Human Mobility Report 2011 Migration and Human Development in African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries ACP Group of States Secretariat Human Mobility Report 2011
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Human Mobility Report 2011
Migration and Human Developmentin African, Caribbean and Pacifi c Countries
ACP Group of States Secretariat Human Mobility Report 2011
ACP G
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HUMA
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2011
Human Mobility Report 2011
migration and human developmentin African, Caribbean and Pacifi c Countries
SupervisionDr. Mohamed Ibn ChambasSecretary-General of the African, Caribbean and Pacifi c (ACP) Group of States
Ms Michele Dominique RaymondAssistant Secretary-General, Head of the Department of Political Affairs and Human Development
Mr Denis Salord European Commission, AIDCO
Task TeamAya KasasaDepartment for Political Affairs and Human DevelopmentChristophe Fleureau-DauloudetEuropean Commission, AIDCO
Andrea Gallina (Team Leader)Cristiano Maugeri (Task Manager)Anna Mizzoni (Assistant)ARS Progetti
Scientifi c Advisory CommitteeAdepoju Aderanti (Network of Migration Research on Africa)Juriaan Booij (Sinking Tuvalu Project)Laurent De Boeck (Observatory on African, Caribbean and Pacifi c Migration)Mohanty Manoranjan (University of South Pacifi c)Frederic Jacquemin (ACP Cultural Observatory)Steven Mac Andrew (CARICOM)Thando D Gwebu (University of Botswana)Vijay Naidu (University of South Pacifi c)Jacqueline Meido Madiot (ACP Culture and Film)Ndioro Ndiaye (Alliance for Migration, Leadership and Development)Matteo Pedercini (Millennium Development Institute)Bridget Wooding (Caribbean Migrants Observatory, OBMICA)
Graphic LayoutLai-momo - Filippo Mantione
ContactSecretariat of the African, Caribbean and Pacifi c Group of States Avenue Georges Henri 451 B - 1200 Brussels Belgium email : [email protected] www.acpsec.org/index.htm - www.acpsec.org/migration Tel: +32 2 743 06 00 Fax: +32 2 735 55 73
Published with the fi nancial support of the European Commissionunder the Framework Contract No2009/216741 implemented by ARS Progetti S.P.A.
The Report may contain material subject to copyright. In case of reproduction please quote the source. Reproduction and dissemination for educational and training purposes are permitted free of charge provided that reference to the ACP Group of States Secretariat is duly acknowledged.
Human Mobility Report 2011. Migration and Human Development in ACP Countries, Brussels: ACP Secretariat (author: Andrea Gallina). © Andrea Gallina and the ACP Secretariat
First Published in Brussels ACP Secretariat, September 2010
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FOrEwOrd.................................................................................. 5
ACkNOwLEdgEmENTS..................................................................... 6
ACrONymS................................................................................... 7
LiST OF TABLES, grAphS, BOxES, FigurES ANd mApS............................. 8
OVErViEw................................................................................... 9
ChApTEr 1ACp grOup ApprOACh TO ThE mOBiLiTy ANd dEVELOpmENT NExuS.......... 13
Free, Regulated and Secure Mobility is the Ultimate ACP Policy Goal 15The ACP Group of States’ Approach to Human Mobility 18Unpacking the Linkage Between Migration and Development 19Four Migrant Capitals 20
ChApTEr 2FiVE kEy pOLiCy ChALLENgES.......................................................... 23
1st Key Challenge: Develop Time and Cost-effective Research Tools for Analysing the Mobility-Development Nexus in ACP Countries 252nd Key Challenge: Ensure Free, Regulated and Secure Mobility 293rd Key Challenge: Address Environmentally Induced Mobility 324th Key Challenge: Integrate Human Mobility to National Development Policies 365th Key Challenge: Assure Social Inclusion, Respect and Protection of Migrants in ACP Countries 38
ChApTEr 3mOBiLiTy TrENdS ANd pATTErNS iN ACp COuNTriES.............................. 41
An Introduction to Mobility in the ACP Group of States 43Immigration into ACP Countries 49Emigration from ACP Countries 60 TA
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Sub-Saharan Africa Emigration Systems 64Emigration from the Caribbean 68Emigration from the Pacific 68A Final Remark on the Emigration of Women in ACP Countries 71
ChApTEr 4migrANT CApiTALS: TrENdS, pATTErNS ANd mAiN COrridOrS.................. 75
An Overview of Migrant Economic Capital in the ACP Countries 77Macroeconomic Importance of Remittances in ACP Countries 81Migrant Human Capital: The Brain Drain and the Brain Gain 88Migrant Social Capital: Transnational Practices as Development Tools 94Migrant Cultural Capital: Tangible and Intangible Factors Shaping Development 99Creative Industries and Diaspora Linkages 100Two Case-Studies: Analysing Migrant Capital Flows in Two Intra-ACP ‘Mobility Corridors’
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ChApTEr 5iNdiCATiONS FOr pOLiCiES ANd prOJECTS........................................... 113
Implications for the ACP Group of States Secretariat 115The Way Forward: Towards a New MDG 120
STATiSTiCAL ANNEx........................................................................ 121
gLOSSAry OF TErmS...................................................................... 127
rEFErENCES................................................................................ 130
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FORE
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Migration is a very important livelihood strategy for millions of ACP countries nationals. Their contribution to the home country development is made of tan-gible and intangible resources which are seldom appreciated by policy makers and development practitioners. In this fi rst ACP Human Mobility Report 2011 we unveil the complex and multifaceted dynamic of the linkage between migration and development in the ACP countries and aim to make this linkage more visible into national, regional and international development plans.
FOrEwOrd
in a global partnership centred on human dignity and mutual respect, issues of mobility, migration and development are central to the fu-
ture of our countries, and indeed are interrelated with almost all of the Millennium Development Goals. As our knowledge and understand-ing with respect to the multidimensionality of people’s mobility within and across borders improves, we realise the complexity of this process, which encompasses historical, geographical, economic, sociological and political spheres. Nonetheless, in recent years, the management of population mo-bility has all too often been limited to an approach centred on infl ux regula-tion and security considerations.
Solutions to migration cannot be based solely on security concerns. Shared refl ections and dialogue on approaches that will be more effective and less destructive in terms of the overall perception of the general public in the countries of origin, as well as transit and host countries, based on respect for human rights – including the right to seek asylum – are part of a long-term strategy as opposed to short-term security concerns. The mobility of ACP nationals as a human right that contributes to the cultural, social and eco-nomic diversity of peoples in the countries of origin, as well as in transit and host countries, must be defended, and the positive impact of these migrants’ capital in host societies needs to be studied in greater depth. People’s ability to choose the place they call home is a dimension of human freedom that we refer to as human mobility. Nonetheless, the ACP Group of States believes mobility cannot be a substitute for national development strategies directed toward investing in people and creat-ing conditions for people to prosper at home. Indeed, the potential of mobility to improve the well-being of disadvantaged sectors of the population is limited precisely because these are often the least likely to move.The ACP Group believes that international migration and mobility constitute major challenges to ACP States and their partners, in particular as regards development policy. To this end, the ACP Group advocates a broader, more comprehensive ‘people-centred’ approach to migration and mobility issues that could steer and maximise the benefi ts of international and internal migration towards sustainable development goals, while minimizing the negative consequences of these population movements, not only for countries of origin and destination, but also for migrants.
Dr. Mohamed Ibn Chambas
Secretary-General of the African, Caribbean and Pacifi c (ACP) Group of States
Dr. Mohamed Ibn Chambas
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This Report is the result of a collaborative effort that involved several people in the Depart-ment of Political Affairs and Human Development of the ACP Group of States Secretariat.
First and foremost, the Team is grateful to the intellectual exchange with former Secretary-General Sir John Kaputin, who led the ACP Group of States Delegation to the III Global Forum on Migration and Development in Athens in 2009, where this Report was conceived as a tool to provide data and analysis based on evidence concerning the main migration and development challenges in the ACP countries, and thus fill a longstanding gap. The Team is also thankful to the strong and enthusiastic support of former Head of Department of Political Affairs and Human Development and Deputy Secretary-General Andrew Bradley in insisting that it should elaborate on controversial and politically sensitive issues and provide the needed evidence base. The European Commission Aidco Team in the Governance Unit led by Kirsi Pekuri, with the support first of Michele Devys and later Christophe Fleureau-Dauloudet has also been instrumental in pursuing this endeavour and providing the necessary support to the ACP Secretariat in order to complete this task. We extend them our deep gratitude. The Team is also extremely thankful to the recently appointed ACP Group of States Secretariat Secretary-General Mohamed Ibn Cham-bas and to the new Head of Department of Political Affairs and Human Development and Deputy Secretary-General Michele Dominique Raymond for ensuring continuity and political support to the entire ACP Migration Dossier, of which this Report is an important component. Last but not least, the Team acknowledges the enthusiastic and timely help of Aya Kasasa of the Department of Policy Affairs and Human Development. Without her invaluable backing this Report would have not been produced and the long hours at the ACP Secretariat would not have been so engaging.
Finally, as Task Team Leader and Report Lead Author I am deeply grateful to ARS Progetti Task Manager Cristiano Maugeri for his flawless logistic and administrative support, as well as to Anna Mizzoni. Earlier drafts of the Report were reviewed by international experts from ACP and other countries. In particular, I am grateful to Mohanty Manoranjan and Vijay Naidu professors at the University of South Pacific, Steven Mac Andrew Specialist on Movement of Skills and Labour at CSME Unit in CARICOM, Adepoju Aderanti, Director of the Network of Migration Research on Africa, Thando D Gwebu at the University of Botswana, Jacqueline Meido Madiot Specialist at the ACP Group of States Secretariat for ACP Culture and Film, Ndioro Ndiaye, Director Alliance for Migration, Leadership and Development, Matteo Pedercini, Deputy Director for Capacity De-velopment and Modeling at the Millennium Institute, Laurent de Boeck, Director Observatory on African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Migration, Susanne Melde Research Officer at the Observa-tory on African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Migration and Frederic Jacquemin Specialist at the ACP Cultural Observatory. Particular thanks go to Bridget Wooding, Director of the Observatorio Migrantes del Caribe and Wilfredo Lozano, Director of the Centro de Investigación Económica y Social at UNIBE, Dominican Republic, for the engaging intellectual discussions on the subject. The responsibility for what has been written in this Report remains, of course, entirely mine.
On behalf of the Task Team,
Andrea Gallina
Lead Author and Task Team Leader - ARS Progetti S.P.A. August 2010, Brussels and Santo Domingo
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ACrONymSACkNOwLEdgEmENTSACp African Caribbean and PacificACp hmr 2011 African Caribbean and Pacific Human Mobility Report 2011AdOpEm Dominican Association for the Development of Women ApmrN Asia-Pacific Migration Research NetworkAu African Union CAriCOm Caribbean Common Market CEN-SAd Community of Sahel-Saharan StatesCOmESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern AfricaCSmE Caribbean Single Market and EconomydrC Democratic Republic of CongoDRC-Sussex Development Research Centre at Sussex UniversityCASS CARICOM Agreement on Social Security EAC Eastern African Community EBS Equity Building Society ECCAS Economic Community of Central African StatesECOwAS Economic Community of West African States EpA Economic Partnership AgreementEu European UnionFdi Foreign Direct InvestmentgATS General Agreement on Trade and Servicesgdp Gross Domestic Product hdi Human Development Indexhdr Human Development Reportidp Internally Displaced PeopleiFC International Finance Corporation iOm International Organisation for Migration NOmrA Network of Migration Research in AfricaOBmiCA Caribbean Migrants ObservatoryOdA Overseas Development AssistanceOECd Organization for Economic Cooperation and Developmentmdg Millennium Development GoalmidSA Migration Dialogue for Southern AfricamOST Management of Social TransformationsNEpAd New Partnership for Africa’s Development OECS Organisation of Eastern Caribbean StatesOFw Overseas Filipino WorkerOwwA Overseas Workers Welfare Administrationp-ACp Pacific ACPpiC Pacific Island Country piFS Pacific Island ‘Forum’ SecretariatpOEA Philippine Overseas Employment Administrationppp Purchasing Power ParityprSp Poverty Reduction Strategy PaperSAdC Southern African Development Community SAmp South Africa Migration Project SiS Small Island States SSA Sub-Saharan Africa SwAC Sahel and West Africa ClubuN United NationsuNdESA United Nations Department for Economic and Social AffairsuNdp United Nations Development ProgramuNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural OrganizationuNhCr United Nations High Commission for RefugeesuS United States uSAid United States Agency for International DevelopmentuSd United States Dollar wB World BankwTO World Trade OrganisationwwB Women World Banking
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Tables Table 1.1 – A Framework for Migration and Development Policies 16 Table 2.4 – ACP Emigration Towards the Global North 121Table 2.5 – ACP Diasporas (Total and as Percentage of Population, 2007) 122Table 3.1 – ACP Emigration: Comparing UN and DRC Datasets on Migrant Stocks 48Table 3.2 – Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) […] end-2008 50Table 3.3 – Emigration of ACP Nationals 60Table 3.4 – ACP Regions and Sub-Regions: Emigration to the Global North 63Table 3.5 – Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) […] end-2008 66Table 4.1 – Remittances and Migration in ACP 78Table 4.2 - Worker’s Remittances, Compensation of Employees, and Migrant Transfers, Credit (US$ Million) 79Table 4.3 – Creative Goods: Exports by Economic Group, 2005 100Table A1 – Main Socio-Economic Indicators of ACP Countries [...] (in Annex) 123Table A2 – Physicians Born in African Countries Appearing in Censuses of Nine Receiving Countries Circa 2000 (in Annex) 124Table A3 – Professional Nurses Born in African Countries Appearing in Censuses of Nine Receiving Countries Circa 2000 (in Annex) 125
GraphsGraph 0.1 - HDI Sub-Regional Average, Lowest and Highest in the ACP Group 9Graph 3.1 - World and ACP Migrant Population 43Graph 3.2 - Female Migrants (about 2000) 44Graph 3.3 - Female Migrants as Share of Total in ACP Regions and Sub-Regions 44Graph 3.4 - World and ACP GDP per capita 44 Graph 3.5 - International Migrants Abroad as Percentage of the Population and GDP per capita Current US$, 2007 44Graph 3.6 - HDI and Population Abroad in ACP 47Graph 3.7 - ACP Top 20 Diasporas in the Global North 64Graph 3.8-3.13 - Female Migrants in ACP Countries as Share of Total, in 1960 and 2005 126Graph 4.1 - ACP and World Migrant Worker’s Remittances in Billion USD, 2009 77Graph 4.2 - Selected ACP Countries Migrant Workers’ Remittances as Percentage of GDP 82Graph 4.3 - Comparing Financial Flows in Western Africa 83Graph 4.4 - Comparing Financial Flows in Southern Africa 84Graph 4.5 - Comparing Financial Flows in Central/Middle Africa 85Graph 4.6 - Comparing Financial Flows in Eastern Africa 85Graph 4.7 - Comparing Financial Flows in the Caribbean 86Graph 4.8 - Comparing Financial Flows in the Pacific 89 BoxesBox 2.1 - The Regional Coordination Process Through MIDSA 31Box 2.2 - The Sinking of Tuvalu Seen by Visual Artists 33 Box 4.1 - Beyond Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) 80Box 4.2 - Task-Shifting from Highly Skilled Health Workers to Less Skilled Health Workers 94Box 5.1 - Strengthening Migration Impact in the Caribbean by Protecting Migrants Rights 116
Figures Figure 1 - The Haiti-Dominican Republic Mobility-Corridor 106Figure 2 - The Zimbabwe-South Africa Mobility-Corridor 108
MapsMap 1.1 - African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States 22 Map 3.1 - Feminization of Migration in Africa 45Map 3.2 - Feminization of Migration in the Caribbean 46Map 3.3 - Feminization of Migration in the Pacific 46Map 3.4 - Sub-Saharan Africa. Immigrants as Percentage of Total Population 52Map 3.5 - Caribbean. Immigrants as Percentage of Total Population 55Map 3.6 - Pacific. Immigrants as Percentage of Total Population 59 Map 3.7 - Intra-Sub-Saharan African Mobility 61Map 3.8 - ACP South-North Mobility 63Map 3.9 - Emigration from Sub-Saharan Africa 65Map 3.10 - Emigration from the Caribbean 69Map 3.11 - Emigration from the Pacific 70
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Demographic Trends in ACP Countries Pose Important Challenges for Migration Management, Especially for Sub-Saharan AfricaThe ACP Group of States brings together 79 countries in the African, Caribbean and Pacifi c regions. In 2007 the ACP population of approx-imately 850 million could be broken down as follows: 802 million (or 94.4 per cent) were Sub-Saharan Africans, 38 million were from the Caribbean and about 10 million were from the Pacifi c Islands. During the period from 2005 to 2010, the natural annual population increase averaged 2.7 per cent in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2.6 per cent in the Pacifi c and 1.7 per cent in the Caribbean. At this pace, by 2020 there will be 285 mil-lion more people in ACP countries (278 m in Africa, 4 m in the Caribbean and 3 m in the Pacifi c), and the ACP’s share of the world pop-ulation will expand from 10.5 per cent to 15 per cent. Considering the demographic struc-ture of many ACP countries (more than two thirds of the population in Africa are under 25 years of age), this will imply a large increase in the share of working-age persons likely to seek greener pastures abroad. In the coming years, these young people will place consider-
able demands on health, housing and educa-tion services, as well as the job markets and natural resources. Furthermore, ACP youth will certainly have an average education level and connectivity with the rest of the world that is far higher than that of their elders, coupled with greater expectations from local labour markets, which are currently unequipped to meet their demands for adequate jobs.
Low Gross Domestic Product and Low Human Development Affect ACP Mobility PatternsDespite a 10.5 per cent share of the worldpop-ulation, the ACP countries account for only 1.8 per cent of world GDP. The ACP’s average GDP per capita in 2007 (in current US$) was 7 times lower than the average GDP per capita in the world. A comparison of average GDP purchas-ing power parity (PPP) in US dollars per capita within the ACP regions confi rms the relatively better situation of the Caribbean countries vis-à-vis the African and Pacifi c regions. In Sub-Saharan Africa we also fi nd the most un-equal distribution of wealth in the entire ACP Group of States: Namibia has a Gini coeffi cient of 74, Botswana 61 and South Africa 57, among the highest in the world.1 Even if the GDP in PPP is only a partial meas-ure of a country’s development, the Human Development Index (HDI) classifi cations indi-cate similarly troubling levels. It situates 59 of the 79 ACP countries in the Medium and Low HDI segment, with only 9 in the High HDI seg-ment and one, Barbados, in the Very High HDI segment with a 0.903 HDI value, just above Malta and equal to the Czech Republic (two EU countries). Data is not available for 11 ACP countries. At the lowest extreme of the ACP scale we fi nd Niger, with a 0.340 HDI, the low-est in the world. Regional averages refl ect the relative low level of HDI except for the Carib-bean region (see Graph 0.1).The extent of poverty and material depriva-tion associated with very low levels of human
Graph 0.1 - HDI Sub-Regional Average, Lowest and Highest in the ACP Group
Source: own elaboration on UNDP HDR, 2009.
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development and GDP per capita has impor-tant consequences for migratory flows. Due to poverty, deprivation and the isolation of many ACP countries, the overall share of ACP mi-grants on the world migrant stock in 2010 will remain much the same as in 2005, despite a 5 point increase in the population. For the most part, migrants from ACP countries can afford only short-distance migration, of-ten in order to escape conflict, environmental disaster or to seek temporary occupations in neighbouring countries with sometimes even lower income levels.2
However, while these mobility patterns have been the norm for many semi-nomadic groups for centuries, contemporary mobility patterns are increasingly permanent and demand other types of measures, which are difficult to ad-dress using already stretched budgets.
The Effects of the Global Crisis Slow Down Development Efforts and Diminish the Positive Effects of MigrationThe global financial, fuel and food crisis that originated in the developed world in 2008, has not contributed to improving mobility frame-works. In ACP countries the crisis led to a dramatic slowdown of Foreign Direct Invest-ments (FDIs), a reduction of exports and earn-ings from Trust Funds,3 and a sharp decline in remittances, which are only now beginning to slowly recover. Foreign reserves to cover im-ports are dwindling, thus jeopardizing many countries’ capacity to import even basic prod-ucts such as food, medical supplies and agri-cultural inputs. The estimated loss of output is significant and erodes the results of positive growth in previous years. As a result, per cap-ita income is declining and resources for na-tional development are being curtailed. Only Chinese and Indian investments are preventing African growth poles to decline further.Secondary effects in neighbouring countries related to petty trade linkages and remit-tances are also significant. In this context, the vulnerability of migrants increases and the effects on the communities left behind — in terms of reduced disposable income — can
be tangible. The poor are the most affected. The effects of the crisis are particularly vis-ible in those countries with large diasporas4 in OECD nations and regions most affected by the crisis, such as the United States and the European Union. As migrant workers tend to be employed in shrinking sectors such as con-struction, retail and tourism, migrant work-ers incomes are significantly affected, with a negative impact on remittances to family back home.5 Migrant workers are even more affected by the crisis not only because of the types of sectors they work in, but also because of the more precarious jobs they hold, compared to local citizens. In times of economic hardship, they are the first to be laid-off due to this more vulnerable employment status. Although this is related to such general issues as discrimina-tion and migrant worker rights, it clearly wors-ens the negative impact on migrants caused by the current crisis.Measures to minimise impact are being un-dertaken by some ACP country governments, including fiscal stimulus packages (Mauritius, Jamaica and Tanzania), revising budget ex-penditures and targeting assistance to key sectors (such as tax cuts for mining compa-nies in Zambia), strengthening regulation of the banking sector and financial markets, and other macroeconomic and monetary policies (such as the short-term fiscal, monetary and exchange rate measures introduced by the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo). However, the ability of ACP countries to sustain an adequate level of investment is severely limited. Pre-existing resource constraints are being exacerbated by a wid-ening savings-investment gap. Estimates by the Committee of African Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors established to monitor the crisis, highlighted that to merely maintain pre-crisis levels of growth in Africa would require an additional US$50 billion in 2009 and US$56 billion in 2010, and that in-creasing investment to the level needed to achieve higher growth rates consistent with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
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2009 and US$130 billion in 2010.6
Consequently, commitments to increase over-seas development assistance (ODA) to ACP countries must be made quickly. However donor countries are also curtailing develop-ment assistance as a measure to cut their own budgets and in any case, ODA alone will not be enough to allow ACP countries to restore growth levels sufficient to reduce poverty. In this context, it is unlikely that substantial new additional resources can be found. In this con-text, is desirable that resources for poverty reduction be untied from migration manage-ment policies.
Mobility Frameworks Need to Be Reformed in ACP Countries Unequal distribution of opportunities, wealth, demographics as well as the existence of tran-snational communities gives rise to migratory flows. Mobility is here to stay. There is a need, therefore, to improve its developmental di-mension and reverse the negative implica-tions. The ‘brain drain’ that affects relevant sectors, including education and health, con-stitutes a major obstacle to the development of ACP countries. Yet it can be turned into an opportunity if mobility schemes are modified at both ends of the migratory chain. Mobility in ACP countries has been and will continue to be one among the various liveli-hood strategies available to improve individu-al and family conditions. The key issue is how to improve mobility without jeopardising the development efforts of other countries and individuals.
Main Objectives and Structure of the Report This Report aims to shed light upon the chal-lenging current issues at hand by providing data and analysis on the current mobility trends and patterns in the ACP Group of States, and to raise awareness among policy makers of the challenges and opportunities that mobility represents for human development. The Report is organised in five chapters. Chap-ter 1 presents the ACP Group of States ap-
proach to mobility and its linkage to human de-velopment. Chapter 2 highlights the five main development challenges to the ACP Group of States in addressing mobility as an element of human development. These key challenges are those that emerged during the international fora and regional ACP events, in which the ACP Group of States Secretariat participated, as well as in the recent discussion on the revision of the Cotonou Agreement with the European Union. Chapter 3 provides an overview on ACP migration. The aim of this chapter is to give a picture of the ACP countries’ emigration and immigration trends and patterns, globally and by focusing on each sub-region. Chapter 4 fo-cuses on the developmental impact of mobil-ity. It aims to provide an overview of the main flows of migrant economic, human, social and cultural capital. It also describes at micro-lev-el the impact of mobility in human develop-ment by looking at human mobility corridors, in order to identify the bottlenecks and areas of intervention propitious for stimulating posi-tive use of migrant capitals for development. Chapter 5 reflects an effort to provide an-swers to the main challenges identified in the Report. It addresses the areas of public poli-cies that can be promoted and/or reformed with an eye toward eliminating the structural barriers that impede the full and positive uti-lisation of the migrants’ resources.
Notes1 - UNDP (2009)2 - Ratha Dilip and William Shaw (2007)3 - The financial crisis also negatively affected earn-ings from Trust Funds held by Kiribati and Tuvalu. ‘The Pacific Conference on the Human Face of the Global Economic Crisis’, Port Vila, 11 February, 2010.4 - The term ‘diaspora’ is used throughout the HMR2011 to indicate the migrant population outside the home country. The term ‘diaspora organisations’ is used to indicate those emigrants formal and informal groups who have left the country and are interested in supporting home country and hometown develop-ment efforts.5 - Awad Ibrahim (2009)6 - African Development Bank Group (2009)
© Istockphotos
Mobility in the ACP Group of States is a key challenge to development due to its linkages with climate change, confl ict, social exclusion,
declining international development assistance and growing urbanization. These common challenges call for an improved mobility framework, in which mobility is considered a fundamental individual
freedom that can lead to substantial benefi ts for all people and countries involved.
ACp grOup ApprOACh TO ThE mOBiLiTy ANd
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ACp group Approach to the mobility and Development Nexus
Mobility in the ACP Group of States is a key challenge to development due to its linkages with climate change, conflict, social exclusion, declining international development assistance and growing urbanization. These common challenges call for an improved mobility framework, in which mobility is considered a funda-mental individual freedom that can lead to substantial benefits for all people and countries involved.
Free, Regulated and Secure Mobility is the ultimate ACp policy goal The ACP Group of States includes 79 coun-tries distributed over three continents and six macro-regions, with a wealth of social, cul-tural, economic diversity and different devel-opment priorities (see Map 1.1). Yet they all share a common vision: improving the devel-opmental dimension of international mobility. This translates into a mission that demands real commitment from policy makers at both ends of the migratory chain for the purpose of improving the current mobility frameworks in order to ensure free, secure and regulated mobility for all.
On the one hand, this implies the elimination of barriers that impede people from having the freedom to choose their place of residence and work, while on the other hand it implies favouring the positive utilisation of resources accumulated during the migratory project, namely the cultural, social, human and eco-nomic capital of migrants.1
This Report is based on two underlying as-
sumptions. The first is that immobility has a cost for ACP countries and their people. The second is that a positive migration and devel-opment nexus can only exist within a system of international relations that favours inclu-sion, cohesion, protection and acceptance of migrants and their families; that considers the individual rights of migrants in cases of vol-untary or forced returns; and that values the positive contributions that the economic, hu-man, cultural and social capital of migrants make to development. This ACP Human Mobility Report is about ‘un-packing’ the linkage between migration and development in the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, by making operational both migration-friendly development policies, meaning development policies that create conditions for the utilisation of migrant capi-tals for the development of migrant-sending countries, and development-friendly migra-tion policies which by facilitating mobility, support the process of accumulation of mi-grant capitals. The policy objectives and ex-pected results of these two Policy Areas are detailed in Table 1.1. The Report also aims to contribute to national, regional, and interna-tional debate on these issues.In the fields of development and migration policies, these are not small challenges. By
To operationalise the developmental impact of migration and mobility, commitments are needed from policy makers at both ends of the migration chain.
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means of this Report and the various Decla-rations and Resolutions approved in the past fi ve years, the ACP Group of States calls for an international agenda that reforms the current international mobility framework and devel-opment paradigm, and includes the ‘migration and development nexus’ in a broader and ul-timately essential agenda for global welfare, in which the benefi ts and costs of mobility are equally shared among nation-states involved.
Eliminating barriers is not enough. The elim-ination of structural barriers to migration and mobility is only one side of the coin. Migrants move anyway, sometimes forced to choose between diffi cult and dangerous routes and means, which both increases their vulnerabil-ity to exploitation and diminishes the return on their investment in the so-called ‘migrato-ry project.’ Therefore, the need to eliminate barriers is self-evident. The other side of the coin is the mobilisation of migrant resources for development. Whether
documented or undocumented, migrants pur-sue their dream of a better life and accumulate skills, knowledge, and contacts, promote their cultures, and save money for remittances, all of which play an important role in their own human development and that of their fami-lies left behind. Enhancing the development potential of mobility — for individuals as well as sending and receiving countries — requires looking at both sides of the migration and de-velopment equation.
Constrained mobility has a cost for coun-tries and individuals. When moving South to North, ACP nationals face barriers such as lim-ited access to segments of the labour market that correspond to their actual skills, limited recognition of diplomas and professional com-petences acquired at home, hidden forms of discrimination in the labour market, the high costs of travel and remittance transfers, and xenophobic attitudes that force them to keep a low profi le and not engage with the host so-ciety.
Due to costs, the second-best alternative is to move regionally. When moving South to South, which is the most typical case for most ACP-country nationals, barriers to mobility are reduced due to the permeability of borders. This is particularly visible in Sub-Saharan Af-rica, where mobility is an intrinsic element of
Migration in the ACP Group of States is main-ly between neighbouring countries. Stories of exclusion, discrimination, lack of protec-tion, and xenophobic reactions are common among migrants moving from one ACP state to another and constitute an insurmountable barrier to enhancing the positive dimensions of migration.
Table 1.1 - A Framework for Migration and Development Policies
Source: Andrea Gallina for the ACP Group of States Secretariat HMR2011.
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ist with the artificially designed borders inher-ited from colonial times. Some countries have booming economies or have sufficient cultural and linguistic affinities to make them a pre-ferred destination for migrants. Established networks and communities of fellow compatri-ots do the rest. Social capital is very important for ACP nationals in their migration projects. Nevertheless, stories of exclusion, discrimina-tion, lack of protection, and xenophobic re-actions are common among migrants moving from one ACP state to another, and constitute an insurmountable barrier to enhancing the positive dimensions of migration.The fluidity of seasonal mobility among ACP countries is jeopardised by conflicts, political instability and transformations of the physi-cal environment due to climate change. All of these factors convert temporary mobility into something permanent, with visible con-sequences for urban development and the management of natural resources. Definitive resettlement in the destination countries re-duces ties with the homeland and therefore the possibility of using the resources acquired for that nation’s development. As will be seen later, contemporary mobility patterns are in-creasing the so-called ‘mobility hotspots’ and ‘mobility tipping points’.This ACP Human Mobility Report calls for the definitive abandonment of the ‘root-causes’ approach to migration which still permeates some policy arenas. It has been empirically demonstrated, by means of the so-called ‘mi-gration-hump’ theory, that progress in devel-opment indicators lead to increased migration and not vice-versa, until a point is reached at which people find enough opportunities at home, and hence migration slows down.2 Therefore, policy makers concerned about de-velopment should take into account that a re-duction in poverty leads to migration and that migration in turn helps people out of poverty. Nevertheless, addressing the ‘root-causes’ of migration remains a challenge for ACP coun-tries that are troubled by environmental cri-ses, conflicts and other forms of forced mi-
gration. Eliminating those ‘root causes’ is a priority for ACP States and the international community alike, but requires different tools and measures than those envisaged in the ‘development-friendly’ or ‘migration-friendly’ policy framework.
Free, regulated and secure mobility is in-cluded in the development agendas of ACP countries. In both regional and inter-conti-nental mobility flows, the benefits of migra-tion are not fully reaped because of the afore-mentioned structural constraints. Elimination of these structural constraints to mobility is at the core of the ACP Group of States’ Brussels Declaration and Plan of Action, approved by the ACP countries’ Ministers of Asylum, Migra-tion and Mobility in April 2006, and the ACP Group of States’ Brussels Resolution on Migra-tion and Development, which in turn was ap-proved in May 2008. Through these documents, the ACP Group of States promotes a liberal and rights-based conception of mobility, which first and foremost guarantees the migrants’ rights to choose their place of residence and work within established legal frameworks, while fostering the positive impact that human mobility has on the development of migrant-sending countries.
The ultimate goal of this Report is to con-tribute to international and national policy debates. Much has been written on this topic and discussed at recent international fora on Migration and Development. Yet often these debates and related literature have reflected the opinions, worries, and needs of countries of the Global North. The ACP Group wishes to contribute to the debate at all levels by highlighting existing is-sues and deficiencies, lessons learned and good practices, as well as by shedding light on data, correcting common misperceptions and placing more emphasis on the positive side of the link-age between mobility and development. This is achieved by stimulating discussion on how to create an environment that promotes the mi-grants’ freedom to choose their place of work
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and residence, while at the same time promot-ing the mobilisation of human, economic, so-cial and cultural resources for development.
The ACP Group of States’ Approach to human mobilityFor the ACP Group of States, migration and mobility are intrinsic elements in the process of human development, as theorised by Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen and liberal philosopher Martha Nussbaum.
On the mobility side of the equation there is a need to focus on the basic rights of mi-grants. Nussbaum puts forward three basic ideas that can be borrowed for positioning the ACP Group of States’ approach vis-à-vis human mobility and development. The first is that all human beings have equal dignity and worth, no matter where they are situated in society. The second idea is that this worth originates from
the power of moral choice human beings have, which means ‘they are able to plan a life in ac-cordance with their own evaluation of ends’.3 The third idea is the notion that the ‘moral equality of persons gives them a fair claim to certain types of treatment at the hands of society and politics [...] This treatment must do two things: respect and promote freedom of choice, and [...] respect and promote the equal worth of persons as choosers.’4 These three ideas set the stage for policy makers who are interested in adopting a liberal and rights-based approach to human mobility.
On the development side of the equation, the issue is resources. The development side of the migration and development equation is well explained by Amartya Sen’s analysis of the capabilities approach, and especially by the concept of substantive freedoms or capabili-ties. Amartya Sen defines development as the
process of expanding individual capabilities or substantive freedoms.5 According to Nussbaum and Sen, there are two common elements that are relevant for development planners. Firstly, the capability approach rejects the util-itarian standard preferences line of thought. According to the latter, development inter-vention should maximize the satisfaction of individuals. However, as noted by Nussbaum, a preference can be distorted either by social norms or asymmetrical power distribution. For example, a migrant can eventually become convinced that to work without a contract is not ideal but at least constitutes work, and despite being denied access to social security, is the best he or she can do. The migrant is ‘adapting’ his or her preferences to a given circumstance which does not lead to greater freedom. The utilitarian approach ‘suggests that the goal of development is a state or con-dition of persons (i.e. a state or condition of satisfaction), and thus understates the impor-tance of agency and freedom in the develop-ment process.’6 The second common element is that the ca-pability approach requires development plan-ners to identify the needs that individuals have for resources, and their diverse ability to convert these resources into activities or functioning.7 A mere distribution of resources is not enough ‘because it fails to take account of the fact that individuals need differing lev-els of resources if they are to come up to the same level of capacity to function. They also have differing abilities to convert resources into actual functioning.’8 Functioning is a key concept in the theoretical constructs of Am-artya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. The latter has listed ten basic and internal capabilities.9 She then adds a third level: the combined ca-pability.10 This combined capability is the com-bination of internal capability and an external environment that allows said functioning to be exercised. For example, if there is no freedom of movement, then a person may have the in-ternal capability to exercise a profession, but lacks the actual opportunity to use it (as he or she deem appropriate) in his or her coun-
People’s ability to choose the place they call home is a dimension of human freedom that we refer to as human mobility. Nonetheless mobility cannot be a substitute for national development strategies
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Without the enabling environment that trans-forms internal capabilities, it would be impos-sible to transform and convert resources into something that has worth.
The challenge to development planners and policy makers is promoting capabili-ties. The internal and combined capabilities on Nussbaum’s list are all relevant for migrant workers and their families (while it is often as-sumed that basic capabilities do not apply to migrants, since people able to move to another country already have enough basic capabilities to embark on a migratory project). Therefore, since the aim of human development policies is the promotion of combined capabilities, two efforts are needed from development plan-ners. The first is to promote the internal capa-bilities of prospective migrants, for example through education and professional training. The second is providing the material and in-stitutional conditions available for exercising these capabilities and transforming them into combined capabilities.
The negative impact of mobility on those left behind should not be underestimated. The theories of Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen have been applied to the UN Human De-velopment Report 2009, which focuses on mo-bility and development. The UNDP Report argues that before we start asking whether the freedom of movement, for example, has significant effects on incomes, education or health, we need ‘to recognise that movement is one of the basic actions that individuals can choose in order to realise their life plans. In other words, the ability to move is a dimension of freedom that is part of de-velopment – with intrinsic as well as potential instrumental value.’11 Yet, one should be careful not to view mobility as beneficial to everybody, or as a form of indi-vidual freedom that indiscriminately benefits everyone’s human development. The ‘brain drain’ of health care professionals is a case in point. The freedom to find employment op-
portunities in better health systems abroad should not be detrimental to the ability of peo-ple in ACP countries to access good doctors at home. However, given the current state of the health care sector in most ACP countries, on the one hand, and the net return from educat-ing those health workers who move abroad, on the other, the blame for dysfunctional health sectors in ACP countries cannot be attributed to migrating health workers but rather to ne-glected social protection policies or predatory recruitment policies on the part of countries who need health workers.
Mobility cannot be a substitute for devel-opment. The ACP Group of States believes mobility cannot be a substitute for national development strategies focused on investing in people and creating conditions that make it possible for people to prosper at home. The potential of mobility to improve the well-being of the very poor and most disadvantaged groups is limited, because these groups are of-ten the least likely to move. Therefore, while human mobility is not a panacea for underde-velopment, the largely positive effects it has on both movers and stayers suggest that it should be an important component of any strategy aimed at generating sustained improvements in human development around the world.
The need to move beyond security concerns. Finally, this approach calls for a redefinition of current hegemonic discourses that search for solutions to migration based on security con-cerns. Shared reflections and dialogue about approaches that will be more effective and less destructive in terms of the general pub-lic’s overall perceptions in the countries of origin, as well as in transit and host countries, and that are based on respect for human rights — including the right to seek asylum — are part of a long-term strategy that goes beyond just addressing short-term security concerns.
Unpacking the Linkage Between Migration and developmentIn this Report we ‘unpack’ the development
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side of the equation by identifying four de-velopmental dimensions of mobility, or re-sources, which are accumulated by migrants during their migratory projects. These are the equivalent of migrant ‘internal capability’. The ultimate goal of ACP policy makers is to transform these internal capabilities of mi-grants into combined capabilities.
Four Migrant Capitals1. Economic capital: remittances of savings accumulated during the migratory process. High transfer costs and reduced access to conventional inexpensive and safe systems signify additional constraints that reduce the potential of the migrants’ economic capital. Reducing these costs by half could result in an additional $2.5 billion in remittance flows to Sub-Saharan Africa alone. Especially in times of crisis, reducing costs may compensate for lower remittance flows. Many ACP countries can tap the wealth of their diaspora by issu-ing diaspora bonds. In Sub-Saharan Africa, is-suing these bonds and overcoming weaknesses in the region’s legal and regulatory systems could help investors tap $5 billion to $10 bil-lion annually.12
2. Human capital: education, technical and entrepreneurial skills learned at home and improved abroad. Facilitating recognition of formal and informal skills in the destina-tion countries would enhance the accumula-tion of human capital and avoid the so-called ‘brain-waste’, meaning the under-utilisation of skills. In the case of less skilled workers, facilitating the formal learning process could have positive implications for both receiving and destination countries. Facilitating return and especially circulation can enrich the proc-ess of human capital accumulation, as well as mobilise critical mass of expertise needed to conduct the development process in the coun-try of origin.
3. Social capital: networks, associations, and trust developed during the migration process that increase the migrants’ access to relevant
information, facilities and resources, and re-duce transaction costs. Social capital repre-sents a source of more informed choices for those deciding to move, while providing social safety nets upon arrival in destination coun-tries. Social networks are vital to this end, and diasporic linkages are instrumental to im-proved mobility. Social capital also leads to business network formation as a substitute for welfare assistance for unauthorised migrants in the host society, thereby facilitating the so-cial inclusion of migrants upon arrival at their destination. Despite the difficulties faced by migrants in host societies and their limited social and economic inclusion, initiatives that maintain close ties with home communities are flourishing.
4. Cultural capital: ideas, attitudes, values and artistic expressions (tangible and intan-gible) that are present in the migrants’ com-munities and that are important elements for bridging different cultures, so that migration is perceived not only as a way to improve indi-vidual migrants’ economic situations but also as a means by which to encourage cultural di-versity and simultaneously promote cultural industries. In the ACP region, the cultural di-mension of migration and mobility needs to be considered, insofar as sedentary and nomadic peoples have always co-existed and made cul-tural contributions, and therefore both have a right to live within their own cultures. The dominant role played by mobility in ACP cultures facilitates the circulation of ideas, know-how and best practices (universities, students, trainees, artists, researchers, etc.) although the full acknowledgement of this fact and its economic importance in develop-ment planning has been limited.
The dominant role played by mobility in ACP cultures facilitates the circulation of ideas, know-how and best practices (universities, students, trainees, artists, researchers, etc.) although the full acknowledgement of this fact and its economic importance in develop-ment planning has been limited.
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contribution to integration and inclusion by promoting better understanding among civili-sations and cultures, thus helping to transcend post-colonial and territorial divisions, estab-lish relationships between states and peoples, and reduce the confidence gap between na-tive and migrant communities.
Defining the ‘Migration and Development’ NexusFor the purpose of operationalising ‘migration-friendly’ development policies, in this Report a migration and development project is any initiative that enables migrants — if they so desire — to become ‘agents of development’, mobilising and investing the human, economic, social and cultural capital accumulated during the migration project in the interest of their own and their communities’ human develop-ment. A ‘migration and development’ project is, therefore, any kind of public or private-led action that proves to be successful in: a) pro-moting and enhancing the mobilisation of the economic, human, social, and cultural capital of migrants for achieving a more inclusive and balanced process of development, in origin, transit and host countries; b) contributing to creating the pre-conditions that allow this process to occur, by integrating factors related to human mobility into national development strategies and eliminating barriers to mobil-ity; and finally, c) improving the management of migration, addressing the root causes of forced migration, ensuring the protection of refugees, displaced and trafficked people, and ensuring the circularity of mobility.
Operationalising the linkage requires a fresh and complementary approach to develop-ment policy. In this framework, the inclusion of human mobility in the agenda of develop-ment cooperation does require a major change in the current approaches taken by internation-al cooperation actors. It does, indeed, demand that they embrace an innovative approach to addressing human mobility and, hence, the migrants’ resources at the local, national, re-
gional and international levels – both South-South and South-North – to complement their current practices. A major change is required, on the one hand, in the form of both the insti-tutionalisation and harmonisation of migration regimes of international cooperation actor, and on the other, in mainstreaming mobility in government policies.Removing the structural barriers to mobility is a long-term development goal. Meanwhile, op-erationalisation of the linkage between migra-tion and development can occur by creating the environment for mobilisation of migrant resources accumulated during various stages and places of the ‘migratory project’. Migrant agency is central to facilitating the process, as is the role played by government and develop-ment partners.
Notes1 - Social capital’s role in local economic develop-ment has been extensively studied following the works of Putnam Robert D., Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti (1993). The role of human capital in economic development has pioneered by Becker Gary S. (1975). The importance of cultural capital is high-lighted by Bourdieu Pierre (1986). The role of remit-tances or the economic capital of migrants is widely documented. For a review of the literature see World Bank (2005)2 - Martin, Philip L. and J. Edward Taylor (1996)3 - Nussbaum Martha C. (1999) 4 - Ibidem5 - Sen Amartya (1999)6 - Nussbaum Martha C. (2003)7 - Nussbaum Martha C. (1999)8 - Nussbaum Martha C. (2003) 9 - A basic capability is, for example, the capability of practical reasoning, while an internal capability is the capability to speak freely. Nussbaum’s list of ten basic capabilities includes life, bodily health, bodily integrity, senses, imagination and thought, emotions, practical reasoning, affiliation, care for other species, play, and control over one’s environment. 10 - Nussbaum Martha C. (1999) pp. 41-42.11 - UNDP (2009) pp. 14-15.12 - Ratha Dilip, Sanket Mohapatra, Sonia Plaza (2008)
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Map 1.1 - African, Caribbean and Pacifi c (ACP) Group of States
Only the main islands of the atolls are represented.The size and position of the Pacifi c Islands on this map do not correspond to the actual ones.Tha map has only descriptive purposes.
This chapter identifies five main challenges to enhancing the migration and development nexus in ACP countries. Given the scarcity of data, the diversity and variety of socio-economic conditions, climatic challenges,
xenophobic attitudes, mobility trends and patterns in the ACP, individual responses as well as collective improvements of the existing national and
international mobility frameworks are needed.
FiVE kEy pOLiCy ChALLENgES
ChApTEr 2
Sea rise and king tides are main concerns for Pacific
Islands people © Juriaan Booij
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This chapter identifies five main challenges to enhancing the migration and de-velopment nexus in ACP countries. Given the scarcity of data, the diversity and variety of socio-economic conditions, climatic challenges, xenophobic attitudes, mobility trends and patterns in the ACP, individual responses as well as collective improvements of the existing national and international mobility frameworks are needed.
ChApTEr 2
In the ACP countries the migration and de-velopment nexus is affected by a complex
set of challenges that demands for concerted actions at the national, regional and interna-tional level. Poverty and human deprivation, youth population and labour force, unemploy-ment and the potential for social disharmony, local and regional conflicts, and governance issues are as important as climate change, policy coherence, lack of data and migration policy frameworks. The ACP countries migration and development challenges discussed in this Chapter are at the core of the recent ACP Ministries of Migration and Asylum ‘Brussels Declaration and Plan of Action’ and the ACP Group of States’ ‘Brussels Resolution on Migration and Development’. The III Global Migration Forum on Migration and Development in Athens presented as well an important arena for the ACP Secretariat to put forward these key policy challenges as the priorities for the coming years in the field of migration and development.
1st Key Challenge: Develop Time and Cost-effective Research Tools for Analysing the Mobility-Development Nexus in ACP CountriesResearch on migration trends and patterns in
ACP countries has traditionally been geared towards satisfying the policy and security con-cerns of Northern countries. With the excep-tion of some noteworthy examples that will be described later, very little has been analysed from a South-South perspective.1 This is mainly due to the scarcity of comprehensive, reliable and comparable data on mobility. As people move, resources move also. Skilled people too migrate regionally, and both skilled and unskilled workers send remittances home. Along with people, there is also movement of music, cultural goods and industries, as well as information about jobs, living conditions and business opportunities. Not only are facts and figures often missing or incomplete, but we know very little about the dynamics that characterise these flows, the conditions faced by migrants, the families left behind and the actual and potential benefits for human devel-opment that can be generated by this intra-ACP mobility. Furthermore, the informality of many regional flows in the ACP countries adds elements of complexity to existing but rather weak sta-tistical information. Difficulties in calculating undocumented migrants, the lack of surveys allowing for comparative analysis during pe-riods between censuses, a lack of coordina-
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tion among data collection methods in sending and receiving countries, selective collection of country data, the lack of updated histori-cal series and so on all significantly undermine policy development in this area. While harmonisation and consolidation are needed, policy based on evidence cannot wait for these to occur, and alternative qualified methods need to be developed.
The Human Mobility Corridor ApproachAnalysis of the migration and development nexus within ACP countries needs to employ a more cost and time-effective research meth-od. Within the ACP Group of States, a time and cost-effective solution would be to improve and systematise the qualitative data collection methods developed by specialised research in-stitutions in ACP countries, and combine them with selected quantitative data for the pur-pose of establishing common frameworks and indicators. The migration and mobility corridor approach proposed in this Report can serve as the unit of analysis. The method proposed by the ‘mo-bility corridor’ is an analysis of the flows of migrant economic, social, cultural and human capitals between two countries (a migrant’s sending and receiving country), which should enable an understanding of their processes of accumulation, utilisation and interrelations with structural factors and obstacles. This ap-proach in essence expands the ‘remittance corridors’ approach developed by the World Bank, by including other flows of migrant re-sources and especially by considering the in-terrelationships between structural factors, resource flow dynamics and the migrant’s agency. Understanding the characteristics of the creation and mobilisation of these resourc-es is instrumental to improving policy-making in the area of migration and development, and consequently human development. Furthermore, framed within the capability-based approach to migration and develop-ment, this method emphasises the positive im-plications of migration on human development while also highlighting its negative dimensions
and constraints. It thus promotes the principle that mobility issues need to be addressed by cooperation frameworks that involve govern-ments at both ends of the mobility chain. For example, a policy addressing issues of so-cial cohesion in which migrant communities are well settled and integrated would necessarily need to be different from a policy addressing the inclusion needs of migrants moving within a newly established mobility corridor. Here, social networks are probably thinner and ac-cess to relevant information is more limited. Therefore, policies should focus on newly ar-rived migrants and reduce their vulnerability by means of institutional social protection measures, while in the former case it would be more important to focus on engaging with established diaspora formations that already provide welfare services in addition to or as a complement to state protection policies. Targeting policies in this manner would limit the risk of adopting incoherent ‘one-size-fits-all’ measures, while enabling policy-makers and development practitioners to understand migration and development dynamics, define context-specific policies, and establish institu-tional frameworks that can maximize the ben-efits of mobility for human development.Finally, the quantitative-qualitative method proposed by the mobility corridor approach can also help to identify ‘human mobility hotspots’, as well as ‘migration tipping points’. A mobility hotspot is an area of great activity of a specific type, such as border zones or ur-ban areas that particularly attract migrants, and urbanized areas along transit routes in which tensions are being spurred between mi-grants and local communities that may have a negative impact on social and economic co-hesion. A hotspot is also a place where there is intense mobility of people due, for exam-ple, to intensive cross-border small-scale trade activities involving human mobility, or due to forced migration and displacement. A hotspot is a point to be monitored. It is not necessarily a negative area, yet it requires priority actions to foster the positive dimen-sions of human mobility, in order to avoid
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crossing a tipping point. A ‘tipping point’ is a previously rare phenomenon that is becoming rapidly and dramatically more common. The term is borrowed from the field of physics, in which adding a small amount of weight to a balanced object can cause it to topple sud-denly and completely. Social stability and co-hesion can topple if migrants are not socially and economically included in the host society and labour market. Xenophobic reactions are an indication that a migration tipping point is being reached. This could occur, for example, in areas of high intensity deforestation, or with limited access to water and sanitation, or in areas where the unemployment situation is particularly severe and causes xenophobic reactions towards migrants. Identifying mobil-ity ‘hotspots’ and ‘tipping points’ can help to establish key entry points for policy-makers and practitioners in the field. The ACP Secretariat and its member states can contribute to improved policy and institutional coherence by considering the peculiarities of each mobility corridor and being able to iden-tify if they are hotspots and/or are close to the tipping point. Ongoing research programs and initiatives in the ACP countries are already focusing on im-portant corridors. In the ACP countries, there are notable examples of research networks that address mobility issues from a ‘mobility-corridor’ perspective, yet these sometimes focus on only one of the implications of the process of accumulation, loss and transfer of migrant resources. For example there are in-depth studies on brain-drain, return migra-tion, remittances, transnational relationships and so on, but few address the loss of migrant capitals and training / education in a systemic and holistic way, and how these interact with human development processes.
Some Notable Regional Research Experiences In Southern Africa, the Southern African Mi-gration Programme (SAMP) is an international network of organisations founded in 1996 to promote awareness of migration-development linkages in the Southern Africa Development
Cooperation (SADC) region. SAMP conducts ap-plied and policy-oriented research on migra-tion and development issues in specific South-ern Africa corridors (Zimbabwe-South Africa, Zimbabwe-Botswana, Lesotho-South Africa, etc.), looking especially at migrant resource formation and critical constraints. SAMP is also establishing an electronic Migration Data Observatory for the SADC region which will be accessible from its website, and has contrib-uted to the ‘Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa’ (MIDSA) (see Box 2.1). In Western Africa, a notable initiative is the Sahel and West Africa Club SWAC/OECD, a semi-autonomous initiative established under the OECD and managed by a Secretariat. The SWAC/OECD reviews migratory policies, gen-erates strategic thinking on various aspects of the regional integration process, and is work-ing to create a ‘Regional Observatory on Migra-tion’ in Western Africa. The research combines a macro-level analysis of intra-regional flows of people and resources, and a micro-level analysis of mobility in cross-border regions by looking at social, economic, cultural, and skills formation factors. The work of SWAC/OECD contributed to the formulation of a Joint ECOWAS Approach to Migration that promotes the free intra-regional movement of persons, and supported the negotiations during the EU-Africa Dialogue on Migration and Develop-ment. Another recently established yet promising regional network in Western Africa is the Net-work of Migration Research in Africa (NOMRA) located in the Human Resources Development Centre (HRDC), Lagos, Nigeria. This is a collab-orative organisation of researchers stemming from a UNESCO/MOST initiative. The Network aims to build a regional migration research network and research capacity to carry out cross-national, multidisciplinary and innova-tive research on socio-cultural, economic and political aspects of international migration in the region in order to advance knowledge on migration dynamics and policy-making in the region. An important goal of NOMRA is to ensure that migration is adequately main-
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streamed into development activities, includ-ing PRSPs and develop capacities, through training, of officials to help governments bet-ter understand migration management.2 An important regional initiative in the Carib-bean is the Caribbean Migrants Observatory (OBMICA), jointly established by the Centre for Research and Social Studies at the Do-minican Republic’s Ibero-American University and the Latin American Faculty of Social Sci-ences, providing research on social, cultural, human and economic capital formation and patterns in the Caribbean, with a particular focus on the Haiti-Dominican Republic mobil-ity corridor. The Observatory has conducted in-depth analyses of the social exclusion of Haitian migrants and Dominican-Haitian de-scendents in the Dominican Republic, and the socio-economic implications of the inte-gration of Haitian migrants into specific less-skilled segments of the labour market, such as domestic work. Research on the Dominican Republic-United States migration corridor is also another established research area of the Observatory. In the Pacific, the Asia-Pacific Migration Re-search Network (APMRN) established in 1995 as a research project of the UNESCO Manage-ment of Social Transformations (MOST) Pro-gramme is located at the School of Govern-ment, Development and International Affairs, attached to the Faculty of Business and Eco-nomics at the University of the South Pacific in Suva, which also coordinates the Pacific group of migration carrying out research on migra-tion and climate change, as well as migration flows between Pacific Islands and Australia / New Zealand. These are only some examples of the ongo-ing initiatives at the regional and sub-regional levels. There are many other initiatives and individual researchers in the ACP regions that are promoting interesting studies about the nexus between migration and development. To support these local initiatives, the ACP Group of States Secretariat established an Intra-ACP Migration Observatory in the 9th European De-velopment Fund. Research efforts will benefit
from linking southern research programs and institutions in order to collaborate in the area of migration and development.
The Role of Female Migration in theACP Countries Remains UnderstudiedAnother important limitation in ACP migration research is the limited analysis of women role in shaping migration patterns and the impact on human development. The participation of women in international mobility represents an important medium for enhancing women’s range of choices, empow-erment and hence human development. Mi-gration may offer women the opportunity to increase their economic independence, man-age economic resources, gain control over remittances, increase their agency and es-cape traditional norms and values that often have detrimental effects on their freedom to choose a social and professional life they con-sider worth living. However, female migration comes with social costs attached. Child-rearing in many ACP countries is a female-dominated task and migration implies family arrange-ments that are not necessarily optimal for the psychological and physical well-being of the children. That said, in the Caribbean context, for example, so-called “transnational mother-ing” has been widely recognised as a success-ful adaptive mechanism to the feminisation of migration, building on traditional female sup-port networks where historically the menfolk have largely been absent from child-rearing responsibilities.3 This may offset the benefits of migration, although remittances improve the opportunities, human development and education of children (especially girls). The increasing feminisation of migration by health care workers is also significantly affecting ACP countries’ health care services, to the detri-ment of those that do not choose to migrate. More information is needed to understand the extent of women’s path to emancipation by way of mobility, as well as its negative effects on human development and the social protec-tion of children and the elderly left behind. The migration of women is often studied as a
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separate subject, when instead it should be an ordinary dimension of all surveys and statistics dealing with remittances, migration decisions, labour conditions, the earnings of migrants, and the like. There is not enough evidence as yet to allow for reaching conclusive results on the role played by migration in the reconfiguration of gender roles leading to sustained gender equilibrium. More empirical evidence on the regulatory frameworks intended to empower women in these directions could guide policy makers in both the migration and develop-ment areas, and introduce a more gendered perspective on migration and development in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and Nation-al Development Plans in ACP countries.4
The Observatory represents an important re-sponse by the ACP Group of countries to this first key policy challenge.
2nd key Challenge: Ensure Free, Regulated and Secure Mobility In order to function, the linkage between migration and development needs coherent policy and institutional frameworks that as-sure effective measures against poverty and unemployment, while promoting social cohe-sion and protection for migrants. Unregulated and insecure mobility has other economic and social costs: to the migrants, because they will have to spend more money to pay expen-sive travel intermediaries, will face difficul-ties finding a job corresponding to the skills and education levels obtained at home, and will be at risk of ending up in exploitative and unprotected forms of labour. There are also expenses for the country of destination be-cause of the cost of exclusion, i.e., not be-ing able to properly utilise the pool of skills available among the migrant labour force, together with costs incurred from patrolling coastlines and land borders, fighting human smuggling and trafficking, removing undocu-mented migrants, labour inspections, the missed income from fiscal revenues, and so on.5 Finally, there are costs to the country of origin because of reduced remittances and
a decrease in the chances they will return. Socially and economically excluded migrants remit less money home, have fewer oppor-tunities to bring back ideas, information and technologies, and the families and children left behind cannot benefit from frequent vis-its by migrating parents.
Strengthening Circular MigrationThe natural corollary of free, regulated and secure mobility is the concept of ‘circular mi-gration’. In this Report, the concept of ‘circular mi-gration’ refers to a continuity of mobility in which the governments of destination and origin countries are committed to protecting individual migrants and protecting their right to choose their place of work and residence. Incentives for circular migration can involve both long-term foreign-born residents – those, for example, enjoying double citizenship who can easily move between two countries with-out restriction – as well as short-term migrants in search of temporary work opportunities.Circular mobility schemes are usually debated in terms of national development strategies, the alleviation of unemployment by coun-tries of origin, and the reliance on a flexible and undemanding labour force by destination countries, with limited consideration of the needs of migrants and a lack of understand-ing of transnational family and community patterns. Further, a structural problem in this policy field is the unpredictability of economic crises, changing trade agreements and other factors may undermine notable migration management policy efforts and hold back cir-cular migration agreements. Effective circular migration can be a strat-egy to remove barriers that force migrants to remain indefinitely in the host countries. Measures securing residence status (dual citi-zenship, permanent or multi-annual residence permits) are only some of the possible meas-ures that can operationalise the concept. Measures should therefore be encouraged that move from a simple concern over brain-drain to improving the management of qualified
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workers in strategic sectors in a timely and collective fashion by the governments of both sending and destination countries.Free mobility is also very important for the country of origin. Increased mobility enables stronger ties with the home country, whereas permanent settlements associated with family reunification loosen them, reducing the trans-fer of migrant capital (resources are no longer saved and remitted but invested in settlement mortgages and the education of children in the host country, for example). Eventually, social costs (family separations, children left behind, etc.) associated with long-term mi-gration can be reduced with eased mobility. It is important to acknowledge that the dura-tion of temporary work permits for unskilled low-wage migrant workers is generally not suf-ficient to recover the investment in the migra-tion project (or allow for meaningful invest-ment at home). However, in the current policy debate, cir-cular migration is often used as the equiva-lent of ‘temporary’, ‘cyclical’ or ‘contract’ migration. Circular migration should instead mean that migrants are free to come and go, in contrast to other forms of migration that are more or less forced, and managed types of temporary residence, which can be easily curtailed in times of economic downturn. Current attempts to promote free and secure mobility for all are undermined by new genera-tions of return and reintegration policy instru-ments, as well as temporary circular migration schemes. These are too recent to be assessed, especially considering the recent impact of the global economic slowdown and recession. However, there are strong indications that they have yielded unconvincing results and mixed feelings: short-term visa holders often become unauthorised over-stayers or perma-nent settlers (with increased social costs, of-ten unaccounted for), whereas regularly set-tled migrants do not necessarily move back to the home country to establish new businesses, despite incentives. There is no point in pro-moting return if people have no clear pros-pects regarding their lives in the countries of
origin. This always leads to failure: people re-emigrate shortly after their return. But when such perspectives do exist, then people will return, even without specific incentives. Well-known examples of this phenomenon are India and China.
Policy and Institutional Coherence In many ACP countries, circular mobility be-tween countries, often for seasonal work, is an established human activity. There are ongo-ing initiatives in the ACP countries that foster and strengthen policy coordination in the area of migration. For example, in West Africa, a treaty establishes free mobility for Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) passport holders. In Southern Africa, policy co-ordination at the regional level takes place in
the framework of MIDSA, and is coordinated by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). The project’s aim is to facilitate region-al dialogue and cooperation on migration poli-cy issues among the governments of the South-ern African Development Community (SADC). The overall objective is to facilitate regional co-operation in migration management by fos-tering a greater understanding of migration and strengthening regional institutional and personnel capacities (see Box 2.1). Ongoing dialogue and discussion about migra-tion issues also take place at the level of the African Union (AU). A Strategic Framework for a Policy on Migration in Africa was developed, specifically in response to the pressing issue of African expertise recruitment by developed countries. The African Union’s framework sug-gests countering the exodus of skilled nationals by promoting the New Partnership for Africa’s
Policy coherence in the field of migration and development is defined as ‘the pursuit of win-win-win opportunities for host and send-ing countries and the migrants’ through the systematic promotion of mutually reinforcing policies in all areas, as well as the promotion of specific synergies between migration and development policies.
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Development (NEPAD) strategy. Its aim is to create mechanisms that retain Africa’s human capacities while providing gainful employment and educational opportunities to qualified na-tionals in their home countries.Other regional economic cooperation initia-tives in Sub-Saharan Africa are addressing the issue of free mobility, although the lack of political will is often the main constraint to progress in the field (see Chapter 3).In the Caribbean, important strides are be-ing made as concerns the free movement of people. The CARICOM Single Market Econo-my (CSME) is designed to include free move-ment of people. The first phase has granted free movement to eleven categories of skilled migrants: university graduates, artists, musi-cians, media workers, sportspersons, teach-ers, nurses, holders of associates degrees or equivalent qualifications, artisans with a Caribbean Vocational Qualification (CVQ) and households domestics with a CVQ or equiva-lent qualification. Besides these categories, free movement has also been granted to all persons who are moving to establish a business or provide a service.6 The agreement foresees issuing Certificates of Recognition of CARICOM Skills Qualifica-tion from the designated ministry of the home or host country.7 In a subsequent phase, the agreement also foresees the ‘Right of Estab-lishment’ for other professionals (business owners, the self-employed, managerial, tech-nical, and supervisory staff, as well as spouses and immediate dependents). Some CARICOM member states have started issuing a CARICOM passport. A study on intra-CARICOM free circu-lation is being undertaken and expected to be released by late 2010.In the Pacific region, the countries of the Pa-cific Islands Forum are also coordinating activ-ities leading to temporary migration schemes within the region and beyond. In order to en-sure sustainability and maximum benefits for the members of the Forum, the Pacific Island States Secretariat is supporting policy discus-sion and negotiations. Various directives have been issued by lead-
Box 2.1 – The Regional Coordination Process Through MIDSA
The Forum created through the MIDSA process works to achieve the following specific goals: > To foster co-operation among SADC Member States on migration-related is-sues, enhancing their capacity to man-age migration within a regional context.To contribute to an increased awareness among SADC officials and policy-makers of the role of migration in the region’s social and economic development, and to ensure that orderly migration is per-ceived and used as a positive factor in the development process. > To help develop regional institutional capacities to deal with the challeng-es of migration management, and to strengthen the capacity of governments to meet these challenges in a coopera-tive and knowledge-based manner.> To enhance the understanding of offi-cials and policy-makers regarding caus-es, dimensions and the impact of migra-tion in Southern Africa.> To promote dialogue and interaction between governments and other agen-cies and institutions with migration-re-lated interests and expertise.> To deliver technical co-operation and training to build the capacity for migra-tion management, the sharing of infor-mation and research, as well as infor-mation dissemination activities.> To enhance the capacity of SADC coun-tries to collectively manage migration, including substantial progress towards harmonised systems of data collection and harmonised immigration policy and legislation.
Source: wInternational Organization for Migra-tion, 2000.
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ers of the Pacific Islands Forum, leaders of the Small Island States (SIS), trade ministers of the Pacific ACP (P-ACP), and the forum of economic ministers. On 26 October 2006, at the Thirty-Sixth Pacific Islands Forum, the Ka-libobo Road Map was approved, which includ-ed an initiative to ‘integrate trade in services, including temporary movement of labour, into the Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA) and the Economic Partnerships Agree-ment (EPA).’Discussions and negotiations at the regional level led to the promotion of guest worker schemes between New Zealand and Australia and several countries. The Pacific Island ‘Fo-rum’ Secretariat (PIFS) has also supported a feasibility study regarding the development of a training programme for caregivers in the Solomon Islands and the exploration of employ-ment opportunities for its youth in the Cana-dian market of care for the elderly, as a means of assisting the country’s economic recovery. Pacific ACP trade ministers regularly meet for ongoing bilateral discussions with selected EU member states, and to develop other parallel activities related to the temporary movement of people in the Pacific region.
3rd Key Challenge: Address Environmentally induced mobilityUnderstanding and predicting climate change and related human mobility is extremely dif-ficult. This is another key policy challenge for ACP countries in the XXI century. Estimates predict 50 million ‘environmental migrants’8 by 2010,9 and projections are that 150 million,10
200 million11 or as many as 1 billion12 people will be obliged to move because of climate-related events by 2050, depending on calcu-lations.13 Although there is disagreement on these figures, which are often ‘heroic extrapo-lations from the best available data’,14 there is consensus that climate change will compro-mise the ability of ecosystems to provide live-lihoods. Hence there is a need to address the link between mobility and climate change.Scholars at the University of Oxford Refugee Studies Centre have underlined that ‘while not
denying the potentially widespread displace-ment consequences of environmental change, these estimates instil a fear of waves of mi-grants and humanitarian crises. These may obscure the positive role of human agency in mediating these potential outcomes – how, in practice, local communities actually do, or might, react and thus what the appropriate policy responses should be. By homogenis-ing the concept of environmentally-induced displacement, they deny the need to design a complex variety of policy interventions ad-justed to the many different situations of such displacement.’15
Temporary migration is the response most of-ten used by an affected community to adapt to the new environment, especially when other resources are exhausted. The mobility of ‘environmental migrants’ is often circular and within regions; most people come back to their place of origin once the original condi-tions are re-established. Long-distance, inter-national migration induced by changes in the physical environment has been and will most likely remain very limited. If this holds true, intra-ACP migration is likely to increase. Fur-thermore, people most vulnerable to climate change are often the ones with only very lim-ited resources vis-à-vis mobility. This has obvi-ous policy implications.16
Despite being the least responsible for greenhouse gas emissions, ACP countries will be the most affected by climate change. Adverse effects will manifest themselves in different ways in the various regions and sub-regions.
Climate Change in the Pacific IslandsPacific countries are already facing drought and rises in sea levels. In fact, the Intergov-ernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) recognised that risk related to climate change in this region is three times greater than in industrialised countries.17 Based on the most plausible scenarios, the IPCC estimates that sea levels will rise worldwide by 0.09m to 0.88m between 1990 and 2050.18
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In the Pacific, most of the small island states have very low elevations, and therefore are already suffering from repeated floods and cyclones. Forced displacements have already begun in Vanuatu, Kiribati, Papua-New Guinea and Tuvalu. In Vanuatu, 100 villagers from Te-gua were moved to higher ground in August 2005, around 600 metres from the coast.19 Vil-lagers were relocated to higher areas in the interior of Tegua, one of the chain’s northern-most provinces, after their coastal homes were repeatedly swamped by storm surges, aggres-sive waves and ‘king tides’ linked to climate change. The relocation, part of a project en-titled ‘Capacity Building for the Development of Adaptation in Pacific Island Countries’, un-derlines the increasingly drastic measures now
being undertaken to protect low-lying commu-nities threatened by increased levels of man-made emissions to the atmosphere.20 In Kiribati, villagers also had to be moved away from seaside. Early in 2009, forty families be-gan relocating from the flooded Carterets Is-land to the nearby Papua New Guinean island of Bougainville. Their island home is expected to be submerged by 2015.21 But the most criti-cal case to date is Tuvalu. Tuvalu’s 11,000 in-habitants are confronted with regular flooding and the island is expected to be uninhabitable by 2050. Currently about 3,000 Tuvaluans have migrated to Auckland, New Zealand, many of whom prompted at least in part by concerns about the environment.22 The options being considered by the Tuvalu government include
Box 2.2 - The Sinking of Tuvalu Seen by Visual Artists
[…] The first time I heard of Tuvalu was when I read about it in the newspaper. It said the country was in danger of disap-pearing beneath the waves due to the ef-fect of climate change. That is why a few years later I found myself on board a small propeller plane on my way to the tiny air-port on the capital island of Tuvalu, one of the smallest and most remote countries on earth. I went to this frontline of cli-mate change, to get a real sense of the impact on the nation. From an idealistic point of view, but also as a visual artist. With all the material I collected during my stay I created a project called The Sinking of Tuvalu. By the use of photography, film, text and illustration, I was able to bring the story without using abstract numbers or future scenarios, but by giving it a real face. Tuvalu is symbolic for the rest of the world; the Tuvaluans are destined to be-come the first complete nation of climate refugees, banned from their home-islands,
their culture and identity taken away. I wanted to capture the uniqueness of this fragile nation before it is wiped from the map. The project was launched as a single exhibition in the city of The Hague in The Netherlands. National newspapers got in-terested in publishing the story and so did national television. This resulted in more exhibitions, magazine features and tel-evision playtime on an international level, which is still ongoing. So what I hoped for before starting the project happened; to raise awareness about what is happening to our world is evidence that major parts of our economic system are not in balance with the environmental reality. This may all be best expressed in the phrase Tatou ne Tuvalu Katoa – We are all Tuvaluans – which is often used in Tuvalu as an expres-sion of national unity, calling on Tuvaluans to pull together in the collective interests of their tiny, isolated, and very vulnerable country […]
Source: Extract from a project of visual artist Ju-riaan Booij.
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buying land in Australia or New Zealand, buy-ing an empty island, or moving to Niue or Kioa (a Fijian island). However, Australia and New Zealand are reluctant to accept a full reloca-tion, while atoll inhabitants and decision-mak-ers are reluctant to abandon their place of ori-gin and are afraid of losing their culture. The Pacific Access Category (PAC) arrangement be-tween New Zealand, Tuvalu, Fiji, Kiribati, and Tonga allows small numbers (75 residents from Tuvalu and Kiribati, and 250 from Tonga and Fiji) to migrate to New Zealand every year. At this rate, however, it will take 100 years to empty Tuvalu.23
Kiribati and Tuvalu are cases in point. Inter-island migration has been a customary method of adapting to climate change. However, al-though Pacific islanders have learned to adapt to their ever-changing environments over the centuries, recent climatic shifts may exceed the capacity of local resiliency.24 For exam-ple, Kiribati — considered one of the ten most vulnerable countries to climate change in the world by the International Institute for Envi-ronment and Development — is experiencing a sea rise that is leading to coastal erosion and a gradual salinisation of potable water supplies and agricultural land. Increased drinking wa-ter scarcity, coral reef depletion and coastal erosion on the outer islands are increasing mi-gration towards the capital city. Drought in the Gilbert Islands is also another push factor.25
Climate Change in Sub-Saharan AfricaIn Sub-Saharan African countries, it is esti-mated that land degradation is causing a 3 per cent annual loss in the contribution by agri-culture to GDP.26 By 2050, African countries will have as much as 10 per cent less annual rainfall in their interior regions, with serious implications for their mainly rain-fed agricul-ture systems. The 2007 IPCC report from the Second Working Group estimates that yields from rain-fed agriculture could fall by up to 50 percent around the year 2020.27 In March-April 2009, flooding killed 60 Angolans and affected 220,000 people, and 92 Namibians were killed and 350,000 more were affected by flooding
during the same period.28 There were 29 natu-ral disasters in Africa during the first half of 2009, killing a total of 309 people and affect-ing another 794,467 persons. Water scarcity problems in Africa could impact 75-250 million people by 2020.29 Heavy rainfall in south-eastern Africa in early 2008 again flooded the low-lying river areas along the Zambezi River in central Mozam-bique, and displaced as many as 80,000 people — the second such occurrence in two years. This was in addition to the tens of thousands already displaced from the floods and cyclones in 2000, 2001 and 2007.30 In Mozambique, about 14 million people (70 per cent of the popula-tion) have been affected by drought over the past half-century, mostly in the southern part of the country. Fires affect about 39 per cent of this country’s land area every year.31 Fire is used as a strategy to hunt small animals such as the bush-rat. In the Sahel, land degradation and drought have historically played a central role in displacement, though drought-induced migration is often only temporary.
The traditional movement in Western Africa has followed seasonal patterns, with peo-ple moving to coastal and urban agglomera-tions, as well as to the coastal states, dur-ing the dry season. However, as rainfall has decreased but the fewer rains create flooding, land degradation in the arid and semi-arid ar-eas of Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger has increased and resulted in rapid intra-coun-try migration southward, with the consequent swelling of large cities such as Dakar, Bamako, Ouagadougou, Niamey and Kano. Estimates for Burkina Faso suggest that close to half the adult population born there moves to coastal states such as Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana for at least part of the year.32 Economic downturns such as the one faced now push people back to the countryside, although the areas to which people return to are often already degraded. One example is the migration of residents from the village of Farka to the village of Caré in the Tilabéri region of Niger, because soil degradation has made crop cultivation impos-
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sible in Farka. Though often temporary, envi-ronmentally induced migration can evolve into a constant ‘onward’ movement if environmen-tal changes make livelihoods unfeasible in the area of origin. Another region that is particularly affected by man-made changes to the environment — with important implications for mobility — is Cen-tral Africa. This region is home to the second largest humid tropical forest in the world, af-ter the Amazon basin in Latin America. Its 200 million hectares span the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Popular Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and Cameroon. The deforestation process has received a great deal of attention, especially in Cameroon. In the decade following the severe economic cri-sis of 1986, the deforestation rate had doubled in comparison to 1973-1986.33 Macroeconomic changes (decline in GDP, employment and terms of trade) pressured rural migrants to leave urban areas and return to their villages of origin to work in agriculture, especially in crop production. In fact, while cocoa and cof-fee prices as well as production declined, the demand for local foods like cassava increased due to a reduction in food imports during the crisis. This, combined with the permanence of plantations (which for cultural reasons cannot be cleared if inherited) has led to land clear-ance instead of crop substitution on the same land. The example of Cameroon highlights the fact that small farmers and increased popu-lations in rural areas contribute to deforesta-tion, but the causes are also linked to macr-oeconomic dynamics and hence policies. Another important environment-migration link in this region of Africa is found in coastal areas. The loss and degradation of coastal habitats and the modification of marine ecosystems due to pollution from land-based urban and in-dustrial sources (including oil and natural gas development) as well as the from the overhar-vesting of marine fish stocks is expanding at a rapid pace. Internal and regional migration leading to population growth in coastal cit-ies such as Douala in Cameroon and Libreville
in Gabon are having a growing impact on the coastal environment. Issues related to high population density are exacerbated by the flooding of low-lying coast-al areas. These provide livelihoods for millions who are employed in both the artisanal and industrial fishery industries. Industrialized foreign fleets are responsible for the overex-ploitation of border-crossing migratory fish, to the detriment of artisanal fishermen and especially the growing coastal communities that depend on near-shore fishery resources for food.34 Furthermore, internal migration is contributing to urbanization, which in Central African Region stands at 41 per cent, the high-est in Sub-Saharan Africa (compared to 39 per cent elsewhere), with its consequent environ-mental degradation. With an annual growth rate of 4.1 per cent between 2005 and 2010, the pace of urbanization is highest in the Cen-tral African region, compared to 3.7 per cent in Western Africa and 3.2 per cent in the other Sub-Saharan countries.35
Climate Change in the CaribbeanIn the Caribbean, half the population lives within 1.5 km of the shoreline, and major infrastructure and economic activities are located in coastal areas. Vulnerability to ty-phoons and hurricanes is therefore very high. In Grenada, Sandy Island on the west coast of Carriacou has lost around 60 per cent of its area, and small sand banks that existed for hundreds of years between Carriacou and Pe-tite Martinique have completely disappeared. The economic impact of tourism in the Carib-bean region is greater than in any other region of the world. Tourism accounts for roughly 17 per cent of total Caribbean GDP, over 21 per cent of all Caribbean capital formation, nearly 20 per cent of total regional exports, and ap-proximately 16 per cent of total employment (2.5 million jobs).36 A decade ago, a rough es-timate of the potential economic impact that climate change could have on the CARICOM nations was US$1.4 to 9.0 billion (in 1999 dol-lars), assuming no shift in climate change con-ditions.37
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The frequent disasters endured by the Carib-bean region in recent years reflect this vul-nerability. During 1990-2006 a total of 163 dis-asters affected about 18 million people, and caused more than 8,500 deaths. The volcano eruption of Montserrat in 1995, entailing the virtual relocation of the entire population off the island (and subsequent faltering return to part of the island) was a tremendously signifi-cant event in the Caribbean context. The vol-cano continues sporadic eruption (including in 2010).38
The January 2010 earthquake in Haiti is raising
the toll to unprecedented levels; more than 300,000 people died and 3 million were af-fected. Two weeks after the earthquake, one half-million people were already internally displaced and the number of those migrating to the Dominican Republic is still unknown. During the 2008 hurricane season, Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Haiti were direct-ly affected by at least seven major tropical storms, which caused widespread devastation and human suffering. In 2008, Hurricanes Fay, Gustav, Hanna, and Ike affected more than a million people in these three countries. Flood-ing wiped out 70 per cent of crops in Haiti, and dozens of children died from malnutrition in the months following the storms. Extreme poverty is the root cause of the relentless de-struction of huge forested areas, leaving be-hind treeless mountain slopes that thereupon collapse during heavy rains.39 By 2008, only 1.5 per cent of Haiti’s forests remained, and there has been sustained and significant mobility of Haitians across the border in search of live-lihoods. Although deforestation is not mainly attributable to climate change at this stage, the direct and indirect effects of such change will most likely accelerate it. This underlines
the need to adopt a more nuanced approach to analysing the linkage between climate change and mobility, and the multiple causes that un-derlies the relationship.40
4th key Challenge: integrate human Mobility to National Development PoliciesACP countries Declarations and Plans that con-tribute to freedom of mobility for the promo-tion of socioeconomic and political develop-ment are not lacking. The Declaration and Plan of Action of the African Union Special Ouaga-dougou Summit on Employment and Poverty Alleviation; the Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, Especially Women and Children; the African Union Com-mon Position on Migration; the ACP Ministries of Migration and Asylum Brussels Declaration and Plan of Action; and the ACP Group’s Brus-sels Resolution on Migration and Development point clearly to the ACP countries’ strong com-mitment to integrating migration issues to de-velopment. However, translating analysis and proposals into policy and actual commitments remains a limited option for countries whose budgets are already stretched.
Coherent and informed ‘migration and de-velopment’ policies require solid data col-lection practices, on the one hand, and substantial political will and commitment from all governmental stakeholders, on the other. institutional coordinating mechanisms
are indispensable for policy coherence, along with appropriate measures to support capacity building, eliminate institutional bottlenecks and evaluate the results of policy coherence efforts. If we look at how migration is integrated to Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) and followed up on in their Progress Reports, we
The ACP Secretariat’s response to this key policy challenge is the establishment of an Intra-ACP Migration Facility aimed at build-ing capacities at the institutional and human resource level, in order to better integrate mobility to development plans and policies.
In the majority of countries, national devel-opment strategies take account of both inter-nal and international mobility as a develop-ment factor.
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find significant policy coherence in ACP coun-tries. In the ACP countries for which those strategic documents are available (39 of 79 countries), the following common features emerge:In most countries, national development strategies take into account both internal and international mobility as a factor in develop-ment. Internal migration is often considered an issue that has positive dimensions (increas-ing productivity in the service sector propelled by rural migration), but also some negative aspects (increased pressures on water and sanitation systems, land, and housing in urban areas). Certain measures have been devised and budgeted, depending upon each specific context accordingly. International migration is also analysed in terms of positive (remittanc-es, social capital formation, enterprise crea-tion, macroeconomic stability) and negative (dependency, brain-drain) dimensions. In countries with significant diasporas, spe-cific analyses and measures are contained in the PRSPs (Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Dominica, Ethiopia, Ghana, Haiti, Li-beria, Rwanda, Senegal, Timor-Leste, etc). In the case of Cape Verde, diaspora groups were also invited to participate in the preparation of the PRSP. Measures to promote the export of labour are not well developed in the PRSPs. In a few cas-es where migration is mainly regional and less intercontinental, labour export is considered as a complementary and transitional strategy for achieving endogenous and less dependent development processes (Burkina Faso govern-ment’s development strategy is a good exam-ple in this direction).In countries recently affected by conflicts or environmental issues, PRSPs focus on the man-agement of refugees and internally displaced people. Measures providing social protection to vulnerable groups are integrated into devel-opment strategies and are budgeted (Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Liberia, Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Timor-Leste, and Zambia).
Environmental issues and risks are also ana-lysed in terms of mobility. Migration represents both a threat to fragile ecosystems and is also a consequence of environmental degradation (Cape Verde and Comoros). Changing environ-ments and traditional practices are also exam-ined in relation to mobility and social impact in the documents from Chad and the Demo-cratic Republic of Congo.Economic restructuring is analysed in terms of its effects on human mobility. The reorganisa-tion of the mining sector in Zambia is a good example of internal movement associated with changing sector dynamics. In some re-cent PRSP Progress Reports, restructuring due to the global financial, food and fuel crises is analysed also in terms of impact on migrant employment, remittances, and so on (Haiti, Cape Verde, Comoros, Dominica and Ghana). In most papers, health concerns are also ana-lysed with respect to HIV/AIDS in relation to migration dynamics, especially regionally and in cross-border areas. Otherwise, the main concern in regard to the health sector is the so-called brain drain of health professionals (Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Comoros, Domini-ca, Haiti, Nigeria and Zambia), and measures designed to retain health workers, mainly by making the sector more attractive.Demographic issues, especially the growing youth population, are addressed in terms of employment and migration. These are consid-ered to be some of the thorniest challenges (as in the Mali strategy). Measures are designed to improve employment opportunities at home and inform youth regarding risks associated with international migration (specifically the case of Senegal).The characteristics of national policies aimed at integrating mobility into development, or using mobility as a national development strategy, depend largely on the political his-tory and labour migration of each individual country. For example, small island states in the Pacific region suffer from a shortage of skilled labour and increasing urban migration, which has induced the majority of Pacific countries to emphasise human resource development in
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their development strategies, in order to sat-isfy needs at home while exporting labour.The ACP Secretariat’s response to this key policy challenge is the establishment of an Intra-ACP Migration Facility aimed at build-ing capacities at the institutional and human resource level, in order to better integrate mobility into development plans and policies. This is an area where policy and institutional coherence are extremely important at both the ACP country level and among the donor community.
5th key Challenge: Assure Social Inclusion, Respect and Protection of Migrants in ACP CountriesThis fifth key policy challenge is probably the most complex, because it requires a radical shift in the way migration and mobility are perceived by public opinion and policy makers in ACP countries. ACP governments often in-sist upon stronger protection for their migrant workers when they reach their destinations in wealthier countries. This has been a central topic at the Global Forums on Migration and Development in Athens and Manila. However, these criticisms often lack coherence when considering the way in which migrant labour-ers are treated when migrating from one ACP country to another. And even while it is true that social protection policies are already stretched thin and under-resourced in most ACP countries, this does not imply that protec-tion, respect and social inclusion of migrants should not be sought.
Exploring Horizontal Inequalities in destination countriesWith this fifth key policy challenge, we intro-duce another important element that is cen-tral to the principles of human development,
namely the need to address ‘horizontal ine-qualities’ in migrant destination countries. Horizontal inequalities are inequalities be-tween culturally defined groups, e.g. ethnic, religious, racial or caste-based groups.41 These kinds of inequalities encompass not only in-come levels, but also broader economic, social and political dimensions. For example, eco-nomic inequalities include differences in asset ownership, employment and other economic opportunities, which are the main causes for inequalities in incomes. Social horizontal in-equalities include unequal access to services, such as education, health and housing, which in turn produces inequalities in health and ed-ucational outcomes. Horizontal inequalities in the political sphere are inequalities concern-ing political opportunities, participation and power, such as control over the main govern-ing bodies of a country such as the presidency, the cabinet, the army, the police, and regional and local governments.42
Analyses of horizontal inequalities indicate that ‘unequal access to political / economic / social resources by different cultural groups can reduce the welfare of individuals in the losing groups over and above what their in-dividual position would merit, because their self-esteem is bound up with the progress of the group’.43 Therefore, even if migration can offer people and groups opportunities to im-prove their situation in principle, the finan-cial, language and structural constraints to migration as well as limits to social inclusion in the destination country/area often curtail this possibility in practice. Whether internal or in-ternational, the migration process creates a new set of unequal relations in the destination areas unless relevant policies are formulated and implemented. Migrants often arrive in urban areas that have only limited capacity to incorporate the ad-ditional labour supply, resulting in higher un-employment and poverty rates among migrant groups. Even when they arrive in areas where there is employment, migrants are often rel-egated to wage labour and denied access to land, assets and credit that would otherwise
Xenophobia presents a very difficult chal-lenge to policy makers and civil society. It represents an insurmountable structural barrier that undermines the relationship between migration and development.
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help them improve their socio-economic con-ditions. Therefore, although migration can improve the socio-economic conditions of mi-grants relative to their situation in the home country, the development of vast slums and shantytowns in many ACP countries, where mi-grants often live in appalling conditions, indi-cates that migration results in important hori-zontal inequalities and that this can lead to situations of conflict and tension.44 Horizontal inequalities are therefore undesirable because they trap people of certain ethnicities or races in relative poverty and powerlessness, and be-cause they threaten political stability, since cultural differences provide a powerful poten-tial political mobilization mechanism.45
Xenophobic Attitudes are widespread in ACP countriesStories of past and recent xenophobic reac-tions abound in the ACP countries. Recent news about the deportation of Guyanese migrants from Barbados, the attacks on Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa, the raids against Hai-tians in the Dominican Republic, as well as past experiences – such as the expulsion of 800,000 Ghanaians from Nigeria in the 1980s, the ex-pulsion of Ghanaians, Burkinabe and Malians from Côte d’Ivoire, of Eritreans from Ethiopia and Ethiopians from Eritrea, the expulsion of West Africans from Zambia and Angola, the massive rights violations against Sierra Leo-nean refugees in Guinea, including expulsions, the deportation from Angola of more than a quarter million foreign citizens involved in ar-tisanal diamond mining, and the deportation of thousands of Mahamid Arabs who had fled insecurity in Chad during the 1980s from Ni-ger – these are all clear examples of deeply-rooted negative attitudes held by the people and governments of ACP countries toward the migrants from other ACP countries. Xenophobia presents a very difficult challenge to policy makers and civil society. It represents an insurmountable structural barrier that un-dermines the relationship between migration and development. ‘Xenophobia towards mi-grants and refugees directly contributes to
the vulnerability and exploitation of these groups, leading to marked inequalities in the long-term between migrant and non-migrant populations. In a broader sense, xenophobia undermines the principles of human equality, social justice, and social cohesion.’46
Xenophobia reinforces horizontal inequali-ties and therefore is a key challenge to ad-dressing the issues of social cohesion and protection of migrant workers. Limited budgets for social protection policies and wel-fare schemes, labour markets unable to absorb new arrivals and urban areas with precarious availability of basic services for newly arrived families are features common to almost all ACP countries. This, of course, does not justify the use of nationalistic discourses to mobilize people against foreigners. However, it demon-strates that the challenge is much greater than simply solving a single problem, and it calls for a broader understanding of social justice. Elimination of horizontal inequalities between culturally and ethnically different groups can lead to improved social cohesion, and there-fore reduced social tensions. Policies enhanc-ing the linkage between migration and devel-opment also need to address this key policy challenge. Often, bridging cultural diversities and emphasising the contribution of migrants to local economies and societies by changing people’s perceptions is an important starting point that needs to be explored by the govern-ments and civil societies of ACP nations, be-fore any major reform of migration laws and welfare systems can be implemented.
Notes1 - South-South migration is simply migration between developing countries. Throughout the Report ‘South’ indicates the Global South and is a synonymous of developing countries, whereas ‘North’ indicates the Global North and is synonymous of industrialised coun-tries. For an-depth discussion on this see Bakewell (2009). 2 - Recent research results of the NOMRA are pub-lished in Adepoju Aderanti (2009) International Migra-tion within, to and from Africa in a Globalised World,
40
Sub-Saharan Publishers: Ghana.3 - I am grateful to Dr Bridget Wooding for this com-ment during the peer review process.4 - Irena Omelaniuk (undated)5 - Martin Philip (2003) in Pécoud Antoine and Paul de Guchteneire (2005). The 25 richest countries spend 25-30 billion dollars per year on the enforcement of immigration laws. These costs stem not only from con-trolling the borders, but also the issuance of visas and residence permits, as well as the prosecution, deten-tion and removal of undocumented migrants, labour inspections and the implementation of sanctions on employers, the treatment of asylum-seekers’ claims, the resettlement of refugees, and the search for un-documented migrants.6 - This paragraph was provided by Steven Mac Andrew at the CSME during the peer review process.7 - In Antigua and Barbuda, Jamaica and Suriname the Skills Certificates are issued by the Ministry of Labour. Grenada, Guyana, St. Lucia and Trinidad and Tobago have Ministries for Caribbean Community Affairs which issue such Certificates. Meanwhile, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, St. Kitts and Nevis and St. Vincent and the Grenadines issue the Certificates through their Minis-tries of Immigration.8 - IOM has suggested a broader working definition of ‘environmental migrants’ as ‘persons or groups of per-sons who for compelling reasons of sudden or progres-sive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either tem-porarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad.’ McKinley Brunson (2008)9 - UN University – Institute for Environment and Hu-man Security (2005)10 - International Symposium on Stabilization of Greenhouse Gas Concentrations – Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change, Exeter, United Kingdom, on 1-3 Feb-ruary 2005.11 - Myers N. (2005)12 - Christian Aid (2007) 13 - Boano Camillo, Roger Zetter, Tim Morris (2008)
14 - Brown O. (2008)15 - Boano Camillo, et al. (2008) pp. 12-13.16 - Brown O. (2008) p. 9.17 - Gemenne François (2006)18 - Ibidem19 - Ibidem20 - Press Release of the 11th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Climate Convention in Montreal, Canada. http://www.grida.no/news/press/1533.aspx visited on 24 January 2010.21 - http://www.treehugger.com/files/2008/11/worlds-first-climate-change-refugees-to-be-rescued-in-2009.php, visited on 24 January 2010. 22 - Warner K., C. Ehrhart, A. de Sherbinin, S. Adamo, and Tricia Chai-Onn (2009) p. 18.23 - Locke J.T. (2009) p. 174.24 - Ibidem25 - ADB (2009)26 - Grote Ulrike and Koko Warner (undated)27 - IPCC (2007) p. 10.28 - CRED CRUNCH (2009) 29 - IPCC (2007)30 - Stal Marc (2009) p.3.31 - United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) (2007) 32 - Warner et al (2009)33 - Sunderlin W. D., J. Pokam (2002)34 - UNEP (2006) p. 167.35 - UNFPA (2007)36 - Haites Erik (2002) p. 16.37 - Haites Erik (2002) p. 43.38 - I am grateful to Dr Bridget Wooding for this com-ment during the peer review process.39 - Alscher Stefan (2009) 40 - Boano Camillo, et al. (2008)41 - Brown Graham and Frances Stewart (2006) 42 - Ibidem43 - Stewart Frances (2001) p.3.44 - Stewart Frances and Arnim Langer (2007)45 - Ibidem46 - Crush Jonathan and Sujata Ramachandran (2009) p.3.
Mobility in the ACP countries is linked to weak domestic labour markets, seasonal work, adaptation to climate change and confl icts. Proximity plays an important role given the relative high cost of international
migration for many ACP nationals. Fences and walls have not been successful in stemming the fl ow of migrants searching for better
opportunities abroad. Rather, they have increased the cost of migration and the vulnerability of people. This chapter provides an answer to the
question of how many people move in the ACP regions and whereto.
mOBiLiTy TrENdS ANd pATTErNS iN ACp COuNTriES
ChApTEr 3
© Andrea gallina
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mOBiLiTy TrENdS ANd pATTErNS iN ACp COuNTriES
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RIESMobility in the ACP countries is linked to weak domestic labour markets, seasonal
work, adaptation to climate change and confl icts. Proximity plays an important role given the relative high cost of international migration for many ACP nation-als. Fences and walls have not been successful in stemming the fl ow of migrants searching for better opportunities abroad. Rather, they have increased the cost of migration and the vulnerability of people. This chapter provides an answer to the question of how many people move in the ACP regions and whereto.
An introduction to mobility in the ACP Group of StatesDepending on the sources of the statistics used, there are about 18.6 to 23 million ACP international migrants, equivalent to approxi-mately 2.2 per cent – 2.9 per cent of the total ACP population.1 This fi gure is very close to the world estimated average of 3.1 per cent, meaning that the proportion of migrants in the ACP is similar to that of the global migration phenomenon (see Graph 3.1).
However, when comparing the number of ACP migrants to the global number of migrants, only about 1 in 10 of world migrants comes from an ACP country, despite the fact that ACP population accounts for about 12.7 per cent of world population. ACP statistics on female migration suffer from the same problems as the statistics previously
analysed on migrant stocks. The main differ-ence is that the UNDESA database provides dis-aggregated data on female migration, whereas the Sussex University DRC database does not. That said, the latter provides more realistic fi gures on migrant stocks than UNDESA. Globally, women in the year 2000 represented 49 per cent of all migrants.2 The difference between men and women was quite similar al-ready in 1960 (47 per cent women to 53 per cent men), but despite this situation migra-tion researchers and policy makers have only
About one in ten of world migrants come from an ACP country. This is probably due to the lack of resources to undertake a migra-tion project: an ACP national is 7 times poorer than an average world citizen.
graph 3.1 - world and ACp migrant population
Source: own elaboration on UNDP HDR2009 Dataset and DRC-Sussex Dataset.
44
recently focused their attention on women. The UNDESA database indicates a female ACP migrant population of 8,047,907 persons, or 43 per cent of the total, but it enormously un-derestimates the migrant population from the Caribbean. If we apply the percentage fi gures of the UNDESA database to the Sussex Univer-sity DRC migrant stock database, we can esti-mate an ACP female migrant stock population of 10.8 million, which means a more realistic share of 47 per cent of the total 23.2 million ACP migrants (see Graph 3.2). A nuanced regional analysis shows that female migration is stronger in Eastern, Central and Western Africa and weaker in the Caribbean, Pacifi c and Southern Africa (see Graph 3.3).
Why do people in ACP countries move less than people from other continents, regions and countries? The answer is that poverty limits mobility. Therefore ACP nationals move less than the average world citizen. This is most likely due to a lack of resources with which to undertake a costly international migration project. Indeed, when measuring wealth as GDP per capita, an ACP national is seven times poorer than the average world citizen. This has implications for the distances that can be travelled (see Graph 3.4).The relation between wealth (in terms of GDP per capita in current 2007 US$) and migration is also refl ected at the ACP sub-regional level3 (see Graph 3.5).
Graph 3.2 - Female Migrants (about 2000) graph 3.4 - world and ACp gdp per capita
Graph 3.3 - Female Migrants as Share of Total in ACP Regions and Sub-Regions
Graph 3.5 - International Migrants as percentage of the population and gdp per
capita Current uS$
Source: own elaboration on UNDESA and Sussex DRC 2007 Datasets.
Source: own estimate based on Sussex Datasets 2007.
Source: own elaboration World Bank 2009a.
Source: own elaboration World Bank 2009a for GDP, Sussex DRC Migration Dataset for migrant stocks and
WDI, 2003 for the population.
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The Caribbean region has a higher GDP per capita and therefore a relatively higher pro-portion of residents abroad, at 13.8 per cent of its total population. The ACP Pacific region has a lower GDP per capita and thus a smaller share of people living abroad (5.1 per cent). Still, this is higher than the ACP African sub-regions, which have the lowest GDP per capita and only 2.4 per cent of their populations re-siding abroad. The four African regions include 48 countries and 800 million people, with a diaspora of some 17.5 million. This is equivalent to the combined diaspora of two countries such as Mexico and Bangladesh, which have less than a third of the ACP population, or to the di-aspora of just seven European countries taken
together (Italy, Germany, France, UK, Nether-lands, Portugal and Spain).
Migration is less prevalent in countries with a low Human Development Index. The differ-ent rates of migration (measured in terms of the percentage of people abroad in relation to the total population) are not only associated with GDP per capita but also the values shown in the Human Development Index (HDI). Peo-ple in low HDI countries are less mobile.4 This can be seen clearly in the cases of Af-rican countries with medium HDIs such as Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Cape Verde, the Seychelles and Mauritius, which have a signifi-cant share of their populations living abroad. The highest migration rates are found among
map 3.1 - Feminization of migration in Africa
46
map 3.2 - Feminization of migration in the Caribbean
Map 3.3 - Feminization of Migration in the Pacific
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countries in the Caribbean and Pacifi c, where HDI values are also higher. In the ACP countries higher levels of mobility contribute to higher levels of human devel-opment and income. There is a vast body of literature on the relationship between migra-tion and economic development. In essence, there is consensus on the following: a) a non-linear inverted U relationship exists between migration and development – the so-called ‘migration hump’ – meaning that citizens of countries with low levels of income and human development tend to migrate less until they reach a certain level of income, whereupon mi-gration fi rst increases, then declines when the gap between the sending and receiving coun-try narrows. Therefore at low levels of income, development seems to foster migration. b) The resources that individuals accumulate during the migration process and that are sent back home have mainly positive impacts on the hu-man development of families and communities left behind, especially on groups often mar-ginalised from development processes (such as girls). c) There are few studies on bilateral mi-gration corridors among developing countries which attempt to show the impact of migration on the income and development of both the receiving and sending countries. d) The devel-opment of a country cannot be explained only by emigration; rather, there is a set of driv-ers, among which institutions play the most important role. The impact of emigration on enhanced opportunities and the welfare of in-dividuals and families is more evident.5 In ACP countries mobility increases the oppor-tunity for individuals to mobilise resources, whether these be remittances, information, contacts, skills, technologies, norms and val-ues that can exert a positive impact on human development in both migrant sending and re-ceiving countries. Yet these effects vary large-ly, depending on the sources and destinations of mobility. In the case of the Caribbean and the Pacifi c countries, proximity to the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand has strengthened the creation of migration corridors with high income countries, which
graph 3.6 - hdi and population Abroad in ACp
Source: own elaboration on UNDP HDR2009 Dataset.
48
implies better opportunities for remittances, further education and training. In these two regions, the long-standing existence of legal migration channels has also helped migrants to maintain ties with the homeland. This has a signifi cant impact on the creation of migrant networks, hometown associations, and the for-mation of engaged diasporas. The situation of Sub-Saharan African countries is much bleaker. Because of their limited resources, migrants from countries in the four Sub-Saharan African sub-regions cannot afford long-distance mi-gration. Thus they tend to migrate to nearby countries with better but still very low income and HDI. According to Ratha and Shaw (2007), over 80 per cent of the South-South migration for which there is statistical evidence takes place between countries that share a common border, compared to 20 per cent for South-North migration.6 Migrants from Sub-Saharan African countries thus fi nd themselves in a ‘mobility trap’: on the one hand, if and when they cross borders, they end up seeking opportunities in countries with relatively little to offer; on the other, by showing remarkably lower levels of emigration and remittances infl ows, they are less likely to succeed in attracting funds and developing policies which link migration to development. However, behind the regional aggregate sta-tistics there are important country-specifi c situations which need to be addressed in order to get ACP countries out of the mobility trap and increase the potential between migration
and human development across ACP regions. Regardless of how robust the causality nexus is between migration and development at coun-try level, mobility is analysed here in terms of the expanded opportunities it offers individu-als to carry out their life plans.
About Numbers and Directions: A Methodological Clarifi cation Is Needed from the Outset There are two important sources of statistics on ACP ‘migrant stocks’, defi ned as people residing in a country different from that of birth: the fi rst is the United Nations Depart-ment of Economic and Social Analysis Popula-tion Division which has collected data based on the year 2000 round of censuses taken in countries of destination. This dataset is peri-odically revised and here we have taken the latest ‘2008 Revision’; the second is the ‘Glo-bal Migrant Origin’ database at the Sussex Uni-versity Development Research Centre (Sussex DRC), which created a matrix of 226x226 coun-tries and territories based on data from the national censuses conducted during the year 2000 round of censuses (between 1995-2004) in nearly all countries and with revisions based on estimates and new information available.7 The Sussex DRC is a complete dataset on origin and destination countries. It thus provides a very powerful tool for the analysis of intra-regional and bilateral movements.8 We have used the Sussex DRC dataset to create a 79x79 bilateral migrant stocks matrix for ACP coun-
Table 3.1 - ACP Emigration: Comparing UN and DRC-Sussex Datasets on Migrant Stocks
Source: own elaboration on Datasets UNDESA 2009, Sussex DRC Dataset, and own estimation using WDI 2004 population data.
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tries and have compared it to the UN dataset in order to highlight differences and similari-ties, as well as analyse intra-ACP migration. At the aggregate level, there are only minimal differences between the two datasets for Af-rica, whereas in the case of the Pacific and the Caribbean some significant discrepancies can be noted (see Table 3.1). At the sub-regional level within Sub-Saharan Africa there are im-portant dissimilarities between the two da-tasets for Southern Africa and Central Middle Africa. For example, the Sussex DRC dataset underestimates data on migrants from South Africa, Namibia and Botswana, whereas the UNDESA dataset presents – relative to the Sus-sex DRC dataset – lower estimates in the Cen-tral / Middle Africa sub-region, especially for Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo and An-gola. Then, we constructed a 79x226 table to identify the direction of migration originating from the 79 ACP countries toward the rest of the world, which serves to highlight mobility patterns for each of the six ACP sub-regions. Despite the shortcomings of these sources (they are based on estimates, and show stocks that reflect the cumulative number of migrants and are therefore higher than annual flows), the Sussex DRC datasets has the advantage of providing both the source of migrants and destination by country, which is central to the type of analysis undertaken in this Report.In the following sections the main features of the mobility systems of each of the ACP re-gions are analysed. These include the four Af-rican sub-regions (Western, Central/Middle, Eastern and Southern), the Caribbean and the Pacific. The analysis is divided in immigration and emigration trends and patterns in each of the regions and sub-regions. A section is dedi-cated to South-North migration flows, which among ACP countries are numerically relevant for the Caribbean and the Pacific, but less so for most of the Sub-Saharan African countries. Finally, even though it represents an important feature of mobility patterns in ACP countries, and especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, internal migration is not analysed in the Report as part of a separate section because the limited data
available, although reference is made to its implications for the development processes in each of the relevant part of the Report.
Immigration into ACP CountriesAnalyses of immigration trends in ACP countries do not abound and little is known about the conditions, measures and policy interventions affecting immigrants. In particular, it is worth mentioning that among the studies available and reviewed in preparing this report, there is a great deal of analysis demonstrating the negative impacts of migration on local welfare and employment, while there is a dearth of empirical analysis on the positive dimensions of immigration on local economies.9
Regional Dynamics: Immigration in Sub-Saharan AfricaImmigration in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is largely under-researched and goes unad-dressed by policy makers. Despite the long his-tory and traditions of mobility, and important recent trends, immigration in Sub-Saharan countries is under-studied,10 except perhaps in the Southern Africa sub-region, where a rea-sonable amount of research has been carried out recently. In SSA mobility is linked to historical patterns of human movement, only partly modified by the artificial construction of national boundaries. Contemporary emigration and immigration are common phenomena in most countries of the continent, influenced by the boom and boost of economic activities, environmental change and political turmoil. Faced with the dilemma of difficult border management and the need to have flexible manpower to work in the plantations, mines and oil fields, many Sub-Saharan countries have historically adopted a laissez-faire approach to migration. In recent times, however, pressure from Northern countries to improve migration management and return undocumented mi-grants has provided the political capital to ne-gotiate migration quotas with the North. As a result, measures to restrict immigration are being introduced in many African countries
50
in exchange for immigration quotas for their own nationals to Northern countries. Not sur-prisingly, in 2005 UNDESA reported that only 9 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Malawi, Mau-ritius, Rwanda, Zambia, Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, Liberia and Togo) had a policy for the integration of non-citizens,11 despite the fact that immigrants in some countries rep-resent an important share of the population. Others countries, such as in Côte d’Ivoire, Ni-geria and Liberia, have in place policies that discriminate against non-nationals in private sector employment.12 Similar to the approach taken by wealthier Northern countries, the Sub-Saharan African governments’ approach to migration and development is therefore tinted by strong national interests, often masked be-hind a layer of imprecise information.However, despite the presence of external infl uence in managing migration and control-ling undocumented transit fl ows, the impor-tance of mobility for development among both skilled and unskilled migrants is widely acknowledged by many countries’ regional economic communities and is in fact clearly stated in the African Union Executive Council Declaration of 2006.13 Regional communities such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)14 and the Eastern African Community (EAC)15 have implemented regional free mobility measures for passport holders. Other regional
economic communities such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC),16 the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Af-rica (COMESA),17 the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)18 or the Com-munity of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD)19 have signed free regional mobility protocols, thus indicating a promising way forward, al-though these will be enforceable only once ratifi ed by member states. This diffi culty in addressing the relationship between mobility and human development in Sub-Saharan Africa cannot be neglected, espe-cially in contexts in which budgets are stretched and development priorities overlap. Still, the issue needs to be addressed by indicating the ways in which governments can turn the nega-tive aspects linked to mobility into develop-ment opportunities. A fi rst step could be done by revamping and consolidating the myriads of regional economic communities as viable focal points of south-south migration. The formula-tion and implementation of the free mobility protocols face several hurdles, and political leaders often pay lip service to these and other bilateral, multilateral and non-binding agree-ments. ACP governments and international or-ganisations should consider creating the neces-sary incentives for making the protocols more attractive and effi cient.20
Furthermore, the complexity in unpacking the mobility issue in SSA is exacerbated by the fact
Table 3.2 - Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), Returnees (Refugees and IDPs), Stateless Persons, and Others of Concern to UNHCR by Country/Territory
of Asylum, end-2008 (Table Established: 10 June 2009)
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that immigration seems to bring another layer of complexity to already existing ethnic con-fl icts, sectarianism and struggles for political power, rather than being treated as an auton-omous policy issue related to social cohesion, integration and multiculturalism.
In Africa, intra-regional fl ows affect all coun-tries, some as exclusively destination countries and others as countries of both origin and desti-nation. Particularly attractive are Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria and now Senegal in West Africa; Gabon and Cameroon in Central Africa; and South Af-rica and Botswana in Southern Africa.21
Forced migration represents a particularly important policy challenge for Sub-Saharan African countries with signifi cant develop-ment implications. SSA governments also face important challenges stemming from forced migration. The four African sub-regions ac-count for 99.74 per cent of refugees and in-ternally displaced people (IDPs) in the ACP countries, which in absolute terms amount to more than 10 million people. Two sub-regions, Eastern and Central Africa, host about 87 per cent of forced migrants from ACP countries (63 per cent in Eastern Africa and 25 per cent in Central Africa); for their part, Southern Af-rican countries are home to over 11 per cent of ACP country refugees (see Table 3.2). Thus already poor SSA countries are facing sig-nifi cant refugee problems and are in need of additional tools with which to deal with immi-gration that go beyond labour market integra-tion policies. Issues of protection, especially for women, as well as livelihoods programs are among the areas to be further explored as a means by which to re-create the condi-tions needed for people to fi nd opportunities within the camps, including the provision of proper identity and travel documentation to refugees. Refugees who are close to urban set-tlements often move out of the camps with-out permission and by doing so become illegal migrants, making them more vulnerable to policy abuse and exploitation from landlords and employers.22 Unfortunately, there is currently a lack of sys-
tematic analysis of the livelihood and socio-economic dynamics of refugees and IDPs camps and settlements, which is of serious concern for the migration and development policy frame-work.23 The work of international relief agen-cies in supporting livelihoods in the refugees and IDP camps could benefi t from an increased focus on impact evaluation analyses.
Sub-Regional Dynamics: Immigration in Western AfricaIn contemporary Western Africa there is a dynamic circular mobility system based on seasonality and favoured by the presence of agreements that facilitate free movement, al-though regional and national regulations are not always synchronized. This mobility system is the result of both pre-colonial seasonal migration, and the introduc-tion of cash crops during colonial times, which set the stage for important movements from landlocked countries to coastal area planta-tions and urban centres.24 Due to the high de-gree of uncertainty surrounding statistics on in-tra-regional migration in this region,25 we have elaborated on the data found in the DRC Sussex database (2007), which refl ects the movement of approximately 5.6 million migrants from one Western African country to another.During the 1960’s and the 1970’s, the two main host countries were Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria. The economic downturn of the two subsequent decades, as well as armed confl ict in Liberia and Sierra Leone, have led to a reshaping of the regional mobility system. Today, Senegal and Mali also host a signifi cant numbers of refugees.26 The countries with the highest per-centage of foreign population are the Gambia (15.2 per cent), Côte d’Ivoire (12.3 per cent), Ghana (7.6 per cent), Burkina Faso (5.6 per cent) and (4.4 per cent) (see Map 3.4).In Côte d’Ivoire migrants are mainly from neighbouring countries and in particular Burki-na Faso, Ghana and Mali. Even after the po-litical turmoil of the late 1990s, characterised among other things by strong xenophobic cam-paigns, there are about 1 million people from Burkina Faso, 437,000 Malians and a 330,000
52
Ghanaians living in Côte d’Ivoire.27 In terms of mobility and development chal-lenges in the mobility corridor between Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso, three aspects need to be underlined: first, following the expulsion of adult Burkinabe from Côte d’Ivoire (over a million were forced to return to Burkina Faso),28 the number of very young migrants has increased, in part as a measure by which Ivo-rian entrepreneurs can reduce labour cost;29 second, the return of migrants to villages of origin and other settlements has led to popula-tion growth in rural areas;30 and third, increas-ing deforestation in the south-western part of Côte d’Ivoire (due to both international migra-tion and internal migration of Ivoirians from North to South) are posing significant chal-
lenges to human development in both coun-tries. This situation needs to be addressed,31 as these three contemporary aspects of mo-bility between Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire demand urgent measures. Especially the issue of youth migration in this sub-regional mobility system has been sorely neglected. For exam-ple, the recent academic literature on youth migration has rightly emphasised that youth migration between Sub-Saharan Africa coun-tries is a ‘rite of passage’ from childhood to adulthood, intertwined with a set of complex inter-generational relationships and value sys-tems.32 From a policy perspective this is im-portant, since it implies that the definition of youth trafficking, which is a quite widespread phenomenon in Western Africa, should be used
map 3.4 - Sub-Saharan AfricaImmigrants as Percentage of Total Population
Angola
Benin
Botswana
BurkinaFaso
Burundi
Cameroon
CapeVerde
Central AfricanRepublic
Chad
Comoros
Djibouti
EquatorialGuinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gabon
The Gambia
Ghana
GuineaGuinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
MaliMauritania
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
São Toméand Príncipe
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Somalia
SouthAfrica
Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
DR Congo
CongoCôte
d'Ivoire
Immigrants as % of total population
0.1 - 0.9% 1 -2.9 % 3-4.9% 5-9.9% > 10%
Mauritius
Seychelles
Map elaborated for the ACP Secretariat by ©Andrea Gallina 2010
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cautiously in migration management policies, so as to avoid addressing youth migrants as a homogenous group. The need to understand the nature of child internal and international migration in Western Africa33 and the specific problems child migrants face in given circum-stances has already been underlined.34 Howev-er, even when youth migration is underpinned by a high degree of autonomy, which reflects the importance of mobility as a mechanism to increase individual freedoms, there are im-portant social protection challenges ahead for reducing the negative aspects of this type of mobility, especially for girl migrants. Within the corridor between Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso, the issue of forced return to Burkina Faso following the expulsion from Côte d’Ivoire is another important challenge yet to be addressed beyond the humanitarian emer-gency relief operations. The pressure created by the returnees on the social infrastructures is enormous, leading to issues of co-habitation between ethnic groups (most returnees are Mossi from the Central Plateau, whereas the area at the border with Côte d’Ivoire is popu-lated with Senufo and Bobo ethnic groups).The intensity of human mobility in this corri-dor has also led to environmental degradation and illegal land clearance for cash crop plan-tations. However, the relationship between migration and environmental degradation has yet to be confirmed, since the ownership of the plantations remains in the hands of a few Ivoirians landlords who employ mostly migrant workers. Other important migration corridors in West-ern Africa are between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, between Mali and Côte d’Ivoire, and between Mali and Burkina Faso: more than 300,000 Ghanaians, or a third of Ghana’s total emigrants and about 486,000 Malians reside in Côte d’Ivoire, while 437,000 Malians live in Burkina Faso to replace Burkinabe who have migrated to Côte d’Ivoire. In Burkina Faso the peace and stability of the past two decades have worked as major at-traction factors for migrants, despite its very low income and HDI levels. Especially cotton-
growing is flourishing in the south-western part of the country. Further, the eradication of parasitic diseases, such as the river blind-ness, contribute to make Burkina an increas-ingly attractive place for migrant workers in the region who thus supply labour to the grow-ing cotton industry.
Sub-Regional Dynamics: Immigration in Eastern AfricaPre-colonial and colonial time movements of people in Eastern Africa for purposes of work-ing with cotton, coffee, mining and pastoral-ist agriculture have more recently been re-placed by forced movement due to conflicts and famine. In this region, forced migration is extremely important: in particular Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Tanzania contain the bulk of refugees and IDPs, with more than a million people at risk in each country — ex-cept Tanzania, which has about 320,000 refu-gees. Virtually all countries in this sub-region have received or sent asylum-seekers, and the refugee camps in the Horn of Africa are transit points for people seeking to reach the Middle East or Europe. Djibouti (13.7 per cent of foreign-born popula-tion) is the country in the region hosting the highest share of migrants compared to the total population, followed by the Seychelles (10.2 per cent), Rwanda (4.8 per cent) and Zimbabwe (3.1 per cent). In Eastern Africa, the presence of high num-bers of forced migrants has probably diverted the attention of scholars and development agencies from the problems and issues related to migrant workers. For example, in this sub-region an interesting case is Mauritius, not due to the proportion of immigrants (it has only 3.3 per cent) but because of their typology. Fully integrated into global production chains, Mau-ritius is importing labour from China and India to work mainly (78 per cent) in manufactur-ing factories in export processing zones, and partly (10 per cent) in the construction sector, both of which are shunned by native workers because of the very poor conditions.35 Migrant workers in these factories have little interac-
54
tions with Mauritian society and despite being numerically few (about 30,000), their claims for better conditions represent an important demand for reforming industrial relations and immigration policies.36
Sub-Regional Dynamics: Immigration in Central / Middle AfricaImmigration in Central / Middle Africa is main-ly associated with forced migration. This sub-region includes some of the poorest countries on the continent and is not a major immigra-tion post. The paucity of data and studies do not help to shed light on mobility in this ar-ea.37 Central / Middle African countries also receive large influxes of refugees (83,300 in Cameroon, 13,300 in Gabon, 25,000 in Congo, 155,000 in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 330,500 in Chad and 12,000 in Angola).38
What is well known is that migratory move-ments in Central / Middle Africa are linked mainly to wars and instability. Countries such as Chad have a third of a million refugees in its territory, originating mainly from Darfur in Sudan, whereas the Democratic Republic of Congo has a very large population of IDPs and about 150,000 refugees. In some cases, immigration is motivated by the presence of ‘geological scandals’, meaning an enormous wealth of precious minerals, such as Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo, which attract people to work in the mines. In the Democratic Republic of Congo there are migrants from French-speaking countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso and Senegal known as ‘Bawusa’ in Kasai and as ‘Lingali’ in Kinshasa, which means West-African nationals, as well as people from neighbouring Angola.39 The nation-als of bordering countries who live in a radius of 15km from the frontier are allowed 72-hour access to the Democratic Republic of Congo, upon acquiring a token at the border.40
Sub-Regional Dynamics: Immigration in Southern AfricaIn Southern Africa the main pole of attraction for migrants is South Africa and in part Bot-swana. The sub-region is also characterised
by an increase in undocumented and forced migrants from crisis-ridden Zimbabwe, as well as by the repatriation of refugees originating from the civil wars in Angola and Mozambique, which still pose serious challenges. Mobility in this sub-region is particularly dynamic and un-stable.41 Within Southern Africa migration is perceived as a temporary livelihood strategy. With the ex-ception of the Mozambicans that fled the civil war of the 1980s and remained in South Africa, surveys have shown that migrants in the region tend to return because they prefer living in their own countries. South Africa and Botswana are seen as better places only in relation to job opportunities and health services.42 Botswana has a more relaxed migration policy, especially for skilled workers. Between 1960 and 2005, the proportion of foreign-born to total population grew from 1.4 per cent to 4.4 per cent, with migrants coming mainly from Congo, Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and South Africa. A particular feature of this sub-region is the high level of HIV/AIDS among the popula-tion. Mobility has contributed to increase the spread of the epidemic. The two countries in the region with better transport infrastruc-ture, more development and higher rates of international and internal mobility, namely Botswana and South Africa, also have the high-est rates of HIV/AIDS.43 The relationship between mobility and HIV/AIDS is a complex one: people affected tend to return home to seek care and are replaced by another member of the household who will migrate in search of income-earnings opportu-nities, or migrate to seek better treatment in another country, or put pressure on rural com-munities, which in turn try to compensate for a reduction in productivity with out-migration. The recent increase of Mozambican workers in South African mines can also be explained by the fact that in Mozambique the prevalence of HIV/AIDS is lower. Understanding how this re-lationship operates in Southern Africa can help to address similar situations in other African sub-regions.44
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With the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa and the gradual reinsertion of the coun-try into the international economy, there is a major increase in international labour migra-tion, internal migration from rural areas and tourism from neighbouring countries.In this sub-region, as a share of the total popu-lation, Namibia has the highest percentage of foreigners (6.6 per cent), mainly South Afri-cans and Angolans. However, when looking at absolute numbers, South Africa has the high-est immigrant population, with the Sussex DRC database indicating about 720,000 migrants, while the UNDP Report 2009 dataset indicates 2.6 per cent of the population (which would mean about 1.3 million foreign-born). The lack of precise statistics on immigrants in South Africa has led to uninformed media
campaigns against immigrants, especially in Zimbabwe, which has implications for poli-cy-making as well. A detailed analysis of the Zimbabwe-South Africa mobility corridor can be found in Chapter 4.
Regional Dynamics: Immigration in the CaribbeanIn the Caribbean region immigrants can repre-sent a significant share of the resident popula-tion. In 2005, as much as 22 per cent of the population in Antigua and Barbuda was foreign-born, with 14.4 per cent in Belize and about 10 per cent Barbados, Grenada, Bahamas, and Saint Kitts and Nevis (see Map 3.5). Migration in the Caribbean has not necessar-ily been linked to linguistic or cultural simi-larities. During the first three decades of the
Belize
Cuba
The Bahamas
Haiti
Dominican Republic
Guyana
Jamaica
Suriname
Trinidad and Tobago
BarbadosSt. Vincent and the Grenadines
Grenada
St. Lucia
Dominica
St. Kitts and Nevis Antigua and Barbuda
Immigrants as % of total population
0.1-0.9% 1.0-2.9% 3.0-4.9% 5.0-9.9% > 10.0%
Map elaborated for the ACP Secretariat by ©Andrea Gallina 2010
map 3.5 - CaribbeanImmigrants as Percentage of Total Population
56
20th century people from Anglophone countries moved to the Hispanic Caribbean and the Neth-erlands Antilles.45 By mid-century, however, movements were mainly between Anglophone countries and from Haiti to the Bahamas, Cuba and the Dominican Republic, with migrants seeking employment in the sugar cane sector. There are also movements in opposite direc-tions, such as for example Dominicans settling in St. Kitts and Nevis under citizenship entitle-ments based on the nationality of their grand-parents who had migrated from St. Kitts-Nevis to the Dominican Republic as labour migrants in the 1920s and 193046 (the so-called coco-los). The immigrants living in the Caribbean had mostly settled prior to the seventies and eighties, attracted by development projects and periods of economic growth driven by a particular industry, such as oil in Trinidad, tourism in the Bahamas (as well as in the U.S. Virgin Islands and Cayman Islands). More re-cently migration in the region has continued apace but without particular peaks.These trends indicate relatively stable and therefore mature bilateral migration corri-dors. Further, the demand for a specific seg-ment of the labour force has implied a selec-tion process, which is confirmed by analyses that often shows higher levels of education among migrants in relation to the population in both the destination and country of origin. For example, the study undertaken by Eliza-beth Thomas-Hope at the University of the West Indies (Jamaica) uses the Caribbean Community Regional Census Office (1994) con-firms that in the early 1990s in Antigua 16.5 per cent of the non-national population had tertiary (pre-university or university) qualifi-cations, compared to 5.5 per cent among the national population. In the Bahamas, the fig-ure is 19.4 per cent for non-nationals, 7.9 per cent for nationals; in Barbados, 54.6 per cent for non-nationals and 8.7 per cent for nation-als; in the British Virgin Islands 17.4 per cent for non-nationals and 7.5 per cent for nation-als. The educational levels also reflected the employment distribution of non-nationals. In Jamaica only 5 per cent and in the Bahamas
33 per cent of non-nationals were employed in occupations requiring lesser skills, while the majority was employed replacing profession-als that migrated to the United States.47 In countries such as Belize, immigration rates are particularly high due to the movement of people from Central American countries that suffered lasting periods of political instability. Over the past 20 years this has caused rapid and drastic changes in the population com-position, and has posed a set of serious chal-lenges to the country. In Belize, the main difficulties brought about by migration range from environmental issues to competition over access to basic infrastruc-ture, such as water, education, health and san-itation. Migrants are also blamed for having in-troduced unsustainable agricultural practices, increasing the level of poverty as a consequence of environmental degradation and, particularly in rural areas, dumping of wages and working conditions, which have led to anti-immigrant sentiment being expressed by sectors of the native population.48 The government of Belize has introduced measures to mitigate these problems by means of laws allowing for selec-tive permanent residency or citizenship, refu-gee management and increasing the number of employment permits granted.49 Furthermore, contrary to other Caribbean countries, current legislation in Belize allows for foreign nation-als to rapidly acquire political rights.50
A characteristic feature of migration in the Caribbean region is undocumented migra-tion. Although precise data on this are lacking, the number of cases of interdiction of boats and persons appearing at airports with forged travel documents, as well as the number of deportees, give an indication that this is an important regional phenomenon. There are estimates according to which over one-half million undocumented Haitians migrants are living in other Caribbean countries. The direction of these undocumented mobil-ity flows depend very much on the assessment made by the migrants as concerns risk versus cost. The risk of being intercepted is lower in
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those countries of the region that can afford only rudimentary coastguard surveillance. For example, since 1994 entry into the Turks and Caicos Islands has been relatively easier than into the Bahamas (and far easier than entry to the US Virgin Islands, whose coasts are pa-trolled by the US Coastguard).51 The main sources of undocumented migrants are Haiti, Cuba and the Dominican Republic. The Bahamas or the Turks and Caicos Islands are used by Haitians as a stepping stone to the US, whereas Cubans travel usually (but not always) directly to Florida and Dominicans attempt to cross the Mona Passage to Puerto Rico. Job opportunities in the tourist industry of the eastern Caribbean (Antigua, the British Overseas Territory of Anguilla and the French Departments of Martinique and Guadeloupe, including their off-shore islands, Marie Galan-te and the Iles des Saintes), are attracting migrant workers from the region. European Union overseas territories are often used as a stepping stone to the European Union. Un-documented migration via these routes also involves smuggling and trafficking of young women destined to work in unprotected and unsafe jobs.52 Migration also takes place from the Eastern Caribbean countries (Guyana, Grenada, St Vincent and the Grenadines and Dominica) into Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados.53 More recently, besides the traditional flows of un-documented migrants within the Caribbean, many countries are facing the challenge of ris-ing numbers of Asian undocumented migrants using the Caribbean as a transit route to the United States.
Undocumented migration and its implica-tions are also common issues in the Domini-can Republic. Another important intra-Car-ibbean migration corridor is the one between Haiti and the Dominican Republic (a detailed analysis can be found in Chapter 4). Haitian migrants in the Dominican Republic face a very similar situation as their countrymen in the Turks and Caicos Islands. Haitians in the Dominican Republic are mainly young males
with low levels of education. Employment is concentrated in two sectors, namely con-struction (39 per cent) and agriculture (41 per cent), with another 13 per cent in services such street vending, transportation and do-mestic help.54 Particularly those living on the bateys (sugar cane plantations) face challeng-ing situations of extreme poverty, limited ac-cess to water and sanitation and a generalized lack of basic services.
Undocumented migration is often associ-ated with exclusion and poverty. Margin-alisation, exclusion from public life and a higher occurrence of poverty among migrant communities is also the result of limited inter-vention by both governments in the areas of documentation and regularisation, recognition of basic rights and investments in human capi-tal.55 Lack of documentation seems to be the primary driver of exclusion and poverty among Haitians migrants in the Dominican Republic. This situation of marginalization also affects the condition of those born in the Domini-can Republic to persons of Haitian origin, for whom the opportunity to obtain citizenship or a permanent residency is very slim, despite having lived in the country for many years and/or coming from a family which may have lived for generations in the Dominican Repub-lic. Further, this group is not entitled under the Haitian Constitution and Haiti’s 1984 law on nationality to gain automatic access to Hai-tian nationality.56 In any case this may not be a route to an effective nationality if the person in question has no real link with Haiti. State-lessness is a condition affecting about 300,000 Haitian-Dominican descendents.57 The result of a survey carried out on the Turks and Caicos Islands among 1,062 households, with 2,960 individuals, shows that Haitians comprise 30 per cent of the population, yet they make up 38 per cent of those persons liv-ing below the poverty line. Nationwide, 26 per cent of the population are below the poverty line.58 The more qualitative analyses show that in the absence of programmes to manage cultural di-
58
versity existing levels of immigration strain the psychological carrying capacity of the receiv-ing country.59 And yet, while there is agree-ment on the fact that the continued growth of the economy depends on access to cheap labour by migrants from Haiti and the Domini-can Republic who are willing to work in jobs shunned by natives, the government has enun-ciated no clear strategy on the rate of growth that might be compatible with the capacity of the country to manage the negative effects of massive immigration. The private sector also provides an important perspective: employers consider migrant workers more reliable and committed to their work than ‘belongers’.60
Immigration in the Caribbean has produced mixed reactions. Haitians in Turks and Cai-cos are stigmatised as ‘non-Belongers’, in the Bahamas the offspring of Haitians migrants are often denied citizenship when they turn 18 years of age, and in the Dominican Repub-lic the new Constitution of 2010 specifically denies those born in the Dominican Republic to foreigners who are not residing legally in the Dominican Republic the right to national-ity and hence citizenship. This new exclusion-ary clause disproportionately affects impov-erished Haitian migrants and their offspring born after the Constitution comes into effect given that they are the foreigners most likely to be unauthorized in the Dominican Republic. Moreover, it brings into question why there has not been a regularisation programme for long-standing irregular migrants in the Dominican Republic which should have taken place prior to the implementation of the new migration law approved in 2004.Conversely, despite being stigmatised as mu-lattas, Dominican women migrants in Turks and Caicos are particularly welcomed to work in the service sector because of their pleasant appearance and lighter skin colour. The demand for labour in the Turks and Caicos Islands has also prompted the return of Turks and Caicos migrants from the Bahamas. It is thus possible that the pressure on health and education services is the result of a combined
influx of migrants and returnees. This is cor-roborated by the findings of the Institute of Health Sector Development, for which non-nationals are relatively under-supplied with services and therefore cannot possibly repre-sent a burden for society. Appalling living con-ditions for Haitians and Dominican Republic migrants, combined with limited interventions in the areas of social inclusion and integration (such as bilingual education for the children of migrants) are responsible for the persist-ence of an underutilised labour force and low growth in human capital. Across the region, social protection and the inclusion of migrants into society are impor-tant factors that must be addressed by policy makers interested in enhancing the linkage between migration and development.
Regional Dynamics: Immigration in the PacificDespite the vastness of the Pacific Ocean and the small size and isolation of land areas, Pa-cific people have historically moved freely and frequently, created social networks, traded and exchanged goods.61 In the 19th and 20th century immigration in the Pacific took various forms: from Melanesia and Micronesia to Fiji (Melanesia), and Samoa (Polynesia). Ethnic Fijian nurses and teachers have migrated in large numbers to the Mar-shall Islands because of the demand for their services, as well as the opportunity to earn better income in US dollars. Fijians of all eth-nicities have migrated to the Cook Islands for employment in the booming tourism industry as well as to the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Tonga to take up positions in professional, managerial and trades areas. During political crises (military coups) and their aftermath, Indo-Fijians have migrated to Australia and New Zealand. In recent times, large numbers of ethnic Fijians have followed suit.62 In the Pacific, the share of immigrants in rela-tion to the local population varies widely. There are countries with immigrant populations as large as half or a third of the total population, such as in Nauru and Palau, respectively. How-ever, whereas in Nauru immigration is mainly
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composed of refugee-seekers applying for asy-lum to Australia, Palau is instead a country in which migrant labour – mainly from China, the Philippines and Bangladesh – represents more than 50 per cent of the labour force. In exchange for foreign aid from Australia, the Nauru Government has accepted to become part of the ‘Pacific Solution’ to refugee-seek-ers. In Palau, however, the economy needs less-skilled and low-paid Asian migrants. These are often undocumented and thus find them-selves vulnerable. According to the Philippine Overseas Labour Office, 80 per cent of the roughly 5,000 Philippines migrant workers in Palau moved there as tourists and then over-stayed. In this region as well, social protection of the foreign-born population is one of the recently identified priority policy areas.63 An important mobility pattern in the Pacific Islands is linked to internal migration, which is the movement of people from ‘outer’ to ‘inner’ islands of the same state. Migration from remote islands towards main islands and
from impoverished rural to accessible coastal urban areas has grown considerably in recent years.64 This in turn has led to the depopulation of the smaller and outer islands towards the inner and more equipped islands, where opportuni-ties for education and access to health serv-ices are available, and to the concentration of the public administration and state bureauc-racy in the so-called urban areas, without mechanisms for taxation and redistribution of income toward rural and more peripheral are-as. This tends to perpetuate territorial imbal-ances and spurs migration, while having only limited compensating effects from internal remittances.65 The most visible consequences have been the growth of squatter settlements, diminished services due to excessive demo-graphic pressure, and social tension between newcomers and the original settlers. Tonga, for example, has a population of about 100,000 people. According to the most recent census (2006), about 70 per cent of the popu-
East Timor
Papua New Guinea
Solomon Islands
Vanuatu
Fiji Islands
Tonga
Tuvalu
Samoa
Palau
Niue
NauruKiribati
Cook Islands
Marshall Islands
Immigrants as % of total population
Only the main islands of the atolls are represented.The size and position of the Pacific Islands on this map do not correspond to the actual ones.The map has only descriptive purposes.
Micronesia, Federated States of
0.1-0.9% 1.0-2.9% 3.0-4.9% 5.0-9.9% > 10.0%
Map elaborated for the ACP Secretariat by ©Andrea Gallina 2010
Map 3.6 - PacificImmigrants as Percentage of Total Population
60
lation now resides on the main island of Tonga-tapu, and practically one-quarter of the entire population lives in the capital, Nuku’alofa. Population growth in South Tarawa, the capital and urban centre of Kiribati, was 5.2 per cent per annum (1995-2000), reaching a population density of 2,558 inhabitants per km2, compara-ble to Brasilia, Rome and Kuala Lumpur. It now contains 60 per cent of the entire population. In Tuvalu, Funafuti Island accounts for 66 per cent of the population; in Fiji, the main island Viti Levu is home to 80 per cent; and the main island of Samoa (Upolu) has 60 per cent.66 This type of internal migration is also having a signifi cant impact on pollution, waste manage-ment, and renewable resources such as fresh water and near-shore fi shing stocks, which in-directly affect the local population’s health and nutrition, as they become more depend-ent with each passing day on imported foods, with the corresponding implications for their health. In Kiribati, overcrowding in the main urban centre has led to poor sanitary condi-tions associated with inadequate sewerage and a lack of garbage disposal systems. This in turn puts stress on local health facilities and results in the highest human poverty index in the Pacifi c Islands.67
Emigration from ACP countriesInternational mobility in ACP countries is linked to proximity and remains a regional phenom-enon, especially for Sub-Saharan Africa coun-tries. More than half (about 54 per cent) of ACP migrants move to another ACP country – often a bordering one – while about 38 per cent are spread across the Global North. The remainder lives in North Africa and Asia. The small island states of the Caribbean and the Pacifi c tend to look beyond their regions when seeking and fi nding greener pastures, whereas those that can afford to migrate in the Sub-Saharan countries are trapped in a short-distance mobility scheme to other Sub-Saharan countries that can offer relatively better incomes, but that are often still very much at the bottom of the development lad-der.
Cultural and linguistic affi nities continue to be very important, but new trends are emerg-ing.68 Migration from Sub-Saharan Africa to Europe is increasingly diversifi ed, and today includes destinations such as Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and Spain. Ghanaians, Sen-egalese, Nigerians and Somalis are particularly dispersed across Europe, and there is an in-creasing fl ow of Francophone Africans, mainly Congolese and Ivoirians, moving into the UK or into Anglophone African countries.69 ACP mobility is also directed towards non-ACP Global South destinations (a very under-re-searched phenomenon). For example, in the Philippines we found 40 per cent of migrants from Antigua and Barbuda (about 25,000 peo-ple), while about 10,000 Dominicans, Cubans and Jamaicans live in Pakistan. What is striking is that migration towards the North is skills-biased. It is the best educated that move South-North in search for better income opportunities, whereas South-South migration, with notable exceptions, is mainly characterised by migrants with lesser skills.70
The data, although scarce and not always comparable, prove at least one important fact: there is a strong misperception on how many persons move from ACP countries and whereto. This is especially important for Eu-ropean policy makers, since on the one hand, Caribbean and Pacifi c Islands migrants move to North America, Australia and New Zea-land, while on the other hand, only one out of fi ve Sub-Saharan Africans moves to the Glo-bal North (and only 1 out of six move to the EU27+Norway and Switzerland).
Table 3.3 - Emigration of ACP nationals
Source: own elaboration on Sussex DRC Dataset, Version IV, 2007.
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In the following sections an overview of emi-gration patterns within ACP countries and be-tween ACP to the Global North is provided. The remainder of the Chapter will discuss the emigration patterns of each sub-region, high-lighting the main mobility corridors that will be analysed subsequently in greater detail (see Chapter 4).
Intra-ACP Migration: Overview Intra-ACP migration is a characteristic especial-ly of the four Sub-Saharan Africa sub-regions. Here, intra-regional migration accounts for 70 per cent of the total (see Table 3.3). In Map 3.4 these patterns are detailed. Partic-ularly dynamic is the mobility within Western
Africa. Intra-Western Africa movements (about 5.6 million people) account for more than two-thirds of all emigration in the entire sub-region. Another million people are split into Eastern Africa and Central / Middle Africa. Migration towards Southern Africa is very small, although there is anecdotal evidence that it is growing.Mobility within Central / Middle Africa is very limited and involves less than half-a-million people. About half of the diasporas in Central / Middle African countries live in Eastern Afri-ca. Southern Africa is the destination of about 400,000 migrants, whereas a mere 5 per cent moves to Western Africa. Within Southern Africa mobility is not par-ticularly strong. This is the case because this
map 3.7 - intra-Sub-Saharan African mobility
62
sub-region accounts for only five countries and has a relatively small population compared to other sub-regions. Intra-Southern Africa mi-gration accounts for 10 per cent of emigra-tion from this sub-region. A third of the total emigration from Southern African countries is directed towards Eastern Africa.Eastern African countries share similar mobili-ty patterns as Western Africa. Intra-Eastern Af-rica migration accounts for 2.5 million people or 46 per cent of the total. Another 8 per cent (ca. 440,000 people) moved to Southern Afri-ca. Other consistent Eastern Africa diasporas live in Western Africa (ca. 160,000 people) and Central / Middle Africa (ca. 106,000 people). For its part, in Sub-Saharan Africa sub-region-al and continental migration is the predomi-nant pattern of mobility. In the Pacific and the Caribbean, intra-ACP migration is somewhat limited.In the Caribbean region only about 4 per cent of total migrants move to another Caribbean island of the ACP group. The main source of intra-Caribbean migration is Haiti. There are also other diaspora groups in the Caribbean, but the numbers are rather small: about four thousand Guyanese live in Antigua and Barbuda, three thousand in Barbados, and five thousand in Trinidad and Tobago. A couple of thousand Jamaicans are in Antigua and Barbuda, the Ba-hamas and Cuba. Four thousand migrants from Saint Vincent and the Grenadines can be found in Barbados and about eight thousand in Trini-dad and Tobago. A couple of thousand people from Trinidad and Tobago have moved to Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, as well as Barba-dos. Similar figures are recorded for the di-aspora from Dominica to Antigua and Barbuda.Among the non-ACP Caribbean Islands there are some main attraction poles for migrants in the region such as the U.S. Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands, in which the demand for workers among the tourist and other service industries is consistent. Intra-ACP migration in the Pacific is also a limited phenomenon, involving less than 3 per cent of Pacific migrants. The main human mobility between the Pacific Islands is charac-
terised by internal migration movements from outer to inner islands within the same state. South-North Migration Trends and Patterns Current migration policies in the Global North prevent ACP migrants from moving easily to Northern countries. Those that do are often subject to temporary schemes linked to spe-cific economic sectors. People from ACP coun-tries who are residents in the Global North represent only a small fraction of its foreign-born population. It is estimated that about 8.7 million people from ACP countries have emi-grated to OECD countries, or about 9 per cent of all migrants living in these.71 The twenty largest Diasporas in absolute num-bers of migrants are shown in Graph 3.5. Of these, the top five account for 42 per cent of migrants to the Global North and all are based mostly in the United States.
Emigration from Sub-Saharan Africa toward the North is rather limited. Only 1 out of five Sub-Saharan African migrants move to the Global North. About 4 million migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa are resident in a coun-try of the Global North. The bulk of these (2.8 million) are in the EU27 +Norway and Switzer-land, another million is in the United States and Canada and the remainder live in Australia and New Zealand (see Table 3.4). Sub-Saha-ran Africa migrants in the EU are less than the migrants from Northern Africa, despite having more than twice the population. For some of the countries in Sub-Saharan Af-rica migration to the Global North represents more than 50 per cent of migrants abroad, es-pecially for the Island States of São Tomé and Príncipe (67.8 per cent), Madagascar (66.5 per cent), Mauritius (63.1 per cent), Cape Verde (61.6 per cent) and Comoros (51.5 per cent). Conversely, for Caribbean ACP countries the bulk of emigration is towards the Glo-bal North, especially the United States, Canada and former European colonies. In-deed, 85 per cent of the 5 million Caribbean migrants live in the global North, with North
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America as the main destination, followed by the EU27+Norway and Switzerland. The fi ve largest Caribbean Diasporas in abso-lute numbers are Cuba, Jamaica, the Domini-can Republic, Haiti and Suriname. These are concentrated in only a few countries. Thus over 80 per cent of Cuban and 77 per cent of
Dominican migrants are in the United States, 60 per cent of Haitian and Jamaican migrants also move to the United States and 68 per cent of Surinamese can be found in the Neth-erlands. These mobility corridors have been studied widely and frequently, thanks to eas-ily available datasets based on censuses and
Table 3.4 - ACP Regions and Sub-Regions: Emigration Towards the Global North
map 3.8 - ACp South-North mobility
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surveys, and might well provide important in-sights for ACP policy makers.
In the Pacifi c, migration towards the Glo-bal North involves three-fourths of all mi-grants. Half of the approximately one half million Pacifi c islanders living abroad are in New Zealand and Australia, whereas another 100,000 have chosen North America as their preferred destination. The remaining group is based mainly in Asia, with very small diaspo-ras in EU27+Norway and Switzerland, notably those from Fiji and Timor-Este. A more detailed analysis of the emigration patterns for each region and sub-region is pro-vided in the sections below.
Sub-Saharan Africa Emigration SystemsIn Sub-Saharan Africa mobility is a very old livelihood strategy, linked to pastoralist pro-duction systems, trade caravans, environmen-tal transformations and man-made crises. It is, however, a phenomenon that is spread un-evenly across the continent. On the one hand, we fi nd countries with a very
high proportion of residents abroad relative to the population at home, Cape Verde (39.9 per cent), Seychelles (16.8 per cent), Equatorial Guinea (15.9 per cent), Congo (15.2 per cent), Mali (12.7 per cent), Eritrea (11.8 per cent), São Tomé and Príncipe (11.4 per cent), Burki-na Faso (9.2 per cent) and Comoros (8.1 per cent). On the other, there are countries with a population residing abroad that accounts for less than 1 per cent of its residents, such as for example Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi, Tanza-nia, Uganda, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Cameroon and Botswana (see Map 3.9). However, for some of the most populated coun-tries, the low percentage of residents abroad in relation to the population at home hides signifi cant diaspora formations. For example, Nigeria has less than 3 per cent of its popula-tion residing abroad, but in absolute numbers this represents a diaspora of more than a mil-lion people. Other diasporas surpassing one 1 million people are those of Mali and Burkina Faso. Diasporas of less than a million but over half a million people can be found in Ghana, Angola, Mozambique, the Democratic Republic
Graph 3.7 - ACP Top 20 Diasporas in the Global North (Number of People)
Source: own elaboration based on Sussex DRC Dataset, IV, 2007; Global North includes: EU27 + Switzerland and Norway, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, United States, Canada and Mexico.
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of Congo, South Africa, Sudan, Benin, Guinea and Congo (see Table A.1 in Annex).
Emigration from Central/Middle Africa There are very few studies on internal, region-al and international mobility from and within Central Africa.72 When it occurs, migration is short-distance and mainly within the region or to other countries on the African continent. It should be noted that the percentage of people living abroad in relation to the total popula-tion in this sub-region is particularly low, con-firming the association between poverty levels and migration levels. By contrast, figures are high for Gabon and Equatorial Guinea, the two
countries of the region with the highest GDP per capita and Human Development Index.In this sub-region migrant movement includes Congolese to Angola, Zambia and Congo Braz-zaville, especially migrants originating in West-ern Congo (where Kinshasa is located). Zambia is a common destination for migrants from the Lubumbashi region in Katanga.73 Camerooni-ans move mainly to Gabon and South Africa for work, although the recent economic down-turns have made life difficult for migrants in many African destination countries. Cameroon is a common destination for neighbouring Ni-geria’s migrants who seek livelihoods in south-western Cameroon’s cocoa plantations, fol-
map 3.9 - Emigration from Sub-Saharan AfricaResidents Abroad as Percentage of Total Population
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lowing a mobility path established in colonial times. Equatorial Guinea’s migrants seek em-ployment in Gabon, which is the main destina-tion of Central Africa’s migrants.74 In the Cen-tral / Middle Africa region, while we record a generalised increase in female migration since the 1960s, the share of female migration slightly decreased in the Central Africa Repub-lic and Congo.Refugees represent another very important group of migrants in this region. Refugee fl ows have been quite large since the independence of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The UNHCR estimates that in 2009 one third of the DRC’s one million refugees were living in Tanzania, Zambia, Rwanda and Uganda, and increasingly in South Africa. In 2009 there were 170,000 refugees from Angola living in neighbouring countries, with some 125,000 from the Central African Repub-lic and 20,000 originating from Congo (see Ta-ble 3.5). There is still very little knowledge on the contribution of these important groups of forced migrants on the development of both countries of origin and destination.Emigration from Central African countries fol-lows historical patterns. Colonial ties between São Tomé and Príncipe, Angola, Guinea Bissau and Portugal favour migration to Europe, much as occurs between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Belgium. However, migration from
this region to Northern countries is also be-coming more diversifi ed and includes non-tra-ditional destinations such as the United States for Cameroonians, and the United Kingdom or France for migrants from the Democratic Re-public of Congo.
Emigration from Southern AfricaMigrants from countries in the Southern Africa sub-region are attracted to South Africa, Na-mibia, and to booming Botswana. Outside the sub-region, movements are consistently east-ward towards Mozambique and Tanzania. For 93 per cent of migrants from Lesotho, the fi nal destination is another African country. For migrants from Botswana and Swaziland, these percentages stand at 60 per cent and 72 per cent, respectively, while 78 per cent of Na-mibian migrants choose an African country as their place of residence and work, especially Mozambique and Tanzania. The permeability of borders, the existence of established migration corridors and networks, the persistence of political instability, and the lower costs associated with proximity facili-tate this process, sometimes despite the rig-id migration policies of the main destination countries. Seasonal migration and occasional cross-border trade also play an important role in shaping mobility patterns in this sub-region. Neighbouring countries also represent
Table 3.5 - Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), Returnees (Refugees and IDPs), Stateless Persons, and Others of Concern to UNHCR by Country/Territory of Origin,
end-2008 (Table Established: 10 June 2009)
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the preferred destinations for South Africans (38 per cent move mainly to Mozambique, Na-mibia, and Swaziland), although compared to its neighbours South Africa migrants have es-tablished more diversified mobility corridors. One-third of South African migrants reside in Europe (mainly the United Kingdom, Portugal and the Netherlands), 13 per cent in North America (US and Canada) and 13 per cent in Oceania (Australia and New Zealand). In Southern Africa, the configuration of female migration has changed with a significant 30 points increase in South Africa, offsetting neg-ligible decreases in Swaziland and Lesotho.
Emigration from Western AfricaWith few exceptions, migration in Western Af-rica is mainly a regional phenomenon. Most of the migration from Western African countries is directed to a neighbouring country or within the continent. Indeed, more than 90 per cent of total emigration from Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, and Niger is to another African country. The permeability and artificiality of borders, together with close cultural affinities and difficulties enforcing legal migration proc-esses, all contribute to this fluidity. Cape Verde has sizeable communities in Portu-gal, Côte d’Ivoire, and Senegal, while Mali has a large emigrant community in France, and Ghana in Italy, Spain and Germany. Migration to North America is numerically larger75 and in-volves fewer countries (mainly Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra Leone to the US and Canada) and mostly involves migrants with upper second-ary and tertiary educations. Other migration trends include mobility towards North Africa as a gateway to Europe that often becomes a permanent place of residence, as well as some movement to countries where West Africa has had limited historical, cultural, political, or even economic links. Examples include Sen-egalese and Malian migrants to Zambia and more recently to South Africa.76
In Western Africa, female migration has de-creased slightly in Benin, Togo, Mali and Burki-na Faso over the past forty years, whereas during the same period increases have been
substantial in most countries, showing a dy-namic migratory phenomenon and an impor-tant reconfiguration of household structures and the labour market, especially at the re-gional level.
Emigration from Eastern AfricaAccording to the Sussex University Develop-ment Research Centre database, the main destination of migrants from this sub-region remains the African continent. Migration to-wards other African countries accounts for 58 per cent of the total, but if one looks at intra-Eastern Africa migration, this represents the main mobility pattern and involves 46 per cent of migrants. A small 8 per cent move to South-ern Africa. At the individual country level, intra-African migration is particularly impor-tant for Burundi (91 per cent), Rwanda (85 per cent), Mozambique (84 per cent), Malawi (83 per cent), Zambia (78 per cent), Eritrea (74 per cent) and Tanzania (67 per cent). Emigration towards the Global North involve a quarter of Eastern Africa migrants and is main-ly to the 27 countries that make up the Euro-pean Union (plus Norway and Switzerland) This is particularly important for Madagascar (64 per cent), Comoros (51 per cent), Djibouti (47 per cent), Mauritius (48 per cent) and Uganda (43 per cent). About 30 per cent of Ethiopian migrants reside in North America, as do 14 per cent of Kenyan and Ugandan migrants. There are also considerable numbers of Suda-nese and Ethiopian migrants in Asia, especially in the Gulf countries. Seychelles migrants also move to Oceania (15 per cent), as do 10 per cent of migrants from Mauritius and 5 per cent from Zimbabwe. The mobility pattern in this region is charac-terized by large-scale displacement and refu-gee movements that have been occurring since the early 1990s, making the region a place of origin and destination for 60 per cent of Af-rican refugees. About 250,000 refugees from Burundi were in Tanzania in 2008, while at the same time there were 20,757 refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo in Burundi, 52,409 in Rwanda, 47,329 in Zambia and 79,706
68
in Tanzania. Ethiopia presently hosts about 83,583 refugees, mainly from Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan, while Eritrea hosts 21,018 refugees from Ethiopia and 124,785 from Sudan. Kenya is host to a third of a million refugees, includ-ing Ethiopians. In Zambia, there were about 84,000 refugees in 2008, mainly from Angola and the Democratic Republic Congo.77 Transit migration is another characteristic of this region. The Horn of Africa has developed into a major transit hub for both transit mi-gration and irregular migratory movements to-wards Southern Europe, the Gulf of Aden and other European destinations, mainly by South and East Asian migrants.78 Trafficking of East African women to Middle Eastern countries is another growing phenomenon. The number of Ethiopian female migrants in Lebanon alone is estimated to be between 17,000 and 35,000.79 In Eastern Africa countries the share of female migrants in Madagascar and Zimbabwe de-creased during the last four decades. In this region Mauritius has the highest portion of fe-male migrants at 63 per cent. In Eastern Africa, intra-regional mobility is re-peatedly identified by both local people and outside observers as a source of tension.80 Despite aridity and seasonality, East African rangelands are fertile and support major live-stock production systems and commercial farming. Mobility has thus always created competition and access to water and fertile land has had to be negotiated. For centuries the area has been dominated by semi-nomad-ic pastoral and agro-pastoral peoples, but tensions were exacerbated only in the late 20th century with the privatization of land.81 Conservation legislation and the bypass of customary laws protecting the rights of us-ers were other factors that contributed to marginalizing poor semi-nomadic farmers.82 The enforcement of border controls and bor-der fencing, together with the privatization of communal land, have trapped pastoral peoples within or between nations, where in many cases they become targets of abuse, state violence, low political representation and social marginalization.
Emigration from the CaribbeanIn the small Caribbean islands emigration is a significant phenomenon that contributes to both de-population and remittances. Intra-Caribbean migration is common among coun-tries that traditionally receive migrants (Bar-bados), send migrants (St. Kitts, Dominica, Haiti) or both receive and send migrants (Do-minican Republic). St. Vincent, Grenada and Barbados have been actively involved in intra-regional migration, particularly in relation to the development of the oil industry.The Haitian diaspora is one of the largest in the region, which is rather interesting since Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. On the one hand, this appar-ently contradicts the empirical relationship that exists between relatively higher incomes and mobility. More accurate analyses show that Haitians in the diaspora have a generally higher level of education and income rela-tive to those that stay behind. However, the Haitian case is noteworthy because it dem-onstrates that without strong institutions at home, the large inflows of remittances gen-erated by the diaspora can likely drop into a vacuum. In fact, although remittances to Haiti have contributed to a safety net for millions of Haitians who would otherwise have fallen into poverty, their impact on human develop-ment is negligible.In the Caribbean, except in Cuba, Dominica, Haiti, Saint Kitts and Nevis and Suriname, fe-male emigration has grown considerably, and for some countries such as Barbados and Anti-gua and Barbuda, it accounts for about 60 per cent of migrants. Female emigration is gen-erally higher in the Anglophone insular Carib-bean than in the rest of ACP Group Caribbean countries.
Emigration from the PacificIn Pacific countries emigration is linked to demographic growth, changing systems of production and limited opportunities and ac-cess to basic services. Emigration from Pacific countries has three poles: Australia, New Zea-
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land and the United States (Hawaii, Guam and America Samoa). Although human mobility from the Pacific Is-lands Countries (PICs) is limited on the glo-bal scale in both absolute and relative terms (only 0.14 per cent of the world’s population lives in the Pacific region and its migrants represent only 0.2 per cent of world migrant stocks), it represents a key factor in develop-ment and has become a structural element in the social and economic systems of many PICs. Given the particular features of this region, which is characterized by small island states with fragile ecosystems, migration contributes to human development while simultaneously depriving local societies and economies of al-ready scarce human resources. The fragility of the linkage between mobil-ity and human development in this region is
exacerbated by the impact that generalized demographic growth has on already strained economies. There will be 3 million more peo-ple in the region by 2020, and 2 million of these will be in Papua New Guinea alone. Bi-lateral migration quota policies are in place to alleviate the demographic pressure (about 1,000 Samoans are allowed to migrate to New Zealand every year),83 but it is unlikely these policies can provide a sustainable response to the challenges that the PICs will face in the longer term.Traditionally, PICs have been grouped into three geographic zones: Polynesia, Micronesia and Melanesia, each with distinct international and internal migration patterns.84 Population movement in Polynesia (mainly from Samoa and Tuvalu) is primarily international, whereas it is mostly internal in Melanesia (principally
map 3.10 - Emigration from the CaribbeanResidents Abroad as Percentage of Total Population
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from the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu) and a combination of both in Micronesia (predomi-nantly from Kiribati). Traditionally, Kiribati’s migrants have been recruited by the mining industry in Nauru and have worked in the in-ternational shipping industry.85 Mobility trends in the Pacific region are strong-ly determined by the proximity to Australia, New Zealand and the United States. Migration from the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia toward the United States is due to the freedom these countries’ citizens have to migrate to the US and its dependencies (through the Compacts of Free Association). Intra-PIC migration also takes place, although to a limited extent. The opening of the Uni-versity of the South Pacific in Fiji (as a result of cooperation between twelve states) has created a significant movement of staff and students from Cook Islands, Tonga, Samoa, Tuvalu, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Solomon Is-lands and Vanuatu who study at the Laucala campus in Suva, Fiji, as well as from Fiji to
Samoa to study agriculture and Vanuatu to pursue legal studies. However, the most highly educated persons from the Pacific Islands States find only limited opportunities due to the small size of the local markets for talent. The median migration rate among holders of upper secondary and terti-ary education diplomas is 59 per cent. Brain drain86 is of particular concern to small states because of the limited opportunities offered by their minute economies.87 A recent study on migration determinants and the return of high academic performers from two PICs included in the ACP Group of States (Tonga and Papua New Guinea) shows that among Tonga’s skilled migrants are medi-cal doctors and nurses (19 per cent), teach-ers (10 per cent), bankers and accountants (10 per cent). Papua New Guinea’s migrants working overseas have similar occupations: IT, accounting, law, academia, engineering, and nursing. For top students graduating in Tonga, the main destinations are New Zealand (31
Map 3.11 - Emigration from the PacificResidents abroad as percentage of total population
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per cent), the United States (23 per cent), Fiji (18 per cent) and Australia (17 per cent). The main destinations of Papua New Guinea’s top students are Australia (50 per cent) and New Zealand (18 per cent), while the rest are scattered across Japan, China, the Solomon Is-lands, and Laos.88
In some Pacific Islands emigration is a serious concern due to the loss of customary norms, cultural models and skills that this implies.89 For example, changing lifestyles and dietary customs have over time increased the preva-lence of diabetes among indigenous people in the Pacific region. Recent studies show that this disease is generally lowest in traditional Pacific environments and highest in both ur-ban Pacific and adopted metropolitan envi-ronments (such as New Zealand); in the latter environments, prevalence is markedly higher among Pacific people than white people, and it has been increasing rapidly in all three envi-ronments as Pacific people experience greater morbidity and more complications than white people with diabetes.90 This has significant re-percussions on both tight health budgets and migration: since these diseases often cannot be treated at existing health facilities, entire families must migrate in order to seek the services they need.91 Depopulation is widespread in the Pacific Is-lands, especially among some of the smallest states such as the Cook Islands, Niue and Pal-au. Some countries are leasing land overseas (Tonga), and others expect Australia and New Zealand to offer resettlement opportunities (Tuvalu, Kiribati). In the Pacific, except for Timor-Leste, migra-tion is mainly a male phenomenon. The strong demand for caregivers in the United States and Australasia (but to some extent also in Kiribati)92 has stimulated the migration of skilled women from the region, in particular from Fiji. Migration of women in Samoa, Pa-pua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands has decreased during the past four decades, al-though these years have implied an important re-equilibrium of the migration gender-bias that has for long characterised the region.
A Final Remark on the Emigration of Women in ACP CountriesThe descriptive data on female migration in ACP countries allows for highlighting some general trends and isolating specific cases, which can be further researched to with a view toward improving the understanding of changing gender dynamics in migratory proc-esses. However, it is questionable to rely on statistics for countries that have gone through severe conflicts. Further, few censuses have been undertaken in the past decades, usually of dubious quality. Indeed it is not uncommon that in the UNDESA statistics on ‘female share of international migrant stocks (%)’ we find the same figure for both 1960 and 2005. Another important limitation in this area is the pau-city of evidence and studies on South-South migration of women in ACP countries. Female migration from ACP countries is mainly ana-lysed from a South-North migration perspec-tive, and little is known about the South-South female migration patterns, except for studies describing anecdotal experiences as concerns the trafficking of women within the ACP re-gions and of women moving from an ACP to another ACP country to enter into previously male-dominated areas of employment, such as petty trade in border areas.93 Even less is known about the conditions of women who are refugees and internally displaced. Interna-tional organizations and NGOs are increasingly inserting nutrition,94 reproductive health and gender equality into post-conflict and demo-bilization programs (e.g. in Mozambique and Angola),95 but still more can be done to tap the development potential of women in reset-tlement areas.
Notes1 - The lower estimate is taken from UNDESA (2009) Trends in Total Migrant Stocks: The 2008 Revision, New York; whereas the higher forecast is based on the Sussex DRC Migration Dataset, version IV, 2007.2 - Zlotnik Hania (2003) 3 - Data on GDP per capita are from World Develop-ment Indicators. World Bank (2009a)4 - Bakewell Oliver (2009)
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5 - Letouzé Emmanuel, Mark Purser, Francisco Ro-dríguez, and Matthew Cummins (2009)6 - Ratha, D. and Shaw, W. (2007)7 - Those not taking part include Afghanistan, Colom-bia, Peru, North Korea, Myanmar, Bhutan, Taiwan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Moldova, Bosnia and Herze-govina, Western Sahara, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Togo, Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Gabon, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Angola, Democratic Republic of Con-go, and Madagascar. Source: United Nations, available online at: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sources/census).8 - The Sussex DRC Dataset Version IV is an important source of statistics on international migration that provides data on both countries of origin and country of destination that can help to identify the major in-tra-ACP migration corridors. This Global Migrant Origin Database has been compiled by the Development Re-search Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty at the University of Sussex, England. There are four versions of this dataset and we have taken the most recent, because even though it is the least exact, it is also the fullest in terms of coverage and has been updated to 2007. The dataset is made of a matrix of 226 x 226 countries and territories and is based on na-tional censuses conducted during the year 2000 round of censuses in both countries of destination and ori-gin. Isolating ACP countries, we obtain a figure of 23.2 million migrant stocks in the world, slightly above the UNDESA statistics, representing 2.7% of the total ACP population. The comparison between these two data-sets is important because there are some significant differences at country and regional levels. These are mainly due to different ways of calculating estimates. It is important to note that both datasets present data on migrant stocks –i.e. the total number of migrants both by country of origin and country of destination – and not the annual (or periodic) flows of migrants between countries. The stocks are the cumulative ef-fect of flows over a much longer period of time than a year and hence are generally much greater than annual flows would be. The dataset is available on-line at: http://www.migrationdrc.org/research/type-sofmigration/global_migrant_origin_database.html. A detailed analysis of the limitations and potentialities of this dataset for migration research can be found in Parsons Christopher R., Ronald Skeldon, Terrie L.
Walmsley, L. Alan Winters (2007)9 - See for example, the review of the literature in ECLAC/CDCC (1998); ECLAC (2006); ECLAC (2006a)10 - Bakewell Oliver (2009)11 - United Nations Migration Chart available at: http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/2006Migration_Chart/Migration2006.pdf 12 - Konseiga Adama (2005) New Patterns of Migra-tion in West Africa, Wiener Zeitschrift für kritische Afrikastudien, Nr. 8/2005, Vol. 5, pp. 25-46; Adepoju Aderanti (2005) 13 - African Union (2006) 14 - The 15 members of ECOWAS are: Benin, Burki-na Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sier-ra Leone, Togo, Guinea (suspended after 2008 coup d’état) and Niger (suspended after 2009 ‘self-coup’).15 - The EAC members are the Republics of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi. Its headquar-ters are in Arusha, Tanzania. For example, in April 2010 the United Republic of Tanzania cancelled the visa requirement for nationals of Burundi travelling into its territory.16 - SADC Member States are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zim-babwe.17 - COMESA Member States are Burundi, Comoros, D.R. Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Sey-chelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zim-babwe.18 - ECCAS Member States are Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Gabon, Guinea, Rwanda, and São Tomé and Príncipe.19 - The CEN-SAD includes 28 Member States, as fol-lows: Central African Republic, Eritrea, Djibouti, Gambia, Senegal, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, Somalia, Tunisia, Benin, Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Li-beria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Comoro, Guinea, Kenya, Mauritania and São Tomé and Príncipe.20 - I am grateful to Prof Aderanti Adepoju for this comment during the review process.21 - ACP Group of States and the New Land Foundation (2004) p. 35.22 - Landau, Loren B. and Segatti, Aurelia Wa Kabwe
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(2009); Landau, Loren (2005)23 - Buscher Dale (2009) 24 - OECD/SWAC (1998) 25 - The UNDESA Population Division 2003 Migrant Stocks Revision (Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations (2004) Trends in Total Migrant Stock: The 2003 Revision. United Nations: New York, 2004) indicates a figure of 6.8, whereas the OECD comes up with a figure of 7.5 million migrants moving within West Africa, OECD (2006) 26 - Konseiga Adama (2005)27 - In West Africa the expulsion of undocumented mi-grants is endemic. Senegal expelled Guineans in 1967; Côte d’Ivoire expelled about 16,000 Beninese in 1964; Sierra-Leone, and later Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire, ex-pelled Ghanaian fishermen in 1968. Earlier on, Côte d’Ivoire had expelled over 1,000 Benin and Togo na-tionals in 1958; Chad expelled thousands of Benin nationals who were ‘illegal migrants’ and not ‘law-abiding’. In early 1979 Togolese farmers were expelled from Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire. Ghana expelled all ille-gal aliens without valid residence permits in December 1969; this exercise involved an estimated half-a-million people, mostly from Nigeria, Upper Volta and Niger. Nigerian traders were once expelled from Cameroon, Zaire and Côte d’Ivoire. These examples show that ex-pulsion has been used extensively by most countries of the sub-region. The largest case of mass expulsion of undocumented aliens took place in Nigeria in 1983 and 1985. Adepoju Aderanti (2005) p. 4.28 - Kress Brad (2006) 29 - According to Whitehead Ann and Hashim Iman (2005) pp. 40-41: ‘Côte d’Ivoire, in particular, being the leading producer of the world’s cocoa (50%), has been singled out as a country where many children are involved in migration, including children consid-ered to be trafficked […] the reduced prices going to cocoa farmers upon privatization of the cocoa market, has translated into a reduced price paid for labour, which in turn, translated into an increased search for the cheapest forms of labour. As a result, child mi-grant workers have been extremely important in the establishment and expansion of cocoa production in the Côte d’Ivoire. Although many of these come with their families and are working as family labour, some are independent child migrants and they have been the subject of considerable public concern regarding
coercion used to recruit them and the slave-like con-ditions of their contracts. 30 - Zongo Mahamadou (2003)31 - According to the Ministry of the Environment, the forested area of Côte d’Ivoire decreased from 10 mil-lion to three million hectares between 1988 and 2005. Until 1984, the rate of deforestation in Côte d’Ivoire was about 2.5 percent per year; but following the start of widespread cocoa and coffee cultivation, it rose to 11 percent annually. However, it is not only mi-gration from elsewhere in the region that is to blame, notes the United Nations Environment Programme. According to this agency, the arrival of people from the north of Côte d’Ivoire accounts for a large part of the exploitation of forests. The south will experience similar desertification if reforestation efforts in this region are not intensified. Zamblé Fulgence (2007) 32 - Thorsen Dorte (2005)33 - Kwankye Stephen O., John K. Anarfi, Cynthia Ad-doquaye Tagoe and Adriana Castaldo (2006)34 - Whitehead Ann and Iman Hashim (2005) 35 - Hein Philippe (2004)36 - Lincoln David (2009)37 - Lututala Mumpasi B. (undated)38 - http://www.unhcr.org, countries briefing notes, accessed on 21 January 2010.39 - Ngoie Tshibambe Germain, Mukohya Vwakyana-kazi (undated)40 - Ngoie Tshibambe Germain, Mukohya Vwakyana-kazi (undated)41 - Crush Jonathan, Vincent Williams, Sally Peberdy (2005) 42 - Crush Jonathan, et al., (2005) p. 8.43 - Ibidem44 - Ibidem, p. 23.45 - Elizabeth Thomas-Hope (undated) 46 - Elizabeth Thomas-Hope (2006) in ECLAC 2006a, p. 58.47 - Ibidem48 - ECLAC (2006b) 49 - In 1999 an Amnesty came into effect allowing un-documented migrants and recent arrivals to apply for permanent residency as long as the applicant could satisfy certain conditions. ECLAC (2006), p. 22. 50 - ECLAC/CDCC (2001) 51 - Kairi Consultants (2000); Thomas-Hope Elizabeth (2003) p. 7. 52 - AS outlined by Dr Bridget Wooding during the peer
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review process, the issue of sex-workers in the Car-ibbean is a complex one and involves different pat-terns of migration. For example, Dominican Republic women have been going, legally, to Curacao since the 1950s (continuing to the present) in well regulated and safe migration in the sex industry. This has been documented, for example, by Kamala Kempadoo in Sexing the Caribbean (2004) and the wider issues ex-plored in Lesser Taryn et al (2006). 53 - Ibidem, p. 7.54 - IOM and FLACSO (2004)55 - Children without birth certificates can enrol in primary school up to sixth grade. However, there is a high correlation between lack of a birth certificate and dropping out of school. World Bank (2006)56 - Wooding Bridget (2009)57 - Ferguson James (2003) 58 - Kairi Consultants (2000)59 - Ibidem, p. xvi.60 - Ibidem61 - According to Helen Lee the vision of Tongan writer Epeli Hau’ofa challenges the Western notion of the Pacific as an isolated and remote area. See Lee Helen (2009)62 - This paragraph has been contributed by Prof. Vi-jay Naidu at the University of South Pacific, during the peer review process. 63 - Asian Development Bank (2009) 64 - Connell John (2003)65 - Connell John (2003) in UNESCAP (2003)66 - These figures on the urbanization levels were provided by Prof Vijay Naidu, at University of South Pacific, during the peer review process.67 - Small C.A. and D. L. Dixon (2004) 68 - ACP Group of States and the New Land Founda-tion (2004)69 - Ibidem, p. 27.70 - Walmsley Terrie L., S. Amer Ahmed, Christopher R. Parsons (2007) 71 - ACP country migrants represent 13% of the non-OECD foreign-born living in OECD nations, OECD (2005)72 - Lututala M.B. (2007)73 - Schoumaker B., S. Vause, J. Mangalu (2009)74 - Ratha D. and Z. Xu (2008) 75 - Donata Gnisci and Marie Trémolières (2006)76 - Aderanti Adepoju (2006) 77 - UNHCR database, available at: http://www.unh-
cr.org/pages/49c3646c4d6.html accessed on 20 Janu-ary 2010.78 - ICMPD (2007)79 - ICMPD (2008)80 - Homewood Katherine, Ernestina Coast, Michael Thompson (2004) 81 - This was particularly detrimental to women and other dependents who did not qualify for registration and land titles in the first instance, Homewood Kath-erine et al. (2004) p. 570.82 - Ibidem, p. 573.83 - ESCAP (2007) p.7.84 - Ibidem, p. 8.85 - Ibidem, p. 9.86 - Docquier F. and H. Rapoport (2008)87 - Mohanty M., M. Reddy and V. Naidu (2006)88 - Gibson J. and D. McKenzie (2009) 89 - Ingram Imogen P. (2004)90 - Foliaki Sunia and Neil Pearce (2003)91 - Aitaoto, Nia, Joann Tsark, and Kathryn L. Braun, (2009). According to this article ‘Native Hawaiians have the highest diabetes mortality rates of major ethnic groups in Hawaii, at approximately 8%.The World Health Organization and diabetes specialists in the region note a high prevalence of diabetes in all US-associated Pacific Island jurisdictions. Estimates suggest that 94% of American Samoans are overweight or obese and 47% have diabetes. In the RMI, estimat-ed diabetes prevalence is 30%, and amputation rates increased by 28% from 2000 to 2001. In the CNMI, a survey of tenth grade students found that 78% of stu-dents had family members with diabetes and 64% of the students had three or more risk factors (e.g. fam-ily history, high body mass index [BMI], elevated cho-lesterol, high blood pressure, tobacco use). In Guam, diabetes prevalence doubled from 5% in 1996 to 10% in 2003. A door-to-door survey in Palau yielded a diabe-tes prevalence rate of 14% in the group aged 50 to 64 years and 23.5% in the group aged 65 or older.92 - Rokoduru Avelina (2006) 93 - Adepoju Aderanti (2006) 94 - For example, the NGO Alliance for Migration, Leadership and Development (AMLD www.amld-ong.org) together with WHO is carrying out a study on nutrition for population in resettlement areas like refugees camps, IDPs, to promote specific nutriments available from the local biodiversity. 95 - Irena Omelaniuk (undated)
This chapter focuses on the trends and patterns of migrant capital. The chapter will identify main infl ows and outfl ows of migrant economic,
social, cultural and human capital. Two important mobility corridors will be analysed in order to identify existing bottlenecks, good practices and
projects supporting the positive impact of mobility on development.
migrANT CApiTALS: TrENdS, pATTErNS ANd mAiN COrridOrS
ChApTEr 4
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© Istockphotos
© Istockphotos
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migrANT CApiTALS: TrENdS, pATTErNS ANd mAiN COrridOrS
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This chapter focuses on the trends and patterns of migrant capital. The chapter will identify main infl ows and outfl ows of migrant economic, social, cultural and human capital. Two important mobility corridors will be analysed in order to identify existing bottlenecks, good practices and projects supporting the positive impact of mobility on development.
An Overview of migrant Economic Capital in the ACP CountriesEvidence that the poor do not move much or that, if they do, they move nearby into not-so-rich countries, is based on statistics regarding migrant workers’ remittances. In 2009, it was estimated that the ACP countries received ap-proximately US$28.2 billion in remittances or8.9 per cent of the US$316 billion received by developing countries (see Graph 4.1). To put this in perspective, two countries alone – Mexico and Morocco – receive about the same amount of remittances as the entire ACP Group of States. The ACP countries remittanc-es are shared as follows: 6.5 per cent is re-ceived by the Sub-Saharan African countries,
2.3 per cent by the Caribbean countries and 0.1 per cent by the Pacifi c countries. Three-quarters (US$20.5 billion) of the ACP workers’ remittances go to Sub-Saharan Afri-can countries, a quarter to the Caribbean re-gion, and a small 1.5 per cent to the Pacifi c Islands. Table 4.0 shows the distribution of remittances, migrants and population shares among ACP countries.In relative terms, the Caribbean region per-forms best among ACP regions: representing only 4.4 per cent of the ACP population and 22 per cent of its migrants in the world, it is able to tap more than a quarter of all ACP re-mittances. The worst performance is by the ACP African countries, confi rming the impact of reduced mobility on their populations. The few ACP countries that have a considerable portion of their diasporas living in wealthy northern countries can reap more benefi ts from mobility.The relationship between remittances and mo-bility patterns refl ects the assumption made at the onset of the report: most of the ACP migrants fi nd themselves in a mobility trap; in other words, they move – but to countries that can offer little in terms of economic capital accumulation. Some people even move into countries with lower per capita GDP. At the sub-regional level of Sub-Saharan Af-rica, this phenomenon is even more evident.
Graph 4.1 - ACP and World Migrant Worker'sRemittances in Billion USD, 2009
Source: own elaboration based on WB Dataset, 2009.
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Among ACP Africa regions, Western Africa (having noteworthy diasporas in France and other European countries) receives the bulk of remittances (61.8 per cent) although it ac-counts for only 46 per cent of migrants from ACP African countries. In contrast, Central/Middle African countries tap a meagre 0.9 per cent of remittances, although they account for 17 per cent of ACP African migrants. South-ern Africa receives 7.7 per cent of remittances fl owing into ACP Africa, although its migrants comprise only 5 per cent of Sub-Saharan mi-grants, spread across various regions includ-ing North America and Oceania. The 31.5 per cent of Sub-Saharan African migrants originat-ing from Eastern African countries tap 29.5 per cent of the region’s remittances. Table 4.1 shows the absolute fi gure for work-ers’ remittances infl ows in each ACP country for which the data are available. The data for the last fi ve years also allow us to see some variations following the global fi nancial crisis, the impact of which will be discussed in a sub-sequent section of this chapter. In addition to remittance infl ows to ACP countries and re-gions, there are also outfl ows, which although substantially lower than inward fl ows, they are an indication of the importance of intra-regional migration.1 The US$28.2 billion of remittances infl ows to ACP countries in 2009 originate from few countries. In Sub-Saharan Africa, four countries – Nigeria (US$9.5 bil-lion), Sudan (US$3 billion), Kenya (US$1.5 bil-lion) and Senegal (US$1.2 billion) – account for three-fourths of the remittances tapped by the African sub-regions. In the Caribbean,
three countries – the Dominican Republic (US$3.3 billion), Jamaica (US$1.9 billion) and Haiti (US$1.2 billion) – account for about 90 per cent of the region’s remittances. In the Pacifi c, Fiji (US$169 million) and Samoa (US$131 million) account for two-thirds of the region’s remittances. A shock in these key countries can thus contribute to large varia-tions in remittances for the entire ACP Group. It is therefore necessary from a policy per-spective to understand the dynamics of the main remittance corridors for the key ACP remittance countries in order to devise meas-ures that facilitate transfers and reduce costs in both the formal and informal remittance transfer systems. A study of informal remittance systems in the ACP countries underlined the important func-tion of these systems for migrants and their ar-eas of origin. International migrants access to money transfer operators and fi nancial servic-es are constrained by language, culture, socio-economic position and legal status. They often revert to informal systems, in part because of the distance between their home villages and formal banking and fi nancial infrastructure. Informal remittance systems can, in this re-gard, be more effi cient in reaching the fi nal recipient. There is no evidence that channel-ling informal remittances into formal systems will make them more accessible or cheaper. Yet there is a need to explore ways to satisfy the security and law-enforcement concerns of states, without restricting the proven ability of these systems to provide a much-needed service.2
Remittances and the Global Financial CrisisThe 2008 crisis in the global 3Fs (fuel, food and fi nance) that hit the world economy has spared no one. In 2009, remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean declined by 7 per cent, those to the Middle-East and North Af-rica by 6 per cent, and those to Sub-Saharan Africa by 8 per cent. Intra-ACP workers’ re-mittances are also declining sharply (as in the case of remittances from South Africa to SADC countries) and the situation may prove more
Table 4.1 – Remittances and migration in ACp
Source: own elaboration based on World Bank (2008) estimates.
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serious for some small, poor countries where re-mittances make up a rela-tively large share of GDP (see Graph 4.2). Migrant workers are gen-erally more vulnerable in times of crisis, and a reduc-tion in wages has inevitably affected the amount of re-mittances sent back home as well. Unemployment among migrants is gener-ally higher than among native workers. The jobs of male migrant workers are concentrated in sec-tors such as construction and manufacturing, which are particularly affected by the crisis. Female-dom-inated low-income occu-pations such as domestic work, caring for children and the elderly or manu-facturing items in export processing zones are af-fected in different ways.3 During the recent econom-ic crisis, female-dominated occupations in the service sectors (health and care of children and the elderly) proved more resilient to the downturn because of the increased global de-mand in the ‘care’ sector. This is a phenomenon that is attracting worldwide attention, not least since the United Nations agreed (in 2010) to begin to draw up a new international in-strument to better protect domestic workers (and es-pecially migrant domestic workers). However, em-ployment conditions have
Table 4.2 - Worker's Remittances, Compensation of Employees,and Migrant Transfers, Credit (US$ Million)
Source: World Bank staff estimates based on the International Monetary Fund’s Balance of Payments Statistic Yearbook 2008.
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worsened in this sector, as is also the case in other sectors, with migrants in general pay-ing the heaviest toll.4 This indicates that so-cial and cultural context influences migration patterns both in countries origin and destina-tion, and even though female migration has increased in most countries, migration policies have not yet taken this into account. Women have also received more attention as remittance-managers and receivers. It has been confirmed that the share of earnings sent by women is higher than that sent by men (al-though women’s remittances are inferior in ab-solute terms, because their wages are lower), and that remittances made by women prioritise expenses on education, clothing and health.The fact that many ACP countries have a low degree of integration to the global financial system has cushioned them against some of
the most severe effects of the crisis. However, ACP countries have been affected negatively by international trade, mainly via increased commodity and oil prices and a decreased de-mand for their exports. Scarce diversification in the economies of the ACP countries has in-creased the level of vulnerability to the crisis. The global financial crisis has also led to a dra-matic slowdown of FDI in ACP states, a reduc-tion of exports, and a sharp decline in remit-tances. Foreign reserves to cover imports are dwindling, jeopardising the capacity of many countries to import even basic products such as food, medical supplies and agricultural in-puts. The estimated loss of output is signifi-cant and erodes the results of positive growth in previous years. As a result, per capita in-come is declining and resources for national development are being curtailed. Investment
Box 4.1 - Beyond Overseas Development Assistance
As indicated by the Migration and Remit-tances Team of the World Bank, Sub-Sa-haran Africa continues to depend on offi-cial aid for its external financing needs. In 2006, ODA was more than two-and-a-half times the size of private flows received by Sub-Saharan Africa excluding South Africa. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the recent increase in ODA appears to be driven by debt relief provided through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (IBRD 2007). Accord-ing to IBRD (2007), debt relief represented close to 70% of the increase in bilateral of-ficial development assistance (ODA) to Sub-Saharan Africa between 2001 and 2005. The relatively small FDI flows to the region went mostly to enclave investments in oil-exporting countries. Portfolio bond and eq-uity flows were almost non-existent outside South Africa. Private debt flows were small and predominantly relationship-based commercial bank lending, and even these
flows were mostly short-term in tenor. Less than half the countries in the region have a sovereign rating from the major credit rat-ing agencies. Of those that are rated, most have below-investment grade ratings. Cap-ital outflows appear to be smaller than in the previous decade, but the stock of flight capital from the region remains high. Migrant remittances appear to be increas-ing, but much of the flow is believed to be unrecorded as it bypasses formal financial channels. In short, there is little room for complacency; efforts to explore new sourc-es and innovative mechanisms for financing development in the region must continue.
Source: summary from Dilip Ratha, Sanket Moha-patra, Sonia Plaza (2008) Beyond Aid: New Sources and Innovative Mechanisms for Financing Devel-opment in Sub-Saharan Africa, Policy Research Working Paper 4609, The World Bank, Develop-ment Prospects Group, Migration and Remittances Team, April 2008. Available at:http://s i teresources .wor ldbank.org/ IN -TPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1110315015165/wps4609_BeyondAid.pdf
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plans have been scaled back in African growth poles, reducing the demand for labour and in-creasing the ‘informalisation’ of the economy. There are also significant secondary effects in smaller neighbouring countries related to petty trade linkages and remittances. In this context, the increased vulnerability of migrants and the negative effects on the com-munities left behind – in terms of reduced dis-posable income – is palpable.From a global dialogue perspective, ACP coun-tries as a group should aim to be part of the overall response to the crisis by promoting re-gional dialogue and common positions, as to assure sustained flows of migrant economic capital to ACP regions.
Macroeconomic Importance of Remittances in ACP Countries For many countries and regions, remittances represent a very important source of foreign currency, and their importance to macroeco-nomic stability is shown by the share of remit-tances in the GDP (see Graph 4.2). Especially for small countries and island states, remittances correspond to a relatively large share of GDP, as follows: Tonga (37.7 per cent) and Samoa (25.8 per cent) in the Pacific; Lesotho (27.3 per cent), Togo (10.1 per cent), Senegal (9.8 per cent) and Cape Verde (9.0 per cent) in Sub-Saharan Africa; and Guyana (24 per cent), Haiti (18.7 per cent) and Jamaica (14.5 per cent) in the Caribbean are just the most remarkable examples of remittance-de-pendent economies. In the following sections a sub-regional anal-ysis of migrants’ remittances is presented, comparing remittances to Overseas Develop-ment Assistance (ODA).
Migrants’ Remittances in Western AfricaWhen calculated as a percentage of GDP, the importance of remittances to the economies of some countries in Western Africa is strik-ing, specifically in the cases of Sierra Leone, Cape Verde, Senegal, Togo and Guinea-Bissau. However, when compared to ODA in per capita terms, remittances become less important,
although it should be emphasised that re-mittances are direct household-to-household transfers and therefore have a stronger im-pact on recipient income than ODA. The low per capita figure for remittances can be explained by the fact that the entire sub-re-gion is highly dependent on ODA, while migra-tion is mainly a regional phenomenon. There-fore, remittances sent home are lower than if they were sent from a higher-wage country. There are, however, some noteworthy ex-ceptions such as Nigeria, where remittances per capita in 2007 topped US$62, compared to US$14 in ODA, and Senegal which received US$75 per capita in remittances, especially thanks to the diaspora in France, while receiv-ing US$68 in ODA. An interesting case of strong dependency on foreign sources of currency in the region is Cape Verde: in 2007, remittances accounted for US$262 per capita and ODA for US$308 per capita. In Togo, remittances total twice as much as ODA per capita (see Graph 4.3). The recent literature on the impact of remit-tances in the region reveals a general consen-sus that remittances reduce the headcount poverty index and reduce the level, depth and severity of poverty. Poverty is further reduced when international, as opposed to internal, remittances are considered.5 When looking at the impact of migrants’ economic capital on development, conclusions are less straightfor-ward. While remittances undoubtedly play an important role in human capital accumulation by educating young boys and girls and easing access to health services, thus creating condi-tions for long-term development, their use for income-generating investments and related multiplier effects seems to be rather limited. This is due to many factors, chiefly lack of trust in the intermediaries (often family members) that are to monitor the investments, diffused distrust in the local public administration, the absence of services and structures supporting and assisting the creation of small and medi-um-sized enterprises with migrant funding, and the migratory regimes currently in place which often hinder the back-and-forth mobil-
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ity of migrants who decide to invest in their home countries. This is particularly true for the European Union migration policies which have restrictive features that create strong disincentives for migrant workers to invest in their home countries.6
Collective Remittances: the Case of ‘Gidimaxa Jikké’ in Mali7
This example of Malians originating from the region of Kayes (mainly ethnic Soninke) living in France has been used often in the literature on remittances. The history of these organi-sations began with the 1973-1974 drought as a form of solidarity aid. Since the 1980s, the organisations in France started to pursue a philanthropic approach by supporting the con-struction of schools, hospitals and roads, en-deavouring to complement often-absent state support in deprived areas. Later, productive projects were put on the agenda, mainly for the improvement of the agricultural sector. It is estimated that the organisations of Malians in France are responsible for 60 per cent of the
infrastructure projects in the region of Kayes and for an investment of about €5 million per year [i.e. about 10 per cent of France’s annual development aid assistance to Mali].The groups in France collect the money, design the project and sometimes assist in the imple-mentation of the project by sending a mem-ber of the group to the village of origin. The socio-cultural dimension of these practices is quite peculiar. Non-monetary factors play an important role (the gift to the village commu-nity left behind, the status that the donation to the association in France can bestow upon the individual migrant, etc.) and the logic of saving is also characteristic of some sub-Saha-ran cultures which also use the informal saving systems (tontines) in France. Furthermore, im-migrant organisations reproduce the same so-cial structure and hierarchy of the village com-munity in Mali. The chief of the village in Mali has an equivalent counterpart chosen with the same criteria in the organisation in France. The ‘Gidimaxa Jikké’ association was created in 1988 and is comprised of 3,000 Malians origi-
Graph 4.2 - Selected ACP Countries Migrant Workers' Remittances as Percentage of GDP
Source: World Bank staff estimates based on the International Monetary Fund’s Balance of Payments Statistic Yearbook 2008.
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nating from the district of Aourou in the region of Kayes. Some 45,000 people live in Aourou in 24 villages which base their subsistence on the cultivation of cereals. The association has promoted projects in the areas of water (wells, dikes), health (vaccination campaigns, community health centres), literacy (motiva-tional courses to enable the local population to defi ne their needs and priorities and pos-sible projects, training courses for women, literacy courses), productive activities such as support for horticultural production (provision of seeds) and conservation of vegetables, and road infrastructure (small bridges for crossing rivers during the rainy season).
Workers’ Remittances in Southern Africa Are Greater than Development Aid Remittances to migrant-sending countries in Southern Africa have grown steadily over the past 40 years, despite being subject to the boom and bust cycles of regional economies. In the Southern Africa region, remittances are also more important than ODA, except for Na-mibia. In Lesotho, for each dollar spent for development assistance, people receive 3.5 dollars from relatives abroad. In South Africa, remittances and ODA per capita are almost
equal in amount, whereas Namibians receive 12 times more ODA than remittances (see graph 4.4).The recent SAMP survey shows important gen-der differences in this region. Women remit less than male migrants, as a consequence of their lower levels of income and employment security.8 The survey also shows that remit-tances play a vital role in supporting South-ern African households, and gender differ-ences have minimal impact on behaviour but do change remittance volumes, since women send less. Among the countries surveyed, Le-sotho’s female migrants in South Africa send more than female migrants from Zimbabwe, Mozambique or Swaziland. This probably re-fl ects higher earnings as domestic workers rather than as informal traders.9
Remittances in Central/Middle Africa Are Not Very ImportantIn the Central African region, remittance in-fl ows are negligible. Due to the low rates of in-ternational migration, remittances do not rep-resent an important source of revenue (US$4 per capita in 2007 for the Congo, US$9 for Cameroon, US$8 for Gabon, and US$13 for São Tomé and Príncipe). In contrast, ODA per capita
Graph 4.3 - Comparing Financial Flows in Western Africa
Source: own elaboration on UNDP HDR 2009 Dataset.
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in 2007 was US$228 for São Tomé and Príncipe, US$34 for the Congo, US$104 for Cameroon and US$36 for Gabon (see Graph 4.5).
Remittances in Eastern AfricaIn Eastern Africa, the potential impact of mi-grant transfers varies across the sub-region. Countries such as Mauritius and the Seychelles are very dependent on remittances, which are three to four times greater than ODA (see graph 4.6). The other country with higher re-mittances per capita compared to ODA is Ken-ya. An important initiative has developed there and is described in the following section.10
The Case of ‘Jijenge’ — Realise Your DreamThe Kenya-based Equity Building Society (EBS) has linked savings products to remittances. ‘Jijenge’ – Realise Your Dream – is a contrac-tual savings product targeting the remittances of Kenyan migrant workers. A part of their re-mittances is deposited in a saving account in order to build or purchase a house.EBS was founded in 1984, and is registered under the Building Society Act, Chapter 489 in Kenyan legislation. In 1994, EBS shifted its focus from mortgage fi nance to microfi nance. It began targeting the niche of small and medi-um entrepreneurs, salaried persons in both the formal and informal sectors, and small-scale commercial farmers that were not receiving services from mainstream fi nancial institu-tions. EBS currently serves as a distributor as
well as sender of remittances. Recently, EBS signed a sub-agency agreement with Western Union, allowing it to access Western Union’s money transfer services. As a result of the agreement, Kenyans will be able to access a worldwide network of 190 countries. EBS has also partnered with the International Finance Corporation (IFC) to support investment in a private sector project to encourage market de-velopment for photovoltaic energy. In Decem-ber 2004, the Equity Building Society became a full-fl edged commercial bank. Today, Equity is a public company that is 80.56 per cent owned by over 2,416 indigenous shareholders, 8.20 per cent by Britak Investment Company Lim-ited and 11.24 per cent by AFRICAP (consor-tium of international development investors, mainly the International Finance Corporation, the private sector arm of the World Bank, and the European Investment Bank). The largest volume of its remittance business is from Kenyans living in Europe and the United States who send money home mainly to save, invest or support their families. EBS is also involved in money transfers out of Kenya for clients that send money to support children studying abroad. EBS can route international remittances out of Kenya through Western Un-ion or through bank telex transfer (traditional wire transfer).A specifi c EBS product is of interest to this study: EBS has a contractual savings product, ‘Jijenge’ –which means Realise Your Dream
in Swahili, through which clients can save a fi xed amount over a pre-determined period of time. This product has been linked to remittances received. EBS clients include a number of Kenyans liv-ing overseas who have subscribed to this product. EBS also has an ordinary savings account which is where most remittance recipients save a portion of their remittanc-es. Eighty percent of remittance recipients retain a portion of their remittances in savings. The proc-ess involves depositing the money
Graph 4.4 - Comparing Financial Flows in Southern Africa
Source: own elaboration on UNDP HDR 2009 Dataset.
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Graph 4.5 - Comparing Financial Flows in Central/Middle Africa
Graph 4.6 - Comparing Financial Flows in Eastern Africa
Source: own elaboration on UNDP HDR 2009 Dataset.
Source: own elaboration on UNDP HDR 2009 Dataset.
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into the savings account and withdrawing sums at gradual intervals. Jijenge allows a customer to commit to save a specifi c amount of money within a certain period for a specifi c purpose, such as school fees or business expansion. Ac-cess to loans can be up to 90 per cent of the deposits at 1.25 per cent interest rates per month. The client, not EBS, determines both the amount and the timeframe. People fi nd this contractual savings very helpful in saving these small lump sums to use mainly for school fees, buying household items, electronic ap-pliances (in urban areas) and working tools or cattle (in rural areas).11
EBS also offers fi xed deposits that provide a premium interest-earning investment oppor-tunity and super junior investment accounts to invest in the future of dependants. It also pro-vides education loans, salary advances, medi-cal loans, business loans, farm input advances, and development loans for the acquisition of durable assets. EBS’s other services include a training program which equips clients with ba-sic business skills as well as bank and school fee cheques and Western Union money trans-
fers, remittance processing and inter-branch transfers.12
Caribbean Migrant Workers’ Remittances: an Important Source of RevenueRemittance fl ows sent home by Caribbean migrants have been widely documented. The data shows steady growth during the past for-ty years, especially in the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Haiti and Guyana. Compared to GDP, remittance shares vary from 24 per cent in Guyana and 18.7 per cent in Haiti to about 7 per cent in St. Kitts and Nevis and the Dominican Republic. Since 2008, the global fi nancial crisis has contributed to a sharp decline (a drop of 7 per cent-8 per cent), due to the high number of workers laid off in the main destination countries (especially the United States), pushing many of the house-holds left behind below the poverty line.13
In comparison to ODA, remittances represent a much more important source of foreign revenues for most Caribbean countries and households, in particular the poorest ones. In Guyana, remittances per capita were US$377
Graph 4.7 - Comparing Financial Flows in the Caribbean
Source: own elaboration on UNDP HDR 2009 Dataset.
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compared to US$178 in development aid per capita in 2007 (see Graph 4.7); similarly, for each development dollar received in Haiti, about two dollars arrive in the form of remit-tances.There are two important initiatives in this re-gion that support the utilisation of the addi-tional income made available by remittances for entrepreneurial activities. These are pre-sented in the following sections.
The Case of the Dominican Association for the Development of Women ‘ADOPEM’An important experience linking microfinance and remittances is that of the Dominican As-sociation for the Development of Women ‘ADOPEM’, an affiliate of the Women’s World Banking Network. ADOPEM is embarking on a strategy to integrate remittances into its cur-rent business lines in partnership with Quis-queyana (a money transfer operator). The institution is professionally managed, offers personalised services, utilises an internal credit methodology and has embraced tech-nology in its operations.In the spring of 2003 ADOPEM recently con-verted to a development bank, when it also acquired Banco de Desarrollo del Valle. By De-cember 2002, ADOPEM had extended a total of 36,700 credits, providing Dominican women credit for micro- and small businesses, as well as training, as a means to economic empower-ment and integration to the formal financial sector. ADOPEM also offers individual loans for business investment, working capital and housing, as well as savings products. A measur-able and reliable stream of remittances could help secure many of ADOPEM’s products and services, including those targeting families in extreme poverty and struggling businesses that lack collateral. Because ADOPEM’s capacity-building train-ing programs for management and vocational skills are well-known and well-attended by mi-crofinance professionals, this type of organisa-tion might be a promising partner for delivery of programs related to the productive use of remittances within the context of financial ed-
ucation. Their adoption of palm- or handheld devices for mobile credit portfolio manage-ment illustrates a readiness to take advantage of information technologies in their portfolio.ADOPEM’s vision is to further leverage remit-tances into micro-health insurance, planned savings, home improvement loans and other products.
The Case of the ‘Fonkoze’ Microcredit Service - Haiti’s Alternative Bank for the Organised PoorA New York-based microfinance institute, ‘Fonkoze - Fondasyon Kole Zepòl’ (which trans-lates as the Shoulder to Shoulder Foundation) has recently entered the remittance business together with a local money transfer opera-tor, ‘Rapid Transfè’. Fonkoze is Haiti’s largest microcredit organisation, with 15 offices in nine provinces of Haiti, offering microcredit and saving schemes built on the principle of solidarity. In 2004, the foundation organised a summit in Haiti with microcredit institutions from Asia and Africa to exchange experiences, and in 2005 staff visited the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and other similar programs to un-dergo intensive training. Today, it offers an international deposit service called ‘Ayiti Dirèk Dirèk’ –‘Direct to Haiti’ – for Haitians living in the United States, in partner-ship with the City National Bank of New Jersey, which is headed by a Haitian-born person. With the January 2010 earthquake, the transfer fee has been temporarily abolished (usually there is a US$10 flat rate for transfers under US$1000). The remitter can send money home by de-positing the money or the check in a special account that is then automatically deposited in the account in Haiti. Fonkoze’s remittance services are also used by home town associa-tions, churches and charity organisations. In ten years, the number of loan clients has in-creased from 110 to 31,090 and the saving ac-counts have increased from 193 to 94,342 and have transferred more than ten million dollars (US$ 7.3 million in 2004 alone). Borrowers are practically all women (99 per cent). Fonkoze in Haiti was conceived of by its cur-rent coordinator Reverend Joseph Philippe, to-
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gether with civil society leaders that emerged with the end of the military dictatorship. The idea of a bank for the poor was motivated by a Catholic ideal to empower people and provide education, health and seed money for small businesses. The literacy and business training programs developed by Fonkoze have also been adopted in Haiti by USAID and other NGOs. The success factors for this microcredit foun-dation involve the alliance with City National Bank of New Jersey, which has a Haitian-born chairman and thus accepted a lowering of the transfer fee and the engagement of a local Catholic priest who perceived the importance of linking microcredit with social and pro-poor programs, inspired by successful experiences such as the Grameen Bank.
In the Pacific Remittances Are an Important Source of Household Income and Support Macroeconomic StabilityData on remittances point to the importance of migration as a livelihood strategy in coun-tries with fragile ecosystems and small econ-omies, such as the Pacific Island Countries (PICs). In Tonga, workers’ remittances account for about 38 per cent of GDP and are around 26 per cent in Samoa. For every dollar of ODA received in Tonga and Samoa, three dollars of private transfers (remittances) are received (see Graph 4.8).In other countries such as the Solomon Islands, Fiji, Kiribati and Vanuatu, remittances are much less important than ODA, but as they are a direct transfer to households, remittances are often the only cash inflow families have. Due to the low rate of emigration from coun-tries like Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, remittances are negligible. The developmental impact of remittances in the PICs is debated,14 and more informa-tion about recent trends is needed to inform policy-makers.15 There are strong indications that migration represents an important liveli-hood strategy in a context where employment opportunities outside the public sector are minimal. However, little is known beyond the use of migration as a safety-valve in response
to pressing employment issues. Remittances have undoubtedly stimulated construction and services and spurred consumption, and hence inflation, but given the economic and trade structure of these economies there is still wide scope for policy intervention to inte-grate mobility as a development factor. These interventions can focus especially on ensuring that remittances will not decay and instead be sustained by ageing migrants able to find opportunities for return.There are also important differences in the PICs when looking at remittances. For exam-ple, in the Fiji Islands, remittances between Indo-Fijian families are minimal since they tend to perceive migration as a permanent resettlement due to persistent discrimination, whereas indigenous Fijian families are more dependent on remittances since they perceive migration as a temporary project.16
migrant human Capital: The Brain drain and the Brain gainIn analysing remittances, the flow of economic capital accumulated by migrants is almost uni-directional: from abroad to the community of origin, often with a positive impact on devel-opment and poverty alleviation. In the case of migrant human capital, the flow generally goes in the opposite direction: from the migrant country of origin to the destination country, often with negative development impacts at home in terms of the depletion of human re-sources. This is referred to as brain drain. However, migrant human capital can also flow in the opposite direction in case of re-turn, whether permanent or temporary; this is called brain gain. Yet migrant returns are not only statistically rather insignificant but there are very few studies on their impact, thus lim-iting efforts to demonstrate a rebalancing flow of knowledge, skills and technologies acquired abroad and transferred back home. The utilisation of migrant human capital for the development of the home country thus re-mains a largely unexplored research field, and its positive impact is based on the assumption that, upon return, migrants automatically find
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ways to deploy the skills and knowledge ac-quired before and during the migration. A key question for policy makers in ACP countries is whether, given the lack of empirical analysis regarding the impact of return migration, at least creating the conditions for utilisation of returnees’ skills and knowledge is a policy goal to be addressed in the medium-term.
Migration, Brain Drain and Human DevelopmentIn the approach used in this report, the op-portunity for a nurse, an engineer or a medical doctor to migrate from a poor African country to another country where he or she can fi nd a job matching expectations represents a very important aspect of the individual freedom to pursue a life worth living. However, we stated from the onset that the exercise of individual freedoms should not limit the freedoms of others. For example, if the migration of the nurse, engineer or medical doctor from an ACP country implies that the hospitals at home cannot deliver proper health services or that roads cannot be built, then their actions jeop-ardise the human development of others. The stories that there are more Malawian doctors in Manchester, Britain than in all of Malawi and
more physicians from São Tomé and Príncipe in Portugal than at home are unfortunately true,and does not help to reduce maternal and infant mortality rates in these African countries.To regulate this situ-ation and ensure the happiness of both those that want to migrate and those that stay is the realm of public pol-icy that links migration with development, and which has been quite absent in many devel-oping countries to date. This absence is justifi ed by the predominant way
of thinking, strongly rooted in an approach that treated (and sometimes institutionalised) skilled migrants as an export commodity in ex-change for the fl ow of remittances into the country. Early debates on brain drain highlighted gov-ernment investment of substantial portions of the national budget – and development aid – to train nurses, engineers and medical doctors and the economic loss for the state when they leave the country. This would also happen in countries where skilled migration is highly institutionalised and regulated; indeed, countries with a strong tradition of sending professionals abroad are still suffering from fragile health and education sectors. In con-trast to this pessimistic approach, the more recent and optimistic new brain drain litera-ture has highlighted that there are usually sig-nifi cant infl ows of remittances to the country following this skilled migration, and also that this type of migration increases the expected return from education, which may convince youngsters to enrol in universities. This debate on the positive or negative aspects of skilled migration on the country’s welfare has been quite animated in the past decade,
Graph 4.8 - Comparing Financial Flows in the Pacifi c Region
Source: own elaboration on UNDP HDR 2009 Dataset.
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with positions ranging from one extreme to the other. A recent World Bank publication has empirically tested some of the underlying as-sumptions of the new brain drain literature and has concluded that the impact of skilled migration on welfare and growth of the home country is likely to be smaller and the likeli-hood of a negative impact significantly great-er than reported in the literature. The study concluded that the early brain drain literature was close to the mark.17
These conclusions are exemplified by the fol-lowing four arguments: 1) those that migrate are usually individuals with greater ability and those that stay generally have less ability; 2) most migration from developing countries is unskilled, indicating that education is not the road to migration; 3) the road to skilled migra-tion through education is full of uncertainties (educational success, migration policies of host countries, family ability to keep paying for education, etc.); 4) additional resources spent on education imply greater public and private spending, fewer taxes (students usu-ally work little or not at all) and less income for the households which generate negative externalities with possible negative impacts on welfare. Brain drain is a significant loss for developing countries, which can hardly be compensated for by increased overseas de-velopment aid investment in social sectors. Furthermore, considering that this migration is usually from the Global South to the Global North, policy implications are important both for ACP countries and for the coherence of Global North development policies.The following sections provide an overview of skilled migration from ACP regions and sub-regions.
Brain Drain in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Haemorrhage of Health ProfessionalsFew existing datasets cover both countries of departure and destination. Usually they only cover physicians, or do not clearly define coun-tries of origin, while other analyses are based on country surveys and anecdotal evidence. In the Statistical Annex, we reported an exhaus-
tive table on ACP African-born physicians and professional nurses living and working in de-veloped countries.18
About 40 per cent of migrants from Cameroon and Chad are university-educated, and as mentioned earlier, there are more physicians from São Tomé and Príncipe in Portugal than in São Tomé and Príncipe (96 in Portugal ver-sus 63 in the home country). The same is true for the number of physicians from Equatorial Guinea in Spain (47 in the home country and 76 in Spain), indicating that health sector pro-fessional migration is considerable from some countries. Gabon, on the contrary, has only 6 per cent of its nurses and 15 per cent of its physicians abroad, mainly in France.19
In Western Africa, migration of highly edu-cated people is particularly high for Nigeria (more than half of migrants living in the OECD countries have a university degree), Togo, and Benin (35 and 42 per cent, respectively). About 80 per cent of migrants that moved to an OECD country have a high school diploma or university degree. The selective migration policies of OECD countries are an important determinant of this phenomenon, as well as the attractiveness of potential incomes in OECD countries for skilled migrant workers. There are large variations in the statistics on health care workforces across the Western Af-rica region: Niger, Mauritania, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea have a tiny physician and nurse diaspora. Nigeria’s proportion of health care workers abroad is also small, although it is quite substantial in absolute terms: about 5,000 physicians and 13,000 nurses live and work abroad.20 The size of Western Africa’s health professional diaspora relative to the domestic workforce is also extreme. There are approximately two physicians from Equatori-al Guinea, Guinea Bissau and Liberia abroad for each one working in the domestic health sector. For every Gambian professional nurse working in the Gambia, about two are living in a developed country overseas; while for every Liberian nurse working at home, four work in a developed country abroad. A review of mi-gration trends in 10 African countries reports
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that 69 per cent of doctors trained in Ghana between 1995 and 2002 left the country, while estimates of vacancy levels in the Ghanaian Ministry of Health exceed 65 per cent for doc-tors and nurses.21 This also raises the question of whether the Ministry of Health would have had the resources to fill the vacancies.For countries such as Zambia, Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, a very critical brain drain has been experienced in the health and education sectors, especially during the last decade. In some university faculties in Botswana and Namibia, the percentage of Zambian lectur-ers leaving the country was as high as 40 per cent to 50 per cent per cent of the staff, while the number of secondary and primary school teachers is also increasing. The exodus of med-ical personnel is very similar to that of univer-sity lecturers. The main causes of this are the poor working conditions in Zambian hospitals as well as the mass sacking of medical doctors in 2000 during the Chiluba regime.22 This same situation occurred in Uganda under Idi Amin, when the most significant emigration flow of professional migrants took place. As with most skilled migrants in the region, many Ugandan migrants were mainly attracted to Botswana and South Africa, even during apartheid.23 De-spite measures taken to stem the flow, migra-tion of nurses and midwives continues towards Anglophone countries. For example, there are only 12 physicians per 100,000 inhabitants in Zambia, which is lower than the least developed country average of 18 per 100,000. New health graduates in Zam-bia number only seven per 100,000 inhabit-ants, which is the eighth lowest rate in Africa and the world.24
In the Caribbean, brain drain is worrisome especially for the health sector. The propor-tion of high school and university graduates moving out of the countries is significant, with figures well above 60 per cent-70 per cent, and as high as 75 per cent in Trinidad and To-bago, the Bahamas and Suriname. As in the case of other ACP countries and regions, this mobility is having particularly
negative effects on the health sector. A re-cent World Bank report on the nurse labour market and education in the Anglophone CAR-ICOM countries estimated that the number of trained nurses working abroad was roughly three times the number working in the An-glophone CARICOM nations.25 Although there seems to be less emigration of nurses than in the past, the current level of graduates is about 10.5 per cent, as a result of measures taken to attract nurses from abroad. With the current attrition rate of 8 per cent (mainly due to emigration), the local demand for nurses cannot be met.26 Given these trends and current policies it is anticipated that the gap between the demand for and the supply of nurses will widen from 3,400 nurses today to 10,700 nurses in 2025.27
Agreements that support the free movement of skilled workers, such as the General Agree-ment on Trade and Services (GATS) and the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) provide the framework for Caribbean nurses to migrate. For example, nurses holding a CARICOM license can practise their profession in virtually any member state they desire, and are even recognised for registering with the Nursing Council in the United Kingdom.28 There is a lack of complete datasets on Carib-bean health care workforce migration. A 2007 study29 using various sources indicates that about 3,000 nursing positions were vacant in the region in 2003, while approximately 1,199 nurses were trained during the years from 2001 to 2003; of these, over 900 left during that same period, leaving only 299 nurses avail-able to fill the vacancies. The vacancy rate for nurses in the region remains high at 42.4 per cent.30
In addition to the fiscal loss, Caribbean coun-tries also lack an adequate nursing staff for ensuring the delivery of quality health care. Countries with the highest ratio of nurses, such as the United States, the UK, Spain and Canada are recruiting nurses from Jamaica, where the ratio is only 17 nurses per 10,000 inhabitants, the Dominican Republic (18 per 10,000), and Guyana (23 nurses per 10,000 in-
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habitants). In Jamaica, 58 per cent of nursing positions were vacant in 2003. Between 2003 and 2008, a total of 2,830 nurses should have been trained to meet the projected demand. However, only 2,055 nurses were expected to graduate in 2008, leaving 19 per cent of posts vacant.31 Furthermore, the number of vacancies published is usually defined by the funding available at the ministry level and therefore underestimates actual need. None-theless, filling these positions would not stop the more experienced and highly trained nurs-es from leaving the country. Some losses were mitigated in Jamaica by recruiting around 650 skilled nurses from the Caribbean (Cuba and Guyana) as well as from outside the region (In-dia, Ghana, Burma, Russia, and Nigeria) during the 1999-2005 period, leaving those countries with their own shortages.32
Forecasts concerning demand for nurses in the United States and Canada are also alarming. In the United States alone there will be a short-age of over 808,416 nurses by the year 2020.33 Given the current training capacity in the US, this will imply a massive need to recruit from abroad and hence ease regulations, which in turn may jeopardise the efforts of ACP govern-ments to manage migration, increase training capacity and retain nurses. Canada also will face a nurse shortage of 78,000 nurses in 2011 and 113,000 by 2016.34
In the ACP Pacific countries, brain drain is widespread… In the Pacific Island Countries, the median mi-gration rate among holders of upper second-ary and tertiary education diplomas is 59 per cent. Brain drain35 is of particular concern to small states because of the limited opportuni-ties offered by their minute economies. There has been scant research on skilled migra-tion in the Pacific. A recent study on migration determinants and the return of high academic performers from two PICs included in the ACP Group of States (Tonga and PNG) shows that the main professions of Tonga’s skilled migrants are medical doctors and nurses (19 per cent), teachers (10 per cent), bankers and account-
ants (10 per cent). PNG’s migrants working overseas have similar occupations: IT, account-ing, law, academia, engineering, and nursing. The main destinations of skilled migrants from the Pacific are New Zealand, the United States, Australia and Fiji, with some scattered across Japan, China, the Solomon Islands, and Laos.36 Migration by health workers is greatest in Fiji, Samoa and Tonga, where more than half of the country’s nurses were working abroad in 2000.37
…and policies are needed to counter the negative effects. The government of Fiji, for example, could eliminate the policy that forces returned migrants that re-enter pub-lic service – such as teachers and nurses – to have to start again at the bottom of the career and salary ladder, at the same level as new graduates. This policy also neglects important skills that have been acquired abroad and that should be taken into account in the career and salary schemes as a mechanism to attract skilled migrants back home.38
Review of Policy Implications in Health Care Workers’ MigrationIn this section we will focus in particular on the policy regarding brain drain in the health care sector. The migration of health care workers has spurred an intense debate among policy makers, international organisations and practitioners.In 2006, the World Health Organisation esti-mated a global shortage of 4.3 million health workers.39 Migration management in this area attempts to reconcile two human rights: the right to access to health services for those that stay behind and the right to freedom of movement for those that want to leave. Many suggestions have been put forward and in this section we present some of the most salient recommendations. Although their practical implementation has been and can be difficult due to conflicting political priorities and po-litical opportunism in source and destination countries, the increasing demand from the Global North for health care workers requires
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reconsideration of the options available. The key underlying message is that there is an ur-gent need for measures that slow down or put a halt to the exodus of skilled workers.40 Three main areas for policy interventions are identi-fied. These are not mutually exclusive and, in fact, should be pursued in parallel: 1) Increase health care workers’ training ca-pacity by engaging the governments of the host countries (where skilled migrants work) to invest in education priorities in the source country, sending experts or funding projects in a manner proportional to the net benefits received from skilled migration.2) Manage migration by engaging migrant sending and receiving countries in institu-tionalising temporary migration schemes for skilled migrants, and by strengthening policy coherence in the overseas development assist-ance for the health sector. Furthermore, this area of migration management should support the achievement of self-sufficiency in the Glo-bal North as a way to reduce the demand for health care staff from the Global South.3) Strengthen national retention policies by engaging ACP Governments and international development agencies to improve the work-ing conditions of the sector. The health care shortage due to migration is only the tip of the iceberg. African-born doctors and nurses working in Organisation for Economic Co-oper-ation and Development (OECD) countries ac-count for less than 12 per cent of the total estimated shortages in Africa. Furthermore, statistics about the African-born doctors in the OECD hide the fact that many have obtained their degree in an OECD country. In the first area, the issue of pre-service train-ing is central to increasing the number of health care workers. However, there are both institutional and physical infrastructure con-straints on this in most (though not all) ACP countries and therefore this represents an im-portant but longer-term strategy. In the Anglo-phone Caribbean the issue has to do less with clinical opportunities for training and more with the insufficient number of nurse tutors. To ease these constraints, there is a need for
funds with which to finance infrastructure, as well as creative strategies to improve the training system. For example, the lack of nurse tutors can be supplied by the major ACP nurse-importing countries, also tapping re-sources among the health care diasporas. This measure can also take advantage of another important – yet often overlooked – resource in technical assistance intervention: social capi-tal among peers. In the shorter term, policies should also consider establishing shorter train-ing programmes while shifting tasks from long-er-term to shorter-term graduates. This policy would also produce a workforce that better reflects the health needs of the population by training middle-level health workers such as clinical officers, assistant medical officers, midwives, surgical technicians and physician assistants, instead of physicians. In the second area, migration management is a responsibility of both source and destination countries. Source countries should not limit the mobility of people with skills, just as des-tination countries should enable them to move more freely back and forth in order to ensure that ties with the home country are main-tained. Migration management in the health sector has been flooded with criticism because of the double standard in both source and des-tination countries. Investments in health sec-tor development by bilateral development agencies are jeopardised by the aggressive recruitment policies of health care staff from the same countries. Policies should include such actions as negotiating reduced recruit-ment by higher-income countries and a better enforcement of code of conducts. Source gov-ernments have been criticised for their lack of policies aimed at retaining health care work-ers despite the crisis, and instead focusing on remittances. A third block of policy responses to the brain drain involves retention policies, made up of sanctions and promotional aspects. Sanctions might include the request of monetary com-pensation from departing health care profes-sionals, bonding new graduates to work in rural locations for a fixed term, or the per-
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formance of periods of compulsory service as a compensating mechanism for the State. However, without prospects for staying and a functional sector, many of these health care workers will depart as soon as the conditional, “punitive” period is over. Promotional meas-ures are more difficult to design, since they are linked to more general issues of working environment, salaries, incentives, and motiva-tion, as well as the opportunity for professional growth by training abroad and the like. These require significant financial resources that the government budgets of many ACP countries do not have. Development donors should fo-cus on the health sector and the brain drain, also including results-oriented indicators that show efforts to stop the exodus of health care workers. Generally speaking, given the global dimen-sion of this challenge, individual efforts by countries are probably doomed to fail. A re-gional approach is needed to pursue these only apparently conflicting goals of stemming the
exodus and promoting diasporic linkages. The monitoring of the health care labour market and migration should be included as a task for all Ministries of Labour in ACP countries and for regional organisations that include mobility management in their mandate, and appropri-ate resources should be allocated to provide timely responses to threatening trends.
Migrant Social Capital: Transnational Practices as Development ToolsThe importance of social capital formation for economic development and poverty allevia-tion has been demonstrated in the extensive literature on the subject.41 Social capital is important for development be-cause, by facilitating ties and networks within and between communities, it increases the cir-culation of knowledge and hence reduces mar-ket failures. Further, it improves knowledge about people’s behaviour and thus controls free-riding and opportunist behaviours. Social capital also improves information flows. Social capital is a precondition for develop-ment and it would be erroneous to try to cre-ate it when does not exist; of course, it would be equally wrong to not try to reinforce it when is already present. Since social capital involves interactions and information, in the analysis of the linkages between migration and development any measure that reduces obsta-cles to mobility and communication between migrants and their hometowns is positive for development. Transnational migration studies42 have high-lighted the importance of migrant networks and ties not only for the purpose of facilitating of the migration project, social inclusion and earnings of the migrant in the host society,43
but have also demonstrated the importance of social capital for the socio-economic develop-ment of the place of origin through migrant engagement in the creation of hometown as-sociations and social and commercial enter-prises.44 Migrant social capital is about ties and information and since it helps to reduce information asymmetries, it represents an ad-vantage compared to non-migrant investors.
Box 4.2 - Task-Shifting from Highly Skilled Health Workers to Less Skilled Health Workers
Countries like Brazil, Ethiopia and Paki-stan implementing successful models of task shifting are reaping improvements in the health status of their popula-tions. For example, the government of Pakistan created the Lady Health Work-er cadre in 1994. By 2005, there were 100,000 trained female community health workers providing essential pri-mary healthcare services in the commu-nity. Evaluation found that the popula-tion served by Lady Health Workers had substantially better health indicators than the control population.
Source: World Bank 2009b, op. cit.
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When social capital is thin, there is a high likelihood that other migrant forms of capital will fall into a vacuum. Social capital is the glue that keeps the other capitals together. Including migrant social capital formation in the analysis of migration corridors can help to achieve a deeper understanding of the mobili-ty-development nexus. Migrant engagement can take various forms: the consumption of homeland foods, sending remittances, frequent calls and internet con-nections with relatives back home, investment in small businesses, and the creation of home-town associations and development NGOs to materially support the community of origin. Hometown associations in particular play the double role of strengthening ties back home and fostering a sense of community for the newly-arrived migrants.45 Hometown associa-tions thus nurture the formation of collective social capital that can also be mobilised for the development of the communities in the homeland. The number of hometown associations per migrant is an important indicator of social capital within the diaspora. Among Sub-Sa-haran African diasporas, the participation of migrants in hometown associations can vary, depending upon the place of residence. In the United States, 16 per cent of Nigerians par-ticipate in a hometown association, compared to 15 per cent of Ghanaians. However, the fig-ure for Ghanaians is relatively higher among migrants living in European countries: 28 per cent of Ghanaian migrants in the United King-dom and 37 per cent in Germany are members of a hometown association.46 There are few studies on membership and participation of ACP migrants in migrant associations in other ACP countries. However, the mere existence of many of these associations in ACP countries indicates that social capital formation is not primarily dependent on income. Although it is difficult to determine the single factor that increases the active participation of migrants in hometown associations, there are also indications that migrants who have lived abroad longer, are more educated and enjoy
legal status tend to have stronger engagement in the development of the home country.47 A quite unexplored dimension of social capital is migrant women participation to hometown associations. Migrant women’s social capital is often limited by isolation, exclusion from im-portant positions in diaspora associations and therefore decision-making processes. Some women have thus organised their own diaspo-ra groups, such as the Pan-African NGO Akina Mama wa Afrika (Swahili for ‘Solidarity among African Women’), which has a Head Office in Kampala and a UK/Europe sub-regional office in London.48 Whereas some are more compelled by social norms and values and therefore main-tain close links to the communities back home, mobility can in fact enhance women’s role in the community: for example, women are per-ceived in Samoa and Tonga as more reliable in terms of sending remittances and maintaining family obligations.49
Social Capital Formation and MigrationThis section of the report will focus on how social capital created abroad and at home fosters transnational engagement for develop-ment. Within ACP countries, given the diver-sity and variety of the group, migrant devel-opment associations in the diaspora present important sub-regional and country-level va-rieties. Almost every diaspora has developed multiple hometown associations and devel-opment NGOs; their total number remains unknown and any attempt to catalogue them would result in an unrepresentative inventory. It is not the aim of this report to list a direc-tory of good experiences in the transnational engagement of diasporas. These are already widely documented, and it is in any case likely that any such attempt would not be able to cover the extent of all interesting experiences and innovative experiences in ACP countries. Instead, this report will focus on the overall common trends across the ACP countries and will highlight common problems and potenti-alities for investing in this sector.We grouped transnational engagement into three sectors: the ACP diasporas in the Glo-
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bal North, the ACP diaspora in another ACP country and an elite diaspora. The first type of hometown associations and development NGOs originating from ACP diasporas living in the Global North is comprised of groups work-ing to provide welfare support and assistance to vulnerable groups, and to provide technical assistance for improving farming, water and sanitation, renewable energy, health services and microcredit. These groups are made up of volunteer and semi-professional NGOs that benefit from a renewed interest by bilateral development agencies to foster migrants’ en-gagement with their home countries and even-tually facilitate voluntary return. A second important group is comprised of as-sociations of migrants moving from one ACP country to another (South-South migration). These groups have fewer resources compared to the diaspora in the Global North. They mainly provide welfare assistance to families and communities back home in the form of support for funerals, weddings, etc., as well as support to newly-arrived migrants through meetings, festivals and social events that fa-cilitate encounters and networks. Although migrant social capital is equally strong, their impact on home country development is likely to be constrained by lack of resources. This is a particularly unexplored research area, but one which is nonetheless relevant in the light of the findings of this report, highlighting the need for policies addressing South-South mo-bility and its development linkages. There is also a third type of migrant diaspora that is comprised of networks of highly-skilled migrants using the internet and social net-works to stimulate policy debates and intro-duce technological solutions to development and business problems in the home countries. This diaspora is providing advice to policy makers, stimulating debates on reforms and introducing technological innovation and busi-ness ventures. This is a particularly vibrant group, one that can have a stronger impact on the home country development, and that is supported by important initiatives of regional and international organisations.50 The focus of
these initiatives is not the return of the high-ly-skilled migrants but the utilisation of their knowledge to improve development policies.51 In the following sections, each of these three types of migrant transnational formation is discussed.
North-South Social Capital Flows An articulated, engaged, and well-structured diaspora in many European Union countries and the United States is the one from Ghana. It has been selected as an example because it presents various types of philanthropic and business engagement and a variety of local dy-namics. The Ghana Union in the United King-dom includes 50 Ghanaian groups; the Council of Ghana Nationals Associations in Italy acts as a large umbrella organisation; and the Union of Ghanaian Organisations in Germany has a membership of 21 local associations.52 In the United States, there is a Council of Ghana Na-tionals only in Chicago, with 12 organisations. They all provide access to information, serv-ices and cultural activities that help newly-arrived migrants to settle in the new country, and many of them engage in philanthropic and business ventures with Ghana. However, the transnational engagement of migrants in support of home country devel-opment is not necessarily channelled through these formal organisations. They are often considered too bureaucratic, hierarchical, and unprepared to engage with development challenges. It happens quite often that Gha-naian migrants organise their own small NGOs and prefer to engage directly in development initiatives outside the formal Unions of Gha-naians abroad. These initiatives back home are negotiated with trusted local leaders and are more informal. Scholars also demonstrate that, probably because of this informality, these initiatives are more effective.53 Remain-ing small, these projects tend to rely on the social capital created over time with the local communities, and tend to avoid conflicts with local interest groups that may have different ideas about development priorities. Another interesting characteristic of the Gha-
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naian diaspora is that the engagement of the hometown association is not necessarily con-fined to intervention in the village of origin. The Ghanaian transnational social entrepre-neurs’ decision to invest is not necessarily based on ties with the home community, but rather on the likelihood of success and devel-opment priorities. GhanaCoop (an Italy-based Ghanaian migrant cooperative importing pine-apples from Ghana) invests part of the profit into a social venture in a very poor village (Gomoa Simbrofo) in which the cooperative members in Italy do not have ancestral linkag-es. Their social engagement shows a national perspective on development that is still lack-ing in many other hometown and development associations. The promoters of these projects claim that easing travel formalities, improving access to small grants, reducing administra-tive burdens in the management of external funds, strengthening the project management capacity of those groups back home that deal with the daily activities, improving transpar-ency and fighting corruption at local level, would significantly increase the likelihood of success of their projects. The engagement of Ghanaian migrants is just one of many examples of hometown associa-tions and development NGOs of the ACP di-asporas based in the Global North countries. Their needs and difficulties can be widely gen-eralised to other diaspora groups.
South-South Social Capital FlowsSouth-South migration should lead to similar transnational engagement for the develop-ment of the home country. However, this is an unexplored research area, probably because South-South migration is a rather under-fund-ed research area in many ACP countries and because developing countries do not prioritise diaspora in their development policies.Nevertheless, despite the limited knowledge of social capital flows between Southern countries and their utilisation for development, there are noteworthy experiences that may indicate potential avenues for South-South cooperation in the field of migration and development.
Social capital in Zimbabwe is particularly well developed, especially among Mozambican refugees that fled from the civil war in the 1980s. They have maintained linkages to home areas in Mozambique, reinforcing existing so-cial networks and economic transactions, and also helped the new waves of migrants fleeing from the economic crisis in Zimbabwe to ob-tain shelter and jobs. There is transnational engagement of Zim-babwean migrants. For example, the Zim-babwean migrant community in South Africa presents well-established and organised burial societies that provide collective support to the communities back home. This could be de-fined as nucleus of hometown associations.54 The potential role of Zimbabwean social capi-tal in South Africa is also highlighted in the UNDP Zimbabwe Report. According to that re-port, hometown associations can be created in the area where workers are recruited (namely Masvingo and Matabeleland South) through the Beitbridge Border Initiative for processing temporary work permits for farm workers in South Africa.55
Cameroonian migrants in South Africa also have a complex and structured social organisation. The Cameroon North Westerners Association (CANOWACAT) holds fortnightly meetings in the industrial suburb of Cape Town called Salt River. The association includes not only north-west Cameroonian migrants but has attracted both Anglophone and Francophone groups.56 It aims to provide welfare support to the needy and raise collective donations for burials. The relevance of this example lies in the fact that Cameroonian migrants from the northwest region are well organised all over the world, especially in the United Kingdom and the Unit-ed States and are engaged in many types of philanthropic work with the home country. Yet there is very little research on the social capi-tal formation and transnational engagement of Cameroonians in South Africa, whereas the presence and structure of the CANOWACAT in-dicates a potential avenue to be explored by development practitioners and the ACP Secre-tariat’s Migration Observatory.
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In Sub-Saharan Africa, there are many other examples of diaspora groups formed as a re-sult of South-South migration. The ‘Haut Con-seil des Guineens en Côte d’Ivoire (Higher Council of Guineans in Côte d’Ivoire) organ-ised transportation for thousands of workers in Côte d’Ivoire following the political crisis in 2002. Other groups include the ‘Association des Femmes du Mali et de la Gambie à Bengha-zi’ (Women Association of Mali and the Gambia in Benghazi, Libya), the numerous associations of Malians migrants in Côte d’Ivoire such as ‘La Coordination des Amicales Maliennes de Côte Ivoire’, the ‘Coordination des Associations Maliennes de Côte Ivoire’, the ‘Union des Res-sortissants Maliens en Côte Ivoire’, the ‘Con-seil de la Jeunesse Malienne de Côte Ivoire’ and the ‘Association des Cadres Maliens de Côte Ivoire’, to mention just a few. In South Africa we also find active Nigerian voluntary associations such as Durban Nigerian Associa-tion which is the umbrella association that accommodates all the different ethnic based associations such as the Igbo Cultural Asso-ciation, Yoruba Cultural Association, Hausa-Fulani Associations that support projects and communities in Nigeria both materially and financially. The Durban Nigerian Association is linked to the Union of Nigerian Friends and the People’s Club of Nigeria which work at the national and international levels.57 Nigerian migrants are also active in Ghana where they formed the ethnic-based Edo Association and the national Association of Nigerian Women both involved in supporting the integration of newly-arrived Nigerian migrants, needy family and women, and providing legal support to mi-grants.58 Migrant social capital reinforces the social protection mechanisms of migrants.59
South-South transnational engagement is also frequent in the Caribbean, especially among the Haitian diaspora organisations in the Do-minican Republic. Groups such as the ‘Mov-imiento Sociocultural para los Trabajadores Haitianos’ (MOSCTHA) that brings relief to Hai-tian workers in the Dominican Republic sugar cane bateyes, and the ‘Movimiento de Mujeres Dominico-Haitianas’ (MUDHA) which fights for
the women’s rights of Haitian descendents, are now also involved in supporting communities in Haiti affected by the January 2010 earthquake. MOSCTHA and other more Haitian worker-based organisations have worked in Haiti for several years (including with legal registration there) whereas those organizations working more with the descendents of migrants in the Dominican Republic (such as MUDHA) tend to intervene more irregularly in Haiti at times of natural disasters, as happened after the Mapou//Ji-maní flooding debacle in 2004 and now again after the earthquake.60 These migrant support organisations have very strong linkages with the communities in Haiti and hence could play a double role of minority rights advocates and protectors in the Dominican Republic, as well as development agents for Haiti.
Elite Migrant Social Capital and ICTThe third type of migrant social capital in-volves the diaspora’s formal and informal networks of professionals which contribute to policy debate and development strategies back home, as well as technology transfers, largely using information and communication technologies (ICT) and social networks. Lead-ing diasporas in this field are the Indian and the Chinese who also have substantial investments back home in high-tech sectors. The diaspora policies of ACP countries should explore their experience. An important initiative for Africa is UNIFEM’s Digital Diaspora Initiative, aiming to support the economic empowerment of African wom-en through ICT capacity building, using the expertise available among African ICT entre-preneurs.61 The project also aims to provide possibilities in the ITC sector for African en-trepreneurs in the diaspora to participate in socially responsible projects while securing better livelihoods for women through ICT ca-pacity building and access to financing. Databases of diaspora ICT experts are also be-ing used by development agencies, as in the case of USAID’s Diaspora Skills Transfer Pro-gram for Southern Sudan, to promote collab-oration between the diaspora and the home
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country in development projects in health and education.62 This program uses the Sudanese North American Diaspora Database (SNADD) as one way of recruiting volunteer profession-als to address critical human resource short-ages in the areas of health and education. A similar initiative is the World Bank African Di-aspora Program which is launching a Database of Professional Skills in the African Diaspora,63 which will initially be used by the World Bank Task Team Leaders to identify individuals and firms that can successfully contribute to World Bank-supported projects in Africa. The data-base will also aim to assist the African Union and other development partners, in their ef-forts to effectively utilise the skills of the Afri-can diaspora to address Africa’s development challenges and priorities. Diasporas organisations such Afford UK are in-creasingly taking advantage of advancements in ICT and testing new forms of interaction that facilitate discussions on development projects, welfare assistance initiatives in the home country and business opportunities.64 Within these virtual spaces, experts in the di-aspora provide advice to home country policy makers and create discussion groups, blogs and web casts for facilitating participation in the formulation of development policies, forging research partnerships, creating tele-work op-portunities, marketing products in the home country, sharing information on investment op-portunities, engaging in operations for natural and man-made disaster relief, and encouraging stronger participation of home country citizens in the demand for governance. The diasporas are already tapping into the endless applica-tions of ICT for development, motivated by philanthropic as well as market interests.65 These motivations could be further leveraged for enhancing the developmental impact of mi-grant social capital in the home country.
migrant Cultural Capital: Tangible and Intangible Factors Shaping DevelopmentIn addition to remittances, information and knowledge, there is another important mi-grant resource that is largely untapped: mi-
grant cultural capital, including shared norms and values as well as artistic talents and ex-pressions that are utilised and mobilised by the diasporas. Due to the weaknesses inherent to cultural policy in many ACP countries and a feeble institutional setting to protect intellectual property, artistic talents and those connected to the creative industries’ ‘value-chain’ are easily attracted overseas to seek recognition and income. They become ‘unofficial’ cultural ambassadors of their country, yet this contri-bution has somehow gone unnoticed by policy makers and migration scholars. Migrants pro-mote markets for the cultural industry, in the broadest sense: from the arts to tourism and from clothing to gastronomy, inasmuch as they are prime consumers of these goods and serv-ices. This is an area of mobility which should be further investigated, given that artists andcultural promoters often benefit from looser mobility schemes and that the economic prof-itability of cultural industries increasingly relies on their capacities to reach out extra-territorial markets.
Creative Industries as Engines of Development Exports by creative industries66 are a fast-growing global market of US$335.5 billion (in 2005), equivalent to 3.2 per cent of world trade in merchandise goods, to which another – and widely underreported – US$89 billion in creative-industries services exports should be added.67 Their contribution to GDP is about 3 per cent in France and the United States and 6 per cent in the United Kingdom.68 Exports of creative goods by developing coun-tries accounted for US$136 billion in 2005 (mainly due to production and trade of crea-tive goods in China, which comprises about half of all exports from developing countries). The ACP Group’s share in world markets remains extremely small, although it is growing fast: exports of creative goods increased from US$20 million in 1995 to US$1.4 billion in 2005.69
In 2005, the Africa Union’s “Nairobi Plan of Action for Cultural Industries in Africa” iden-tified a wide range of challenges and weak-
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nesses faced by the African cultural industries. The importance of connecting the continent with regional and global markets is one of the main priorities. Cultural productions abound, although mainly by microenterprises which lack capital and connections. Information and communication technologies are providing im-portant opportunities, but only large groups can afford to scale up production. The Afri-can Union’s instructions to Members States for boosting the industry include recommenda-tions to support artists and their associations in establishing networks in the region to inte-grate diasporas and link up with large global networks.70 The Declaration thus recognises the role of diasporas in promoting African cultural her-itage and creativity, yet there is very little knowledge about its reverse linkages with de-velopment or about the economic and social investments of the cultural diasporas in the home-grown cultural industry. This is an im-portant area to be further researched, with coordination between the ACP Observatory on Migration and the ACP Observatory on Cul-ture, as well as with other ongoing research projects71 in this fi eld, including the Observa-tory of Cultural Policies in Africa.72
Creative Industries and Diaspora LinkagesMigrants are consumers, promoters and pro-ducers of home country cultural goods. The markets for goods from creative industries –
including nostalgic crafts and food – are pro-moted by migrants in two ways: by stimulating the supply side of their country, as well as by increasing the consumer base in the destina-tion countries beyond their own ethnic and national groups. A case in point is the music industry in the Carib-bean.73 Countries like the Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago have fostered export markets in cities such as New York, Mi-ami, Toronto, London, Paris and Amsterdam due to the predominance of Caribbean immigrants. The value in terms of annual export earnings ranges from US$30 million for Trinidad and Tobago to approximately US$50-60 million for Jamaica and the Dominican Republic.74 Almost every major city in North America and Europe has a diasporic Caribbean carnival inspired by the one in Trinidad. For instance, the Notting Hill carnival in London attracts over two mil-lion people over three days of activities. It is considered to be the largest festival of popular culture in Europe and is estimated to generate £93 million. Similarly good examples are the Labour Day carnival in New York and Caribana in Toronto. The diasporic Caribbean carnivals have become a crucial component of pan-Car-ibbean identity as well as a strategic market for cultural exports.75
African diasporas are equally active in pro-moting their own music, art and traditions. The Carlow African Film Festival in Ireland is a good example of a diasporas’ engagement in
Table 4.3 – Creative Goods: Exports by Economic Group, 2005
Source: Original table based on UNCTAD data, 2008.
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promoting homeland culture and artistic ex-pressions. The festival provides an annual plat-form to celebrate and explore the intellectual and aesthetic diversity of African culture and promotes social interaction and integration by bringing together the various communities of Africa and Ireland. It aims to celebrate and promote excellence in African filmmaking by showcasing and honouring the best works. It also provides artistic links between African and Irish communities and artists. The Carlow African Film Festival was founded by Ade Oke, a Nigerian, in September 2005 with support from local businesses and authorities.76 At the 2010 fifth edition of the Festival, a Symposium on ‘Effective Collaboration: Instrument of De-velopment in the African Movie Industry’ was held with key actors from the Nigerian film in-dustry. Another prominent event is the London Inter-national African Festival of the Arts featuring some of the best of African and International music, dance, film and visual arts from several countries. The Festival also aims to arouse wider public interest in the arts and to encour-age artistic dialogue and cultural exchange as well as celebrate the achievements of the Af-rican diaspora.77
African music is another very important sub-sector in which the diaspora can play a key role. A prominent vehicle for African music promotion is ‘Afrisson’, a web-based company founded and managed by Nago Seck of Senega-lese origin. The site is an invaluable documen-tation centre, providing access to the musical history of 56 countries of Sub-Saharan Africa and the Indian Ocean, about 1,138 artists and a wide range of information about styles, in-struments, books, and a list of African music labels.78
Another very important event for the promo-tion of home-based and diaspora-based music production is the World Music Expo (WOMEX). This is part of the Africa-Caribbean-Pacific Mu-sic Festivals Network backed by the EU-ACP Support Programme for cultural industries in ACP countries. This demonstrates that positive synergies can be built across sectors to pro-
mote both the industry and more migration-friendly development policies.By associating partners from different hori-zons: Anglo-, Franco- and Lusophones from West, East and Central Africa as well as the Indian Ocean, Pacific and Caribbean, this project aims to create, support and consoli-date exchanges and cooperation among these regions and the professionals grouped in the network.79 The coordinating group for WOMEX contributes to the project with its internation-al expertise, providing professional advice, or-ganising workshops and offering a marketplace not only at the WOMEX event, but also online through virtual WOMEX.80
Migrants do not only promote, produce and consume movies and music. In the field of lit-erature, an established magazine for interna-tional contemporary writing is Wasafiri. The magazine aims to promote the work of writ-ers from African, Caribbean, South Asian and Black British diasporic backgrounds. Its editor, Susheila Nasta, launched the magazine in 1984 at the University of Kent, seeking to demon-strate the interconnections among different cultural traditions and providing a dynamic forum for debates about migration, diaspora, global modernity and contemporary literature. It also provides literary and critical coverage of writers who often struggle, because of their cultural or ethnic backgrounds, to obtain ad-equate notice in the mainstream press. It is managed by a group of associated editors with different national backgrounds, mainly from developing countries, that moved to Britain at a young age to carry on their graduate stud-ies.81 Visual art and paintings from Africa have been widely acknowledged thanks to the world fa-mous exhibition “Africa Remix: Contemporary Art of a Continent”. This began in 2004 under the coordination of the Cameroon-born, Paris-based curator, writer and critic Simon Njami. It is the first exhibition to provide a comprehen-sive overview of present day artistic activities on the African continent and in the diaspora. All the works exhibited at ‘Africa Remix’ have been created within the last 10 years. The ex-
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hibition features artists from countries across the African continent, from Algeria to South Af-rica, as well as from African artists now living in Europe and North America. The exhibition also aims to dispel perceptions of a continent focused on the past, stuck in ritual and tradi-tion, and engulfed by poverty, disease and war. Initially launched at the Kunstpalast museum in Düsseldorf, it has subsequently travelled to the Hayward Gallery in London, the Pompidou Centre in Paris, the Mori Art Museum in Tokyo, the Moderna Museet in Stockholm and, more recently, the Johannesburg Art Gallery in Gau-teng, South Africa.82
In the Pacific, the diaspora is also very en-gaged in promoting home culture. In 2010, the Manukau Pacific Arts Summit was inaugurated in Manukau City in New Zealand to celebrate Pacific artistic expressions. This is the result of engaged Pacific Island States descendants and members of diasporas with a professional background in the creative industry. Indeed, references to a continuum between migration, urbanisation and indigenous culture are not lacking in the festival promotional material, as well as the need to foster the development of Pacific arts as a mechanism to preserve Pa-cific culture and maintain strong links with the home country.83 Another important element in the Pacific is the international Pacific Arts Association, founded in 1974. This is an international organisation devoted to the study of art from Oceania, with broad-based participation of intellectuals and artists from the Pacific Island States diasporas. The association provides a forum for dialogue and awareness about Pacific art and culture. It has antennas in Europe and the United States. By connecting individuals and institutions around the world, it encourages greater co-operation among those who are involved with the creation, study, and exhibition of Pacific art. For example, in 2009, the Pacific Arts As-sociation promoted the ‘Fiji Times’ exhibition in Honour of Fiji Day featuring five contem-porary artists from the Fijian diaspora, politi-cally inspired as a commentary on the current situation in that country.84
Cultural Capital as an Integration Factor in Destination countriesMigrant cultural capital is also an important vehicle for integration and social inclusion in the host society. It is often the case that when this capital is not free to manifest itself and where xenophobic attitudes are widespread, the opposite occurs due to the strengthening of negative perceptions of the ‘other’ and the creation of false dichotomies such as ‘them’ and ‘us’. However, when it is promoted and supported, it can lead to significant integra-tion, mutual understanding and pacific cohab-itation, with important spill-over effects on the economy. The International Network of Migration Insti-tutions is one of many important initiatives contributed by the diasporas to create a posi-tive view of migration. The Network includes museums and other cultural institutions pro-moting public understanding of migration, fa-cilitating transmission between generations as well as encounters among migrants and local populations. These museum initiatives are aimed at ac-knowledging the contributions made by mi-grants to their destination societies, the di-versity and wealth of the cultures of origin and the right to a dual belonging. Furthermore, they build awareness and educate regarding the events that induced individuals to leave their land in the first place, thus developing empathy among the host population. More generally, these types of museums have been instrumental in deconstructing stereotypes about migration.85
A prominent museum of the diaspora is the San Francisco (U.S.) based ‘Museum of the African Diaspora’ which showcases the history, art and the cultural richness that resulted from the dispersal of Africans throughout the world. The museum opened in 2005 and was conceived as a cornerstone of the economic and cultural revitalisation of downtown San Francisco. It represents an important aspect of the city ad-ministration’s strategy to focus on the creative industry as a means to attract talent.86
Cultural associations of ACP migrants abound
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all over the world. They are another impor-tant means to promote home country values, strengths and goods. Among the thousands of organisations that are led and managed by di-asporas, the cultural association ‘100%culture’ established in Sweden by a group of journal-ists and coordinated by Ivorian-born journalist Firmin Koto aims to make Francophone Afri-ca’s culture accessible to a broader audience. The internet-based journal and newsletters of the association endeavour to stimulate inter-cultural debates, informing and thus reducing the barriers to African migrants’ integration in Europe.87
Strengthening the linkages and networks be-tween the great number of small and large cultural associations is an important area of policy intervention. Furthermore, diaspora writers and artists have sufficient distance to be able to better identify the development challenges in their home countries and injus-tices faced by migrants in their countries of origin.88 These contributions of the diaspora should be further explored in order to maxim-ise the promotional and cultural potential of engaged and organised migrants.
Diaspora Cultural Engagement Back HomeAnother interesting phenomenon that involves the mobilisation, accumulation and utilisation of migrant cultural capital is the engagement of diaspora groups and individuals in the crea-tive industries back home. Diaspora cultural engagement in the country of origin can take various forms. Migrant associations are devel-oping a strong interest in the promotion of lo-cal festivals, as a way to promote transnational identities, gain local political support and also generate income. Festival-mania is a deeply rooted phenomenon in many ACP countries which tends to get a new momentum thanks to diasporas. For example, the Cameroonian diaspora is recently increasing its involvement in the organisation of cultural events back home. Several festivals are being organised and supported by migrants abroad such as the Ngondo Festival by the Sawa people (which is also celebrated abroad by the diaspora in
Canada for example) and the Ngouen Festival by the Bamoun people. These events are an extension of the migrant intervention for the social and spatial transformation of the place of origin. Some argue that the migrants’ inter-vention has produced a commercialisation of once-traditional events, which are now losing some of their originality, or that the interven-tions have reinforced diaspora group rivalries in gaining political support and recognition back home.89 There is a growing engagement of the diaspora in the organisation of festivals in Mali, similar to what occurred in Cameroon.90 However, the festivals stimulate international and domestic tourism and economic interests around a specific territory, with a positive im-pact on the local economies. Cultural policies in this area should definitely examine the ways in which the new encounters between the mi-grants’ transnational identities and the tradi-tional values and norms of those back home can contribute to positive synergies and dilute significant potential tensions. In the case of the Caribbean-wide ‘Carifesta’ festival, the promoters have specifically man-dated that diaspora organisations open Festival Chapters around the world to support the or-ganisation, promotion and implementation of the event. When held in Guyana, the diaspora organisation ‘Guyana Cultural Association’ of New York promoted the ‘Carifesta’ cultural festival of the Caribbean Community 2008 edi-tion in Guyana, under the theme “One Carib-bean, One Purpose, Our Culture, Our Life”.91
Since then, the association has worked closely with Guyana’s Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports and with members of the wider Carib-bean community in New York and in other parts of the United States to develop a mechanism to support the participation of the Caribbean diaspora in the United States in ‘Carifesta’.92
A similar proactive engagement from the Fes-tival promoters can be found in the organisa-tion of the ‘5th Festival of Pan-African Dance’. This is a bi-annual event with a view toward encouraging intercultural and inter-ethnic di-alogue and to promote mutual respect through the arts, music and dance. In 2006, eighteen
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countries participated in the international dance contest. A large number of Rwanda di-aspora singers, dancers and choreographers were invited to play a key role in the event.93
In July 2010 the Festival was organised in Kiga-li. Due to diasporic movements out of Rwanda (from 1973 onwards) Traditional Dance groups (Inthoré) were formed abroad and were keep-ing alive the core of the choreographic tradi-tion outside of Rwanda. Other forms of African diaspora engagement in cultural events back home involve the par-ticipation in large-scale artistic events, such as the Dak’Art Biennial of Contemporary Af-rican Art in Senegal, the Durban International Film Festival in South Africa, the Pan-African Film and Television Festival of Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso, the Gabon International Film Festival, to mention only a few. These events are a ‘rite of passage’ for African artists liv-ing abroad. Dak’Art was organised for the first time in 1992. Nowadays, it features 289 artists from 34 African countries, with 16 artists rep-resenting the African diaspora (or 6 per cent of the total) and 13 participants from the rest of the world.94
In the Pacific, the promotion of art has been boosted by the creation of the first Islands Mu-seums Association in 1994 in New Caledonia. This became a regional forum where herit-age professionals at home and in the diaspora could exchange views and work towards im-proving the quality of the services that mu-seums provide to the public. In mid-2006, the Secretariat moved from the Fiji Museum to the Vanuatu Cultural Centre. Its aim is to assist Pacific museums, cultural centres and peoples to preserve the Pacific Island Heritage, while promoting community participation in herit-age management, capacity development of museum and cultural centres in the Pacific Is-lands and advocating for the development of regional cultural resource management poli-cies and practices. It also facilitates training, provides a forum for the exchange of ideas and skills involving the diasporas, and encour-ages regional and global networks that support Pacific Island heritage preservation.95
Music festivals in migrant countries of origin are another important occasion for regional and international musical and cultural ex-changes and encounters. Afrif’Aktion is one of the main platforms for the diffusion of music and urban culture in Central Africa. It is based in Gabon and collaborates with Eu-ropean festivals such as “Sfnks” in Belgium, ‘Kosmopolite’ and ‘L’Original’ in France and with the French Cultural centres in Libreville, Brazzaville, Kinshasa, Pointe Noire, Yaoundé, Malabo, Bangui, N’djamena. The main activity of this association is the organisation of the Festival Gabao. Among the organisations sup-porting Afrik’Aktion is the ACP Music Festival Network. Another artistic event that reaches out to diaspora artists is the Kriol Jazz Festival held in Praia (Cape Verde). The Festival’s main objective is to promote Creole-inspired music from all islands, whether in the Caribbean, In-dian Ocean, Cape Verde, or Africa, the cradle of Creole.96
These festivals represent a significant source of revenue and their economic benefits should be better documented. Research on the larg-est Caribbean festival – the Trinidad Carnival – shows that in 2004 it attracted over 40,000 visitors and generated revenues of US$27.5 million. The Saint Lucia Jazz Festival attracted 10,000-13,000 visitors who spent US$17.3 mil-lion in 2003. In Jamaica, the SumFest Reggae Festival generated economic benefits on the order of one billion Jamaican dollars (about US$12.3 million).97
Food is Also culture: Diaspora contributionto development via nostalgic tradeAnother widely unexplored area is the diaspo-ras’ contribution to the demand for traditional export products and the promotion of cultural capital through ethnic stores and restaurants. A recent study of twelve migrant communities in the United States provides some interesting indications of the magnitude of this market.98 The consumption of home country goods (food and crafts), which at home are non-traditional exports (tortillas, beans, etc.), is a manifes-tation of cultural identity, transnational links
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and community building for about 90 per cent of the surveyed migrants. The existence of a developed network of retailers and distribu-tors facilitates this process, and local stores complete the chain by offering what migrants seek at a convenient price and in a wide range of varieties. A migrant consumes an average of US$1000 per year in nostalgic food and crafts. Migrants are not the only consumers of these goods, and their demand serves as a catalyst for the promotion of these goods to a wider market, thereby helping to integrate their country to the international economy. Clearly, together with remittances, hometown associations and family linkages back home, this component of cultural capital constitutes an important building block for transnational economic transactions and relationships chan-nelled through migration. As these are non-traditional exports, they rep-resent only a small portion of total exports, but they are the most consumed products of their own diaspora. On the supply side, the providers are mainly small ethnic stores stocked by an extensive network of domestic and international distributors. These ethnic stores are closely connected with the commu-nities they serve and, while introducing more modern management and administrative prac-tices, they remain close to their clients and have traditional marketing approaches. Often the owners belong to a migrant group, which indicates the importance of this sector for employment as well. The study also identifies areas for improvement in the functioning of markets, imports and distribution of nostalgic foodstuffs. These aspects should be further researched in the cases of the major ACP di-asporas in the Global North.If we project – with all due caution – the study estimates on nostalgic foodstuff and craft consumption to the ACP migrants living in the Global North, where the demand for nostalgic foodstuffs and goods can be higher and costs similar to those in the United States, the com-bined nine million ACP migrants in the Global North could spend nine billion dollars annually on these products.
Two Case-Studies: Analysing Migrant Capital Flows in two Intra-ACP ‘Mobility Corridors’ This section attempts to provide two examples of the application of the mobility corridor ap-proach. At this stage in the development of this tool, the analysis remains descriptive. The analytical impact of the corridor approach can benefit from the development of a composite Mobility Index that includes all four migrant capital flows.99 A mobility-corridor should be considered a unit of analysis that can, first, help shed light on the mobility dynamic between two coun-tries where there is a critical mass of migrant capital flows (whether remittances, social net-works, professional and student mobility, or cultural capital), and that can, secondly, pro-vide the basis for comparison with other coun-tries and regions of the ACP Group to highlight differences and similarities in order to inform a regional approach. It is a research method that, considering the paucity of data, can help provide information about mobility patterns in less important mobility corridors that present similar characteristics by promoting intra-re-gional and inter-regional comparisons. It can also be used to facilitate the transition from a ‘security’ to a ‘human development’ approach to migration by focusing on ways in which mo-bility and migrant resources can be improved and bottlenecks eliminated. Finally, the cor-ridor approach also allows for monitoring of migration-related hotspots and tipping points that can be targeted by quick policy responses based on comparisons with similar hotspots and tipping points in other ACP regions.
Case 1: The Haiti-Dominican Republic Mobility Corridor An important mobility corridor in the ACP Group is the one between Haiti and the Do-minican Republic. It has been widely studied and there is enough qualitative and quantita-tive information that can be used. This cor-ridor is about a century old, and is historically linked to the importation of Haitians workers by the Dominican sugar cane industry. One would expect that most phases of the mi-
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gratory project (preparation, departure, ar-rival, integration, family reunifi cation, socio-economic inclusion, political participation, and return) and their related policy measures would have been suffi ciently tried and tested. Instead, this corridor still presents the char-acteristics of a recent corridor, where issues of integration and social cohesion have not yet been addressed, and where other meas-ures to enhance the utilisation of migrants’ resources have been limited. A closer look at its characteristics, together with the identi-fi cation of major migration-related tipping points and human mobility hotspots, is pre-sented in Figure 1.This mobility corridor involves an estimated 380,000 to 510,000 Haitians living in the Do-minican Republic, or about 5 per cent of the total population. This migrant group’s human capital formation in terms of education and skills is rather low, chiefl y supplying the ag-ricultural and construction sectors. Few Hai-
tians have degrees from home or are studying in Dominican universities. Haitian migrants send more than half of their remittances through family and friends, or through offi cial channels costing as much as 6 per cent to 27 per cent of the amount re-mitted. Due to the high level of informality in the transfers, data on remittances from the Dominican Republic to Haiti are based on esti-mates, and range widely from US$33 to US$350 million per year. There is a lack of consistent data, remittance transfers are mostly informal, and objective constraints include a discriminatory labour market and diffi culties in moving up the skills ladder. There is an organised Haitian-Domin-ican civil society, but its advocacy work has yielded only partial results; cultural exchang-es are very limited despite the presence of a vibrant music industry and carnival in both countries. As has been mentioned, this mobility corri-
Fig. 1 - The haiti-dominican republic mobility-Corridor
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dor is about a century old, yet the main chal-lenge for both countries is still improving the protection of migrants, whether documented or undocumented, and whether born in Do-minican territory to Haitian descendents or recently arrived. Similarly, active labour mar-ket policies targeting migrants or Dominican-Haitian descendents are lacking, and meas-ures to increase formal remittances transfers are non-existent. Intercultural dialogue is limited by negative perceptions among the Dominican population. All of these elements indicate that both governments have relied upon market forces to smooth out issues re-lated to integration, cohesion and inclusion, or at best have implemented reactive policies in moments of crisis. The actual contributions to development of this mobility to both Haiti and the Dominican Republic have yet to be ex-plored. Historical and sociological research on transborder flows of capital, goods and labour and the formation of the border in the island, have shown the establishment of sub-corridors at the border areas with their own dynamics, when we can clearly identify important mobil-ity hotspots to be monitored.100
A more detailed and systematic analysis of this corridor – expanding upon the analysis pro-vided here – could surely provide support to policy formulation by both governments, and assist the donor community in improving the potential benefits of migration and mobility on either side of the island. For example, the World Bank, in its Dominican Republic Poverty Assessment, has identified – among policies to be considered for poverty alleviation – the regularisation of Haitian migrants ‘using a mix of temporary and longer-term work permits on the basis of further analysis of its impact on rural and urban labour markets and drawing lessons from international experiences such as the migration policy framework agreed by Cos-ta Rica and Nicaragua’.101 Interestingly, in the case of the Haiti-Dominican Republic mobil-ity corridor, migration policy is proposed as a measure for poverty reduction, together with intervention in crucial sectors such as health and education, which otherwise could miss the
importance of the impact of Haitian migration on demographics and service demand.
Case 2: The Zimbabwe-South Africa Mobility CorridorAnother example of a well established mobil-ity corridor is the case of migration between Zimbabwe and South Africa. The research car-ried out by the South Africa Migration Project (SAMP) and other specialised research centres provides enough data to analyse this corridor (Figure 2). This corridor originally arose due to the de-mand for workers by South Africa’s mining in-dustry. Recently, migration between these two countries has taken a new direction, first be-cause the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa has attracted skilled workers from the region seeking jobs in a booming economy and secondly, because the political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe has generated significant flows of people seeking to meet their basic needs. It is estimated that the Zimbabwean community in South Africa numbers between 800,000 and one million people. Historically, the mining and agriculture sec-tors in South Africa have been dependent on foreign labour migrating from neighbouring countries. However, when the apartheid racial laws were in force, migrants were mainly un-documented and were only tolerated because of the need to maintain a cheap supply of hu-man resources. This situation generated a high proportion of non-citizens with no rights, de-spite having been in the country for genera-tions. Even with the end of apartheid in the mid-nineties, migrants did not obtain greater freedoms and continued adapting to the new reality. The latest census in South Africa (2001), in-dicated a total of 477,000 foreign-born resi-dents, which was then corrected to an esti-mated 500,000 to 850,000 migrants. According to the 2007 Community Survey conducted by the South African Statistics Agency, the total number of foreign-born residents is over 1.2 million, or 2.8 per cent of the total popula-tion. It is not clear whether this increase was
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due to improved data collection methods, or to the crisis in Zimbabwe. The exact number of Zimbabweans in South Africa is not certain, and fi gures are often driven by ideological in-terests. Despite the census results indicating 1.2 million foreign born residents, some claim that as many as two to three million Zimba-bweans now live in South Africa.A closer look at the human mobility patterns between Zimbabwe and South Africa from a resource perspective indicates that there have been few measures to address old and new challenges. Until 2000, the majority of Zimbabweans were young job seekers, with secondary and tertiary educations, migrating alone in order to send remittances back home. More recently, the economic and political cri-sis in Zimbabwe has pushed many people to seek food and basic health care, including larger percentages of women, children and the elderly. This has modifi ed the previous composition of migrant labour, but it did not lead to new welfare interventions until needs
had reached a crisis point in specifi c locations (such as the border area during the mid-2008 crisis). Newly-arrived migrants are in an ex-tremely vulnerable situation, and welfare sup-port is mainly provided by Zimbabwe’s organ-ised civil society.Generally, Zimbabweans have a higher level of education compared to South Africans, and have linguistic abilities that favour their insertion to the hospitality sector. However, despite the need for qualifi ed labour in South Africa, few efforts have been made by public and private employers to provide Zimbabwean migrants with opportunities. Remittance estimates indicate that the equiv-alent of US$289 to US$360 million is being sent from South Africa to Zimbabwe. Transfer costs range from 9 per cent in the case of money transfer operators to 19 per cent through com-mercial banks. Only 2 per cent of migrants send remittances via offi cial channels.Cultural exchanges between the two countries are very limited, and general perceptions in
Fig. 2 - The Zimbabwe-South Africa mobility-Corridor
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South Africa about migrants, and Zimbabwe-ans in particular, are negative. Xenophobic attacks against foreigners – particularly Zim-babweans – point to a tense relationship, al-though migration and migrants were not nec-essarily the driving factors behind the attacks in May 2008.
Preliminary ConclusionThe Zimbabwe-South Africa and Haiti-Domini-can Republic mobility corridors are examples that highlight the need to study contemporary migrant resources exchanged between each of the countries, as well as the structural factors that affect the accumulation and mobilisation of such resources, including the lack of wel-fare policies and labour market policies, a lag-ging formal remittance transfer market that could create important multiplier effects for the economy, and biased public perceptions of migrants. In the case of the Haiti-Dominican Republic corridor, half the population sends remittances through formal channels. Although this is quite low given that migration from Haiti dates back at least a century, it indicates a certain famili-arity with money transfer operators and banks that could be further exploited to increase the level of bank utilisation by migrant communi-ties, while at the same time reducing transfer costs. In the case of Zimbabwean migrants, very few use money transfer operators, indi-cating that opening new branches and offices would not be enough to improve the flow of migrants’ economic capital, unless migrants’ familiarity and financial literacy were to be augmented.Zimbabwean migrants to South-Africa are a more heterogeneous group in terms of skills and education compared to Haitians in the Dominican Republic, yet neither country has labour market policies favouring the employ-ment of migrant groups or on-the-job techni-cal and professional training. In the case of the Dominican Republic, the lack of proactive labour market policies has led to slower tech-nical progress in the agriculture sector, since entrepreneurs rely on an unlimited supply of
unskilled migrant labour. Meanwhile, in South Africa, proactive recruitment measures for Zimbabwean skilled migrants have not been introduced to replenish the skills gap produced by the brain drain of native professionals.The potential for further developing the mobil-ity described in these two examples is rather obvious, if the issues emerging from the analy-sis of mobility corridors were to be addressed in a more systematic and coherent manner. Recent measures that attempt to regularise Zimbabwean migration to South Africa are a positive indication of the South African gov-ernment’s more proactive attitude.
Notes1 - I am grateful to Susanne Melde for suggesting this point during the peer review process.2 - Pieke Frank N., Nicholas Van Hear, Anna Lindley (2005)3 - Sassen Saskia (2003)4 - The Global Care Chain phenomenon is illustrated, for example, in the Dominican women who go into domestic work in Spain and the Haitian women who come to take up care tasks in their households in the DR. See, for example, (INSTRAW 2006).5 - Adams, Richard H. Jr. (2006); Adams, Richard H. Jr., Alfredo Cuecuecha, John Page (2008)6 - Gubert Flore (2006)7 - The description of this case is taken from: Gallina Andrea (2008)8 - Dodson B.. H. Simelane, D. Tevera, T. Green, A. Chikanda and F. de Vletter (2008)9 - Ibidem10 - The description of the three cases of financial products linked to remittances (Jijenge, Adopem and Fonkoze) used in this chapter are taken from: Gallina Andrea (2008)11 - http://www.cgap.org/direct/docs/case_studies/EBS.pdf12 - http://www.mfnetwork.org/members/equity_building_society.html; http://www.seepnetwork.org/files/2084_Equity_Mobile_Banking_Unit_Coetzee_et_al.1.doc. 13 - OBMICA (2009)14 - Connell John (2003)15 - Connell John, Richard P.C. Brown (2005)16 - Voigt-Graf Carmen (2008)
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17 - Özden Çağlar and Maurice Schiff (2006) 18 - Clemens M. and G. Pettersson (2007) New Data on African Health Professionals Abroad, Working Paper No. 95, February 2007, Washington, DC. Centre for Global Development. The developed countries (and year of census) are: France 1999; US 2000; Australia, Belgium, Canada, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, and United Kingdom 2001. However, one should be cau-tious in analyzing these figures since it is impossible to tell how many of these health care workers were educated in the destination country.19 - Ibidem20 - Ibidem21 - Shaw William (2007) p. 25.22 - Hunzinger Laurence (2007) 23 - Thomas K.J.A. (2009) 24 - Amin M. and Aaditya Mattoo (2007)25 - World Bank (2009b) 26 - Ibidem 27 - Ibidem 28 - Nurses in the Caribbean write a common final nursing examination referred to as the ‘Regional Nurs-ing Examination’.29 - Little L. and J. Buchan (2007) p. 7.30 - Hewitt H. (2004)31 - Salmon M.E., J. Yan, H. Hewitt, and V. Guisinger (2007)32 - Ibidem33 - HRSA (2002) 34 - Canadian Nurse Association (2002) p. 70.35 - Docquier F. and H. Rapoport (2008)36 - Gibson J. and D. McKenzie (2009) 37 - Haour-Knipe Mary and Anita Davies (2008)38 - Voigt-Graf Carmen (2008)39 - World Health Organization (2006)40 - Özden Çağlar and Maurice Schiff (2006)41 - See for example Putnam Robert D. (1993); Portes Alejandro (1998); Bourdieu Pierre (1983); Collier Paul (1998) 42 - Massey, DS, Arango, J, Hugo, G, Kouaouci, A, Pel-legrino, A & Taylor, JE (1998); Guarnizo L. and M.P. Smith (1998)43 - Aguilera Michael B., Massey Douglas S. (2003)44 - Orozco Manuel (2006); Newland K. (2004); Durand Jorge, William Kandel, Emilio A. Parrado and Douglas S. Massey (1996); COMPAS (2004)45 - Orozco Manuel and Rebecca Rouse (2007)46 - Ibidem
47 - Ibidem48 - http://www.akinamamawaafrika.org/49 - Mohanty Manoranjan (2006) 50 - Among the various initiatives there are: the Unit-ed Nations ‘Digital Diaspora Network for the Carib-bean’ and the ‘Digital Diaspora Network for Africa’, established by the UN ICT Task Force in 2003 and 2002. These are mechanisms used by expatriates working in the high-tech sector to help diaspora members jump-start information and communication technologies initiatives in their home region. http://www.un-gaid.org/. The World Bank African Diaspora Initiative is an important step towards the engagement of the highly skilled diaspora. The various actions of the Initiative aim to use lending instruments to find ways of engag-ing the diaspora in the design and implementation of the on-going and planned portfolio of World Bank-assisted projects, as well as to work with diaspora organizations and professionals, donor agencies and African governments to share knowledge and improve communications among and between all parties with the objective of enhancing diaspora contributions to development. The initiative aims to establish a da-tabase of diaspora development expertise that can be tapped by international and regional development agencies. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INT-DIASPORA/Resources/African_Diaspora_Program-Ac-tion_Points.pdf, visited on 25 August 2010. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) also established the ‘African Information Society Initiative (AISI)’ in 1996 with the aim of harnessing the poten-tial contribution of the diaspora in improving ICT and knowledge in Africa.51 - Interview to Margaret Kilo, Head of Fragile States Unit, African Development Bank, at the AfDB’s Annual Meetings’ Side Event “Mobilizing the African Diaspo-ra for Capacity Building and Development: Focus on Fragile States”, on 25 May 2010 in Abidjan, available at: http://www.afdb.org/en/news-events/article/interview-the-african-diaspora-does-not-have-to-re-locate-to-the-continent-in-order-to-contribute-to-its-development-magaret-kilo-ofsu-head-6946/ visited on 26 August 2010.52 - Vezzoli Simona (2009) 53 - Mazzucato V., M. Kabki (2009)54 - Maphosa France (2005) 55 - UNDP (2010)56 - Mbong Magdaline Mai (2006)
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57 - Singh Anand and Kombi Sausi (2010)58 - Antwi Bosiakoh Thomas (2009)59 - Development Research Centre on Migration (2008)60 - I am grateful to Dr Bridget Wooding for this com-ment during the peer review process.61 - http://www.unifem.org/campaigns/wsis/docu-ments/KampalaDeclaration.pdf 62 - http://cit.aed.org/forecast_sudan.htm 63 - http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/EXTDIASPORA/0,,contentMDK:22636820~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:4246098,00.html, visited on 26 August 2010. Ac-cording to the blurb on the website “This database will capture the diverse talents, skills and experienc-es of professionals throughout the global African di-aspora, so that they may be utilized to further Africa’s development agenda. Every year, innumerable young, educated Africans leave home to seek their fortunes abroad. Most of these immigrants never return home, though their abilities and knowledge are a priceless commodity that, if leveraged correctly, could contrib-ute significantly to the development of their home countries. In addition to this group, millions of people of African descent, located in communities around the world, are actively seeking ways to re-engage with their ancestral homes in Africa”. 64 - A well documented experience is Afford, the Af-rican Foundation for Development, at: http://www.afford-uk.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=25&Itemid=43 An interesting initiative is the Chilean Disapora net-work ‘Chile Global’, http://www.chileglobal.org/ and the recent private sector-led ‘Emerging Diaspora Market initiative’, which was discussed in New York as a private sector-led venture aimed at connecting the global investment community with opportunities that originate at the diaspora level. (See Report on the “Seminar on Emerging Diaspora Markets [EDM]: “Can they be Stimulated to Fuel Capital Flow between Developed and Developing”, 1 June 2009, New York UN Headquarters.http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/gaid/unpan035147.pdf.65 - Gueron Joseph, Anne Marie Spevacek (2008)66 - According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) the creative indus-tries are cycles of creation, production and distribu-tion of goods and services that use creativity and in-
tellectual capital as primary inputs; constitute a set of knowledge-based activities, focused on but not limited to arts, potentially generating revenues from trade and intellectual property rights; comprise tan-gible products and intangible intellectual or artistic services with creative content, economic value and market objectives; are at the cross-road among the artisan, services and industrial sectors; and constitute a new dynamic sector in world trade. UNCTAD (2008)67 - Ibidem68 - Ibidem69 - Ibidem70 - African Union (2005)71 - The results of the ongoing TNMundi Research Project on ‘Diaspora as Social and Cultural Practice: a Study of Transnational Networks across Europe and Africa’ coordinated by Prof. Ulrike Meinhof at South-ampton University should be monitored in this regard. The project aims to gain an understanding of the in-terconnection between cultural and social engage-ment of groups /associations within civil society, in-cluding those of (post-)migrant cultural practitioners themselves, and to evaluate their impact on a variety of cultural, social, political and ecological factors within countries of settlement and of origin (http://www.tnmundi.com/). 72 - The Observatory of Cultural Policies in Africa is an independent pan-African non-governmental organisa-tion aiming to enhance the development of national cultural policies in the region and their integration in human development strategies through advocacy and promotion of information exchanges, research, capac-ity building and cooperation at the regional and inter-national levels. http://ocpa.irmo.hr/index-en.html, visited on 19 August 2010.73 - Nurse Keith (2006b)74 - Nurse Keith (2006c)75 - A similar analysis could be made of the sports industry. It is estimated that over six hundred Do-minicans play professional baseball in the US, Canada, Venezuela, Mexico and Japan, and an undetermined number of track and field athletes and football and cricket players, coaches and trainers originating in the Anglophone Caribbean work in the United States. Nurse Keith (2006) Diaspora, Migration and Develop-ment in the Caribbean, Focal Policy Paper, 04-6.76 - http://www.carlowafricanfilmfestival.com/in-dex.html visited on 10 July 2010.
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77 - http://liafa.org/default.aspx visited on 10 July 2010.78 - www.afrisson.com/ visited on 10 July 2010.79 - Project partners include Zone Franche (interna-tional network), Fest’Napuan Association (Vanuatu), Busara Promotions (Tanzania), Harmonia (Cape Verde, responsible for the organization of the Kriol Jazz Fes-tival), Umane Culture (Burkina Faso), Sakifo Produc-tion (Reunion), Afrik’aktion (Gabon), Conseil Fran-cophone de la Chanson (international network) and Media, Sports and Entertainment (Jamaica).80 - http://www.womex.com/realwomex/main.php?id_headings=122&id_realwomex=12, visited on 18 August, 2010.81 - http://www.wasafiri.org/, visited on 10 July 2010.82 - UNCTAD (2008)83 - http://www.manukau.govt.nz/EN/Yourcommu-nity/Arts/Artevents/2010ManukauPacificArtsSummit/Pages/Home.aspx, visited on 15 July 2010.84 - http://pacificarts.org, visited on 15 July 2010.85 - http://www.migrationmuseums.org/web/index.php?page=Network. 86 - http://www.moadsf.org/about/index.html vis-ited on 15 July 2010.87 - http://www.100pour100culture.com/, visited on 17 August 2010.88 - I am grateful to Dr Bridget Wooding for this com-ment during the peer review process.89 - Kamdem Pierre (2008) 90 - Ouallet Anne and Diama Cissouma Togola (2008) Festivals et patrimoine au Mali: quels enjeux pour le développement culturel? Actes du colloque interna-tional. Le développement culturel: un avenir pour les territoires? Nîmes, avril 2008 3e rendez-vous de Géog-raphie culturelle, Ethnologie et Etudes culturelles en Languedoc-Roussillon.
91 - The first ‘Carifesta’, ‘Carifesta 72’, was held in Guyana in 1972 and brought together writers, artists, musicians, dancers, poets, and other creative peo-ple from more than 30 Caribbean and Latin American countries. The audiences included visitors from other Caribbean countries, the United States, Europe, and other parts of the world. ‘Carifesta 72’ was a celebra-tion and a showcase of the ethnic, racial, and cultural diversity that is the hallmark of the Caribbean. It was inspirational and left a legacy of education and com-munity development. This orientation and spirit have marked the nine ‘Carifestas’ that have followed since 1972—Jamaica (1976), Cuba (1979), Barbados (1981), Trinidad and Tobago (1992), Trinidad and Tobago (1995), St. Kitts and Nevis (2000), Suriname (2003, and Trinidad and Tobago (2006).http://www.guyfolkfest.org/carifestax2008.htm, vis-ited on 18 August 2010.92 - http://www.guyfolkfest.org/carifestax2008.htm 93 - UNCTAD Newsletter No 3 / August 2006: http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditctabmiscnews03_en.pdf visited on 15 July 2010. 94 - http://www.biennaledakar.org/2010/ visited on 16 July 2010.95 - http://www.pima-museum.com, visited on 18 Au-gust 2010.96 - http://www.krioljazzfestival.com/index2.php, visited on 18 August 2010.97 - Nurse Keith (2006a).98 - USAID (2008) 99 - The ACP Group of States Mobility Index is under construction. The report makes a first attempt to de-fine some of the main variables and indicators.100 - Moya Pons Frank (1992) in Lozano 1992 and Dilla Haroldo y Sobeida de Jesús Cedano (2007).101 - World Bank (2006)
This chapter is about potential solutions to the main challenges identifi ed in the Report. The chapter proposes operational
recommendations regarding measures that can potentially improve the positive impacts of mobility on human development for the ACP Group
of States Secretariat, and can also be of use to the ACP countries’ governments and the regional and international organizations working on
migration issues in ACP countries.
iNdiCATiONS FOr pOLiCiES ANd prOJECTS
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Implications for the ACP Group ofStates SecretariatThe complexity of migration and mobility dynamics in the ACP Group of States is enor-mous. However, there are some stylised facts that can help the international development community, regional organisations and individ-ual governments set the agenda for the next decade of work in this area. The indications for policies discussed in this chapter are based on statistics, dialogue with academics, members of think tanks and civil society, and a thorough review of the exist-ent literature. This section of the Report also proposes concrete projects and programmes, and key entry points for policies enhancing the positive linkage between mobility and migra-tion.1 These are not blueprint prescriptions that fit all countries and contexts, but rather indications on the gaps and challenges to be addressed as a priority at the various levels of the policy arena.
1 - South-South mobility (intra-ACP) needs to be further investigated in order to improve understanding of mobility in ACP countries. The lack of data on annual flows of migrants between countries and the presence of signifi-cant inconsistencies in the existing datasets on migrants stocks are important factors that lim-it analysis. However, there is strong evidence that South-South migration represents the bulk of mobility for Sub-Sahara African countries, whereas South-North mobility is much more
important in the Caribbean and the Pacific. Nevertheless, in all three regions there are im-portant South-South corridors that could bene-fit from further research, especially in the light of recent agreements on the free movement of people, with a view toward carrying out a cost-benefit analysis of migrant capitals flows.
2 - The ‘mobility corridor’ approach to the analysis of the migration and development linkages enhances the focus of the analysis and allows for monitoring important migra-tion hotspots and tipping points. Flows of key migrant resources such as economic, so-cial, human and cultural capital can be better understood by focusing the analysis on main mobility corridors. These corridors reflect new and old migration trends and therefore can mirror a significant set of challenges, instead of focusing on an individual country’s migra-tion pattern towards the rest of the world. It is thus a cost-effective research methodology that can be adopted for both quantitative and qualitative analysis. This approach is an exten-sion of the remittances corridor approach to other migrant resources. It could benefit from the development of statistical indexes that help achieve a multidimensional perspective on the linkage between migration and devel-opment that goes beyond the matter of remit-tances. This approach can also assist in finding solutions to the lack of comparable data across countries, and provide the framework for drawing comparisons between corridors. The
This chapter is about potential solutions to the main challenges identified in the Report. The chapter proposes operational recommendations regard-ing measures that can potentially improve the positive impacts of mobility on human development for the ACP Group of States Secretariat, and can also be of use to the ACP countries’ governments and the regional and in-ternational organizations working on migration issues in ACP countries.
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corridor approach also allows for monitoring migration-related hotspots and tipping points. The role of the Intra-ACP Migration Observa-tory is going to be pivotal in coming years. Efforts should not be spared to coordinate with key knowledge organizations such as the World Bank. The mobility corridor approach can be further explored by the Observatory by appraising and strengthening existing research capacities at the ACP region level and by iden-tifying ongoing projects, methodological ap-proaches and initiatives that can be coordi-nated and harmonised in a common ACP Group approach to migration and mobility studies.
3 - Enhancing policy dialogue with regional organisations and the European Union in order to stimulate ‘development-friendly’ migration policies. Once the positive link-age between migration and development is acknowledged, it is necessary to introduce migration policies in source and destination countries that favour human mobility and hence address the obstacles to the circulation of migrant capital.For example, circular migration schemes for unskilled workers consist of migration policies that can have a positive impact on develop-ment. Similarly, incentives to return for skilled migrants are another type of development-friendly migration policy. Liberalising the cir-culation of artists, musicians and other profes-sionals of the culture sector can promote the cultural industry of a country and therefore is also development-friendly. Another important, albeit controversial policy, is the regularization of undocumented / ille-gal migrants. Regularization can be a powerful poverty alleviation tool, insofar as migration can be an important social protection scheme for those left behind. It must be made clear that it is advisable to avoid using funds origi-nally allocated to poverty reduction measures for migration management. Instead, specific budget lines for migration management poli-cies that are pro-development should be in-stitutionalized in the government annual and multi-annual budgets of ACP countries.
4 - Enhancing policy dialogue with regional organisations and the European Union with a view toward stimulating ‘migration-friend-ly’ development policies. Development poli-cies can be introduced to improve conditions for better utilisation of the migrant’s capital. Therefore, specific development policies can be designed that enhance the positive impact of migration.For example, cutting remittance transfer costs and improving remittance market transpar-ency and competition are migration-friendly development policies.Policies promoting the introduction of infor-
Box 5.1 – Strengthening the Impact of migration in the Caribbean by protecting Migrants Rights
The CARICOM Agreement on Social Secu-rity (CASS) signed by the member states in Georgetown, Guyana, on 1 March 1996 protects pension rights and provides equal treatment in the case of select pension rights for workers moving between CARI-COM member states. The benefits covered include contributory pensions for invalid-ity, disablement, old age and survivor and death benefits. Short-term benefits (like maternity allowances or sickness benefits) are not included. Instead, the broader Convention on Social Security in the OECS (Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States) covers both short and long-term benefits. Under this agreement, contributions regu-lated by the OECS convention on social security are always totalised, including cases in which the worker qualifies in one or more OECS member states. There are also bilateral agreements on social security signed between Caribbean states and the UK, Canada and Quebec.
Source: ACP (2009) Background Paper for the III Global Forum on Migration and Development, Roundtable 2, Migrant Integration, Reintegration and Circulation for Development, ACP/28/011/09, Brussels, 28 October 2009 PAHD Dept.
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mation and communication technologies in emigration areas are important measures that can help increase the exchange of informa-tion between migrants and those left behind. This can help to strengthen ties with home and share important knowledge on migration routes, costs and conditions in host countries, as well as information on investment opportu-nities back home. Development policies that promote interna-tional cultural events and festivals are also mi-gration-friendly since they promote the export of cultural items that can benefit both domes-tic and diaspora production. This sector is par-ticularly important since it can help improve intercultural dialogue and reduce xenophobia. Within this group of development policies the most important is most likely the one that ad-dresses the human capital formation of mi-grants. Migrants are often trapped into seg-ments of the market that do not correspond to their actual skills (‘brain waste’), which in turn reduces their capacity to enjoy the full benefits of mobility, while their relatives and children are penalized by lack of safety nets, access to education and health. Therefore, so-cial protection of migrants regardless of their status is key to reducing losses during the mi-gration process (reduced remittances due to untapped skills for example, or reduced re-turns from education which in turn translate into lower wages and thus less remittances), and at the same time accelerate and improve the migrants’ inclusion into the host country labour market (ameliorating social capital formation and reducing social stigmatisation, while increasing earnings). Social protection policies can also improve migrant children’s access to education and health, and/or augment the portability or transferability of migrant pensions. Although measures concerning generalised education and access to health for migrants are contro-versial because they introduce an affirmative action, their importance for the development of both the country of destination and of ori-gin is significant. In this regard, more research is needed on the processes of social exclu-
sion of migrants as a group and the cost of said exclusion. The approach to the analysis of horizontal inequalities proposed by Frances Stewart can yield important results as regards advancing the understanding of inter-group in-equalities and thus improving the targeting of social protection policies. In cooperation with the World Bank, DRC Sus-sex has identified four essential components of social protection for international migrants. These include: i) access to formal social pro-tection regimes in host countries; ii) the ‘port-ability’ (or transferability) of migrants’ pension benefits across international borders; iii) the existence of safe and fair labour market condi-tions for migrants in host countries; and iv) the migrants’ access to social networks, which are an informal but often important means of social protection, especially among migrants moving from one developing country to another.2
A good example is the CARICOM Agreement on Social Security (CASS), signed by the member states in Georgetown, Guyana on 1 March 1996, which protects pension rights and provides equal treatment for workers moving between CARICOM member states (see Box 5.1). The benefits covered include contributory pensions for disability, disablement, old age, and survivor and death benefits. Short-term benefits (such as maternity allowances or sickness benefits) are not included. Instead, the broader Convention on Social Security in the OECS (Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States) covers both short and long-term ben-efits. Under this agreement, contributions regulated by the OECS convention on social security are always totalised, including cases in which the worker qualifies in one or more OECS member state. There are also bilateral agreements on social security signed between Caribbean states and the UK, Canada and Que-bec. However, there is no agreement between the US and any Caribbean country, despite the fact that the US is by far the main destination of Caribbean migrants.The creation of migrant welfare schemes is an-other migration-friendly development policy. Migrant source countries such as Bangladesh,
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Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, India and Thailand, have created migrant welfare funds that serve as a safety net for protecting their migrants, especially those in particularly vul-nerable situations (domestic workers in Gulf countries, for example, are targeted by these measures). These funds provide a range of services to migrants including pre-departure orientation seminars, loans, emergency repa-triation, life and medical insurance, and re-integration assistance. Organizationally, there are a variety of ways in which these funds are managed. In Pakistan, this is a responsibility of the Overseas Pakistanis Foundation, while in the Philippines the fund is managed by a spe-cial government agency within the Department of Labour and Employment. Welfare funds are usually paid for by employers, recruitment agencies, and/or the migrant workers. The success of welfare funds has sparked new in-terest by countries such as India to establish funds that assist their workers abroad, such as the one recently launched to assist migrants in Gulf countries that are facing some distress. Among the wide variety of existing welfare funds, a closer look at the most elaborate fund developed thus far, the Philippines’ Over-seas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA), serves to provide lessons and illustrate the challenges faced in providing such migrant protection services. The OWWA is fully funded by a mandatory membership fee of US$25 per contract for migrants going abroad as tempo-rary workers. It can be obtained in two ways: by enrolment upon processing of a contract at the Philippine Overseas Employment Adminis-tration (POEA) or by voluntary registration at a job site overseas. Membership is valid until the Overseas Filipino Workers (OFW) employment contract expires. Ideally, the fee is paid for by the employer or recruitment agency, but in practice it is usually paid for by the migrant.3
5 - Policy and institutional coherence are areas to be further investigated since it appears there are countervailing forces at play. Policy incoherence in key fields such as health, the fishing industry, agriculture and
trade must be addressed in a timely fashion. Of particular concern is the exodus of ACP skilled health workers moving to the Global North. Measures to attract them back home are rather limited and costly. Policy incoher-ence between developed countries recruit-ment measures (through better regulation of private sector recruitment agencies) and de-velopment aid assistance to support the health sector in ACP countries should be penalised with compensation measures for affected sec-tors and groups. Fishery agreements between developed coun-tries and coastal ACP states need to be re-viewed in light of previous negative experienc-es that have displaced local jobs and indirectly stimulated unauthorised migration flows. Oth-er measures adversely affecting traditional, labour-intensive sectors should be removed.Negotiations and consensus-building among various parties whose interests are not always convergent is a key element in this process, along with an increase in the flow of effec-tive and relevant communication among mul-tilateral institutions, aid agencies, foreign and economic ministries and civil society. Mobility should thus be included in the policy dialogue agenda at regional, international and global levels, and compensation mechanisms (po-litical or economic) should be generated for those who stand to lose, while identifying complementarity and substitutability between policy vectors.Regarding specifically ACP-EU relations, mul-tilateral trade negotiations such as those encompassed in the Economic Partnerships Agreements represent an important opportu-nity for addressing policy coherence regarding development and worker mobility (GATS Mode 4), regardless of skill levels.Policy and institutional coherence is also es-sential to be built within ACP Government, by establishing mechanisms that allow for improved cooperation among ministries, sec-tors and autonomous institutions involved in migration management.
6 - Support the capacity-building process
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of ACP Governments and Regional Organi-sations staff in addressing the multidi-mensional aspects of the linkage between mobility and development. The Intra-ACP Migration Facility has an important role to play in this area of policy. A set of ten rec-ommendations are within reach of a substan-tial capacity and institution-building program such as the Intra-ACP Migration Facility, which can target the ACP Group’s governmental staff, in order to: i) Address measures within the framework of the World Trade Organisa-tion (WTO) and ACP-EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations related to the flow of legal workers from ACP states, includ-ing working conditions, employment portabil-ity and remuneration, especially in line with Article 13, Section 3 of the Cotonou Agree-ment; ii) Address global economic transforma-tions and crises in a proactive manner; labour market policies and investment policies should be specially targeted to deal with challenges such as unstable world prices for raw mate-rials, mutating multilateral agreements, and unstable energy prices; iii) Ensure the ongoing presence of stable personnel within and across relevant organizations and ministries working to integrate migration and development is-sues into policies; iv) Assess, together with the competent ACP authorities, the European Commission’s recommendations regarding the development of ACP intra-regional markets in the framework of the ongoing Economic Part-nership Agreement (EPA) negotiations, and introduce accompanying measures regarding the movement of skilled and unskilled work-ers; v) Link national and regional development policies to migration patterns and the impact of economic policies in developed countries – such as agricultural subsidies – on the agricul-tural sector in ACP States, which in turn have a bearing on migration from rural to urban are-as; vi) Manage borders and tackle the irregular aspects of migration, particularly human traf-ficking; vii) Design and implement preventive measures and strategies to eradicate racial discrimination, xenophobia, ethnocentrism and related intolerance towards migrants; viii)
Address the burden that migration places on the environmental and social services of ACP states, especially with regard to the HIV/AIDS pandemic; ix) Prepare for the new High-Level Dialogue on International Migration in 2013, and speed up implementation of the ACP Brus-sels Plan of Action adopted for the purpose of executing the Brussels Declaration; and finally — and most importantly — x) Improve the in-tegration of mobility into Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and National Develop-ment Plans and Strategies. This can be done in the following practical ways: a) Insert a section in the PRSP that provides information on the development partners’ policy statements and commitments to integrating the migration-de-velopment nexus into development coopera-tion and into each policy area (e.g. poverty re-duction, business development, education); b) Include a section of the PRSP with an analysis of the major migration and development nexus issues at various levels in the different sectors and priority areas. Particular attention could be paid to the link between poverty and the environment (e.g. livelihood resources, envi-ronmental degradation), as this contributes to forced migration; c) Include the main fea-tures of the country’s institutional, policy and regulatory frameworks for migration into the PRSP, thus contributing to identify weaknesses and constraints as well as the means by which to overcome them; d) Include segregated mi-grant workforce data by sector, qualification, gender, geographic distribution, and so on; e) Include a section on the interventions related to the migration and development nexus that is to be addressed in cooperation with develop-ment partners. The four types of migrant capi-tal that constitute resources for development – economic, human, social and cultural – can provide a basis for identifying programmatic actions; f) Institutionalise that these sections of the PRSP and National Development Strate-gies should be the specific task of a ‘Migration and Mobility’ Focal Point. High-level support for the focal points is needed in order to avoid further administrative inertia in government offices; g) Train Migration and Mobility Focal
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Points on how to engage with diasporas and lo-cal civil society in increasing the participatory dimension of development policy formulation and strengthen the civil society demand for better migration governance.
7 - Support ongoing civil society initiatives that enable migrant social, economic, cul-tural and human capital accumulation and mobilisation, as well as building capacity for advocacy of the need to protect migrants. There are many projects implemented by ACP civil society which are specifically oriented to-wards creation and mobilisation in favour of the development of migrant skills, knowledge, contacts, and remittances. Projects involv-ing an engaged diaspora have strong potential for sustainability, compared to donor-driven projects. However, current measures that hinder the mobility of migrants engaged with projects supporting their communities signifi-cantly slow down their implementation. Civil society organisations in ACP countries often have little or no knowledge on practices in other countries and lack a strategic vision on how to scale up their operations to higher lev-els and thus influence policy-making. It is recommended that ACP Secretariat en-gagement with civil society focus on build-ing capacity and constituencies for reform. Supply-side policy interventions can improve by an enhanced demand-side of governance and accountability. For example, second gen-erations of PRSP cover consultations with civil society, including diasporas. Supporting civil society in making the consultations truly par-ticipatory is an important area that can be fur-ther explored.Advocacy campaigns against xenophobia will most likely yield better results if they are strategically embedded in the social inclusion policies of destination countries (for example through affirmative action) as well as diaspora dialogue and support policies in source coun-tries.
The Way Forward: Towards a New MDGThe underlying assumption of this Report is
that mobility and migration can achieve their full potential for development if freedom to move 1) is considered a fundamental human right; 2) does not affect the human develop-ment of those that do not move; and 3) takes place in a safe and orderly manner. Based on this assumption, the ACP Group of States Secretariat should strive to create a hu-man mobility framework in which the benefits outweigh the costs and in which fundamental freedoms are respected. Through ongoing policy dialogue, participation at international and global fora, and based on recent ACP Declarations on migration and de-velopment, the ACP Group of States Secretar-iat firmly holds to the position that policy and institutional coherence can only be achieved over the long term by creating an overarching global consensus on mobility that views the phenomenon first and foremost as a livelihood strategy.If mobility truly contributes, as the ACP Group believes it does, to improving people’s capa-bilities as much as do education and health – which are key to expanding individual choices so that lives worth living can be lived – then the inclusion of ‘Free and Secure Human Mo-bility for All’ as Millennium Development Goal No.9 needs to be considered, as a response to this as yet unexplored dimension of develop-ment. No effort to build international consen-sus on this point should be spared.
Notes1 - There are two important documents in this area that should be utilised by practitioners and policy makers in the field of migration and development: ARS Progetti (2007) The linkage between migration and de-velopment. Operational implications for programming and project development, Final Report, EuropeAid, 2008, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/infopoint/publications/europeaid/141a_en.htm and the ARS Progetti (2007) Reference Guide for the Eu-ropean Commission on “How to Integrate Migration in Project and Programme planning, design and imple-mentation”, ARS Progetti: Rome.2 - Development Research Centre (2008)3 - Ruiz Neil G. and Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias (2008)
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Table 2.4 – ACP Emigration Towards the Global North
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Table 2.5 - ACP Diasporas (Total and as Percentage of Population, 2007)
Source: own estimates based on migrant stocks from Sussex DRC Database 2007.
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Table - A1 Main Socio-Economic Indicators of ACP Countries According to UN Geoscheme Classifi cation of Macro-Regions
Source: UNDP (2009) Human Development Report, 2009, UNDP: New York.
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Table A2 - Physicians Born in African Countries Appearing in Censuses of Nine Receiving Countries Circa 2000
Source: Michael Clemens and Gunilla Pettersson (2006), ‘Medical Leave: A new database of health professional emigration from Africa’, CGD Note (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development). Centre for Global Development, http://www.cgdev.org. For in-dividual countries source see source’s appendix. African sending countries show country of birth as recorded in the receiving-country census. Receiving countries show country of residence at the time of the last census (France 1999; United States 2000; Australia, Belgium, Canada, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, and United Kingdom 2001). The copyright to some of the data in this table is retained by the source agency; see appendix for details before reproducing these data elsewhere. All data used here with written permission. *Shows the number of physicians living in each sending country circa 2000. **Gives the number of professionals abroad as a fraction of total professionals (domestic + abroad). † There are 834 physicians born in one of the other eight receiving countries who appear in the 2001 census of South Africa. This negative number thus represents a ‘netting out’ term.
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Source: Michael Clemens and Gunilla Pettersson (2006), ‘Medical Leave: A new database of health professional emigration from Af-rica’, CGD Note (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development). Center for Global Development, http://www.cgdev.org. For indi-vidual countries sources see source’s appendix. African sending countries show country of birth as recorded in the receiving-country census. Receiving countries show country of residence at the time of the last census (France 1999; United States 2000; Australia, Belgium, Canada, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, and United Kingdom 2001). The copyright to some of the data in this table is retained by the source agency; see appendix for details before reproducing these data elsewhere. All data used here with written permission. *Shows the number of physicians living in each sending country circa 2000. **Gives the number of professionals abroad as a fraction of total professionals (domestic + abroad). † There are 261 professional nurses born in one of the other eight receiving countries who appear in the 2001 census of South Africa. This negative number thus represents a ‘netting out’ term.
Table A3 - Professional Nurses Born in African Countries Appearing in Censuses of Nine Receiving Countries Circa 2000
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Graph 3.8-3.13 - Female Migrants in ACP Countries as Share of Total, in 1960 and 2005
Source: own elaboration on UNDESA, 2009.
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Brain Drain, Brain Gain, Brain WasteBrain drain: The phenomenon of large numbers of educated and skilled persons leaving their coun-try of origin to seek work in countries where their skills can be used and be more highly remunerat-ed in the labour market. Brain gain: Immigration of talented and trained individuals from a third country into the receiving country, or the return of highly skilled migrants who can start projects that benefit the country of origin. Brain waste: This refers to skills mismatch. A typical example is a highly skilled migrant who finds a job in a low-skill occupation. This process can lead to de-skilling.
Circular migrationCircular migration: Any arrangements that make it easier for migrants or former migrants to circu-late, or travel back and forth between the country of origin and the (former) country of residence. [As defined by the EC in its COM (2005) 390 on Migration and Development: Some concrete ori-entations]. Temporary migration (temporary la-bour migrants, also known as guest workers or overseas contract workers): People who migrate for a limited period in order to take up employ-ment and send money home.
human developmentHuman Development is a development paradigm that has to do with creating an environment in which people can develop their full potential and lead productive, creative lives in accordance with their needs and interests. Development is thus about expanding the choices people have to lead lives that they value. Migration and mobility are means of widening people’s range of choice, thus allowing them to increase their capabilities through resources accumulation.
international migrantThere is no universally accepted definition of a migrant. The term is usually understood as cov-ering all cases where the decision to migrate is taken freely by the individual concerned, for rea-sons of ‘personal convenience’ and without in-tervention by an external compelling factor. The term applies to persons and family members who move to another country or region to better their
material or social conditions and improve pros-pects for themselves or their family. A Migrant Worker is defined by the UN Convention on the Rights of Migrants as ‘a person who is to be en-gaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remu-nerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national.’ Migrants consist of four main cat-egories: (i) long-term immigrants (or emigrants); (ii) short-term immigrants (or emigrants); (iii) residents returning after (or leaving for) a pe-riod working abroad; and (iv) nomads. Highly skilled migrants are people with qualifications as managers, executives, professionals, techni-cians or the like, who move within the internal labour markets of transnational corporations and international organisations, or seek employment through international labour markets for scarce skills. Many countries welcome such migrants and have special ‘skilled and business migration’ pro-grams to encourage them to come.
Migrant ResourcesThe accumulation and mobilisation of the mi-grants’ resources is the key factor for enhancing the developmental dimensions of mobility. Mi-grants possess at least four types of capital that can constitute resources for development. Eco-nomic capital: the monetary remittances of sav-ings accumulated during the migratory process. The inflows and outflows of workers’ remittances have macroeconomic implications. The inflows can have positive microeconomic implications on consumption, savings and investment patterns. The negative impact is associated with inflation-ary pressures, inequality, rent-seeking behaviour, etc. Data about remittances is available for many countries. Human capital: This refers to the knowledge, technical and entrepreneurial skills improved abroad that can be used upon return in the home country. Human capital’s positive im-pact on human development can be measured in terms of the return to country of origin by highly skilled migrants. The negative side is associated with the so-called brain-drain, i.e. the net loss of public investments in education and research due to migration. Data on return migration is often not available. Social capital: The ties, networks, associations, and trust developed during the mi-gration project that increase the migrants’ access
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to relevant information, facilities and resources, and make them a possible transnational junction between cultures, economies and societies. So-cial capital can be measured in terms of back-and-forth travel, accessibility to and the use of communication channels, the number and types of diaspora associations, and engagement in the home communities. The negative impact of so-cial capital is related to the creation of migrants’ networks that lead to the depopulation of villag-es and towns. Cultural capital: This refers to the ideas, attitudes, values and artistic expressions that are present in the migrants’ communities and constitute important elements for bridging different cultures, so that migration is perceived not only as a way of improving economic situa-tions but of encouraging cultural diversity. Cul-tural capital can be measured in terms of cultural events, festivals, and artistic productions by di-asporas and return migrants, which also have an economic and cultural dimension.
Migrants’ Civil Society and Non-State ActorsDiaspora: There is no single definition of the term ‘diaspora.’ Nowadays diasporas are groups of migrants residing and acting in host countries but that maintain strong sentimental and mate-rial ties to their countries of origin. Diaspora is also defined as a migrant community made up of persons with the nationality of the country of origin and persons who have acquired the nation-ality of the country of settlement. Informal and community-based organizations: These organiza-tions are not registered and rely on the mem-bers’ spare time and private homes as distinct from paid staff and rented office space. Prima-rily identity-based, they play an important role and have direct and immediate impact on pov-erty at the family and community levels. Home town associations: Residents from the same town or village migrating to the same locality in the country of settlement commonly provide so-cial support to migrants and economic support to their places of origin. Migrants’ associations: Registered non-profit associations. These are typically founded by a group of migrants shar-ing the same country of origin who join together for a common purpose: to facilitate integration, solidarity, cultural exchanges, etc. in the host society. Migrant-led development NGOs or foun-dations: Registered non-profit organizations or chambers of commerce. Founded by a group of
migrants to support the diaspora in the country of settlement and contribute to the development of a country, with a broader geographical scope. Confessional migrants’ associations: Formal or informal, a group of people joined together by a common faith and forms of worship. Umbrella organizations / International solidarity organiza-tions addressing migrant issues: Organized in na-tional platforms, these bring together migrants’ associations and networks. They are dedicated to both integration issues in the country of settle-ment and development activities in the country of origin. Business networks: Acting as ethnic chambers of commerce within the country of settlement and/or with transnational links. They can organize events to connect the diaspora with businesses, and goods and services in their rel-evant regions/countries.
migration and mobilityA process of moving, either across an internation-al border or within a State. Migration and mobil-ity refer to population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes mi-gration of refugees, displaced persons, uproot-ed people, migrant workers and their families. Internal migration or mobility refers to a move from one area (a province, district or municipal-ity) to another within one country. International migration or mobility is a territorial relocation of people between nation-states. Mobility is intro-duced as an interchangeable concept having few-er negative connotations than those sometimes associated with migration. Forced migration: In a broader sense, this includes not only refugees and asylum seekers but also people forced to move due to external factors, such as environ-mental catastrophes or man-made causes. This form of migration has characteristics similar to displacement.
Migration and Mobility CorridorsAs in other parts of the world, ACP human mo-bility occurs within established ‘migration cor-ridors.’ The creation of migrant networks facili-tates the flow of relevant information, reducing risks and costs associated with travel. Migration corridors are physical spaces inside which migrant resources (human, social, economic and cultural capital) move back and forth. The macro dynamic of the migration corridor is reproduced at the mi-
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cro level, where people move from their home-towns and settle in cities or towns in the country of destination where migrant home communities are stronger. The migration corridor is therefore an important unit of analysis in research on the nexus between migration and development. For ACP countries, geographic proximity plays a very important role, as do cultural and linguistic prox-imity.
There are important development and social co-hesion policy issues that should be considered when using migration corridors as a unit of anal-ysis. Furthermore, there will probably be more chances to identify migrant organizations, pro-viders of services for migrant communities, mon-ey transfer operators, etc., when examining spe-cific corridors. Research on intra-ACP migration is lacking, although quantitatively it is a more important field of research than North-South mi-gration flows.
RemittancesFinancial Remittances: The most commonly used definition of remittances is that of the IMF: ‘Workers’ remittances cover current transfers by migrants who are employed in new economies and considered residents there.’ The IMF (1996) added that workers’ remittances are ‘transfers made by migrants who are employed by entities in economies where the workers are considered residents’ and that transfers by self-employed migrants ‘are not classified as workers’ remit-tances but as current transfers.’ Individual and collective remittances: The bulk of remittances are individual remittances, sent by individual migrants. A smaller fraction is sent in the form of collective remittances or donations by groups of migrants through community or church as-sociations. The latter form is often organized through hometown associations (HTAs) consisting of migrants from the same town or parish in the home country, as well as other more or less or-ganized groups, such as refugee groups, ethnic professional groups or even virtual refugee or-ganizations that use the internet to participate in collective donations. In-kind remittances: ‘In-kind’ remittances are payments made on behalf of relatives or friends in the home country (e.g. school or medical bills), remittances in the form of household goods (e.g. televisions, washing-machines, etc.), and donations to origin-country
institutions. Often this sort of remittance is mis-classified as export revenue, tourism receipts, and/or foreign direct investment (FDI) in the BOP reports. Social remittances: Social remittances are the ideas, practices, identities, and social capital that are transmitted through the migra-tion circuit. Social remittances are carried by migrants and travellers or they are exchanged by letter, video, or phone. They travel through well-marked pathways — be they formal or informal organizational structures or during interpersonal exchanges between individuals. Methodologies by which to account for remittances in the bal-ance of payments; the Technical Sub-Group (TSG) definition: The TSG has suggested replacing the term ‘workers’ remittances’ with the broader concepts of ‘personal transfers,’ ‘personal remit-tances’ and ‘total remittances.’ The TSG agreed on the following definitions: Personal transfers: ‘Personal transfers’ would replace the current concept of ‘workers’ remittances’ and would be defined as follows: ‘Personal transfers’ are all current transfers in cash or in-kind that are made or received by resident households to or from other non-resident households. Personal transfers, therefore, include all current transfers from resident to non-resident households, inde-pendent of (a) the sender’s sources of income (be they wages and salaries, social benefits or any other type of transfers, including transfers from a person receiving no income and running down his/her assets); (b) the relationship between households (be it between related or unrelated persons); or (c) the purpose for which the trans-fer is made (be it inheritance, alimony, lottery, etc.). Consequently, this new component would not be based on employment or migration status and would resolve any inconsistencies associat-ed with ‘workers’ remittances.’ Personal remit-tances: The TSG agreed to define ‘personal re-mittances’ from the perspective of the receiving country: Personal remittances = personal trans-fers + net compensation of employees + capital transfers between households. Total remittances would thus include all transfers directly to house-holds from other institutional sectors such as cor-porations, government and non-profit institutions serving households. The TSG considered this con-cept policy-relevant. It noted that the concept of total remittances entails irregular reporting, since social benefits are sent by the government and received by households.
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