Loss prevention in the petrochemical and chemical-process high-tech industries in Taiwan Chien-Chung Chen a , Tzu-Chi Wang b , Lu-Yen Chen c , Jie-Huei Dai a , Chi-Min Shu a, * a Process Safety and Disaster Prevention Laboratory, Department of Safety, Health and Environmental Engineering, National Yunlin University of Science and Technology, 123, University Rd., Sec. 3, Douliou, Yunlin 64002, Taiwan, ROC b Department of Chemical Engineering, Chinese Culture University, 55, Hwa-Kang Rd., Yang-Ming-Shan, Taipei 11114, Taiwan, ROC c Department of Emergency and Resources, National United University, 1, Lienda Rd., Miaoli 36003, Taiwan, ROC a r t i c l e i n f o  Article history: Received 13 August 2009 Received in revised form 23 April 2010 Accepted 25 April 2010 Keywords: Accidents Chemical disasters Emergen cy response Loss prevent ion Safety manageme nt a b s t r a c t Indu strial safety has noti ceab ly impr oved in recent yea rs in Ta iwan . Desp ite thes e impr ovements, however , serious accidents including explosions, chemical releases, and  res have still occu rred in companies such as the Fu Guo Chemical Company (2001), Sin Hun Chemical Company (2005), Motech Industries, Inc. (2005) and Nanpao Resin Co. (2010). These accidents resulted in great loss of life and prope rty , and furth er cause d dema nds for impro veme nt. Chemica l disas ters usually result from the combination of several mistakes or gross carelessness and are seldom caused by a single episode. To ensure the safety of operating, handling and storing chemicals, as well as to prevent chemical disasters, one must take many critical points into account, such as techniques, manufacturing processes, operators, chemicals, and emergency response. In Taiwan, the hazards and risks of high-tech companies are higher than in other industrial sectors. Therefore, a variety of safety management methods and regulations appropriate for high-tech companies have been generated. We studied the current status of the indig- enous loss prevention protocols based on the safety manageme nt of petrochemical and chemical-process high-tech industries in Taiwan. Crown Copyright   2010 Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction Highly developed industrial technology has not only resulted in great advances, but also in the expansion of the complexity and scale of chemical proc esse s res ulting from the deve lopme nt of process technologies in the chemical industries, such as thin lm transistor-liquid crystal displays (TFT-LCD), light emitting diodes (LE D), pho tovoltaics , and semico ndu ctor-re lat ed ind ust rie s. However, the harm from chemical disasters caused by machine breakdowns, operational mistakes, poor design, and mismanage- ment, among others, has steadily increased (Chang, Chang, Shu, & Lin, 2005; Wu, Shyu , Y et-Po le, Chi, & Shu, 2009). In retr osp ect, serious res, explosions, and chemical release accidents that have happ ened in rece nt year s in Taiwa n have been disas trou s. For example, on May 18, 2001, a 6-ton reactor at the Fu-Kao Chemical pla nt loc ated at an indus tri ali zed park in the nor thern par t of Taiwan exp loded due to a violent runaway polymerization reaction of a batch production of acrylic resin. Due to the lack of a proper eme rgency relief and dis posal sys tem on the rea ct or , the ammable chemicals wererelea sed and blanke ted the entire pro cess a rea. The catastrophic explosion leveled the plant and other nearby plants, including 16 high-tech companies. The shock wave was so violent that thousands of windows within a 500 m radius were shattered (see Fi g.1). Roughly 100 people were injured from ying glass and several were hospitalized. Fortunately, the Fu-Kao workers were able to escape in time and there were no deaths ( Kao & Hu, 2002). The seco nd infa mous example of an accid ent fro m a gros s safet y violation was a re at Advanced Semiconductor Engineering (ASE), which was a global leader in the integrated circuit (IC) packaging industry. On May 1, 2005, its semiconductor packaging and testing facilities were ruined by a  re in its substrate plant in Chungli, Taiwan (see Fig. 2). The facilities were not in operation at the time of the re, although some operators working overtime were on the premises. In total, several  reghters, ve ASE employees and two employees of outside contractors suffered minor injuries and had to rec eive med ical att ent ion. The rehad sp read tothe third oo r of  the eleven-oor building and higher oors were spoiled by smoke. The losses from the  re were expected to be enormous, including rebui ldi ng costs as wel l as $1 9 mill ion USD per mont h in los t capacity. Clients were also signi cantly hampered by this accident; * Corresponding author. Tel.:  þ886 5 534 2601x4416; fax:  þ886 5 531 2069. E-mail address:  [email protected] (C.-M. Shu). Contents lists available at  ScienceDirect  Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries journal homepage:  www.elsevier.com/locate/jlp 0950-4230/$ e see front matter Crown Copyright   2010 Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.jlp.2010.04.006  Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (201 0) 531e538
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HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
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8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
Loss prevention in the petrochemical and chemical-process
high-tech industries in Taiwan
Chien-Chung Chen a Tzu-Chi Wang b Lu-Yen Chen c Jie-Huei Dai a Chi-Min Shu a
a Process Safety and Disaster Prevention Laboratory Department of Safety Health and Environmental Engineering National Yunlin University of Science and Technology
123 University Rd Sec 3 Douliou Yunlin 64002 Taiwan ROC b Department of Chemical Engineering Chinese Culture University 55 Hwa-Kang Rd Yang-Ming-Shan Taipei 11114 Taiwan ROC c Department of Emergency and Resources National United University 1 Lienda Rd Miaoli 36003 Taiwan ROC
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history
Received 13 August 2009
Received in revised form
23 April 2010
Accepted 25 April 2010
Keywords
Accidents
Chemical disasters
Emergency response
Loss prevention
Safety management
a b s t r a c t
Industrial safety has noticeably improved in recent years in Taiwan Despite these improvements
however serious accidents including explosions chemical releases and 1047297res have still occurred in
companies such as the Fu Guo Chemical Company (2001) Sin Hun Chemical Company (2005) Motech
Industries Inc (2005) and Nanpao Resin Co (2010) These accidents resulted in great loss of life and
property and further caused demands for improvement Chemical disasters usually result from the
combination of several mistakes or gross carelessness and are seldom caused by a single episode To
ensure the safety of operating handling and storing chemicals as well as to prevent chemical disasters
one must take many critical points into account such as techniques manufacturing processes operators
chemicals and emergency response In Taiwan the hazards and risks of high-tech companies are higher
than in other industrial sectors Therefore a variety of safety management methods and regulations
appropriate for high-tech companies have been generated We studied the current status of the indig-
enous loss prevention protocols based on the safety management of petrochemical and chemical-process
high-tech industries in Taiwan
Crown Copyright
2010 Published by Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved
1 Introduction
Highly developed industrial technology has not only resulted in
great advances but also in the expansion of the complexity and
scale of chemical processes resulting from the development of
process technologies in the chemical industries such as thin 1047297lm
Generally speaking the majority of high-tech companies in
Taiwan have good contractor management systems in which
various methods are employed to carefully screen contractors in
advance Nevertheless some serious accidents including 1047297re and
leakage have still occurred in high-tech companies due to reckless
operation by contractors For example an arsine leak in one plant
caused many operators to be hospitalized a silane leak in another
plant led to a con1047298agration and a 1047297lling error of water treatment
reagents resulted in a chlorine leak
39 Incident investigation
Incident investigations in high-tech plants are performed
cautiously and con1047297dentially Information regarding incident
investigations is closed not only between one business and
another but also between subsidiary companies in the same
business group The industrial safety staff often encounter the
problems of important questions being evaded and intentional
concealment when they investigate an incident or false alarm In
the case of an evacuation caused by a false 1047297re alarm althoughthe engineering department knew the whole story they were
unwilling or reluctant to share the true details which make
incident investigation dif 1047297cult However if a serious accident
occurred the regional labor safety department from CLA would
initiate a thorough investigation seeking out the root cause and
proposing prevention measures for future operation
310 Compliance audits
Each high-tech company has its own audit system for safety
management The industrial safety staff usually perform the
primary audit whereas a department manager generally does the
secondary audit The auditorrsquos experience and ability affectswhether a violation of a safety regulation or potential hazard can
be identi1047297ed However a high-tech company is comprised of
many different technologies and departments so most industrial
safety staff audits only the technology in which they specialize
The safety audits mostly focus on super1047297cial mistakes therefore
many serious mistakes such as equipment safety protections
being illegally bypassed are often not discovered
311 Pre-startup safety review
The equipment in high-tech companies usually goes through
a pre-startup safety inspection before being put into of 1047297cial regular
production The inspected items include supply systems safetymonitoring equipment pipelines vent systems and emergency
shutdowns However some plants still put the equipment into
production without a pre-startup safety inspection due to urgent
production demands
312 Hot work permit
A hot work permit receives signi1047297cant attention in high-tech
companies so very few plants have accidents because of poor
management of hot work permits These hot work permits however
should be expanded to 1047297re control (ie any chemicals that might
cause a 1047297re should be kept away from a 1047297re or external thermal
source)
313 Mechanical integrity
Unlike petrochemical plants general maintenance in high-tech
companies is conducted quite well and thus accidents are seldom
caused by equipment aging and pipeline corrosion
4 Conclusions
Most of the plants in the chemical industries that are small or
medium scale require counseling and assistance to effectively
improve loss prevention (Fig 6) The labor commission will be able
to provide personalizedassistance based on the actual conditions of
each plant if it categorizes and classi1047297es the data accumulated from
the 190 plants that accepted counseling and assistance For
example plants with suf 1047297cient manpower budget and certain
levels of safety management can be provided with thorough
assistance regarding safety management However those having
inferior safety management should be offered extraordinary
assistance on key subjects so that they can obtain the correct
knowledge and develop experience to further avoid serious risks
The best effect will be achieved if the plants are guided and assisted
on the basis of their individual needs
In Taiwan the hazards and risks of high-tech companies are
higher than in other industrial sectors Therefore a variety of safety
management methods and regulations appropriate for high-tech
companies have been generated and implemented However it
is crucial for managers and industrial safety specialists to think
carefully about how to completely identify understand and control
potential hazards associated with the manufacturing processes
Furthermore they need to determine and address uncertainties
that arise from any operational errors or incidents across the whole
range of stages in manufacturing
Acknowledgments
The authors are deeply grateful to Mr A MJaneshek of The Dow
Chemical Co Freeport Texas USA for his valuable assistance and
suggestions
References
Basso B Carpegna C Dibitonto C Gaido G Robotto A amp Zonato C (2004)Reviewing the safety management system by incident investigation andperformance indicators Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 225e231
Beatriz F M Manuel M P amp Camilo V O (2007) Safety management systemdevelopment and validation of a multidimensional scale Journal of LossPrevention in the Process Industries 20 52e68
Bernatik A amp Libisova M (2004) Loss prevention in heavy industry risk assess-ment of large gasholders Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 271e278
Carson P Aamp MumfordC J (1995) Thesafehandlingof chemicalsin industry(2nded)New York USA Longman Scienti1047297c amp Technical
Chang M K Chang R R Shu C M amp Lin K N (2005) Application of risk basedinspection in re1047297nery and processing piping Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 18 397e402
Chen C C Lin S Y Wu S H amp Shu C M (2006) Precautions against chemicalaccident in small and medium plant in Taiwan In The 18th annual conference for Chinese Institute of Environmental Engineering (pp 667) Taichung Taiwan ROCTunghai University
Chen K Y Wu S H Wang Y W amp Shu C M (2008) Runaway reaction andthermal hazards simulation of cumene hydroperoxide by DSC Journal of LossPrevention in the Process Industries 21 101e109
Crowl A amp Elwell I (2004) Identifying criteria to classify chemical mixtures ashighly hazardous due to chemical reactivity Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 17 279e289
Guidelines for hazard evaluation procedures (2008) The American Institute of Chemical Engineers (3rd ed) New Jersey USA John Wiley amp Sons
Hirano T T (2004) Accidental explosions of semiconductor manufacturing gases in Japan Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 29e34
Kao C S amp Hu K H (2002) Acrylic reactor runaway and explosion accident
analysis Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 15 213e
222
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538 537
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
Lin Y F Tseng J M Wu T C amp Shu C M (2008) Effects of acetone on methyl ethylketone peroxide runaway reaction Journalof Hazardous Materials 153 1071e1077
Meel A OrsquoNeill L Levin J Seider W Oktem U amp Keren N (2007) Operationalrisk assessment of chemical industries by exploiting accident databases Journalof Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 113e127
Muniz B Peon J amp Ordas C (2007) Safety management system developmentand validation of a multidimensional scale Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 20 52e68
PohanishR Pamp Greene SA (2003)Wileyguide to chemical incompatibilities(2nded)New York USA John Wiley and Sons
Reyes J amp Beard N (2008) A systematic approach to managing safety Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 21 15e28
Rigas F Konstandinidou M Centola P amp Reggio G T (2003) Safety analysis andrisk assessment in a new pesticide production line Journal of Loss Prevention inthe Process Industries 16 103e109
Rotaru A Constantinescu C Rotaru P Moan A Dumitru M Socaciu M et al(2008) Thermal analysis and thin 1047297lms deposition by matrix-assisted pulsedlaser evaporation of a 4cn type azomonoether Journal of Thermal Analysis andCalorimetry 92 279e284
Shaluf M Ahmadun F amp Shariff A (2003) Technological disaster factors Journalof Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 16 513e521
Suardin J Mannan M amp Halwagi M (2007) The integration of Dow rsquos 1047297re andexplosion index (FampEI) into process design and optimization to achieve
inherently safer design Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 79e90
Taipei Times (2005) ASE issues positive outlook in wake of Chungli factory 1047297rehttpwwwtaipeitimescomNews
The annual reports on labor inspection (2004 2005 2006 amp 2007) Council of LaborAffairs Executive Yuan Taipei Taiwan ROC
The Center of Environmental Safety (2001) The explosion of Fu Guo ChemicalCompany httpwwwtsintedutwadminssafetyE5B7A5E5AE89E58DB1E5AEB3danger-1-1htm
The China Post (2005) ASE assesses damage caused by 1047297re at Chungli plant http
wwwchinapostcomtwbusiness2005050361901ASE-assesseshtm TheEpochTimes (2005) Aninvestigation of 1047297re accident of Advanced Semiconductor
Engineering Inc httpwwwepochtimescomb5551n907054htmThe Epoch Times (2010) The Nanpao Resin Company explosion on January 08
2010 httpepochtimescomb51019n2780991htmTseng J M Liu M Y Chang R H Su J L amp Shu C M (2008) Emergency response
plan of chlorine gas for process plants in Taiwan Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 21 393e399
Urban P G (2006) (7th ed)Bretherickrsquo s handbook of reactive chemical hazards Vols1e 2 Burlington USA Academic Press
Wu S H Shyu M L Yet-Pole I Chi J H amp Shu C M (2009) Evaluation of runaway reaction for dicumyl peroxide in a batch reactor by DSC and VSP2
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 22 721e727
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538538
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
Generally speaking the majority of high-tech companies in
Taiwan have good contractor management systems in which
various methods are employed to carefully screen contractors in
advance Nevertheless some serious accidents including 1047297re and
leakage have still occurred in high-tech companies due to reckless
operation by contractors For example an arsine leak in one plant
caused many operators to be hospitalized a silane leak in another
plant led to a con1047298agration and a 1047297lling error of water treatment
reagents resulted in a chlorine leak
39 Incident investigation
Incident investigations in high-tech plants are performed
cautiously and con1047297dentially Information regarding incident
investigations is closed not only between one business and
another but also between subsidiary companies in the same
business group The industrial safety staff often encounter the
problems of important questions being evaded and intentional
concealment when they investigate an incident or false alarm In
the case of an evacuation caused by a false 1047297re alarm althoughthe engineering department knew the whole story they were
unwilling or reluctant to share the true details which make
incident investigation dif 1047297cult However if a serious accident
occurred the regional labor safety department from CLA would
initiate a thorough investigation seeking out the root cause and
proposing prevention measures for future operation
310 Compliance audits
Each high-tech company has its own audit system for safety
management The industrial safety staff usually perform the
primary audit whereas a department manager generally does the
secondary audit The auditorrsquos experience and ability affectswhether a violation of a safety regulation or potential hazard can
be identi1047297ed However a high-tech company is comprised of
many different technologies and departments so most industrial
safety staff audits only the technology in which they specialize
The safety audits mostly focus on super1047297cial mistakes therefore
many serious mistakes such as equipment safety protections
being illegally bypassed are often not discovered
311 Pre-startup safety review
The equipment in high-tech companies usually goes through
a pre-startup safety inspection before being put into of 1047297cial regular
production The inspected items include supply systems safetymonitoring equipment pipelines vent systems and emergency
shutdowns However some plants still put the equipment into
production without a pre-startup safety inspection due to urgent
production demands
312 Hot work permit
A hot work permit receives signi1047297cant attention in high-tech
companies so very few plants have accidents because of poor
management of hot work permits These hot work permits however
should be expanded to 1047297re control (ie any chemicals that might
cause a 1047297re should be kept away from a 1047297re or external thermal
source)
313 Mechanical integrity
Unlike petrochemical plants general maintenance in high-tech
companies is conducted quite well and thus accidents are seldom
caused by equipment aging and pipeline corrosion
4 Conclusions
Most of the plants in the chemical industries that are small or
medium scale require counseling and assistance to effectively
improve loss prevention (Fig 6) The labor commission will be able
to provide personalizedassistance based on the actual conditions of
each plant if it categorizes and classi1047297es the data accumulated from
the 190 plants that accepted counseling and assistance For
example plants with suf 1047297cient manpower budget and certain
levels of safety management can be provided with thorough
assistance regarding safety management However those having
inferior safety management should be offered extraordinary
assistance on key subjects so that they can obtain the correct
knowledge and develop experience to further avoid serious risks
The best effect will be achieved if the plants are guided and assisted
on the basis of their individual needs
In Taiwan the hazards and risks of high-tech companies are
higher than in other industrial sectors Therefore a variety of safety
management methods and regulations appropriate for high-tech
companies have been generated and implemented However it
is crucial for managers and industrial safety specialists to think
carefully about how to completely identify understand and control
potential hazards associated with the manufacturing processes
Furthermore they need to determine and address uncertainties
that arise from any operational errors or incidents across the whole
range of stages in manufacturing
Acknowledgments
The authors are deeply grateful to Mr A MJaneshek of The Dow
Chemical Co Freeport Texas USA for his valuable assistance and
suggestions
References
Basso B Carpegna C Dibitonto C Gaido G Robotto A amp Zonato C (2004)Reviewing the safety management system by incident investigation andperformance indicators Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 225e231
Beatriz F M Manuel M P amp Camilo V O (2007) Safety management systemdevelopment and validation of a multidimensional scale Journal of LossPrevention in the Process Industries 20 52e68
Bernatik A amp Libisova M (2004) Loss prevention in heavy industry risk assess-ment of large gasholders Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 271e278
Carson P Aamp MumfordC J (1995) Thesafehandlingof chemicalsin industry(2nded)New York USA Longman Scienti1047297c amp Technical
Chang M K Chang R R Shu C M amp Lin K N (2005) Application of risk basedinspection in re1047297nery and processing piping Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 18 397e402
Chen C C Lin S Y Wu S H amp Shu C M (2006) Precautions against chemicalaccident in small and medium plant in Taiwan In The 18th annual conference for Chinese Institute of Environmental Engineering (pp 667) Taichung Taiwan ROCTunghai University
Chen K Y Wu S H Wang Y W amp Shu C M (2008) Runaway reaction andthermal hazards simulation of cumene hydroperoxide by DSC Journal of LossPrevention in the Process Industries 21 101e109
Crowl A amp Elwell I (2004) Identifying criteria to classify chemical mixtures ashighly hazardous due to chemical reactivity Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 17 279e289
Guidelines for hazard evaluation procedures (2008) The American Institute of Chemical Engineers (3rd ed) New Jersey USA John Wiley amp Sons
Hirano T T (2004) Accidental explosions of semiconductor manufacturing gases in Japan Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 29e34
Kao C S amp Hu K H (2002) Acrylic reactor runaway and explosion accident
analysis Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 15 213e
222
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538 537
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
Lin Y F Tseng J M Wu T C amp Shu C M (2008) Effects of acetone on methyl ethylketone peroxide runaway reaction Journalof Hazardous Materials 153 1071e1077
Meel A OrsquoNeill L Levin J Seider W Oktem U amp Keren N (2007) Operationalrisk assessment of chemical industries by exploiting accident databases Journalof Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 113e127
Muniz B Peon J amp Ordas C (2007) Safety management system developmentand validation of a multidimensional scale Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 20 52e68
PohanishR Pamp Greene SA (2003)Wileyguide to chemical incompatibilities(2nded)New York USA John Wiley and Sons
Reyes J amp Beard N (2008) A systematic approach to managing safety Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 21 15e28
Rigas F Konstandinidou M Centola P amp Reggio G T (2003) Safety analysis andrisk assessment in a new pesticide production line Journal of Loss Prevention inthe Process Industries 16 103e109
Rotaru A Constantinescu C Rotaru P Moan A Dumitru M Socaciu M et al(2008) Thermal analysis and thin 1047297lms deposition by matrix-assisted pulsedlaser evaporation of a 4cn type azomonoether Journal of Thermal Analysis andCalorimetry 92 279e284
Shaluf M Ahmadun F amp Shariff A (2003) Technological disaster factors Journalof Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 16 513e521
Suardin J Mannan M amp Halwagi M (2007) The integration of Dow rsquos 1047297re andexplosion index (FampEI) into process design and optimization to achieve
inherently safer design Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 79e90
Taipei Times (2005) ASE issues positive outlook in wake of Chungli factory 1047297rehttpwwwtaipeitimescomNews
The annual reports on labor inspection (2004 2005 2006 amp 2007) Council of LaborAffairs Executive Yuan Taipei Taiwan ROC
The Center of Environmental Safety (2001) The explosion of Fu Guo ChemicalCompany httpwwwtsintedutwadminssafetyE5B7A5E5AE89E58DB1E5AEB3danger-1-1htm
The China Post (2005) ASE assesses damage caused by 1047297re at Chungli plant http
wwwchinapostcomtwbusiness2005050361901ASE-assesseshtm TheEpochTimes (2005) Aninvestigation of 1047297re accident of Advanced Semiconductor
Engineering Inc httpwwwepochtimescomb5551n907054htmThe Epoch Times (2010) The Nanpao Resin Company explosion on January 08
2010 httpepochtimescomb51019n2780991htmTseng J M Liu M Y Chang R H Su J L amp Shu C M (2008) Emergency response
plan of chlorine gas for process plants in Taiwan Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 21 393e399
Urban P G (2006) (7th ed)Bretherickrsquo s handbook of reactive chemical hazards Vols1e 2 Burlington USA Academic Press
Wu S H Shyu M L Yet-Pole I Chi J H amp Shu C M (2009) Evaluation of runaway reaction for dicumyl peroxide in a batch reactor by DSC and VSP2
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 22 721e727
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538538
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
Generally speaking the majority of high-tech companies in
Taiwan have good contractor management systems in which
various methods are employed to carefully screen contractors in
advance Nevertheless some serious accidents including 1047297re and
leakage have still occurred in high-tech companies due to reckless
operation by contractors For example an arsine leak in one plant
caused many operators to be hospitalized a silane leak in another
plant led to a con1047298agration and a 1047297lling error of water treatment
reagents resulted in a chlorine leak
39 Incident investigation
Incident investigations in high-tech plants are performed
cautiously and con1047297dentially Information regarding incident
investigations is closed not only between one business and
another but also between subsidiary companies in the same
business group The industrial safety staff often encounter the
problems of important questions being evaded and intentional
concealment when they investigate an incident or false alarm In
the case of an evacuation caused by a false 1047297re alarm althoughthe engineering department knew the whole story they were
unwilling or reluctant to share the true details which make
incident investigation dif 1047297cult However if a serious accident
occurred the regional labor safety department from CLA would
initiate a thorough investigation seeking out the root cause and
proposing prevention measures for future operation
310 Compliance audits
Each high-tech company has its own audit system for safety
management The industrial safety staff usually perform the
primary audit whereas a department manager generally does the
secondary audit The auditorrsquos experience and ability affectswhether a violation of a safety regulation or potential hazard can
be identi1047297ed However a high-tech company is comprised of
many different technologies and departments so most industrial
safety staff audits only the technology in which they specialize
The safety audits mostly focus on super1047297cial mistakes therefore
many serious mistakes such as equipment safety protections
being illegally bypassed are often not discovered
311 Pre-startup safety review
The equipment in high-tech companies usually goes through
a pre-startup safety inspection before being put into of 1047297cial regular
production The inspected items include supply systems safetymonitoring equipment pipelines vent systems and emergency
shutdowns However some plants still put the equipment into
production without a pre-startup safety inspection due to urgent
production demands
312 Hot work permit
A hot work permit receives signi1047297cant attention in high-tech
companies so very few plants have accidents because of poor
management of hot work permits These hot work permits however
should be expanded to 1047297re control (ie any chemicals that might
cause a 1047297re should be kept away from a 1047297re or external thermal
source)
313 Mechanical integrity
Unlike petrochemical plants general maintenance in high-tech
companies is conducted quite well and thus accidents are seldom
caused by equipment aging and pipeline corrosion
4 Conclusions
Most of the plants in the chemical industries that are small or
medium scale require counseling and assistance to effectively
improve loss prevention (Fig 6) The labor commission will be able
to provide personalizedassistance based on the actual conditions of
each plant if it categorizes and classi1047297es the data accumulated from
the 190 plants that accepted counseling and assistance For
example plants with suf 1047297cient manpower budget and certain
levels of safety management can be provided with thorough
assistance regarding safety management However those having
inferior safety management should be offered extraordinary
assistance on key subjects so that they can obtain the correct
knowledge and develop experience to further avoid serious risks
The best effect will be achieved if the plants are guided and assisted
on the basis of their individual needs
In Taiwan the hazards and risks of high-tech companies are
higher than in other industrial sectors Therefore a variety of safety
management methods and regulations appropriate for high-tech
companies have been generated and implemented However it
is crucial for managers and industrial safety specialists to think
carefully about how to completely identify understand and control
potential hazards associated with the manufacturing processes
Furthermore they need to determine and address uncertainties
that arise from any operational errors or incidents across the whole
range of stages in manufacturing
Acknowledgments
The authors are deeply grateful to Mr A MJaneshek of The Dow
Chemical Co Freeport Texas USA for his valuable assistance and
suggestions
References
Basso B Carpegna C Dibitonto C Gaido G Robotto A amp Zonato C (2004)Reviewing the safety management system by incident investigation andperformance indicators Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 225e231
Beatriz F M Manuel M P amp Camilo V O (2007) Safety management systemdevelopment and validation of a multidimensional scale Journal of LossPrevention in the Process Industries 20 52e68
Bernatik A amp Libisova M (2004) Loss prevention in heavy industry risk assess-ment of large gasholders Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 271e278
Carson P Aamp MumfordC J (1995) Thesafehandlingof chemicalsin industry(2nded)New York USA Longman Scienti1047297c amp Technical
Chang M K Chang R R Shu C M amp Lin K N (2005) Application of risk basedinspection in re1047297nery and processing piping Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 18 397e402
Chen C C Lin S Y Wu S H amp Shu C M (2006) Precautions against chemicalaccident in small and medium plant in Taiwan In The 18th annual conference for Chinese Institute of Environmental Engineering (pp 667) Taichung Taiwan ROCTunghai University
Chen K Y Wu S H Wang Y W amp Shu C M (2008) Runaway reaction andthermal hazards simulation of cumene hydroperoxide by DSC Journal of LossPrevention in the Process Industries 21 101e109
Crowl A amp Elwell I (2004) Identifying criteria to classify chemical mixtures ashighly hazardous due to chemical reactivity Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 17 279e289
Guidelines for hazard evaluation procedures (2008) The American Institute of Chemical Engineers (3rd ed) New Jersey USA John Wiley amp Sons
Hirano T T (2004) Accidental explosions of semiconductor manufacturing gases in Japan Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 29e34
Kao C S amp Hu K H (2002) Acrylic reactor runaway and explosion accident
analysis Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 15 213e
222
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538 537
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
Lin Y F Tseng J M Wu T C amp Shu C M (2008) Effects of acetone on methyl ethylketone peroxide runaway reaction Journalof Hazardous Materials 153 1071e1077
Meel A OrsquoNeill L Levin J Seider W Oktem U amp Keren N (2007) Operationalrisk assessment of chemical industries by exploiting accident databases Journalof Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 113e127
Muniz B Peon J amp Ordas C (2007) Safety management system developmentand validation of a multidimensional scale Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 20 52e68
PohanishR Pamp Greene SA (2003)Wileyguide to chemical incompatibilities(2nded)New York USA John Wiley and Sons
Reyes J amp Beard N (2008) A systematic approach to managing safety Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 21 15e28
Rigas F Konstandinidou M Centola P amp Reggio G T (2003) Safety analysis andrisk assessment in a new pesticide production line Journal of Loss Prevention inthe Process Industries 16 103e109
Rotaru A Constantinescu C Rotaru P Moan A Dumitru M Socaciu M et al(2008) Thermal analysis and thin 1047297lms deposition by matrix-assisted pulsedlaser evaporation of a 4cn type azomonoether Journal of Thermal Analysis andCalorimetry 92 279e284
Shaluf M Ahmadun F amp Shariff A (2003) Technological disaster factors Journalof Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 16 513e521
Suardin J Mannan M amp Halwagi M (2007) The integration of Dow rsquos 1047297re andexplosion index (FampEI) into process design and optimization to achieve
inherently safer design Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 79e90
Taipei Times (2005) ASE issues positive outlook in wake of Chungli factory 1047297rehttpwwwtaipeitimescomNews
The annual reports on labor inspection (2004 2005 2006 amp 2007) Council of LaborAffairs Executive Yuan Taipei Taiwan ROC
The Center of Environmental Safety (2001) The explosion of Fu Guo ChemicalCompany httpwwwtsintedutwadminssafetyE5B7A5E5AE89E58DB1E5AEB3danger-1-1htm
The China Post (2005) ASE assesses damage caused by 1047297re at Chungli plant http
wwwchinapostcomtwbusiness2005050361901ASE-assesseshtm TheEpochTimes (2005) Aninvestigation of 1047297re accident of Advanced Semiconductor
Engineering Inc httpwwwepochtimescomb5551n907054htmThe Epoch Times (2010) The Nanpao Resin Company explosion on January 08
2010 httpepochtimescomb51019n2780991htmTseng J M Liu M Y Chang R H Su J L amp Shu C M (2008) Emergency response
plan of chlorine gas for process plants in Taiwan Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 21 393e399
Urban P G (2006) (7th ed)Bretherickrsquo s handbook of reactive chemical hazards Vols1e 2 Burlington USA Academic Press
Wu S H Shyu M L Yet-Pole I Chi J H amp Shu C M (2009) Evaluation of runaway reaction for dicumyl peroxide in a batch reactor by DSC and VSP2
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 22 721e727
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538538
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
Generally speaking the majority of high-tech companies in
Taiwan have good contractor management systems in which
various methods are employed to carefully screen contractors in
advance Nevertheless some serious accidents including 1047297re and
leakage have still occurred in high-tech companies due to reckless
operation by contractors For example an arsine leak in one plant
caused many operators to be hospitalized a silane leak in another
plant led to a con1047298agration and a 1047297lling error of water treatment
reagents resulted in a chlorine leak
39 Incident investigation
Incident investigations in high-tech plants are performed
cautiously and con1047297dentially Information regarding incident
investigations is closed not only between one business and
another but also between subsidiary companies in the same
business group The industrial safety staff often encounter the
problems of important questions being evaded and intentional
concealment when they investigate an incident or false alarm In
the case of an evacuation caused by a false 1047297re alarm althoughthe engineering department knew the whole story they were
unwilling or reluctant to share the true details which make
incident investigation dif 1047297cult However if a serious accident
occurred the regional labor safety department from CLA would
initiate a thorough investigation seeking out the root cause and
proposing prevention measures for future operation
310 Compliance audits
Each high-tech company has its own audit system for safety
management The industrial safety staff usually perform the
primary audit whereas a department manager generally does the
secondary audit The auditorrsquos experience and ability affectswhether a violation of a safety regulation or potential hazard can
be identi1047297ed However a high-tech company is comprised of
many different technologies and departments so most industrial
safety staff audits only the technology in which they specialize
The safety audits mostly focus on super1047297cial mistakes therefore
many serious mistakes such as equipment safety protections
being illegally bypassed are often not discovered
311 Pre-startup safety review
The equipment in high-tech companies usually goes through
a pre-startup safety inspection before being put into of 1047297cial regular
production The inspected items include supply systems safetymonitoring equipment pipelines vent systems and emergency
shutdowns However some plants still put the equipment into
production without a pre-startup safety inspection due to urgent
production demands
312 Hot work permit
A hot work permit receives signi1047297cant attention in high-tech
companies so very few plants have accidents because of poor
management of hot work permits These hot work permits however
should be expanded to 1047297re control (ie any chemicals that might
cause a 1047297re should be kept away from a 1047297re or external thermal
source)
313 Mechanical integrity
Unlike petrochemical plants general maintenance in high-tech
companies is conducted quite well and thus accidents are seldom
caused by equipment aging and pipeline corrosion
4 Conclusions
Most of the plants in the chemical industries that are small or
medium scale require counseling and assistance to effectively
improve loss prevention (Fig 6) The labor commission will be able
to provide personalizedassistance based on the actual conditions of
each plant if it categorizes and classi1047297es the data accumulated from
the 190 plants that accepted counseling and assistance For
example plants with suf 1047297cient manpower budget and certain
levels of safety management can be provided with thorough
assistance regarding safety management However those having
inferior safety management should be offered extraordinary
assistance on key subjects so that they can obtain the correct
knowledge and develop experience to further avoid serious risks
The best effect will be achieved if the plants are guided and assisted
on the basis of their individual needs
In Taiwan the hazards and risks of high-tech companies are
higher than in other industrial sectors Therefore a variety of safety
management methods and regulations appropriate for high-tech
companies have been generated and implemented However it
is crucial for managers and industrial safety specialists to think
carefully about how to completely identify understand and control
potential hazards associated with the manufacturing processes
Furthermore they need to determine and address uncertainties
that arise from any operational errors or incidents across the whole
range of stages in manufacturing
Acknowledgments
The authors are deeply grateful to Mr A MJaneshek of The Dow
Chemical Co Freeport Texas USA for his valuable assistance and
suggestions
References
Basso B Carpegna C Dibitonto C Gaido G Robotto A amp Zonato C (2004)Reviewing the safety management system by incident investigation andperformance indicators Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 225e231
Beatriz F M Manuel M P amp Camilo V O (2007) Safety management systemdevelopment and validation of a multidimensional scale Journal of LossPrevention in the Process Industries 20 52e68
Bernatik A amp Libisova M (2004) Loss prevention in heavy industry risk assess-ment of large gasholders Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 271e278
Carson P Aamp MumfordC J (1995) Thesafehandlingof chemicalsin industry(2nded)New York USA Longman Scienti1047297c amp Technical
Chang M K Chang R R Shu C M amp Lin K N (2005) Application of risk basedinspection in re1047297nery and processing piping Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 18 397e402
Chen C C Lin S Y Wu S H amp Shu C M (2006) Precautions against chemicalaccident in small and medium plant in Taiwan In The 18th annual conference for Chinese Institute of Environmental Engineering (pp 667) Taichung Taiwan ROCTunghai University
Chen K Y Wu S H Wang Y W amp Shu C M (2008) Runaway reaction andthermal hazards simulation of cumene hydroperoxide by DSC Journal of LossPrevention in the Process Industries 21 101e109
Crowl A amp Elwell I (2004) Identifying criteria to classify chemical mixtures ashighly hazardous due to chemical reactivity Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 17 279e289
Guidelines for hazard evaluation procedures (2008) The American Institute of Chemical Engineers (3rd ed) New Jersey USA John Wiley amp Sons
Hirano T T (2004) Accidental explosions of semiconductor manufacturing gases in Japan Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 29e34
Kao C S amp Hu K H (2002) Acrylic reactor runaway and explosion accident
analysis Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 15 213e
222
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538 537
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
Lin Y F Tseng J M Wu T C amp Shu C M (2008) Effects of acetone on methyl ethylketone peroxide runaway reaction Journalof Hazardous Materials 153 1071e1077
Meel A OrsquoNeill L Levin J Seider W Oktem U amp Keren N (2007) Operationalrisk assessment of chemical industries by exploiting accident databases Journalof Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 113e127
Muniz B Peon J amp Ordas C (2007) Safety management system developmentand validation of a multidimensional scale Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 20 52e68
PohanishR Pamp Greene SA (2003)Wileyguide to chemical incompatibilities(2nded)New York USA John Wiley and Sons
Reyes J amp Beard N (2008) A systematic approach to managing safety Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 21 15e28
Rigas F Konstandinidou M Centola P amp Reggio G T (2003) Safety analysis andrisk assessment in a new pesticide production line Journal of Loss Prevention inthe Process Industries 16 103e109
Rotaru A Constantinescu C Rotaru P Moan A Dumitru M Socaciu M et al(2008) Thermal analysis and thin 1047297lms deposition by matrix-assisted pulsedlaser evaporation of a 4cn type azomonoether Journal of Thermal Analysis andCalorimetry 92 279e284
Shaluf M Ahmadun F amp Shariff A (2003) Technological disaster factors Journalof Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 16 513e521
Suardin J Mannan M amp Halwagi M (2007) The integration of Dow rsquos 1047297re andexplosion index (FampEI) into process design and optimization to achieve
inherently safer design Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 79e90
Taipei Times (2005) ASE issues positive outlook in wake of Chungli factory 1047297rehttpwwwtaipeitimescomNews
The annual reports on labor inspection (2004 2005 2006 amp 2007) Council of LaborAffairs Executive Yuan Taipei Taiwan ROC
The Center of Environmental Safety (2001) The explosion of Fu Guo ChemicalCompany httpwwwtsintedutwadminssafetyE5B7A5E5AE89E58DB1E5AEB3danger-1-1htm
The China Post (2005) ASE assesses damage caused by 1047297re at Chungli plant http
wwwchinapostcomtwbusiness2005050361901ASE-assesseshtm TheEpochTimes (2005) Aninvestigation of 1047297re accident of Advanced Semiconductor
Engineering Inc httpwwwepochtimescomb5551n907054htmThe Epoch Times (2010) The Nanpao Resin Company explosion on January 08
2010 httpepochtimescomb51019n2780991htmTseng J M Liu M Y Chang R H Su J L amp Shu C M (2008) Emergency response
plan of chlorine gas for process plants in Taiwan Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 21 393e399
Urban P G (2006) (7th ed)Bretherickrsquo s handbook of reactive chemical hazards Vols1e 2 Burlington USA Academic Press
Wu S H Shyu M L Yet-Pole I Chi J H amp Shu C M (2009) Evaluation of runaway reaction for dicumyl peroxide in a batch reactor by DSC and VSP2
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 22 721e727
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538538
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
Generally speaking the majority of high-tech companies in
Taiwan have good contractor management systems in which
various methods are employed to carefully screen contractors in
advance Nevertheless some serious accidents including 1047297re and
leakage have still occurred in high-tech companies due to reckless
operation by contractors For example an arsine leak in one plant
caused many operators to be hospitalized a silane leak in another
plant led to a con1047298agration and a 1047297lling error of water treatment
reagents resulted in a chlorine leak
39 Incident investigation
Incident investigations in high-tech plants are performed
cautiously and con1047297dentially Information regarding incident
investigations is closed not only between one business and
another but also between subsidiary companies in the same
business group The industrial safety staff often encounter the
problems of important questions being evaded and intentional
concealment when they investigate an incident or false alarm In
the case of an evacuation caused by a false 1047297re alarm althoughthe engineering department knew the whole story they were
unwilling or reluctant to share the true details which make
incident investigation dif 1047297cult However if a serious accident
occurred the regional labor safety department from CLA would
initiate a thorough investigation seeking out the root cause and
proposing prevention measures for future operation
310 Compliance audits
Each high-tech company has its own audit system for safety
management The industrial safety staff usually perform the
primary audit whereas a department manager generally does the
secondary audit The auditorrsquos experience and ability affectswhether a violation of a safety regulation or potential hazard can
be identi1047297ed However a high-tech company is comprised of
many different technologies and departments so most industrial
safety staff audits only the technology in which they specialize
The safety audits mostly focus on super1047297cial mistakes therefore
many serious mistakes such as equipment safety protections
being illegally bypassed are often not discovered
311 Pre-startup safety review
The equipment in high-tech companies usually goes through
a pre-startup safety inspection before being put into of 1047297cial regular
production The inspected items include supply systems safetymonitoring equipment pipelines vent systems and emergency
shutdowns However some plants still put the equipment into
production without a pre-startup safety inspection due to urgent
production demands
312 Hot work permit
A hot work permit receives signi1047297cant attention in high-tech
companies so very few plants have accidents because of poor
management of hot work permits These hot work permits however
should be expanded to 1047297re control (ie any chemicals that might
cause a 1047297re should be kept away from a 1047297re or external thermal
source)
313 Mechanical integrity
Unlike petrochemical plants general maintenance in high-tech
companies is conducted quite well and thus accidents are seldom
caused by equipment aging and pipeline corrosion
4 Conclusions
Most of the plants in the chemical industries that are small or
medium scale require counseling and assistance to effectively
improve loss prevention (Fig 6) The labor commission will be able
to provide personalizedassistance based on the actual conditions of
each plant if it categorizes and classi1047297es the data accumulated from
the 190 plants that accepted counseling and assistance For
example plants with suf 1047297cient manpower budget and certain
levels of safety management can be provided with thorough
assistance regarding safety management However those having
inferior safety management should be offered extraordinary
assistance on key subjects so that they can obtain the correct
knowledge and develop experience to further avoid serious risks
The best effect will be achieved if the plants are guided and assisted
on the basis of their individual needs
In Taiwan the hazards and risks of high-tech companies are
higher than in other industrial sectors Therefore a variety of safety
management methods and regulations appropriate for high-tech
companies have been generated and implemented However it
is crucial for managers and industrial safety specialists to think
carefully about how to completely identify understand and control
potential hazards associated with the manufacturing processes
Furthermore they need to determine and address uncertainties
that arise from any operational errors or incidents across the whole
range of stages in manufacturing
Acknowledgments
The authors are deeply grateful to Mr A MJaneshek of The Dow
Chemical Co Freeport Texas USA for his valuable assistance and
suggestions
References
Basso B Carpegna C Dibitonto C Gaido G Robotto A amp Zonato C (2004)Reviewing the safety management system by incident investigation andperformance indicators Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 225e231
Beatriz F M Manuel M P amp Camilo V O (2007) Safety management systemdevelopment and validation of a multidimensional scale Journal of LossPrevention in the Process Industries 20 52e68
Bernatik A amp Libisova M (2004) Loss prevention in heavy industry risk assess-ment of large gasholders Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 271e278
Carson P Aamp MumfordC J (1995) Thesafehandlingof chemicalsin industry(2nded)New York USA Longman Scienti1047297c amp Technical
Chang M K Chang R R Shu C M amp Lin K N (2005) Application of risk basedinspection in re1047297nery and processing piping Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 18 397e402
Chen C C Lin S Y Wu S H amp Shu C M (2006) Precautions against chemicalaccident in small and medium plant in Taiwan In The 18th annual conference for Chinese Institute of Environmental Engineering (pp 667) Taichung Taiwan ROCTunghai University
Chen K Y Wu S H Wang Y W amp Shu C M (2008) Runaway reaction andthermal hazards simulation of cumene hydroperoxide by DSC Journal of LossPrevention in the Process Industries 21 101e109
Crowl A amp Elwell I (2004) Identifying criteria to classify chemical mixtures ashighly hazardous due to chemical reactivity Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 17 279e289
Guidelines for hazard evaluation procedures (2008) The American Institute of Chemical Engineers (3rd ed) New Jersey USA John Wiley amp Sons
Hirano T T (2004) Accidental explosions of semiconductor manufacturing gases in Japan Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 29e34
Kao C S amp Hu K H (2002) Acrylic reactor runaway and explosion accident
analysis Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 15 213e
222
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538 537
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
Lin Y F Tseng J M Wu T C amp Shu C M (2008) Effects of acetone on methyl ethylketone peroxide runaway reaction Journalof Hazardous Materials 153 1071e1077
Meel A OrsquoNeill L Levin J Seider W Oktem U amp Keren N (2007) Operationalrisk assessment of chemical industries by exploiting accident databases Journalof Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 113e127
Muniz B Peon J amp Ordas C (2007) Safety management system developmentand validation of a multidimensional scale Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 20 52e68
PohanishR Pamp Greene SA (2003)Wileyguide to chemical incompatibilities(2nded)New York USA John Wiley and Sons
Reyes J amp Beard N (2008) A systematic approach to managing safety Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 21 15e28
Rigas F Konstandinidou M Centola P amp Reggio G T (2003) Safety analysis andrisk assessment in a new pesticide production line Journal of Loss Prevention inthe Process Industries 16 103e109
Rotaru A Constantinescu C Rotaru P Moan A Dumitru M Socaciu M et al(2008) Thermal analysis and thin 1047297lms deposition by matrix-assisted pulsedlaser evaporation of a 4cn type azomonoether Journal of Thermal Analysis andCalorimetry 92 279e284
Shaluf M Ahmadun F amp Shariff A (2003) Technological disaster factors Journalof Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 16 513e521
Suardin J Mannan M amp Halwagi M (2007) The integration of Dow rsquos 1047297re andexplosion index (FampEI) into process design and optimization to achieve
inherently safer design Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 79e90
Taipei Times (2005) ASE issues positive outlook in wake of Chungli factory 1047297rehttpwwwtaipeitimescomNews
The annual reports on labor inspection (2004 2005 2006 amp 2007) Council of LaborAffairs Executive Yuan Taipei Taiwan ROC
The Center of Environmental Safety (2001) The explosion of Fu Guo ChemicalCompany httpwwwtsintedutwadminssafetyE5B7A5E5AE89E58DB1E5AEB3danger-1-1htm
The China Post (2005) ASE assesses damage caused by 1047297re at Chungli plant http
wwwchinapostcomtwbusiness2005050361901ASE-assesseshtm TheEpochTimes (2005) Aninvestigation of 1047297re accident of Advanced Semiconductor
Engineering Inc httpwwwepochtimescomb5551n907054htmThe Epoch Times (2010) The Nanpao Resin Company explosion on January 08
2010 httpepochtimescomb51019n2780991htmTseng J M Liu M Y Chang R H Su J L amp Shu C M (2008) Emergency response
plan of chlorine gas for process plants in Taiwan Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 21 393e399
Urban P G (2006) (7th ed)Bretherickrsquo s handbook of reactive chemical hazards Vols1e 2 Burlington USA Academic Press
Wu S H Shyu M L Yet-Pole I Chi J H amp Shu C M (2009) Evaluation of runaway reaction for dicumyl peroxide in a batch reactor by DSC and VSP2
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 22 721e727
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538538
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
Generally speaking the majority of high-tech companies in
Taiwan have good contractor management systems in which
various methods are employed to carefully screen contractors in
advance Nevertheless some serious accidents including 1047297re and
leakage have still occurred in high-tech companies due to reckless
operation by contractors For example an arsine leak in one plant
caused many operators to be hospitalized a silane leak in another
plant led to a con1047298agration and a 1047297lling error of water treatment
reagents resulted in a chlorine leak
39 Incident investigation
Incident investigations in high-tech plants are performed
cautiously and con1047297dentially Information regarding incident
investigations is closed not only between one business and
another but also between subsidiary companies in the same
business group The industrial safety staff often encounter the
problems of important questions being evaded and intentional
concealment when they investigate an incident or false alarm In
the case of an evacuation caused by a false 1047297re alarm althoughthe engineering department knew the whole story they were
unwilling or reluctant to share the true details which make
incident investigation dif 1047297cult However if a serious accident
occurred the regional labor safety department from CLA would
initiate a thorough investigation seeking out the root cause and
proposing prevention measures for future operation
310 Compliance audits
Each high-tech company has its own audit system for safety
management The industrial safety staff usually perform the
primary audit whereas a department manager generally does the
secondary audit The auditorrsquos experience and ability affectswhether a violation of a safety regulation or potential hazard can
be identi1047297ed However a high-tech company is comprised of
many different technologies and departments so most industrial
safety staff audits only the technology in which they specialize
The safety audits mostly focus on super1047297cial mistakes therefore
many serious mistakes such as equipment safety protections
being illegally bypassed are often not discovered
311 Pre-startup safety review
The equipment in high-tech companies usually goes through
a pre-startup safety inspection before being put into of 1047297cial regular
production The inspected items include supply systems safetymonitoring equipment pipelines vent systems and emergency
shutdowns However some plants still put the equipment into
production without a pre-startup safety inspection due to urgent
production demands
312 Hot work permit
A hot work permit receives signi1047297cant attention in high-tech
companies so very few plants have accidents because of poor
management of hot work permits These hot work permits however
should be expanded to 1047297re control (ie any chemicals that might
cause a 1047297re should be kept away from a 1047297re or external thermal
source)
313 Mechanical integrity
Unlike petrochemical plants general maintenance in high-tech
companies is conducted quite well and thus accidents are seldom
caused by equipment aging and pipeline corrosion
4 Conclusions
Most of the plants in the chemical industries that are small or
medium scale require counseling and assistance to effectively
improve loss prevention (Fig 6) The labor commission will be able
to provide personalizedassistance based on the actual conditions of
each plant if it categorizes and classi1047297es the data accumulated from
the 190 plants that accepted counseling and assistance For
example plants with suf 1047297cient manpower budget and certain
levels of safety management can be provided with thorough
assistance regarding safety management However those having
inferior safety management should be offered extraordinary
assistance on key subjects so that they can obtain the correct
knowledge and develop experience to further avoid serious risks
The best effect will be achieved if the plants are guided and assisted
on the basis of their individual needs
In Taiwan the hazards and risks of high-tech companies are
higher than in other industrial sectors Therefore a variety of safety
management methods and regulations appropriate for high-tech
companies have been generated and implemented However it
is crucial for managers and industrial safety specialists to think
carefully about how to completely identify understand and control
potential hazards associated with the manufacturing processes
Furthermore they need to determine and address uncertainties
that arise from any operational errors or incidents across the whole
range of stages in manufacturing
Acknowledgments
The authors are deeply grateful to Mr A MJaneshek of The Dow
Chemical Co Freeport Texas USA for his valuable assistance and
suggestions
References
Basso B Carpegna C Dibitonto C Gaido G Robotto A amp Zonato C (2004)Reviewing the safety management system by incident investigation andperformance indicators Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 225e231
Beatriz F M Manuel M P amp Camilo V O (2007) Safety management systemdevelopment and validation of a multidimensional scale Journal of LossPrevention in the Process Industries 20 52e68
Bernatik A amp Libisova M (2004) Loss prevention in heavy industry risk assess-ment of large gasholders Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 271e278
Carson P Aamp MumfordC J (1995) Thesafehandlingof chemicalsin industry(2nded)New York USA Longman Scienti1047297c amp Technical
Chang M K Chang R R Shu C M amp Lin K N (2005) Application of risk basedinspection in re1047297nery and processing piping Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 18 397e402
Chen C C Lin S Y Wu S H amp Shu C M (2006) Precautions against chemicalaccident in small and medium plant in Taiwan In The 18th annual conference for Chinese Institute of Environmental Engineering (pp 667) Taichung Taiwan ROCTunghai University
Chen K Y Wu S H Wang Y W amp Shu C M (2008) Runaway reaction andthermal hazards simulation of cumene hydroperoxide by DSC Journal of LossPrevention in the Process Industries 21 101e109
Crowl A amp Elwell I (2004) Identifying criteria to classify chemical mixtures ashighly hazardous due to chemical reactivity Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 17 279e289
Guidelines for hazard evaluation procedures (2008) The American Institute of Chemical Engineers (3rd ed) New Jersey USA John Wiley amp Sons
Hirano T T (2004) Accidental explosions of semiconductor manufacturing gases in Japan Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 29e34
Kao C S amp Hu K H (2002) Acrylic reactor runaway and explosion accident
analysis Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 15 213e
222
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538 537
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
Lin Y F Tseng J M Wu T C amp Shu C M (2008) Effects of acetone on methyl ethylketone peroxide runaway reaction Journalof Hazardous Materials 153 1071e1077
Meel A OrsquoNeill L Levin J Seider W Oktem U amp Keren N (2007) Operationalrisk assessment of chemical industries by exploiting accident databases Journalof Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 113e127
Muniz B Peon J amp Ordas C (2007) Safety management system developmentand validation of a multidimensional scale Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 20 52e68
PohanishR Pamp Greene SA (2003)Wileyguide to chemical incompatibilities(2nded)New York USA John Wiley and Sons
Reyes J amp Beard N (2008) A systematic approach to managing safety Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 21 15e28
Rigas F Konstandinidou M Centola P amp Reggio G T (2003) Safety analysis andrisk assessment in a new pesticide production line Journal of Loss Prevention inthe Process Industries 16 103e109
Rotaru A Constantinescu C Rotaru P Moan A Dumitru M Socaciu M et al(2008) Thermal analysis and thin 1047297lms deposition by matrix-assisted pulsedlaser evaporation of a 4cn type azomonoether Journal of Thermal Analysis andCalorimetry 92 279e284
Shaluf M Ahmadun F amp Shariff A (2003) Technological disaster factors Journalof Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 16 513e521
Suardin J Mannan M amp Halwagi M (2007) The integration of Dow rsquos 1047297re andexplosion index (FampEI) into process design and optimization to achieve
inherently safer design Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 79e90
Taipei Times (2005) ASE issues positive outlook in wake of Chungli factory 1047297rehttpwwwtaipeitimescomNews
The annual reports on labor inspection (2004 2005 2006 amp 2007) Council of LaborAffairs Executive Yuan Taipei Taiwan ROC
The Center of Environmental Safety (2001) The explosion of Fu Guo ChemicalCompany httpwwwtsintedutwadminssafetyE5B7A5E5AE89E58DB1E5AEB3danger-1-1htm
The China Post (2005) ASE assesses damage caused by 1047297re at Chungli plant http
wwwchinapostcomtwbusiness2005050361901ASE-assesseshtm TheEpochTimes (2005) Aninvestigation of 1047297re accident of Advanced Semiconductor
Engineering Inc httpwwwepochtimescomb5551n907054htmThe Epoch Times (2010) The Nanpao Resin Company explosion on January 08
2010 httpepochtimescomb51019n2780991htmTseng J M Liu M Y Chang R H Su J L amp Shu C M (2008) Emergency response
plan of chlorine gas for process plants in Taiwan Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 21 393e399
Urban P G (2006) (7th ed)Bretherickrsquo s handbook of reactive chemical hazards Vols1e 2 Burlington USA Academic Press
Wu S H Shyu M L Yet-Pole I Chi J H amp Shu C M (2009) Evaluation of runaway reaction for dicumyl peroxide in a batch reactor by DSC and VSP2
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 22 721e727
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538538
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
Generally speaking the majority of high-tech companies in
Taiwan have good contractor management systems in which
various methods are employed to carefully screen contractors in
advance Nevertheless some serious accidents including 1047297re and
leakage have still occurred in high-tech companies due to reckless
operation by contractors For example an arsine leak in one plant
caused many operators to be hospitalized a silane leak in another
plant led to a con1047298agration and a 1047297lling error of water treatment
reagents resulted in a chlorine leak
39 Incident investigation
Incident investigations in high-tech plants are performed
cautiously and con1047297dentially Information regarding incident
investigations is closed not only between one business and
another but also between subsidiary companies in the same
business group The industrial safety staff often encounter the
problems of important questions being evaded and intentional
concealment when they investigate an incident or false alarm In
the case of an evacuation caused by a false 1047297re alarm althoughthe engineering department knew the whole story they were
unwilling or reluctant to share the true details which make
incident investigation dif 1047297cult However if a serious accident
occurred the regional labor safety department from CLA would
initiate a thorough investigation seeking out the root cause and
proposing prevention measures for future operation
310 Compliance audits
Each high-tech company has its own audit system for safety
management The industrial safety staff usually perform the
primary audit whereas a department manager generally does the
secondary audit The auditorrsquos experience and ability affectswhether a violation of a safety regulation or potential hazard can
be identi1047297ed However a high-tech company is comprised of
many different technologies and departments so most industrial
safety staff audits only the technology in which they specialize
The safety audits mostly focus on super1047297cial mistakes therefore
many serious mistakes such as equipment safety protections
being illegally bypassed are often not discovered
311 Pre-startup safety review
The equipment in high-tech companies usually goes through
a pre-startup safety inspection before being put into of 1047297cial regular
production The inspected items include supply systems safetymonitoring equipment pipelines vent systems and emergency
shutdowns However some plants still put the equipment into
production without a pre-startup safety inspection due to urgent
production demands
312 Hot work permit
A hot work permit receives signi1047297cant attention in high-tech
companies so very few plants have accidents because of poor
management of hot work permits These hot work permits however
should be expanded to 1047297re control (ie any chemicals that might
cause a 1047297re should be kept away from a 1047297re or external thermal
source)
313 Mechanical integrity
Unlike petrochemical plants general maintenance in high-tech
companies is conducted quite well and thus accidents are seldom
caused by equipment aging and pipeline corrosion
4 Conclusions
Most of the plants in the chemical industries that are small or
medium scale require counseling and assistance to effectively
improve loss prevention (Fig 6) The labor commission will be able
to provide personalizedassistance based on the actual conditions of
each plant if it categorizes and classi1047297es the data accumulated from
the 190 plants that accepted counseling and assistance For
example plants with suf 1047297cient manpower budget and certain
levels of safety management can be provided with thorough
assistance regarding safety management However those having
inferior safety management should be offered extraordinary
assistance on key subjects so that they can obtain the correct
knowledge and develop experience to further avoid serious risks
The best effect will be achieved if the plants are guided and assisted
on the basis of their individual needs
In Taiwan the hazards and risks of high-tech companies are
higher than in other industrial sectors Therefore a variety of safety
management methods and regulations appropriate for high-tech
companies have been generated and implemented However it
is crucial for managers and industrial safety specialists to think
carefully about how to completely identify understand and control
potential hazards associated with the manufacturing processes
Furthermore they need to determine and address uncertainties
that arise from any operational errors or incidents across the whole
range of stages in manufacturing
Acknowledgments
The authors are deeply grateful to Mr A MJaneshek of The Dow
Chemical Co Freeport Texas USA for his valuable assistance and
suggestions
References
Basso B Carpegna C Dibitonto C Gaido G Robotto A amp Zonato C (2004)Reviewing the safety management system by incident investigation andperformance indicators Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 225e231
Beatriz F M Manuel M P amp Camilo V O (2007) Safety management systemdevelopment and validation of a multidimensional scale Journal of LossPrevention in the Process Industries 20 52e68
Bernatik A amp Libisova M (2004) Loss prevention in heavy industry risk assess-ment of large gasholders Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 271e278
Carson P Aamp MumfordC J (1995) Thesafehandlingof chemicalsin industry(2nded)New York USA Longman Scienti1047297c amp Technical
Chang M K Chang R R Shu C M amp Lin K N (2005) Application of risk basedinspection in re1047297nery and processing piping Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 18 397e402
Chen C C Lin S Y Wu S H amp Shu C M (2006) Precautions against chemicalaccident in small and medium plant in Taiwan In The 18th annual conference for Chinese Institute of Environmental Engineering (pp 667) Taichung Taiwan ROCTunghai University
Chen K Y Wu S H Wang Y W amp Shu C M (2008) Runaway reaction andthermal hazards simulation of cumene hydroperoxide by DSC Journal of LossPrevention in the Process Industries 21 101e109
Crowl A amp Elwell I (2004) Identifying criteria to classify chemical mixtures ashighly hazardous due to chemical reactivity Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 17 279e289
Guidelines for hazard evaluation procedures (2008) The American Institute of Chemical Engineers (3rd ed) New Jersey USA John Wiley amp Sons
Hirano T T (2004) Accidental explosions of semiconductor manufacturing gases in Japan Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 29e34
Kao C S amp Hu K H (2002) Acrylic reactor runaway and explosion accident
analysis Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 15 213e
222
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538 537
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
Lin Y F Tseng J M Wu T C amp Shu C M (2008) Effects of acetone on methyl ethylketone peroxide runaway reaction Journalof Hazardous Materials 153 1071e1077
Meel A OrsquoNeill L Levin J Seider W Oktem U amp Keren N (2007) Operationalrisk assessment of chemical industries by exploiting accident databases Journalof Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 113e127
Muniz B Peon J amp Ordas C (2007) Safety management system developmentand validation of a multidimensional scale Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 20 52e68
PohanishR Pamp Greene SA (2003)Wileyguide to chemical incompatibilities(2nded)New York USA John Wiley and Sons
Reyes J amp Beard N (2008) A systematic approach to managing safety Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 21 15e28
Rigas F Konstandinidou M Centola P amp Reggio G T (2003) Safety analysis andrisk assessment in a new pesticide production line Journal of Loss Prevention inthe Process Industries 16 103e109
Rotaru A Constantinescu C Rotaru P Moan A Dumitru M Socaciu M et al(2008) Thermal analysis and thin 1047297lms deposition by matrix-assisted pulsedlaser evaporation of a 4cn type azomonoether Journal of Thermal Analysis andCalorimetry 92 279e284
Shaluf M Ahmadun F amp Shariff A (2003) Technological disaster factors Journalof Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 16 513e521
Suardin J Mannan M amp Halwagi M (2007) The integration of Dow rsquos 1047297re andexplosion index (FampEI) into process design and optimization to achieve
inherently safer design Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 79e90
Taipei Times (2005) ASE issues positive outlook in wake of Chungli factory 1047297rehttpwwwtaipeitimescomNews
The annual reports on labor inspection (2004 2005 2006 amp 2007) Council of LaborAffairs Executive Yuan Taipei Taiwan ROC
The Center of Environmental Safety (2001) The explosion of Fu Guo ChemicalCompany httpwwwtsintedutwadminssafetyE5B7A5E5AE89E58DB1E5AEB3danger-1-1htm
The China Post (2005) ASE assesses damage caused by 1047297re at Chungli plant http
wwwchinapostcomtwbusiness2005050361901ASE-assesseshtm TheEpochTimes (2005) Aninvestigation of 1047297re accident of Advanced Semiconductor
Engineering Inc httpwwwepochtimescomb5551n907054htmThe Epoch Times (2010) The Nanpao Resin Company explosion on January 08
2010 httpepochtimescomb51019n2780991htmTseng J M Liu M Y Chang R H Su J L amp Shu C M (2008) Emergency response
plan of chlorine gas for process plants in Taiwan Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 21 393e399
Urban P G (2006) (7th ed)Bretherickrsquo s handbook of reactive chemical hazards Vols1e 2 Burlington USA Academic Press
Wu S H Shyu M L Yet-Pole I Chi J H amp Shu C M (2009) Evaluation of runaway reaction for dicumyl peroxide in a batch reactor by DSC and VSP2
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 22 721e727
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538538
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
Lin Y F Tseng J M Wu T C amp Shu C M (2008) Effects of acetone on methyl ethylketone peroxide runaway reaction Journalof Hazardous Materials 153 1071e1077
Meel A OrsquoNeill L Levin J Seider W Oktem U amp Keren N (2007) Operationalrisk assessment of chemical industries by exploiting accident databases Journalof Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 113e127
Muniz B Peon J amp Ordas C (2007) Safety management system developmentand validation of a multidimensional scale Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 20 52e68
PohanishR Pamp Greene SA (2003)Wileyguide to chemical incompatibilities(2nded)New York USA John Wiley and Sons
Reyes J amp Beard N (2008) A systematic approach to managing safety Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 21 15e28
Rigas F Konstandinidou M Centola P amp Reggio G T (2003) Safety analysis andrisk assessment in a new pesticide production line Journal of Loss Prevention inthe Process Industries 16 103e109
Rotaru A Constantinescu C Rotaru P Moan A Dumitru M Socaciu M et al(2008) Thermal analysis and thin 1047297lms deposition by matrix-assisted pulsedlaser evaporation of a 4cn type azomonoether Journal of Thermal Analysis andCalorimetry 92 279e284
Shaluf M Ahmadun F amp Shariff A (2003) Technological disaster factors Journalof Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 16 513e521
Suardin J Mannan M amp Halwagi M (2007) The integration of Dow rsquos 1047297re andexplosion index (FampEI) into process design and optimization to achieve
inherently safer design Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 79e90
Taipei Times (2005) ASE issues positive outlook in wake of Chungli factory 1047297rehttpwwwtaipeitimescomNews
The annual reports on labor inspection (2004 2005 2006 amp 2007) Council of LaborAffairs Executive Yuan Taipei Taiwan ROC
The Center of Environmental Safety (2001) The explosion of Fu Guo ChemicalCompany httpwwwtsintedutwadminssafetyE5B7A5E5AE89E58DB1E5AEB3danger-1-1htm
The China Post (2005) ASE assesses damage caused by 1047297re at Chungli plant http
wwwchinapostcomtwbusiness2005050361901ASE-assesseshtm TheEpochTimes (2005) Aninvestigation of 1047297re accident of Advanced Semiconductor
Engineering Inc httpwwwepochtimescomb5551n907054htmThe Epoch Times (2010) The Nanpao Resin Company explosion on January 08
2010 httpepochtimescomb51019n2780991htmTseng J M Liu M Y Chang R H Su J L amp Shu C M (2008) Emergency response
plan of chlorine gas for process plants in Taiwan Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 21 393e399
Urban P G (2006) (7th ed)Bretherickrsquo s handbook of reactive chemical hazards Vols1e 2 Burlington USA Academic Press
Wu S H Shyu M L Yet-Pole I Chi J H amp Shu C M (2009) Evaluation of runaway reaction for dicumyl peroxide in a batch reactor by DSC and VSP2
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 22 721e727
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538538