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Brand Reality: The JapanesePerspectiveJohny K. Johansson &
Masaaki HiranoPublished online: 01 Feb 2010.
To cite this article: Johny K. Johansson & Masaaki Hirano
(1999) Brand Reality:The Japanese Perspective, Journal of Marketing
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joumal of Marketing Management 1999, 15, 93-105
Johny K Johansson 1 Brand Reality: The Japaneseand Masaaki
Hirano2 Perspective
Georgetown University
Waseda University
Introduction
This study of the japanese perspective on brandreality draws on
personal interviews in japaneseorganizations and published writings
onbranding in japan. It first details the variousfactors which make
brand reality such a naturaland powerful element of the successful
japaneseorganizations. The study then discusses howbrand reality is
created by japanese finns. Itends with the current efforts of the
japaneseorganizations to manage and control theirfuture brand
identity.
Brand reality, the sense among employees and other stakeholders
of the brandas the unifying symbol of the organization, and the
passionate commitment tosustaining this symbol, has been with the
Japanese corporations since theirinception. Japanese corporations
have long found it natural to clearly identifythemselves as
guarantors of product quality and selVice perfonnance andconsumers
have come to expect it. Procter & Gamble, with its many
differentbrands in packaged goods, found it necessary to add its
corporate logo at theend of every TV commercial in Japan. Of
course, in Japan corporate and brandnames are often synonymous
(Tanaka, 1993). A Sony Walkman is made by theSony Corporation, the
Yamaha company makes both Yamaha pianos, sportsequipment and
motorcycles, and a Honda car is built by the Honda Corporation.Even
in the rare cases where brand names differ from corporate names
(such asthe Matsushita Corporation with its National, Technics, and
Panasonic brands)little doubt has been left about the maker of the
products. Just as Japaneseconsumers have been taught through
experience to trust Matsushita products, sothe founder, Mr.
Matsushita himself, went to great lengths (through
infonnalconversation, talks, a monthly magazine, videos, television
appearances etc.) toexplain to employees "the Matsushita Way." This
even though Matsushita andother Japanese companies have long been
listed on major foreign exchanges.
The contrast to many Western organizations could hardly be
starker. Even
1 McCrane/ShakerProfessorof InternationalBusiness and
MarketingSchool of
BusinessGeorgetownUniversityWashington,D.C.20007, U.SA
2 Professor of Infonnation Management Institute of Asia-Pacific
Studies WasedaUniversityTokyo 169-0051,Japan
ISSN0267-257XJ99/010093+ 12 $12.0010 Westburn Publishers
Ltd.
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94 johny K Johansson and Masaaki Hirano
though the conglomerate corporation exemplified by the notorious
ITT'of HaroldGeneen is mostly a thing of the past, the corporate
identity of many Westernfinns is something divorced from its market
presence. Few American consumerswould know - or care - that Coleman
tents come from the Sunbeamcorporation, that Eddie Bauer is a
division of General Mills, or that Eurekavacuum cleaners are owned
by Electrolux. Among more patriotic Europeancustomers, the fact
that Swedish Saab is half-owned by American GeneralMotors, that
Swiss Nestle owns French Vittel, and that Gennan BMW now ownsthe
Rolls Royce name (while Volkswagen got Bentley and the factory) may
bemore of a concern, but the realities of the free market system
are presumablysoon accepted even by the most stubborn. Inside the
merged or acquiredorganizations, however, the employees sense of
belonging and identity is severelytested. Although a few Western
organizations seem to have recognised theimportance of brand
identity (Microsoft and Intel, Mercedes and BMW, and CocaCola come
to mind), for many Western corporations brand reality must seem
animpossible dream, a cmel joke.
Several of the factors which help make brand reality a "natural"
for japaneseorganizations are discussed below. Then we will discuss
the way japaneseorganizations create and sustain the value inherent
in their brand reality. In thethird section we will present the
efforts underway in japanese organizations tofurther enhance brand
value now that the Western organizations have caught onto the
importance of brand reality.
Drivers Of Japanese Brand Reality
For the japanese, the "reality" in brand reality comes from the
parallelismbetween individual and corporate objectives. The brand
symbolises thecorporation, the products on the market, but also the
individual's sense ofidentity. A japanese employee "belongs" to the
corporation in the same sensethat a son or daughter belongs to a
family. The family name is the corporation'sname. The brand is who
you are - a Toyota employee is a Toyota-jin, a "Toyota-man."
Everything is in the name - and the name has to be protected
andenhanced as any family name. It is a source of pride, for the
employee as well ashis family members. Losing the name, even if
voluntarily, means that you areautomatically a "ronin" -- without a
"master," without an identity. On the flip side,the corporation has
a responsibility to care for its employees, even its prodigalsons,
one reason why big companies are reluctant to shed
unprofitablebusinesses.
Historical RootsSuch a paternalistic situation does not, of
course, arise in a vacuum. A
historical tradition of feudalism, the well known system of
landlord daimyos andtheir samurai vassals, lent itself easily to a
concept of the corporation as lordingover its employees. The shogun
Tokugawa froze the feudal system for nearly300 years, effectively
blocking the spread of European-inspired enlightenment
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Brand Reality:The japanese Perspective 95
and democratic ideals. Only after the Meiji restoration in the
1870s did the newideas begin to be disseminated. Still, feudalistic
sentiments were supported by afocus on the Pmssian model of Kaiser
Wilhelm and Chancellor Bismarck ratherthan the less militaristic
societies of France, England and the United States.
The result was a hierarchical society with the Emperor at the
top, a stronggovernment bureaucracy, acceptance and even
encouragement of businessgroupings, and a regulated labour market.
With the mobilization up throughWorld War II, lifetime employment
became the nonn, still maintained as theideal condition. In tum
this led to the situation where employees have largelyfinn-specific
skills, further limiting their mobility. Coupled with the lack
ofnatural resources in japan, employee skills became the main
source ofcompetitive advantage. For the employees, to prove a
winner became all-important, and competition between finns and
groups of finns took on theintense aura of a World Cup game still
seen today. Thus, while success for manyWestern companies involves
inimitable access to technology or natural resources,government
protection or entrepreneurial luck, japanese assume that the
mostsuccessful companies have the best people. Even though today
some of theyoung people question the values that an older
generation represent, thischallenge to the authority of age seems
no more serious than in earlier times. IfWestern youth seem to fonn
their values in high school and college, japaneseyoung people wait
until they enter the organization they will belong to.
Drive Towards RecognitionIt is this focus on being recognised
that drives many japanese corporations
still today to focus on size, including sales and market share.
Why not profits?Because profits are necessarily kept less visible.
Profits shown are taxed. Profitsshown can be - and often are --
manipulated. Even today when the .Americanprofit-seeking
capitalists seem to be invincible, profits shown carry an
unseemlyaura of selfishness in the Confucius-oriented ethics of
japan. Market share is aless ambiguous and more acceptable measure.
Large market share implies largesize, and even in japan bigger is
better. Potential customers know you already.The company employs,
and accepts responsibility for, more people. A largemarket share
engenders power. In short, greater sales and market share
meangreater public recognition. For example, the seating
arrangement in themeetings of an industrial association is
traditionally based on the company'sshare of the market And market
share helps determine the societal obligationsof the company. For
instance, the amount given to charitable causes varies withthe size
of the company, and similar sized companies feel a need to give
similaramounts.
A striking example of the pervasiveness of the desire for
visibility and status isthe annual ranking of preferred workplaces.
Every spring Recmit, a leadingJapanese research finn, publishes a
ranking of which companies graduatingcollege students would like to
work for. The 1998 rankings of a select set ofcompanies are given
in Exhibit 1. While a similar listing for the U.S. wouldmainly be
based on the respondents' balance between independence,
challenging
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96 Johny K Johansson and Masaaki Hirano
work and economic security, in Japan security and pride in the
social statusassociated with the job are paramount Thus, these
rankings can in fact be seenas an indicator of the strength of a
company's brand identity and perhaps evenbrand reality. Sony has
clearly a very compelling brand identity among collegestudents.
In the end, the Japanese company, like any proud family, wants
to berecognised, to be famous. The employees working for a famous
company willhave an easier time financing a home, will be married
to prettier girls, will bemore popular than their friends,
colleagues, or competitors at other companies,and will simply feel
better about themselves. With market share as the goal,
thecompany's and the individual's objectives are aligned properly -
with profits lessso. Profits, as Western employees know all too
well, are primarily forshareholders, not for them.
Exhibit 1: 1998 Rankings of Companies as Places to Worko
Frequencies represent the number of students who named the
company inresponse to the question: "Name five companies you would
like to work for."Respondents were Japanese college juniors in
March 1998, the time at whichtheir job search usually gets underway
(N=13476).
CompanySonyToyotaHondaNECMatsushitaIBMJapanFuji
XeroxFujitsuSegaCanonNissanToshibaMitsubishi CarsHitachiSharp
Rank178101430344047526166768087
Frequencies1352486479475398269254245211197173159142137117
*The listing is from Recmifs annual survey of Japanese colleges
and universities.Only a few select companies with global presence
are shown. Many of the listedpreferences involve domestic-only
players, such as Japan Travel Bureau UTB),no.2 with 670 mentions,
and Nippon Telephone and Telegraph (NIT), at third placewith 575
votes.
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Brand Reality:The japanese Perspective 97
Internal and External SymbolsOne consequence of the emphasis on
recognition is a clear understanding of
the dual role of brand names as an internal as well as an
external symbol. WhenSony's Morita, in the often retold 1956
anecdote, rejects an OEM offer from alarge American company with
the words "Fiftyyears ago your name was nothing ..Today it is
famous. In fiftyyears Sony will be famous," he is not simply
speakingabout creating innovative products and memorable
advertising (Morita 1987).He is putting into words the essence of
the conviction and commitment amongthe Sony employees, the brand
reality within Sony itself. That reality is priceless,and not for
sale. Morita's only mistake was in the timing - it took less than
halfthat time.
The internal role of brand reality is not simply as a powerful
motivator. Itsummarises and defines organizational culture, it
serves as a guide forindividuals far away from headquarters who
make decisions according to the"Matsushita Way," it serves as a
guide for the new and young hires who are stilllearning the unique
ways of the corporation. 'this is the way we do it here atDentsu,"
is a typical example expressed in one of our interviews. job
rotationhelps reinforce this company-specific style, allowing
employees to develop theappropriate perspectives and skills useful
in the organization. Also, a japanesemanager is guardian and
teacher ("sempai" or senior) of a more recent hire("kohai" or
junior), one of the most important of their managerial tasks. A
majorreason employees in japan do not move easily between companies
is the relativeuniqueness of their decision making style and the
degree to which it is adjustedto the specific skills and
personalities that make up the organization. As in thestone walls
that surround the japanese castles, japanese companies try to fit
bigand small pieces into something that is more than the sum of the
individualparts - and brand reality is the glue that holds the wall
together. In the Westthe stones in the wall are identical and are
easily replaced - just as an employeecan easily move to another
company to fill a vacancy.
The emphasis on "the company identity" is also closely related
to the fact thatthe japanese are particularly reluctant to rely on
national origin when evaluatingtheir companies' competitiveness.
For Western observers it is clear that the"japanese" identity of a
Sony or Toyota is a very salient attribute in the globalmarket
place. Not so to the japanese. This is mainly because other
japanesecompetitors are their strongest competitors, and thus
country-of-origin cannot bea particular company's competitive
advantage. In addition, of course, thecompetitive edge in product
differentiation - a better quality product or newfeatures - is
minimal because of benchmarking and "me-too" productdevelopment
japanese managers are forced to look for intangible assets.
Brandidentity is one such asset, all the more important because it
is less easilyimitated.
Brand Identity in the MarketplaceExternally, the japanese also
find it easy to see more in the brand than a
simple brand image which resonates with the customer and reduces
theperceived risk of the purchase. The brand identity naturally is
seen to carry over
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98 Johny K Johansson and Masaaki Hirano
to the customer - the Sony customer is special, reflecting the
Sony identity(something also recognised in the West see Kapferer,
1997). The identity is infact reciprocal -- what defines the image
of a brand is not simply the positioningcommunication from the
manufacturer. Rather, in the end, say the Japanese, hewho buys and
uses a brand defines its image. If Toyota's image is
conservative,this is because its buyers are conservative, not
simply because Toyota wants toproject traditional values (although,
for sustained success, it is of coursenecessary for communicated
message and user profile to be aligned).
This conception of the role of brand identity in the marketplace
also meansthat the Japanese emphasise brand awareness among
non-users. For mostmarketers in the West brand image is a matter
between buyer and seller. Butfor recognition at large, the powerful
effect of brand reality among Japanese, it isof course necessary
that the brand is well known among a broad spectnlln ofpeople.
Wearing Levi's create no particular effect unless non-llsers
alsorecognise and appreciate the Levi's name. Thus, brand effects
work in a triad:Buyer-seller-third party. For a full brand effect a
general awareness is required.Large market shares help to achieve
the visibility, as do relentless marketingefforts.
How the Japanese Create Brand Reality
With the idea, if not the tenn, of brand reality coming
naturally to them, thejapanese have not thought very strategically
about the building of brand reality,or brand identity for that
matter. In interviews it was palpable how the conceptsinvolved were
new in name only -- conceptually, the japanese found the
ideascommon-sensical. Now that they realise these issues are being
emphasisedamong Western competitors, they are starting to pay more
strategic attention tobranding, if nothing else at least for
defensive reasons.
Successful ProductsIn the Western literature brand identity and
image are seen as drivers of
success. The "power" of their brands is the cause of the success
of Coca Cola,AT&T, and 3M. While not denying this, the japanese
are inclined to theopposite view. For the japanese finns, market
success is what creates a powerfulbrand. The main way to build a
strong brand is to capture a large share of themarket Any brand
needs to build up a constituency of loyal customers.
Oncesuccessful, new and weak brands gain stature. Even seemingly
odd brand namestake on the magical aura of a power brand. So it
goes with Honda, withNintendo, with Canon and with Bridgestone.
It is therefore not surprising if there are several examples
where the japaneseinsistence on maintaining identity - and thus
keeping their brand names intact -has been a problem in foreign
markets. Toyota's suggestion of a "toy" was anearly drawback, aided
and abetted by an unfortunate model called the "Toyopet"Softdrinks
like "Pocari Sweat" and "Calpis" were early casualties as well,
butdespite snickers, Fujitsu's "Facom" computers seem to have
gained a measure ofsuccess abroad. In some cases where the japanese
paid more attention to how
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Brand Reality:The japanese Perspective 99foreigners react to
their brands, the changes have not necessarily been for
thebetter.
The Datsun story is a case in point Here OAT represents the
initials of thethree founders. They thought of the car as their
"son," hence Datson, but "son" ifpronounced as romanized japanese
suggested "loss." Since "son" in Englishsounds similar to "sun," a
more upbeat association, the name was changed toDatsun. Despite
some snickers in the West (Datsun or "That soon?"), the car wasvery
successful, especially after the introduction of the sporty ZX
model.However, after more than a decade in the U.S. market, Datsun
was changed toNissan, the name of the corporation and the brand
name already used in japan.According to the company the change was
made mainly in order to get financialinvestors familiar with the
company, a successful move, but the reaction in theauto market has
been stubbornly negative. Going in the opposite direction, theToyo
Kogyo corporation changed its name to that of its main brand, Mazda
(forMatsuda, the founder of the company), as did Sony at an early
stage in its growth.Because the National brand was already
trademarked in the U.S., Matsushita'sgeneric-sounding National
brand, still in use in japan, had to be changed toPanasonic, an
improvement to many Western observers.
Apart from the strong sense of identity, there can of course be
some marketadvantages to staying so close to the roots as the
japanese do. japan's gradualemergence as a high-quality
manufacturer of world-class products beginning inthe mid-1950s has
been based on the products of its major corporations. Whenmade in
japan stands for high quality and good design, a
japanese-soundingbrand and corporate name, however difficult to
pronounce, can engender apositive country-of-origin effect A
striking example is that of Dixons, a Britishdiscount chain of
electronics goods, whose store brand is japanese-sounding"Matsui."
But the Japanese themselves, ever wary of a potential backlash, do
notlike to dwell on national stereotypes, and play down this reason
for usingjapanese-sounding brand names abroad. In any case, for the
typical japanesecompany, there are several competitors who can
claim the same national origin,and they are the ones to beat
first
In all, the aesthetics of the name itself are still seen as a
minor issue by thejapanese when compared to Western companies
(Schmitt &; Simonson, 1997).The basic driver of brand creation
is success. The analogy to sports is immediateand often expressed:
What does it take to attract fans to the ball park? A winner- even
if they play in white shoes.
By implication, quality products and superior service come
before the brandname. More precisely, the final act of placing the
brand name on a product doesnot come until quality and service are
up to the required levels. As a strongproduct can build a brand
name, so a weak or inconsistent product quality cansoon min it
These are basic mles anywhere, but are always at the forefrontamong
the successful japanese companies. The problems at Nissan, the
automanufacturer whose market share has slipped consistently in
recent years bothat home and abroad, are not placed on the change
of name as Westernobservers are apt to do (Aaker, 1996). Rather,
for the japanese, it is the lack of
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100 Johny K Johansson and Masaaki Hirano
consistency of dealer service and attention to product quality
which are theculprits. Typically, it was suggested that one problem
for Nissan in the U.S. hasbeen too many dealers relative to unit
sales, not allowing sufficient volume perdealer to justify the
appropriate dealer attention to supporting the Nissanproduct
line.
Relationship MarketingWhile basics are important, Japanese also
allow for brand effects as "value
added." With competitive benchmarking and reverse engineering
makingfunctional differentiation ever more difficult to sustain,
the brand value addedallows some "soft" differentiation centring on
image and identity. The goal is tocreate and keep loyal customers
who become part of an "extended family"belonging to the corporation
-- relationship marketing.
To achieve this objective, all employees in the Japanese
corporation serve as"marketers." If a Honda employee finds a Honda
car broken down on the side ofthe road, it is his responsibility to
help the user. After all, it is "all in the family."At some stage
all employees will have been in contact with customers -
"c1ose-to-customers" is not simply a matter of sales people or
marketing reps visitingcustomers, but a company-wide assignment
Instead of laying off people in adownturn, the company may rotate
employees into front-line sales jobs.
These well known Japanese principles have unquestionably a sense
ofdesperation to them. To a Western observer, they seem to be
last-ditch efforts tomaintain employment at all costs. Other brand
building efforts are more similarto Western tactics. Offering new
products free to prominent actors and famousathletes is a typical
approach. Blanketing leading market areas with in-store andoutdoor
promotions backed by intensive media blitzes is another. But these
andsimilar measures are of course well known also in the West One
can even arguethat the Japanese are less adept at some of these
activities, especially whencompared to the superior event marketing
and sponsorships evidenced bycompanies such as M~crosoft,Nike and
Swatch.
Continuous ImprovementWhere the Japanese effort at building
brand equity differs from that in the
West is at another level. In line with the notion that the
finn's brand signifies apromise to customers, Japanese companies go
to great lengths to provideproducts with state-of-the-art
technology to its loyal customers. Just as qualityproducts are
needed to build a strong brand name, so a constant stream of newand
improved products is the best way to maintain the brand franchise.
The wellknown "kaizen" (continuous improvement) principle rears its
head again. Theproducts may come from the finn's own research and
development efforts, orthey may simply be "me-too" versions of
leading competitors' products. Theintensity of the resulting
competitive rivalry has been noted by several observersof Japanese
strategies Uohansson & Nonaka, 1996). What is not
alwaysappreciated, however, is that the focus on competitors is
driven by an underlyingcustomer orientation. As one interviewee in
the electronics industry stated: "In
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Brand Reality:The japanese Perspective 101
the japanese marketplace, even the most loyal customer is
willing to wait only afew months for his or her brand to introduce
a matching product"
The "new and improved" product emphasis can be seen in the
manner inwhich the new luxury cars from Honda, Toyota, and Nissan
were introduced.Even though a lot of advertising and promotional
efforts were undertaken, thebasic thrust for Acura, Lexus, and
Infiniti was the reliance on test drive reportsand consumer
satisfaction scores to establish an aura of superior quality.
Theefforts behind the Acura involved the now notorious unravelling
of the j.D.Powersatisfaction measures to generate high scores. As
is well known, Honda simplyinstructed its dealers to ask customers
what was needed to get "Excellent" ratingson all scale items - and
then follow through on the customers' demands. Forbetter or worse,
the practice is now of course common throughout the
autoindustry.
Acura's arrival at the top of the customer satisfaction race in
1987 has sincebeen matched by both Lexus and Infiniti. Lexus also
generated free publicitywhen early ratings by auto experts showed
it superior to the Mercedes modelstargeted - and at a price level
25% below that of the Benz. Even the stature ofthe established
Mercedes brand could not sustain such a difference, andMercedes was
soon forced to engage in japanese-style brand maintenance,
byintroducing a range of new models at lower price points.
The reasoning behind the creation of three new brand names for
thejapanese luxury cars also illuminates the way japanese companies
approachbrand building. Since Lexus and Infiniti to some extent
patterned theirstrategies on the success of Honda's Acura, the most
interesting case is Acura,the first entry.
Honda's decision to create a new upscale model was based
primarily on thenotion that loyal Honda customers did not have a
car to trade up to after theAccord. The decision to create a new
name was based on market researchwhich showed that the prevailing
image of Honda was too focused on mid-rangevehicles to be optimal,
and even though there was a sentiment that the Hondaname should be
used, publicity was counted on to help loyal Honda owners
torecognise the maker behind the new brand. In addition, a new
brand helpedsolve the problem that existing Honda dealers in some
of the states with toughfranchise laws would have an option on any
new Honda model. The companyknew that some dealers in the U.S. - as
opposed to japan and Europe - wouldnot be able to provide the
appropriate premises, sales people and superiorservice judged
necessary.
The name Acura was picked with the help of an independent
research finn inCalifornia. The finn generated several alternatives
via computerisedcombinations, with Acura one among several to be
registered by Honda's lawyers.The ultimate choice depended partly
upon the positive association with"accuracy" and partly with the
perceived advantages of a name starting with theletters Ac: The
model would be found at the top of any list The effort involvedin
building up a new brand was seen as a long tenn investment
requiringpatience rather than deep pockets. Although success did
come, it is interesting
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102 Johny K Johansson and Masaaki Hirano
to note that after one year on the market the Acura was
proclaimed a "failure"by the Wall Street Journal.
Both Honda and Toyota have successfully introduced their luxury
models athome in Japan - but under their corporate marques (as, for
example, the HondaLegend, and the Toyota Celsio). By contrast
Nissan, with several existing modelsat the upper end, introduced
the Infiniti name in Japan, with less success. TheAcura name is
only found in the North-American market Lexus is used in
North-.America and Europe, while Infiniti is a global name. The new
names were usefulto avoid potentially negative stereotypes of
japanese as producers of luxury cars,but as we have seen, the major
rationale had more to do with marketing basics.
Newer Branding Thinking
One would perhaps have expected that the difficulties in the
Japanese domesticeconomy in the 1990s would have curtailed the
brand building and maintenanceefforts by the japanese companies,
and to some extent this is the case. The rateof new product
introductions in Japan, for example, has slowed noticeably asdemand
has tapered off, even though companies with a global
presence(including Sony and Matsushita in consumer electronics, and
Honda and Toyotain autos) still maintain the pace in other markets.
But according to ourinterviews, the increased emphasis on brand
equity in the West has alsoregistered in japan, and companies do
spend more on promotion and advertisingthan before to sustain
established brands in Japan. The general impression isthat current
practices are becoming more like those in the West separatingbrands
from products.
Product Still Going StrongNevertheless, the emphasis on "quality
products and service first" is still very
much alive. A good example is again provided by Honda. Stung by
the loss ofBritish venture partner Rover to BMW two years ago,
Honda has moved stronglyto revitalise and upgrade its main brand,
the Honda Accord. Dramatic designinnovations has allowed the
company to build three Accord models on oneadjustable platfonn,
saving costs while allowing localisation. A slightly largerAccord
for the U.S. market is accompanied by a slimmer European version
and asmaller Asian model. The American version has already become
the leadingmodel in its market This is in stark contrast to the
Accord Wagon, built in Ohioand very successful in japan. It was
introduced in japan with a "HondaManufacturing America" sticker at
the height of the trade conflict in 1990, andwas timed well for the
increased japanese interest in outdoor life styles.
Honda has also created a task force with the assignment of
sketching thebrand identity which Honda should have in 10 years,
and the path of arrivingthere. Unusual for a japanese company, not
because of the long time horizonbut because of the active
management of the brand identity, the task force beganby studying
the history of the company, its past product introductions, and
theaccumulated market research over the years. This enabled the
task force to
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Brand Reality:The japanese Perspective 103
identify the one concept which summarised the essence of Honda's
identity:"Kodawari," or "Uncompromising." It then developed a
three-step revolvingprocess - clarify, penetrate, evaluate - which
provides a basic blueprint for thestewardship of the brand identity
over time. It is perhaps not surprising ifjapanese as we)) as
Western observers consistently single out Honda, togetherwith Sony,
as the best managed japanese brands (Kapferer 1997, Katahira
1996).
Stature and Vitalityjapanese companies are familiar with the
Y&R division of brand equity into
"stature" and "vitality" (Brandt & johnson, 1997). However,
many areuncomfortable with too much analysis, and seem to prefer to
join the twoconcepts into a brand "spirit" which energises both
employees and customers.This spirit is reflected in the brand name,
which in japan is more of arepresentative "emblem" or "family
crest" ("noren" in japanese, referring to thecurtains with their
kanji symbols hanging over the doors of sma)) sushi shopsand
establish a positive association between store name and
reputation). This isanother reason why brand reality -- feeling
passionate about sustaining the brand- comes so naturally to the
japanese employee. By contrast the American senseof brand seems to
derive from the branding irons used for cattle in cowboymovies, a
subtle but telling difference for the japanese and some
Westernobservers (Macrae, 1996).
However, the new thinking, exemplified by ad agencies such as
Dentsu, isbased on the stature-vitality split The Dentsu brand
stewarding system involvesboth elements, and separates the
measurement as well as the creative objectivesalong this division.
As in the West brand vitality is primarily seen to createbrand
loyalty among existing customers, and is sustained with the help
ofinnovative new products, events marketing, and an emphasis on
freshness andyouth in the marketing communications. Brand stature,
on the other hand, isviewed as more relevant for first-time buyers
and for segments with oldercustomers. The first-time buyers need
the risk reduction which comes withstature, and older customers are
more interested in the status conferred by thebrand. The marketing
communications sustaining the brand stature need tohave a broad
appeal, to build brand awareness among non-customers as well.While
vitality is necessary for keeping customers and is akin to a
one-to-onerelationship with the customer, stature is projected from
the customer's peers,from whom recognition and approval must come
forth.
The Brand Life CycleAs in the West the product life cycle's
decline stage is often rejected by the
Japanese. The "kaizen" notion of continuous improvement
naturally suggeststhat products can live for a long time, provided
they are kept technologically up-to-date. The same is true for
brand life cycles. The earlier stages of the brandcycle --
introduction, growth, and maturity - are used to fashion a
brand'smarketing strategy, although here the Japanese seem to
mainly be followers, notleaders of Western companies.
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104 Johny K Johansson and Masaaki Hirano
For example, as a new brand is introduced, the main objective is
the creationof stature, primarily accomplished, as we have seen,
with the help of a superiorproduct and product-focused
communications. As in the West, a strong parentcan be useful, and
in most cases the corporate parent will supply the
endorsingidentity. When Kao introduced its new cosmetics line,
Sofina, the companythought it useful to avoid mentioning its
corporate identity, associated as it waswith detergents. The
product concept was focused around a superior new facecleansing
technology, sufficiently unique for the brand to stand alone.
However,test market results showed that the endorsement from
established Kao namewas a strong purchase motivator, and "Kao
Sofina'" became the name, helpingthe company to a successful entry
in a very competitive field. In foreign marketswhere the Kao brand
is not so well known, the leveraging effect is weaker andthe line
has not been so successful.
Similar experiences are of course typical also in the West The
one novelconcept used that we uncovered revolved around the
marriage of vitality andstature. While stature building is a matter
of product perfonnance andpromotion to create trial, the role of
brand vitality is to sustain product statureover the brand life
cycle. Stature is not built or lost in a short period of time -but
vitality can be. Vitality is created out of a sense of
excitement,innovativeness, and presence. These are factors which
involve media advertising,publicity, and an urgency created by
rapid product introductions. An image ofvitality on the market side
is the counterpart to brand reality internally in theorganization.
While brand stature can convey status among society at large,
forbrand reality to produce superior employee perfonnance, brand
vitality isinstnunental.
Summary
Brand reality is a concept that comes naturally to the Japanese
corporation. Thenotion that there are employees that care
passionately about the brand nameand are willing to work hard to
sustain the organization's identity are values thatlie close to the
core of the individual employee's selfworth. Anything less thanthe
full commitment is unacceptable.
But, with few exceptions, on the marketing side of brand
management theJapanese still are followers. Although some well
known companies - Sony,Honda, Canon, and others - have managed to
develop powerful brands throughhigh quality products, the majority
of japanese finns still do not separate brandsfrom products. The
idea of separate "brand equity accounting" is new to them,and the
logical consequence of considering the possibility of "selling" a
brandname is still abhorrent
The "management" of the brand is therefore somewhat of an
anachronism injapan. To traditional japanese it seems another idea
spawned by barbarianWesterners, whose conceptions of self have not
yet reached maturity.Individualistic ideals make it necessary for
Western organizations to invent newnotions to solve consequent
problems in motivating groups and organizations.
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Brand Reality:The japanese Perspective 105
The japanese have already solved that problem. They are cool
about it havingtranscended the fire which commitment lights in
Western employees. While afire in the belly can motivate employees
for some short periods, they bum outand in the long run the war is
won by those with ice in the stomach.
References
Aaker, DavidA (1996), Building Strong Brands, NewYork: Free
Press.Brandt Marty and johnson, Grant (1997), Power Branding, San
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Ikujiro (1996), Relentless: Tile Japanese Way of
Marketing, NewYork: HarperBusiness.Kapferer, jean-Noel (1997),
Strategic Brand Management, 2nd ed. London:
Kogan Page.Katahira, H. (1996), Tile Principles of Power Brands
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London: The Economist
Intelligence Unit.Morita, Akio (1987), Made in Japan: Akio
Morita and Sony. With Edwin M.
Reingold and Mitsuko Shimomura. London: Fontana/Collins.Schmitt
Bernd and Simonson, Alex (1997), Marketing Aesthetics: Tile
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Management of Brands, Identity, and Image, NewYork: Free
Press.Tanaka, Hiroshi (1993), "Branding in japan." In David A Aaker
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