Http://pbma.nasa.gov H Hartt / D Vecellio April 3, 2005 1 NASA / Navy Cooperation & Process Based Mission Assurance Knowledge Management System (PBMA-KMS.

H Hartt / D Vecellio April 3, 2005 1http://pbma.nasa.gov

NASA / Navy Cooperation

&

Process Based Mission Assurance Knowledge Management System (PBMA-KMS ) functional support to program and

project managers

April 5, 2005

Henry Hartt and Don Vecellio

ARES Corporation

NASA Office of Safety & Mission Assurance


RATIONALEFOR

NASA / NAVY COLLABORATION

• Notable similarities between human space flight and nuclear submarine programs.

• Both spacecraft and submarines operate in extreme environments

• Both require integration of complex systems and subsystems

• Both must maintain the highest levels of safety and reliability to perform their missions.

• Navy has continued to operate safely and effectively in resource-constrained and declining production environments.

• As NASA explores application of nuclear propulsion and power for space exploration, lessons learned from the Navy’s nuclear safety program could be beneficial.

• Given current management challenges the Agency might benefit from in-depth examination of the engineering management, safety, and mission assurance practices employed by the Navy submarine force.


Initial Areas of Emphasis for NNBE Investigations• Assurance Requirements

SUBSAFE, Deep Submergence, Nuclear Reactors, Space Shuttle Program

• Assurance Planning and AnalysisLife-Cycle Risk Management: Requirements, Approaches, Tools (e.g., FMEA, Criticality Analysis, PRA, Hazard Analysis, etc.) for Design, Manufacturing, and Operations

• Assurance ProcessesManagement, Organizational approach (reporting relationships / requirements flow-down), Resource Loading, Engineering, Training

• Control ProcessesWork Control, work instructions, configuration management, component/work documentation / pedigree (NAVY SUBSAFE Re-entry Control (REC) Process), Non-conformance disposition, Work review, Surveillance / Inspection, Change Control, Design Change Control, Configuration management

• Verification Processes Audits: Functional (SUBSAFE Periodic ), NASA Process Verification, NASA NEQA Audit, Certification, Ships: Leave the Shipyard (hull or vehicle) SUBSAFE: Pre-Fast Cruise, Audit, Parts: see REC, Operational Readiness, SUBSAFE: Unrestricted Operations Maintenance Requirements Certification (URO-MRC), Space Shuttle Certification of Flight Readiness Process


Navy Organizations Visited by NASA

• NAVSEA (Naval Sea Systems Command) HQ / WNY• NAVSEA 07 (SUBSAFE Program)• NAVSEA 08 (Naval Reactors)• NAVSEA 05 (Ship Design Integration and Engineering)

• SUPSHIP (Supervisor of Shipbuilding Conversion and Repair)• Portsmouth Naval Shipyard

– SUBMEPP (Submarine Maintenance Engineering, Planning and Procurement)

– NAVSEALOGCEN (NAVSEA Logistics Center)– SHAPEC (Ship Availability Planning and Engineering Center )

• Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard & Integrated Maintenance Facility– SUBSAFE Functional Audit

• General Dynamics Electric Boat Division• Bath Iron Works


Navy Strengths

• Rigor of SUBSAFE Safety Assurance Process

• NAVSEA 08 religious assignment of lifecycle assurance responsibility– Emphasis on “Minority Opinion” in the Decision Process– Emphasis on Recurrent Training

• NAVSEA Warrants – Independent Technical Authority

• PDREP/RYG processes of maintaining a record of contractor/supplier Quality Assurance (QA) performance


NASA/NAVY Memoranda of Agreement

Audit Participation

NASA / NAVSEA 07

Supplier QA Information Exchange

NASA / NAVSEALOGCENDET Portsmouth

NASA / NAVSEA 05

Engineering Investigations and Analyses


Navy Approaches Infused into NASA Processes

• NAVSEA SUBSAFE and Nuclear Reactor training led to Safety Critical Decision Making (CSDM) training initiative implemented by Office of the Chief Engineer (OCE)

• SUBSAFE Audits Model adapted to NASA Programmatic Audit and Review Process

• Ongoing collaboration in Human Factors and Software development IV&V

• Pyramidal (three point) decision process (Technical, Program, Safety) adapted by NASA

• ITA Technical Warrant Holders process established by OCE

• Establishment of NESC• Creation of OSMA Review and Assessment Division


Summary Reports Published

• December 20, 2002 -- Report 1 : “Navy Submarine Program Safety Assurance”

• July 15, 2003 -- Report 2: “Naval Nuclear Submarine Safety Assurance”

• October 22, 2004 -- “Ongoing NNBE Activities & Software Subgroup Report I”

• http://pbma.nasa.gov/program/nnbe.htm


Safety Cultural Emphasis

"The only way to operate a nuclear power plant and indeed a nuclear industry -- the only way to ensure safe operation, generation after generation, as we have -- is to establish a system that ingrains in each person a total commitment to safety: a pervasive, enduring devotion to a culture of safety and environmental stewardship."

ADM F.L. BOWMAN


“RESPONSIBILITY IS A UNIQUE CONCEPT"

• It can only reside and inhere in a single individual.• You may share it with others, but your portion is not

diminished.• You may delegate it, but it is still with you.• You may disclaim it, but you cannot divest yourself of it.• Even if you do not recognize it or admit its presence, you

cannot escape it.• If responsibility is rightfully yours, no evasion, or ignorance,

or passing the blame can shift the burden to someone else.• Unless you can point your finger at the man who is

responsible when something goes wrong, then you have never had anyone really responsible.

ADM H.G. RICKOVER


Process Based Mission Assurance Knowledge Management System

(PBMA-KMS ) functional support to program and

project managers


Background• PBMA-KMS deployed in March of 2001 is the first fully operational NASA-wide multi-

functional Knowledge Management System

• Developed and implemented under the sponsorship of the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance

• Merged existing NASA SMA program/project life-cycle “knowledge architecture” with state-of-the-art KM concepts presented in GWU/KM graduate coursework

• PBMA Knowledge Architecture reflects integration of SMA functions (work processes) into the systems engineering program/project life-cycle

• Maintaining ongoing dialogue with KM community at GWU, GMU, Washington KM Roundtable, KM-Pro / Universal KM Framework Workshop

• PBMA-KMS serves program/project managers and safety and mission assurance professionals within a traditional life-cycle work breakdown context:

• Widely accessible / user friendly / content rich

• In place: policies & requirements, best practices, lessons learned, tacit knowledge capture (video nuggets), collaborative tools, etc.


Knowledge Capture

Knowledge Sharing

Knowledge Protection

Requirements• 7120.5 8x5 Lifecycle Matrix

(Plan, Do, Check)• Program Profiles• Best Practices• Lessons Learned• Tutorial

• NIST/Section 508 Compliance• Video Nuggets• Collaborative Environment• Road Shows• CoP Workshops• Knowledge Registry

• 2810 Compliance• CAIB/CTF Support• Enhanced Security Work Groups• SecureMeeting• NASA Transformation:

PM / ITA / ICV SupportPBMA

ITA ICV

PM

Milestones

Content Block Updates

Center Rollouts / CoP Workshops

Call for Best Practices

New Functionality / Support

Awards

Operational

2001 2002 2003 2004200019991998 2005Concept Development Deployment

PBMA

ITA ICV

PM

PBMA

ITA ICV

PM

HQ PBMA-KMSTeam Award

Administrator’sAward forExcellence

Knowledge Registry

Enhanced SecurityEnhanced Security

Standard SecurityStandard Security

Work Group Members (x 100)

(500 2100)(500 2100)

Unique Visitors per Month

Metrics

Other PBMA-KMS Statistics:• 230+ Best Practices; 260+ Video Nuggets• 1300+ Links to Gov’t & Industry LL & Standards • 180+ NASA Programs / Projects Supported

PBMA-KMS Timeline

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Over 7200 work group members

More than 340 individual communities of practice

38 Communities of Practice supporting the Space Shuttle Program return-to-flight efforts.

145 other NASA programs and projects also supported

Glenn Sotware Engineering

Process Group

PBMA-KMS Work Groups/Communities of Practice

Volume: More people are coming to PBMA, they are using the site for longer, and they are coming back again for more information. - 190,000 hits per month (an increase of over 20% from the beginning of 2004). Return Visits: numbers of daily visitors and returning visitors (key indicators of value) have increased more than 25% during the last 12 months.Length of Visit: most telling indication of value is the length of visit. Visitors are spending 45% more time at PBMA then they were at the beginning of 2004.

H Hartt / D Vecellio April 3, 2005 15http://pbma.nasa.govEach cell contains video-nuggets, text, links

Formulation Implementation

Project Phase

Elements

PgmMgmt

ConceptDevel.

Acq.

1.1 2.1 3.1 4.1 5.1 6.1 7.1 8.1

1.2

1.3

1.4

1.5

2.2

2.3

2.4

3.2

3.3

3.4

4.2

4.3

4.4

4.5

5.2

5.3

5.4

5.5

6.2

6.3

6.4

6.5

7.2

7.3

8.2

8.3

8.4

HW SW Mfg Integ.Test

Ops

Policies(Rules & Req.)

Plans

Processes

Controls

Verification2.5 3.5

7.4

7.5 8.5

PBMA - Knowledge Architecture


KM Functional “Utilities”The PBMA-KMS employs a core set of KM functionalities that have the potential to serve all users. These are "no-brainer" functional requirements (i.e., the gas, water, electricity and cable TV of knowledge management) applicable/available to every unique knowledge management system and architecture.

Advanced Search / Discovery (across public domains)

Secure Communities of Practice (Work Groups)

Secure Web MeetingsKnowledge Registry (expert finder)

Document Repository

Individual Business Units with Unique Knowledge Architectures

Business Unit-SpecificKnowledge Architectures

Agency/Enterprise-wide KM Utilities

Safety and Mission Assurance

Financial MgmtDeep Space Programs


Selected PBMA Functionality

• Framework Mode– Knowledge Architecture– Video Nuggets (a verbal corporate/tacit knowledge archive)

• Standard Security Work Groups– Web-based collaborative environment (CE) tool for public domain information

• Enhanced Security Work Groups– Secure Web-based CE Tool for sensitive information

• Knowledge Registry– Web-based repository for SMA/engineering/technical expertise

• Secure Web Meeting– Secure, real-time “white-board” tool for sharing information and conducting

meetings remotely via the Internet (secure uplinks/downlinks and servers)


Video “Nuggets”

Functional Tabs

(operational modes)


Standard Security Work Groupsand Communities of Practice

• COTS Web-hosted Product– Industry Best Practice– Password protected / NPR 2810.1

compliant– No ITAR / EAR or other Sensitive

Data

• Document Sharing and Management, Calendars, Action Tracking, Announcements, Polls, Contacts, Links, Threaded Discussions, etc.


• Developed in Partnership with GRC-CIO/IT Security

• One-factor strong authentication

• 128-bit SSL encryption

• Designed to Support Sensitive Information Management and Exchange

• ITAR / Export Controlled Information

• Source Evaluation Boards and Competition Sensitive Information

• Mishap Investigation Information

Provides a means of establishing a secure, accessible site for team collaboration when Administratively

Controlled Information (ACI) is involved

Enhanced Security Work Groupsand Communities of Practice


PBMA Knowledge Registry

• Locate/Contact Experts• Identifies where Agency S&MA, Engineering, and Technology expertise

and knowledge resides

• Voluntary Registration• Linked to NASA Competency Management System (CMS)

• Allows users to locate specific subject matter experts in a fast, convenient mechanism• Searchable by selected (e.g., “.mil”, “.nasa”, “.gov”) domains

• Can assist in Resource Management & Planning Activities• Currently supporting NASA / NAVSEA expert collaboration


Secure Web Meeting• Reduced travel • Schedule on your own, no dial-in numbers• Easy access; plug-and-play appliance with no recurring costs• Real time collaboration• Remote “white-board” collaboration in a secure environment• Protected Transient Events – 128-bit encryption• Implemented on a NASA Server behind NASA’s firewall• Operates with standard Web browsers• Does not require similar software on attendees’ PCs• Easy client setup: install or download it “on-the-fly” on first use• Host a "shared desktop" session over the Internet• Capable of holding 10 meetings with 50 people in each – simultaneously• Share any document, briefing, spreadsheet, etc. between multiple users• Pass control of the meeting among attendees• Make changes in real-time• Built-in meeting scheduling and user invitation


BACKUP CHARTS


Potential Opportunities (NASA/Navy Benchmarking Exchange Interim Report #1)

Requirements & Compliance

Opportunity Description Rationale / Value

1.1 Functional Safety Requirements for Future Human Rated Space Systems

Enhance current NASA efforts to develop corporate- level human rating functional design requirements by adding the NAVSEA evolutionary (successive ship class specification) dimension.

Establishes a clear, executable requirements baseline for future human rated space systems

1.2 NAVSEA

Model for Compliance Verification Organization

Establish, for human rated space systems, a centrally controlled and separately funded independent safety compliance organization to verify the implementing organization’s functional capabilities, and to verify compliance with the program /project baseline safety and mission assurance requirements.

Approach creates a clearly independent, unambiguous compliance assurance organization.

1.3 Compliance Verification for new NASA Human Rated Programs

Review current NASA planning versus NAVSEA approaches for compliance verification to be employed for the Orbital Space Plane program and potential future nuclear propulsion programs.

Assures that contract surveillance and compliance verification methods have a scope and rigor consistent with the goal of mitigating manageable risks in human space flight systems.



Lessons Learned & Knowledge Retention


2.1 Lessons Learned

Management at NASA

Move forward with current NASA planning to implement an aggressive NASA lessons learned/knowledge management initiative, under the leadership of the NASA Chief Engineer. Using NAVSEA “template” combine continuous learning with technical authority roles.

Facilitates requirements development for future NASA space and aeronautical systems. Enables programs to avoid past mistakes. Provides for centralized management and ownership of lessons learned within the engineering management/systems engineering organization.

2.2 Lessons Learned Training

Explore the possibility of developing safety/mission success lessons learned training courses for small groups of trainees based on noted NASA failures including the Challenger (STS 51L) loss, the 1967 Apollo 1 (Apollo 204) fire, 1970 Apollo 13 mishap, the 1986 (manufactured) Hubble Space Telescope mirror incident, and the more recent Lewis Spacecraft, Mars Climate Orbiter, and Mars Polar Lander mishaps.

Provides motivation and reinforces safety culture and discipline within NASA workforce.

Provides greater understanding of failures in tightly coupled, complex system.

Reinforces the need to address all areas of potential critical failure.

2.3 Knowledge Retention (FTE Ceiling Authorization for Hiring)

Obtain approval to increase its hiring ceiling (not its overall budget) allowing the flexibility to hire young engineers while retaining the experienced engineers necessary to mentor and provide essential knowledge transfer.

Provides means to retain corporate knowledge.

Enables mentoring of new employees.



Process Improvement


3.1 NAVSEA Logistic Center

Leverage the extensive vendor quality history database available at the NAVSEA Logistics Center to assist in supplier selection and evaluation.

Assists in selecting qualified, proven suppliers and vendors.

3.2: Software Contracting Approach

Review future software contract language and structure to insure an appropriate level of specification detail and implementation assurance consistent with the NAVSEA approach.

Ensures that appropriate software assurance processes are implemented throughout the software development life-cycle.

3.3: Human Factors Collaborate with NAVSEA 03 to develop possible human/system interface technical standards, policies, and processes for NASA. Evaluate how mission goals, function analysis, task analysis, and maintenance/operation tasks were developed and modeled in the VIRGINIA Class.

Provides the opportunity for NASA and Navy to exchange lessons learned as each organization moves to provide additional focus on human factors in system program/project life cycle.

3.4: Tools/ Quantitative Methods

Improve NASA databases containing historic reliability and operational performance data, by centralizing information into an Agency risk and reliability database.

Enables use of historic reliability and operational performance data, to support design and risk assessment teams


NR Key Organizational Observations (NASA/Navy Benchmarking Exchange Interim Report #2 )

• Total programmatic and safety responsibility for all aspects of design, fabrication, training, test, installation, operation, and maintenance of all U.S. Navy nuclear propulsion activities.

• Flat organization with quick and assured access to the Director – about 40 direct reports from within HQ, the field offices, and prime contractors. Communications between headquarters and prime contractors and shipyard personnel occurs frequently at many levels, and a cognizant engineer at a prime or shipyard may talk directly with the cognizant headquarters engineer, as necessary.

• The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (NNPP) is a very stable program based on long-term relationships with three prime contractors and a relatively small number of critical suppliers and vendors.

• NR embeds safety and quality process within its organization; i.e., the “desired state” of an organization completely mainstreams safety and quality assurance .

• Reliance on highly qualified, highly trained people who personally accountable and responsible for safety.

• Recurrent training a major element of safety culture. NR incorporates extensive outside experience (Challenger, Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, Army SL-1 reactor) into a safety training regimen that has become a major component of the NR safety record – 128,000,000 miles of safe travel using nuclear propulsion.

• NR promotes the airing of differing opinions. Even with an absence of differing opinions, management is responsible to ensure critical examination of an issue.


NR Safety Observations(NASA/Navy Benchmarking Exchange Interim Report #2 )

• NR has an institutionally embedded closed-loop process that begins with a technical requirements base built on lessons learned from more than 5,400 reactor years of experience, which in turn represents the foundation for the next-generation propulsion plant design specifications.

• There is no single (stand-alone) document that prescribes NR design safety criteria or standards. Safety requirements are embedded in a uniform set of technical requirements.

• NR has a rigorous change control process that enforces review and concurrence of each recommended change by all stakeholders. Managing change is frequently discussed at senior levels.


NR Implementation Observations(NASA/Navy Benchmarking Exchange Interim Report #2 )

• Each independent lab general manager is required to be technically competent and is directly responsible for the safety of the reactors and facilities under his/her cognizance.

• The NR Director exercises (by law) direct supervision over the laboratories.• Review by Quality Assurance or Safety does not diminish responsibility of line organization for program/product

safety.• There is no separate systems engineering group or a job category of “systems engineer” within NR. While no single

individual serves as system safety engineer or integrator, there is an individual (Reactor Safety and Analysis Director) responsible for maintaining an overall design safety perspective.

• Responsibility for safety of an action remains with the authoring engineer and his Section Heads. The Reactor Safety and Analysis Section reviews, consults and concurs in decisions on product nuclear safety aspects, but responsibility for product safety remains with the cognizant engineer and engineering organization.

• The Reactor Safety and Analysis Section has an independent and equal voice in design and operational decisions.• Evolutionary application of more than 50 years Lessons Learned to each program reduces operational risk and

uncertainty.• “Freedom to Dissent” is a primary element within NR.• Systemic emphasis on recruiting, training, and retaining the “very best people” for their entire careers.• Critical self-evaluation of problems with strong Headquarters oversight isolates and controls the small problems

before they escalate into large problems.• Closed loop corrective action is mandatory. Problems must be identified, analyzed, and resolved and their

resolutions proven successful.• Cause analysis is performed via a formal fact-gathering critique, supplemented by expert assessment of root

cause/corrective actions.• Heavy emphasis placed on reactor design ergonomics through the use of methods, such as interactive visualization

techniques, walk-throughs, and discussions with operators. Operational human factors are emphasized; but change for the sake of change is not permitted.


NR Compliance Verification Observations(NASA/Navy Benchmarking Exchange Interim Report #2 )

• Emphasis on “Silver Bullet Thinking is Dangerous” -- "there is no silver bullet tool or technique.” All elements of quality assurance and compliance assurance must be rigorously implemented to ensure delivery and operation of safe, reliable, and high quality systems.

• Audit teams include the requirement owner (technical authority) for a particular area. Owner participates in the audit process to acquire first-hand understanding of how technical requirements are (or are not) being implemented.

• NR field offices act as day-to-day audit and inspection groups. Responses to their findings are required, and they must approve final actions in response to major comments.

• Functional audits of shipyards supplemented by field office assessments and comparative evaluations of the site’s own self-assessments.

• Qualification and biennial re-qualification of all nuclear operators by written examination and oral board examination assures currency of skills. In addition, the NPEB administers an annual examination to the entire engineering department of a ship and reports results to the ship’s CO, the command authority for that ship, and NR Headquarters.

• DCMA is used, but is given technical direction by NR directly rather than by DCMA HQ.• NR has Process Sponsor Program where engineering activity retains technical responsibility for

its components but consults with process experts (sponsors) within their identified areas of responsibility, as necessary.


NR Key Certification Observations (NASA/Navy Benchmarking Exchange Interim Report #2 )

• NR performs incremental audits (similar to SUBSAFE) prior to key events to evaluate critical processes and to correct any problems with work accomplishment or critical documentation.

• A seven-phase test program begins with visual check of installation and progresses through higher levels of detail to actual operation of the reactor and delivery of power to assure readiness of the reactor plant for sea trials.

• A Joint Test Group (JTG), composed of representatives from the construction shipyard, NRRO, Ship’s Force, and the cognizant laboratory, reviews and approves the administration and performance of test documents and acceptance of test results.


Software Assurance Opportunities for NASA(NASA/Navy Benchmarking Exchange Interim Report #3 )

1. Reappraise Shuttle software using CMM or CMMI– NASA may want to consider reappraising Shuttle on both the contractor and civil

servant sides using CMM or CMMI to verify that their exemplary rigor has not diminished. This is especially important since the Shuttle is still certified at CMM Level 5 despite not having been appraised in 8 years, during which time it has changed contractors twice.

2. Strengthen the levels of defense for assuring software safety– NASA may want to consider strengthening its levels of defense for assuring

software safety and quality. Specifically, this opportunity includes establishing and implementing better contractor requirements (Level 1), bolstering the Agency’s Software Assurance (SA) resource pool (Level 2), and ensuring that IV&V is called upon only in critical situations (Level 3).


Software Assurance Opportunities for NASA(NASA/Navy Benchmarking Exchange Interim Report #3 )

3. Strengthen Agency CMM/CMMI related requirements for mission critical software.

– When updating NPD 2820, NASA Software Polices, NASA may want to consider not only keeping, but potentially strengthening, the CMM/CMMI related requirements for organizations developing or maintaining mission critical software. Some of this work has already been initiated in NASA SWE NPR 7150.2 (Software Engineering Requirements), which was in the administrative review cycle at the time of this report.

4. Institute Agency-wide software inspection efforts.– The use of rigorous formal software inspections, developed based on industry

best practices such as those prescribed by Fagan and Gilb, has provided positive lessons learned for NASA. NASA is considering instituting an Agency-wide effort to re-infuse these, or similar inspection processes, into all software intensive projects.


GLOSSARYACI Administratively Controlled InformationCAIB Columbia Accident Investigation BoardCE Collaborative EnvironmentCIO/IT Chief Information Officer/Information TechnologyCMS Competency Management systemCoP Community of PracticeCOTS Commercial Off The ShelfDCMA Defense Contract Management AdministrationEAR Export Administration RegulationsFMEA Failure Modes and Effects AnalysisGRC Glenn Research CenterMRC Maintenance Requirement CardGWU George Washington UniversityGMU George Mason UniversityICV Independent ITA Independent Technical AuthorityITAR International Traffic in Arms RegulationsJTG Joint Test GroupKM Knowledge ManagementNAVSEA Naval Sea Systems CommandNAVSEA 05 Ship Design, Integration and EngineeringNAVSEA 08 Naval ReactorsNAVSEALOGCEN NAVSEA Logistics CenterNESC NASA Engineering Safety CenterNIST National Institute of Standards and TechnologyNNBE NASA/Navy Benchmarking Exchange

NPEB Naval Nuclear Propulsion Examining BoardNR NAVSEA 08 Naval ReactorsNRRO Naval Reactors Representative OfficeOCE Objective Quality EvidencePDREP Product Data Reporting and Evaluation Program PBMA-KMS Process Based Mission Assurance – Knowledge

Management SystemPM Program ManagerPRA Probabilistic Risk AssessmentREC Re-entry ControlRYG Red/Yellow/Green contractor evaluation processSA Software AssuranceSHAPEC Ship Availability Planning and Engineering CenterSUBMEPP Submarine Maintenance Engineering, Planning and

ProcurementSUBSAFE Submarine Safety ProgramSUPSHIP Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and RepairSWE Software EngineeringURO Unrestricted OperationsWNY Washington Navy Yard

Http://pbma.nasa.gov H Hartt / D Vecellio April 3, 2005 1 NASA / Navy Cooperation & Process Based Mission Assurance Knowledge Management System (PBMA-KMS.

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