I, 86 Wattle Street Telephone: 0893442248 'lr/l/ !Q7 · The ACNB had steadfastly denied that Aquitania broke radio silence. The ACNB stand condemned from the mouths of these German

SUBMISSION No 15

1039

I ~!'(! 617

C.A.V. Bourne

Yours sincerely

G. P. CAPT. C.A.V. BOURNEMBE AE (ret'd)86 Wattle StreetTUART HILL WA 6060Telephone: 0893442248

'lr/ l/ !Q7

I. "The Fairey Battle Cover-up"2. "The Trocas Cover-up"3. "A Packet of Lucky Strikes?"4. The DVA Involvement.5. The R.S.L. Involvement.

Please find enclosed the following papers which I submit as evidence to theInquiry into the Circumstances of the Sinking ofHMAS Sydney:

Dear Ms Towner

~. Joa~~wner(~~. ~etary\~~~ence Sub-Committee on\ Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade

Parliament HouseCANBERRA ACT 2600

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PINQ.SUBS.005.0080

THE LOSS OF HMAS SYDNEY

THE FAIREY BATTLE COVER-U~

BY GP CAPT C.A.V. BOURNE

2

(1) RAAF Pearce had its own two yellow and black Fairey Battles and did

not need any extra help from Geraldton.

(II) To carry a crew of two; as stated it would be necessary to remove the

winch, boom and metal drum holding 100 yards of steel cable with the

aid of a light crane. Without this equipment, it could not tow drogues.

My accusations are based on the following facts:

The Unit History Sheet (Commanding Officer's Monthly Report) for the month

of November 1941 of No 4 Service Flying Training School (No 4 SFTS) based

at Geraldton, Western Australia during World War II shows the following

entries:

Future researchers of the loss of HMAS Sydney would probably accept these

entries at face value unless they were familiar with target towing Fairey Battles

and the military circumstances pertaining at that time. In this regard, I wish to

point out that I have flown Fairey Battles and towed drogues in Hudsons using

identical equipment and techniques. I also served in No 14 Sqn Pearce and

took part as a pilot in air searches firstly for the raider Steirmark, then HMAS

Sydney and finally for the survivors of the alleged battle between these two

ships and I unequivocally aver that these entries are false and an attempt at

deliberately covering up the real purpose of this flight on this day.

23.11.97

27.11.41

FlO DALY Battle aircraft L5175 Crew 2, departed to

Pearce on target towing duties.

and

FlO DN DALY Battle aircraft L5775 returned from

duty at Pearce.

(III) According to the C.O. of No. 14 Sqn Wg Cdr Lightfoot's Monthly

Report for November 1941 No. 14 Sqn had completed its air to air firing

training in the period of 11-22 November 1941. It was common practice

for No. 25 Sqn to complete its air to air training at the same time to

make maximum use of the target towing Fairey Battle during the

gazzetted and media publicised period of using the Lake Pinjar Air to

Air Gunnery Range for live firing so there was no RAAF Pearce

requirement in the forthcoming week. In addition all 14 Sqn's Hudsons

and 25 Sqn's Wirraways were absent in Geraldton, Carnarvon and

Onslow. At this time there was only one unserviceable Hudson and one

unserviceable Wirraway at Pearce. FIt Lt. (Flaps) McDonald was busy

recovering a crashed Wirraway and the only other No. 25 Sqn pilot Sgt

Pilot Gordon White was in Station Sick Quarters.

(IV) HMAS Wyrallah, Yandra, Heros and Olive Cam sailed on the HMAS

Sydney search on the night of 24/2S1h November so they were

unavailable to undergo AiA firing at sea if it was so desired.

(V) The fleet auxiliary tanker HMAS Karumba and the small HMAS Alfie

Cam were the only two naval vessels remaining in Fremantle, Alfie Cam

was undergoing repairs and was unseaworthy at the time. John Doohan,

a seaman on the Karumba. said that neither was ship put to sea during

the week of 23_301h November 1941.

1040 1041

PINQ.SUBS.005.0081

3

(VI) Targets were never towed for heavy NA practice. Falling nose cones

and shrapnel over built up areas precluded this and it was two dangerous

for the aircraft. Heavy AlA fire was notoriously inaccurate.

(VIl) The Volunteer Defence Corps in the Perth Metropolitan area did not

receive and train on Bofors guns until after Japan entered the War, so

they too are ruled out.

What then did this yellow and black Fairey Battle do on this day?

In his interrogation Capt Detmers said that on Sunday morning the 23rd

November 1941 he and the crew of his lifeboat saw the Aquitania 5 nms away.

Lt Bunje in Gosseln's lifeboat saw the Aquitania 8 runs away. Both Detmers

and Bunje said that in the afternoon both lifeboats were circled by a strange

yellow and black aircraft. Bunje said that it was a bomber. This aircraft had

red, white and blue RAAF roundels prominently pointed above and below each

wing and or each side of the fuselage aft of the cockpit so it was obviously a

military aircraft.

This event occurred 318.5 nms on a bearing of 322°T from Geraldton or 149.5R~ 0

ms on a be~ng of 277 T from Carnarvon.. In the absence of any Search and

Rescue facilities, single engined aircrafts did not fly so far out to sea for fun on

a Sunday afternoon. The implication is that when the Aquintania stopped to

pick up 26 German survivors at that position, having been thus alerted and by

the use of the lookout's big binoculars, the bridge telescope and the powerful

optics in its range finder, it sighted both lifeboats and broke radio silence to

report their presence and South Western Area Combined Headquarters had

dispatched this Fairey Battle secretly to confirm their presence in this position.

The ACNB had steadfastly denied that Aquitania broke radio silence. The

ACNB stand condemned from the mouths of these German officers. If the

1042

4

ACNB and Australian Government accepted the German version of the alleged

battle between the HMAS Sydney and the HSK Kormoran then they must also

accept their account of being circled on that afternoon by an obviously military

aircraft.

There are other anomalies in this same Unit History Record. It shows that Fit

Lt Payne took off from Geraldton in Avro Anson W2129 at 9545 hrs WST on

the 2ih November 1941 on Track NoiofSearch G1/27 with a Datum ofLat 270

"32'S Long 1130 53'E on a leg of 150 nms. The report goes onto state that FLT

LT Payne landed in aircraft W2124 at 1025rs WST and reported an "oil stain"

between datum 270 00' - 1130 32'E and Coast. The odd thing is that he landed

in a different aircraft number to that which he took off - tricky business in mid

air. There is no record of him landing and changing aircraft at Carnarvon.

Similarly, there is no record in SWACH,ACH or Intelligence Reports of FLT

LT Payne's "oil stain" sighting. All three documents record the oil patch

sighting by the two Catalinas but not its sighting by Wg Cdr Lightfoot in

Hudson A16-62 which saw HMAS Wyrallah searching 30 runs South of the oil

patch on Friday 28th November 1941. This is recorded only in No.1 4 Sqns

Operations Record Book for November 1941. I believe it is possible that this

_"oil stain" entry was imposed to cloud the oil patch issue. The ACH report

says that the Captain of HMAS Wyrallah when he couldn't find the oil patch

considered that it could have been a cloud shadow. Both 2 RAAF pilots and 1

USN pilot who saw this oil patch were very experienced maritime

reconnaissance pilots who had seen many oil patches in their time and also

knew what cloud shadows on the ocean looked like, whereas Lt Cdr

Levingstone was a RANR officer, who had possibly limited experience in

command of a small ship 200 nms to seaward.

This report was signed on the last page by Gp Capt Heffernan, whom I knew.

He would not be averse to maintaining secrecy on this Fairey Battle Flight but

1043

PINQ.SUBS.005.0082

5

being aware of all the circumstances above he would have been reluctant to

sign a report containing such an easily contradicted story. He was probably

acting on the personal telephoned orders of Air Cdre De La Ru early on Sunday

morning the 23rd November 1941. Telephones fitted with scramblers ie

"secraphone" were commonly used in the absence of any wrr facility at No 4

SFTS, HQWA SWACH and ACH. The need for secrecy would have been

stressed but "Paddy Heffernan" would not have signed such a woeful Unit

History Sheet. The format for the Commanding Officer's Monthly Report was

laid down in Air Board Administrative Orders (ABO "A's") which were an

extension of Air Force Orders (AFO's). This No 4 SFTS report did not meet

these requirements.

In conclusion, I submit that this report was "doctored" at a later date by a very

ill informed person in an effort to conceal the revealing flight by a Fairey Battle

on Sunday 23rd November 1941. It would be necessary to make some record of

the flight because there would be other records elsewhere ego Flight

Authorisation Book, Daily Servicing Schedule Form ££/77 and Pilots Flying

Log Book.

C.A.V. Bourne

I~/I//97

1044


THE TROCAS COVER-UP


AT 1500 hrs WST on Monday 24 th November 1941 the Shell tanker Trocas

rescued a raft at Lat 24°06' Long 111°40' with 25 Germans aboard. This

position was 321 runs on a bearing of 330° from Geraldton or 119 nms on a

bearing of293° from Carnarvon.

Captain Sam Bryant sent First Mate R.V. Robson to supervise the transfer of

these POW's from raft to ship. They were brought on board singly and

searched singly for arms only and were allowed to keep other possessions

including diaries. They were then immediately confined under guard in an

empty oil tank which had flooring made up of wooden planks.

Barbara Winter at page 147 of her book "HMAS Sydney Fact, Fantasy and

Fraud" relates the above details which I accept only because they are

con'oborated by official Australian documentation and she interviewed the

Germans involved but 1 do not accept her other comments here or elsewhere in

her book on this incident.

"HOW DID TROCAS HAPPEN TO HAVE AN EMPTY OIL TANK WITH

FLOORING OF WOODEN PLANKS READY FIT AND SAFE FOR

IMMEDIATE HUMAN HABITATION AT THIS TIME?"

"HAD SHE BEEN FOREWARNED BY SIGNAL FROM THE ACNB OF

THE PRESENCE OF 25 ENEMY IN A LIFE RAFT IN THIS PRECISE

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PINQ.SUBS.005.0083

2

LOCATION AND THUS BEEN ASSURED OF A CERTAIN RESCUE TO

JUSTIFY ALL THIS PREPARATOR WORK?"

Before examining these questions let us look at the booklet, "No Survivors"

published by the West Australian. A photograph of this area of the Trocas

shows a German sailor being carried by an Australian soldier from the oil tank.

John Doohan who served as a merchant seaman on board the RAN oil tanker

HMAS Karumba has closely examined this photograph and concludes that this

was a wing tank, not a central tank. The Trocas also had a starboard fly over

bridge and was riding fairly high in the water which meant she was sailing

"light".

When Trocas sailed from Palembang her oil load would have been evenly

distributed through all tanks to ensure stability under all sea conditions. It is

most unlikely that she would have one empty wing tank even if counter

balanced by an empty wing tank on the opposite side of the ship. Such an

arrangement could place undue structural stress on the bulk heads.

Winter goes on to say that two inured men Marwinski and Lensch were placed

in the sick quarters leaving 23 men in the oil tank. It would require a wooden

platfonn of approximately 16ft by 18 feet allowing a space of 6ft by 2ft for

each man. They were going to spend 3 nights sleeping in this area and spend

daylight hours sitting and eating on this platform. Food and water would have

been supplied in buckets and buckets used for toilet purposes.

To empty an oil tank on the Trocas would require hundreds of tons of oil to be

transferred by pumping to top up part filled tanks of the same type of oil and

obtain a even distribution throughout the ship. Under normal circumstances an

empty tank would be chipped and scraped at this stage to remove rust and dirt

sediment before thoroughly hosed out and washed with sea water. Due to the

urgency of the situation on this occasion the scraping and chipping of the tank

104f;

3

undoubtedly would have been dispensed with but the tank would still have to

be thoroughly washed out to remove all oil traces. It would then be necessary

to place sails on the ventilators of the empty tank to allow the wind to remove

all toxic fumes from the tank before crew could enter to to lay the wooden

platform. The Trocas like all ships would have carried stout wooden planks

about 12-15ft long, 10-12 ins wide and 2 ins thick, bound at each end by steel

straps. These were normally used hung over the side to scrap and paint the

hull.

Only now would the tank be ready for human habitation and it is estimated that

the whole procedure would take about 10-12 hours. To counter balance the

ship it was probably necessary to empty a wing tank on the opposite side but

this could be done at leisure.

Of course, the oil could simply have been dumped at sea and there were no

"Greenies" or Environmentalists to protest over such action but this was

Wartime and every drop of oil was precious. In fact, it was unusual for a

tanker to sail not fully laden, although, it could have been carrying a specific

order for the RAN or for a civilian buyer.

How then could the Trocus have been forewarned by the ACNB to take all this

action necessary 10-12 hours before the rescue and also be directed to the exact

position. of a life raft several hundreds of miles fonn the WA Coast.

I have told in my booklet "HMAS Sydney Forum 1997 - The Bourne Papers"

of a secret Dutch Military Signals Unit based in the Port Hotel Carnarvon

which was listening into all the radio traffic in the north eastern Indian Ocean.

In my paper, "Detmers' Contingency Plan", I have told how the Gennan rafts,

life boats. cutters and motor torpedo boat were communicating with each other

by radio advising their positions with the common goal of capturing a ship.

10·17

PINQ.SUBS.005.0084

4

rounding up all the survivors at sea or ashore and sailing to a safe haven such

as the Carolines. This information was being passed by the NEI listening post

to the ACNB by secure means not by radio transmissions.

I allege that the ACNB through the agency of the NEI listening post was aware

of the up to date position of each German raft and boat (see my papers, "A

Packet ofLucky Strikes").

I further allege that in a series of signals that the ACNB was communicating

with the Trocas in merchant shipping code before the rescue and that the

ADNB using naval code and a naval frequency requested C in C China

(Singapore) to dispatch a signal advising:

PICKED UP 25 GERMANS 0700Z

24 II 24065 11140E

which the ACNB received at 1816K, ie, 1616 WST.

Officially, this was to be known as the first information that the ACNB had

received of naval action in this area and was a cover up for the fact that the

ACNB had received signals from HMAS Sydney on the evening of Wednesday

19th

November 1941 and were aware that Sydney and her crew were destroyed.

My paper ("A Bad Radio Area") covers the myth created by Barbara Winter

and subsequently by Journalists, Historians and Authors. This was purely a

smoke screen to cover the supposed failure of Coastal Radio OTC Geraldton

and other radio stations to pick up the signals of Trocas and the two QQQQ

signals of Kormoran and Sydney's final signal "Calling Darwin on fire fozt'and

aft abandoning ship". The preliminary signals of the ACNB and Trocas

together with Geraldton's copying of those signals are either buried in the

1048

5

morass of signals still held unsorted by the Australian Archives in Melbourne

or even destroyed at that time.

Leading writer Mason, in his papers placed in the Mitchell Library 1981, tells

that the destruction of signals at the ship to shore radio station HMAS Harman

Canberra began on the morning ofThursday 20th November 1941 following the

receipt of signals received from HMAS Sydney the previous evening.

Finally, I allege that all this Trocas activity was to cover up the fact that

Aquitania had broken radio silence some 33 hours earlier to advise that she too

had picked up a raft (see my paper HMT Aquitania 2nd Edition) and had not

ordered an immediate large scale sea and air search on Sunday 23rd November

1941. This wasting and filling in of time since the actual sinking of HMAS

Sydney on the evening of Wednesday 19th Novmeber 1941 is a complex issue

best told by SRG researcher John Doohan in his "Scenario". In brief nothing

was to be seen or discovered to prevent the sailing of the Japanese Fleet on

Wednesday the 26th November 1941 for the attack on Pearl Harbour which

would bring the USA into World War 2 as planned by Churchill and

Rooseveldt.

Preservation of the secrecy of the breaking of the Japanese Main Fleet Code

JN25 was paramount and absolute and remained so for all of World War 2.

The sinking ofHMAS Sydney was just a small hiccup in the strategic planning

of these two World War 2 leaders. She and her 645 Australian crew were

expendable in their eyes and in the "Grand Design" as were the 3000 men in

Hawaii and the Australian Slh Division in Malaya.

1049

PINQ.SUBS.005.0085


"A PACKET OF LUCKY STRIKES?"


Appendices: Pages 8, 9, & 10 - No 14 Squadron Pearce Operation Record Book

Senior RAAF Maritime pilots and officials of the Search and Rescue

Organisation, Canberra will know only too well the difficulties of aerial and sea

searches for lifeboats and rafts several hundred miles from a remote coastline

with little or no knowledge of their approximate positions. This was the

situation at the beginning and for most of the time of the search for HMAS

Sydney in November 1941, the greatest search in Australian history involving

21 ships and 33 aircraft.

They could also assist in any inquiry into the loss of HMAS Sydney assessing

the statistical possibilities and probabilities of the allegations I am about to

make in this paper which aims to show that luck played no part in the

interceptions and rescues of German rafts and lifeboats but that their up to the

minute exact locations were known to the RAAF and RAN enabling rescue

ships and aircraft to "hit the nail on the head". Each case will be dealt with in

detail later but they are summarised here as a preliminary guide:

2

Throughout this paper I must refer to previous papers printed in my booklet,

"HMAS Sydney Forum 1997 - The Bourne Papers". These are held in the

Australian Archives in all States, Australian War Museum, RAN and RAAF

Historical Sections, W.A. Battye Library, W.A. Maritime Museums and all

W.A. Port Libraries. They have also been submitted as evidence to the 1997

"Inquiry into the circumstances of the sinking ofHMAS Sydney" by the "Joint

Standing Committee on Foreign affairs, Defend and Trade - Defence Sub

Committee".

For preliminary reading, it is necessary to read my papers "RAAF, PMG and

Allies Direction Finding and Radio Intercept" and "Detmers Contingency

Plan". It is emphasised that powerful RAAF MIF and HFfDF stations based at

RAAF Pearce Darwin Townsville and Sale were reading and taking bearings

on all German and Japanese maritime radio signals transmitted from the

Eastern and North Eastern Indian Ocean during 1940-41. In all the books and

media articles written on the loss of HMAS Sydney and in all the official

records, all mention of this subject has been taboo. There is one mention and

one mention only of Direction Finding in the South Western Area Combined

Headquarters (SWACH) Operations Record Logbook at page 110 is the

following entry, "Nothing sighted during the afternoon air search which was

cut short when Trocas reported her position (.) DIF bearing supported position

(.)".

(1) 23.11.41

(2) 24.11.41

(3) 25.11.41

(4) 25.11.41

(5) 27.11.41

(6) 27.11.41

(7) 28.11.41

"Aquitania" rescued a life raft.

"Trocas" rescued a life raft.

FIt Lt Goode sighted Gosseln's lifeboat.

FIt Lt Cook sighted lifeboats ashore.

"Koolinda" rescued on lifeboat.

"Centaur" rescued lifeboat.

"HMAS Yandra" rescued a lifeboat.

1050

My same papers tell of a powerful secret NEI Military Signals Radio Listening

Post located in the Port Hotel Carnarvon. This was manned by six well

educated Javanese WIT Operators who were multi-lingual. They could all

read, write and speak English, Dutch, German and Japanese. These six

Warrant Officers were under the command ofW. Off. Soena~.

The next paper to be read should be "Detmers Contingency Plan", in which it is

alleged that the rafts, lifeboats, cutters and motor torpedo boat were

communicating with each other by radio in their plan to capture a ship. recover

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3

as many German survivors as possible and sail to a safe haven such as the

Japanese Carolines.

It is alleged that the NEI Signals Post was picking up these German messages

giving details of their positions at sea or ashore and their rescues and passing

this information to the ACNB. At the same time this intelligence was being

duplicated by the RAAF DIF stations and confirmed by their bearings. The

secret PMG DIF station in Sydney was closed down after the Kormoran was

sank and played no part in this aftermath.

THE AQUITANIA RESCUE

This has been well covered in my paper lIMT Aquitania (2nd

Edition). In brief,

this giant 45000 ton troopship sailed under standing orders never to stop at sea

yet she did stop to pick up 26 survivors from a life raft at Lat 240

35'S Long

1100 57'E. There were two German lifeboats fully loaded 5 - 8 oms away,

which made no effort to attract attention. It is alleged that the Aquitania was

diverted by ACNB radio to this nest of German survivors whose position was

known from radio intercepts ordered to stoop and rescue the raft only. It is

further alleged that the ACNB and the Aquitania were in radio communication

from then on until her arrival in Sydney on the 28th

November 1941.

THE TROCUS RESCUE

The Shell tanker Trocas stopped at Lat 24° 06'8 Long 1110

40'E to pick up a

raft containing 25 survivors. They came on board singly and searched before

being confined immediately in an empty oil tank with a prepared wooden

platform serving as a clean floor. The question is, how did the Trocas happen

to have an empty tank prepared in this manner ready for secure confinement of

German survivors? My paper "The Trocas Cover Up" deals with this question.

It is alleged that the ACNB was in radio communication with the Trocas 10-12

hours before the rescue to enable her to make the necessary preparations for a

1052

4

virtually guaranteed rescue at an exact time and position. It is also submitted

that this was a situation contrived with the Trocas and C in C China

(Singapore) to cover-up Aquitania's breaking radio silence between 6 - 7 am

WST the previous day, Sunday 23 rd November 1941.

FLT LT GOODE'S SIGHTING OF GOOSELNS LIFEBOAT

The attached pages 8, 9 and 10 of No 14 Sqn's Operations Logbook can be

confusing as the entries are not in chronological order and there are many

anomalies. I believe this was intended to cloud several cover-ups in these three

pages. It is dangerous for the uninformed reader or researcher to accept these 3

and all other pages of this Operations Logbook at face value. I only intend to

deal with cover-ups and vital features because "I was there" and know the

facts.

Hudson Search P1I25 was carried out on Tuesday, 25th November 1941 fromSF'7'S

No 4.tf:¥S Geraldton. I present the following table of data in a simplified form

extracted from the attached three pages:

TROC/S A1CNo PILOT T.O. LDG

PI I A16-7 Wg Cdr Lighfoot 0445 0910 WST

PI2 A16-45 Fit Lt Learmonth 0505 0940 WST

P13 A16-62 Fit Lt Goode 0430 0915 WST

** PI4 A16-30 Fit Lt Fletcher 0425 0625 WST

** PI5 A16-12 FIt Lt Cook 0615 1215 WST

* PI6 A16-36 FIt Lt Nichols 0415 1930 WST

* Pl7 A16·60 Fit Lt Forman 0410 0800 WST

* Both ale had engine failure, returned to Geraldton but completed Tracks 6

and 7 later.

** Did not complete Tracks 4 and 5. A16-30 made two attempts but

returned to Geraldton with engine failure. Cook A 16-12 flew direct to

Red Bluff(see account later). This entry is a blatant cover up.

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PINQ.SUBS.005.0087

5

It will be seen from the above table that only Wg Cdr Lighfoot, Fit Lt

Leannonth and Fit Lt Goode on Tracks 1,2 and 3 on the extreme western or

seaward search legs completed the search according to schedule. The eastern

Tracks 6 and 7 were completed later. The two middle Tracks 4 and 5 were

never completed leaving a vast gap in the search pattern although all tracks

were shown on the official RAAF Track Chart (Australian Archives Victoria

File No MP 1049/5 RAAF File 2026/2/451). My paper, "RAN and RAAF

Search Charts", reports cover-ups in these charts.

So that Fit Lt Goode in A16-62 CIS P13 Track 3 was the only searcher nearest

the middle of the search pattern. The entries on page 106 of the SWACH

Operations Record Book are significant:

QUOTE

0724 [WST] Received NR6 fr Pearce = Pl3 sighted lifeboat 24°52'S

111 0 09'E.

0725 [WST] SIN Darnels phone Pearce = instructed them to call for

amplifYing report.

0745 [WST] Signaled CWR lifeboat sighted 24°52'S lIl o09'E at 2307Z!24

= 23422.

NOTE: It is considered that the Herstein sighted in position 26°08'S

II1 0 50'E at 22372 should be diverted to pick up the lifeboat.

There were no naval officers on duty to arrange this.

0825 WST Received NRI2 fr Pearce = Pl3P lifeboat full using white coats

as sails have lost touch vis bad searching am returning to base

Carnarvon 00092/25 00.

9839 WST Received NRI6 fr Pearce P13 P lifeboat course East 3 knots =

00322/25.

UNQUOTE

1054

•

6~1!:

This then was Goode's sighting. It was obvious that 4be only had a brief

sighting in bad weather possiblrin a rainsquall and then lost the lifeboat again.

On the adjacent leg, PI2 Fit Lt Learmonth was reporting visibility 8 oms

negative sightings.

According to Barbara Winter, the Herstein was directed to Goode's signaled

original sighting position but Goode then amended this position and Herstein

was not so informed. I can find no detailed reasoning in RAAF records for

this. The normal procedure for RAAF patrols to seaward was to check the

position of landfall and back plot to any sighting position and then amend it if

necessary. He landed at 0915 hrs WST and probably made land fall 10 - 15

.minutes earlier south of Steep Point or on Dirk Hartog Island but the actual

spot is unknown.

The original lifeboat position would no doubt have been based on Dead

Reckoning and Astro-Navigation. Once having found a lifeboat in bad weather

conditions the sensible thing to do would be to call for D/F bearings which

would have fixed his then position to within about I nm then back plot theet:

distant to the lifeboat and send a more accurate position report.

My query, at this stage, is how did Goode find a lifeboat in such bad weather

conditions that he lost it again. I speculate that he was instructed to search a

certain position. I cannot prove this as the RAAF Pearce Signals Log prior to

the 151 December 1941 is missing. I suggest the reader return to this conjecture

after reading this paper and assessing the situation as a whole.

FLT LT COOK'S SIGHTING OF TWO LIFEBOATS ON COAST

The entry of Fit Lt Cook, double starred above, is a most obvious and blatant

cover-up. Records show that about 9 am Tuesday 25 November 1941 he

sighted Lt Cdr Bretschneider's lifeboat at Red Bluff and soon after he sighted

CPO Kohn's lifeboat at the 20 mile wel1 near Quobba. Upon landing Fit Lt

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PINQ.SUBS.005.0088

7

Sharp contacted the local Manager of Dalety's, Herbert Sharp, who organised 3

trucks and informed Police Sergeant Anderson. Soon after Cook joined

Sergeant Anderson, Dr Piccles and Mr Snook in a utility, heading northward.

About an hour later Keith Baston from Quobba stopped the utility told Fit Lt

Cook he had been recalled to the airfield and then drove him back there.

There can be no doubt that Cook was not flying on a 6 hour flight on leg 5 of

Search PII25 but this involves another cover up involving the departure from

Geraldton. Whilst all other aircraft took off between 0410 and 0505 hrs WST,S

Cook waited until 061,4 hrs.

Page 8 attached shows that Fit Lt Nicholas took off from Pearce at 0345 hrs

WST on the 25th and landed at Geraldton at 0500 hrs. In addition, to the crew

shown this aircraft was carrying FIt Lt Menear, the Senior RAAF Pearce

Operations Officer, a clerk, an airframe and engine fitters plus operations

equipment. It is alleged that at some time during the night Gp Cpt Heffeman or

Wg Cdr Lightfoot received an urgent telephone call from either Air Cdre De La

Rue, Wg Cdr Mclean or Wg Cdr Fleming giving instructions that either he, Wg

Cdr Lighfoot, or a Fit Cdr should await the arrival of Fit Lt Nicholas' aircraft

as they were carrying special instructions which, for security reasons, could not

be passed and explained over the telephone. Pure conjecture, of course, at this

stage.

But the fact is that Fit Cook in Hudson A16-22 took off at 0615 and flying at

140 kts reached Red Bluff either directly or along a coastal search in a flight

time of 2 hrs 15 minutes, probably making land fall on the coastline north of

Red Bluff and then flying southward and "luckily" found two lifeboats. The

information received by him at Geraldton was obviously so important that he

never carried out his Search Track No 5 even though, at that stage, three

aircraft had returned to Geraldton with engine trouble and might be unable to

continue possibly leaving 4 search legs missing. Quite obviously, Cook was

informed that there were two lifeboats ashore north of Carnarvon.

, 105(;

8

From whence did this information come. There were 3 possible sources:

(I) The NEI Signals Unit at the Port Hotel Carnarvon had received their

radioed landing message to the other German boats.

(II) RAAF DIF had fixed their positions by bearings taken on these positions

by bearings taken on these radioed landing signals.

(III) Someone saw both boats, reported their presence through Intelligence

channels, possibly Army Intelligence. It is known that they had white

four-wheel drive vehicles with powerful radio receivers and transmitters

patrolling the coastal strip as far north as the Kimberleys, avoiding

civilisation but making rendezvous with small army patrols and

informers. These units were highly secret. It is significant when the

Navy were interrogating the German POW's a Senior Naval Captain

made the comment, "Keep the Army out of this."

However, the cover-up in the 14 Sqn Operations Log continues on page 9. Fit

Nicholas in Hudson A16-95 is shown taking off at 0510 Le. 10 minutes after he

had landed at Geraldton heading cross country for Carnarvon a 2 hour flight.

He then retumed to Geraldton and FIt Lt Fletcher and I saw him at lunchtime in

the Officer's mess. The record shows him as landing at 1700 a ridiculous

figure i.e. officially he carried out a 12 hour-flight, whereas the normal planned

endurance flight time of a Hudson was 6 hours and none of the aircraft were

using internal long-range tanks. They were all in storage at Pearce.

At page 10, attached, it will be seen that at 1305 hrs WST Fit Lt Fletcher and I

took off in Hudson A16-30 on a square search but for the tanker Trocas not to

locate HMAS Sydney and ship's boats as shown in the remarks column. For

the third time that day, we returned unserviceable on one engine: this was

becoming a habit. Then at 1520 hrs the same day Fit Lt Nicholas took off on a

square search for the Tanker Trocas, once again not to locate HMAS Sydney

and ship's boats. He was recalled to Geraldton before reaching the datum

point. Unbeknown. to us, the Trocas had radioed its position.1057

PINQ.SUBS.005.0089

9

The point is that the Trocas should have been sighted earlier that morning by

Hudsons on Search P/25, but it was at the southern end of Tracks 4 & 5, which

were not carried out by Fletcher and Cook. Why disguise the fact by false

entries that we were to square search for the Trocas not the Sydney. The

ACNB was obviously worried that the German paws might have captured the

Trocas before HMAS Wyrallah had reached and placed an armed guard aboard.

She had obviously missed an agreed radio schedule.

KOOLINDA RESCUES LIFEBOAT

In my paper titled, "Detmers Contingency Plan", I wrote of how Fit Lt Cook in

Hudson A16-62 CIS P24 whilst on Search P2/26 sighted Kuhl's lifeboat at

0734 hrs WST on Wednesday 26th November 1941 in position Lat 20° 14'S

Long ll2° 24'E steering 07SOT at about 1.7 kts. At 1405 hrs WST, it was

picked up by the Koolinda at Lat 24° 07'S Long 112° 47'E. So that in about 11

hrs after altering Course 4° to Port it had covered 22.15 nms and a course of

071or. Koolinda in fact picked her up only 3-4 nms north ofwhere Kuhl's boat

would have been had she maintained as course of 0750T but this was in near

darkness. Before Captain John Airey would take them aboard he made the

Germans throw a considerable number of arms overboard. They came on

board singly and were searched singly for arms and an Atlas confiscated and

they were confined under guard in No 2 orlop deck.

Later in the darkness at 2215 hrs Koolinda challenged an unknown ship which

did not reply. This recovery is reasonable, Kuhl's latest lifeboat position could

have been calculated closely by DNOWA and Koolinda directed to it. On the

other hand if it had been transmitted by radio to other German craft both the

NEI Military Signals Listening Post at Carnarvon and the RAAF DIF Stations

could have fixed its position exactly.

THE CENTAUR LIFEBOAT RESCUE

1058

10

This is the most powerful and damming evidence that the lifeboats were

communicating by radio and that their signals were being picked up by the NEI

Signals Listening Post at Carnarvon and by RAAF DIF stations. These boats

were using modem powerful Tele-funken portable radios. Fit Lt Cook sighted

Detmers' lifeboat at 0648 H126 at Lat 24° 39'S 112° 02'E on a course of 090T

i.e. due east travelling at 1.7 kts. Fit Lt Learmonth in a Hudson. Fit Lt Wintert/v--(CHIN$c)N

in a Gannet and Lt Gftrfiifler DSN in a Catalina failed to relocate this lifeboat

particularly because of the foul weather in this area and they were searching

eastward of Detmers last seen position based on his sighted heading. But

Detmers had carried out a 'D' tum after Cook~ aircraft had left the area and

headed due west on a course of 2700r for a period of IS % hours at a speed of

1.7 kts so that he was at a distance of 26.2 nm west of his sighting by Cook.

Had he continued on his easterly course at the same speed he would have been

26.2 nms east of his sighted position as plotted by DNOWA. So that Centaur

picked up Detmers' lifeboat 52 Y2 runs west of where it was calculated to have

been. Such a move could never have been foreseen by the Navy and the only

way of knowing his actual position in the darkness at 10:30 pm was by RAAF

DlFandtheNEI.vNI-r~ IN'1'~~Ci::P1' f>F De1'mI!R'S Rfl./)IO"f'R,qN&Il7IS~10N'f>

In his book, "The Raider Kormoran", Detmers wrote that he fired two red flares

to attract attention. Barbara Winter in her book copied this statement. Both 2nd

mate Eric Greenwood and ship's Doctor Habberfield are still alive and I have

interviewed and corresponded with them. Both said they were on the poop

deck and did not see any red flares but that the Centaur came alongside the

lifeboat in the darkness and heard voices.

Military intereept of Detmers radio trtmsmissj€}fis a.ul Gosseln's lifeboat was

still at large. A capture of the Centaur by Detmers was still possible or of a

tanker by Gosseln was also possible. It would only take a seaman with a knife

at a Captain or seaman's throat to take a hostage and the ship would be theirs.

1059

PINQ.SUBS.005.0090

II

Detmers' lifeboat rescue provides clear intentions of their plan to evade rescue

and to capture a ship. They were thwarted by allied interception of their radio

signals. which are thus confirmed.

HMAS YANDRA'S RESCUE OF A LIFEBOAT

Fit Lt Goode orignally sighted Gosseln's lifeboat 160-180 nms out to sea and

lost it in bad weather conditions before it was eventually re-sighted by FIt Lt

Rooke in Anson W2049 on search Gl/27 at 1015H/27 at Lat 25°S 04'S Long

112 04°E and thus had covered a distance of 108.8 nms in 58.25 hrs at 1.87 kts

on a track of096"T since Goode's sighting.

Goode flew to HMAS Yandra and the tanker Herstein some 15 nms away and

signaled his instruction to follow him in the direction of the boats by the

traditional way of repeating low level flights in the direction and waggling his

wings till they got the message and this would have eventually got them in

about 1 Y:z hours at 10 knots to the sighted position.

But Yandra picked up Gosseln's lifeboat at 1157HJ27 at Lat 24° 59°8 Long 112

OO'E which meant it had altered course 23° to Starboard and increased her speed

from 1.87 kts to 10.06 kts and this in a clinker built boat with only a lug sail in

the face ofa fresh south east wind with only a few inches of freeboard and with

72 men aboard.

In his initial sighting report at 1I34HJ28 Rooke had mentioned another small

patrol vessel steering a course approximately to position. Rooke was a flying

instructor unskilled in maritime reconnaissance and ship recognition. It is

claimed that this small patrol vessel was in fact the German torpedo boat still'10

afloat, which towed Gosseln's lifeboat at 10 kts for 4!5 minutes, transferred 20 -

30 survivors aboard the lifeboat. and was then, scuttled. Normal torpedo crews

were aboard this lifeboat.

1060

12

The Centaur, Yandra and Trocas rescues provide the strongest evidence that the

German boats and rafts were communicating by radio and that their messages

were being intercepted and the information used to direct allied ships and

aircraft to intercept them. The Aquitania, Koolinda rescues and Goode's

intercept also support this theory when all rescues are regarded as whole.

Mr Makin, the Navy Minister at the time of the loss of HMAS, is reported as

saying, "The Germans were the only eye witnesses of the battle". These words

may be politically correct, but there were other witnesses. They wore

earphones, listened to loud speakers and gazed into Cathode Ray Tubes. This

was electronic warfare, all knowledge of which has been suppressed and

withheld from researchers and the Australian public. This secrecy was

necessary and acceptable in Wartime, but is not fifty-six years after the event.

C.A.V. Bourne

/3{ "(q7

lOG 1

PINQ.SUBS.005.0091

i\pl'endi:c "A tI

OPERATIONS RECORD DOOK

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OPEHATIONS HECORD DOOK

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PINQ.SUBS.005.0092

'. ('~. ,. ~. ~ ... 't' .- " ... " lin ' •


At the first meeting of the HMAS Sydney Forum 1997 Committee I was

appointed to approach the Department of Veteran Affairs to seek their

assistance in mounting the Forum.

Accordingly, in October 1997 I approached Jim Dalton the W.A. DeputyA.

Director and mad~ tentative request for assistance. I pointed out that the topic

was controversial and had possibly sensitive, political implications. I said this

because I did not wish him to prejudice his personal position by such an

involvement. However, I guessed that he might wish to confer with his

colleagues in Canberra and may be get the pennission of his Secretary and even

that of the Minister of OVA.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERAN AFFAIRSINVOVLEMENT


At a second meeting a few weeks later Jim Dalton agreed to provide assistance

and it was agreed that a third meeting would take place at which one of his

officers Paul DuDumas would be present as would John Doohan the Secretary

of the Forum 1997 Committee when a broad idea of our requirements would be

presented. At this meeting it was agreed that either Mike Scaffidi or Mike

Wade would assist in the provision of materials for a static display of

documents, photographs and the model of HMAS Perth. a Leander Class

Cruiser, identical to the Sydney.

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It was also agreed that the OVA representative would make an audio recording

of the proceedings of both days of the Forum to be held on Saturday and

10C5

PINQ.SUBS.005.0093

2

Sunday the 1st and 2nd February 1997 and would provide a typed transcript of

these proceedings.

Later on Dr Mike McCarthy Curator of the Fremantle Maritime museum

promised to make 15 copies of this transcript together with copies of the papers

submitted by speakers at the Forum. This would provide for a limited

distribution, which was to have included in several Federal Government

Departments particularly that of the Minister of Defence. In January and

March 1997 John Doohan corresponded with the Minister's staff who indicated

the Minister would welcome a copy and the Forum Committee was anxious

that this should be forwarded at an early date.

Mike Wade subsequently gave wonderful assistance in the provision of a

collapsible mobile screen with documents and photographs suitably titled and

with explanatory notes. He also made an audio recording of the first day's

proceedings, which occupied 6 hours. The Sunday proceedings last only 5

hours when the Chairman, Gwynne Williams, closed the meeting at 3 pm as a

result of a preplanned attempt to hijack the Forum by associates and members

of the HMAS Sydney Foundation Trust Inc who were scattered strategically

throughout the audience of some 200 researchers and interested public (This is

a non air-conditioned hall with a temperature of41°C).

The meeting concluded in disarray, as a result, no question period took place

and no resolutions or recommendations were made thus achieving the aim of

the mischief makers. Only 5 hours of audio recording was thus completed on

the second day.

Time passed by with John Doohan making occasional requests to Mike Wade

as to the progress of the transcript. Neither he nor I were prepared to press

strongly to expedite proceedings as although we had kept DVA involvement

low key media-wise to avoid any possible incrimination of DVA in the inter-

10GB

3

faction squabbling, we were both extremely grateful to DVA for the valuable

assistance they gave the Forum Committee.

In April 1997, I asked Mike Wade, "how things were going" on the transcript

and he replied that he was having difficulty in finding someone to do it (there

are many firms in Perth capable of this transcription of tapes).

Shortly after, Stephen Smith MHR supported by Paul Filing MHR had

presented a motion on HMAS Sydney in the House Representatives, I again

kept an appointment with Jim Dalton and asked him whether the prolonged

delay in producing the transcript was due to any external influences; eg:

pressure form the HMAS Sydney Foundation Trust. He thought that I was

being overly suspicious and said that he would "look into it" and he then

rushed off to a conference. This last meeting lasted about one minute.

However, about 3 weeks later, John Doohan received the typed transcripts of

61 pages from Mike Wade. After examining the document, John Doohan

infonned me by telephone that much of the vital evidence given at the Forum

was missing from the typed manuscript and that in effect all the transcript

covered was "dregs". In brief some of the following important presentations

were missing:

(I) Commodore Trotter's opening address - all record of his presence and

views were thus erased from the record.

(2) My presentation as covered in "The Bourne Papers" which were

supported by photographs and documents on display;

(3) John Doohan's tabling of Reg Landers' Statutory Declaration on his HIF /

DIF tracking of the raider Kormoran from a secret PMG D/F station in

Sydney and the presentation of the (ate Gordon Laffer's papers which

studied the murder ofHMAS Sydney survivors;

10G7

PINQ.SUBS.005.0094

4

(4) Richard Summerall's presentation of the Australian Archives

involvement;

(5) Journalist David Kennedy's presentation, with the aid of a video of his

interview with the late leading writer, Mason, a few days prior to the

latter's death; and

(6) Dr Bye's presentation of his drift card experiment relating to the

Christmas Island raft and corpse.

And so the list goes on. John Doohan then asked Mike Wade for the tapes,

which I picked up from DVA on VJ Day and passed to John Doohan that day.

He rang me to say that there were only 4 tapes in the packet with a~ hr reading

on each side ofeach tape; ie: a total of 6 hours whereas there should have been

a total of II hours recording needing at least 8 tapes. It became obvious to

both of us that the tapes and transcripts had been edited somewhere by

someone or organisation that was well informed on the historical political value

of the evidence given at the Forum 1997.

The incongruous situation now arises that, although the Minister for Defence

was awaiting receipt of the transcripts and the Forum Committee was anxious

to forward them to him, the prolonged delay was apparently caused by another

Federal Government Department; ie: the Department of Veteran Affairs.

My personal belief is that after consultation with the Defence Department,

DVA Canberra gave the WA Deputy Director, Jim Dalton approval to assist in

the Forum 1997 with instructions that the transcript tapes were to be forward~~'A

the Department of Defence. It is in fact possible that the original tapes are still

held there together with a typed transcript. After editing, the "doctored" tapes

were returned to DVA of WA for a local transcript to be made.

lOC8

5

When passing the transcripts to John Doohan Mike Wade, on the telephone,

was apologetic over the whole affair. If for example he had sent 8 audio tapes

to Canberra and received only 4 in return, he would realise that some

skullduggery had taken place and he had been left "holding the baby".

Possibly, he shares this view and feeling with his Deputy Director.

Both John Doohan and I feel betrayed by DVA over the whole affair but bear

no malice to Jim Dalton and Mike Wade. Both are Public Servants with

families and mortgages and must do as they are told in the belief that they are

serving the nation's interest.

In fact, all is not lost. The Forum 97 Committee enlisted the help of John

Henry (his Australian name, a relative of a German seaman lost on the

Kormoran) and paid him to make both audio and video records of the whole

Forum with before and after scenes and special shots. These are now held in

secure storage and will be used as and when the End Secrecy on Sydney Group

(ESOS) see the greatest advantage to be gained.

C.A.V. Bourne

lO£;9

PINQ.SUBS.005.0095


THE R.S.L. INVOLVEMENT


Trevor Lloyd, a trustee of the Executive of the R.S.L. W.A. Branch, was

appointed as a trustee of the HMAS Sydney Foundation Trust (Inc) when it was

originally founded by Wayne Borne in 1965 and remained in that capacity

when it was reconstituted by Graham Edwards MLC after Wayne Borne's

sudden death in 1996. Paul Filing MLA was also a trustee of this original

Sydney Trust and remains so today.

When the End Secrecy on Sydney Group (ESOS) formed the HMAS Forum

1997 Committee, Trevor Lloyd acted as a liaison officer between the Forum 97

Committee and the HMAS Sydney Foundation Trust Inc. All members of the

Forum 1997 Committee were RSL members and the regular meetings took

place in Anzac House Club rooms.

At the 8151

Annual State Congress of the R.S.L W.A. Branch held the 13-1Slh

June 1997 Agenda Items No 46 and 47 (copies attached) were both passed

unanimously.

Both motions were then referred as W.A. Agenda Items to the R.S.L. National

Congress held in Adelaide during the week and both items were again carried

with Agenda Item No 46 being accepted as Standing Policy.

This means that by accepting the need to search for the truth on the loss of

HMAS Sydney, the Returned and Services League of Australia does not

1070

I,

2

believe the official account of the alleged battle between HMAS Sydney and

HSK Kormoran on the 19th November 1941 off the W.A. Coast.

A copy of my letter dated / ~/sjcJ7 to the then National President, Major

General "Digger" James is also attached. This demonstrates the difficulties of

researchers speaking publicly on the subject and the reluctance of those in

authority to listen to and accept a contrary and possibly embarrassing viewpoint

whereas the Australian public are keen to hear and learn researched facts and

not just media speculation.

CAY. Bourne

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PINQ.SUBS.005.0096

·71 •

YANCHEP-1WO ROCKS SUB-BRANCH

ITEM NO. 46

....

·72·

It is for these reasons that the following motion Is ~ut:

GENERAL: HMAS SYDNEY· SEARCH FOR THE TRU'-H

PREAMBLE

HMAS Sydney was lost with all hands (645) on the 19th November 1941. The PrimeMinister, John Curtin, made two brief statements on her sinking on the 1st and 3rd ofDecember 1941. These were based primarily on the earlier interrogation of Lt.Bunje, who was assessed as being one of the more truthful of the German survivors.

Mr. F A Eldridge, MA, a senior master on the teaching staff of the Royal AustralianNaval College acting in a voluntary capacity produced a "Report on the Loss ofHMAS Sydney" based entirely on his examination of the material gathered frominterrogations of the German survivors. It was handed to Commander Long, Directorof NavallnteJligence, on the 28th of January 1942, some 10 weeks after the sinking.

In his covering minute to the DCNS the DNI state that "the report had been checkedthrough. There appear to be no errors." It was sighted by the CNS, 2nd navalmember and the DCNS. Mr. Eldridge was commended for his work in a voluntarycapacity.

The Eldridge Report was conceived in haste and secrecy. It did not becomeavailable for pUblic access until after 1972. ~~AN\/}tY\.lM1 Jo,&1'

In January 1997, Richard Summerrell, Assistant Director, National Office, AustralianArchives, confirmed that there had never been an official inquiry into the sinking ofthe HMAS Sydney.

Historians, researchers, authors and journalists over the y~ars have cast doubts onthe truthfulness of many of the German survivors' accounts of the action.

The WA Maritime Museum held a HMAS Sydney Forum in 1991, the general themebeing ''The Search for the Wreck of the Sydney." On the 1st and 2nd February 1997,the HMAS Sydney Forum 1997 Committee, convened by the "End Secrecy onSydney Group" held a Forum to present new evidence on its theme, ''The Search forthe Truth on HMAS Sydney" which revealed t[1at the Germans were telling lies onmany aspects of the battle. Doubt was thus cast on the credibility of the EldridgeReport, which had remained unchallenged for fifty-five years. The transcripts of bothForums are held in the Australian National Archives, the WA Maritime Museum andthe WA Battye Library.

Nearly 200 historians, researchers and interested public attended the 1997 Forumand voted overwhelmingly in favour of continuing the search for the truth on thesinking of HMAS Sydney. It is vital for historical correctness that future generationsof Australians learn the true story of the sinking of HMAS Sydney.

RESOLUTION

THAT THE RETURNED AND SERVICES LEAGUE SUPPORTS THE SEARCH FORTHE TRUTH ON THE SINKING OF HMAS SYDNEY AND THAT THIS BEADOPTED AS NATIONAL STANDING POLICY.

Ja:cngrss97:ENTITLE 1072 ....Ja:cngrss97:ENTITLE

1073

PINQ.SUBS.005.0097

-73·...•

GERALDTON CITY, DONGARA, NORTHAMPTON SUB-BRANCHES

ITEM No. 47

GENERAL: HMAS SYDNEY·FOR ACTION BY THE NATIONAL exECUTIVE

PREAMBLE

56 years have passed since the sinking of HMAS Sydney with little attempt orapparent desire by successive Governments to locate the wreck to put at rest theminds of the relatives of the 645 crew that perished with their ship. The NorthernSub-Branches are particularly concerned with the doubts remaining as to the fate ofthis warship since it is probably located off our section of the coast and constantinquiries are directed to Sub-Branches by the general commur.ity and the manyvisitors that come to our towns and cities. We believe that the time for action is longoverdiie and that the Australian Taxpayers will support the expenditure necessary tolocate'lhe ship.

RESOLUTION

"THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PROVIDE THE NECESSARY INITIATIVEAND FUNDS, AS PROPOSED BY THE LATE SENATOR JOHN PANIZZA, TO FINDTHE HMAS SYDNEY LOST IN 1941."

1074Ja:cngrss97:ENTITi..E

Gp. CAPT. C.A.V. Bourne86 Wattle St

Tuart Hill W.A.6060

TEL: 08 9344 2248FAX; 08 93094902

lih August 1997

MAl. GEN. W.B. James AD. MBE, MCNational PresidentR.S.L. National HeadquartersP.O. Box 303CANBERRA A.C.T. 260 I

Dear General

NATIONAL CONGRESS HMAS SYDNEY

~?IlO\Vi~f normal procedure undOUbtedly Agenda Items Nos. 46 and 47 of thef .A

h, 8; Annu~1 State Congress will be submitted for inclusion on the Aoenda

or t e 10rthcomlOg National Congress. '"

I think it essential to keep the record straioht that the ~ II "d' '" 10 O\'dng account ofprocee lOgS an.d events be recorded as the official minutes "viII no~ tell the fullstory although It can be veritied from the audio tapes made at the time,

As delegate for the Yanchep/Two Rocks R S L S b B I ...... -S d , -lh ' '. u - runc 1 at .J .J "pm on~n ay ) June '.997. I rose to present Item No 46. I had spoken to; onl .... 4

mmutes when Chairman Len Turner interrupted and said' "All ve .' t :bU~, cut it short:' I .rep.~ied. ,"I thought I had '0 minutes:: He the;o~~:;:~t:;~o pr~sent the molton which I did immediately and it was seconded, Withiness t an one second. he then called for "Those in favour" and .

ap " . b unanImousprova . was glve.n y a show of hands. So that following "the gao" no

OPP?rtUntty was given for anyone to speak for or aoainst 0; to am~ "'d thmotion. '" en e

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PINQ.SUBS.005.0098

Maj, Gen. W. B. James AO, MBE, Me 3 II August 1997

Paragraph 6 of Congress Rules of Debate states. "\Vhen a motion has been dulyproposed and seconded. the Chairman shall at once proceed to take the \'otesthere on unless some delegate rises to oppose it or propose an amendment",

Earlier during the lunch break [ had discusM:d Item No 47 with the Geraldtonspokesman who sat next to me for both daysACongress. [showed him a writtencopy of an amendment I proposed to make to Item No 47 and he generallyagreed to it. I also showed this proposed amendment to Trevor Lloyd. a StateExecutive Trustee and also [he appointed R.S.L. trustee on the HMAS SydneyFoundation Trust and he als0 appe:lred happy \\ith it. At le:lst he \vas aware ofmy intentions.

Obviously the Chairman acted within the strict letter of Rule 6 in calling forvotes within one second of the seconding and possibly considered this wassmarr chairmanship but he onl:: applied this "sudden death" procedure inrespect of the two H~l--\S S:: dney motions and not to any other motion duringCongress. I consider this to be malproctice under the circumstances. TheChoirman \vas well aware from my earlier speech and personal acquaintancethot I was severely disabled and unable to rise quid:l:: to my feet. Although Iraised m:: hand and called ~"\ut. this actiL)n was unnoticed amidst the \'ct:ngprocedure.

Yours sincerely

It could be said that Congress was running behind time and time saving wasnecessary except that 6 or 7 more lengthy motions and several speechesfollowed before the Congress closed at 4.20 pm.

It could also be said that the passing of Agenda Item No 47 was invalid becauseit had earlier been withdrawn and the Geraldton delegate only proceeded with itunder duress. Had he refused to do so he could have been deemed in contemptof the Chair and disciplined.

It is most important that the implications of Agenda Item 47 be examinedcarefully because it means that millions of taxpayer's dollars could be fundedto meet this recommendation.

MLA. Stephen Smith recently moved a motion on this subject in FederalParliament and at the relayed suggestion of the Minister for Defence, to whichMr Smith agreed, it was referred to a Sub Committee of the joint standingCommittee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade.

P.S You may gather that I feel strongly on this subject. As a young Hudsonpilot I carried out aerial searches for German raider Steiermark(Kormoran) know to be operating off the W.A coast. then for Hi\tlASSydney and finally for the survivors of their alleged battle, I haveresearched this matter for the past 56 years. I lost a mate on HMASSydney!!!

c.A.V, Bourne

•

11 August 1997:'vlaj. Glln. \\. B. James AO. MBE. ~IC

Following completion of Agenda Item 46 the Geraldton delegate rose andannounced. "In view of the previous item. I wish to withdraw Item 4T and hesat down. It appeared that \vas the end of the matter but the Chairman LenTurner. then said. "You cannot withdraw the motion as it is different to theprevious motion. Proceed with your motion". The Geraldton delegate thenrose and spoke for about 15 seconds and then said. "I present the motion'" andit was seconded. Within one second the Chairman said "Those in favour" andagain received a unanimous show of hands. He followed immediately with··those against". then "Carried".

O\'erall I had no opP0rrunit:. lL) ful:: present Item lei in the allo\\ able i l~

minutes and 5 minutes right of Repl:.. \:0 one \\ as given the opporrunit:: It)speak for. agoinsl or to amend either Items -+0 and -t"". \Vorse still. IheGeraldton delegate \\ os forced to present Item :--';0 -+., despite his withdr:m al ofit. Thus any meaningful debate on the loss of the HMAS Svdne\ \\ aseffectively gagged swiftl:: and purposel::. I must admit that I was n~t su;Prisedby this turn of e\~nts. This has b~en the stor\ on th~ loss of HMAS Svdne\ for56 years - nothing said. nothing done.' . .

··LEST WE FORGET"

A 1~/197

107G 1077

PINQ.SUBS.005.0099

I, 86 Wattle Street Telephone: 0893442248 'lr/l/ !Q7 · The ACNB had steadfastly denied that Aquitania broke radio silence. The ACNB stand condemned from the mouths of these German

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