I I No. 2010-5067 WEST/CRS I In the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit I I SAMISH INDIAN NATION, I Plaintiff-Appellant, RECEIVED FROM NIGHTBOX JUL- g ?010 u"_steea comof_ r'or .e r-_ r.ir_ i I ! I I _m UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee. Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims in 02-CV-1383 Hon. Margaret M. Sweeney I ! i I i I BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IGNACIA S. MORENO Assistant Attorney General KATHRYN E. KOVACS THEKLA HANSEN-YOUNG U.S. Department of Justice Environment & Natural Res. Div. P.O. Box 23795 (L'Enfant Station) Washington, DC 20026 (202) 307-2710 thekla.hansen-young_usdoj.gov ._¢f) s _otd. CLEm I .
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I In the United States Court of Appeals for … I No. 2010-5067 WEST/CRS I In the United States Court of Appeals forthe Federal Circuit I I SAMISH INDIAN NATION, I Plaintiff-Appellant,
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I
I No. 2010-5067
WEST/CRS
I In the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
I
I SAMISH INDIAN NATION,
I Plaintiff-Appellant,
RECEIVEDFROMNIGHTBOX
JUL- g ?010
u"_steeacomof_r'or.e r-_ r.ir_
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_m
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims in 02-CV-1383
Hon. Margaret M. Sweeney
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BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
IGNACIA S. MORENO
Assistant Attorney General
KATHRYN E. KOVACS
THEKLA HANSEN-YOUNG
U.S. Department of JusticeEnvironment & Natural Res. Div.
P.O. Box 23795 (L'Enfant Station)
Washington, DC 20026
(202) 307-2710
thekla.hansen-young_usdoj.gov
._¢f)s_otd.
CLEm
I.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES ................................................................. xiii
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT .......................................................................... I
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ............................................................................... I
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II
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................................................................. 2
A•
B.
The Federal Acknowledgement Process ............................................... 2
I 25 U.S.C. § 13 ............................................................................................... 12
I Indian Self-Determination and Education ActAssis ce25 U.5.C. § 450 etseq .................................................................................. 12
I 25 U.S.C. § 450b(e) ...................................................................................... 39
Johnson O'Malley Act __,.I 25 U.S.C. §§ 452-457". .................................................................................. 34
I Pub. L. No 103-263, 108 Stat. 70925 U.S.C. § 476 ............................................................... .......................... 25,26
I Pub. L. No 103-454, 1994 H.R. 418025 U.S.C. § 479a ........................................................................................... 26
I 25 U.S.C. § 479a-1 ................................................................................... 25,26
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978
I 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 ............................................................................... 34
I Indian Alcohol and Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 198625 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2455 .......................................................................... 34-35
i Indian Child Protection and Violence Protection ActFamily
Pub. L. No. 92-512, 86 Stat. 919 .......................................................... 1,15,44
I 86 Stat. 918 sec. 102 ..................................................................................... 1686 Stat. 918 sec. 105 ................................................................................ 43,50
l 86 Stat. 918 sec. 106 .................................................................... . ........... 43,5086 Stat. 918 sec. 108(b)(4) ....................................................................... 16,47
I State and Local Fiscal Assistance Amendments of 1976Pub. L. No. 94-488, 90 Stat. 2341 ................................................................ 15
I State and Local Fiscal Assistance Amendments of 1980
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Pub. L. No. 96-604, 94 Stat. 3516 ................................................................ 15
Fed. R. App. P. 4 ........................................................................................................ 1
OTHER AUTHORITIES
United States Government Accountability Office,3 Principles of Federal Appropriations Law (3d ed. Sept: 2008) ............ 52,53
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STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES
Aside from this Court's provious decision in Samish Indian Nation v. United
i States, 419 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2005), Counsel for Appellee is not aware of any
other pending cases that quali_y as related cases.
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IJURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The United States Court of Fmierai Claims did not have jurisdiction to hearII the claims of the Samish Indian Nation ("Tribe" or "Samish") because none of the
statutes under which relief is sought are money-mandating and they therefore
cannot supply the court with jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491,
or the Indian Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1505. Arguments concerning the lack of
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II jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims are addressed thoroughly below.
I Jurisdiction in this Court is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1295(aX3). The
Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal on January 13, 2010. See 28 U.S.C.
I § 2522; Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(l)(B).
I STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
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In this case, the Tribe contends that, starting in 1969, the United States failed
to treat it as federally recognized and that it therefore is entitled to certain federal
benefits. The Tribe seeks damages in the precise amount it claims it would have
received under the Tribal Priority Allocation ("TPA") system and the State and
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Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 ("Revenue Sharing Act"), Pub. L., No. 92-
512, 86 Stat. 919 (A608-A619) if it had been recognized. The issues on appeal
Whether the Court of Federal Claims lacked jurisdiction over the Tribe's
two claims because neither the TPA system nor the Revenue Sharing Act,
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the waiver of sovereign immunity in the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.'§ 1491, or
the Indian Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1505.
Whether the Court of Federal Claims' ability to provide a monetary remedy
is limited by operation of the Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1341.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The Federal Acknowledgement Process.
Federal acknowledgment of Indian tribes establishes a government-to-
government relationship with the United States, acknowledges the Tribe's
sovereign powers and immunities, and is a prerequisite to the protection, services,
and benefits of the federal government available to Indian tribes. 25 C.F.R. § 83.2.
This includes the right to potential access to funding for social programs.
Id. § 83.12(c).
In the early nineteenth century, Congress delegated to the Executive branch
the power to recognize Indian tribes. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2, 9; Miami Nation oflndians,
Inc. v. Department of the Interior, 255 F.3d 342, 345 (Tth Cir. 2001). The Indian
Reorganization Act ("IRA") of 1934 led to the need for federal recognition of
tribal status because the Act provided benefits only to members of federally
recognized Indian tribes and their descendants. Golden Hill Paugicssett Tribe of
Indians v. Weicker, 39 F.3d 51, 57 (2d Cir. 1994). The Department of the Interior
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I ("Interior") recognized Indian tribes on an ad hoc basis from 1934 until 1978,
I when it established a uniform regulatory process for the review and approval"of
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petitions for acknowledgment of Indian tribes. See 25 C.F.R. Part 83; see also 43
On appeal, the Tribe challenges the Court of Federal Claims' dismissal of its
two claims, but limits its arguments to two programs it alleges are money-
mandating: the TPA system and the Federal Revenue Sharing program. The Tribe
I makes no arguments on appeal concerning any other federal programs or benefits
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raised in its Complaint.
The Court of Federal Claims held, in its first opinion, that the TPA system
was not money-mandating and thus it did not have jurisdiction over either of the
Tribe's claims. Samish IV, 82 Fed. Ci. at 68-69 (AI6-AI7). The TPA system is an
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internal Department of Interior ("Interior") process by which the BIA prepares its
budgetary requests, presents its requests to Congress, and then distributes its
congressional appropriations for the operation of Indian programs. See A217 19
(McDivitt Affidavit); A98 _3 (Affidavit ofDebbie L. Clark, Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Indian Affairs, Department of Interior).
The Court of Federal Claims first found that the TPA system was not a
"statute" or "discrete statutory program," but rather, was a budgetary mechanism.
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Id. at 59, 65-66(A7, AI3-AI4). Therefore, by itself, it could not impose a money-
mandating duty on the United States. Id. at 66 (AI4) ("analysis must train on
specific rights-creating or duty-imposing statutory or regulatory prescriptions.")
(citing United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 506 (2003) ("Navajo 1")); id.
at 68 (AI6) (precedent concerning "discretionary" schemes did not apply).
Relying on White Mountain Apache Tribe v. United States, 537 U.S. 465
(2003), and Navajo I, 537 U.S. at 488, the Court of Federal Claims next found that
the TPA system did not create a fiduciary duty on the part of the United States or a
specific trust. Samish IV, 82 Fed. CI. at 68 (A16). The court analyzed the statutes
authorizing programs fundedby the TPA. Id. at 66-67 (A14-15). None of those
statutes imposed a fiduciary obligation on the United States. Id. The statutory
language was "merely an expression of the general trust relationship between the
United States and the Indian people" and the statutes included "no [] detailed,
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Iprescriptive [statutory] language" imposing an obligation on the United States. Id.
at 67-68 (A15-16). "Because [the Tribe] has not shown the existence of trust
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property, there necessarily can be no trustee to manage the trust property or
beneficiary for whom the trust property is managed." Id. at 69 (AI7). Because
there was no fiduciary obligation imposed by the TPA system, or relevant statutes,
it could not be interpreted as money-mandating. Id. at 68 (AI6-A17).
In its second opinion, the Court of Federal Claims held that though the
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Federal Revenue Sharing program was money-mandating, to the extent that
Samish's claims relied upon it, those claims were not justiciable by operation of
the Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1341. Samish V, 90 Fed. CI. at 133-137
(A33-A38). The Federal Revenue Sharing program was created by the State and
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Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 ("Revenue Sharing Act"), Pub. L. No. 92-512,
86 Stat. 919 (A608-A619), and Congressional appropriations for the program
ceased in 1983) 90 Fed. CI. at 133 n.l I (A33-A34).
The court analyzed the Tribe's claiin for statutdry damages under the
I Revenue Sharing Act, but did not address the Tribe's breach of trust claim and
i whether the Revenue Sharing Act imposed a fiduciary duty upon the United States
I i The program was extended twice by the State and Local Fiscal Assistance
I Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-488, 90 Stat. 2341, and the State and LocalFiscal Assistance Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-604, 94 Stat. 3516,
and terminated on September 30, 1983.
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I to provide it with funds authorized by the Act. With respect to the Tribe's first
I claim, the court found that the Act was money-mandating because it was framed as
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an "entitlement" and included the following language: "[t]he Secretary'of the
United States Department of the Treasury shall, for each entitlement period, pay
out.., to each State government.., and.., each unit of local government a total
I amount equal to the entitlement of such unit." 90 Fed. CI. at 133 (A33-34); see
i also A608 (86 Stat. 91'8 at Sec. 102). 2
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In holding that the Revenue Sharing Act was money-mandating, the court
declined to follow the District of Columbia Circuit's decision not to "interpret the
Revenue Sharing Act as mandating compensation in the absence of clear
Congressional intent." 90 Fed. CI. at 135 (A35) (citing National Association of
i Counties v. Baker, 842 F.2d 369, 375 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). Instead, the Court of
Federal Claims found that the Federal Circuit's precedent in Agwiak v. United
States, 347 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005), which addressed the statutory construction
i f the terms "is entitled" and "shall pay," was controlling, and required an
I interpretation of the Revenue Sharing Act as money-mandating. 90 Fed. CI. at
135-136 (A35-A36). In Agwiak, the plaintiff-appellants were government
2 Section lOS(b) provided that if"there is an Indian tribe [] which has a recognized
governing body which performs substantial governmental functions, then.., there
shall be allocated to such tribe [an] amounL.." A616 (86 Stat. 918 at Sec.
108(b)(4)).
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iemployees who sought, among other things, remote worksite pay pursuant to 5
U.S.C. § 5942(a), which provided that an employee "is entitled.., to an
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allowance" that "shall be paid .... " Id. (citing Agwiak, 347 F.3d at 1376-79). The
Federal Circuit held that the terms "is entitled" and "shall be paid" meant that the
statute and its implementing regulations were money-mandating, ld. (citing
Agwial_ 347 F.3d at 1380). This reasoning was grounded upon prior precedent
i that "the use of the word 'shall' generally makes a statute money-man.dating." Id.
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(citing Agwiak, 347 F.3d at 1380).
Nevertheless, the Court of Federal Claims found that its ability to award any
damages mandated by the Revenue Sharing Act was limited by the Anti-
Deficiency Act. 90 Fed. CI. at 136-137 (A36-A37). The Anti-Deficiency Act
I prohibits a court from "award[ing] funds if an appropriation has lapsed unless an
i aggrieved party files suit before the appi'opriation lapses." Id. at 136 (A37).
Because the appropriations for the Revenue Sharing Act lapsed in 1983, and the
I Samish did not bring their claims until 2002, the court held that the Tribe's claims
i were not justiciable. 90 Fed. CI. at 136-137 (A36-A37). The Tribe now appeals
I those rulings.
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I STANDARD OF REVIEW
I The Court of Federal Claims' dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is reviewed
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de novo. "Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Forest Laboratories, Inc.,
527 F.3d 1278, 1290-91 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Court of Federal Claims has no, subject matter jurisdiction under the
I. Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker Act to hear the Tribe's claims for damages
because the Tribe points to no statute or regulation imposing an obligation on the
i United States, the breach of which obligates the United States to pay money
I damages.
I There is no statute or regulation obligating the United States to have treated
i the Tribe as recognized or to have provided it with benefits prior to 1996. On this
basis alorie, the Tribe'_t two claims must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
i To the extent the Tribe's claims for statutorydamages and breach of trust
I rely on the TPA system, the TPA system cannot supply the requisite money-
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mandating source of law that would support jurisdiction in the Court of Federal
Claims. The TPA system is not a statute or regulation. It is simply the manner in
which the BIA requests and allocates lump sum Congressional appropriations. "The
only relevant statutes are the annual Appropriations Acts that provided TPA funds
and the statutes creating programs supported by TPA funds. Samish has waived its
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iarguments with respect to these statutes. Regardless, this Cou_ cannot interpret
the Appropriations Acts as imposing an obligation, fiduciary or otherwise, upon
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the United States whose breach gives rise to a claim for money damages because
there is no relevant prescriptive language in the Acts. The Appropriations Acts did
nothing more than appropriate money to the BIA to operate Indian programs.
To the extent that the Tribe's claims for statutory damages and breach of
trust rely on the Revenue Sharing Act, the Act does not supply the requisite source
of law to support jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims. The Revenue
Sharing Act is not money-mandating because it provides discretion to the Secretary
to distribute funds and does not impose a fiduciary duty'on the United States. In
addition, Congress expressly provided for limited judicial review of the Secretary's
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funding decisions under the Act, which did not include a remedy for monetary
damages. Accordingly, the Act cannot f_irly be interpreted as money-mandating.
Even if this Court finds that the Revenue Sharing Act is money-mandating,
I the Court of Federal Claims' ability to award damages under this statute is limited
I by the Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 134I, which prevents courts from
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awarding damages authorized by statutes whose appropriations have lapsed. The
Judgment Fund is not available to satisfy any judgment in this case because the
Tribe's claims rest on a program that was funded by specific appropriations.
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ARGUMENT
THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS IS
LIMITED.
i The United States is "immune from suit save as it consents to be sued."
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United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941). A waiver of sovereign
immunity must be "unequivocally expressed in statutory text." Lane v. Pe_a, 518
U.S. 187, 192 (1996). The scope of a waiver of sovereign immunity must be
"strictly construed.., in favor of the sovereign," id., and "not enlarged.., beyond
what the language requires." United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607,
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615 (1992). Without a waiver of sovereign immunity, the Court of Federal Claims
lacks jurisdiction to hear the suit. Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172
(Fed. Cir. 2005).
The United States has provided a limited waiver of its sovereign immunity
under 28 U.S.C. § 1491 ("Tucker Act"), and under 28 U.S.C. § 1505 ("Indian
n Tucker Act"). The Indian Tucker Act states:
• The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction of any claim against the United
I StateS... in favor of tribe, whenever such claim is underany one arisingm g
the Constitution, laws or treaties of_e United States, or Executive orders of
i the President, or is one which otherwise would be cognizable in the Court ofFederal Claims if the claimant were not an Indian tribe, band or group.
i 28 U.S.C. § 1505. The Tucker Act contains similar language. 28 U.S.C. § 1491
n (providing jurisdiction to hear claims based "upon the Constitution, or any Act of
Congress, or any regulation of an executive department.., for liquidated or
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I unliquidated damages"). The Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker Act thus provide a
I limited waiver of sovereign immunity for claims to enforce substantive rights to
I money damages that appear in other sources of law, such as the Constitution,
statutes, or regulations. United _tates v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216 (1983)
!C'Mitchel111"); United States v. Navajo Nation, 129 S. Ct. 1547 (2009) ("Navajo
I IIl').
I To bring a claim in the Court of Feder_il Claims under the Tucker Act or
I Indian Tucker Act, and fall within the scope of Congress's waiver of sovereign
immunity, the Samish must satisfy two distinct requirements, as clarified in the
!Supreme Court's decision in Navajo IlL
I The first of the two requirements is that a tribe "must identify a substantive
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source of law that establishes specific fiduciary or other duties, and allege that the
Government has failed faithfully to perform those duties." Navajo I11, 129 S.Ct. at
1552 (citation omitted); see also Mitchellll, 463 U.S. at 216 (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491(a)). The obligations identified must arise out of specific statutory or
regulatory prescriptions that govern the conduct at issue. Navajo I, 537 U.S. at
t 506; Navajo III, 129 S. Ct. at 1558 (citation omitted). A "threshold" requirement
i for non-constitutional claims is the identification of"specific rights-creating or
duty-imposing statutory or regulatory prescriptions" that establish the "specific
fiduciary or other duties" that the government allegedly has failed to fulfill.
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i Nilvajo I, 537 U.S. at 506. In Navajo III, the Supreme Court squarely rejected the
-I notion that something other than the Constitution, a statute, or a regulation could
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impose an obligation on the United States for whose breach it would be liable
under the Tucker Act or Indian Tucker Act. 129 S. Ct. at 1557-1558.
If the tribe identifies a law that imposes specific obligations, then the court
may proceed to the second inquiry, which requires the court to "determine whether
the relevafit source of substantive law can be fairly interpreted as mandating
I compensation for damages sustained as a result of a breach of the duties the
governing law imposes." Navajo III, 129 S. Ct. at 1552 (citation omitted). The
I law must be "reasonably amenable to the reading that it mandates a right of
i recovery in damages." White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. at 473.
i The inquiry into whether a law can be interpreted as mandating
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compensation is distinct from the initial question of whether the government has
violated a specific statutory or regulatory provision. Cf id. at 480 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (explaining that Navajo I addressed the threshold question of whether"
a statute or regulation "impose[d] any concrete substantive obligations," whereas
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the "dispositive question" in White Mountain Apache was whether a statute
"mandate[d] compensation" for its violation.). The separation of these two
inquiries rests upon the premise that not all statutes mandate the award of money
damages. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400-401 (1976).
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I With respect to this second requirement, this Court must look to
I Congressional intent to determine whether a statute or regulation may be
I interpreted as creating a fight to money damages. Samish II, 419 F.3d at 1365.
"To determine Congressional intent the court begins with the language of the
I statutes at issue," as well as "the design of the statute as a whole and to its object
I and policy." Id. (citations omitted). A statute providing some "discietion" to the
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government "over payment of claimed funds" can provide a right of recovery if the
statute at issue "(1) [] provide[s] 'clear standards for paying' money to recipients;
(2)[] state[s]the precise amounts that must be paid; or (3) as interpreted, compel[s]
payment on satisfaction of certain conditions." Sarnish II, 419 F.3d at 1364.
In the context of claims brought by tribes against the United States, when the
statutory or regulatory fights-creating or duty-imposing language "bears the
hallmarks era conventional fiduciary relationship," a court may look to "principles
of trust law" to help "draw[] the inference that Congress intended damages to
remedy a breach." Navajo III, 129 S. Ct. at 1552, 1558 (citation omitted); see also
White Mountain Apache, 537 U.S. at 477.
In White Mountain Apache, for example, the statute specified that the United
States held the property at issue "in trust," but nonetheless directed the United
States to use the property for its own purposes. 537 U.S. at 474-75. The Supreme
Court found that the term "in trust" was a "term of art" that is "commonly
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I understood to entail certain fiduciary obligations." Id. at 475-76, 480. The use of
I the term "in trust" in combination with the statute's language directing the United
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States "to make direct use of portions of the trust corpus" led the Supreme Court to
conclude that the statute created a statutory obligation to preserve the trust corpus.
Id. at 480 (J. Ginsburg, concurring). Borrowing on principles of trust law, the
Court found that the fiduciary duties imposed by the statute were money-
mandating. Id. at 475-76.
I No court has interpreted a network of statutes, as outlined in Mitchell II, 463
U.S. 206, as creating fiduciary obligations or as being money mandating if the
relevant laws do not impose specific duties. SeeNavajolll, 129 S.Ct. at 1558
(emphasizing the duty imposed must stem from a statute or regulation). Thus, to
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the extent that the Samish make the argumerit that a common law trust was
established, without pointing to relevant sources of statutory or regulatory
language, this argument is precluded by the Supreme Court's recent ruling in
Navajo III.
Only in the limited situation where a Tribe alleges both that the United
States violated a statute or regulation that imposes an obligation on it, and that
Congress intended for that law to be money-mandating does the Court of Federal
Claims have iurisdiction to entertain claims for damages against the United States
under the Tucker Act or the Indian Tucker Act.
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I II.
ITHERE IS NO STATUTE OR REGULATION IMPOSING A DUTY UPON
THE UNITED STATES TO TREAT THE SAMISH AS A FEDERALLY
RECOGNIZED TRIBE PRIOR To 1996.
i The Tribe's two claims rest on the argument that the United States had a
duty to the Samish Tribe to treat it as federally recognized prior to 1996. However,
I the Tribe does not identify a substantive source of law--a statute or regulation--
I that imposed an obligation upon the United States to treat it as federally recognized
prior to its formal recognition in 1996 or to provide it with federal benefits during
that period. In fact, regulations provide that recognized tribes are not
automatically entitled to federal benefits. 25 C.F.R. § 83.12(c) (acknowledgment
I does "not create immediate access to existing programs."). The Tribe therefore
I cannot meet the first requirement of Navajo III, 129 S.Ct. at 1552. Because there
I is no statute or regulation imposing such an obligation on the United States, this
i Court need not even reach the question of whether the TPA system or the Revenue
Sharing Act raised by .the Samish can be interpreted as mandating compensation
for damages.
The Tribe cannot rely on 25 U.S.C. § 479a-1 and 25 U.S.C. § 476(0 to
I supply a relevant source of law, Br. at 40-44, because the statutes do not obligate
i the United States to provide benefits to tribes that do not have federal recognition.
The first statute the Tribe relies upon, 25 U.S.C. § 479a-1, requires the Secretary of
I Interior to annually publish "a list of all Indian tribes which the Secretary
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Irecognizes to be eligible for the special programs and services provided by the
United States to Indians because of their status as Indians." The term "Indian
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tribe" is defined to mean "any Indian... tribe.., that the Secretary of the Interior
acknowledges to exist as an Indian tribe." 25 U.S.C. § 47%(2). The second
statute the Tribe relies upon, 25 U.S.C. § 476, governs the organization of Indian
• Tribes and prohibits federal agencies from "diminish[ing] the privileges and
immunities available to [a recognized] Indi_ tribe relative to other federally
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recognized tribes by virtue of their status as Indian tribes." Both of these statutory
provisions were enacted in 1994. See Pub. L. No. 103-454, 1994 H.R. 4180
I LP v. United States, 59 Fed. CI. 724, 728-729 (2004). In these situations, a court
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lacks jurisdiction to heara claim for money from a specific fund pursuant to a
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cited three statutesin the Court of Federal Claims that appropriated Revenue
Sharing funds for the periods of 1972-1976, 1977-1980, and 1980-1983. See 90Fed.Cl. at 136-137 (A37). The funding lapsed in 1983, long before Samish
I brought suit in 2002.
In addition, the Anti-Deficiency Act also prevents the Tribe from obtaining
the relief it requests because the amounts appropriated under the Revenue Sharing
Act were capped on an annual basis. Congress annually appropriated a certain!
amount of funds to be distributed under the Revenue Sharing Act. A611 (86 Stat.
918 at Sec. 105). In the event that "the total amount appropriated" for a period was
I "not sufficient to pay in full the additional amounts allocable" under the law, the
Secretary was not authorized to pay additional sums, but rather, was .required to
"reduce proportionately the amounts so allocable." A613 (86 Stat. 918 at Sec.
1106(c)(2)). Congress did not intend to provide additional funding under the
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statute because the c_urt is unable to grant the relief requested. Church of
Scientolog),, 506 U.S. at 12. Only ifa lawsuit is brought before an appropriation
lapses may a court award funds. City of Houston, 24 F.3d at 1426.
The Anti-Deficiency Act bars the Tribe from recovering the relief it seeks
because the appropriations to the Revenue Sharing Act lapsed in 1983. See Star-
(31o Assoc, 59 Fed. CI. at 728-29; City of Houston, Tex., 24 F.3d at 1426. Samish
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I Revenue Sharing Act once the appropriations were spent. Because the funds were
I capped, this Court cannot authorize the payment of additional funds under the
I statute. See Star-Gio Associates, 414 F.3d at 1354-55; City ofHouston, Tex., 24
i F.3d at 1426; see also Greenlee County, Ariz v. United States, 487 F.3d 871,878-
879 (government's liability under a statute is limited if appropriations are capped
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Iby Congress).
In order to grant Samish the particular relief it requests, the court would
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have to order the Government to pay money greater than the amount appropriated.
This relief is no longer available due to the Anti-Deficiency Act, see Highland
Falls, 48 F.3d at 1171, and therefore this Court must affirm the dismissal of the
Tribe's claims.
C. The Judgment Fund Is Unavailable To Pay The Tribe's Claims.
i The Tribe argues that its claims are not moot because the Court of Federal
Claims can award damages under the Judgment Fund, 31 U.S.C. § 1304(a).
I However, the Judgment Fund is.not available to pay the Tribe's claims because the
Samish seeks its alleged share of funds appropriated under the Revenue Sharing
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Act. The appropriations for the Revenue Sharing Act were capped annually and
lapsed in 1983. Because the appropriations were capped and have lapsed and the
Judgment Fund is not available, the Court of Federal Claims cannot award relief to
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l Scientology,506 U.S.at12.
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the Tribe and lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Samish's claims. Church of
The Judgment Fund is a "permanent, indefinite appropriation for the
payment of judgments." See U.S. Government Accountability Office, 3 Principles
of Federal Appropriations Law ("GAO, Principles"), at 14-31 (3d ed. Sept. 2008),
I available at http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/dO8978sp.pdf. However, the
I Judgment Fund is only.available to pay damages in limited situations. The statute
creating the Judgment Fund provides that it is only available "to pay final
judgments.., when- (1) payment is not otherwise provided for." 31 U.S.C. §
13o4(a).
The Judgment Fund is not available to pay the Tribe's claims because the
statute's first requirement--that the payment sought must not be otherwise
provided for--is not satisfied. See County of Suffolk, N.Y.v. Sebelius, --F.3d .... ,
2010 WL 2025524, at *6 (2nd Cir. May 24, 2010) (holding that the Judgment Fund
was unavailable to pay a claim for money previously authorized under a statute
because the statute supplied the proper source of funds). Here, the Revenue
Sharing Act provided a proper source of funds. Under Supreme Court and District
of Columbia Circuit precedent, the Tribe, like any other state or local government,
could have brought a claim seeking judicial review of the Secretary's decisions
under the Revenue Sharing Act in the district court or court of appeals. See
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National Association of Counties I,. Baker, 842 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(challenge to Secretary's decision to make 180 million dollars unavailable for
allocation under Revenue Sharing Act properly brought" in district court); 31
U.S.C. § 1263(a)-(d) (Supp. V 1975) (authorizing petition for review of certain
decisions reducing or withholding payments in specific circumstances) (SAI 8-
SAI9); c.f. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 907 n.42 (1988) (challenge to
United States' decision not to reimburse state for.certain Medicaid expenditures
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properly brought in district court).
The statute creating the Judgment Fund cannot be interpreted as available to
pay the Tribe's claims because "payment is... otherwise provided for." 31 U.S.C.
§ 1304(a). Where "payment of a particular judgment is otherwise provided for as a
I matter of law, the fact that the defendant agency has insufficient funds at that
i particular time does not operate to make the Judgment Fund available." GAO, 3
Principles, at 14-39. The unavailability of funds under the Revenue Sharing Act
I does not make the Judgment Fund available to pay the Tribe's claims. See County
I of Suffolk, 2010 WL 2025524 at *6. "There is only one proper source of funds in
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any given case." GAO, 3 Principles, at 14-40.
Paying this particular claim, which seeks to recover specific appropriated
funds, not compensation generally, out of the Judgment Fund, would render the
Anti-Deficiency Act meaningless. In addressing the interaction of these two
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Istatutes, this Court is "not at liberty to pick and choose among congressional
enactments." .Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974). "[W]hen two
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statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly
expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective." Id.
The Anti-Deficiency Act bars the payment of money pursuant to a statute once the
appropriations for it have lapsed. To allow the Judgment Fund to supply money in
this situation would obligate Congress to pay money under the Revenue Sharing
Act, even though its appropriations lapsed in 1983. This ruling would render the
Anti-Deficiency Act invalid.
On the other hand, a ruling that the Judgment Fund is not available to pay
the Tribe's claims does not render the statute creating the Judgment Fund invalid.
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It simply recognizes that the Judgment Fund is not available here because funds
have been "otherwise provided for" by Congress. See 31 U.S.C. § 1304(a).
Because there is a possible construction of the two statutes that "give[s] effect to
both," this Court should find that the Judgment Fund is not available in this
particular case. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 551 (citing United States !,. Borden Co., 308
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U.S. 188, 198 (1939)).
Because the Judgment Fund is unavailable and the appropriations for the
Revenue Sharing Act have lapsed, the Court of Federal Claims cannot grant the
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I requested relief and does not.have subject matter jurisdiction over the Tribe's
I claims. Church of Scientology, 506 U.S. at 12.
I V. ANY CLAIM FOR POST-1996 BENEFITSHAS BEEN WAIVED.
The Tribe raised claims for post-1996 benefits in its first complaint in the
I . Court of Federal Claims and in a similar complaint under the APA in the District
I Court for the Western District of Washington. See Samish II, 419 F.3d at 1363.
The Court of Federal Claims dismissed without prejudice the Tribe's claim for
I post-1996benefi?under28 UIS.C. § 1500. SamishI, 58Fed. Cl. at122. ThisICourt affirmed without prejudice. 5 Samish II, 419 F.3d at 1363. The District
I Court for the Western District of Washington ultimately dismissed the Tribe's
I claim for post-1996 benefits for lack of standing and subject matter jurisdiction
I under the APA. SamishlndianNation, 2004 WL 3753252, at *l; see Section B,
i supra. . .The Tribe did not renew its claim for post-1996 benefits m this case on
I remand before the Court of Federal Claims. See Compl. at _.34-36; 40-44 (A92-
I A95). Nor did it raise this claim or argument in its opening brief in this appeal.
I Therefore, the Tribe is barred from raising this claim in future litigation. C.f5 In Tohono O'Odham Nation v. United States, thm Court interpreted the scope of
I 28 U.S.C. § 1500 when it reversed the Court of Federal Claim's decisiondismissing a tribe's action on the grounds that it was precluded by Section 1500.559 F.3d 1284, 1287-1292 (Fed. Cir. 2009). This case has been granted certiorarib); the United States Supreme Court. United States v. rohono O'Odham Nation,
130 S.Ct. 2097 (2010) (pending).
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Conoco, Inc. v. Energy & Environmental Intern., L.C., 460 F.3d 1349, 1358-1359
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (litigants cannot raise new arguments or claims on appeal);
Whelan v. Abell, 48 F.3d 1247, 1251 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (issues not raised before
judgment in the district court are waived on appeal).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Federal Claims
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted, •
IGNACIA S. MORENO
Assistant Attorney General
July 8, 201090-2-20-10800
KATHRYN E. KOVACS
THEKLA HANSEN-YOUNG
U.S. Department of JusticeEnvironment & Natural Res. Div.
P.O. Box 23795 (L'Enfant Station)
Washington, DC 20026
(202) 307-2710
thekla.hansen-young(_usdoj.gov
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iCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I WITH TYPE VOLUME LIMITATION
i This brief complies with the type volume limitation set forth in Rule
32(a)(7)(B) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Excepting the portions
I described in Circuit Rule 32(a)(1), the brief contains 13,501 words.
I THEKLA HANSEN-YOUNG L/U.S. Department of JusticeEnvironment & Natural Res. Div.
P.O. Box 23795 (L'Enfant Station)
Washington, DC 20026
(202) 307-2710
thekla.hansen-young_usdoj.gov
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On July 8, 2010, I served two copies of the foregoing on the following by
FedEx overnight:
Craig J. Dorsay
Attorney at Law
2121 SW Broadway, Ste 100
William R. PerryAnne D. Noto
Sonosky, Chambers, Sachse, Endreson
i Portland, OR 97201 & Perry, LLP1425 K Street, N.W., Ste 600
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1 SW Columbia St Ste 440 Washington, DC 20005
Portland, OR 97258 (202) 682-0240
(503) 790-9060
U.S. Department of JusticeEnvironment & Natural Res. Div.