How have Polish-American relations informed Polish foreign policy?

How have Polish-American relations informed Polish foreign

policy?

Introduction

Poland has a specific foreign policy unique to the

Central European region. A long history of occupations,

partitions and becoming a battlefield in European wars

developed what Zaborowski calls a ‘strategic culture’ in

Polish consciousness. This notion is embodied in a

permanent feeling of insecurity towards “historical

enemies” such as Russia and Germany and a fixation on

security and territorial defence (Zaborowski and

Longhurst 2003: 1013).

Existence of this ‘strategic culture’ becomes important

for developing domestic and foreign policy, especially

when Polish society is ‘permeated with historical

consciousness, somewhat obsessed with the past […], and

as free from an unreflective ‘presentism’ as from an

over-optimistic, future-oriented achievement

syndrome’(Sztompka 1990: 83). The majority of present-day

policy-makers as well as their recent predecessors were

born in Poland under hostile Soviet dominance, which only

promoted their ‘strategic culture’ mindset. Since

security policy is the nucleus of Polish foreign affairs

this essay will focus on its development and

implementation in the framework of Polish-American

relations. ‘Special relations’ between these two

countries on opposite sides of the globe are mostly built

up in a security paradigm, where they have mutual

interests. Being only the 50th biggest US trading partner,

economic, energy and cultural relations with United

States so far have played a minor role in informing

Polish foreign policy (www.msz.gov.pl).

To explain Polish decision-making and foreign policy

approach a mix of contemporary IR theories are required.

The analysis will be undertaken from the offensive and

defensive realist point of view, following

Schimmelfennig’s categorisation of security and power

approaches (Schimmelfennig 2003: 27-32). However, the

logic of the Polish leadership’s grand decisions can be

explained only partially through a realist perspective.

Therefore, simultaneously a constructivist approach with

a strong emphasis on history and culture will be used

where realist theories fail to explain the rationale

behind certain decisions. The analytical focus of this

essay will be on two major cases when the Poland-US

security partnership reached its highest peak: the

invasion of Iraq and the deployment of the Anti-Ballistic

Missiles (ABM) defence system. Polish regional policy

including its relations with Russia and participation in

NATO will also be considered through the lens of US-

Poland partnership.

Theoretical framework

At first glance Poland’s foreign policy approach has a

classic defensive or offensive realist rationale. The

defence approach claims that ‘security is the highest

end' and explains how the state reacts when it feels

threatened by other countries (Waltz 1979: 126). If the

state is strong it can internally or externally balance

the threat by building a coalition (Waltz 1979: 168,

128). But in case the state is weak it seeks to bandwagon

a much more powerful ally to balance the threat, which is

the case in Polish relations with the US (Walt 1987:

31). However, frequently Polish foreign policy decisions

seem irrational and asymmetrical since they employ

military action to respond to challenges that do not

directly threaten Poland. As stated in the White Book,

Polish modern external security environment challenges

are mainly of a non-military nature (www.spbn.gov.pl).

This makes the security model inefficient.

The offensive realist approach takes almost the same

stance, yet it assumes that state actions are not fuelled

by the direct threat. According to the power model all

states are ‘power maximisers’, who tend to dominate other

countries (Mearsheimer 1995: 11-12). The alliances in

this model are built using realistic cost-efficient

decisions and by making realistic goals (Schimmelfennig

2003: 31). Maximisation of power in one area can lead to

benefits in another, which is usually the case in Polish

security policy. The power model explains Polish

decisions better, yet it frequently fails to disclose why

Poland uses such cost inefficient ways to project power.

For example, participation in the Iraq campaign was

irrelevant in terms of state security and did not bring

Poland any significant benefits, but cost lives and

money.

However, the rationale behind Poland’s decision can be

explained through a constructivist approach. It states

that structures of human association are defined

primarily by shared ideas rather than material force.

Therefore, national identities as well as the interests

of international actors are constructed by these shared

ideas (Wendt 1999: 1). Constructivists believe that the

interests and rationality behind any state policy have

their own unique historical roots created by different

political actors through the history of a particular

society. This creates a cultural, political and

historical predicament in every social action.

Therefore, the key to understanding the rationale behind

any decision in foreign affairs lies in historical and

political conceptualisations of interests (Tsigankov

2005: 36). This idea corresponds to Zaborowski concept of

historically based ‘strategic culture’ and Sztompka’s

idea of domination of ‘historical consciousness’ in

Poland. Therefore, to understand Polish contemporary

foreign affairs and relations with the US we need to

deconstruct the country’s historical consciousness by

highlighting the most important events and decisions in

Polish history.

Deconstructing Polish history

In 16th and17th centuries United Poland was the largest

state in Europe and perhaps the continent’s most powerful

nation (www.britannica.com). This glorious past

determined the idea of regional leadership, its

continuity and a set of ‘prioritized’ territories, mainly

to the East, which once were a part of Poland and where

the country seeks to project its power today. Mainly this

is Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania. Due to the later

political, economic and military decline of the Polish

state it was firstly reduced and then eliminated in the

aftermath of the Third Partition between the Prussia,

Austrian and Russian Empires in 1795. Since then Poland

enjoyed only small periods of sovereignty: between the

two World Wars and in the last 23 years after the

collapse of the Soviet Union. This dramatic historical

experience is the main reason why the objective of

preserving national identity and independence dominates

contemporary Poland’s national strategy and foreign

policy approach. (Friedman 2012: 1). The fate of the

Polish state was partially decided by its geographical

position. Protected by the Carpathian and Tatar Mountains

only in the South and with open plains in all other

directions it was a natural line of attack and a foothold

for foreign armies including Napoleonic France and Nazi

Germany (Friedman 2012: 2). The position between the

rival Great Powers of Russia and Germany made Poland a

primary target in their disputes. Yet, even worse was

when these two states attacked Poland together. This is

why Poles became perpetually suspicious concerning

potential aggression from their closest neighbours. This

feeling remains strong today towards Russia and

relatively weak towards Germany.

Unable to protect itself historically Poland had two

strategic options, both of which did not work well for

the country. First was to reach accommodation with one of

its Great Power neighbours, deflecting the other and

making sure that the defender would not occupy Poland.

The second was to find a powerful outside force which

would guarantee Poland’s existence (www.stratfor.com

2012, March 21). Historically the second option was

favoured. Until today this strategy remains a priority,

representing the continuity of Polish strategic thought.

However, Poland experienced first-hand the shortcomings

of this strategy. An outside security guarantor might

not be interested in providing assistance or privilege

self-interests on the global arena, which hold him back

from interference. It also might not be physically

possible for the third party to provide security in times

of need due to lack of time or capabilities. Eventually,

for Poland an outside guarantor’s main value was only in

deterring a potential attack (Friedman 2012: 2). In the

20th century Poland chose to rely on external actors such

as Britain and France, which ended in two “western

betrayals”: first in 1939, when guarantors failed to

fulfil the pledge of military assistance and protect

Poland from Nazi Invasion (Źwikliński 2004: 66) and

second, when they allowed Poland to fall under Soviet

dominance in the aftermath of World War II (Plokhy 2009:

44).

Poland was left concerned about the capabilities and

willingness of Western European actors to provide

security in times of need. Nevertheless, other potential

options were even less acceptable and the search for a

strong international protector remained Poland’s main

option. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and United

States’ emergence as a hegemonic world leader, there was

no doubt in Poland concerning the new international

guarantor. Building good relations to win US favour in

exchange for security guarantees (directly American or

from NATO) became the centre of Polish strategy. With the

fall of the Soviet Block, the collapse of the USSR,

German reunification and recognition of the Oder-Neisse

border, Poland gained the best geopolitical position in

centuries as no one had territorial claims against it.

Its return to Europe, alliance with US and NATO as well

as partner relations with Germany provided grounds for

sustainable foreign affairs and confident security policy

development (Wandycz 2008: 99). Learning from past

mistakes Poland was not satisfied only with security

commitments – it wanted hard evidence. This may explain

why Poland was so eager to have US missile defence

systems, troops or military equipment on its soil. The

confidence Poland acquired with NATO membership and US

backup made it more assertive in its own foreign and

security policies. In Eastern Europe Poland tried to form

a bulwark of safe and loyal neighbours on its border.

Historic perspective on Polish-American relations

To have a coherent constructivist framework it is

important to have an overview of the history of Polish-

American relations. The main goal is to understand if

Poland has historic grounds to distrust the US as much as

France or Britain and if this influences contemporary

Polish foreign affairs. Although relations between the

two nations date back to the 18th century mostly they were

weak since US generally ignored Poland. However, there

are several important trends, which might influence US

domestic policy and foreign relations with Poland. One of

them can be codified as an awareness of Poland’s military

input in the establishment of the United States of

America. Polish military commanders like Tadeusz

Kościuszko and Casimir Pulaski sufficiently contributed

to the success of American Revolutionary War by leading

armies and were remembered as US national heroes (Wales

2007: 3). This leads to another implication important for

modern Polish-American relations – the historical

confidence of US in the loyalty and capabilities of

Polish soldiers as well as in the continuity of good

military traditions. It is crucial for Poland since due

to its unreformed national army so far the main Polish

input in US military campaigns has been its men.

However, the US never supported the Poles military in

return. During the November Uprising of 1830 – 1831 it

provided only financial aid, non-military equipment and

raised awareness through newspaper coverage even after

the fall of the Insurrection (Lerski 1958: 26). During

the US Civil War Lincoln and the American leadership were

entirely alienated from the support of Poles. They feared

that interference in Europe’s affairs would backfire

against the North. According to a policy of non-

interference, the US backed Russia, which solidly

supported the North. In a way it was also fuelled by

America’s relative weakness and domestic concerns since

both Russia and US at the time were fighting

insurrectionists (Kutolowski 1965: 560 - 561). This trend

to leave Poland to the competence of European powers

continued until the fall of the USSR.

After the re-recreation of Poland in 1918 relations

between two states were distant mainly because of a lack

of US interest. During the Second World War there was

little need for cooperation with the Polish government

in exile, which later was abandoned, while the Communist

government in Warsaw was recognised by US (Lukas 1982:

41). The US prioritised good relations with the USSR,

turning a blind eye to the ‘Polish issue’. Later during

the Cold War Poland officially became a US enemy as a

part of the Soviet Block. Nervetheless, Poles always

considered themselves on the wrong side of the curtain

and saw the US as a friendly power and the USSR as an

occupier (Zaborowski and Longhurst 2003: 1014). The real

improvement of relations between Poland and US began in

1980 with the birth of the Solidarity Movement (that the

US significantly financed with over 50 mln USD) and hope

for democratic change in the country, which was followed

by the collapse of the USSR (Judt 2005: 589). Therefore,

until the US became a world hegemonic power its attitude

towards Poland did not much differ from the other Western

states. Poland fell victim to the balance of world powers

and their self-interests. The difference was that the US

unlike France or Britain never pledged to guarantee

Poland’s security. Therefore, there was less ground for

Poles to feel betrayed by US. Also Poland historically

had important leverage: diaspora in America. After the

Third Partition over a million of Poles migrated to the

US and formed a large community. Today they are 10

million strong, which makes them the largest Polish

diaspora in the world. Although, nowadays Poles represent

only 3.2% of US population their presence is crucial in a

domestic framework and might explain why US leadership

cannot entirely ignore Poland in its decision-making

(www.factfinder2.census.gov).

NATO and regional policy

The decision to apply to NATO was one of the first

independent Poland took in 1992. It was supported even by

the communist party and the membership came seven years

later (Zaborowski and Longhurst 2003: 1013). In line with

traditional security concerns Poland fenced itself from

Russian influence and through NATO improved relations

with a former foe – Germany. NATO membership also

stimulated important transition reforms in the framework

of the Polish “return to Europe” notion, which was later

embodied in country’s EU membership. Most importantly

Poland became a part of the block whose security is

guaranteed by the strategic presence of the world hegemon

– the US (Reeves 2010: 533). Poland saw the foundation of

security in Europe as US presence in NATO as it was

historically sceptical of European Powers as well as

multilateral organizations like the UN, which failed to

preserve the Cold War status quo. Unlike Old Europe

Poland does not believe in multilateral empowering and

because of its own weakness prefers to ally with the

strongest player. Since relations with US are highly

prioritized Poland did a lot to stay in its good books.

Currently it is one of the most pro-American countries in

the world and the second one in Europe

(www.pewglobal.org). Poland was the only country in

Europe where George W. Bush would have been re-elected

according to 2004 survey (Michta 2006: 15) Poland was

open enough even to accept a $3.8 billion loan from the

US Congress to buy 48 F-16 jets. It was the largest

military loan in Polish history but most importantly a

symbolic gesture of commitment, loyalty and future long-

term relations in military arena (www.nytimes.com, 2003).

In turn the US wished to see Poland as the regional

leader, capable of providing security in Eastern Europe

and as a transmitter of NATO enlargement. Therefore, for

Poland proving this status became one of its main foreign

and security policy objectives (Zaborowski and Longhurst

2003: 1010). However, it also corresponded with Polish

strategic thought. A mix of an offensive realist

approach, when Poland maximized its power and influence

through bandwagoning with NATO and the US together with

the historic-constructivist reasoning of returning

geopolitical influence in a traditionally prioritized

region and building a security bulwark of loyal countries

as defence from Russia. In 1997 this rationale led Warsaw

to support the Belarusian democratic and nationalist

opposition against the pro-Russian and anti-NATO stance

of Lukashenko (Sanford 2006: 194) Poland was a major

advocate for anchoring Lithuania in the West through NATO

membership and Ukraine through NATO and Central European

institutions in the beginning of the 2000s (Zaborowski

and Longhurst 2003: 1010) The high-profile involvement of

President Kaczynski during Russian/Georgian hostilities

in 2008 and the support of Ukraine’s ‘Orange Revolution’

is another example of Poland’s engagement in regional

affairs (www.theguardian.com: Adamowski) the Country’s

leadership saw progress in relations with Eastern

European States and Russia as a key to the rise of

Poland’s importance and respect in the West (Zaborowski

and Longhurst 2003: 1022). As a result of this process in

2000 Poland initiated the creation of a Community of

democracies together with US and in 2008 with support of

Sweden put forward the concept of the EU’s Eastern

Partnership.

US military support

After becoming a NATO member Poland actively supported

the US in all major military operations (whether they

were NATO-led or not). Currently it participates in 14

international operations under UN, NATO and EU auspices

with 3500 soldiers and military personnel in action

(www.archiwalny.mon.gov.pl). One of the most significant

Polish military deployments since the Second World War

was participation in the US-led invasion in Iraq. It

occurred after 9/11 and set the stage for the US War on

Terror in which America started to look for new potential

partners and revive relations with old ones. Therefore,

it laid the foundation for the US-Polish relations’

galloping development. Poland contributed only 200 plus

Special Forces troops to the initial invasion. However,

by August 2003 the country pledged 2000 troops to form

the core of a Polish-led multinational division, which

was one of four present in Iraq. In its peak the number

of Polish soldiers in Iraq exceeded 2.5 thousand. They

had all been withdrawn by October 2008 when the US rolled

back the operation. (Wysakowski-Walters 2010: 2).

Involvement of Polish troops in Iraq was controversial.

Poland’s national security was not directly endangered by

Iraq or Islamic terrorism. Therefore, from a defensive

realist stance there was no rational reason to engage in

this operation. An offensive realist approach states that

all actions of power maximisers must be cost-efficient.

The only direct benefit for Poland was armed forces

combatant skills enhancement, which for a long time

lacked military operations experience. At the same time,

participation in invasion endangered Poland’s relations

with the EU before 2004 accession and resulted in the

loss of 23 lives. Although it accounted for only 0.5% of

coalition fatalities it is the 4th largest death toll and

it is hard to calculate the full costs of this operation

for Poland (www.icasualties.org). After Iraq there was

also no return on military investments from the US, which

many in Poland expected (www.articles.latimes.com).

Therefore, from an offensive realist perspective for

Poland this operation was an irrational choice.

A Constructivist approach gives a better explanation of

Polish motives. Due to historical experience Poland

highly prioritises relations with external security

guarantors; therefore it should do everything to secure

the commitments of the US in case of a potential threat

by providing support and loyalty. This (especially

accompanied by damage, like loss of soldiers) in Polish

strategic thought should serve as leverage based on the

sense of ‘gratitude debt’ to stimulate future commitment

and also gain benefits in other areas. From the other

less mercantile constructivist stance this rationale may

be called a ‘solidarity approach’ and linked to

Solidarity Movement values (stemming from Christian

virtues): sacrifice for the collective good, sense of

mutual commitment towards common purpose and giving a

shoulder in the time of need (Bielasiak 2009: 54).

Since Poland volunteered to take part in the operation

one may argue that there are no grounds for a sense of

obligation in the US. However, Poles received positive

feedback for their actions from America and with that an

excitement, a sense of purpose and an affirmative signal

for proceeding with this course. George W. Bush famous

response ‘You forgot Poland’ to his opponent John F.

Kerry during a 2004 Presidential Debate regarding the

involvement of different nations in the Iraq invasion was

one of them. ‘I honour their sacrifices. And I don't

appreciate it when a candidate for president denigrates

the contributions of these brave soldiers. You cannot

lead the world if you do not honour the contributions of

those who are with us.’ (www.web.archive.org). From the

US domestic point of view Polish involvement in Iraq was

used mainly as a tool to present the operation as

international. However, the effect of this message in

Poland can be explained by the Polish sense of common

military continuity with the US dating back to the 18th

century. This positive feedback pushed Poland to expand

its support of the US in Afghanistan in 2004 through

NATO-led International Security Assistance Force. During

this period Poland got more involved in other NATO-led

operations, for example, in Kosovo or Bosnia and

Herzegovina as well as in EU missions like Operation

Concordia in the Republic of Macedonia. Poland continues

to bear burdens in support of the US even today. When in

2012 the United States recalled its ambassador to Syria,

the Polish government assumed responsibility for

representing U.S. diplomatic interests in Damascus

(www. now.mmedia.me ). However, this is not only about

keeping loyalty to US. From an offensive realist stance

Poland indirectly projects power by participating in

NATO-led operations and diplomatic missions. Poland sees

active involvement in international security operations

as a way to improve its image as a regional leader, take

more responsibility and engage in international

organisation and world diplomacy decision-making.

Anti-ballistic missile complex

The watershed moment in the US-Polish relations was

August 2008. Shortly after the Russo-Georgian War the

Bush Administration signed the Declaration on Strategic

Cooperation with Poland. Among other references on

strengthening collaboration the document outlined the

development of a joint air defence system and the

deployment of the US Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM)

(www.2001-2009.state.gov). The initial plan was to deploy

10 ballistic missiles on Polish territory and a radar

installation in the Czech Republic (www.stratfor.com

2012, August 7). The announced purpose of the system was

to deter intercontinental missiles from rogue states such

as Iran, Syria or North Korea. However, Iran’s ballistic

missile capabilities were not sufficient at the time to

be considered a potential threat to the US or even

Warsaw (www. fpc.state.gov). The only non-European state

with land-based missiles able to strike the US was China

(www.nti.org). These facts lead political analysts to the

conclusion that the real motive behind ABM deployment was

to create a bulwark against the more proximate threat of

Russia (www.stratfor.com 2012, August 7). Although this

assumption was never officially confirmed by US, more

important was its perception by Russia, who threatened to

move missiles to Kaliningrad to stop NATO’s aggressive

expansion and later held military exercises on the Polish

border (www.news.bbc.co.uk). Polish elites also

interpreted the US intention the same way

(www.theguardian.com: Traynor).

The Polish agreement to allow the US ABM system on its

territory from a defensive realist point of view seems

similarly irrational as the decision to engage in the

Iraq invasion. The potential missile attack threat to

Poland was negligible. Moreover, at the time Iran (as

well as China) was more concentrated on regional

objectives. As for Russia its overwhelming conventional

forces would make ABM redundant in case of an attack

(Wysakowski-Walters 2010: 15). Furthermore, by allowing a

US military facility Poland potentially becomes a target

of Russia’s first strike (www.telegraph.co.uk, 2009).

This decision makes more sense in an offensive realist

power maximeser framework. The US missiles give Poland

grounds and confidence to act more offensively itself.

Hard-power leverage against Russia gave Poland more

confidence in its Eastern policy. However, applying this

leverage seems not entirely cost-efficient for Poland,

since it might provoke an open armed conflict with

Russia. It was unclear to what degree the US would want

to be involved in a scenario it had successfully avoided

for more than fifty years. However, the situation did not

escalate to this point. The new Obama Administration,

which took office in 2009 had a softer perspective on

missile defence issue and relations with Russia. The ABM

project was seen as a destabilizer of the power balance

in Europe. Appealing to the reassessment of the ‘Iranian

threat’ the program was cancelled (www.nytimes.com, 2009)

and transformed into to a smaller project offering Poland

three land-based SM-3 interceptors as well as periodical

station of the US F-16 fighter jets and C-130 transport

planes for joint military exercises (www.stratfor.com,

2010 December 9). Phasedown took away Poland’s exclusive

role (crucial for its power maximisation) in the project,

since an SM-3 site was also planned for Romania. This was

perceived as a US backdown on its commitment to secure

Poland in favour of a ‘reset’ with Russia. The

announcement of these plans on the 70th anniversary of the

Soviet invasion of Poland signalled at best a lack of

sensitivity from the new US leadership (www.cbsnews.com)

and at worst an insult and betrayal of Poland. Former

Polish President Lech Walesa reflected on the Poles’

alienation by saying that ‘Americans have always only

taken care of their own interests and they have used

everyone else’ (Walesa cited in www.spiegel.de)

From a constructivist point of view one of Poland’s major

historical concerns was that for centuries it was the

object, not the subject, of international relations

(Zaborowski and Longhurst 2003: 1019). Therefore, the ABM

deployment would have given Poland a sense of protection

against another western betrayal. Unlike declarations and

obligations, which can be easily violated, military

facilities and the US troops were seen as a more cogent

guarantee of the US involvement in a potential conflict.

Allowing the US to station ABM was also a way to show

loyalty. Therefore, the stormy reaction on the

cancelation of the project amplified by the symbolic date

was associated with the betrayal of an outside guarantor

– a fear deeply imbedded into Polish historical

consciousness. The Polish emotional reaction, commitment

of previous administration and encouraging rhetoric used

by the previous US leadership towards Poland might have

influenced Obama’s decision to maintain some form of

military presence in the country and not to abandon the

missile defence project entirely. The new project was

accepted by Poland since it still contained the crucial

security feature: presence of the US military troops and

equipment. Yet, it limited Poland’s power maximiser

capacities.

The cancelation of Bush’s missile ABM project marked the

start of a period of cooldown in the US-Polish relations.

Poland saw the station of missiles in a way as a payback

for the involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, yet the US

probably did not feel obliged. The United States’

decision to station ABM in Poland was more in a realistic

than constructivist framework: Poland was prone to

cooperate and it was easy to influence. Back in 2001,

when the US announced missile defence plans Polish

politicians privately were largely sceptical since this

issue drew a split between European NATO members and the

US. Poland was afraid that it would result in a

decoupling of the US from Europe and influence negatively

Poland’s Eastern policy. However none of these concerns

were voiced partially because Poland did not want to show

uncooperative behaviour, partially as a ‘wait and see

strategy’ in a debate it could not influence anyway.

Thus, the Polish position on the issue evolved from quite

reticent to publically demanding (Zaborowski and

Longhurst 2003: 1015).

Shift from the US or marshal of forces?

The Polish ‘Solidarity approach’ did not work in

relations with America: constraints grew as well as

disillusionment with the Americans’ commitment to support

Polish security, which seemed sacrificed in favour of

good relations and ‘reset’ with Russia

(www.foreignpolicy.com). Outside the security arena other

commitments to Poland, like the lifting of the visa

regime with the US were not abided as well. This was

accompanied by several scandals which unravelled in the

press, like the CIA secret prisons in Poland or Obama’s

‘Polish Camps’ error (www.economist.com ). These factors

might seem to shift the Polish approach to foreign

affairs. With a change of political leadership in Poland

security strategy turned from US-dependent and externally

oriented to more EU-collaborative and internally focused.

Currently the country heads EU Weimar and i-2010 Battle

Groups and soon will head the Visegrad Battle Group

(www.atlantic-community.org ). Poland has been attempting

to broaden its security guarantees through unprecedented

commitments to the EU defence cooperation, but its

efforts were met with limited interest from European

partners (O’Donnell 2012: 1). Additionally President

Komorowski announced plans to limit Polish participation

in overseas missions (www.defensenews.com). At the same

time Poland committed approximately 26 billion euros to

reconstruct and strengthen its armed forces and transfer

them to a professional and mobile platform

(www.telegraph.co.uk, 2014), so far keeping 20 thousand

reservist personnel (www.rmf24.pl).

However, despite constrained relations there is still no

alternative to the US and NATO for Poland’s security.

Especially now after the failure of ‘reset’ and the

invasion of Crimea the ‘Russian threat’ seems more real

for Poland than ever. A sense of alarm in the region at

the same time empowers the Polish foreign policy stance,

which may soon be exercised through joint Polish-

Ukrainian-Lithuanian military brigade

(www.telegraph.co.uk, 2014). With this security crisis

the importance of Poland in the region enhanced as well

as attention towards it from the US. It means Poland will

have more security guarantees and will not have to worry

about US refocusing to the Pacific region. Americans

already revoked additional F-16 fighter jets in Poland

and Lithuania and plan to deploy more American troops to

Baltic States to protect NATO allies against Russian

aggression (www.thehindu.com). The Polish decision to

gradually withdraw from international missions seems to

be more in the cost-efficient realism framework, but it

does not mean turning its back on the US. The same can be

said about the current focus on internal defence, which

answers the US expectations to see Poland as a regional

security leader able to provide stability in the region –

a realistic objective Poland was always aiming for

(Zaborowski and Longhurst 2003: 1010). It requires a

strong, mobile and professional army, which Polish

military reform is aiming to create

(www.visegradrevue.eu). For the US it will lower the

probability of the need for intervention under NATO

Article 5. However, even in the worst case scenario, the

Polish army is important as a barrier on the EU’s Eastern

border, which would be capable of holding back potential

Russian aggression until the US and other allies could

mobilize their powers (Friedman 2012: 3). This gives

Poland a primarily strategic role making it a significant

powerbroker in the region and enhancing its prestige on

the world arena.

Conclusion

Security concern is the main focus and a primary

objective of Polish foreign policy. The more Poland feels

secure from external threats the more it is active in

other areas of foreign affairs. Polish strategic thought

is deeply penetrated and influenced by the tragic history

of the Polish state, which has been stable only for the

last 23 years. This historical background promotes a

specific perspective on foreign affairs, which might seem

irrational from the point of view of defensive and

offensive realism, but makes perfect sense from a

constructivist perspective.

Poland’s relations with the US are also security based

and stem from the Polish sense of weakness and

insecurity. Therefore, Polish strategy through the last

decades was to ally with the world’s militarily and

economically strongest nation. This makes Polish security

decisions frequently cost-inefficient, yet strategically

important to show loyalty and back the US. For Poland it

was the way to secure the US protection guarantees, but

bearing in mind the experience of Western betrayals of

the past Poland wanted some hard evidence such as the US

troops or missiles on its soil. Deeper military alliance

with the US makes Poland more confident in its own

regional foreign policy aimed towards Eastern Europe and

enhances its role on the global arena. Therefore, the

closeness of relations with the US plays a crucial role

in informing Polish policy. As long as the US remains the

world hegemon and the only power capable of resisting

Russian aggression, Poland does not have any other

options than to ally with it. In recent years the

relations between two countries experienced a cooldown,

but that does not mean Poland will turn away from the US.

Instead of wining favour and unwaveringly backing the US

in international military operations Poland turned to the

strategy of developing its own capacities to become a

valuable partner of the US in Europe.

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