Humanitarianism: A rights vs Needs debate with a case study on Darfur

Humanitarian Politics and Ethics

Humanitarianism: A Rights versus Needs Debate

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction.........................................

.......................................3

Research

Question.............................................

.........................4

MAIN BODY

Old and New

Humanitarianism......................................

.............4

The changing nature of

conflict.............................................

......6

Addressing the principle of

neutrality.........................................8

Arguments against a rights based

approach...............................9

2

Case study: Lessons learnt from Rwanda-

Darfur......................11

Conclusion...........................................

...........................................18

Bibliography.........................................

...........................................19

Introduction

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There is a growing trend in the International humanitarian

system to adopt a rights based approach as opposed to a needs

based approach. This trend is being privileged by many actors

in an attempt to strengthen the perception of human rights and

the humanitarian system makes for a good conduit because it

has both access and a neutral perception. The failures of

addressing the root causes of Rwanda was one of the reasons

humanitarian aid organisations began to think of long term

solutions than the basic provision of band-aids to conflict

situations. Many people involved in the aid sector articulated

how aid had an influence on conflict and so saw a need to

ensure that aid positively impacted the areas in which it was

being dispersed. Also humanitarian actors wanted the

International community to see that indeed human rights abuses

were clearly being seen and aid agencies would no longer

remain mute but speak out in order to protect the civilians

who were not engaged in the conflict. Another reason why the

rights based approach to humanitarianism is gaining popularity

is the blurred lines that have emerged in today’s modern day

conflicts were one cannot distinguish between combatants and

civilians.

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The rights based approach to humanitarianism offers aid

agencies a new ‘moral banner’ under which to work especially

in light of the new and complex emergencies. It is overtly

political in nature and aims to have a positive influence on

the politics of a conflict both during and post.

Research Question

Should Humanitarian Action adopt a rights based approach as

opposed to a needs based one???

Old and New Humanitarianism.

Traditional humanitarianism is based on a belief in a

universal duty to act in the face of human suffering. Deriving

from a sense of compassion and common humanity, it is governed

by an ethical principle sometimes articulated as the

‘humanitarian imperative’. It is governed by other rules too,

most obviously by the provisions of international humanitarian

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law (IHL) which extend the humanitarian concern to the

political arena, by setting humanitarian limits on what is

permissible in the conduct in war. Traditional approaches to

humanitarian action are needs based. The principle of

impartiality is central, but stress is also put on neutrality

and independence. Traditional humanitarianism is apolitical

and wary of co-option. (Darcy 2004:10)

Rights-based humanitarianism is more ambitious. It looks to

human rights to provide its universal ethic, enshrined in

legal terms that go beyond the narrower confines of IHL.

Arising in the post-Cold War era, some interpretations of it

are pro-interventionist, accepting that armed force may be

necessary to achieve humanitarian ends. More generally, this

approach accepts that political engagement is both a proper

and necessary part of humanitarian action. It tends to see

coherence between humanitarianism and a range of other agendas

including development and conflict reduction. It construes the

humanitarian problem in a different way: ‘somebody is

responsible for this suffering’. It concerns itself with

tackling root causes as well as symptoms, with structural

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injustices, even power imbalances. Emergency and development

work can and should be reinforcing, on this view, and rights

provides the analytical framework that unites them. (Ibid

2004:10)

The concept of new humanitarianism comes from the view that

the traditional type of humanitarianism lacks in capacity

because it only provides temporal solutions to the problem

faced in conflict zones. There has been a common consensus

that humanitarian action plays a role in how conflicts play

out and so why not make a positive impact and address what are

viewed as the underlying problems of these conflicts. Old

humanitarianism was seen as only offering band-aids and not

helping in any way and so various aid organisations began to

advocate for a ‘do no harm’ approach to humanitarianism.

In practice, of course, humanitarian actors do not divide

neatly into camps, and many would endorse aspects of both of

the above descriptions. Moreover, a distinction should be made

between the general use of the rights concept to underpin the

humanitarian agenda, and the adoption of specific rights-based

approaches to humanitarian programming. Deep differences of

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view exist as to what degree (if any) of political engagement

is appropriate for humanitarians. By contrast, a rights

approach seems to imply a willingness to engage in the

political arena. In the view of Michael Ignatieff, ‘Human

rights activism means taking sides, mobilizing constituencies

powerful enough to force abusers to stop. As a consequence,

effective human rights activism is bound to be partial and

political.’ These views are hard to reconcile. It is however

possible to agree that humanitarianism depends on certain

forms of political engagement without agreeing that this

should be on the basis of a rights agenda. (Darcy 2004:10)

The changing nature of conflict.

Karl Von Clausewitz observed that people use violence against

one another when there is “a clash of interests” between them,

leading each side to try to impose its will on the other. Such

a struggle turns into war when it is organized, continuous and

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conducted by armed groups leading to destruction and death all

over. However, as seen from the first decade of the new

millennium the nature of war is changing. When it comes to

explaining the reasons for war, researchers in the field of

International relations generally fall into two camps-the

neorealist and the neoliberal. Both emphasize the rational

nature of war. Neorealists argue that war erupts when after

cautious deliberation; a country’s leaders conclude that going

to war is preferable to avoiding it. This conclusion is based

on one or two goals, either the desire to guarantee the

nation’s security, or the desire to expand its wealth and

status, and demonstrate its strength. (Ben-Eliezer 2012:7)

In contrast the neoliberal approach uses these goals as

reasons for avoiding war. For example, neoliberals argue that

nations have a better chance of maximizing their material

gains by improving commercial relations with other countries

rather than going to war. Neoliberals also place great faith

in International institutions as a means of controlling

countries and forging cooperation between them in an effort to

avoid war. (Ibid 2012:7)

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Some believed that with the end of the Cold War,

globalization, and the rise of neoliberal markets, an end to

the war was imminent. This illusion was shattered not only

when the world trade centre on September 11, 2001, but also

even earlier by conflicts and wars in Yugoslavia, Chechnya,

Sudan Liberia, Somalia, Rwanda, not to mention Afghanistan,

Iraq, and the Middle East, Israel included. These wars seemed

different in many respects from those of the past. The new

wars were characterized by the attempt to provide an answer,

not to the position of states within the International system,

but to the character of communities. The claim that wars had

assumed a new form reverberated throughout the literature,

with the appearance of studies that referred to “new wars” or

postmodern wars, “wars of the third kind”, “identity wars”,

“low intensity conflicts”, “small wars”, “limited wars” etc.

The analysis of these new wars often invoked new concepts such

as “new threats”, “new fears”, “new risks” and of course “new

terrorism” and the “global war on terrorism” (Ben-Eliezer

2012:8)

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New wars depart from the usual conventional pattern insofar as

they are not exclusively wars between states, certainly not

between strong states. In contrast, they are civil wars, or

wars that have the characteristics of civil wars, in that they

are wars between communities, or between non states and

states. These wars are not waged between professional,

conscript, or mass armies, even if such armies take part

alongside other military groups. In fact, these wars involve a

welter of forces: private armies, militias, autonomous

military units, paramilitary groups, regional armies, segments

of national armies, tribal armies, national movements,

underground organizations, mercenaries, terrorist gangs, and

even criminal organisations. (Ben-Eliezer 2012:9)

Another element of the peculiarities of these wars is that

they are no longer fought on specific battlefields, such as

Trafalgar, Waterloo, El-Almein, Stalinford, or the Golan

Heights in 1973, in which on decisive victory can determine

the outcome of the war. In addition, the purposes of the new

war are less likely to be clearly defined and bureaucratically

formulated. One of the arguments concerning this change is

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that the new wars are marked neither by desire to conquer

enemy territory nor by the goal of appropriating the

adversary’s material resources. Furthermore, in wars of this

kind, there is usually no declaration of war. The end of the

war is never clear. In addition, the dichotomous boundaries

between the front and the rear, soldiers and civilians, peace

and war, legal and illegal activities, internal and external,

local and global are often blurred. In these wars, the loci of

violence often shift from the battlefields to the big cities,

refugee camps, and villages-in short, to civilian habitats.

(Ben-Eleizer 2012:10)

Looking at the principle of neutrality

In order to critically understand why there is a great debate

on right versus need needs in the humanitarian sphere, it is

important to go back and address one of the three basic

principles on which humanitarianism was founded.

It is crucial to understand the origins of the concept of

neutrality to appreciate the difficulties of applying it to

contemporary conflicts. The notion gained currency in the 19th

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century in Europe in the context of wars fought between

professional armies on a battlefield. A third party could

engage as arbiter, and required the confidence of both sides

to play such a role effectively. Thus the concept of

neutrality pertained to such arbitrage at a time when wars

were fought according to certain rules and at a time when

there was a clear distinction between combatants and non-

combatants. (Terry 2000:1)

Although neutrality might be useful as a tool of humanitarian

action under certain circumstances, there are many perverse

effects of neutrality that need to be explored. Most of these

stem from the fact that the situations of war under which the

concepts developed are very different to contemporary

conflicts. Today’s wars are not undertaken between two states

on a defined battlefield but are international or internal

conflicts involving ideological, economic, religious, and

political stakes, that are played out in urban, rural,

populated and unpopulated areas alike. Civilian casualties and

displacement are rarely the unfortunate by-products of

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conflict, but as in Bosnia and Rwanda, can be the objective of

the conflict itself. (Terry 2000:2)

Humanitarian action is more than a technical exercise aimed at

nourishing a population defined as ‘in need’, but is a moral

endeavour based on solidarity with other members of humanity.

Thus the overriding question that we need to pose is whether

it is morally acceptable to remain neutral when faced with

genocide of grave violations of human rights. Refusing to make

judgement about who is wrong and who is right assumes a legal

and moral equality between oppressors and their victim’s it

places them on an equal footing. Remaining neutral ratifies

the law of the strongest. (Terry 2000:3)

Arguments against a rights based approach.

In as much as a rights based approach is gaining attention in

the humanitarian sphere, there are many who feel that shifting

away from the initial principles of humanitarianism will bring

to light a new set of problems for the humanitarian actors who

respond to conflicts.

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One argument raised is the politicisation of humanitarian

space. This argument says that, whatever its apparent

attractions, a rights-based approach to humanitarianism

inevitably introduces a political Trojan Horse into the

neutral and apolitical humanitarian arena, and for that reason

is to be viewed with suspicion, or rejected altogether. This

is a pragmatic argument as much as a principled one An

alliance with human rights activism, it is said, threatens the

very space within which humanitarian action can take place,

since such activism is inevitably perceived to be partisan,

and depends on a modus operandi of denunciation and shaming

that is incompatible with the careful negotiation,

constructive engagement and relative discretion required by

humanitarian action. Human rights organisations, it is noted,

do not work on the ground, and are not threatened by the

consequences of speaking out. (Darcy 2004:11)

Also the co-option by political actors, this argument concerns

both the possibility of independent humanitarian action, and

the dangers of political ‘hijacking’ of the humanitarian

agenda. Critics point in particular to the use made of rights

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rhetoric, combined with the language of humanitarianism, to

produce a hybrid justification for actions such as the bombing

of Kosovo or the invasion of Iraq. They see the association of

humanitarian agencies with such actions and their rationale as

excluding the possibility of independent action, undermining

the basis of humanitarian action, and simultaneously

corrupting the concept of rights. (Opcit 2004: 11)

Some argue that precisely because of the nature of engagement

that a rights approach implies –including, for example, a

willingness to testify at tribunals – humanitarians should

think twice before they adopt such an approach. The broader

argument here is that rights are in danger of being

instrumentalised in political agendas, and that humanitarians

may be complicit in this. Related to this is the selectivity

of engagement noted above: rights are invoked when it suits

the political case to do so, but are otherwise seen as a

nuisance. (Darcy 2004: 12)

One argument raised about the rights based approach is that

they are irrelevant. This line of criticism concerns the

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nature of the situations within which humanitarian action is

undertaken. These, it is argued, are typically situations in

which the political contract between people and government has

broken down. The invoking of rights in such contexts is a

largely rhetorical exercise, since the primary duty-bearer

(the state) has proven itself unwilling or unable to fulfil

its obligations, and may indeed be the chief threat to

people’s welfare. Even allowing that individuals may have a

right to humanitarian assistance, and may have claims on the

wider international community, the language of rights in such

situations tends to obscure rather than expose the (often

anarchic) reality. In such circumstances, humanitarian action

fills the gap between rights and reality. The real concern is

anyway not with rights per se, but with human suffering. (Ibid

2004:12)

CASE STUDY: DARFUR

As much as there are differences between Rwanda and Darfur,

there are also similarities to these two cases. For one,

Darfur has been referred to as Rwanda all over again,

especially in light with the genocide that has occurred there.

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Also it is similar to Rwanda when it comes to the issue of

sovereignty, the emphasis given to keeping a peace process on

track and failures of addressing the deep rooted causes of the

conflict and human rights violations for fear of upsetting the

Khartoum government and an inadequate response by the

international community.

The humanitarian crisis in Rwanda began shortly before the

defeat of the Rwandan armed Forces by the Tutsi RPF in July

1994. The Rwandan government issued state directives

encouraging Hutu’s to flee Rwanda for fear of retaliatory

attacks by the RPF. More than two million Hutu’s sought refuge

in the neighbouring countries of Zaire (Congo), Tanzania and

Burundi, and approximately one million Rwandans were displaced

internally. Unable to triage refugees, NGOs felt complicit in

prolonging the conflict and aggravating human suffering in the

camps. This sentiment led to the shared belief that they

failed to meet their moral duty. (Gugerty 2010:186)

NGOs reactions to perceived failures in Rwanda were more

severe that in the Biafra intervention, though many of the

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same problems, such as capacity, coordination, and security

hindered NGO performance in both emergencies. Though some aid

groups working in Biafra did voice concerns that humanitarian

relief aid prolonged the conflict by emboldening Biafrans,

their calls for reflection on the political and long-term

effects of humanitarian aid did not resonate in the

humanitarian sector. In contrast, NGOs in Rwanda reflected

deeply about the long-term impacts of their intervention. The

Rwanda case highlights a fundamental shift in the expectations

of humanitarian NGOs. The standard that emerged in Rwanda was

one of the “humanitarianism plus” or the belief that NGOs

should not only alleviate suffering but also pay attention to

root causes of suffering and take into account the impacts of

aid on local communities. (Ibid 2010:186)

Though NGOs felt that they failed to meet the demands of the

humanitarianism plus standard, they interpreted this failure

in different ways. Two dominant positions emerged during the

crisis: groups such as CARE-UK, THE International Federation

of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Oxfam, and the Dutch

and Belgian sections of Medecins Sans Frontiers (MSF) felt

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that their moral duty justified staying in Rwanda. Others,

like MSF-France and the International Rescue Committee (ICR),

eventually pulled out of Rwanda because they believed that

humanitarian aid was abetting the former-FAR refugees and

prolonging the suffering. The two groups disagreed on how to

meet their moral duty in Rwanda. Whereas the latter group

acknowledged the potentially negative effects of well-

intentioned actions, the former group believed that, above

all, helping those in need superseded the problems associated

with providing aid. (Gugerty 2010:187)

According to Watkins (1995) particular stark dilemmas were

faced by Oxfam and other agencies in and around Rwanda. They

were profound debates over whether to continue providing

relief to refugees in camps in Tanzania and Eastern Zaire. The

camps in Zaire held some 630,000 refugees and were largely

controlled by those who masterminded the killing of up to one

million Rwandans between April and July 1994. Having condemned

the genocide and demanding that its perpetrators be brought to

justice, Oxfam and other agencies had found themselves in the

invidious position of delivering aid through structures

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controlled by the very people responsible for the crimes

committed in Rwanda. Hutu military leaders controlled the

camps and used them as a base from which they planned there

incursions into Rwanda and forcibly prevented refugees from

returning home. Some agencies, unwilling to work with people

who were guilty of genocide pulled out.

The humanitarian crisis in Darfur confirms the limits of band-

aid humanitarianism. Human rights groups have documented

widespread human rights violations. Western states and

organisations have become involved to address the crisis, yet

their humanitarian activity has stopped short of ending the

emergency. Instead, 'the advocacy has stimulated government

responses that have had the perverse effect of defusing the

political pressure to stop the killings and return the

refugees home'. Western governments can pinpoint their

engagement to limit damage and save lives. But that type of

involvement perpetuates a low level crisis that keeps people

dying slowly, instead of ending their suffering. From the

Western vantage point, slow death is much preferable to quick,

violent annihilation. The lack of widespread killing does not

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mobilise media interest, and buys time for Western diplomacy

trying to defuse the crisis. This intervention is a case of

damage control parading as humanitarianism. (Belloni 2001:465)

Aid agencies are grappling with familiar problems around

advocacy in Darfur. Long-recognised as a crisis of protection,

and not solely of humanitarian relief, difficult issues have

emerged as to the roles aid actors should play in advocating

for measures to address civilian insecurity and conflict

resolution.

Darfur demonstrates many of the classic characteristics of a

non-permissive advocacy environment: high levels of insecurity

for aid workers, continuous efforts by the Sudanese government

to curtail what it perceives as ‘political’ activities and

inconsistent levels of humanitarian access. There are thus

serious operational considerations to be taken into account

when undertaking advocacy. Finally, there are issues of

competence and expertise. (HPG 2007:1)

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As aid agencies began to advocate on sensitive civilian

protection issues, the risks associated with advocacy

appeared. As agencies began to press for a strengthened

mandate and increased manpower for the African Union

peacekeeping mission, AMIS, the president of the Sudanese

national assembly announced the dispatch of a parliamentary

commission ‘to investigate the work of humanitarian

organizations (which) are trying to gain control of the

camps’. The Sudanese president, President Omar al-Bashir,

declared that ‘humanitarian organizations were the real

enemies’ of Sudan. A press release by Save the Children-UK,

reporting the aerial bombardment of Tawila in North Darfur,

resulted in a threat to expel the agency’s head. Similar steps

were taken against Oxfam GB in November 2004 when it publicly

berated what it saw as the UN Security Council’s ‘diplomatic

dithering’ over Darfur. Between December 2004 and April 2005,

at least 20 aid workers, most of them from organisations

publicly advocating on IDP issues, were arrested or detained

(HRW, 2005).

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This increase in the harassment and intimidation of aid actors

also corresponded with rising insecurity. According to OCHA,

reported security incidents involving aid workers (including

theft, detention, physical/sexual assault and death) increased

by 59% between 2005 and 2006 and by a further 53% in the first

half of 2007. While the effects of insecurity are felt across

the humanitarian sector, operational NGOs and other non-UN

agencies have borne the brunt, with a 69% rise in the number

of security incidents between 2005 and 2006, compared to a 28%

increase for UN agencies. Over this period, and particularly

during 2007, field workers also indicated an increase in the

number of expulsions and greater difficulties in renewing

working papers, particularly for agencies engaged in policy or

protection activities. (HPG 2007: 3)

The experience of advocacy in Darfur indicates a lack of

consensus about where the ‘edge’ of humanitarianism lies.

Different agencies have adopted different approaches, but in

general there has been a willingness to compromise strict

neutrality in order to address questions of civilian

insecurity and/or conflict resolution. This reflects a growing

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acceptance of the role that humanitarian agencies can play in

influencing political debates. However, what has yet to emerge

is an articulation of the humanitarian agenda in these

debates. While MSF’s approach tends to be more closely defined

– focusing on catalysing attention to injustice, rather than

prescribing solutions – this is not always consistent. (HPG

2007:6)

It is ‘widely recognised’ that Darfur is a ‘crisis of

protection rather than a simple assistance crisis’ (Mowjee

2006:18). However, by promoting the rights of communities

which have been targeted by the government, aid agencies and

NGOs are inevitably perceived to be acting politically. Any

advocacy on the conflict in Darfur’ challenges the Sudanese

government’s line that the situation is a minor and internal

issue. In speaking out against the government and the

Janjaweed, aid agencies and NGOs appear to have solidarity

with the ‘black’ population and rebel groups (HRW 2006: 21-22)

Tensions are therefore not merely erupting between ‘Arabs’ and

‘blacks’, nomads and agriculturalists, but between all of the

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various tribes. ‘Inter-Arab clashes’ are thought to ‘have

killed nearly 200 people in southern Darfur’ since the turn of

the year and ‘thousands of Arabs have been forced into

makeshift displacement camps’. Rather than providing aid for

Arab tribes, agencies and NGOs have left them ‘at the back of

the queue for relief… they are usually considered last and

receive less than their fair share’. Not only is an unbalanced

humanitarian response likely to fuel resentment between

communities, but in the absence of outside help, Arab nomads

may believe they have no choice but to fight for their

survival.

In sum, it appears that the advocacy work of aid agencies and

NGOs in Darfur has resulted in the ‘humanitarian space’

shrinking. On the one hand, aid workers are operating under

conditions which are not secure; they are subject to

harassment and even attacks because of speaking out. But also

on the other hand aid organisations seem to have created a

hierarchical structure of who is worthy of receiving aid and

this will only fuel the conflict and increase animosity among

the fighting parties..

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It is perhaps not surprising then that aid should have had

unintended political consequences in Darfur. The denial of

humanitarian access to ‘rebel’ populations has been a high-

profile problem: both the government and Janjaweed militia

have deliberately prevented agencies and NGOs from working in

rebel-held areas so as to weaken their civilian support base.

Predictably, people who have been forced to leave their

villages have tended to move to centralized IDP or refugee

camps where humanitarian aid is more reliably available. There

is some evidence that the government is deliberately

manipulating this dynamic in order to move people into

territory which it controls. Thus, pro-government forces are

able to contain vulnerable and compliant ‘rebel’ populations

through a campaign of harassment and terrorization of the IDP

settlements. Some aid workers have even suggested that, as a

result of this process, the humanitarian effort is

‘perpetuating the conflict’ (Mowjee 2006: 18)

The Human right watch (2006) asserted that advocacy for a

rights based approach appears to have contributed to the high

levels of violence and intimidation towards humanitarian

organizations, something which, in its extreme, has critically

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undermined the ‘humanitarian space’ and made operations

untenable. However, one must be careful not to assume a simple

causal relationship between advocacy-work and attacks on aid

agencies and NGOs, as even the ‘neutral’ ICRC has been

targeted.

CONCLUSION

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The case of Darfur used in this paper gives an insight of what

it means operationally for aid agencies to have a rights based

approach. From the literature provided above, the question of

whether humanitarian action should be that of a rights based

approach as opposed to that of a needs based approach is very

complex. There are a plethora of arguments for both why aid

organisations must adopt a rights based approach and also why

aid organisations must focus solely on needs and not enter

political arenas. To a large extent the focus on adopting a

rights based approach has moved away from the very reason why

humanitarian action was conceived and that is the universal

right to assistance and there is a real danger when it comes

to this. On the other hand however, the rights based approach

has been advocated for because it not only concerns itself

with remedial solutions for today but for the future as well.

The rights based approach is focused on accountability be it

by governments or anyone carrying out violations and is very

justice oriented

Although traditional humanitarianism is more obviously duty-

based than rights-based, there is no inconsistency in

principle between human rights and humanitarian goals. Both

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forms of humanitarianism aim at protecting people and believe

that laws must be engaged to deal with people committing

crimes; both are governed by broadly compatible principles.

The luck of consensus not only in the humanitarian sphere but

also among academics and the international community is one

that will remain because it is hard if not almost impossible

to articulate what good humanitarianism should look like. Even

with initiatives to improve standards and develop guidelines

for humanitarian work, like, the new Code of Conduct, the

Sphere Project, and the concept of ‘Do No Harm’, there still

remains a lack of clarity with regards to the framework for a

new humanitarian system.

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