Hunt Moral panic Media

8/19/2019 Hunt Moral panic Media

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'Moral Panic' and Moral Language in the MediaAuthor(s): Arnold HuntSource: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Dec., 1997), pp. 629-648Published by: Wiley on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political ScienceStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/591600 .

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2/21

Arnold

Hunt

'Moral

panic'

and

moral

language

in the

media

ABSTRACT

This article provides

a comprehensive

survey

of the use

of the term 'moral

panic'

from its coinage

in 1972

until the

present

day. It traces

the evolution

of the term

in academic sociology

and criminology,

its adoption by

the media in

the

mid-

1980s and its subsequent

employment

in the

national press.

It shows how

and

why

the term

changed

its meaning,

and how far

its use

in academic

discourse

affected

its use

in the media.

The

article traces the

development

of 'moral

panic' in

the

media, where it

was

first used

pejoratively,

then

rejected for being

pejorative,

and finally

rehabilitated

as a term

of approval.

It explains

why the term

developed

as it did:

how

it enabled

journalists

to justify

the moral

and social

role of

the media, and

also

to support

the reassertion of 'familyvalues' in the early l990s.

The article

concludes

by considering

the relationship

between 'moral

panic'

and moral language

in general. This

is a more

speculaiive

analysis of

the term,

drawing

on the

work of moral

philosophers

and attempiing

to

predict

how 'moral

panic' may develop

in the future.

'Moral panic',

I suggest,

is an unsaiisfactory

form of moral

language

which may

adversely affect

the

media's ability

to handle

moral issues seriously.

KEYWORDS:

Media; morality;

moral

panic

I

first encountered

the

term 'moral

panic'

at a seminar

in earlymodern

history

n

1991.As I

later discovered,

t

had been around

for nearlytwenty

years and

had

alreadybecome

firmlyestablished

n the literature

of soci-

ology

and

criminology;

but

it wasonly

just beginning

to

find its way

into

wider

circulation.

I

was curious,

first about

its application

to the

fields

of

social

and

culturalhistory

withwhich

I

was concerned,

then

aboutits back-

ground,

its original

use and its subsequent

development.

Despitethe exist-

ence of a sizable body of literatureon the subject, most recentlyErich

Goode

and Nachman

Ben-Yehuda's

Moral

Panic: The

Social

Construction

f

Deviance

(1994),

whose

usefuldistinction

between

three

different

theories

of

moralpanic

('interest-group',

elite-engineered'

and 'grassroots')

have

gratefully

adopted

here, there

is

no fully detailed

or

satisfactory

istoryof

the term.

This article

attempts

o provide

one,

and to suggest,

through

an

Bnt. Jnl. of Socgologzy

olume no. 48

Issue no.

4 December 1997

ISSN 0007-1315

i) London

School of Economics

1997


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3/21

630

Arnold

Hunt

examination

of

the

various

meanings

of

the

term,

that

sociologists

need

to

be

more

rigorous

n

its

use

and

more

sensitive

to

its

hidden

implications.

In

particular, doubtwhetherGoodeandBen-Yehudare ustified n treat-

ing

it

as

a

homogeneous

concept

and

in

attempting

o

construct

a

grand

unified

theory

of

moral

panic.

A

personal

apologia

eems

necessary,

as

I

am

a

historian,

not a

sociologist,

uneasily

aware

of

the

tension

between

the

empirical

method

in

which

I

was

rained

and

the

more

theoretical

approach

which

I

adopt

here.

This

is

intended

as

an

interdisciplinary

work,

an

encounter

between

two

academic

traditions

hat

meet

too

seldom,

to

the

disadvantage

f

both.

While

this

article

was

being

written,

the

problem

of

'moral

panic'

took

on

a

new

dimension.The termhas appearedoccasionallyn the national

press

for

at

least

ten

years,

but

suddenly

came

to

prominence

in

1993,

as a

survey

of

the

broadsheet

newspapers

demonstrates.

FT

Profile,

a

computer

database

overing

most

of

the

national

press

rom

the

late

1980s,

ists

eleven

uses

of

the

term

in

1989,

twelve

n

1990,

eight

in

1991

and

seventeen

in

1992,

but

eighty-nine

n

1993.

This,

as

we

shall

see,

has

implications

or

the

academic

use

of

the

term,

for,

asJean

Aitchison

has

argued,

newspapers

do

not

initiate

linguistic

change

so

much

as

'push

the

language

along

further

in

the

direction

n

which

it

was

already

going',

and

sociologists

must

there-

fore

bear

some

responsibility or the use of 'moralpanic' in the media.

(Aitchison

1994:

19)

The

media's

heightened

sensitivity

o

moral

ssues

may

be

just

a

temporary

phase,

one

of

a

series

of

media

debates

about

'moral

decline'

that

have

gone

on

since

the

1960s,

flaring

up

and

quickly

dying

down

again.

But

in

looking

at

'moral

panic'

in

the

context

of

this

wider

debate

on

public

morals,

this

article

will

also

consider

the

possibility

hat

the

potent

association

of

morality

with

panic

may

have

a

permanent

effect

on

the

moral

language

used

by

the

media.

1.'INTEREST-GROUP'HEORY

Discussion

f

moral

panic

properly

begins

with

Stanley

Cohen's

Folk

Devils

and

MoralPanics

1972),

a

classic

ociological

tudy

of

the

Mods

and

Rockers

phenomenon

of

the

mid-1960s.

Cohen

offered

the

following

definition

of

the

term:

Societies

appear

to

be

subject,

every

now

and

then,

to

periods

of

moral

panic.

A

condition,

episode,

person

or

group

of

persons

emerges

to

become

defined

as

a

threat

to

societal

valuesand interests; ts natureis

presented

in

a

stylized

and

stereotypical

ashion

by

the

mass

media;

the

moral

barricades

are

manned

by

editors,

bishops,

politicians

and

other

right-thinking

eople;

socially

accredited

experts

pronounce

their

diag-

noses

and

solutions;

ways

of

coping

are

evolved

or

(more

often)

resorted

to;

the

condition

then

disappears,

submerges

or

deteriorates

and

becomes

more

visible.

Sometimes

the

object

of

the

panic

is

quite

novel

and

at

other

times

it

is

something

which

has

been

in

existence

long




4/21

'Moral anic'and moral

anguagen themedia

631

enough, but

suddenly appears in the limelight.

Sometimes the panic

passesover and is forgotten, except in

folklore and collective

memory;at

other times it has more seriousandlong-lasting epercussions nd might

produce such changes as those in legal

and social policy or

even in the

waythe society

conceives tself.

Severaldetailsof

Cohen's thesishave provedparticularly

nfluential.The

first s the idea thateverymoralpanic has

its scapegoat, he

'folkdevil' onto

whom public fears and

fantasiesare

projected.The moral panic must have

an object; it must be

about something.

This does not mean that the folk

devil is created by the

moral panic. Cohen was at pains to

point out that

'despite using termssuch as panic nd analogiesfrom the studyof mass

hysteriaand delusion' he did not mean to

implythat the Mods

and Rockers

would not have existed if there had been

no moral panic or 'would have

gone away f we had simply gnored them',

only that turningthem into folk

devils was an inappropriate solution to

the problem. That 'problem',

however,wasnot the activities f the Mods

and Rockers,or onlyin a limited

and temporary ense;

the underlyingcause of the moralpanic

wasthe 'cul-

turalstrainand

ambiguity' ausedby social change. The object

of the moral

panic wasnot so much

the ModsandRockersas the post-war

ffluenceand

sexualfreedom thatthey represented; onsequently, he Modsand Rockers

were forgotten withina few years,and

new folk devils

emerged to replace

them. Recent writershave gone further

than Cohen in

emphasizingthe

arbitrary election of folk devils.

Nowadays, he term 'folk

devil' is more

likely to be applied to vulnerablefigures

such as unmarried

mothers or

people with AIDS,or

to contestable

phenomena such as the satanicabuse

of children, than to

aggressively eviant

or anti-socialgroups such as the

Mods and Rockers.

One linguisticresult

of this has been the conflation of

the moral panic and

the folk devil. Single

mothers,wroteJulie Burchill n

the Mailon Sunday 15 August1993), 'havetakenover from drugpushers

(an

equally lorid,unrealisticmyth) as

society'smain folk

devil and moral

panic'. This implies

that the moral panic is not about he

folk devil; the

moral panic is the folk devil, or, to put it

another way,the folk

devil would

not

be perceived as a

problem - might not even exist at all -

without the

moral panic.

Another influentialaspect of Cohen's

thesis is the

argumentthat moral

panicsare generatedby

the media, or by

particularnterest-groupsCohen,

following Howard

Becker, calls them

'moral entrepreneurs') using the

media to publicize their concerns. An example of this approach can be

found in

PhilipJenkins'srecent book

Intimate nemies:MoralPanics n Con-

temporary reatBritain

(1992) which

identified various interest-groups,

including charities, he

police and social workers,who made

claims about

the sexual and ritual

abuse of children

which were then 'takenup by a sig

nificant section of

the mass media and presented as

factual'. Cohen,

however, aid

particular tresson the media itself, as an

'especially mpor-

tant carrierand

producerof moralpanics'.Most

commentators, ven those




5/21

632

Arnold

Hunt

within

the

media,

have

tended

to

agree.

As

the

Financial

Times

ommented

on

13

March

1993:

Thatthe Britishmediaexercisea uniquelydecisive nfluenceon national

political

life

has

been

notably

demonstrated

n

recent

days:

n

no

other

country

would

what

has

been

termed

the

'moral

panic'

over

juvenile

crime

have

provided

the

basis

of

such

a

concerted

campaign

hat

led

to

almost

nstant

action

on

the

part

of

the

government.

While

this

was

a

cause

of

alarm

o

some

writers,

others

were

inclined

to

cel-

ebrate

the

power

of

the

press

to

initiate

a

moral

panic

on

an

issue

of

public

importance.

Name

an

issue',

wrote

MartinJacques

n

the

Sunday

Times

n

7

March

1993,

and

it

is

more

than

likely

that

the

newspapers

have

been

responsible

or

making

it

happen:

the

moral

panic

over

the

state

of

society,

economic

policy .

.

.

the

royal

amily

.

.

It

is

no

exaggeration

o

say

that

without

he

press

none

of

these

issues

would

have

acquired

he

importance

hey

have.

Perhaps

the

most

far-reaching

spect

of

Cohen's

thesis,

however,

s

the

remark

hat

'the

processes

by

which

moral

panics

and

folk

devils

are

gener-

ated

do

not

date'.

This

has

encouraged

historians

o

transport

he

concept

of

moral

panic

into

other

periods.

Rob

Sindall,

or

example,

employs

the

termas 'a usefulanalytical ool' in his studyof streetviolencein the nine-

teenth

century,

on

the

assumption

hat

'Cohen's

model

is

...

applicable

over

ime',

the

only

precondition

or

a

moral

panic

being

the

existence

of

a

mass

media

capable

of

transmitting

t.

(Sindall

1990:

29)

Historians

of

the

seventeenth

entury

have

been

particularly

eceptive

o

the

term,

perhaps

encouraged

by

the

fact

that

a

work

of

seventeenth-century

istory,

Kai

Erikson's

Wayward

urztans

1966),

was

one

of

Cohen's

own

sources

or

the

study

f

deviance.

David

Underdown

describes

he

Puritan

reformation

of

Dorchester

n

the

1620s

as

'pursued

with

an

intensity

bordering

on

a

state

of moralpanic ',with Puritanpreachersand magistratesn the role of

moral

ntrepreneurs.

Moral

panics,

he

suggests,

are

timeless:

small

towns

are

mall

towns

n

any

time

and

place',

and

Dorchester

n

the

1620s

s

com-

parable

o

Brighton

n

the

1960s.

(Underdown

1985:

52,

Underdown

1992:

x)

ohn

Morrill

argues

hat

in

the

1650s

he

gentry

were

'caught

n

a

moral

panic '

hich,

as

in

Cohen's

model,

was

media{Iriven,

uelled

by

'the

rapid

growth

f

newspapers

and

pamphlets

at

a

time

of

political

uncertainty'

(Morrill

993:

370-1).

Christina

Larner

points

out

that

witch-hunts

n

early

modern

cotland

tended

to

occur

at

moments

of

political

tension,

often

accompanyinghe transitionto a new regime, as in the late 1650s:'The

absence

f

a

machinery

or

law

and

order

.

.

.

seems

to

have

engendered

an

anxiety

mong

the

ruling

classes

amounting

to

a

moral

panic .'

(Larner

1981:

98-9;

see

also

Larner

1984:

64)

Similarly,

.C.

Davis

argues

that

in

periods

f

history

when

moral

boundaries

are

undergoing

wholesale

reappraisal

or

revision,

as,

for

instance,

n

the

wake

of

a

revolution

.

.

moral

uncertainty




6/21

'Moral

panic' and moral

anguage in the media

633

can lead to great

anxiety or 'moral panic'

and to the demand for a

reassertionor

redefinition of moral

boundaries.

In the

1650s, he believes, there was a moral

panic aboutantinomianand

libertinesects such as the

Ranters,generatedbya varietyof

interest-groups

including printersand

publishers,

oyalistjournalists, nd conservative ec-

tarians

using the image of

the Ranter to police the sects' own

boundaries,

to

induce conformity'.

Davis1986:96-8)

Davis'sworkexposes one of the weaknesses f

the 'interest-group'

heory

of moral panic:a tendency

to concentrateon

deep-seatedculturalcauses

'religiousanxieties',a 'sense of dislocation',a

fear of sexualinversionand

a 'preoccupationwith

order and disorder', to

quote some of the expla-

nations that Davisoffers -

and to neglect local and particular auses.

As a

result,moral panics can

appearstrangely

divorced rom reality.An article

in the

Independentn May 1994 assumes that

moral panics occur

spon-

taneouslyand have no connection with real

events:

We are in the grip of a

moralpanic aboutcrime on television.Quite

when

it

started,or who was

responsible,nobody can be sure, but a classic

panic

it

most definitely is. Like some medieval

plague, it springs from

every

sewer n a spontaneous

overflow, eaches ever

pitch, then mercifully ub-

sides . . . The essentialelements of the moralpanic are now all in place.

No obvious beginning,

no single individualresponsible ...

And, of

course, most important,no evidence at all to

support the case.

In interpreting Cohen,

Davis makes the revealing assumption

that Folk

Devilsand MoralPanics s

not about real

deviance, or about real activities

subsequentlyclassifiedas deviant, but about

'the manufactureof

the chi-

maera

of the existence of

those activities'; nd this provides he

theoretical

basis for his controversial

rgument that the

Rantersnever really existed.

While this is a misreadingof Cohen's work,certain passages n the book,

such as the remark hat the

situation could take

on a mythical,chimerical

meaning' (1980: 171),

could easily end

themselves o such a misreading.

Cohen has recognized

the problem and acknowledges, n the

preface to

the 1980 edition of Folk

Devilsand MoralPanics,

hat the book is guiltyof 'a

certain

timelessness,an unveiling of a set of

consequences nsulatedfrom

historyand politics'.Some

historianshave also

begun to growuneasyabout

the

indiscriminateuse of the term:John

Springhall, or example,

hesitates

to

describe the campaignagainst 'horror

comics' in the 1950s as a

'moral

panic', on the grounds that 'assigningeach successive crisis o the inclu-

sive

categoryof moralpanic risksdisregarding

particular eaturesof his-

torical

context, new technology, or social

anxiety' (Springhall

1994).

Others, however,continue to present moral

panic as historically

imeless.

The most extreme

statement of this view can

be found in the preface to

Goode and Ben-Yehuda's

ook, in which the

'fearsand concerns' under-

lying

moralpanics are said to be 'partand parcel

of the humancondition',

an expressionof human

frailty.We are all

subjectto them; all societies are




7/21

ArnoldHunt

34

wrackedby them'. The same determinist iewof humanbehaviour,and dis-

belief in historicalchange, occur frequently n the media. The Independent

(3 December 1992) reported the view of the Education Secretary, ohn

Patten, that Britishsocietywas n a state of moral decline.

Historiansmight take a different perspective,however,and argue that

societyhas not become less orderlyand peaceable, hat there have always

been areaswhere gangs of young thugs have flourished.If they are right,

Mr Patten and Mr Pascallmay simplybe a part of one of society'speri-

odic moral panics over an issue that never reallygoes away.

2. 'ELITE-ENGINEERED'HEORY

The second theory of moral panic is describedby Goode and Ben-Yehuda

as the 'elite-engineeredmodel' and is developed at lerlgth by StuartHall

and others n Policing heCnsis:Mugging,heState, ndLawand Order1978)

The authorsof Policing heCrisis uoted Cohen's definition of moral panic

with approval,commenting that the panic of 1972-3, when the national

press began to use the term 'mugging'with reference to a perceived epi-

demic of violent crime, fitted Cohen's definition 'in almost every detail'.

However, heir model of moralpanicwasdesigned to plug some of the gaps

in Cohen's use of the term: in particular, o explain where moral panics

originatedand whythey occurredwhen they did. Cohen implied that moral

panics originated n the media, in ways hat depended on establishedpat-

terns of crime reporting,on journalists'own perceptionsof a 'good story',

or simply on the absence of any alternativenews; in short, 'the media

created the news and imageswhich lent the cognitivebasis for the panic'.

Hall and his co-authors greedthat the mediawere 'amongthe most power-

ful forces in the shaping of public consciousnessabout topical and contro-

versial ssues'. But they went on to argue that moral panics about law and

order typically riginated n statementsby membersof the police and the

judiciary,which were then amplified by the media. The media does not

'create' the news so much as 'reproduce and sustain' the dominant

interpretationsof it, and can thus be said to function, consciouslyor not,

as an instrumentof state control (Hall et al. 1978:220-2).

The two theories of moral panic differ in other ways.Cohen adopts a

studied neutralit in his discussionof moral panic, and although his own

sympathies can quite easily be inferred, they are never spelt out. He

refrains, oo, from drawing irm conclusionsabout the 'policy mplications'

of his work,merely commentingthat 'differentreaderscan drawdifferent

implications' and that 'sociologistsdo not have the power to stop such

implicationsbeing made or acted upon'. The authorsof Policing the Cr7sis,

on the other hand, incorporate n their definition of a moral panic the

notion of an irrationalor unjustifiedresponse. 'When the officialreaction

to a person, group of persons or series of events s out of all preportion o the

actualthreat offered', and




8/21

'Moral

anic and

moral anguagen the

media

635

when the media

representations

niversally tress

sudden

and dramatic'

increases in numbers

nvolved

or events)and 'novelty',

bove

and beyond

thatwhich a sober,realisticappraisal ould sustain, hen we believeit is

appropriate

o speakof the

beginningsof a maralpanic.

p.

16)

This is a much

more partisan definition

of

moral panic, signalling

an

entirely different

purpose; for whereas

Cohen

is pessimistic about

the

chances of breaking

the cycle of repeated

moral

panics,Hall and

his co-

authors regard their

work

as an 'intervention'

n 'the struggle

to change

the structures

and conditions'

by which moral panics

are

produced (p. x).

By aying

stresson particular

structures nd conditions',

Policing heCnsis

also calls into questionthe timelessnessof moralpanics,their apparently

endlessrecurrence

over the whole course

of history.

t treats he succession

of moral

panics

between the early 1960s

and the late 1970s,

between

the

emergence

of moral

panicsand their

incorporation nto

a general

panic

about

law and order, as an

'exceptional

moment' in a long-term

historical

process.

To use Marxist (more

precisely,

Gramscian)terminology,

that

process is the 'crisis

of hegemony',

the breakdown

of consensus

which

forces the ruling

classto resort

to new techniques

of exercising

controland

repressing

dissent. This marks

another

departurefrom

Cohen's original

theory.Hall andhis co-authors re far stricter n defining the historicalcir-

cumstancesunder

which moral panics

occur,

although they share

with

Cohen

a sense of the inevitability

f moral

panicsonce the

appropriate

on-

ditions

are met.They do not

go so far as to suggest

that the

'mugging'panic

could

not haveoccurredbefore

the 1970s,but

they argue

that 'it makes a

great

deal moresense' than

it would havedone at

an earlier

period,because

only bythe 1970s

were all the

'essentialconditions'

n place. Other eft-wing

commentators

have

also tried to give

the concept of moral

panic greater

historical

specificity,

though with slightly

different emphases.

Kate

Mar-

shall,for example,associatesmoral panicswiththe economic recessionof

the 1980s

and the need to transfer

he

cost of theWelfareState

onto private

families (Marshall

1985).

Goode and Ben-Yehuda's

ccount

of the 'elite-engineered'

model

is that

the ruling classes

deliberately

nd consciously'

create a moral

panicabout

'an issue

that they

recognisenot to be

terriblyharmful to

the society

as a

whole'

in order to

divertattentionfrom

more seriousproblems.

As the

New

Statesman

xplained in December

1993,

moral panics are

'diversions

or

those

in power who prefer

that the

socialand moral community

s not

examinedtoo closely for fear it is found bankrupt'.PolicingheCrisis ctu-

ally takes

a less

conspiratorialview of

this process, pointing

to 'evidence

. . . that in this

period the

ruling classesthemselves

substantially

elieved

the definition of

an emergent

social crisiswhich

they were propagating'

(Hall et al. 1978:

220). But

the conspiratorial eading

alerts us to the

fact

that,

as far as Policing he

Crisis s concerned,

moral panics

are political

phenomena

and are generated,

whether

'deliberatelyand

consciously'

or

not, throughpolitical

and uridical

activity.This

is quite differentfrom

the




9/21

636

Arnold

Hunt

view

of

Folk

Devils

and

Moral

Panics

that

moral

panics

are

the

product

of

'cultural

strain

and

ambiguity'.

As

Cohen

puts

it,

in

reviewing

he

differ-

ences betweenhis theoryof moralpanicand thatof

PolicingtheCrisis,

the

level

of

explanation

'is

shifted

from

social

control

agencies

or

cultures

-

or

vague

allusions

to

the

wider

ociety

to

the

specific

operation

of

the

state'

(Cohen

1980:

xxiii).

This

distinction

between

cultural

and

political

models

of

moral

panic

may

seem

dubious.

The

two

categories,

after

all,

are

not

mutually

xclusive:

for

Cohen,

political

agents

are

incorporated

n

the

notion

of

a

control

culture,

while

for

Hall

and

his

co-authors,

hegemony

is

as

much

a

matter

of

cultural

as

of

political

dominance.

However,

Cohen

also

suggests

that

'casesof masshysteria,delusionandpanics'mightprovideaframeworkor

the

study

of

moral

panics,

mplying

hat

the

moral

panic

was

a

form

of

col-

lective

irrationality

which

must

have

deep

cultural

or

psychological

roots,

and

for

which

a

purely

political

or

ideological

explanation

would

be

in-

adequate.

(Cohen

1980:11)

This

is

the

sort

of

language,

unattached

o

any

historical

period,

that

leads

Hall

et

al.

to

reject

the

concept

of

a

control

culture

as

'too

imprecise',

preferring

nstead

to

set

moral

panics

in

the

context

of

a

specific

moment

in

history

and

'a

specific

type

of

political

regime'

(Hall

et

al.

1978:

195).

3.

'GRASSROOTS'

HEORY

Goode

and

Ben-Yehuda

dentify

a

third

theory

which

stresses

he

extent

of

popular

participation

n

moral

panics

and

which

they

term

the

'grassroots

model'.

According

to

this

theory,

'politicians

and

the

media

cannot

fabri-

cate

concern

where

none

existed

nitially',

and

moral

panics

must

therefore

be

founded

on

genuine

public

concern,

reflected

or

magnified

by

the

media,perhaps,but arisingmore or less spontaneously.This is a 'bottom

up'

rather

than

'top

down'

theory

of

moral

panic;

the

authors

of

Policing

the

Crisis,

by

contrast,

are

sceptical

about

'this

seemingly

pontaneous

public

opinion'

and

argue

that

it

is

'transmitted

nd

constructed

higher

up

in

the

chain

of

communication'

nstead

of

being

generated

from

below

(Hall

et

al.

1978:

137;

Goode

and

Ben-Yehuda

994:

127).

The

'grassroots'

heory

resembles

the

work

of

so-called

'realist

crimi-

nologists'

such

as

TrevorJones,

Brian

Maclean

andJockYoung,

co-authors

of

The

Islington

Crime

Survey

(1986),

who

suggest

that

people's

perceptions

of crime 'are not basedon moralpanic and/or a regurgitationof media

stereotypes,

but

bear

a

close

relationship

to

the

real

facts

about

the

areas

n

which

they

live'.

Realist

criminologists

end

to

be

unhappy

with

the

term

'moral

panic',

identifying

'moral

realism',

rather

than

panic

or

hysteria,

n

people's

attitudes

o

crime.

However,

hey

do

not

simply

reject

the

concept

of

moral

panic.

In

their

view,

moral

panic

and

moral

realism

are

symptoms

of

the

same

problem,

signs

that

crime

really

is

on

the

increase.




10/21

'Moralpanic' and moral anguage in the media

637

The same forceswhich make for the increase n crime fuel a moralpanic

about crime.That is, the real fear about crime s intimately elatedto the

moral hysteriaabout crime. It not only provides a rational kernel for

alarm,but its genesis lies at the same source;and the mass media serve

and exaggeratesuch public fears. (Lea and Young 1993:49, 263)

This leaves the statusof moral panic slightlyambiguous.The line between

'fear' and 'hysteria', alarm'and 'panic', s a fine one: if it is rational o be

alarmedabout crime, it mayalso, perhaps,be rational o panic. One of the

most telling objectionsto Policing the Crzsiswas that it treated the moral

panic as an irrationalor disproportionate esponse to a situation,without

providingany 'criteriaof proportionality' o distinguish t from a rational

response (Waddington1986). The realistcriminologists olve this problem

ratherneatlyby eliminatingthe need for any such distinction.

In shifting the focus of attentionaway rom the utterancesof politicians,

journalists and other professionalsto the attitudes and opinions of the

general public, the 'grassroots'model marksa significantdeparture rom

previoustheories of moral panic. However, t can also be seen as continu-

ing and developing some of the themes of Cohen's original definition. Its

proponents have tended, like Cohen, to treat moral panic as a cultural

phenomenon. StuartA. Scheingold, n

ThePoliticsof Law and Order

1984),

arguesthat moral panics about street crime are rooted in a 'mythof crime

and punishment' hat has little to do with the actual ncidence of crime but

is sustainedby the pervasive culturalpresence' of violence in contempor-

aryAmericansociety.In a discussionof the moral panic in Swedencaused

by a proposal to provide clean syringes o intravenousdrug users, Arthur

Gould suggests that an analysisof 'political, deological and institutional

factors' s incomplete without reference to the 'widersocial structureand

culture' and, in particular, he sense that Swedish national identity was

under threat. Unlike Cohen, Scheingold and Gould treat moral panics as

the product of a diffuse sense of crisis,not obviously n the interestsof any

particulargroup. As with Cohen, however, there is a timelessnessabout

their view of moral panic: they emphasizethe cultural actorswhich make

it inevitable hat similarmoralpanicswill occur again n the future,regard-

less of social or politicaltrends.Scheingoldsuggests hat there are 'cultural

constants' n Americansociety which favour the development of punitive

policies on law and order (Scheingold 1984, Gould 1994).

A tentativegenealogy of moral panic, then, would depict Cohen's orig-

inal theoryas the parentof twoother, mutually pposing theories.One (the

'elite-engineered') theory accepts Cohen's suggestion that moral panics

serve the interestsof particulargroups, but rejectsthe idea that they have

deep-seated cultural causes; the other (the 'grassroots' heory) accepts

Cohen's cultural nterpretation f moralpanicsbut rejectsor severelyqual-

ifies the interest-group xplanation. The work of David Underdown,dis-

cussed brieflyabove, illustrates he developmentof the 'grassroots' heory

particularly learly. In locaiing the moral panic at the level of 'cultural




11/21

638

Arnold

Hunt

conflict'

and

identifying

moral

entrepreneurs

who

promote

it,

Underdown

resembles

Cohen;

yet

he

argues

that

there

was

widespread

popular

partici-

pationin the moralpanic,and considershimselfto be asserting he auton-

omy

of

popular

culture,

as

opposed

to

historians

who

'say

that

...

everything

of

importance

n

seventeenth-century

ngland

happened

from

the

top

down ,

with

the

common

people

always

obediently

following

the

lead

of

their

betters'

(Underdown

1992:

x) .

Like

other

'grassroots'

heorists

-

David

Herman,

for

example,

deploring

the

'sneering,

cynical

tone'

used

by

the

left

to

denigrate

real

cultural

anxieties'

(New

Statesman,

3

May

1994)

-

he

defines

his

own

position

n

opposition

to

the

'elite-engineered'

heory.

'MORAL

ANIC'

N

THE

MEDIA,

98y1995

The

evolving

use

of

'moral

panic'

in

the

media

parallels

ts

use

in

academic

discourse,

hough

with

a

marked

ime-lag.

Folk

Devils

and

Moral

Panics

ame

out

in

1972

and

was

reprinted

n

1980;

by

1984,

references

o

'moral

panic'

were

starting

o

appear

regularly

n

the

broadsheet

newspapers.

Policing

he

Crzsis

ame

out

in

1978

and

was

often

reprinted

hereafter;

ts

effect

on

the

media's

use

of

'moral

panic'

is

not

evident

before

1988.

Lea

and

Young's

What

s

ToBeDoneAboutLawandOrder?ppeared n 1984,and Wadding-

ton's

article

Mugging

as

a

Moral

Panic'

n

1988;

witha

few

exceptions,

our-

nalists

did

not

follow

up

their

critique

of

the

'elite-engineered'

heory

until

1993.

It

may,

seemingly,

ake

up

to

ten

years

or

new

developments

n

soci-

ology

and

criminology

o

filter

through

to

the

media.

There

are,

of

course,

exceptions

to

this

chronology.

One

of

the

earliest

newspaper

rticles

o

use

the

term,

on

18June

1985,

proved

to

be

remark-

ably

prescient

n

anticipating

hings

to

come.

Moral

panic,

Digby

Anderson

explained

to

the

readers

of

The

Times,

was

'1960s

sociologese

to

refer

to

public

concernssociologistswouldpreferto brushunderthe carpet'.There

was

no

social

scientific

evidence

of

a

moral

panic'

about

AIDS,

but

in

the

light

of

attempts

o

'relativize

moral

standards'

and

'extend

the

incidence

of

homosexual

practice',

perhaps

there

ought

to

be:

Should

not

those

within

Judaism,

the

Christian

churches,

Islam

and

among

half-churched

but

traditionally

nclined

parents,

and

the

many

homosexuals

who

do

not

approve

of

homosexual

proselytization,

tart

o

be

concerned?

In

short,

what

we

need

is

a

little

more

moral

panic.

Having

egun

by

dismissing

he idea of moralpanic,Andersonended up

by

endorsing

it.

Over

the

next

ten

years,

the

use

of

'moral

panic'

in

the

national

press

would

follow

the

same

trajectory.

In

the

course

of

the

1980s

the

term

was

applied

to

a

wide

variety

of

issues,

including

AIDS,

child

abuse,

crowd

violence

at

football

matches,

drug

addiction,

uvenile

crime

and

surrogate

mothers.

Moral

panic

was

attriS

uted

ither

to

the

media

alone

('a

Fleet

Street

moral

panic')

or

to a

mood

of

public

concern

created

by

the

media

('The

public's

moral

panic

is




12/21


639

accompanied by a good deal of misinformation').The term was almost

alwaysused pejoratively. Moralfervour often breeds and benefits from

moral panic', declaredone writer n the Guardian n 12July 1985. 'In con-

ditions of such alarm, nformed and sustaineddebate seems to go by the

board.' Most of the references to 'moralpanic' in the mid-1980soccurred

in the Guardian r in left-wingweekliessuch as the NewStatesmannd New

Society, ut by the end of the decade the term had made its way nto other

broadsheetnewspapers nd wasbeginning to be treatedas a commonplace.

At first, quotationsfrom academicswere used to establishthe credentials

of an unfamiliarterm: 'Whatwe are witnessing s a moral panic, says

MichaelFreeman,Professorof EnglishLawat UniversityCollege, London'

(Guardian 5January1985) Within a few years, ournalists elt sufficiently

familiarwith the term to refer casually o 'the inevitablemedia moralpanic'

(IndependentOctober 1988) or 'the media-saturatedpace marked moral

panic ( TheTimes 2 February1992)

The interpretationof moral panic underlyingmost of these newspaper

articles is neatly summed up in an extract from the Daily Telegraph20

March1991):

Dr Thompson does not deny the existence of occult crime . . . 'I'm not

saying hat this sort of abuse could never happen,' he says. Butso far this

bears all the signs of a classicmoral panic - a scare promoted by a par-

ticulargroup to achieve a particular nd.'

The influence of the 'interest-group'heory can also be detected in articles

which suggest,by means of historicalparallels, hat moralpanicsare eternal

or cyclical n nature. A Guardian rticle on 30 May 1985 recounted 'the

extraordinarystory of a fourteenth century moral panic that swept

Europe' at the time of the BlackDeath, and an articleby Roy Porter,pub-

lished in NewSocietyn December 1986, drew similarparallelsbetween the

present-daymoral panic about AIDS and the panic about cholera in the

nineteenth century,or plague in the sixteenth century,noting that scape-

goats (Cohen's 'folk devils')were found for each epidemic.Viewingmoral

panics in historicalperspective, here was a tendency to attribute hem to

culturalrather han social or economic causes.A book review n the Sunday

Times n June 1992 declared that 'as the last years of centuries seem his-

toricallyprone to moral panics, it should not surpriseus that the Aids epi-

demic has, with wearisome predictability,been interpreted as an act of

God'. Moralpanic, agreed The

Tix?zesin

a leading article (24 February 993),

was a pervasiveelement in 'contemporaryWestern culture' and a 'pre-

dictablefixture in fin de siecle life'.

By the late 1980s,however,other theoriesof moralpanic had entered the

media. The term was ncreasingly elt to belong to left-wingpolemic rather

than detached historicalanalysis,and there was consequentlya reluctance

to use it uncritically. nterestingly, his originated in the left-wingmedia.

The Guardian ommented on 17 June 1988 that recent cases of football

hooliganism had provoked 'predictable responses. On the demagogic




13/21

640

ArnoldHunt

right, there are calls for such louts to be locked up for a long time . . . On

the jargon-laden eft it's all being blamed on moral panic, Mrs Thatcher

and social deprivation'.On 28 August1989 the

Guardian

attacked he 'con-

ventionalwisdom', 'widelyaccepted in Home Office and policing circles',

'that risk of crime is much lower than the public suspect . . . and that the

mass media have contributed to irrational fears, particularlyamongst

women and the elderly'.Again, this waspresented as politicallybipartisan:

'whilst he Right talksof irrationalear ,much of the Left talksof moral

panic .All of this is palpablyuntrue for inner city areasand for the more

vulnerablemembers of our society'.These two articlesare exceptional in

being up to date with the work of realist criminologists; ther newspaper

articlesof about the same date are awareof the 'elite-engineered' heory

but accept t uncritically.An article n the Sunday Timesattacked those who

wish to whip up moralpanics and cut backon socialspending' (3 Decem-

ber 1989) and an article n the Independenteporteda claim that 'the police

and local authorities'had 'whippedup hysteria n relation to acid house

and are using their powersaccordingly . . It's moral panic. They see it as

somethingwickedand they want to stop it' (24July 1990).

The sudden popularity f 'moralpanic' in 1993was argelydue to a single

news story:the killing of the toddlerJames Bulger in February1993, and

the arrestof twoother boyswho were subsequently onvictedof his murder.

As The Timessummed it up eight months later:

When a toddler was abducted and murderedearlier this year, with sus-

picion falling on two other boys,the killing nspireda moralpanic across

Britain. John Major announced a 'crusade against crime', and the

numberswho told MORI heywereworriedabout awand order doubled

within a month.

As a result of the Bulger murder, the Home Secretary,Kenneth Clarke,

announced plans for more custodial sentences for young offenders. A

statement by a group of charities, published in The Timesand widely

reported in other newspapers,warned that 'in the atmosphereof moral

panic , here is a danger that all the lessons learned in recent yearsabout

the clear link between uvenile custodyand high re-offendingrateswill be

lost' (The Times3 March 1995). The Times tself commented in a leading

article on the same day that 'Britain s in the grip of one of those moral

panics that afflictseverynation periodically,usuallyduringrecessions'and

thatyoung people were being cast as scapegoats.This use of 'moralpanic',

based on

Folk Devils and Moral Panics,

was not at all unusual. Simul-

taneously,however, he popularityof the termwas eading some writers o

examine it more critically.

On the weekend afterJames Bulger'smurder, the Sunday Timestook a

conventionallypejorative iewof moral panic ('Weare in the midstof what

sociologistscall a moralpanic ,a contagiousburstof popularoutragethat

risks osing sight of reality'),while a leading article n the relatively iberal

Independent n Sunday

mounted a sustainedcritiqueof the term:




14/21

'Moralpanic' and

moral anguage

in the media

641

Moralpanic is

one of those deflating

phrases

used by sociologists

and

otherallegedly

mpartial

tudentsof human behaviour

o condescend

to

excitements among the general populace. The phrase usuallycomes

equipped

withstatisticswhich

demonstrate hat

alcohol

consumptionwas

in fact much larger

in the 1840s,

or that football

hooliganism actually

began

in 1898.

. . The doctoralmessage

s calming:do not

worry,we

have

been

here before,your concerns

are

an ersatzcompound

manufactured

by the

media, a few odd

bishops,

strident voices from

the left and the

right,

moralistsand nostalgists

of all

kinds. (21 February

1993)

Beforethe Bulger

case, ournalists n

the right-wing

ress had occasionally

experimented

with

differenttheories

of moralpanic.An article

n the

Daily

Telegraphn 3July 1987 had attempteda reworkingof the 'interest-group'

theory,

arguing

that the moralpanic

about child

abuse wascaused 'not

by

the popular

press'

but by professional

ocialworkersand their

political

sut

porters,

people

like the LabourMP,

MissClareShort'.On

18 October

1992

the Sunday

Times ad made

an ingenious

attempt o commandeer

he 'elite-

engineered' theory

n the cause

of right-wing opulism,

with

the suggestion

that

the anti-smoking

movement . . . is

only the latest

in a long line of

coer-

cive crusadesand moralpanics, by means of which upper and middle

class elites seek

to impose their

lifestyles and

preferences upon

the

workingclasses.

Theseare plausible

arguments,playing

on fears

of left-wingor middle-class

elitism

and skilfullydrawing

on the pejorative

connotations

of 'moral

panic', but as interpretations

of moralpanic, they

did not catch on.

The

Independent

n Sundayhelped

to popularize

a new theory

of moral

panic,

similarly

nti-elitist, ut now

seeking to endorse

moral panic,

ustifying t as

rationaland repudiating

he

pejorativeuse of the

term.

This version of the 'grassroots' heory rapidlygained ground in the

broadsheet

papers.

On 28 February1993,

only

a week afterthe Independent

on Sunday's examination

of moral panic, the

SundayTimes

ollowedsuit

with an

articlebyGreg Hadfield

which placed Stuart

Hall

in a sinisterpan-

theon of 'sociologists,

criminologists,

academics

and clerics'

whom 'critics

blame

for the nation'swoes':

'In 1978,

in PolicingheCrisis,

e argued that

concern

about mugging was

a moral

panic ,based on

exaggerated evi-

dence.' 'Bringback

the voice

of authority',pleaded

Melanie

Phillips n the

Guardian

n 5

March1993:

Onlythe ivory-towermiddle classeswith a bad dose of Utopianmyopia

could

delude themselves

hatjuvenile

crimeisn't an immensely

serious

problem

. . .

Realitysuggeststhat

juvenile offending is

up, not

down.

Community

anxiety is understandable.

The term 'moral

panic' is mis-

placed.

A successionof

similar articles

appearedin both

left-wingand right-wing

papers

throughout

1993, attacking

'progressive criminologists'

for




15/21

642

Arnold

Hunt

'dismissing

the

crime

epidemic

and

crisis

in

values

as

moral

panic '

(Obsgrver

9

September

1993)

or

complaining

that

alarm

about

single-

parent

families

'has

been

labelled

in

progressivecirclesas mere moralpanic (DailyTelegraph

November

1993).

Some

attempts

were

made

to

recapture

the

term,

often

by

readers

responding,

hrough

the

letters

pages,

to

applications

of

'moral

panic'

that

they

disagreed

with.

Thus

the

Independent

n

Sunday's

ditorial

was

ollowed,

a

week

later,

by

a

reader's

etter

castigating

t

for

'a

misunderstanding

f

the

valuable

concept

of

moral

panic '

and

reiterating

Cohen's

theory

of

folk

devils:

popular

concerns'

(in

this

case,

'widespread

oncern

about

the

state

of

British

society

arising

rom

the

Bulger

case')

was

taken

up

by

'poli-

ticians

and

the

media',

turned

into

a

moral

panic and directed against'scapegoats'.Forcedonto

the

defensive,

he

writer

was

prepared

o

concede

that

moral

panics

were

an

exaggerated

version

of

'popular

concerns'

about

real

social

problems.

ProfessorJock

Young

put

forward

a

similar

argument

in

a

letter

to

the

Guardian

n

8

June

1994,

in

which

he

attempted,

not

altogether

uccessfully,

o

gloss

over

the

ambiguities

of

'moral

panic'.

'Soci-

ologists

n

Britain

coined

the

term',

he

suggested,

to

refer

to

cases

where

public

reaction

was

completely

disproporiionate

o

the

actual

problem

aced

.

.

.

At

no

point

was

t

suggested

hat

such

a

term

should

be

usedto blankout anddenigrategenuinefearsandconcernsaboutcrime.

These

attempts

o

contest

and

to

regulate

the

definition

of

moral

panic

failed

o

dispel

the

ambiguity

of

the

term.

It

was

an

ambiguity

which

could

sometimes

ome

in

useful.

It

enabled

the

film

censorJames

Ferman,

nter-

viewed

n

the

Independent

13

August

1993),

to

offer

a

sop

to

both

liberal

and

onservative

eaders:

We

seem

to

go

through

a

wave

of

moral

panics

in

Britain,

but

there's

always

omething

at

the

heart

of

it.'

It

helped

The

Times

leading

article,

23

May

1994)

to

sell

the

idea

of

a

'new

politics

of

social

esponsibility'

o

readers

who

might

be

suspiciousof moralcoercion:'Thought is easyfor a nation

to

slip

into

moral

panic

unnecessarily,

he

concern

which

is

felt

by

ordinary

people

about

such

issues

can

no

longer

be

gnored

by

those

who

represent

them'.

This

ambivalence

about

'moral

panic'

llustrates

he

writer's

doubts

about

the

popular

credibility

of

moral

language

a

problem

neatly

encapsulated

n

William

Oddie's

description

of

he

'back

to

basics'

campaign

as

'a

kind

of

controlled

moral

panic'

(

The

Times

0

March

1994).

At

other

times,

of

course,

the

ambiguity

was

acci-

dental

nd

simply

ed

to

confusion,

as

different

meanings

of

'moral

panic'

came

nto

collision.

Writing

n

the

London

Review

f

Books

n 1993,MarinaWarnereferred o incestas 'one of

the

dominant

focuses

of

moral

panic';

she

vidently

ntended

to

use

the

term

in

a

neutral,

descriptive

ense,

but

one

eader

interpreted

it

differently,

assuming

that

'moral

panic'

was

a

pejorative

erm,

and

accusing

Warner

of

condoning

incest

(LRB

7

October

and

November

1993).

In

examining

the

recent

and

current

use

of

the

term,

several

features

stand

ut.

The

first

is

the

assumption

that

moral

panic

is

a

cultural




16/21

'Moralpanic' and moral anguage n the media 643

phenomenon. As The Timesput it, in a leading article on 8 August

1994:

Few now feel comfortablewith the notion of a zeitgeist or spirit of the

age. Common sense dictates, however, that moments in history are

defined in part by moods, attitudesand propensities or action. Future

historiansof Britainwill ook backon the twoyearsafterthe 1992general

election as a period of moralpanic, culturaluncertainty nd politicaldis-

orientation.They mayalso recordthat a subtleshift n the nationalmood

took place during 1994.

Even those who used the term pejoratively ended to accept the idea of a

'national mood', and to use phrases like 'moral panic grips the nation'

(Guardian3 June 1994) or 'the latest moral panic to sweep Britain'

( Guardian 3June 1994) EvenLivingMarxismonceded in November1994

that moral panic affected 'not only the media and a small circle of reac-

tionaries', and 'not only those in authority',but 'society as a whole'. A

second, and related,aspectof the term'srecent use is the increasingpreva-

lence of the 'grassroots' theory. The American conservative Charles

Murray,writing n the SundayTimes n 22 May1994 in the first of a much-

publicizedseries of articleson the 'Britishunderclass',argued that Britain

needed to return to the traditionalvalues of marriageand the two-parent

family n order to ensure social stability, nd claimed to detect a 'changed

public mood' on the current social crisis. The academic associationsof

'moral panic' were now used to discreditrather than to support the term.

'Most ntellectualsare still holding out: all but a handful of the academics

I met continued to dismissproblemsof risingcrime and single parenthood

as a moralpanic .But concern was evident everywhere lse'.

Murraywas correct to suggest that 'moral panic' was on the retreat.

Writerswho used the term in a manner consistentwith the 'interest-group'

or 'elitesngineered' theories did so more cautiously,even apologetically.

'Though the concept of the moralpanic has been somewhatdiscreditedof

late (or at least found wanting), it still has its uses', ventureda reviewer n

the Guardian n 28 January1995. The growingrecognition of the 'grass-

roots' theory ed to its appearance n the DailyMailon 11 March1995,one

of the first occasions on which the term 'moral panic' had appeared n a

tabloid newspaper.Following Murray, he subject under discussion was,

once again, the threat to the two-parent amily.

Perhaps he time has come when we should not be ashamedof standing

up for old-fashionedvalues, merely because of taunts that we are suc-

cumbing to a 'moralpanic'. We need, for the sake of all our children, to

foster a sense of communitywhich depends on these traditionalvalues.

The term 'moral panic' is rejected; but the phenomenon, redefined as

'standing up for old-fashionedvalues', is presented more positively han

ever before. Several ournalistshad already tartedto use 'moral panic' as

a term of approval:Suzanne Moore wrote that the problem of feckless




17/21

644

ArnoldHunt

fathers, not single mothers, was 'whatwe should have our moral panics

about' ( Guardian7 May1994);Nick Hornbywrotethat on seeing a contro-

versialworkof art inspiredby the Bulgermurder I found that I could par-

ticipate much more directly n the moral panic' (Indtpendentn Sunday

June 1994).

CONCLUSION: HEMEDIAANDMORAL ANGUAGE

Supportersof 'moralpanic' have argued that the term is everybit as rele-

vant to the media in the l990s as it was to the relativelyunsophisticated

reporting of the Mods and Rockers n 1964 and 1965. Moral panics have

evolvedand developed,admittedly,but the species is in no dangerof dying

out. Now that the term has established tself in the media, professional he-

oristsof moralpanic no longer have sole control over the way t is used;but

its popularity cross he politicalspectrumand amongjournalists s well as

academicsonly goes to show, as Goode and Ben-Yehuda emark, hat the

concept is generallyagreed to be valid. The media has become more self-

conscious about participating n moral panics,and it could be argued that

recent moralpanicshavebeen more self-referential, ven theatrical n char-

acter, as well as being more open to criticism rom within the media; but

the result, n the wordsof AngelaMcRobbie, s that 'the model of the moral

panic is urgently n need of updating and revisingpreciselybecause of its

success'.McRobbie's xaminationof moral panic is a good example of the

'evolution, not extinction' school of thought. She suggeststhat we live in

an era of postmodernmoral panics, when the moral panic can no longer

proceed unchallenged and cannot, therefore, be used to justify new

measuresof social control. But she seesJamesBulger'smurderas the cata-

lystfor a moral panic of a thoroughlyold-fashionedkind, 'wherea horrific

event givesrise to a spiralof anxietiesand leads to punitivemeasuresbeing

taken'.For all its sophistication,postmodern ournalism akesus full circle,

back to a theory of moral panics and folk devils hardly changed from

Cohen's originalmodel (McRobbie1994: 198-219).

But there is a need for a much more searchingcritiqueof the concept.

Recent writing on moral panic incorporatesseveral highly questionable

assumptions: irst,that moral panicsare timeless,common to 'all societies'

(Goode and Ben-Yehuda1994: x) and 'subject to eternal recurrence'

(Downesand Rock 1988:96); secondly, hat they are embedded in the 'col-

lective conscience' (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 994:202) as partof the 'land-

scape of the public imagination' (McRobbie1994: 203). The presence of

these assumptions s not particularly urprising,as recent histories of the

sociology of deviance have shown that the theory of moral panic has

descended from functionalismand ultimatelyfrom Durkheim (Downes

and Rock 1988: 96; Summer 1994: 263). But while they can be found in

Cohen's original model of moral panic, it is in the 'grassroots' heory of

moral panic developed by the realistcriminologists, nd even more in the




18/21


645

simplified version of that theory that took root in the media, that they

become most prominent and most damaging. Colin Sumner describes

Cohen's model as a blend of Marxand Durkheim,

suggesting that we could rely on Durkheim for insights into general

societal changes/evolution and on Marx for the internal, detailed,

dynamicsof that change;an approach hatwasnot uncommon in British

sociology n the 1960s. (Sumner 1994:263)

In the 'grassroots' heory, Marx drops out of the picture, and one is left

with a theory of moral panic that is disengagedfrom the immediatepoliti-

cal circumstances n which a panic occurs.There is a worrying ack of his-

torical specificity (as in Goode and Ben-Yehuda's eclectic approach'

applied to phenomena as diverse as the Renaissancewitch-craze nd the

American drug-panicof the 1980s) and a facile optimism (compare, for

example, McRobbie's sympathetic depiction of pressure groups with

Cohen's much harsher treatment of moral entrepreneursand Jenkins's

highly criticalaccount of the role of the NSPCCand other 'claims-makers'

in the panic over child abuse).

A further problem is that no theory of moral panic has yet provided a

satisfactory xplanationof the relationshipbetween the media and public

opinion. McRobbiecriticizes existing theories for assuming 'a clear dis-

tinction between the world of the media and the world of social reality', n

other words,betweenwhat 'really'happens and what the paperssay.It is a

valid criticism,as we shall see in a moment; but one could argue ust the

reverse: hat the problem with 'moral panic' is that it fails to distinguish

betweenthe media and socialreality,betweenwhatthe paperssayand what

the public thinks. Keith Tester has criticizedthe assumption hat 'simply

because there was a moral panic in the media there must also have been a

moral panic among the viewers and readers' (Tester 1994: 85). Colin

Sumner puts it more bluntly: 'Was there actually a moral panic about

mugging?'Presscuttings,as he points out, are an unreliableguide to public

opinion, and 'it is quite conceivable that the public statementsmade by

journalists,policemen, and politiciansdid not have much impact on the

public at large'. (Sumner1981:282-3) The seeds of this problemweresown

in FolkDevilsandMoralPanics,where there is said to be 'littledoubt that the

mainstreamof reaction expressed in the mass media - putativedeviance,

punitiveness, the creation of new folk devils - entered into the public

imagery', despite Cohen's finding that some sections of the public per-

ceived the media as having over-reacted Cohen 1980: 70). Once again,

however, the problem is most acute in the 'grassroots' heory of moral

panic, with its assumption hat the media reflects, though in a distorting

mirror, 'real' public fears about crime, and in the thoroughlyself-serving

versionsof this theory that have appeared n the media itself.

Testerdoubtsthe socialrealityof moralpanicbecausehe doubtswhether

the media is capableof communicating ssuesof moralsignificance. Media

significancemeans moral insignificance.' n other words,the media is less




19/21

646 ArnoldHunt

likelyto createmoralpanics than 'moralboredom and dullness'.This is an

extreme statement of the increasinglycommon view that we are experi-

encing a moralcrisiswhich is, in essence, a crisisof moral anguage.Among

moralphilosophers,AlasdairMacIntyre as arguedthatmoral anguagehas

become devaluedor dislocated,and MaryMaxwellhas identified a 'moral

inertia' resulting, in part, from 'the unavailability f words needed to

express certain concepts . . . [or] to portray he relationshipof responsi-

bility and blame in particular ituations'.(MacIntyre 981, Maxwell1991)

This sense of moral crisishelps to explain the sudden popularityof 'moral

panic' in the media. 'Moralpanic' was not only a way of diagnosing the

crisis; t also appeared o providea moralvocabulary o meet it. Interviewed

in the Guardian n 22 February1995, the right-wingournalist Matthew

D'Anconaexplained that Britainhad

experienced a sort of moral panic between the case ofJamie Bulger and

the death ofJohn Smith,which was seeminglyalleviatedby the arrival f

Tony Blair.You see, Blairhas a linguisticprojectwhich is to constructa

language that his partycan win with . . . by appropriating ome thinking

from conservative nd liberal traditions.

The remedy or moralpanic, according o this argument,was the language

of citizenship, community and 'civic responsibility',of a 'moral order'

stressing duties rather than rights, 'a coherent vocabulary',as The Times

leader-writer alled it on 23 May1994, 'withwhich to develop these emerg-

ing ideas' of moral renewal.As part of this 'linguisticproject', the term

'moralpanic' itself had to be redefined as a form of civicconsciousness,an

expression of public anxiety rather than a conspiracyof elites or interest-

groups.

Cohen's original set of synonyms 'moral panic . . . moral crusadesor

moral ndignation . . moral campaigns' made it clear that a moral panic

was a temporaryburstof moral excitement,a diversion rom seriousmoral

discussion.Poticing he Crzsisimilarlycontrastedmoral panic with 'sober,

realistic appraisal';and journalists n this tradition have done the same,

stressing he need to 'separate he wheat of real moral concern from the

chaff of moral panic' (Michael Ignatieff in the Guardian, 2 May 1981).

McRobbie's riticismof the distinctionbetween moral panic and the 'real'

world is extremely elling here, and in this respect the 'grassroots' heory

does mark a significantadvance on its predecessors, n its integration of

moral panicswith the continuousprocessof moral discourseand practice.

Whatwe are dealing with, as Simon Watneyobserves, s not a stringof 'dis-

continuous and discrete moralpanics ,but rather the mobility of idew

logical confrontation across the entire field of public representation'

(Watney1987: 42). But there are obvious difficulties n transplanting he

language of 'moral panic' into this radicallydifferent context, as, for

example,when the Archbishopof Canterbury,n his sermon on EasterDay

1993, equates moral panic with the instinctive human response to evil.

Morality, t seems, naturally akes the form of panic:




20/21

'Morat anic ' and

morat anguage n the

media

647

There is a battle in the world,and

we all know t, between

good and evil.

It is within each

one of us and it is

in each society . . Evil: t fills us with

horror and a kind of moral panic.

It is hard to see how

this form of moral

anguagecould incorporatenotions

of moral reasoning or decision-making.

t makes morality

appear danger-

ouslyvolatile,as in PaulJohnson'sprediction

hatpopular

discontentwould

'reach a criticalmass and detonate

a moral explosion' (SundayTimes2

January1994), and

the result is an attitude

of moral helplessness.

Manyof the

metaphorsused to describe

moral behaviourreflect a pre-

occupation with

moral aggression,as if to echo Goode and

Ben-Yehuda's

observation that

the concepts of moral panic and moral

crusade have

tended to overlap

( 1994: 19) Susie Orbach's 'new

moral consensus'

requires nothing

less than 'a secular moral crusade' (Gqbardian

5 April

1995);Will Hutton's

'moraleconomy' involves a call to arsns

n a world n

which time is runningshort' (Hutton

1996:26). The concern

with shared

moralvalues s laudable,

but by conflatingmoralitywithpanic,

these writers

(both, ironically,

on the political eft) have committed hemselves

o repro-

ducing moral panics

uncritically. f, in Cohen'swords, 'more

moral panics

will be generated', it will be because

of a moral language

that admits no

other possibility.

(Date accepted:June

1996)

ArnoldHunt

Trinilt College

CamEdge

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Hunt Moral panic Media

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