Human Security is an Analytically Flawed Notion.

Human Security isan AnalyticallyFlawed Notion.

Discuss.PIED5213 CONFLICT, COMPLEX

EMERGENCIESDR. JAMES WORRALL

200519519

6523 WORDS

200519519 PIED5213M

‘Human security is an analytically flawed notion’.

Discuss.

Introduction

It is perhaps our inescapable and indivisible insecurity which

makes us most human of all. Our vulnerability, our basic needs

to survive and, ultimately, our finite existence are the only

really universal attributes of humanity, so from this

perspective it appears peculiar that the notion of ‘human

security’ has been deemed such a controversial, yet

progressive, political idea. The term first entered the

popular vocabulary of International Relations in the 1994

United Nations (UN) Human Development Report, where it defined

Human Security as ‘first, safety from such chronic threats as

hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means

protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns

of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities’.

(UNDP 1994: 3, 23) The report was a response to the growing

need to confront the post-Cold War threats of civil war and

state failure, disease, famine, and poverty, whilst also

1

200519519 PIED5213M

recognising the transnational nature of many of these dangers

in an increasingly globalised world.

This notion has refined the traditional security concept by

placing the individual, rather than the state, as the referent

object to be secured. Its inclusion in the UN Development

Programme also represents a merging of development and

security strategy, whilst also indicating a new normative and

cosmopolitan approach to international politics. However,

whilst this theory/policy has become more prevalent in

international organisations, it has not yet found full

approval in the academic community. Rather, it has faced

widespread criticisms for its vagueness, incoherence, and

arbitrariness. (Alkire, 2003: 22) The fact that ‘human

security’ as theory and practice could be applied to almost

anything has meant that for many scholars the concept lacks

any real analytical value for security studies.

The Human Security colloquium is now dominated by this

for/against debate which, besides being extremely monotonous,

is adding little to the development of a new and critical form

2

200519519 PIED5213M

of security thinking. To improve the sophistication of this

concept, rather one must ‘examine it as ideology, and lay bare

its concealed perspective’. (Cox, 1981: 128) In an effort to

contribute a more unique approach to this symposium, this

essay will apply Jacques Derrida’s method of deconstruction to

the study of ‘human security’. What McQuillan refers to as

‘textual activism’ (2009: 32) or a means of ‘philosophical

insurgency’, (2009: 274) deconstruction (a component of post-

structuralist analysis) acts as an ontological destabiliser

whereby totalising norms of what ‘is’ are questioned at their

most basic levels to unearth underlying power structures and

relations of hierarchy. Derrida described his strategy of

deconstruction as consisting ‘in precisely that:

deconstructing, dislocating, displacing, disarticulating,

disjoining, putting “out of joint” the authority of the “is”’.

(1995: 25) In the case of human security, a deconstructionist

or post-structuralist reading allows the analyst to uproot

‘that which attempts to present itself as originary or

foundational’ (Hirst, 2011: 4) – our, Western, constructs of

the ‘human’ and ‘security’ in its relative context of

modernity. The totalising ontological foundations of what it

3

200519519 PIED5213M

means to be a secure human are in need of investigating if the

concept of ‘human security’ is to be regarded as an

empowering, cosmopolitan term. This discussion will follow on

the belief that human security acts as both concept and

discourse, therefore the very language of its field must be

broken apart and explored.

To ‘deconstruct’ these foundations, this essay will be

structured around the binary logics of human/inhuman and

security/insecurity. The implicit dichotomies inherent in the

human security concept reveal how certain practices or

discourses in our (Western) reality are ‘privileged as a

higher reality, a regulative ideal, and the [other] term is

understood only in a derivative and negative way, as a failure

to live up to this ideal and as something that endangers this

ideal’. (Ashley, 1998: 230) In this sense, human security

should be viewed as an expression of the changing nature of

power in liberal modernity, and how this has resulted in the

exclusion or domination of the ‘other’ or

underdeveloped/insecure. The essay will first explore the

liberal idea of ‘the human’ and how this has influenced human

4

200519519 PIED5213M

security strategy. Using Foucault’s concept of biopolitics, it

will then assess how the this idea of the modern human has

excluded other life forms, the ‘inhuman’, in the human

security field, notably refugees and those living with

infectious diseases.

Finally, the essay will look into the merging of security and

insecurity, concentrating especially on security’s association

with liberal development strategy and how this has mutated

into an omnipotent governance technology, wherein our concept

of what it is to be ‘insecure’ has lost all meaning and

potential to empower the vulnerable and marginalised.

Ultimately, the ‘human security discourse harbours an inherent

analytic conservatism… [It] reveals the acceptance of specific

cultural norms about what it means to be a “good” analyst’.

(Grayson, 2008: 394) Thus this essay will attempt to break out

of these cultural restraints and question the very practices

that bring theories into existence and practice.

Locating the ‘human’ in human security

5

200519519 PIED5213M

Ultimately the notion of ‘human security’ rests upon certain

normative assumptions about what it is to be human. By

investigating the ontological premises through which a liberal

idea of ‘security’ has emerged, scholars can better understand

the limits and potential benefits of ‘human security’ as a

concept. Whilst the metaphysics that underpins political,

social, and anthropological theory is indeterminate and

subject to constant reconfiguration, the modern liberal mode

of thinking about ‘the human’ has become, since the

Enlightenment, ‘so deeply embedded in Western consciousness

that many adherents refuse to accept it as a “mode” of

thinking at all’. (Shy, 1986: 184-5) The construction of the

‘liberal human’ in modern political and sociological thought

has its origins in the writings of the various rationalist and

empirical philosophers, notably Descartes, Kant, Hobbes, Locke

and Mill. Central to their philosophical writings was the

resolute belief in man’s individualistic, rational, and

autonomous position in the centre of his anthropocentric

universe. To be truly liberated was to realize ‘the conscious

development of one’s own power’, (Nielsen, 1977: 152-3) and

this freedom would be instrumental ‘for extending our mastery

6

200519519 PIED5213M

over the physical and social worlds’. (McCarthy, 1995: 246)

Man’s mastery and rational-positivist thinking has been

translated into our engineering of the natural world,

continuous techno-scientific revolutions, and the gradual

expansion of urbanisation and the global free market. Most

significantly, however, out of man’s reason and desire for

peaceful progress came the construction of the central

hierarchical opposition in global politics,

sovereignty/anarchy. Man’s creation of and trust in the state

is a crucial turning point in the liberal West’s advancement

into contemporary civilisation.

These processes have characterised the Western program of

modernity and predominant in this program has been the liberal

emphasis on the notion of progress, regarded as the single

most important idea in Western civilisation. (Nisbet, 1980: 4)

Linking the notions of progress and liberal civilisation

theory together, Bowden has found that at the centre of these

paradigms is the belief in attaining ‘individual and social

perfectability in which the dangers and uncertainties of the

Hobbesian war of all against all are left behind in favour of

7

200519519 PIED5213M

the relative safety and security of civil or civilised

society’. (2011: 122) Bowden illuminates the inextricable

connection between the rational man, the state, and security,

tangible concepts that are held together by this notion of

progress or development. Implicit in liberal thought is the

belief that through the emancipation of the rational man,

violence and insecurity will be overcome as the desire for

progress becomes the overall ambition of civilised society in

the state. Conservative theorist Popper wrote that ‘reason is

the only alternative to violence so far discovered’. (1994:

69) From this foundation Popper thus advocated progressive

social engineering as a means of securing the individual and

the ‘open society’. Various forms of social engineering have

been used by the developed world in their global governance

agenda since the colonial era, and these policies have been

empirical and universalist in nature. Williams (1998: 213)

believes that the liberal techno-political method has emerged

as a ‘social practice’, where in which the collection of data,

the formulation of causalities and the emphasis on risk

calculation in ‘insecure’ and ‘uncivilised’ regions is an

expression of the liberal ‘quest for certainty’ (Toulmin,

8

200519519 PIED5213M

1990) through use of science and reason. The expansion of the

liberal global governance ‘field’ now includes a number of

risk assessment and ‘security measuring’ organisations such as

the International Risk Governance Council, whilst NGO’s and

security companies now spend large amounts of their funding on

processing collected data on humans in the South in an effort

to respond to empirically predicted insecurities.

Consequently, the human security debate has limited its

respective field to ‘seeking precision, causality and

universalism through measures of human (in)security’ (Grayson,

2008: 397) which is the unquestioned liberal methodology of

global politics. Yet, as Grayson highlights, ‘body counts,

generalized poverty models and epidemiological data may reveal

the biological limits and distributions that define our

species, but they remain silent on what makes us human(e)’.

(2008: 396) The Western calculations of human need in the

underdeveloped world are distorted by the limits of its own

social experience ‘in this tiny zone of safety known as the

developed world’. (Ignatieff, 1984: 29) Moreover, the

ontological foundations of liberalism tend to ignore the

9

200519519 PIED5213M

particularities of humans and their security needs. As Hayek

wrote, knowledge in human societies is contingent to

particular times and places and ‘not given to anyone in

totality’, (1948: 78) regardless of the rational man’s

cerebral capabilities. Human security as a liberal

‘civilising’ mission uses scientific and technical knowledge

as a means of changing people’s ‘work habits, living patterns,

moral conduct and world view’ (Scott, 1998: 89) which glosses

over the unpredictability, complexity, and diversity of the

social and of the human.

Mehta is particularly critical of the liberal ‘civilising’

mission; non-Western peoples are characterised as incomplete

or somehow lacking the necessary requirements for a proper

existence. (1999: 126) Duffield, too, argues that

developmental agencies seek to ‘proselytize the attitudes and

behaviour that liberal states deem to reflect acceptable as

opposed to unacceptable ways of life’. (2010: 57) The shift

away from community (primitive) based societies to the

atomisation of the Cartesian human in liberally constructed

state-society entities reflects the ‘human’ side of the ‘human

10

200519519 PIED5213M

security’ agenda. Yet it is this constant emphasis on progress

and development, the liberal dialectical trajectory, that

induces the West to cast moral judgement on the ‘other’ or

underdeveloped peoples as requiring an epistemological

epiphany of ‘reason’, prodded by the West itself, which will

launch them into wealth and civility.

However, by remaining fixed on one form of the ‘authentic’

civil human, the human security agenda excludes what falls

outside of this conception. Securing the de-communalised,

disembodied self also becomes a mission to exclude or

securitise the ‘inhuman’ or subaltern, those who remain on the

periphery of the liberal utopian dream and, in many eyes,

threaten to dismantle it. Through liberalism’s inclusion of

all those they deem acceptable humans, they implicitly or

explicitly alienate the marginalised and voiceless who are the

most insecure of all.

The construction of the ‘inhuman’

Human security discourse is shaped by and simultaneously

reproduces an exclusionary and subjective classification of

11

200519519 PIED5213M

the human to be secured. Human security as a concept will

therefore continue to be analytically flawed as long as it is

applied under its masquerade of universality and all-

inclusiveness. Rather than emancipating and empowering, the

human security programme operates through the victimisation,

securitisation or marginalisation of voiceless and inhuman

life forms. By using Derrida’s method of deconstructing

hierarchical oppositions, the examination of the ‘inhuman’ in

our political and social worlds will expose the power

relations inherent in the notion of human security.

A number of critiques in the human security literature have

expanded this idea of the ‘inhuman’ to include women,

homosexuals, refugees, migrants and internally displaced

people, the poor, and those living with HIV or AIDs. These

classifications, indicative of the empiricist mode of

thinking, serve to disqualify certain peoples from the

political and the social. Rather, some are victimised, some

securitised, and some are completely excluded from the

security-development agenda. From this perspective, the

concept of human security is representative of, and

analytically pregnant with, the West’s ultimate biopolitical

12

200519519 PIED5213M

power to classify and (de)politicise/securitise certain humans

who are ‘othered’ in our political discourses. Within human

security scholarship the us/them dichotomy is usually implicit

within the text, in which the Western theorist measures the

subaltern or inhuman experience through reductionist

comparisons with the Western modernity experience. Thus,

within the current human security symposium, the ‘other’ is

really a ‘blindspot where understanding and knowledge is

blocked’. (Maggio, 2007: 433) Hence, as Benjamin (1968) has

argued, the Western scholar must always be aware of the

‘inaccessibility’ of knowledge of the inhuman, whether that is

a refugee or someone living with AIDS. This inaccessibility

can only be overcome through ‘translation’ rather than seeking

an imaginary knowledge, in other words, a desire to understand

rather than know.

Foucault’s examination of (biopolitical) power relationships

in political discourse and policy is particularly enlightening

when studying human security. Whilst he does not provide his

own definition of power, Foucault highlights how power

relations are both conditions and effects of the production of

truth about human beings. Using his central dichotomy of

13

200519519 PIED5213M

power/knowledge, Foucault illustrates how relations of power

exist where ‘some people try to determine the conduct of

others [from] states of domination’. (1997: 300) The ultimate

form of power which developed as a distinct aspect of

modernity is biopolitics, where in which states or those in

power manage and engineer life forms in both a physical and

political sense. From a Foucauldian perspective, human

security is the ultimate biopolitical form of governance,

where the human is taken as the subject to be secured.

Consequently, the means of domination over the underdeveloped

world are gradually perfected under the veil of the West’s

moral emancipation mission - ‘the dark side of the modern

civilising process’. (Honneth, 1995: 178)

Philosopher Giorgio Agamben has expanded on Foucault’s notion

of biopolitics and power/knowledge relations to highlight the

exclusion or depoliticisation of stateless (inhuman) peoples.

In his discussion on refugees and their position in the

biopolitical framework, Agamben writes that stateless life

forms ‘find themselves in the unfortunate position of being

rendered the negative counterpart of the citizen,

paradoxically included in political matters only be virtue of

14

200519519 PIED5213M

their exclusion’. (1998) through this dichotomy of

citizen/refugee, processes of dehumanisation operate under the

banner of human security by removing the political agency of

‘victims’ of insecurity. If the liberal notion of what it is

to be a modern human (a citizen) rests upon one’s inclusion in

the political and social realms, then, by such a logic, when

one’s voice becomes ‘empty of political content’ (Nyers, 2006:

50) they cease to be regarded as ‘human’. Agamben classifies

this as ‘bare life’, and nowhere is this more apparent than in

the refugee camp.

In Gheciv’s research on the effects of the Balkans war, he

notes how the Bosnians and Kosovars were depicted as ‘passive

subjects’, whilst the tutelary international organisations

were endowed with a significant degree of agency and

biopolitcal power. (2006: 107) Bare life was produced as ‘the

protected are objectified, presented as victims, who must rely

upon – and, therefore, subordinate themselves to – the

international protectors if they are to survive’. (2006: 107)

The process of becoming a refugee highlights these dehumanising

tendencies of the human security agenda. When refugees began

crossing the borders into Macedonia during the Balkans war

15

200519519 PIED5213M

they were ‘stripped of their vehicles, their money, and their

documents… leaving them in possession of only their lives’.

(Edkins, 2000: 16) These ‘invisible human beings, stateless,

landless, and derelict…’ (Dalrymple, 1999: 1) were given

‘humanitarian’ rather than refugee status under the Macedonian

government, which, according to Daniel Puillet-Breton of

Action Against Hunger, meant that they had ‘no civil rights,

no human rights, no access to health services or legal

advice’. (Hooper, 1999: 16)

Anthropological research into the production of bare life also

sheds light on the inherent instability of the human security

notion. In Pereira’s harrowing findings from the Fraternidade

Assistencial Lucas Evangelista (FALE) in Brazil for AIDS

sufferers, he casts the institution as a ‘zone of social

abandonment’ where the desire to contain insecure and

in(fected)human life forms overshadows the inhabitants’

silence on their experiences of insecurity. (2008: 33) Pereira

thus finds himself, the anthropologist, emerging in the ‘space

in which we question what is human’, and through this he

challenges the a priori definition of humanity and opens up

various points of view by interviewing the infected

16

200519519 PIED5213M

cohabitants of FALE. (2008: 49) Pereira’s work on AIDS victims

exemplifies the inherent fear of ‘contamination’ of the human

by the inhuman, and it is this anxiety that forces the

creation of such institutions or camps. This anxiety is

ultimately represented in text through the use of binary

oppositions.

The ‘camp’ or institution hence becomes a spatial

representation of biopolitical power, whilst those inside it

are rendered non-political, and therefore non-human, passive

objects to be secured. In these ‘zones of indistinction’,

sovereignty and governmentality bind together in a nexus much

like security and development do. This nexus becomes most

evident in ‘complex emergencies’, where whole arrays of actors

join the field to control and manipulate forms of life in

various states of chaos. Thus there is a contradiction

inherent in the discourse of human security which compromises

its analytical utility; the reclassification of humans to

refugees or AIDS sufferers denies them a place in the

normative space of ‘citizenry’. Thus whilst human security

attempts to secure and enforce order, it simultaneously

induces insecurity and dehumanisation for those the powers are

17

200519519 PIED5213M

trying to ‘make live’. This is one of the key aporias of human

security. (Burke, 2002) For the concept of human security to

be truly understood, further investigation into the various

classifications of different insecure groups and how they are

controlled is required. There is a worry that in classing this

new agenda as general ‘human’ security, other, more particular

and context-specific forms of insecurity (refugee insecurity,

undocumented migrant insecurity, etc.) may be glossed over.

This critique has been elevated by postmodern feminist writers

who have highlighted the masculinised notion of the ‘human’

and the over-generalised concept of security which, arguably,

does not sufficiently address female-specific security issues.

Peterson and Parisi (1999) have argued that the construction

of the ‘human’ as a rational and political agent is

exclusionary to women as such a status has historically been

available only to heterosexual, white males. Thus, the notion

of the ‘liberal human’ as the ‘rational man’ denies women, gay

people, and ethnic minorities an ‘authoritative status of

personhood’. Derrida’s deconstruction is once again useful in

highlighting these inherent hierarchies between different

classifications of humans. For instance, whilst reason and

18

200519519 PIED5213M

rationality have always been associated with the male,

irrationality and emotion has historically been associated

with the female. It is in this light, as Mackenzie and Stoljar

reveal, that human security is in fact complicit with

structures of domination and subordination, in particular with

‘the suppression of others – women, colonial subjects, blacks,

minority groups – who are deemed incapable of achieving

rational self-mastery’. (2000: 11)

By continuing to allow just one, totalising, idea of the

developed human to inform human security policy, other groups

are hence pushed out into the peripheries of liberal

modernity. Nevertheless, such critiques also risk fragmenting

the already confused human security concept into various

specific security classifications; female security, gay

security, infected security, minority security, etc. It

remains to be seen whether compartmentalising the human

security framework in this way would be more useful for

scholarship and policy-making.

Securing ‘security’ in ‘human security’

19

200519519 PIED5213M

Like ‘the human’, the notion of security rests within

discursive fields that ‘convey various hierarchies, forms of

temporary stability and different geographical foci in which

the very meanings and boundaries of security are constantly

negotiated, contested and therefore potentially changed’.

(Stritzel, 2011: 346) It is well known in International

Relations scholarship that security is a highly contested

term, and the emergence of varying schools of thought on this

topic reflects that truism. Rather than attempt to formulate a

concise definition of security, this discussion will examine

the expanding human security field and its relation to

development policy in the global governance network. Any

investigation into the concept of human security should

include its association with the liberal development agenda,

for the safety of humans has become inextricably linked with

the development or improvement of the social, economic, and

political realms of ‘vulnerable’ or ‘fragile’ states.

A complex array of power dynamics are at work in the new

security framework, and these relations of power play a new

and broader role in global governance. Development has now

become just as much a security issue for the West than a moral

20

200519519 PIED5213M

one, and coinciding with this reclassification has been the

increase in the number of actors involved in this agenda. No

longer are states the only institutions with which security

politics can be formulated and executed. International

organisations (IOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs),

charities and private military companies (PMCs) have joined

the security-development field. In light of this, human

security should be analysed in the postmodern context of

globalisation and network politics. Power in this sense has

expanded and is distributed among new players on the field,

resulting in competing knowledges. Yet this network or field

is already playing under rules or norms which have been

crystallized by the liberal security-development mission. The

adherents to these norms have large amounts of physical and

cultural capital, thereby pushing alternative security or

development agendas to the periphery. Consequently, human

security can be viewed as the engineering of the global

development trajectory – an ‘uneasy merger of human

development and peace themes, via the bridge of the term of

“security”’. (Gasper, 2005: 221)

21

200519519 PIED5213M

A post-structuralist reading of ‘security’ unearths its ‘dual

descriptive-normative nature’. (Prodanov, 2008: 11) Security’s

ontology cannot be pinned down, it has produced its own

metalanguage with an infinite array of associated meanings or

signifiers; security ‘lies at the confluence of countless

semantic rivers’. (Levinas, 2003: 11-12) As Prodanov

highlights, whilst security describes protection from danger,

it also represents other ideals like ‘justice’, ‘freedom’ and

‘equality’. (2008: 13) The meaning of contemporary security

is, from this perspective, conterminous with liberalism’s

central tenets; it now ‘reflects through its meaning the

differences between ideologies, religions and world outlooks’.

(Prodanov, 2008: 13) Of all its various associated concepts,

however, security is now closely concomitant with the notion

of development, resulting in the so-called ‘security-

development nexus’ (See Duffield, 2001) Included within this

relationship is the treatment of vulnerabilities or emerging

complex emergencies to fortify the state and its people to

withstand threats to their security and development.

The binding of these two concepts together has resulted in a

chicken or egg dilemma for scholars and policy-makers, where

22

200519519 PIED5213M

one cannot be achieved without the other. But rather than

viewing these two concepts as mutually exclusive, they are in

fact mutually reinforcing. Development, as ‘progress’, has

always been imbued with the desire to bring about stability

and security to counter the chaos of dialectical

transformations. In the contemporary world, security is

required to ease the disorder engendered by the liberal

engineering of ‘underdeveloped’ states and regions, notably

unemployment, impoverishment and environmental degradation.

(Cowen and Shenton, 1995) Development, like security, has

acquired its own hegemonic discourse which has constructed the

‘underdeveloped’ world by connecting interventionist and

managerial power with established empirical truths or

knowledges about the ‘other’. The result of this amalgamation

is the liberal ‘global governance’ network or system.

Using Bourdieu’s sociological framework, the global governance

system and its human security agenda can be interpreted as an

intellectual and political ‘field’ where the number of

actors/players has, since the 1990s, greatly expanded. This

field has generated its own ‘habitus’ or modes of thinking and

behaviour about security and development. The dominant or

23

200519519 PIED5213M

normative habitus is the empirical/positivist attitude towards

international development and security policy. This has

determined the way in which the various actors compete with

each other to gain capital or power within this field, for

example the acquirement of funding or contracts to begin

working in specific states or regions. New forms of

interaction and subordination are emerging between traditional

and non-traditional (state/non-state) actors within this

field, where the ‘security concerns of metropolitan states

have merged with the social concerns of aid agencies’.

(Duffield, 2005: 208) This merger has resulted in a ‘reworking

of international power and its projection through non-

territorial networks and private systems of calculation’.

(Duffield, 2005: 214) These ‘systems of calculation’ are

reproducing the established liberal mode of thought, where the

application of scientific methodology is used to assess ‘risk’

in the social world. Hence the security or ‘risk’ field has

broadened to include particular forms of knowledge:

statistics, management, accounting, etc. Consequently, the

human security field itself has now been liberalised. We are

witnessing a ‘new public management’ where agencies and

24

200519519 PIED5213M

organisations, etc. are expected to deliver good results and

services, much like any other human services industry. These

organisations are ‘governed through contracts, targets,

performance measures, quality assessments…’ not through the

humans themselves. (2005: 213)

These macrolevel securing or developmental measures have been

concentrated on removing the potential risks to state failure

or conflict. Yet this calls into question of what exactly is

the primary object to be secured – the individual, or the

state? Whilst advocates of human security have praised the

apparent shift from state to human, evidence suggests that in

many ways the state remains the referent object to be secured

by the West and its various security agencies. There is an

interesting paradox at play, particularly in complex

emergencies, whereby the influential role played by NGOS and

IO’s shows that states cannot fulfil their duty or function,

but at the same time reinforces the conception that the state-

citizen relationship is the ‘normal’ political relationship;

humanitarian acts occur only in a temporary space of

exception. (Watson, 2011: 9)

25

200519519 PIED5213M

Parekh (1997: 56) argues that human security both ‘presupposes

and simultaneously subverts the statist manner of thinking’.

However, rather than subverting the traditional state security

thinking, human security policy actually reaffirms the West’s

Hobbesian reliance on, and belief in, the necessity of a

strong state to ensure security from anarchy. Few have

challenged the liberal state model since the 1990s or the

conditionality approach they have taken to human security

interventions. Paris (2002) cites cases in Rwanda, El

Salvador, Nicaragua and Bosnia where the human security

network has engineered state constitutions, trained police,

reformed economic structures and enforced democratic elections

– all in the name of human security. Ultimately, the notion of

development has transmogrified into a form of planetary global

governance where statehood and relief for emergencies in the

South is conditional upon social (liberal) reconstruction. In

this sense, then, the concept of human security is, by

definition, inherently flawed. The ‘human’ is largely

conditional upon, and secondary to, the state.

This desire to predict and control possible or potential

security threats through the use of non-state actors presents

26

200519519 PIED5213M

to some a worrying new development in the global governance

agenda of the West. Chandler (2007) has problematized this

phenomenon with regards to the shift in policy accountability

away from traditional centres of power. He posits that the

inclusion of non-state agents in the human security agenda is

because states would rather disengage from serious policy-

making. (2007: 363) This has led to what Chandler coins as

‘anti-foreign policy’; a disconnection between policy rhetoric

and policy interests. (2007: 364) The rhetoric he refers to is

usually backed up by some moral purpose, yet few resources are

put behind such policies.

Those who agree with Chandler’s indictment, that states rarely

translate human security rhetoric into political practice,

have concluded that human security is thus conceptually

useless or simply a bunch of hot air (Paris, 2001). Yet, there

is no reason to suggest that the conceptual worth of human

security should be determined by the frequency of which it is

practiced by states. The inclusion of non-state actors and

their professionalization of risk calculation should instead

be classed as distinct aspects of human security, and further

enquiry should be made into how much influence these private

27

200519519 PIED5213M

organisations have if human security is going to be better

understood as a contemporary and cosmopolitan political

concept. As Cox aptly wrote on the subject of critical theory,

‘one must be aware of allowing a focus upon institutions to

obscure either changes in the relationship of material forces,

or the emergence of ideological challenge to an erstwhile

prevailing order’. (Cox, 1981: 137) It may be states

themselves who are falling outside of the realities of the

human security agenda, rather than being the ones who

determine it.

The human security field has accumulated its own ‘techno-

scientific and social-scientific truth-telling practices of

knowledge’ (Dillon, 2008: 400) whereby the liberal

developmental model has become the ad hoc panacea for weak or

underdeveloped states. The field’s associated methodology for

‘measuring’ vulnerabilities has been adopted by a variety of

organisations in order to formulate hypotheses on what can

induce complex emergencies, state failure, or generally human

‘insecurity’. By adopting technocratic remedies and

behavioural modification, human security professionals have

reduced the insecurities of humans to generalised data sets,

28

200519519 PIED5213M

thus removing the particularities of the human condition in

fragile societies. In the study of this new concept, one must

be wary of the affirmations of modernity that have

‘degenerated into dogmatisms’. (Walker, 1993: 18) These

dogmatisms of what it means to be ‘secure’ or ‘developed’

should not cloud the hermeneutical potential of critical or

deconstructionist investigations into human security. To

unveil these regimes of truth or ‘truth-telling practices of

knowledge’, we must dissolve the boundaries between the

central dichotomies of secure/insecure and

developed/underdeveloped.

Who is insecure?

These ideals of being ‘secure’ and ‘developed’ have informed a

disciplinary practice and theory of politics whereby meaning

can only be constituted by creating boundaries inside and

outside the dialectics of ‘progress’. Brincat has posited that

by establishing these boundaries, we have created a ‘false

duality that does not adequately grasp the interconnectedness,

the unity of these dialectical categories’. (2009: 466)

Rather, the West is studying or attempting to modify the

progress of the underdeveloped world without appreciating that

29

200519519 PIED5213M

in fact the two worlds or oppositions are part of one

dialectical process. The interplay between security and

insecurity, and development and underdevelopment, is, or

should be considered, a significant component of human

security analysis. A central concern in human security

scholarship should thus be how to destabilise these seemingly

opposed categories ‘by showing how they are at once mutually

constitutive and yet always in the process of dissolving into

one another’. (Walker, 1993: 25)

The blurring between security and insecurity is particularly

exemplified when interpreting human security as a distinctly

Western (in)security strategy rather than a universal humanitarian agenda.

Upon reaching the apotheosis of its political, economic, and

social development after the Cold War, Western states’ focus

began to shift towards the complex emergencies that were

engulfing underdeveloped states in the South. Civil and ethnic

conflicts, famine, and disease not only caused the deaths of

millions, but also created major refugee crises, regional

instability, and, most significantly, the collapse of states.

Failing states have emerged as new ‘threats’ to Western

security as they fall prey to the ‘shadow economies’ that deal

30

200519519 PIED5213M

in drugs, guns and human-trafficking, whilst also having the

potential to provide sanctuary to terrorist organisations. The

borderless nature of these dangers – refugee movements, the

selling of guns and drugs, transnational terrorism – has

forced the West to reconsider its security position vis-à-vis

the global South and the threats posed by its instability.

This change in security strategy was supplemented by the

publication of various grand apocalyptic meta-narratives by

political and social theorists in the 1990s, which further

besmirched the image of the South as a black hole of brutality

and chaos. (See Huntington, 1996; Kaplan, 1994)

The West’s securitisation of Southern insecurity represents a

new and strange power inversion, whereby the strongest and

richest states are now threatened or rendered ‘insecure’ by

the most vulnerable and ‘underdeveloped’. There are now

concerns that human security will be, or is, hijacked by the

very rich and powerful in order to hold on to their ‘immature

fantasies of invulnerability’. (Gasper, 2005: 232) Such a

worry explains why human security practice emphasises top-

down, state-level development projects and regional stability

instead of focussing on the humans who are increasingly

31

200519519 PIED5213M

vulnerable and without basic survival needs. Consequently,

whilst the human security concept may well have the patina of

a solely moral and humanitarian outlook, it is questionable as

to whether it represents a movement away from realist security

strategy at all. Rather, the West prioritises its own security

against that of the humans who are the most insecure. Or, as

Burke explains, human security will remain a flawed concept

because it has the ‘ability to have an almost universal appeal

yet name very different arrangements of order and possibility

for different groups of people’. (Burke, 2002: 7) Hence the

descriptive and prescriptive value of ‘insecurity’ for humans

has been compromised by its application by the West to threats

that are international in scale and spectacular by nature.

Lemanski criticises the human security agenda’s ‘overfocus on

global/national spatiality, spectacular temporality,

collective subjectivity and state-led strategies’ on the

grounds that real and recurrent human insecurity is largely

found with the ‘urban dwellers in the South [who] demonstrate

human (in)security at the bottom-down micro-scale of the

everyday’. (2012: 62) Lemanski’s work identifies a

‘spectacular/everyday’ anomaly, one which is frequently

32

200519519 PIED5213M

missing from human security literature but highlights another

important flaw in the notion of human security – the absence

of the human experience of insecurity, or, rather, the

prioritisation of quantitative insecurity over qualitative

insecurity. Whilst the UN Development Reports emphasises the

importance of security concerns in people’s ‘daily lives’,

policy is usually dictated by distant and unexpected ‘threats’

that divert international attention from the less ‘sexy’

problems of insecurity i.e. crime, urban segregation,

unemployment, and poverty.

An anthropological approach to human security research and

analysis could remedy this issue. By introducing cultural and

sociological relativism to human security study, there will be

greater appreciation for the complexity and particularism of

individual experiences of insecurity which will serve to

improve the field’s relevance to contemporary problems of

vulnerability. Anthropologists Winslow and Eriksen are

optimistic about the potential benefits of this holistic

methodology. They argue that an anthropocentric viewpoint will

unearth how insecurity is expressed through symbolic and

social processes, whilst also revealing how ‘people combat

33

200519519 PIED5213M

insecurity through the use of multiple resources and

identities’.(2004: 362) By exposing the capabilities of the

(in)human in the realm of the insecure, more effective, top-

down human security projects can be implemented in local

contexts.

Winslow and Eriksen’s short but instructive essay discloses

the tensions between the objective and subjective modes of

knowledge inherent in the notion of human security. To be able

to integrate these opposing forms of understanding was a key

concern of Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology, which observed that

the ‘double truth’ of the objective and subjective constituted

‘the whole truth of the social world’. (Bourdieu and Wacquant,

1992: 255) In breaking down this dualism, Bourdieu denounced

positivist (objectivist) enquiries into sociological phenomena

because they were merely representations of the arbitrary

constructions of the ‘scientist’ himself. (Sulkunen, 1982:

103) In the context of human security analysis, statistical

patterns serve the interests of the security professionals

rather than the humans deemed insecure. Rather, human security

as a concept denies the reality that insecurity is a fluid,

subjective, and largely inexpressible emotion.

34

200519519 PIED5213M

However, those who are most vulnerable do not exist in the

normative political space where these experiences can be

voiced. As aforementioned, those who are ‘othered’ by their

classification i.e. refugee, AIDS victim, the homeless, play

no role in the formulation of human security policies. Rather,

they are securitised, marginalised or rendered bare life. Just

like the securitisation of the underdeveloped by the West on

the international stage, the problems of insecurity are being

externalised and contained in national or local settings. This

attempt to plug the ‘spread’ of insecurity has been most

apparent, for example, in the increasingly fragmented urban

landscapes of the global South. Like the secured borders of

Western states, the middle-classes in megacities have

relocated to ‘gated communities’ that are protected by

security officers, whilst also offering its residents private

swimming pools and tennis clubs. These communities are

particularly popular in cities with high crime rates, such as

Cape Town or Bangalore, and offer security to those who do not

want to face the insecurities emanating from the ‘others’ in

the slums. The erected walls and gates symbolise, like

territorial borders, the fear and insecurity that those who

35

200519519 PIED5213M

are most secure feel towards their antithesis. In this sense,

the boundaries of insecurity can be stretched to include

everyone, rich (secure) or poor (insecure). The fortification

of territorial borders to prevent the entry of refugees or the

erection of gated communities to barrier the rich from the

criminal poor are symbolic of how security and insecurity

dissolve into each other, rendering both terms meaningless and

at the same time highlighting their interconnectedness.

Conclusions

The debates surrounding human security’s analytical utility

have gone stale. An overemphasis on finding a definition has

limited the transformative potential of this concept. In

concurrence with Rosenau and Durgee, ‘definitional exactness

is not the only criterion of thinking theoretically and it may

not even be a necessary requirement for such a thought’.

(2000: 226) By limiting its definitional boundaries to a fixed

meaning or specific range of issues, the notion of human

security may provide ‘a false sense of security, a misguided

confidence that once one is equipped with a clear-cut

definition, one needs only to organise one’s empirical

materials in the proper way’. (Rosenau and Durfee, 2000: 226)

36

200519519 PIED5213M

As the discussion has revealed, empirical data regarding human

security and its ‘definitional exactness’ does not necessarily

justify its utility, nor does it adequately reflect human

experience. Instead, by using Derrida’s deconstructionist

method, the analyst can expose how ‘meaning systems are

precarious, self-defeating and only strive for closure without

ever succeeding’. (Waever, 1996: 180)

As this investigation has discovered, it is impossible to

stabilise the ontological foundations of the ‘human’ and

‘security’, and therefore any analysis of the notion of human

security will be varied and inconsistent. Rather, by exploring

the dualisms of human/inhuman, security/insecurity, we can

better engage with the underlying social, political, and

cultural processes by which our, or Western, understanding of

‘human security’ is constructed. Whilst human security may be

analytically flawed in its definitional context, it is

undoubtedly useful in bringing to light the changing nature of

the security-development field, its association with the

global governance network and, most significantly, the

muddying between our conceptions of what it is to be secure

and insecure. From this perspective, the elevation of human

37

200519519 PIED5213M

security to the forefront of international politics is

indicative of the uncertainty that defines modernity. Yet this

uncertainty exists in both reality and fantasy; the most

vulnerable continue to experience everyday insecurities that

are widely ignored by the most powerful who focus their agenda

on the abstract, distant and apocalyptic threats to their own

security.

Biblography

Acharya, A. 2004. A Holistic Paradigm. Security Dialogue. 35(3), pp. 355-356.

Alkire, S. 2003. A Conceptual Framework for Human Security. [Online]. Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security, and Ethnicity (CRISE) working paper series no. 2. Oxford: Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford. [Accessed 14th December2013]. Available from: http://www3.qeh.ox.ac.uk/pdf/crisewps/workingpaper2.pdf

38

200519519 PIED5213M

Alkire, S. 2004. A Vital Core That Must be Treated with the Same Gravitas as Traditional Security Threats. Security Dialogue. 35(3), pp. 359-360.

Ashley, R. 1988. Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Readingof the Anarchy Problematique. Millennium: Journal of International Studies. 17(2), pp. 227-62.

Axworthy, L. 2004. A New Scientific Field and Policy Lens. Security Dialogue. 35(3), pp. 348-349.

Ayoob, M. 1995. The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System. London: Lynne Reiners Publishers.

Baines, E. and Paddon, E. 2012. “This Is How We Survived”: Civilian Agency and Humanitarian Protection. Security Dialogue. 43(3), pp. 231-249.

Barry, C. 2012. ‘The Feasible Alternatives Thesis’: Kicking Away the Livelihood of the Global Poor. Philosophy, Politics, and Economics. 11(1), pp. 97-119.

Bauman, Z. and Donskis, L. 2013. Moral Blindness: The Loss of Sensitivity in Liquid Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bay, C. 1968. Needs, Wants and Political Legitimacy. Canadian Journal of Political Science. 1(33), pp. 241-260.

Bayat, A. 2012. Politics in the City – Inside-Out. City and Society. 24(2), pp. 110-129.

Beck, U. 1992. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage Publications.

Bellamy, A. J. and McDonald, M. 2002. “The Utility of Human Security”: Which Humans? What Security? A Reply to Thomas and Tow. Security Dialogue. 33(3), pp. 373-377.

Benjamin, W. 1968. Illuminations. New York: Schocken Books.

39

200519519 PIED5213M

Bhaskar, R. 1979. The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Sciences. 3rd edn. London: Routledge.

Biersteker, T. J. 2010. Interrelationships between Theory and Practice in International Security Studies. Security Dialogue. 41(6), pp. 599-606

Bigo, D. 2002. Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governance of Unease. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political. 27, pp. 63-92.

Bourdieu, P. and Wacquant, L. J. D. 1992. An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.

Bourne, M. and Bulley, D. 2011. Securing the Human in CriticalSecurity Studies: The Insecurity of a Secure Ethics. European Security. 20(3), pp. 453-471.

Bowden, B. 2011. The Thin Ice of Civilization. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political. 36(2), pp. 118-135.

Brincat, S. 2009. Negativity and Open-Endedness in the Dialectic of World Politics. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political. 34, pp. 455-493.

Burge, M. 1996. The Seven Pillars of Popper’s Social Philosophy. Philosophy of the Social Sciences. 26(4), pp. 528-556.

Burke, A. 2002. Aporias of Security. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political. 27(1), pp. 1-27.

Buzan, B. 2004. A Reductionist, Idealist Notion That Adds Little Analytical Value. Security Dialogue. 35(3), pp. 369-370.

Cain, M. 2000. Orientalism, Occidentalism and the Sociology ofCrime. In: D. Garland, D. and Sparks, R. eds. Criminology and Social Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 71–102.

Cammack, P. 2009. Poverty Reduction and Universal Competitiveness. Labour, Capital and Society. 42(1), pp. 35-54.

40

200519519 PIED5213M

Ceyhan, A. and Tsoukala, A. 2002. The Securitization of Migration in Western Societies: Ambivalent Discourses and Policies. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political. 27, pp. 21-39.

Chabal, P. 2009. Africa: The Politics of Suffering and Smiling. South Africa: University of Kwazulu National Press.

Chandler, D. 2012. Resilience and Human Security: The Post-Interventionist Paradigm. Security Dialogue. 43(3), pp. 213-229.

Chandler, D. 2007. The Security-Development Nexus and the Riseof ‘Anti-Foreign Policy’. Journal of International Relations and Development. 10, pp. 362-386.

Cochran, M. 1999. Normative Theory in International Relations. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

Cowen, M. and Shenton, R. 1995. The Invention of Development. In: Crush, J. ed. The Power of Development. London: Routledge, pp. 27-44.

Cox, R. W. 1981. Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory. Millennium Journal of International Studies. 10(2), pp. 126-155.

Dalby, S. 2000. Geopolitical Change and Contemporary Security Studies: Contextualising the Human Security Agenda. [Online]. Institute of International Relations working paper series no. 30. British Colombia: University of British Colombia. [Accessed on 12th December 2013]. Available from: http://www.ligi.ubc.ca/sites/liu/files/Publications/webwp30.pdf

Dalrymple, J. 1999. Stateless, Landless, and Derelict: The Forlorn Lost Tribe of Kosovo. Independent. 3rd April, p. 1.

Davies, J. C. 1977. The Development of Individuals and the Development of Polities. In: Fitzgerald, R. ed. Human Needs and Politics. Oxford: Pergamon Press Ltd, pp. 74-96.

Davis, M. 2006. Planet of Slums. London: Verso.

41

200519519 PIED5213M

Dillon, M. 1996. Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought. London: Routledge.

Dillon, M., 2008. What Makes the World Dangerous?. In: Jenkins, E. and Zehfuss. eds. Global Politics: A New Introduction. London: Routledge, pp. 397-426.

Dillon, M. and Lobo-Guernero, L. 2008. Biopolitics of Securityin the 21st century: An Introduction. Review of International Studies. 34, pp. 265-292.

Dornelles, F. K. 2002. Postmodernism and IR: From Disparate Critique to a Coherent Theory of Global Politics. [Online]. Global Politics Network. [Accessed 5th December 2013]. Available from: http://www.globalpolitics.net/essays/Krause_Dornelles.pdf

Duffield, M. 2001. Global Governance and the New Wars. London: Zed Books Ltd.

Duffield, M. 2005. Governing the Borderlands: Decoding the Power of Aid. In: Wilkinson, R. ed. The Global Governance Reader. London: Routledge, pp. 204-216.

Duffield, M. 2007. Development, Territories, and People: Consolidating the External Sovereign Frontier. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political. 32, pp. 225-248.

Duffield, M. 2010. The Liberal Way of Development and the Development-Security Impasse: Exploring the Global Life ChanceDivide. Security Dialogue. 41(1), pp. 53-76.

Eagleton-Pierce, M. 2011. Advancing a Reflexive International Relations. Millennium. 39(3), pp. 805-823.

Edkins, J. 2000. Sovereign Power, Zones of Indistinction, and the Camp. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political. 25(1), pp. 3-25.

Eidenstadt, S. N. 2000. Multiple Modernities. Daedelus. 129(1),pp. 1-29.

42

200519519 PIED5213M

Eriksen, T. H. 2005. Risking Security: Paradoxes of Social Cohesion. [Online]. Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 15th March, Amsterdam. [Accessed 13th December 2013]. Available from: http://folk.uio.no/geirthe/Security.html

Fawaz, M. Practicing (In)Security in the City. City and Society. 24(2), pp. 105-109.

Foucault, M. 1997. The Ethics of the Concern for the Self as aPractice of Freedom. In: Rabinow,P. ed. Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth.New York: The New Press, pp. 281-302.

Fukuyama, F. 2004. State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century. New York: Cornell University Press.

Gasper, D. 2005. Securing Humanity: Situating ‘Human Security’as Concept and Discourse. Journal of Human Development. 6(2), pp. 221-245.

Gheciv, A. 2006. “Civilizing” Balkans, Protecting Europe: The International Politics of Reconstruction in Bosnia and Kosovo.In: Huysman, J., Dobson, A. and Prokhovnik, R. eds. The Politics of Protection: Sites of Insecurity and Political Agency, pp. 101-122.

Graham, S. 2012. Foucault’s Boomerang: The New Military Urbanism? Development Dialogue. (58), pp. 37-49.

Grayson, K. 2004. A Challenge to the Power over Knowledge of Traditional Security Studies. Security Dialogue. 35(3), p. 357.

Grayson, K. 2008. Human Security as Power/Knowledge: the biopolitics of a definitional debate. Cambridge Review of International Affairs. 21(3), pp. 384-401.

Haber, H. F. 1994. Beyond Postmodern Politics: Lyotard, Rorty, and Foucault.London: Routledge.

Hampson, F. O. 2004. A Concept in Need of a Global Policy Response. Security Dialogue. 35(3), pp. 349-350.

Hayek, F. A. 1948. Individualism and Economic Order. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

43

200519519 PIED5213M

Hilgers, M. 2012. The Historicity of the Neoliberal State. Social Anthropology. 20(1), pp. 80-94.

Hirst, A. 2011. Ordeals of Resistance: Derrida, Deconstruction, Aporia. [Online]. In: BISA Annual Conference, 27th-29th April, Manchester. [Accessed 5th December 2013]. Available from:https://www.academia.edu/595369/Ordeals_of_Resistance_Derrida_Deconstruction_Aporia>

Holbrook, D. 1977. Politics and the Need for Meaning. In: Fitzgerald, R. ed. Human Needs and Politics. Oxford: Pergamon PressLtd, pp. 174-194.

Honneth, A. 1994. Foucault’s Theory of Society. In: Kelly, M. ed. Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate. Massachusetts: MIT Press, pp. 157-185.

Hooper, J. 1999. Powerless UN Looks On As Refugee Crisis Grows. Observer. 11th April, p. 16.

Hubert, D. 2004. An Idea That Works in Practice. Security Dialogue. 35(3), pp. 351-352.

Hudson, H. 2005. “Doing” Security as Though Humans Matter: A Feminist Perspective on Gender and the Politics of Human Security. Security Dialogue. 36(2), pp. 155-174.

Huntington, S. 1996. The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order. London: Simon & Schuster UK Ltd.

Huysman, J. 2002. Defining Social Constructivism in Security Studies: The Normative Dilemma of Writing Security. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political. 27, pp. 41-62.

Huysman, J. 2005. Agency and the Politics of Protection: Implications for Security Studies. In: Huysman, J., Dobson, A.and Prokhovnik, R. eds. The Politics of Protection: Sites of Insecurity and Political Agency, pp. 1-19.

Ignatieff, M. 1984. The Needs of Strangers. New York: Picador.

44

200519519 PIED5213M

Jentleson, B. W. The Need for Praxis: Bringing Policy Relevance Back In. International Security. 26(4), pp. 169-183.

Johnson, C. G. 2011. The Urban Precariat, Neoliberalization, and the Soft Power of Humanitarian Design. Journal of Developing Societies. 27(3), pp. 445-475.

Johnson, D. P. 1990. Security Versus Autonomy Motivation in Anthony Giddens’ Concept of Agency. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. 20(2), pp. 111-130.

Jones, W. 1999. Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory. London: Lynne Reiner Publications.

Joseph, J. 2010. Poverty Reduction and the New Global Governmentality. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political. 35, pp. 29-51.

Kaltofen, C. 2013. Engaging Adorno: Critical Security Studies After Emancipation. Security Dialogue. 44(1), pp. 37-51.

Kaplan, R. 1994. The Coming Anarchy. Atlantic Monthly. [Online]. 1st February. [Accessed 2nd December 2013]. Available from: http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1994/02/the-coming-anarchy/304670/

Krause, K. and Williams, M. C. 1996. Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods. Mershon International StudiesReview. 40(2), pp. 229-254.

Larrinaga, M. and Doucet, M. G. 2008. Sovereign Power and the Biopolitics of Human Security. Security Dialogue. 39(5), pp. 517-537.

Leaning, J. 2004. Psychosocial Well –Being Over Time. Security Dialogue. 35(3), pp. 354-355.

Lemanski, C. 2012. Every Human (In)Security: Rescaling for theSouthern City. Security Dialogue. 43(1), pp. 61-78.

Levinas, E. 2003. Humanism of the Other. Poller, N. trans. Illinois: University of Illinois Press.

45

200519519 PIED5213M

Liotta, P. H. 2002. Boomerang Effect: The Convergence of National and Human Security. Security Dialogue. 33(4), pp. 473-488.

Loader, I. and Walker, N. 2007. Civilizing Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Macpherson, C. B. 1977. Needs and Wants: An Ontological or Historical Problem? In: Fitzgerald, R. ed. Human Needs and Politics. Oxford: Pergamon Press Ltd, pp. 26-36.

Mackenzie, C. and Stoljar, N. 2000. Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Maggio, J. 2007. “Can the Subaltern Be Heard?”: Political Theory, Translation, Representation, and Gayatri Chakravorty Spirak. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political. 32, pp. 419-434.

Marhia,N. 2013. Some Humans are More Human Than Others?: Troubling the ‘Human’ in Human Security from a Critical Feminist Perspective. Security Dialogue. 44(19), pp. 19-35.

McCarthy, T. 1995. The Critique of Impure Reason: Foucault andthe Frankfurt School. In: Kelly, M. ed. Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate. Massachusetts: MIT Press, pp. 243-283.

McCormack, T. 2008. Power and Agency in the Human Security Framework. Cambridge Review of International Affairs. 21(1), pp. 113-128.

McQuillan, M. 2009. Deconstruction after 9/11. New York: Routledge.

Mehta, U. S. 1999. Liberalism and Empire. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Mustapha, J. 2011. An Analytical Survey of Critical Security Studies: Making theCase for a (Modified) Post-Structuralist Approach. [Online]. York Centre for International Security Studies working paper no. 53. York:University of York. [Accessed 17th December 2013]. Available

46

200519519 PIED5213M

from: http://yciss.info.yorku.ca/files/2012/06/WP53-Mustapha.pdf

Narruzzaman, M. 2006. Paradigms in Conflict: The Contested Claims of Human Security, Critical Theory and Feminism. Cooperation and Conflict. 41(3), pp. 285-303.

Ndi, A. 2011. Why Liberal Capitalism Has Failed to Stimulate aDemocratic Culture in Africa. Journal of Developing Societies. 27(2), pp. 177-200.

Neocleus, M. 2012. “Don’t Be Scared, Be Prepared”: Trauma-Anxiety-Resilience. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political. 37(3), pp. 188-198.

Newman, E. 2004. A Normatively Attractive but Analytically Weak Concept. Security Dialogue. 35(3), pp. 358-359.

Newman, E. 2001. Human Insecurity. International Studies Perspective. 2(3), pp. 239-251.

Nielsen, K. 1977. True Needs, Rationality and Emancipation. In: Fitzgerald, R. ed. Human Needs and Politics. Oxford: Pergamon Press Ltd, pp. 142-157.

Nisbet, R. 1980. History of the Idea of Progress. New York: Basic Books.

Nyers, P. 2006. Taking Rights, Mediating Wrongs: Disagreementsover the Political Agency of Non-Status Refugees. In: Huysman,J., Dobson, A. and Prokhovnik, R. eds. The Politics of Protection: Sites of Insecurity and Political Agency, pp. 48-68.

Oberleitner, G. 2005. Human Security: A Challenge to International Law. Global Governance. 11, pp. 185-203.

Ong, A. 2006. Neoliberalism as exception: Mutations of citizenship and sovereignty. Durham: Duke University Press.

Owen, T. 2004. Human Security – Conflict, Critique and Consensus: Colloquium Remarks and a Proposal for a Threshold-Based Definition. Security Dialogue. 35(3), pp. 373-387.

47

200519519 PIED5213M

Parekh, B. 1997. Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention. International Political Science Review. 18(1), pp. 49–69.

Paris, R. 2001. Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air? International Security. 26(2), pp. 87-102.

Paris, R. 2004. Still an Insatiable Concept. Security Dialogue. 35(3), pp. 370-372.

Pereira, P. P. G. 2008. Anthropology and Human Rights: BetweenSilence and Voice. Anthropology and Humanism. 33(1), pp.38-53.

Pettman, R. 2005. Human Security as Global Security: Reconceptualising Security Studies. Cambridge Review of International Affairs. 18(1), pp. 137-150.

Pogge, T. 2005. Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties. Ethics and International Affairs. 19(1), pp. 55–84.

Popper, K. 1994. The Myth of Framework. Routledge: Oxon.

Prezelj, I. 2008. Challenges in Conceptualizing and Providing Human Security. HUMSEC. (2), pp. 23-45.

Prodanov, V. 2008. The Concept of Security. [Online]. In: XXV Varna International Philosophical School, 1st-3rd June, Bulgaria. [Accessed 19th December 2013]. Available from: http://old-philosophy.issk-bas.org/books/PHILOSOPHY_OF_SECURITY.pdf

Ramel, F. 2007. Human Security and Political Philosophy in theLight of Judith Shklar’s Writing. Human Security Journal. 5, pp. 28-35.

Reid-Henry, S. 2011. Spaces of Security and Development: An Alternative Mapping of the Security-Development Nexus. Security Dialogue. 42, pp. 97-106.

Roche de Coppens, P. 1976. Ideal Man in Classical Sociology. London: The Pennsylvania State University Press.

Rosenau, J. N. and Durfee, M. 2000. Thinking Theory Thoroughly. 2nd edn. Oxford: Westview Press.

48

200519519 PIED5213M

Scott, J. C. 1998. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes toImprove the Human Condition Have Failed. New York: Yale University Press.

Sharma, N. 2003. Travel Agency: A Critique of Anti-TraffickingCampaigns. Refugee: Canada’s Periodical on Refugees. 21(3), pp. 53-65.

Shy, J. 1986. Jomini. In: Paret, P. ed. Makers of Modern Strategy. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 143-186.

Simmel, G. 1955. Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations. Trans by Wolff, K. H. and Bendia, R. New York: The Free Press.

Smith, A. 1976. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sorensen, J. S. 2012. The Failure of State-Building – ChangingBiopolitics and the Splintering of Societies. Development Dialogue. (58), pp. 49-67.

Sorensen, J. S. and Soderbaum, F. 2012. Intro-The End of the Development-Security Nexus? Development Dialogue. (58), pp. 7-21.

Stritzel, H. 2011. Security, the Translation. Security Dialogue. 42(4-5), pp. 343-355.

Stuvoy, K. 2009. Security Under Construction: A Bourdieusian Approach to Non-State Crisis Centres in Northwest Russia. Ph.D. thesis, University ofTromso.

Sulkunen, P. 1982. Society Made Visible – On the Cultural Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. Acta Sociologica. 25(2), pp. 103-115.

Thomas, N. and Tow, W. T. 2002. The Utility of Human Security:Sovereignty and Humanitarian Intervention. Security Dialogue. 33(2), pp. 177-192.

Toulmin, S. 1990. Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity. New York: Free Press.

49

200519519 PIED5213M

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 1994. Human Development Report 1994. New York: Oxford University Press.

Uvin, P. 2004. A Field of Overlaps and Interactions. Security Dialogue. 35(3), pp. 352-353.

Van Hees, M. 2012. Rights, Goals, and Capabilities. Philosophy, Politics, and Economics. 12(3), pp. 247-259.

Villumsen, T. 2011. Capitalising on Bourdieu: Boundary Setting, Agency, and Doxic Battles in International Relations.[Online]. In: ISA conference, 16th-19th March, Montreal. [Accessed 15th December 2013]. Available from: http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/5/0/0/1/9/pages500198/p500198-1.php

Wacquant, L. 2010. Crafting the Neoliberal State: Workfare, Prisonfare, and Social Insecurity. Sociological Forum. 25(2), pp. 197-220.

Waever, O. 1996. ‘The Rise and Fall of the Inter-Paradigm Debate’. In: Smith, S., Booth, K. and Zalewski, M. eds. International Theory: Positivism and Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 149-185.

Walker, R. 1993. Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.

Watson, S. 2011. The ‘Human’ as Referent Object?: Humanitarianism as Securitization. Security Dialogue. 42(1), pp. 3-20.

Williams, M. C. 1998. Identity and the Politics of Security. European Journal of International Relations. 4(2),pp. 204-225.

Winslow, D. and Eriksen, T. H. 2004. A Broad Concept That Encourages Interdisciplinary Thinking. Security Dialogue. 35, pp. 361-362.

50

200519519 PIED5213M

Woollacott, M. 1998. The Politics of Prevention. In: Franklin,J. ed. The Politics of Risk Society. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 120-124.

51