaove posrednike, koji
odraavaju rizike koji oni preduzimaju; tree, od posredni-ka na
tritu hartija od vrednosti treba da se zahteva da ispuwavaju
standardeinterne organizacije i voewa poslova koji imaju za ciq da
zatite intereseklijenata, obezbede odgovarajui rizik upravqawa koji
omoguuje prihvataweprimarne odgovornosti za ova pitawa; etvrto,
potrebno je utvrditi odgovara-juu proceduru postupawa u sluaju
propusta posrednika na tritu hartija odvrednosti u ciqu
minimizirawa tete i gubitaka investitora i kontrole si-stemskog
rizika).
Osmu kategoriju ine principi u vezi sekundarnog trita, kojih je
ukupnoest (prvo, ustanovqewe sistema trgovawa, ukquujui i razmenu
hartija odvrednosti treba da bude podvrgnuto odobrewu i nadzoru
regulatora; drugo, po-trebno je da postoji tekui regulatorni nadzor
razmene i trgovine koji ima zaciq da obezbedi da se to odvija kroz
fer i pravina pravila koja osiguravaju od-govarajuu ravnoteu izmeu
zahteva razliitih uesnika na ovom tritu; tre-e, regulacija treba da
afirmie transparentnost trgovawa; etvrto, regula-cija treba da bude
postavqena tako da otkriva i spreava manipulacije i drugenefer
prakse i postupke trgovawa; peto, regulacija treba da obezbedi
adekvatnoregulisawe velike izloenosti rizika od docwe u izvravawu
obaveza i pore-meaja na tritu; esto, sistem kliringa i saldirawa
transakcija sa hartijamaod vrednosti mora biti podvrgnut
regulatornom nadzoru i ureen tako da obezbe-di da je fer, efikasan
i efektivan, kao i da smawuje sistemski rizik).
Osnovni ciqevi regulative hartija od vrednosti postavqeni u
navede-nom dokumentu IOSCO, koji se sastoje u zatiti investitora,
smawewu si-stemskog rizika i obezbeewu da wihovo trite bude
transparentno, feri efikasno nisu u dosadawoj naoj regulativi
realizovani. Nerazvijenost
-
17M. Vasiqevi: Novi propisi i zatita investitora (str. 3-19)
trita hartija od vrednosti, posebno akcija, kod nas17) nije do
sada u svojsvojoj otrini otkrila to obiqe pravnih praznina i
nerazvijenost zakonskeinfrastrukture, u protivnom pokazale bi se
sve wene negativnosti, to bipo pravnu sigurnost potencijalnih
investitora u hartije od vrednosti bilopogubno. Posebno u naoj
regulativi serijskih hartija od vrednosti i wiho-vog trita
nedostaju upravo razvijeni posebni oblici zatite investi-tora u ove
hartije (prvo, dunost otvorenih drutava da o svom finansij-skom i
pravnom poloaju, kao i poslovawu izvetavaju javnost; drugo, du-nost
pojedinih uesnika na tritu hartija od vrednosti da objavquju
pro-pisane podatke; tree, posebne forme zatite prava mawinskih
akcionara;etvrto, zabrana iskoriavawa povlaenih informacija; peto,
zabranamanipulativne prakse; esto, zabrana manipulisawa
informacijama; sedmo,zabrana poslovawa motivisanog provizijom;
osmo, zabrana neovlaenogobavqawa nekih poslova sa hartijama od
vrednosti; deveto, postupak preuzi-mawa akcionarskih drutava sa
javnim upisom akcija. Zbog fenomena tzv.evidentne informacione
asimetrije na tritu hartija od vrednosti, ne po-stoji posebna
potreba da se tite tzv. profesionalni (struni) ulagai uhartije od
vrednosti, ve samo tzv. neuki-nestruni ulagai, koji se
profe-sionalno ne bave hartijama od vrednosti.18) Brojni berzanski
krahovi, u ra-nijoj i novijoj istoriji berzanskog poslovawa,
trebalo bi da prodrmaju naegzakonodavca i da mu ukau na potrebu
stroge i detaqne regulative najreguli-sanijeg trita u svetu trita
hartija od vrednosti i na potrebu ubrzawaprocedure donoewa novog
Zakona o tritu hartija od vrednosti, kao i wegovestroge primene,
kako bi se predupredili takvi krahovi i u naoj praksi berzan-ske
trgovine hartijama od vrednosti, posebno akcijama.
7. Zatita investitora u hartije od vrednosti i berzanski
krahovi
Jedan od najpoznatijih i ujedno i prvih berzanskih krahova
dogodio se na Lon-donskoj berzi 1720. godine, a poznat je pod
imenom Junomorski mehur (South SeaBubble), po imenu kompanije koja
ga je izazvala. Naime, 1711. godine engleski par-lament je zakonom
osnovao komaniju pod imenom "Kompanija junih mora", sa ci-qem
namirewa potraivawa poverilaca engleske drave, koji su je
kreditiraliu nizu ratova. Ovim zakonom su ta potraivawa
"sekjuritizovana", tj. pretvorenau hartije od vrednosti ove
komopanije. Ova kompanija dobila je ovim zakonom
17. U ovom trenutku na Beogradskoj berzi samo 10 preduzea trguje
akcijama iz privatiza-cije, prosena trina cena je oko 36% od
kwigovodstvene (iako je na primer jednopreduzee iskazalo dobit od
43%, ali ipak prosena cena wegovih akcija je 39%, toukazuje da nema
odgovarajueg iskustva u ovoj oblasti investirawa i da
investicionaklima nije povoqna).
18. Vie o ovim razgraniewima: N. Jovanovi, "Emisija vrednosnih
papira", Beograd, 2001,str. 7783.
-
Pravo i privreda br. 5-8/2002.18
monopol u trgovini sa engleskim kolonijama u junim morima (juni
deloviAfrike, Indija, Australija, Kina). Da bi prikupila sve
kapital kompanija jepoela da emituje akcije i wihova prodaja je ila
veoma dobro, poto su okiva-wa kupaca (investitora) bila da e ona
zahvaqujui monopolu ostvarivati veli-ki profit. Ipak, to se nije
desilo i kompanija je poslovala sa sve veim gubici-ma, to je
prikrivano od javnosti, a gubici su stalno pokrivani novim
emisijamaakcija, za kojima je vladalo veliko interesovawe zbog
zablude kupaca. Na Lon-donskoj berzi akcije ove kompanije dostizale
su basnoslovnu vrednost i ve 1720.godine wihova ukupna berzanska
vrednost (tzv. kapitalizacija) iznosila je petputa vie od ukupne
novane mase u svim zemqama tadawe Evrope (oko 500 mi-liona funti
sterlinga). Kada se saznalo za gubitke ove kompanije ovaj
naduvani"mehur" je morao "pui". Cene akcija ove kompanije su naglo
pale i desio se ber-zanski krah. Akcionari ove kompanije koji su
bili do tada prividno bogati pre-ko noi su propali i osiromaili.
Izuzetno mali broj akcionara koji je ove ak-cije preprodao pre ovog
kraha, naprotiv, preko noi se obogatio. Meu ovim "do-bitnicima"
naao se i Princ od Velsa i ser Robert Valpol, predsednik
VladeBritanije. Ovaj berzanski krah uticao je da iste godine
parlament donese tzv. Za-kon o mehurima (Bubble Act) sa motivom
zatite investitora u hartije od vredno-sti od slinih prevara. Ovim
zakonom uslovqeno je osnivawe akcionarskihdrutava posebnom dozvolom
drave.
Slian sluaj desio se u SAD 1929. godine, u vreme kad su kursevi
akcijarasli na svim berzama, posebno na najveoj od wih wujorkoj.
Postojala jeprava pomama kupaca za kupovinu akcija kako bi se na
taj nain obogatili.Veina ovih kupovina vrena je na kredit (on
margin), to znai da je kupac umomentu zakquewa ugovora plaao samo
deo cene za kupqene hartije (oko10-15%), a za ostatak cene je
dobijao kredit od banke ili berzanskog trgovca,uz istovremeno
zalagawe tih hartija za obezbeewe tog kredita. U vreme do-spelosti
kredita, ako je cena hartija bila via od kupovne, kupac je mogao
date hartije proda i vrati kredit i uz to zaradi na razlici, a ako
je cena bilania, onda je preputao hartije zalogoprimcu (kreditoru)
da ih proda i timenamiri svoje potraivawe. Sve ovo je uzelo toliko
maha da su akcije kupova-ne po znatno viim cenama od wihove stvarne
vrednosti u momentu kupovine.Ovim se stvorio pekulativni bum na
berzi, zbog rasta kurseva akcija uslednerealnih oekivawa kupaca tih
hartija, a ne zbog stvarnog profita kompa-nija ije su to bile
akcije. Kad se ovo shvatilo nastala je prava panika meuakcionarima
i desio se berzanski krah. Time je stvoren tzv. "crni oktobar"1929.
godine. Skoro svi uesnici trita hartija od vrednosti, ukquujuii
profesionalne (poput Xona Rokfelera) i struwake (poput Irvina
Fie-ra, uvenog profesora ekonomije na Jejlu) pretrpeli su ogromne
gubitke. Vr-hunac je dostignut 1933. godine, do kada su kursevi
izgubili oko 85% svojevrednosti u odnosu na polaznu 1929. godinu.
Sve ovo je uticalo da predsednikRuzvelt u okviru tzv. politike
"Novog dogovora" inicira donoewe brojnih
-
19M. Vasiqevi: Novi propisi i zatita investitora (str. 3-19)
zakona u kongresu, sa preventivnom i kontrolnom funkcijom. Re je
o uve-nim zakonima koji i danas vae Zakonu o hartijama od vrednosti
(1933.) iZakonu o trgovini hartijama od vrednosti (1934.). Uprkos
strogoj kontrolnojfunkciji amerike Komisije za hartije od
vrednosti, u skladu s ovim zakoni-ma, zakonitosti trita nekada su
nepredvidive, to opet raa, s vremenana vreme, berzanske krahove.
Najtei berzanski slom desio se 1987. godine.Naime, od 1982. godine
kursevi akcija su stalno rasli da bi do ove godine do-stigli 300%
svoje vrednosti iz te godine. Iznenada, desio se slom 19.
oktobra(tzv. "crni ponedeqak"), kada su akcije za samo est sati
izgubile 22% svojevrednosti.19)9
I novija istorija berzanske trgovine obiluje slinim krahovima.
Nedav-ni (2001. godina) krah kompanije "Enron" u SAD (sedma na
listi najveihsvetskih korporacija) sa 690 miliona dolara gubitka
(do kog je dolo zbog"precewenog" profita od oko 600 miliona dolara
od nezavisne oditorske ku-e "Anderson"), kao i krah nemake
graevinske kompanije "Holzman" zboggubitka 2.4 milijarde maraka i
krah kompanije EM.TV sa 2.6 milijardi mara-ka gubitka, poquqali su
ne samo poverewe investitora u berze ve i u sam si-stem modernog
poslovawa otvorenih kompanija.20)
19. Vidi: Samuelson&Nordhaus, "Economics", New York, 1992,
str. 518.20. Za bankrotstvo "Enrona" vidi: "Politika", 24. 02.
2002.
-
Pravo i privreda br. 5-8/2002.20
-
II_0.fm; str. 21
II Preduzea
-
Pravo i privreda br. 5-8/2001.22
-
II_1_Thomas Jersild.fm; str. 23
Thomas N. Jersild,
Liaison in the Republic of Macedonia in 1999-2001,
American Bar Association Central and East European
Law Initiative (ABA/CEELI)
Senior Counsel and Retired Partner, Mayer, Brown & Platt
Duties of Company Directors: the Developing
Law in Macedonia*
It is a fundamental rule of corporate governance that a
company's directors must act, al-ways with the highest degrees of
care, diligence and loyalty to the company and its owners.This rule
expresses simple fairness but it is more than that; this rule is
essential if companiesare to attract significant investment and it
is an absolute requirement for public confidence inbusiness and
capital markets as a whole. It has been demonstrated empirically
that companiesthat are governed honestly and fairly produce more
value for their investors and, by impli-cation, for their employees
and other stakeholders.1)
Every company law imposes duties of these kinds in some form and
to some extent, andmost or all company laws provide penalties and
remedies when these duties are violated. Atthe same time, the laws
on this subject should be clear and understandable and should notbe
so restrictive or so punitive that they discourage qualified people
from becoming direc-
* Review of Central and East European LawPublished in
Cooperation with the Institute of East European Law and Russian
Studies of LeidenUniversityMartinus Nijhoff Publishers27 Review of
Central and East European Law 2001 No. 1, 53-69 2001 Kluwer
Academic Pub-lishers. Printed in The Netherlands
-
Pravo i privreda br. 1-4/2002.24
tors, or prevent honest risk taking and entrepreneurship by
directors when that is in the com-pany's interest.
This article will review the legal rules governing directors'
duties in one East Europeancountry, Macedonia, and will suggest
ways in which they might be clarified and reformed tofurther the
above objectives. These rules are now set forth in the Macedonian
Law on TradeCompanies (hereafter, the "LTC"),2) a large and
comprehensive statute enacted in 1996 whichis one of the "first
generation" of Macedonian laws in the post-socialist era.
Macedonia can be considered representative of the countries of
South-Eastern Europe,a region whose laws have been relatively
neglected in current comparative research. Ofthose countries,
Macedonia offers a particularly useful case study. It has adopted a
relativelynew company law, but one which is largely untested. There
is a scarcity of case law and le-gal precedent, which highlights
the need for clear statutory provisions. At the same time,there are
associations of local lawyers and judges who are actively calling
for businessand company law reform. Importantly, the Macedonian
Government is encouraging the pro-cess.
The activity of local groups is, in fact, reflected in many of
the proposals for change put for-ward in this article. The
proposals have already been voiced by Macedonian lawyers and
judgesduring workshops on corporate governance and company law
reform organized by CEELIsince late 1999. Moreover, the suggestions
have also been made directly to the Mace-donian Government in the
course of a process which the Government recently initiated
torevise or replace the LTC.3)
Many of the proposals discussed in the article are derived from
Western, particularlyUnited States, practice and experience. The
point should be made that, while the UnitedStates' common law
system differs greatly in form from the civil-law systems of
Macedoniaand other European countries, many solutions to company
law problems are applicable univer-sally. Indeed, while it is clear
that the common law and civil law systems will retain their
im-portant formal differences, they are converging in the results
they produce in practice. This is es-pecially so in business and
company law.
The discussion below will describe the present Macedonian law
and presently-pro-posed changes in that law in four specific areas:
directors' duty of care, directors' personal lia-
1. See, e.g., "Protection Money", a review of research on the
relationship between corporate gover-nance and company valuations,
The Economist 11 December 1999,75. See also "In Praise of Rules:A
Survey of Asian Business", The Economist 1 April 2001,4, in which
recent research is reportedwhich concludes that good corporate
governance can raise the value of companies by 20%-30%,and in which
it is further stated that "the best western companies are now
moving from the 'con-formance' to the 'performance' model of
governance. This means directors no longer simply complywith the
rules but try to do better than that, realizing that the best
practice is a competitive advan-tage. By contrast, most companies
in East Asia are still a long way from even conforming".
2. Macedonian Official Gazette 1996 No. 28, amended 1997 No. 7,
1998 No. 21,1998 No. 37, 1998No. 63, 1999 No. 39, 1999 No. 81 and
2000 No. 37.
3. In January 2000 the Macedonian Government appointed a working
committee to review the presentLTC and to draft suggested changes
to be considered by the Government and Parliament. The com-mittee
includes representatives of the Ministries of Justice, Economy and
Finance and persons fromthe judiciary, the practicing bar, the
Skopje University, Law faculty and CEELI.
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25Thomas N. Jersild: Duties of company directors: the developing
law in Macedonia
(str. 23-37)
bility for their business mistakes, directors' duty of loyalty
in personal conflict of interest sit-uations and directors' duty
not to engage in business competition with the company. The
dis-cussion is not an academic or theoretical analysis of the law,
but rather is an attempt to describepractical issues and aspects of
the current law reform process.4)
1. Directors' Duty of Care
A director's duty of care is difficult to define without citing
examples but it is, essentially,the legal duty of a director to act
with a very high degree of care, deliberation and diligencewhen he
makes decisions for the company and when he monitors and directs
the company'smanagement. In actual corporate life, this means that
a director should attend all board meet-ings that he possibly can
(and resign from the board if he is unable to attend a
significantnumber), give full attention to all matters that come
before the board including those thatmay be outside his own
personal expertise, make a special effort to monitor the quality of
themanagers' performance and ask them hard and uncomfortable
questions when necessary andgenerally treat the shareholders'
investment in the company as he would treat his own
in-vestments.
The Macedonian LTC imposes the duty of care in a particularly
severe form and withmuch specific detail. The LTC's statement of
the duty of care for joint stock company directors(set forth in
Article 320) states, very simply and straightforwardly, that
members of the board of directors must work with due care and
maintain busi-ness secrets
but the article immediately continues by saying that
directors
who violate their obligations toward the company shall be
jointly liable for damagescaused
and, further,
shall have the burden of proving that they acted with due care
(italics added).
4. A preliminary point should be made regarding terminology.
This article uses the word "director" tomean a person in a company
who owes the company the duties which are referred to in the
firstparagraph above and are discussed in more detail in the
article. In normal usage a "director" is(only) a member of a
company's board of directors. Often, however, these duties are also
owed tothe company by persons who are not directors (for example,
by controlling shareholders or senioremployed managers), and in
some circumstances the duties themselves may be different
dependingon, for example, whether they are born by independent
directors or by employees with a management func-tion. A
well-drafted company law should define and apply those distinctions
clearly, but - except tomake this point here - this article will
not deal with them further.As another preliminary point, the reader
should be aware that the LTC provides for two principaltypes of
business companies, joint stock companies and limited liability
companies. The provisions dis-cussed in this article relate
sometimes to one type and sometimes to the other, but the
principles of gooddirector conduct are essentially the same for
both.
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Pravo i privreda br. 1-4/2002.26
Article 320 further stipulates that a director owes the duty of
care not only to the compa-ny's shareholders but, in some cases,
directly to the company's creditors. On this point the ar-ticle
states that
if a member of the board of directors severely violates his
obligation to act with due carethe company's creditors may request
compensation for damages after failing to settletheir claims with
the company" (italics added).
The law does not contain, however, a definition of the term
"severely". Article 320 provides an exception to these liability
rules, but the exception would apply
only in limited circumstances.5) It is that
members of the board of directors shall not be liable for the
damages if they acted pursu-ant to a decision of the company
assembly that was made despite the fact that the membersstated
their opinion (presumably at the assembly meeting, although this is
not stated) thatsuch a decision was contrary to this law.
An analysis of Article 320 requires several critical comments.
Firstly, it does not de-fine "due care" or offer guidelines on how
to recognize it.
Secondly, it provides that the directors will always be liable
jointly. That is, however, incontradiction with actual corporate
life where the directors' actions, and their individual
cul-pability, could vary greatly from director to director.
Further, it could be unfair to hold one di-rector liable for the
fault of another, particularly because the LTC does not appear to
provide aright of contribution among jointly liable persons.
Thirdly, the provision places the burden and presumption of
violation on the directors.This, in effect, makes them guilty until
proven innocent.
Fourthly, Article 320 gives an outside creditor the right to sue
the directors personal-ly even though, under most company laws, the
duty of care is owed only to the company and itsshareholders.
Finally, as noted above, the exception to the rule envisaged in
the article is very limited. Itcan be seen from the duty-of-care
situations which typically arise in corporate life (some
illus-trated in the first paragraph of this section and some
below). They often do not involve conductwhich is brought before a
shareholder assembly.
These comments lead to the conclusion that this law is simply
too strict for the realities ofbusiness and corporate life. The
collection of rules in Article 320 - combining an undefinedstandard
of conduct with quite stringent and highly specific possibilities
of liability - coulddiscourage a good potential director from being
willing to serve as a director at all. That couldcertainly be the
case if this law were taken and enforced as written. The point
might be madethat in an actual lawsuit a court would moderate the
article's provisions, for example, by ne-gating or ignoring the
presumption of guilt or the rule of joint liability. But on the
other hand,Macedonian lawyers and judges have expressed the view
that judges would be hesitant to
5. Article 320 has other significant and very detailed
provisions which, however, can be consideredbeyond the limited
point made in this article.
-
27Thomas N. Jersild: Duties of company directors: the developing
law in Macedonia
(str. 23-37)
"make new law" in this way, especially in the Macedonian civil
law system. In any event, thispoint does not provide an argument in
favor of the law as it is now drafted.
The question of how to amend Article 320 has arisen in the
course of the efforts now un-derway to revise the LTC. One
possibility is to eliminate Article 320 altogether and not re-place
it, thus leaving the entire subject to be dealt within court
litigation. That could be called an"American" solution. In the
United States, many states' corporation statutes do not define
oreven refer to the duty of care; it is simply left to case law.
However, this is not seen as appropri-ate in a civil-law system,
especially in a transition country where clear definition of legal
stan-dards of conduct is much needed and where personal liability
for breaches of the duty ofcare may now be an unfamiliar idea.
Furthermore, three points do seem clear as a result of the above
analysis: (1) the presentlaw can be made simpler, (2) the standard
of care can be defined more clearly (to the extentthat that is
possible), and (3) the burden of proof should be put clearly on the
complainingshareholder, as is the case with most other laws. With
these points in mind, it has been pro-posed that the Article might
be deleted but replaced with a short provision stating simply thata
director:
has a duty to the company to perform his functions as a director
in good faith, in the rea-sonable belief that he is acting in the
company's best interests, and with the careand attention a prudent
person in a similar position would take under the
circum-stances
and possibly stating no more. If thought necessary, additional
provisions could be added:(1) to clarify the burden of proof, (2)
to state explicitly that the duty of care is not owed to
thirdparties such as creditors, contract or tort claimants or the
Government (recognizing, of course,that directors may have other
duties to third parties, and that a company's claim against a
di-rector is a company asset which could become the creditors'
property in a bankruptcy), or(3) to make it clear that when a
director exercises his duties he is entitled to rely on
financialstatements and other materials which are prepared by the
company's management or inde-pendent accounts or lawyers. It should
be noted that the proposed language quoted above issubstantially
similar to that of duty-of-care laws which have been enacted in
some U.S. states.
Even the above-suggested language defining the duty of care is
partially subjectiveand, therefore, still not entirely clear.
However, some subjectivity is unavoidable in this area,since each
case will involve unique facts on which a court must make value
judgments whenev-er an actual lawsuit arises. What the above
proposal hopefully does do, is provide a guide tothe factors and
criteria which should be taken into account in making those
judgments. Itdoes this by making specific references to good faith,
to the requirement of a "reasonable" be-lief, and the reference to
a "prudent person in a similar position", however subjective
thoseconcepts may ultimately be.
The difficulty of defining the duty of care in actual practice
is illustrated by a very contro-versial American case, Smith v. Van
Gorkom.*6) The decision in that case struck fear in thehearts of
many American company directors at the time but it has had the
effect of raising
6. 488 Atlantic 2d 858, Delaware 1985.
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Pravo i privreda br. 1-4/2002.28
the standard of care which directors, in the United States at
least, are legally required to fol-low. A case with similar facts
would be unlikely today in Eastern Europe, but it may be
worthdescribing here because it illustrates the kinds of judgments
a court must make in definingthe duty of care in a lawsuit. Thus it
helps make the point that the statutory law on this subjectshould
be as clear as possible.
The case involved a publicly-traded financial services company
called Trans Unionwhose chief executive officer had been approached
by an outside party with a proposal tobuy all of Trans Union's
stock through an offer that the outside party would make to all
ofTrans Union's shareholders with the Trans Union board's approval
and recommendation. Theproposal was very favorable to Trans Union's
shareholders; among other things, the proposedoffer price was 50%
higher than the price at which Trans Union's stock was then trading
onthe New York Stock Exchange. Moreover, Trans Union's independent
outside law firm ad-vised Trans Union's directors that they could
be sued personally by unhappy shareholders ifthe directors did not
approve the offer and did not submit it to the shareholders with
theboard's recommendation. In these circumstances, the directors
very quickly (in a board meet-ing lasting only two hours) approved
and recommended the offer, which was then submitted tothe
shareholders who overwhelmingly approved and accepted it at a
specially-called share-holder meeting. Following the shareholders'
approval, the merger was completed and the share-holders received
their money.
Then, however, despite the high price which had been obtained, a
group of the formerTrans Union shareholders sued the former Trans
Union directors personally, claiming thatthey had violated their
duty of care. The claim was that if the directors had taken more
timeand care, and been more diligent in advocating the
shareholders' interests, they could - andthey would - have obtained
an even higher price for the company.
In defending the lawsuit, the ten former directors demonstrated
that they were very ex-perienced in financial matters and that the
five of them who were independent (non-employ-ee) directors had a
total of 78 years experience as chief executive officers of other
majorcompanies and 53 years as Trans Union directors, and that one
of them was a prominentprofessor at one of the United States' most
prominent university business schools. They ar-gued that they
clearly knew better than the court what their own company was worth
andhow much it could be sold for. (Also, there was no claim that
any of the directors had a per-sonal conflict of interest.)
To great surprise in the legal community, the court of five
judges, by a three-to-twovote, agreed with the suing former
shareholders and held that the directors had beengrossly negligent
and had violated their duty of care when they approved the sale so
quick-ly. The court held that the directors had failed in their
duty in several ways, including by nothiring an outside investment
banker to provide an independent opinion on the price, and fail-ing
to take enough time and care in analyzing and actively negotiating
the extensive agree-ments which the lawyers had prepared. The court
pointed out, among other things, that theacquisition agreements
which the board approved did not have a provision (which is
nowcommon in company acquisition agreements) that would have
permitted Trans Union to
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29Thomas N. Jersild: Duties of company directors: the developing
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(str. 23-37)
accept a higher offer from another outside party even after the
contract with the proposedbuyer was signed.
The decision was appealed but the case was privately settled
before it was finally decid-ed on appeal. Under the terms of the
settlement the former directors were required to paythe former
shareholders more than $20 million, of which $10 million (but only
that) waspaid by the board's insurance company.
Court litigation like this may lie far in the future for Eastern
Europe, but it can teachthe lesson - applicable everywhere - that
the standards of director conduct are evolving andgenerally
becoming higher, and that severe personal consequences can be
visited on direc-tors who violate those standards.
2. Personal Liability of Directors for Their Business
Mistakes
An issue that is different from (but related to) the duty of
care is that of when, and towhat extent, the law should hold
directors personally liable in damages for their businessmistakes,
i.e., for business decisions which directors have made with due
care but which,later and with hindsight, turned out to be bad
decisions, sometimes even to the point ofbankrupting the company
and destroying the shareholders' investments. Under Ameri-can law,
a doctrine called the "business judgment rule" has evolved under
which directorswill normally not be held liable in that situation.
The author has been involved in many cas-es where the business
judgment rule was applied; typical of these are situations where
acompany has overpaid (in hindsight) for the acquisition of another
company and has laterhad to sell it at a loss, and situations where
a company has invested heavily in a promisingnew product line which
then failed on the market. Such cases are often in the newspapers -
aspectacular recent one involved BMW's acquisition of Rover Cars
which BMW later dis-posed of with losses and write-offs exceeding
eight billion DM.
The Macedonian LTC, on its face, rejects the business judgment
rule and does so in aparticularly strong way. This is done in
Articles 181 and 194, which state that directors ofa limited
liability company:
shall be personally and jointly liable to the company and to
third parties for ac-tivities conducted contrary to law and
regulations, breach of contract and mis-takes made in the
management of the company (italics added).7)
Unlike Article 320, Article 181 also provides a remedy against
offending directorswhich is distinctively American rather than
traditionally European, namely, the remedy ofa derivative lawsuit.
This is a lawsuit that is brought, not directly by and on behalf of
the
7. The language quoted above is in Article 181, which as drafted
applies only to managers of a company. Article194 states, however,
that Article 181 (as well as Article 178, discussed later in this
paper) shall applyalso to members of the board of directors. It
should be pointed out that Article 181, by its terms,applies to
managers and directors of limited liability companies but not to
managers or directors of joint stockcompanies. The LTC provisions
for directors of joint stock companies do not appear to deal with
this subject atall, which leaves open the question of whether the
principles of Article 181 would be applied to them by analogy.
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Pravo i privreda br. 1-4/2002.30
complaining shareholders, but rather on behalf of the company
itself or in the name of allof the shareholders. Paragraph (3) of
Article 181 states:
(3) Shareholders may both file complaints for compensation of
damage sufferedpersonally and individually or jointly file a
complaint for compensation on be-half of the company. Plaintiffs
may request full compensation for damage suf-fered by the
company.
This last sentence in paragraph (3) even suggests that the
damages paid by the culpa-ble director in a derivative suit may be
received directly by the complaining shareholders,not (as is
required in American derivative litigation) to the company
only.
Article 181 is also extremely inflexible in that it provides
that, in any agreementamong the shareholders,
any provision that contains a waiver of the right to file a
complaint shall be void
and that
no decision reached at a shareholders' assembly may affect the
filing of a com-plaint to impose liability on directors for
mistakes in performance of their du-ties.
These provisions would appear to deprive shareholders of the
freedom to reducethe strictness of Article 181 by agreeing among
themselves on other liability standards towhich they will hold
their directors - for example, by granting their directors the
protectionof the business judgment rule. In the author's experience
such agreements - which are oftencarefully negotiated by
knowledgeable shareholder-investors and their lawyers - are
verycommon, particularly in limited liability companies and
closely-held corporations whichare organized for specific business
ventures.8)
Summing up, several observations can be made with regard to
Article 181: Firstly, asalready stated, it on its face imposes
strict liability regardless of whether a director's de-cision was
made with due care and in good faith, and it would seem to limit or
preventshareholders from agreeing among themselves on their own
desired liability standard, as isdone elsewhere.
Secondly, like Article 320, Article 181 imposes joint liability
on directors even thoughtheir culpability might be different and
even though there will inevitably be some cases inwhich it will be
unfair to hold one director liable for the fault of another.9)
8. This is the case in the United States and, in the author's
experience, increasingly the case in Europeand Latin America. Such
agreements among shareholders often contain some form of the
businessjudgment rule, and also often contain provisions that limit
the liability of the directors from liabilityfor acts that would
otherwise be violations of the duty of care or the duty of loyalty
(for example, toallow a director to continue pursuing other
existing businesses that might be in competition with thecompany in
question). In some cases, such agreements are believed by the
shareholders to be neces-sary to induce a particular director to
serve; typically, the shareholders in such agreements
aresophisticated investors who are aware of the risks they are
undertaking.
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31Thomas N. Jersild: Duties of company directors: the developing
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(str. 23-37)
Thirdly, another problem is that Article 181 creates direct
liability of a director to thirdparties for the director's business
mistakes, even though, as argued above, the duty of careshould
properly be owed only to the company and the shareholders.
Finally but most importantly, it should be said that the policy
of Article 181 doessomething that the law should not do: by
imposing liability for all business mistakes it candiscourage or
prevent directors from taking entrepreneurial risks which are for
the share-holders' benefit - also the country's economy's benefit -
but which could ultimately turn outbadly. It puts courts and
judges, who rarely have business expertise, in a position to
sec-ond-guess the business judgments of experienced boards of
directors.
How, then, might Article 181 be amended? This question too has
arisen in the presentefforts to revise the Macedonian company law.
In answer, it has been suggested that Ar-ticle 181 should be
deleted and replaced with a simple statement of the principles
whichunderlie the business judgment rule, such as the
following:
A director who makes a business judgment in good faith fulfills
the duty ofcare, and will not be personally liable for damages or
other legal sanctions aris-ing from his making the judgment, if:(a)
he does not have a personal interest in the subject of the
judgment,(b) he is informed regarding the subject of the judgment
to the full extent that hereasonably believes is appropriate under
the circumstances, and(c) he rationally believes when the judgment
is made that it is in the best inter-ests of the company.
Like the suggested revision in section 1 of this article, this
also resembles solutionsfollowed in some U.S. states. For purposes
of clarity, it would also be advisable to definethe term "personal
interest" in clause (a) as clearly as possible, and it has been
suggested inMacedonia that the definition of "personal interest"
which is described below in section 3of this contribution be used
for that purpose. The above-quoted provision might also
besupplemented by rules stating clearly and objectively when an
individual director will, andwill not, be deemed to have agreed to
actions which were taken by the board of which he isa member. On
this, it has been suggested that the Macedonian law be expanded to
state:(1) that a director who attends a board meeting at which any
action is taken will bedeemed to have agreed to that action unless
his dissent is recorded in the company's recordof the meeting or he
files a statement of his dissent in writing with a specified
company of-ficial immediately after the meeting; and (2) that a
director who was absent from themeeting will be deemed to have
agreed to the actions taken at the meeting unless he filessuch a
dissenting statement immediately after he has notice of the
action.
9. On this point it should be noted that while Article 181
states, like Article 320, that the directors' liability isjoint,
Article 181 also states, unlike Article 320, that "the court shall
determine the fault of each [director] if sev-eral [directors]
participated in acts that cause damage". This would seem to be an
effort to modify the strictnesson imposing joint liability, but the
point should be made that imposition of joint liability at all is
inappropriate.
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Pravo i privreda br. 1-4/2002.32
3. Directors' Duty of Loyalty in Conflict of Interest
Situations
Another fundamental duty of a director is his duty of loyalty to
the company. The lawshould make it clear that, simply by becoming a
director, a person commits his personal alle-giance to the company
and agrees that the interests of the company and its shareholders
will pre-vail over any individual interest of his own when there is
a conflict between them. It also meansthat a director must not use
his corporate position to make a personal profit or to gain other
per-sonal advantage.
The duty of loyalty can arise in very different (although
sometimes overlapping)types of situations. Among them are
situations in which the director: (1) has a personalinterest in a
business transaction with the company, (2) may vote to determine
his own sala-ry or his own directors' fees or to determine the
salary or directors' fees of other directors whowill then be
determining his salary or fees, (3) has the ability to use his
company position or touse "inside" company information to further
his personal interests in some way, (4) has theability to take for
himself, personally, a business opportunity that has come to the
compa-ny and which he knows of only because he is a director of the
company, (5) serves as adirector of two companies and there are
transactions between these two companies involved,and (6) is
engaged in business competition with the company of which he is a
director (dis-cussed in section 4 of this article).
This section will discuss the Macedonian law relating to the
first of these- acts or transactions in which the director has a
personal conflict of interest- and, as above, this article will
discuss possible clarifications and revisions to the present
LTC provisions. The principal relevant provisions of the LTC are
Articles 313 and 344. Theyare similar to each other except that
Article 313 deals with directors of joint stock compa-nies which
have a single or "one-tier" board of directors (which under the LTC
must, then,have two separate types of directors, called "executive
directors" and "non-executive" direc-tors), while Article 344 does
the same for companies which have a German-style "two-tier" board
system (with a supervisory board and a managing board). Under the
LTC, alljoint stock companies have the option of choosing which of
these two systems they willadopt.
Articles 313 and 344 take the approach of declaring that certain
contracts in which a di-rector has an interest may be executed if
they have been approved by an appropriateboard majority;
specifically, Article 313 states:
Contracts in which a joint-stock company is a party and in which
an executive or anon-executive member of the board has an indirect
or direct interest may be executed ifthe contract is approved by at
least a majority of non-executive members of the board of
direc-tors.
The article then stipulates that a director shall inform the
board if he knows that acontract meets the above requirements; and
that the interested director "is entitled to be heard",but may not
participate in the discussion or decision of the non-executive
directors regarding thecontract or its approval. The article also
lays down a blanket requirement that the shareholder as-sembly be
informed of all approvals.10)
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33Thomas N. Jersild: Duties of company directors: the developing
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(str. 23-37)
Several observations might be made on Articles 313 and 344.
Firstly, unlike the casewith Article 320, which states that a
director has an affirmative duty of care which he is person-ally
liable for violating, Articles 313 and 344 do not state that a
director has an affirmative dutyof loyalty which he is liable in
damages for violating.11)
Secondly, Articles 313 and 344 require that all
interested-director contracts must be for-mally approved by the
board. This means literally that formal approval is needed even
if:(1) the contract is fair to the company, (2) similar contracts
were previously approved, and(3) the contract is de minimis in
value or importance: to take an extreme but practical example,it
would cover a director's arrangement to use a company-owned car for
one day or one week,both in the case where he paid the company for
its use and the case where he did not.
Thirdly, Article 313 also requires that the board's approval be
given in advance, forego-ing the possibility (not unusual in
corporate life) of board approval and ratification at apoint in
time after the contract has been executed. The articles, however,
do not state theconsequences if an interested-director contract is
not approved by the board. Is the con-tract then void? Is it
voidable by the company at the company's option? Is it valid but
givingrise to a damage claim by the company against the
director?12)
Fourthly, they do not define the concept of a director's
"indirect or direct interest". Nor dothey provide guidelines to
determine when it exists: does it, for example, encompass the
inter-est of a family member of the director?
Fifthly, they do not require that the board members who approve
the contract mustthemselves have no interest in the contract or any
related transaction; and they do not re-quire that full disclosure
of the director's interest must be made to the board, or that the
ap-proval will be effective only if the board has all the material
fact about the director conflict.
Finally, they require that all such approvals be reported to the
shareholder assembly even ifthe contract is de minimis in value or
importance.
To deal with these points, a replacement of Articles 313 and 344
has been proposed inMacedonia that has three parts. First, it would
impose an affirmative duty of loyalty ondirectors in all matters
(not only contracts) affecting the company in which they have a
per-sonal interest. It would do this by stating, simply, that:
a director who has a personal interest in a matter affecting the
company has a duty toact fairly and loyally to the company with
respect to that matter.
10. Articles 313 and 344 have other important, and sometimes not
fully clear, provisions, and there aresignificant differences
between the two articles, This, however, is beyond the limited
points made inthis contribution.
11. The closest thing to an affirmative imposition of the
director's duty of loyalty in the LTC appears to be the state-ment
in Article 314 that directors of one-tier companies "are obliged to
work in the interest of thejoint stock company and its shareholders
and employees" (italics added). There does not appear to be
acorresponding provision for directors of two-tier companies.
12. On these issues it should, however, be pointed out that
Articles 345 and 346, which apply only totwo-tier board companies,
state that contracts which have been disapproved by the
supervisoryboard may be annulled "if the contracts are harmful to
the company" and that "a complaint forannulment shall be filed
[presumably with a court] within three months after the contract
was exe-cuted". There is not a corresponding provision for one-tier
board companies.
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Pravo i privreda br. 1-4/2002.34
Second, the proposed version sets forth a detailed and fairly
broad definition of theterm "personal interest" in the hope of
forestalling the endless arguments which could oth-erwise ensue on
when and whether it is present. The suggested definition states,
among otherthings, that a director has a personal interest in an
"act or transaction" if: (1) either he or a fam-ily member (a term
which is, in turn, specifically defined elsewhere to include
immediatefamily members and their spouses and any other persons
sharing the same home with the direc-tor) is a party to the act or
transaction, or (2) he has a financial or family relationship to a
party toit which could reasonably be expected to affect the
director's judgment adversely to the com-pany, or (3) he is under
the control or controlling influence of a party to the act or
transac-tion which could reasonably be expected to affect his
judgment adversely to the company.As in the case of the
above-proposed definition of due care, this definition of "personal
inter-est" requires some subjective judgment, but that appears to
be unavoidable in dealing withthis value-laden issue, where each
case will be different and will often require that
individualjudgments be made.
The third part of the proposed amendment has the same purpose as
Articles 313 and344, namely, to state specific circumstances in
which a director will be protected from li-ability notwithstanding
his conflict of interest. The proposal does this, however, in a way
thattries to answer some of the questions raised above. It states,
among other things, that a directorhas not violated the duty of
loyalty, and will not be personally liable for damages or other
le-gal sanctions arising from his conflict, if either (1) all
material facts concerning the interestare known to the board of
directors and the board authorizes the transaction in goodfaith by
majority vote of disinterested directors, or (2) all such material
facts are knownto the shareholders and the transaction is approved
by the shareholders in good faith by ma-jority vote at a
shareholder assembly, or (3) the transaction, judged under the
circum-stances at the time it was entered into, is shown to be fair
to the company.
It will be noted that clause (2) in the preceding sentence
provides for the option ofshareholder approval, and that clause (3)
assures that the company may have the benefit of acontract which is
favorable to the company even if the contract was not approved -
whichmight have happened through inadvertence or may even have
happened through deliberateconcealment on the part of the
interested director. It also allows the interested director
thebenefit of such a contract if he can show that it was favorable
to the company.
4. Directors' Duty Not to Compete with the Company
While a director's duty not to compete with the company is part
of his duty of loyalty,many company laws including Macedonia's deal
with it separately. As will be seen below,the LTC provisions on
this subject are particularly restrictive and are also different
for di-rectors of joint stock companies which have a single-tier
board (covered in Article 312), fordirectors of joint stock
companies which have a two-tier board (covered in Article 327),and
for directors of limited liability companies (covered in Articles
178 and 194).
Article 312 (for directors of joint-stock companies with a
one-tier board) begins with anextremely broad proscription. It
states:
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35Thomas N. Jersild: Duties of company directors: the developing
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(str. 23-37)
Executive members of the board of directors may not perform any
paid or unpaid regis-tered activity or involve themselves in any
kind of paid or unpaid activities of an-other company whether on
their own behalf or on behalf of a third party, withoutprior
permission of the non-executive members.
The article next states that the company' s shareholder assembly
"shall be notified of de-cisions of the board approving the
involvement of an executive member in certain activities".While
this quoted language is not completely clear, it was probably
intended to mean thatthe assembly must be notified of all decisions
made by the non-executive members of theboard which approve any
activities of the kind described in the first part of Article 312.
In athird provision Article 312 requires that, prior to the
appointment of a natural person as anon-executive director, the
proposer of that person shall disclose to the company's "bodyin
charge" all of the activities of the proposed person of the
type