1 Human Capital Development in the Middle East: Is Secularism a Solution? Evidence from Turkey in the 19th and 20th Century Rima Ghanem University of Tübingen ABSTRACT Human capital and its relation with religion is an important topic especially in the Middle East region. This paper tests the influence of separating religion and government on human capital in Turkey. The development of numeracy is calculated using evidence based on two Turkish censuses which were carried out in the twentieth century. Was secularism the solution to develop human capital in Turkey? Did the Turkish regions equally benefit from secularism and the other reforms that were carried out by the Ataturk government? And was there a significant difference between human capital development in the Kurdish and the Turkish regions? 1. INTRODUCTION The relationship between religion and human capital has been discussed in earlier studies. Some researchers showed a positive relation between religion and education. For example, Botticini and Eckstein (2007) provided evidence for a positive influence of being Jewish on people’s education. Similarly, Becker and Woessmann (2009) showed that Protestantism has led to better education levels in Prussia already before the industrialization. In Turkey, during the time of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in the first half of the 20th century, many reforms have
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1
Human Capital Development in the Middle East: Is Secularism a Solution?
Evidence from Turkey in the 19th and 20th Century
Rima Ghanem
University of Tübingen
ABSTRACT
Human capital and its relation with religion is an important topic especially in the Middle East
region. This paper tests the influence of separating religion and government on human capital
in Turkey. The development of numeracy is calculated using evidence based on two Turkish
censuses which were carried out in the twentieth century. Was secularism the solution to
develop human capital in Turkey? Did the Turkish regions equally benefit from secularism
and the other reforms that were carried out by the Ataturk government? And was there a
significant difference between human capital development in the Kurdish and the Turkish
regions?
1. INTRODUCTION
The relationship between religion and human capital has been discussed in earlier studies.
Some researchers showed a positive relation between religion and education. For example,
Botticini and Eckstein (2007) provided evidence for a positive influence of being Jewish on
people’s education. Similarly, Becker and Woessmann (2009) showed that Protestantism has
led to better education levels in Prussia already before the industrialization. In Turkey, during
the time of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in the first half of the 20th century, many reforms have
2
been initiated in different fields such as politics, economics and culture. Ataturk’s reforms can
be summarized mainly in abolishing the sultanate and afterwards the caliphate system in the
country and converting the republic of Turkey in a secular state. Turkey with its Muslim
majority changed from being an Islamic state to a laic country. The main hypothesis of this
research is that, separating the religion from the government had a positive influence on the
human capital in Turkey. Introducing the secular state of Turkey might have led to a clear
jump in numeracy levels in the different Turkish regions. Apparently Mustafa Kemal paid
attention to the education in the republic of Turkey. He built new schools and made primary
schooling mandatory and free. In addition to that, he replaced religious education by a
national education system. Turkey did not change to an atheist state; the freedom to worship
and follow religions still existed. But the idea was concentrating on Islam in the mosques and
religious places; on the other hand, what mattered at school was science and education.
The methodology applied in this paper is the “age heaping methodology”. It relies on
the ability of people to declare their exact ages without rounding them to numbers ending with
zero or five. A measure that represents the share of people that are able to state their age
correctly is the ABCC index. This index will be calculated for 57 Turkish provinces according
to gender and different birth decades. The data used in this research stem from censuses that
were carried out in different years in the twentieth century in Turkey and cover the birth
decades of the 1860s-1950s. These censuses contain the declared ages of people in the
Turkish provinces according to their gender. Some available resources are used to determine
the shares of religions and ethnic groups in Turkey during the same period. By using these
data sources and applying the age heaping methodology, this research will assess whether
converting to a secular state in the first half of the 20th century had a significant effect on the
human capital development in Turkey. The Turkish growth rate during and after the reforms’
3
period will be compared to other countries’ growth rates in the region. Other factors that will
be taken into account are gender inequality and ethnic influence on human capital.
2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Before the establishment of the modern Turkish Republic in 1923, the Ottoman Empire was
ruled by the Islamic law. This law controlled all of the important fields in people’s lives such
as education which was in case it was available mainly religious. (Çağırıcı, 1992 cited in
Rankin and Aytaç, 2006).
On October 29th
, 1923, Turkey was announced as a republic state and Mustafa Kemal
was elected to be its first president. A few months later, the Grand National Assembly voted
to abolish the Islamic law on March 3rd
, 1924 (Davison, 1981). The caliphate system was
abolished on November 2nd
, 1924 (Cagapaty, 2006) and Turkey converted into a secular state.
The main definition of secularism is the separation of church and state (Yildirim, 2004).
Ataturk wanted not only to separate the government from religion, but also to limit the control
of religion and put everything under the government’s control (Geibel, 2012). His main goal
was to change Turkey into a modern secular state which would be independent and able to
compete with other developed nations. Therefore, he introduced reforms into different fields.
He was successful in strengthening the relations with other countries trying to avoid wars in
order to give Turkey a chance to rise up. During his fifteen years of government, Ataturk
introduced a westernized institutions system, reforms in the language, a new capital in Ankara
and many changes in the cultural field. He also initiated laws that strengthened the role of
women and encouraged them to improve their position, in addition to many other reforms.
However, these fifteen years were not enough to achieve better results in the economic field.
The Second World War afterwards affected the economy negatively. There are other negative
4
aspects to consider. For example, the majority of the rural population remained unaffected by
the modernization. Some scholars, such as Landau (1984), have criticized the reforms in that
the changes did not impact on the core of the social and economic structure; in other words,
they were superficial.
Because of its importance, the Ataturk government applied changes to the education
system. The Arabic alphabet was replaced with the Latin alphabet and the Islamic education
system was replaced with a western education style (Koc et al., 2007). Primary education
became mandatory for all children, including girls. Apparently, gender equality was an aim in
the government agenda (Rankin and Aytaç, 2006). In 1924, the Ministry of National
Education regulated the whole education system in the country. It began to change the
curriculum at elementary schools according to the needs of the established republic (Gözütok,
2003). Around a decade after, in 1936, new reforms were conducted again on the curriculum.
This new curriculum remained the same until 1948 when another wave of developments was
initiated (Binbasioglu, 1995, cited in Koc et al., 2007).
The main question of this study is: Was converting from an Islamic to a secular state
beneficial of human capital development in Turkey? In order to answer this question, we will
study the development of an indicator of human capital during the secularization period and
after it. There will be a comparison between Turkey and other countries in the area for the
same period of time, to prove that secularism had a significant effect on human capital
development.
5
3. DATA DISCRIPTION
Two data sets will be used in this study. One of them is an international comparative data set
on Turkey and its neighboring countries. The second data set provides regional evidence on
Turkey. It is based on a combination of two different Turkish censuses. The first census was
carried out in 1935. The publication of this country-wide census included the aggregate
numbers of people in almost all of the Turkish provinces by single years of age. Fifty seven
provinces were included; some of which are today divided into smaller provinces.1 In this
census there is detailed information about each province: the aggregate population (according
to gender, languages, occupations and age), the area, the religion shares, and some other
details. The documents of the 1935 census are in French and in Turkish. There is a microfilm
copy kept at the Mannheim Center for European Social Research (Mannheimer Zentrum für
Europäische Sozialforschung (MZES)) and the original documents are available in Turkey.
The second census was done in 1985 and it is available online from IPUMS International2.
This census is taken from the Turkish Statistical Institute. It includes individual observations
including age statements. Evidence is available for all of the Turkish provinces. However,
only the provinces that were mentioned in the first census are included in this study. The
sample of the 1935 census reflects 7,184,645 people aggregated according to their ages and
provinces of residence. The ages taken into account of this research are between 23 and 72
years. Covering the seven geographical Turkish regions, this data comes from 57 provinces
(see Table 1). The census sample of 1985 takes into account that, a few changes happened in
1 However, five provinces were not mentioned in this census: Yalova from Marmara region in the west, Karabük
a part of the Black Sea region in the north, Kirikkale in Central Aanatolia, Tunceli in Eastern Anatolia and
Batman in Southern Aanatolia. In addition to these provinces, there was another excluded province which is
Hatay, it was a Syrian territory back then and became Turkish only in 1939 according to an agreement between
Turkey and France which controlled Syria during that time. (Pipes, 1949).
2 Minnesota Population Center. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International: Version 6.1 [Machine-
readable database]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2011.
6
the second census and some of the provinces were divided into smaller ones. In this paper, the
observations of these provinces are summed up according to the 1935 administrative division.
The estimated Kurdish population share in Turkey by region and by province is taken from a
study of Multu (1996).
The internationally comparative database mentioned above contains ABCC index values for
each birth decade from 1860 until 1950 for twelve countries and was provided by Crayen and
Baten 2010; and Prayon and Baten 2013. The twelve countries are all in the region around
Turkey and they are included in the research to compare the Turkish increase of numeracy.
These countries are: Russia3, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Cyprus, Egypt,
Greece, Bulgaria and Romania. The values of GDP per capita for Turkey and the other 12
countries in the region were taken from the Maddison Project Database by Bolt and van
Zanden (2013). The average of the GDP per capita for each decade was calculated and
included in the regression.
4. METHODOLOGY
4.1 Age Heaping
There are many indicators used nowadays to measure the human capital in a country, such as
the total number of students that are enrolled at schools, the literacy rates, the expenditure of
the government on education, the average salaries of teachers, the ratio of teachers to students
numbers, and many other classic indicators that can be calculated using the available data in
the world. But such indicators cannot be calculated for countries where the needed data is not
available, especially in earlier time periods.
3 i.e. those regions of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union which are situated on today’s Russian territory.
7
When there are no official registers of the literacy rates in a country, the literacy level can be
estimated using signature rates as a proxy, which can be calculated using some available
documents such as marriage registers, military and prisons records and other legal documents
(A’Hearn et al., 2009). However, significant evidence is not available for some countries.
There is another indicator for the cases where there is no schooling or literacy data available
in order to determine the human capital of a country. This indicator is the numeracy level of
the people. One might wonder why not school enrolment rates or literacy are taken to
consider the effects of the Ataturk reform. But, for Turkey no evidence is available for school
enrolment before the first cohort which benefited from the Atatürk school reforms (Benavot
and Riddle, 1988) and (Lindert, 2004). For the other Middle Eastern countries taken as
comparison sample here, only some sketchy evidence on Egypt, Iraq and Syria is available.
Literacy is only available for a cross-section of regions in 1935, plus some punctual
information before.
The numeracy level can be specified as the ability of people to calculate their ages
accurately. This measure can be determined by using registers of countries where the people
mentioned their ages, such as censuses, hospitals registers, court documents and marriage
registers. Today, by using birth certificates and other documents almost everyone can
determine his or her exact age, but this was not the case in earlier times. It has been noticed
that people tended to round their ages. They mostly reported them as numbers ending with
zero or with five. Some of the younger population reported their ages ending with multiples of
two. This tendency to report the ages ending with a particular digit is called age heaping.
Earlier literature shows that there is a positive correlation between the age heaping and
illiteracy among people. Compared to educated people, illiterate ones seem to be less able to
determine their exact ages. More age heaping was noticed for women and older people as
well.
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4.2 ABCC Index
There are a number of methods to calculate the ratio between the heaped ages and the other
ones. According to A’Hearn, Baten and Crayen (2009), the best way is by using the Whipple
Index.
The Whipple index determines the ratio between the number of people in a census who
declared rounded ages (ending with zero or five) and the total number of people in this
census.
[∑
⁄ ∑
]
In our study, the ages used in the analysis are between 23 and 72, ages younger than 23 or
older than 72 are excluded from the study.
The result of Wh = 500 means that all of the people reported rounded ages. The other way
around, when everyone reports his or her exact age, the Whipple Index should be equal to
100. That means, twenty percent of the people reported ages ending with a multiple of five,
which is supposed to be the ideal case.
A’Hearn, Baten and Crayen (2009) suggested a new index to simplify the interpretation of age
heaping. We call it the ABCC Index4, and it is a linear transformation of the Whipple Index.
The ABCC index estimates the ratio of the people who stated their exact ages to the whole
population.
4 The name of this index comes from the initials of the authors’ names in addition to Greg Clack’s, who gave this
suggestion in a comment on the paper.
9
[
]
The ideal case of Wh =100 leads to the result of ABCC = 100, which means that all of the
people reported their ages correctly. The worst case will be when everyone reports rounded
ages and the resulted ABCC will be in this case equal to zero.
A’Hearn, Baten and Crayen (2009), also discuss a number of caveats such as potential
cultural bureaucratic and sample selection biases which we do not discuss here. Sample
selection bias is not a problem here, as the sample is based on census data.
According to A’Hearn et al. (2009), in order to calculate the ABCC index, the ages are
divided into groups according to their birth decades. The range of the ages is, as mentioned
above, between 23 and 72 and it is divided into four age groups each includes ten years, “and
two ages ending with a multiple of five”. The resulting five age groups 23-32, 33-42, 43-52,
53-62 and 63-72 are classified into five birth decades and then the ABCC index can be
estimated for each birth decade.
5. ANALYSIS
5.1 Age Heaping and ABCC Index for Turkey
The available data about Turkey indicates clear age heaping in 1935. However, this age
heaping gets less with time and shows a clear improvement in 1985. It differs between
provinces. Some provinces show better numeracy and less age heaping than others, as in the
case of Istanbul for example. A marked difference is noticed between men and women, the
10
females tend to heap their ages more than men in all of the provinces. For example, where the
women show higher age heaping than men in the Black Sea region (see Figure 1).
The ABCC Index for Turkey is calculated for the 57 provinces as well as the seven
geographical regions by gender and by birth decades from 1860 till 1950. Figure 2 shows the
development of ABCC index by birth decade for each region. There is a huge difference
between the ABCC values for the regions in the birth decade 1860. While the Marmara region
in the northwest shows the best value of more than 55%, on the other side, Eastern and
Southern Anatolia are characterized by less than half this value by less than 25%. This
difference becomes less for the younger generations and declines till around 15%. But the
ranking of the regions stays almost the same with Marmara region and Aegean region on the
top and Eastern and Western Anatolia at the lowest level.
The analysis indicates a clear gender inequality, where the female ABCCs are lower
than the male ones in all of the provinces. Figure 3 shows the values resulting from
subtracting the females ABCCs from the males ABCCs for the seven regions by birth
decades. All of the regions improved with the time and the inequality was getting less for the
youngest generations. This is not only caused by the bounded variable problem, because even
in the later periods, values of 100 were not reached. But still there is inequality by around
15% in the east and south, while it vanishes in the west for the people who were born in 1950.
The difference was not only among regions, it was also in between each region where
some provinces (the smaller regional unit) had different levels of ABCC than others in the
same region. However, these differences are still not that large in each region. In the 1935
census, one can notice that most of the provinces in the west have a good ABCC level in
comparison with the eastern provinces. The provinces in the central part have mostly middle
values (see Figure 4). The provinces’ ABCC values improve in the 1985 census. Almost all of
the provinces double their ABCCs. Figure 5 shows this improvement and it shows that the
11
eastern part of Turkey is still less developed than the western part. What could be the reason
of this difference?
5.2 Effect of Kurdish ethnicity and other factors
In the following section, we deviate from the analysis of the main question about the effect of
the Ataturk reforms in order to study the differences within Turkey.
In order to understand the differences in numeracy between the Turkish provinces and
regions, one should study the geographic and demographic differences between them. The
eastern part of Turkey is a mountain area (Oxford Business Group, 2009). This part is
inhabited mainly by the Kurds who are an ethnic group, have a common language and history
and mostly are Muslims (Multu, 1996). It is not easy to estimate the exact number of Kurds in
Turkey, even nowadays. Koc et al. (2008) estimate the percentage of Kurds to be 14% of the
whole population depending on the Turkish Demographic and Health Survey of 2003. In 1965
82% of them lived in the eastern part of Turkey. There is some other estimation according to
the old statistics of 1927 and 1935 which included the distribution of people according to their
languages. Figure 6 shows the distribution of Kurds in Turkey according to the 1927 census.
In this map the high density of Kurds is obvious in the eastern part of Turkey compared to the
other regions. Multu (1996) estimated the number of Kurds in the different provinces in 1990
relying on data from 1965 and 1990 censuses. These estimates will be used in regressions to
estimate the effect of being a province with Kurdish majority on the numeracy of the people.
The economic mechanism is partly traditional discrimination of the Kurdish ethnicity within
the Turkish dominated state; partly the more traditional economic and social system which
developed, following the language boundaries.
12
Table 2 shows the results of the OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the ABCC
value. The reference category is a female from Aegean region who was born in birth decade
1860. In the first regression the Kurds variable is included as a dummy equals one if the
majority of the province are Kurds. The result indicates a significant negative effect of being a
province of Kurdish majority. Being a male has a significant positive effect on ABCC which
supports the hypothesis of gender inequality in the different regions. The geographical regions
show significant differences, while only being a province in Marmara results in a better
ABCC level compared to the Aegean. Other regions followed in the order: Mediterranean,
Black Sea and Central Anatolia. Eastern and Southern Anatolia indicate no significant
difference in the first regression. But after excluding the Kurds dummy in the second
regression, they show significant negative effect by around 20% lower ABCC level. In the
regressions 5 and 7, the Kurds percentage share in the whole population in 1990 in each
province according to Multu’s estimates is included resulting a significant negative effect on
numeracy.
The numeracy disadvantage of the Kurdish provinces did not change during the
Ataturk reforms. During the years of War of Independence (1919-1922), Mustafa Kemal
Ataturk used to recognize the mixture of the ethnic groups in Turkey. He declared many times
that “Kurds and Turks are true brothers”. He also used to mention “the people of Turkey”
rather than “the Turkish people” while talking about his people. But on the other side, his
critics mention that after 1923 all his government’s concentration was on the cultural
revolution, and it invested little to develop the Kurdish provinces (Mango, 1999). In the same
paper, Mango states that there was resistance against the land reforms that Ataturk conducted
in the Kurdish areas. The opposition was mainly from the Kurdish landowners who refused
these reforms because they were afraid to lose their noble titles as a result. Other scholars
criticize Ataturk’s policy of ignoring the non-Turkish ethnic groups and discouraging them
13
using their languages in public. Aytürk (2011) mentions that it was not allowed to speak
Kurdish in public and the names of the places should be changed into Turkish. This might was
a reason of having less benefit from the educational reforms. Encouraging learning Turkish at
schools in addition to Kurdish might not be a bad idea. But it might have been a reason of
having less benefit from schools when only Turkish was allowed, not the mother language of
the Kurdish majorities in the east.
In addition to the effect of ethnic group, we expected a significant effect of time.
Therefore the birth decades were included in the regression, and they had significant positive
effect over time. The later the person is born, the better ABCC value he has. However, while
the effect of the birth decades grows clearly over time, between the birth decades 1930 and
1940 there is only a slight growth. It is still not yet clear why the people who were born in the
decade of World War II and after Ataturk’s death would show only a modest growth in their
ABCC level.
Another factor which might play a role in the numeracy level is the religion. The
majority of the Turkish population is Muslim (approximately 99%). Around 85% of the
Muslims are Sunni and the rest are Alevi. The Non-Muslims are divided into Jews, Catholics,
Greek Orthodox and Protestants (Oxford Business Report, 2009) and most of them live in
Istanbul. The Non-Muslim share per thousand (1935 census) is included in the regression and
it shows a small but a significant positive effect on numeracy in all of the regressions even if
the population density is controlled for. Being from a province with high density has no
significant effect on numeracy.
Other dummies are included in the regression to test whether the neighboring countries
affect the ABBC levels. Being a neighbor of Georgia or Armenia has no significant effect.
However, being a neighbor for the Muslim countries in Asia has a significant negative effect.
14
Surprisingly, being from the provinces on the European borders has an unexpected negative
effect on the numeracy.
In Regression 6, the regions are not included, but a province from each region is
included. The result is a significant large positive effect for Istanbul from Marmara region as
expected. A significant positive effect appears of Izmir from the Aegean region, Antalya from
the Mediterranean and Ankara the capital in Central Anatolia. While being from Van from
Eastern Anatolia, Trabzon from the Black Sea or Mardin from the south result a significant
negative effect on the numeracy.
5.3 Ataturk Reforms and Numeracy
In order to test the effects of the Ataturk reforms, we adopted a very straightforward approach
as a first step. We compiled a sample of numeracy growth rates for the Ataturk period, for
Turkey before the reforms, and for a set of neighboring countries. Which countries might
provide a good comparison for the territory which formed later the Turkish state? First of all,
the neighbors to the East and in the Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Georgia, Iran,
Iraq, and Syria had similar numeracy levels. In contrast, Egypt was still at a lower stage of
numeracy development, but we still included this country. In order to complete the number of
neighboring countries (including those which had been ruled by the Ottoman Empire earlier),
we also included the Western and Northwestern neighbors: Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and
Russia. We compiled evidence for these countries starting in the 1860s and running until mid-
20th
century (based on the compilations in Crayen and Baten 2010, and Prayon and Baten
2013).
As a second step, we assigned a dummy variable to Turkey in the decades in which the
Ataturk reforms should have exerted an influence. Of course, we need to control for initial
15
levels of numeracy: a country with a high level of numeracy would have more “room” for
substantial increase. In contrast, a country which has already reached a high level of basic
numeracy development can achieve only small growth rates. One additional problem is that
some of the countries, especially in the Northwest, had already reached values of 100 percent
in the last few decades. Hence we tested a separate specification to cope with this potential
problem: We included only those countries which had lower numeracy values than 95
percent. 95 percent is a value beyond which there is little space for development left.
The results indicate that the Kemalist reforms had in fact a significant and positive impact, if
the initial level is controlled for (Table 3). We use clustered standard errors to avoid potential
consequences of serial correlation.5
In addition, we controlled for other potential variables. Given the fact that some of
these variables have missing values for some of the countries, we entered these controls
separately, and not in one comprehensive model (including all at one time, N would be
reduced to 13).
(1) We include GDP per capita – although we would not state a certain direction of causality
here – because one could imagine that the growth rate depends on available financial
resources.
(2) Juif and Baten (2013) have recently assessed whether early land inequality has an
influence on educational formation. They shared their estimates with us, hence we could also
control for this variable in our small sample of Turkish neighbor countries.
(3) As a third variable, we controlled for democracy. If the participation rate is higher, we
would expect voters to demand a higher growth rate of educational investment.
5 The estimates are in fact heteroskedasticity-robust and cluster-robust, see Cameron/ Trivedi (2009), p. 85. We
thank Christina Mumme for this hint.
16
(4) Finally, a high level of fertility might reduce the propensity to increase, as the quality-
quantity trade-off might lead to lower investments if children numbers are high.
These control variables never reach statistical significance, which might be caused by the
small number of cases included in our sample. More importantly, however, those control
variables do not render the Ataturk reform variable insignificant. The Kemalist reforms
remain significant in all models test.
As we have seen above, there was a substantial variation between the various
provinces of Turkey. Hence, we were curious whether the Ataturk reform dummy would still
be significant and positive if applied to (a) predominantly Kurdish and (b) non-Kurdish
provinces. In fact, in this regression with provincial observation units, the effect of the
Kemalist reforms remained positive and significant in the non-Kurdish provinces. But the
significance disappeared in the Kurdish ones (Table 4).
6. CONCLUSION
The empirical analysis of the available data about Turkey in the twentieth century showed that
secularism helped improving the human capital. The reforms of Ataturk on the different fields
of life led to a significant improvement in the human capital of Turkey. However, the effect
was not the same for all the regions. In our descriptive analysis, we showed that the eastern
part of Turkey, where the Kurds are mostly located, never caught up fully to the west. Gender
inequality was shrinking gradually with the time after the reforms with less improvement for
the Kurdish regions.
This research contributed to understanding the relation between secularism and human
capital especially for the Middle East, where in most of the countries, the religion still
controls the governments and the human capital needs to be improved. As an outlook more
17
detailed studied on gender and ethnic inequality before and after educational reforms are
planned, as well as, extending the regional database to additional Middle Eastern countries.
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