How Environmentalists ÒGreenedÓ Trade Policy: Strategic ...

In 1994, the North American Free TradeAgreement (NAFTA) went into effect after

years of contention over its content and passage.Although the agreement itself was significant,the emergence of a U.S. anti-NAFTA move-

ment and its ability to shape supplemental laborand environmental side accords was even morehistoric. Indeed, the subsequent developmentof the anti-NAFTA campaign into a broaderantiglobalization movement signaled a newdynamism in trade politics. In the United States,NAFTA is widely viewed as a turning point inthe politicization of trade politics (O’Brien1998; Rupert 1995). Environmental, labor, andother anti-NAFTA activists created both a con-gressional insurgency and a larger grassrootsmovement in an effort to promote environmen-tal and labor protections.

This political mobilization resulted in a sub-stantial achievement for environmentalists: theygained official recognition for the legitimacy oftheir claims, they obtained access to U.S. tradenegotiators, they helped turn a previously tech-nocratic concern into a highly visible populistissue, and they spurred the creation of an envi-ronmental side agreement (the North AmericanAgreement on Environmental Cooperation, orNAAEC) with new transnational adjudicatory

How Environmentalists “Greened”Trade Policy: Strategic Action and theArchitecture of Field Overlap

Rhonda Evans Tamara KayElm Research and Strategy Harvard University

This article examines why and how environmental activists, despite considerable

political weakness and disproportionally few resources, won substantive negotiating

concessions that far outstripped labor achievements during NAFTA’s negotiation.

Despite a trade policy arena hostile to their demands, environmentalists gained official

recognition for the legitimacy of their claims, obtained a seat at the negotiating table,

turned a previously technocratic concern into a highly visible populist issue, and won an

environmental side agreement stronger than its labor counterpart. We argue that this

unexpected outcome is best explained by environmentalists’ strategic use of mechanisms

available at the intersection of multiple fields. While field theory mainly focuses on

interactions within a particular field, we suggest that the structure of overlap between

fields—the architecture of field overlap—creates unique points of leverage that render

particular targets more vulnerable and certain strategies more effective for activists. We

outline the mechanisms associated with the structure of field overlap—alliance

brokerage, rulemaking, resource brokerage, and frame adaptation—that enable activists

to strategically leverage advantages across fields to transform the political landscape.

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, 2008, VOL. 73 (December:970–991)

Direct correspondence to Tamara Kay, Departmentof Sociology, 6th floor, William James Hall, 33Kirkland Street, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA02138 ([email protected]). We thank ChristopherBail, Jason Beckfield, Frank Dobbin, Peter Evans,Neil Fligstein, Harold Toro Tulla, Christopher Wheat,Ezra Zuckerman, and ASR reviewers and editors fortheir insightful and helpful comments. An earlierversion of this article was presented at the MIT-Harvard Economic Sociology colloquium and atHarvard’s Institutions and Organizing WorkingGroup. Many thanks to all those who, at these events,offered invaluable suggestions and ideas. We alsothank Chris Woodruff and the Center forU.S.–Mexican Studies at the University of California,San Diego for support during the writing of thisarticle.

Delivered by Ingenta to :Harvard University

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institutions and mechanisms of enforcement.1

In contrast, the mobilization was ultimately afailure for labor activists: not only did theynarrowly fail to block the agreement’s passage,but labor side agreement protections were alsomuch narrower in scope and lacked the enforce-ment mechanisms of the environmental sideagreement.2

The extraordinary politicization of U.S. tradepolicy that began with NAFTA, and the privi-leging of environmental demands in the nego-tiating process, presents us with two interrelatedenigmas: How were environmental activistsable to transform basic presumptions aboutinternational trade liberalization policy duringNAFTA negotiations despite considerable polit-ical weakness?3 And why did the negotiationsresult in the creation of labor and environ-mental side agreements with such disparateimpact? Two distinct outcomes appeared pos-sible at the onset of the NAFTA debates: pas-sage of a standard neoliberal agreement, orfailure in the United States as a result of exist-

ing tensions among trade policy elites. Instead,a dynamic broad-based political movementemerged that made trade a subject of popularcontention and resulted in a novel trade arrange-ment that privileged environmental linkagesfor the first time.

The questions that arise out of the environ-mental successes are situated at the intersectionof social movement and organizational schol-ars’ efforts to develop a robust theoreticalframework to explain both contentious and pre-scribed politics. In this article, we argue thatenvironmentalists’ success can best be under-stood as the result of greater strategic use ofmechanisms available through the overlap ofmultiple fields. While field theory has previ-ously focused on interactions within a partic-ular field, we extend it by arguing that thestructure of overlap between fields—the archi-tecture of field overlap—provides critical lever-age and structured opportunities to transformthe political landscape.

We also outline the mechanisms associatedwith the structure of field overlap—alliancebrokerage, rulemaking, resource brokerage,and frame adaptation—that enable politicalactivists to strategically leverage advantagesacross fields. In the case of NAFTA, environ-mentalists achieved substantive policy goalsby utilizing field overlap mechanisms to suc-cessfully apply pressure on actors in a hostiletrade policy field. Using a combination of con-tentious and routine activity, they effectivelyshaped and channeled support among Congressmembers and the public. They harnessed keycongressional rulemaking capacity over thetrade policy field, achieving surprising sub-stantive gains.

Environmentalists’ successful NAFTA mobi-lization provides an empirical case that enablesus to push beyond the current limits of tradepolicy theories promulgated by political sci-entists and trade economists, which lack analy-ses of the institutional channeling of domesticinterests and the emergent, dynamic elementsof politicization in trade policy formation.Given that many areas of interest to sociolo-gists—environmental degradation, labor rights,and economic development—are significantlyaffected by international trade policies, we seekto remedy the relative lack of sociologicalengagement with trade policy formation andpoliticization through a theoretical framework

HOW ENVIRONMENTALISTS “GREENED” TRADE POLICY—–971

1 In this article, we measure success in terms of thelaw “on the books.” A full evaluation of the successof NAAEC’s implementation, while a crucial ques-tion, is beyond the scope of this article. Most envi-ronmental and labor activists agree, however, that theagreements’ protections and enforcement mecha-nisms are not strong enough in practice.

2 Although labor activists generally view it as a fail-ure, the labor side agreement helped catalyze transna-tional labor cooperation and collaboration (see Kay2004, 2005). For more detailed information about theside agreements, see the Online Supplement at theASR Web site: http://www2.asanet.org/journals/asr/2008/toc066.html.

3 Unions had substantially more political and finan-cial resources to draw upon during this period thandid environmentalists. The AFL-CIO represented13.9 million members in 1991, and 19 percent of vot-ers in the 1992 election came from union house-holds. Major national environmental organizationscombined counted approximately 9 million mem-bers, with considerable membership overlap amongthem. Defenders of Wildlife had a $4 million budg-et in 1991. The AFL-CIO reported $60 million in gen-eral fund expenses in 1991 and reserves of morethan $65 million (AFL-CIO Executive Council1993a; Burek 1991). Environmental organizationsdonated less than $2 million in PAC contributions dur-ing the 1992 midterm elections, while labor groupscontributed more than $43 million.


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http://www2.asanet.org/journals/asr/2008/toc066.html

http://www2.asanet.org/journals/asr/2008/toc066.html

that helps explain how social movement actorscan shape them.4 More generally, our theory offield overlap extends social movement andorganizational theory to provide a framework forunderstanding the mechanisms that enable andlimit successful political contention.

UNDERSTANDING THE MECHANISMS OF

POLITICAL CONTENTION: THE

ARCHITECTURE AND OVERLAP OF

POLITICAL FIELDS

Recent scholarship weaves together usefulstrands from the social movement and organi-zations literatures to build more robust theoriesof collective action (Davis et al. 2005;Schneiberg and Lounsbury forthcoming). Socialmovement scholars, who generally focus onmechanisms for change, use elements of organi-zational theory to explore the structural contextin which social movement actors operate.Organizations scholars, who focus primarily onstructures that reproduce power, use socialmovement concepts to analyze how change hap-pens within organizations. In both cases, theconcept of a field is central to expanded mod-els of collective action. Although there are dif-ferent ways to def ine f ields,5 mostorganizational scholars focus on the dynamics

of a single field and define it to map onto exist-ing categorizations of industries or sectors (seeDiMaggio and Powell 1991; Meyer and Scott1983). When policy questions are addressed,industry-specific regulatory agents and otherstate actors who influence the substantive indus-try are all aggregated within a single field (seeLaumann and Knoke 1987).

Organizational scholars have focused on thecreation of new fields, competing logics with-in fields, and the effect of outsiders on fields(see Armstrong 2002; Clemens 1993;Lounsbury 2007; Schneiberg and Soule 2005;Scott et al. 2000). Their research provides atheoretical foundation for understanding socialmovement strategy and outcomes by (1) empha-sizing the networked nature of the political ter-rain, in which relationships between “hubs”within a field predominate and in which hier-archies of actors exist; (2) highlighting the socialconstructedness of the terrain, in which wide-ly shared beliefs may limit the parameters ofpolitical debate and shape the perception ofwhat is possible; and (3) underlining the impor-tance of informal norms and formal regulationsthat restrict and channel action. While fieldshave different internal logics, all are organizedsuch that actors, beliefs, and rules matter.

Despite extensive scholarship on internalfield dynamics, however, there has been littlework on the relationship between f ields.Although community ecology and niche com-petition come closest to conceptualizing fieldoverlap, they are more limited than the approachwe advance here.6 Laumann and Knoke’s (1987)“organizational state” provides a useful startingpoint for thinking about field overlap; here thestate is conceived as a complex grouping ofmultiple overlapping policy domains (i.e.,fields) that include both state and non-stateactors and organizations. This conceptualizationforegrounds the relevance of actors outside afield and the influence hierarchies within it,rather than perpetuating a simple division ofinsiders and outsiders.7 While Laumann and

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4 Exceptions to the relative paucity of sociologi-cal work on trade include Ayres (1998), Dreiling(2001), and Duina (2006).

5 The field concept emerges from two theoreticaltraditions: Bourdieu’s work on social fields, andorganizational theory. For Bourdieu, the social spacesthat constitute fields (e.g., art and economics) rep-resent the structures of different components of sociallife through which power is constituted, contested, andreproduced as individuals pursue common interests(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; Swedberg 2006). Fororganizational theorists, a field is constituted by likeorganizations that directly interact or are indirectlyoriented to each other, and that “in the aggregate, con-stitute a recognized area of institutional life”(DiMaggio and Powell 1991:64). Fligstein (2001:107)conceives of fields as “local social orders,” such thatsociety is a diverse collection of social arenas inwhich different institutional logics apply. While mostorganizational theorists highlight the networked com-ponent, and Bourdieusian theorists highlight thestructural and cultural components of these localsocial orders, Fligstein (2001) draws from both.

6 We thank a reviewer for noting this point (seeRuef 2000).

7 The policy domain/field concept extends socialmovement ideas about elites and challengers; non-state actors are not all challengers because some mayhold hub positions within a given field. Conversely,


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Knoke’s model illuminates the routine func-tioning of policy decision making, it does notoffer theoretical purchase on how social move-ment activists engage policy domains. Mostimportant for our purposes, Laumann andKnoke cannot illuminate the mechanisms thatallow marginalized actors to achieve successfulpolicy outcomes.

As currently conceived, organizational fieldtheory is limited because it fails to take intoaccount that social actors and organizations—including elements of the state itself—almostalways straddle multiple arenas in which theorganizing principles, networks of actors, andinstitutional characteristics differ. Our definitionof a field is quite specific and more narrowlytailored than the definition used by many organ-izations scholars. We define a field as a “localsocial order” (Fligstein 2001:5) of actors “whotake one another into account as they carry outinterrelated activities” (McAdam and Scott2005:10) and that is characterized by an ori-enting principle or goal.8 The inclusion of alocal social order is important because it delin-eates fields not only by networks of actors, butalso by specific institutional logics and discretenorms. The idea of an orienting principle orgoal is particularly important; a field adheres asa coherent entity only to the extent that theactions of actors operating within it are moti-vated, shaped, and constrained by the featuresof that field.

Instead of a single undifferentiated entity, asoften described in social movement and politi-cal science literatures, or even as multiple pol-icy domains, we posit that the state is bestconceptualized as an aggregation of multiplefields that overlap with non-state fields. Whenwe look at the contexts in which trade policyactors operate, for example, it quickly becomesapparent that they often stand at the intersectionof multiple fields oriented to overlapping but notidentical goals. Rather than draw a boundaryaround all the actors and institutions engaged intrade policy to define it as a single trade field,

we believe it is more analytically useful to thinkof these actors as embedded in distinct yet over-lapping fields that address trade issues in thecontext of broader problem-solving directivesand that operate according to distinct institu-tional logics in the pursuit of those goals.9 Bydefining fields more narrowly and focusing onthe places of field overlap, we capture the mul-tiplicity and diversity of local logics in social andpolitical life. This has critical consequences forhow actors maneuver in the pursuit of novel orcontentious aims. Political action, and ultimatelysocial change, frequently occurs through thejudicious use of opportunities available at theintersection of multiple fields. Analysis of thesephenomena therefore requires understandingthe mechanisms at work across fields.

THE ARCHITECTURE OF FIELD OVERLAP

Our primary contribution in this article is tointroduce a new concept of field overlap thatprovides a more robust theoretical understand-ing of collective action. We argue for a deeperfusion of the organizational and social move-ment literatures by theorizing how, through fieldoverlap, mechanisms for change are embeddedin every organizational context. Our contribu-tion to a growing literature synthesizing organ-izations and social movements ideas is threefold.First, we show that field overlap is critical tounderstanding social movement action and effi-cacy. Second, we offer a field theory of strate-gic action that not only articulates thedimensions of field overlap, but also specifiesthe leverage mechanisms by which field over-lap affects social movement action. Third, wedemonstrate that successful actors are thosewho effectively broker across fields.

It is the way fields intersect and overlap—what we refer to as the architecture of fieldoverlap—that creates unique points of leveragethat render particular targets more vulnerableand certain strategies more effective. Whenfields overlap, transformation in one field can


politicians can be “challengers” to a dominant ide-ology within a policy field.

8 Our definition is more akin to Bourdieu’s con-cept of social field (see Homo Academicus [1988] andState Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power[1996]) or Weber’s concept of social order (see alsoMartin 2003).

9 We could have called the NAFTA fields “sub-fields” of the larger trade policy field. We decidedagainst using the term subfields, however, because wefeel it inaccurately defines a larger cohesive wholeand minimizes the structured integrity of each of thearenas of action.


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occur because of the leverage derived from theway it interlocks with other fields and as a resultof networked actors operating in multiplefields.10 Those who are marginalized within,or excluded from, one field are not inevitablywithout political advantages or resources. Socialmovement activists can exploit sites of overlapwith one field to change the parameters inanother, use their position in one field to gainaccess to an overlapping field, use resources asleverage in another field, and expropriate legit-imating discourse from one field in pursuit ofthe goals of another. The most fundamentalchanges lie in the transformation of the rulesbounding a preexisting field; this can benefitpreviously disadvantaged groups and changethe configuration of influence hierarchies with-in that field. The concept of field overlap placesstrategy at the center of analysis because move-ment success is a result of activists’ ability toskillfully use leverage across fields.

The shift in analysis to the architecture offield overlap brings into sharp focus a crucialbut underexplored component of contentiouspolitical activity: while challengers of existingpolitical parameters begin from a position of rel-ative political weakness, they draw uponresources and advantages that extend beyondthat weakness as narrowly defined. This isimplicit in social movement analyses of organi-zational capacity-building, resource mobiliza-tion, and alliance building. The status ofnon-state actors within a field is often definedlargely by their positions outside of it. Mostimportantly, the state itself is not a monolith.Non-state actors may be privileged in one fieldand marginalized in another; officials can haveconsiderable statutory power in one field andnegligible influence in another. The disconti-nuities are in part due to the institutional land-scape that invests different positions,departments, and bodies with distinct normativeand statutory capacities. But they are also aresult of overlapping status hierarchies andspheres of influence that derive from interper-sonal relationships, control of key resources, andideological affinity.

DIMENSIONS AND MECHANISMS OF FIELD

OVERLAP

When fields overlap, transformation is possiblebecause of the bounded ways fields interlockand through networked actors operating in mul-tiple fields. We outline four dimensions of thearchitecture of field overlap: (1) rule linkage, (2)network intersection, (3) resource interdepen-dence, and (4) frame concordance. We furtheroutline the corresponding mechanisms thatallow for leverage across fields: (1) rulemaking,(2) alliance brokerage, (3) resource brokerage,and (4) frame adaptation. While the character-istics of field overlap provide the context inwhich actors operate, the mechanisms are medi-ated by social skill and creative collective action(see Fligstein 2001). Table 1 outlines the char-acteristics and mechanisms of the architectureof field overlap and provides brief descriptions.

The first dimension of the architecture offield overlap is rule linkage, or the extent towhich fields are institutionally connected. Rulelinkage can be ranked from high to low relativeto the capacity of actors in one field to shape therules by which another field operates. The lever-age mechanism for this dimension is rulemak-ing, which can be informal, operational, judicial,regulatory, or statutory. The most fundamentalchanges occur in the transformation of rulesbounding a preexisting field, which can give pre-viously disadvantaged groups an advantage andtransform influence hierarchies.

Network intersection refers to interpersonalconnectivity across fields. Intersection can behigh or low depending on the linkages, withrespect to both quantity and quality, that is, thenumber of hub connections from one field toanother. The leverage mechanism for thisdimension of field overlap is alliance brokerage.Actors who lack influence within a field candraw upon relationships with influential fieldmembers to gain direct access to the field,increase their legitimacy within it, or indirect-ly influence decision making. This mechanismcaptures the importance of alliance-buildingand highlights the potentially transferable natureof influence. Relationships outside of specificpolicy contexts can become an effective polit-ical resource, and legitimacy within one fieldcan facilitate access to another.

Resource interdependence is the extent towhich financial or political resources from onefield can be useful or necessary for the effec-


10 Bourdieu’s discussion of structurally homolo-gous groups in Homo Academicus (1988) approxi-mates this idea. Our thanks to a reviewer for bringingthis to our attention.


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tive functioning of another field. It can beranked from high to low depending on howreliant a field is on external resources. Resourcebrokerage is the leverage mechanism for thisdimension of field overlap. Actors can use val-ued resources to influence behavior in a partic-ular field through, for example, the inducementof trade-offs, explicit buying of access, and theprovision of discourse-shaping information.The extent of a field’s resource interdepen-dence, as well as the scarcity of its resources,impacts the efficacy of resource brokering;fields that lack particular resources are moreamenable to brokering. Social movement schol-ars have long recognized the importance ofresources for political mobilization. The conceptof resource brokerage, however, emphasizes theimportance of resources that can be rallied exter-nally and leveraged across fields.

Frame concordance is the extent to whichdominant discursive frames that anchor differ-ent fields have compatible underlying logics ordraw from related cultural traditions. Frameconcordance between fields can be high or lowdepending on the degree of resonance betweendominant frames. The leverage mechanism—frame adaptation—refers to actors’ ability tostrategically adapt ascendant frames from onefield to facilitate the reconceptualization of keypolitical ideas or discursive parameters in anoth-er. Skilled actors can build upon existing frameconcordance between fields or translate con-ceptual understandings from one field to anoth-er. They can thereby transform the collectiveunderstanding of available political options.

THE EMPIRICAL CASE: FIELDS RELEVANT

TO NAFTA

In this article, we argue that four key fieldsaffected trade policy outcomes during the

NAFTA struggle in the United States. The U.S.trade policy field includes the office of the U.S.Trade Representative (USTR), approximately1,000 non-state members of official advisorycommittees (in which business and labor lead-ers have a legally mandated role), negotiatorsfrom various government offices, and Congressmembers involved in trade-related committeesthat coordinate with the USTR (e.g., the HouseWays and Means Committee and the SenateFinance Committee). The U.S. legislative fieldincludes Congress and non-state congression-al advisors. Under the Constitution, Congressdetermines the conditions under which tradenegotiations occur and ratifies trade agreements.Fast-track privileges granted by Congress enablethe USTR to negotiate changes in domestic lawwhile restricting congressional ability to amendelements of an agreement; members can onlyvote up or down as a whole. It is important todifferentiate conceptually between the U.S. leg-islative and U.S. trade policy fields because theformer’s broader policy mandate enables com-promise and logrolling that could not be accom-plished solely within the U.S. trade policy field.

The transnational trade negotiating fieldincludes the negotiators and staff empowered torepresent their nations in trade negotiations.During NAFTA negotiations, it included U.S.,Mexican, and Canadian trade policy represen-tatives. The field underlines the relationshipbetween mobilization in domestic and interna-tional fields; negotiators are influenced by theactors, rules, resource considerations, and pol-icy frames of their own domestic trade policyfields, those of their counterparts, and thosewithin the field itself. The grassroots politicsfield encompasses the public arena, distinctfrom the state, in which mobilization orientedtoward affecting state policy outcomes occurs.


Table 1.—Characteristics and Mechanisms of Field Overlap

Characteristics Mechanisms Description

Rule Linkage Rulemaking The discretion and ability of actors in one field to influence orchange the rules in another.

Network Intersection Alliance Brokerage The ability of actors to broker alliances that can influence howdecisions are made across fields.

Resource Interdependence Resource Brokerage The extent to which actors can use valued financial or politicalresources to gain influence or power in another field.

Frame Concordance Frame Adaptation The ability of actors to strategically adapt frames to facilitate theirresonance or adoption in another field.


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Table 2 illustrates the fields, mechanisms, andstrategies at work during NAFTA negotiations.

The NAFTA case illustrates the importanceof conceptualizing the state as an aggregationof multiple fields that overlap with non-statefields because the U.S. trade policy field has aunique corporatist structure. Further, theNAFTA debate included discrete time periodspunctuated by decision points that brought dif-ferent fields, actors, and points of overlap intoplay. Our analysis reveals how the unique archi-tecture of these four fields created openingsfor environmental activists that enabled them towield influence despite their political weaknessin the U.S. trade policy field. At every stage ofNAFTA’s negotiation, environmentalistsachieved unexpected policy goals by utilizinga unique combination of routine and contentiousactivity in overlapping domestic and transna-tional fields.11 They built support for environ-mental protections in trade policy among thepublic—using contentious actions, ranging fromletter-writing campaigns to protests and streettheater—and among legislators by garneringsupport through electoral pressure and lobbying.Environmentalists were assisted by the rule-making leverage provided by Congress’s role inboth establishing the rules under which the tradenegotiations occurred and ultimately in author-izing passage. Grassroots activists’pressure onCongress members played a crucial role in legit-imizing the threat of nullif ication. Laboractivists, in contrast, made strategic errors intheir efforts to use field overlap mechanisms to

alter NAFTA’s outcome. Figure 1 provides atimeline of the key events.

DATA AND METHODS

To analyze asymmetrical social movement out-comes, we use a case study that allows us toflesh out strategic choices and events and incor-porate actors’ understanding of their impactinto the analysis.12 We analyzed every articlefrom Inside U.S. Trade (N = 656), the only pub-lication to provide weekly coverage of envi-ronmental and labor issues related to NAFTA.13

Its reporting includes drafts of negotiatedNAFTA texts and copies of letters to and fromtrade participants, as well as coverage ofNAFTA-related press conferences, congres-sional hearings, trade-related speeches, andmeetings between decision makers and NGOadvocates. We supplemented Inside U.S. Tradecoverage with all available CongressionalQuarterly (CQ) articles, publicly-released gov-ernment documents, and articles from the majornational newspapers relating to environmentalor labor issues associated with NAFTA(N = 328).14


Table 2. Field Overlap and NAFTA

Environmental Outcomes

Defined environment as trade issue

Gained access to the U.S. tradepolicy field

Initiated environmental sideagreement

Ratcheted up environmental sideagreement

Mechanisms at Work

Frame adaptation and alliancebrokerage

Rulemaking

Resource brokerage

Rulemaking

Overlapping Fields

U.S. trade policy and legislative

U.S. trade policy and legislative

Grassroots politics and legislative

U.S. trade policy, transnationalnegotiating, and legislative

11 Like all social movements, the anti-NAFTAmovement was not monolithic. For more informationon the alliances and cleavages among labor and envi-ronmental activists, see the Online Supplement.

12 We originally collected the source material forthis article for related projects (see Evans 2002; Kay2004, 2005).

13 Inside U.S. Trade is a weekly report on govern-ment and industry trade action published by InsideWashington Publishers.

14 A Lexis-Nexis search yielded more than 1,000articles (N = 1,083) on NAFTA. Excluding duplica-tion, we chose 202 articles for analysis that collec-tively cover all the major events of negotiations,grassroots activism, and the political battle inWashington.


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We conducted content analysis of environ-mental and labor representatives’ congression-al hearing testimony on NAFTA (N = 143) toassess the discursive frames they employed toinfluence legislators. We used hearing testimo-ny because it is explicitly oriented to the leg-islative field, and it enabled us to eliminatesample bias by analyzing the complete body ofpublic statements of this type. We initially usedopen-ended coding to tease out stated concerns,whether linkages between environmental andlabor issues were mentioned, and suggestedsolutions. Once we determined the full range ofresponses for each of these variables, we veri-fied the reliability of the coding through twoadditional reviews of each testimony by a sin-gle coder. We verified the validity of the cod-ing schema through interviews with labor andenvironmental activists themselves.

Through access to organizations’ archivesand activists’ personal files, we obtained a fullrange of public documents (e.g., press releases,position papers, advocacy ads, op-eds, and inter-nal memos) from environmental, labor, andother anti-NAFTA groups for the time periodunder study (N = 1,225). We conducted in-depth interviews with at least one representativefrom each of the major U.S. environmental andlabor NGOs involved in the NAFTA fight (N =53) to obtain insight into activists’ assessmentof their strategic motivations and mistakes. Wealso conducted interviews with U.S., Mexican,and Canadian labor activists (N = 140).

To gauge public perception of the negotia-tions, we examined data from all available majoropinion polls concerning NAFTA during thetime period, from initial announcement throughfinal passage (N = 50). For an analysis of con-gressional voting patterns concerning labor andenvironmental issues, we reviewed ratings by theAFL-CIO and the League of ConservationVoters for all senators and representatives of the103rd Congress and compared them to the finalNAFTA voting record. For an assessment ofCongress members’ receptivity to the claimsof environmental and labor advocates, we ana-lyzed all House and Senate floor speeches onNAFTA (N = 295). Finally, we conducted adetailed content analysis of the provisions of theagreement.

FRAME ADAPTATION MECHANISMS

CREATING A LABOR–ENVIRONMENTAL

STANDARDS OPPOSITIONAL FRAME

At the onset of the NAFTA debate, both laborand environmental activists had to look outsidethe U.S. trade policy field to shape the negoti-ating principles of the key negotiators within it.Although labor unions maintained positions inthe U.S. trade policy field and their fair-tradeoppositional frame was acknowledged within it,they were nevertheless marginalized by nego-tiators. Environmental organizations had norole in the U.S. trade policy field at all, and theconceptual link between trade liberalization andenvironmental degradation was not even anoppositional frame within the field.

Congress’s control over trade made leveragebetween the legislative and U.S. trade policyfields high across multiple dimensions. Therewas high rule linkage because the legislativefield had the ability to influence both the verystructure of the USTR and the circumstancesunder which the USTR negotiated NAFTA.There was also high network intersectionbecause key legislative and non-state actorsoperate in both fields, and high resource inter-dependence because the legislative field controlsthe USTR budget. There was only moderateframe concordance between the two fields ontrade issues, however; the U.S. trade policy fieldwas more hegemonically neoliberal thanCongress as a whole, although trade liberaliza-tion was still the dominant paradigm inCongress.

The rulemaking linkage between the U.S.legislative and trade policy fields, as embodiedin fast-track authorization, provided legislatorswith leverage at the onset of debates to mandatethe inclusion of environmental and labor pro-tections in U.S. negotiating positions. Theycould directly revoke fast-track (enabling moredirect congressional involvement in negotia-tions) or threaten revocation to obtain negoti-ating concessions in advance. The initialpresumption at the onset of the NAFTA debates,however, was that fast-track reauthorizationwould pass in the legislative field with minimalresistance. It was presumed that any opposi-tion to reauthorization would come from laborrepresentatives and their congressional allies.



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The strategic hurdles for environmentalactivists were twofold: first, how to expand thedefault understanding of the trade debate with-in the legislative field to include environmen-tal issues; and second, how to best use leveragefrom the legislative field in the U.S. trade pol-icy field once the legislative debate had expand-ed. To surmount these hurdles, environmentalistsused frame adaptation and alliance brokeragemechanisms to legitimize both environmentalcritiques of trade liberalization and themselvesas trade actors within the legislative field. Theyformed alliances with other members of theanti-NAFTA coalition and Congress memberswho were not traditional allies. They thenworked with new and old congressional alliesto inject environmental actors and an environ-mental frame on trade into the U.S. trade poli-cy field.

The opportunities for environmental frameadaptation in the legislative field were consid-erable because fair trade was already a power-ful oppositional frame in the field. But the fairtrade frame, with its focus on labor, was vul-nerable to being derided as protectionist.Activists therefore twinned environmental andlabor concerns together through claims thatincentives to move plants to Mexico as a resultof less regulation could result in downwardlabor and environmental regulatory pressure inthe United States. This “greening” discourseboth expanded the scope of traditional fair tradearguments and provided legitimacy for the envi-ronmental impacts of trade (see Buttel 1992).The linkage was a win-win for environmental-ists and labor unions. For environmentalists,frame adaptation allowed them to piggybackon labor’s influence; it heightened the politicalrelevance of environmental issues by rhetoricallylinking them with the default oppositional tradeframe. Labor activists used environmental con-cerns to expand the authority of their opposi-tional position and blunt criticisms ofprotectionism. As John Audley, the Sierra Club’sProgram Director for Trade and the Environmentduring the NAFTA battle, explained:

Whether we were actively conscious of it or not,political power existed when we were, either loose-ly or formally [allied] with labor, in terms of legit-imizing our work.|.|.|. I mean, our work to defeatNAFTA at the time was based largely in our abil-ity to form a coalition with labor. A standing alone

environment would not have beaten anything relat-ed to trade.15

Together, environmental and labor activistscould fight the protectionist label that wasattached to opposition in the transnational tradenegotiating field, thereby expanding the pool ofpotential supporters of their new oppositionalframe. This was particularly important for pro-labor Congress members whose constituentsmight lose jobs to NAFTA; appropriating agreening discourse helped them avoid a pro-tectionist slant to their arguments as they triedto derail or modify the agreement.

Our analysis of data compiled from the 20hearings Congress held on the free trade agree-ment between May 21, 1990 and May 24, 1991(the period between the initial announcement ofintent to negotiate and the vote on fast-trackextension) reveals the success of the labor andenvironmental linkage in the legislative field. Ofthese hearings, fully 55 percent dealt with envi-ronmental or labor issues. Significantly, 82 per-cent of the hearings that dealt withenvironmental or labor issues addressed themtogether. While none of the hearings focusedexclusively on environmental concerns, only18 percent addressed labor issues alone. Laborand environmental standards quickly became thedefault oppositional frame, and the two issuesbecame coupled conceptually. This is a remark-able finding given that the link between tradeand environmental issues was novel and con-troversial at the time.

ALLIANCE BROKERAGEMECHANISMS

GAINING LEGITIMACY AND THROWING

FAST-TRACK INTO DOUBT

In the early stages of negotiations, environ-mental organizations used alliance brokeragemechanisms between the U.S. legislative andtrade policy fields to gain legitimacy and throwthe fast-track vote into doubt. They faced stiffopposition; initially, USTR officials said theywould fight the inclusion of labor and environ-mental issues in the agreement. USTR also tried


15 Personal interview with John Audley of theSierra Club (April 27, 1998).


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to dissuade Congress members from attemptingto tie labor and environmental standards to theagreement (Maggs 1991; see also Auerbach1991; Inside U.S. Trade 1991a; McQueen 1991).The successful linkage between environmentaland labor concerns in the legislative field, how-ever, facilitated environmentalists’ ability topenetrate the U.S. trade policy field.

In January 1991, in an early coordinatedeffort to build alliances, members of theWorking Group on Trade and EnvironmentallySustainable Development organized a trina-tional public forum titled “Opening Up theDebate.”16 The organizers designed the forumprimarily for the staff of the House Ways andMeans Committee, one of the key committeesthat straddles the legislative and trade policyfields. The forum championed the elaborationof trade critiques to include environmentalissues and used some members’ network con-nections to extend legislative alliances to oth-ers (Inside U.S. Trade 1990, 1991b). In the wakeof the event, a Greenpeace staffer reported that“some congressional offices are calling us forsuggestions on how to frame proposals toinclude environmental concerns in the [freetrade agreement]” (Duncan 1991). The con-gressional reverberations from the forum sug-gested a potential receptiveness amonglegislators to broker alliances to oppose anytrade agreement that lacked environmental pro-tections. Trade policy members also worriedabout the implications for passage. USTR CarlaHills warned that “opposition groups [are] form-ing even as we speak.|.|.|. There are those whowould be quite happy to take away our fast-track authority and in so doing cripple us”(Dunne 1991:4).

Alliances quickly multiplied after the forum.Environmental organizations that unequivocal-ly opposed fast-track joined with labor unionsand a small group of Congress members to ini-tiate a legislative campaign to actively chal-lenge fast-track reauthorization. They workedwith Representative Marcy Kaptur and SenatorsErnest Hollings and Don Riegle, who tried toconvince their colleagues to vote against extend-ing fast-track negotiating authority. Politicians

wary of an unrestricted trade agreement turnedto environmental organizations to obtain tech-nical information, frame strategies concerningthe agreement’s potential problems, and lobbysupport (see Inside U.S. Trade 1991f, 1991g;MacArthur 2000). For example, 18 Housemembers sent President Bush a letter makingtheir support for fast-track extension contin-gent on an environmental review of the agree-ment and assurances through action that“environmental concerns will be properlyaddressed in the proposed trade agreement”(Wyden et al. 1991; see also Inside U.S. Trade1991d). The letter reflected the National WildlifeFederation’s (NWF) position paper on the envi-ronmental impact of U.S.–Mexican economicintegration, particularly the environmental andpublic health hazards of maquiladoras.Environmental groups that favored compro-mise, like the NWF, and their congressionalallies became a key swing group in the passageof fast-track authorization.

Members of congressional committees thatoverlapped with the U.S. trade policy field alsoraised concerns about the viability of an agree-ment that lacked environmental and labor pro-tections. Democratic members of the SenateFinance Committee invoked the labor–envi-ronmental standards frame when they forceful-ly questioned USTR Hills during her testimonyconcerning the possible movement of U.S. plantsto Mexico to take advantage of lax labor andenvironmental enforcement (Inside U.S. Trade1991e). To reduce congressional concerns, theoffice of the USTR quickly backed away fromits initial position that environmental and laborconcerns had no place in trade negotiations.After a Ways and Means Committee hearing,USTR Hills acknowledged a need to work withorganizations concerned with environmentalproblems and labor standards, and she sug-gested that a concurrent environmental treatywith Mexico be explored. Hills then met pri-vately with a number of environmental organ-izations to search for a compromise position(Inside U.S. Trade 1991c). Environmentalistshad finally gained informal access to centralU.S. trade policy field actors.

What began as a seemingly hopeless effortgained traction as the new labor–environmen-tal standards frame provided legitimacy (throughframe adaptation mechanisms), and as alliances(through alliance brokerage mechanisms) pro-


16 The National Wildlife Federation, Friends ofthe Earth, and Greenpeace were among the environ-mental organizations represented.


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vided environmental challengers with sufficientpower in the legislative field to throw the out-come of fast-track reauthorization into doubt.This enabled environmentalists to sustain influ-ence in the legislative field far beyond theirresources or their position in the legislativeinfluence hierarchy. Environmental issuesgained legitimacy in the legislative field, andenvironmental representatives were now viewedas legitimate trade actors in the NAFTA debate.

RULEMAKING MECHANISMS(PART I)

GAINING CONCESSIONS AND OFFICIAL

ACCESS TO THE U.S. TRADE POLICY FIELD

The rule linkage between the U.S. legislative andtrade policy fields, as embodied in fast-trackauthorization, provided state and non-state leg-islative actors with rulemaking leverage to man-date the official inclusion of environmental andlabor principles in U.S. negotiating positions.Environmentalists’ and other anti-NAFTAactivists’ successful mobilization during thefast-track struggle left them well-positioned;U.S. negotiators in the U.S. trade policy fieldwere now in danger of losing fast-track privi-leges and operating under greater negotiatingconstraints. They were ready to compromise.

House Ways and Means Chair Rostenkowskiand Senate Finance Chair Bentsen, who werekey actors in both the U.S. legislative and tradepolicy fields, tried to find a negotiating positionthat would satisfy the opposition in the House.They wrote President Bush in March 1991requesting a trade policy plan that responded tolabor and environmental concerns. They advisedhim to address “the disparity between the twocountries in the adequacy and enforcement ofenvironmental standards, health and safety stan-dards and worker rights” (Cameron and Tomlin2000:73). House Majority Leader Gephardt,who was the key network actor for potentialopposition in the House, followed with a letteroutlining the conditions that needed to beaddressed to obtain his support for fast-trackextension. He expressed concern that inade-quate labor and environmental enforcementgave industries unfair cost incentives to relocateproduction to Mexico (Gephardt 1991).

On March 29, 1991, the NWF hand-delivereda set of “sustainable development” principles fornegotiating NAFTA to USTR Hills, accompa-

nied by a letter outlining key demands, includ-ing that the USTR “create an environmentalnegotiating group that would be part of theNAFTA talks” (Inside U.S. Trade 1991f).Representative Wyden, with the support of envi-ronmentalists, also sought to include environ-mental organizations in the U.S. trade policyfield. He insisted that “environmental experts[be] part of the U.S. negotiating team forNAFTA” (Inside U.S. Trade 1991f).

On May 1, the administration outlined anaction plan in response to Rostenkowski andBentsen’s letter. Along with labor concessions,it included a “parallel track” for increasing envi-ronmental cooperation and expanding environ-mental protection through an Integrated BorderEnvironmental Plan. The action plan alsorequired that an Environmental Review be con-ducted. Finally, environmental representativeswere appointed to USTR advisory committees;representatives from five environmental organ-izations17 and one state-level EnvironmentalProtection Agency (EPA) director were select-ed to advise the USTR during negotiations (seeBush 1991; Inside U.S. Trade 1991k).Environmentalists had won substantive gainsfor environmental improvements along theU.S.–Mexico border. And for the first time,environmentalists had a recognized role with-in the U.S. trade policy field itself. Gephardtannounced qualified support for fast-track reau-thorization on May 9, when he declared hisadoption of a “trust but verify” approach (InsideU.S. Trade 1991h). While environmental organ-izations such as Sierra Club and Friends of theEarth, who were not appointed to USTR com-mittees and remained outside the U.S. tradepolicy field, continued to oppose fast-track, thesupport of a large faction of environmentalistsand their allies ensured reauthorization.Gephardt and Rostenkowski sponsored a reso-lution “memorializing” the administration’saction plan that overwhelmingly passed in theHouse (Inside U.S. Trade 1991i; see alsoGugliotta 1991; Inside U.S. Trade 1991j).

Although the passage of fast-track reauthori-zation in May 1991 was a disappointment toenvironmental NGOs that fought to defeat it, theenvironmental coalition’s organizational and


17 These advisors were culled from groups leastlikely to oppose negotiations.


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political achievements were significant.18 Thepresident of the Natural Resources DefenseCouncil (NRDC 1991) said, “For the first timein history, the environment has entered tradedebate [sic]. The challenge ahead is to shapeinternational agreements that promote sustain-able development worldwide.” Rulemakingmechanisms between the legislative and U.S.trade policy fields enabled environmentalists, ina short period of time and with few resources,to win concessions from trade negotiators andgain representation in the U.S. trade policy field.

RESOURCE BROKERAGEMECHANISMS

INCREASING PUBLIC AND LEGISLATIVE

OPPOSITION TO NAFTA

Once fast-track reauthorization was completedand negotiations began, environmental and laboractors had a limited opportunity to directlyimpact the direction of the negotiations them-selves. Although environmental actors now hadestablished roles within the U.S. trade policyfield, their position, like labor’s, was marginal-ized. Moreover, the labor–environmental stan-dards frame remained oppositional within thefield, generating considerable pushback fromopponents. Environmentalists with USTR advi-sory positions worked to promote environmen-tal protections and had some success advocatingfor a more environmentally-oriented agreement.But given the constraints within the field, itbecame clear that additional social movementmobilization outside the field was needed tomaximize negotiating outcomes.

There was little overlap between the grass-roots politics and U.S. trade policy fields, how-ever, which left activists few direct leveragepoints. The grassroots politics field had nodirect rulemaking capacity or resource leverageover the U.S. trade policy field, and given therestricted nature of the USTR advisory com-mittees, there was low network intersectionbetween the fields. There was also low frame

concordance between the two fields becausethe grassroots politics field was much less hege-monically neoliberal than even the legislativefield. Activists therefore focused on the finalcongressional vote on NAFTA and the resourcebrokerage leverage available through the over-lap between the legislative and grassroots pol-itics fields resulting from Congress members’dependence on key political resources: votes,money, and organizational support. Theactivists’ strategy was to increase public hostil-ity to NAFTA, harness that antagonism to influ-ence legislators, and then use their leverage tomaximize agreement concessions or underminethe entire agreement.

While environmental organizations with posi-tions in the U.S. trade policy field pressed forconcessions within it, those outside the fieldjoined with labor activists to mobilize in thegrassroots politics field. They used a three-pronged strategy to leverage legislative resourcebrokerage mechanisms: (1) educate local inter-est group members to increase opposition, (2)threaten legislators with loss of votes by increas-ing general voter antagonism to the agreement,and (3) mobilize pressure on legislators by con-vening lobbying efforts in home regions. MarkRitchie, then president of the Institute forAgriculture and Trade Policy, emphasized thestrategic benefits of connecting mass mobi-lization in the grassroots politics field with leg-islative pressure:

At the end of the day, the Washington’s people’scontribution to all of these things is the single-mindedness of vote-counting and delivering ofvotes. At the end of the day, you’re held account-able in Washington for how the vote goes. And out-side of Washington, we don’t. In fact, for us, you’reable to throw up your hands and say, “oh those ter-rible politicians.” .|.|. So in a way, we were verylucky that the trade campaign grew to the sizethat it did, so that it could involve as many peopleas it did, so it could in fact have a grassroots anda Washington that could then be kind of equalpartners.|.|.|. I would say a real genius aspect of thetrade work—which was not easy nor always happy,but was really crucial to the success—was theability to move it in and out of Washington.|.|.|.When there was a fast-track vote looming or some-thing else looming or a NAFTA vote looming, allthe money and all the resources, everything gotconcentrated in Washington.|.|.|. And when therewasn’t that kind of focus, then people and energyand money got moved out for more of the grass-


18 Friends of the Earth and Sierra Club had con-tinued to oppose fast-track reauthorization, for exam-ple, while the Border Ecology Project struck a middleground (see Friends of the Earth 1991; Kamp 1991;McCloskey 1991).


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roots stuff.|.|.|. I think this was really an innova-tion.19

Activists conducted two broad grassrootspolitics campaigns: the first during substan-tive negotiations; the second beginning with thesupplemental negotiations and continuingthrough final passage. During the former,groups held local rallies and forums with com-munity groups and local politicians, wrote pressreleases, and appeared in media outlets in morethan 100 cities. There were active coalitions in20 states, with more than 60 groups partici-pating in the campaign (Merrilees and Weiner1992). Protestors picketed the Tijuana hear-ings on the border environmental plan, whichthey felt was not strong enough, bearing signswith slogans like “The Plan Stinks” (Crawley1991; Lindquist 1991; McDonnell 1991). Theyheld “citizen receptions” at negotiation sites toprovide an alternative assessment of the events.In Texas, activists met negotiators with picketsigns and banners. In D.C., activists dressed intuxedos and set up a “hospitality suite” in thebuilding where negotiations were held. Theyhanded out fake menus listing the pesticidesthat could contaminate food under proposedtrade rules (Merrilees and Weiner 1992; Wastler1992).

This grassroots mobilization succeeded inaltering public opinion. Opinion polls prior tothe negotiations show 72 percent of respon-dents broadly supportive of a North Americanfree trade zone (Burkholder 1991). By October1992, support had dropped to only 21 percent(NBC News 1993). The coalition also success-fully leveraged grassroots mobilization to affectsupport in the legislative field. At the time of thesigning, it was believed that NAFTA did nothave sufficient support for passage given theagreement’s weaknesses on labor and environ-mental issues. Activists had achieved a consid-erable victory. To secure passage, Clintonadopted a suggestion made by key environ-mental leaders to negotiate for additional pro-tections.20

Environmental and other anti-NAFTAactivists also organized during the supplemen-tal negotiations. Once concerns were raisedabout the adequacy of the side agreement pro-tections, they launched an unprecedented mobi-lization in the grassroots politics field. Theyparticipated in a series of events designed toinform the public and to pressure Congressmembers about NAFTA. By the fall of 1993,activists maintained more than 25 coalitionchapters in 43 states. They held news confer-ences, canvassed door-to-door, held local meet-ings with their elected representatives,conducted border trips, initiated postcard drives,and held public protests. Leverage between thegrassroots politics and legislative fields onceagain significantly diminished the chances of theagreement’s passage. Pro-NAFTA leadersexpressed skepticism that the supplementalnegotiations would overcome legislative divi-sions. In July 1993, Speaker Foley confided toa diplomat that he thought NAFTA was dead andthere was nothing Clinton “or anyone on theplanet” could do about it (Apple 1993). Mostsenior officials in the administration privatelybelieved that the president should jettison theaccord and “cover his tracks” (Apple 1993).

RULEMAKING MECHANISMS(PART II)

RATCHETING UP THE ENVIRONMENTAL SIDE

AGREEMENT

U.S. legislators’ ultimate rulemaking ability todetermine NAFTA’s fate meant that overlapbetween the U.S. legislative and transnationaltrade negotiating fields proved critical for envi-ronmentalists during supplemental negotia-tions.21 British Columbia’s trade ministerunderlined the significance of congressionalrulemaking leverage when he quipped after thecompletion of substantive negotiations that “nowthat the NAFTA has been initialed, only specialinterests in the U.S. stand a chance of changingthe text by lobbying Congress. Canadians haveno such opportunity” (Inside U.S. Trade 1992:5).When supplemental negotiations began in


19 Personal interview with Mark Ritchie of theInstitute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (June 11,2001).

20 Labor leaders did not support this option. TheAFL-CIO called for Clinton to renegotiate the agree-ment to promote “worker rights, strong labor stan-

dards, consumer health and safety, and environmen-tal protection” (AFL-CIO Executive Council 1993b).

21 Of course, Mexico and Canada always had theoption to simply withdraw from negotiations.


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March 1993, one of two outcomes was likely:business interests would use their influence toensure that a paper tiger document with noenforcement mechanisms was passed;22 or, thelabor movement would wield its influence inboth the U.S. trade policy and legislative fieldsto secure a stronger side agreement than that ofthe politically weaker environmentalists.

Environmentalists were at a relative disad-vantage; they had fewer seats on USTR com-

mittees, they had less money and organization-al capacity to throw at legislative lobbying, andthey were less influential actors in the U.S. leg-islative field. Up to this point, environmental-ists had achieved many of their gains becauseof their ability to use leverage mechanisms tosuccessfully piggyback on labor concerns.Moreover, demands for strong labor protectionscontinued to be more central to passage in thelegislative field. As a result, negotiators in theU.S. trade policy field entered into supplemen-tal negotiations assuming that the labor sideagreement would need to be stronger than itsenvironmental counterpart (Cameron andTomlin 2000).

Contrary to all expectations, however, nego-tiations produced a diluted labor agreement anda more robust environmental agreement. Bystrongly leveraging rulemaking mechanismsbetween the U.S. legislative, U.S. trade policy,and transnational trade negotiating fields, envi-ronmentalists and their allies were able tostrengthen two key provisions of the environ-mental side agreement that were initially weak-er than the labor agreement: enforcementmechanisms and international standards. In con-trast, labor leaders pursued an ineffective strat-egy of privileging legislative defeat. At thecrucial later stages of negotiations, they did notfocus on legislative rulemaking leverage to gainfurther traction in the U.S. trade policy field. Toobtain legislative support for passage, negotia-tors therefore pressed for trade-offs for increasedenvironmental concessions at the expense oflabor concessions.

Initially, labor negotiators in the U.S. tradepolicy field, led by Labor Secretary RobertReich, were much more insistent on the impor-tance of enforcement mechanisms than wereEPA off icials operating in the f ield (seeCameron and Tomlin 2000; Inside U.S. Trade1993a, 1993b). Environmental NGOs and theircongressional allies, however, applied legisla-tive rulemaking pressure for sanctions in theU.S. trade policy field. This pressure enabledEPA officials, concerned that the environmen-tal side agreement would be weaker than thelabor agreement, to demand similar enforce-ment mechanisms as the labor side agreement.Canadian and Mexican negotiators in thetransnational trade negotiating field unequivo-cally opposed all sanctions. Inside U.S. Trade(1993c) reported, however, that it was difficult


22 Business representatives did not push forstronger environmental over labor sanctions; theywere on record as similarly opposed to both.Representatives of the Chamber of Commerce (CC)criticized both side deals, saying they had not beenadequately consulted. Major business organizationssaid they would support only limited environmentaland labor commissions and would oppose trade sanc-tions. A letter from the CC by International VicePresident Willard A. Workman to USTR Kantorfocused almost exclusively on concerns with theenvironmental side agreement. Workman wrote: “Imust frankly tell you that there is considerable con-cern in the business community about the directionU.S. proposals in the environmental side agreementnegotiations appear to be taking and that this couldjeopardize our members’ continued support for theNAFTA. Their concerns relate both to the structureand powers of a prospective North AmericanCommission on the Environment (NACE) and toproposed provisions for the use of trade sanctionsunder some circumstances” (Workman 1993:S8).USA*NAFTA released a press statement on June30, 1993 criticizing a U.S. District Court decision torequire an environmental impact statement forNAFTA in a case filed by environmental NGOs(USA*NAFTA 1993) (see also Inside U.S. Trade1993f). White House and congressional officialsroundly criticized the business coalition’s legislativefight; House Minority Whip Gingrich called thebusiness effort “pathetic.” Rep. Jim Kolbe “accusedthe business community of having led a ‘dreadfuleffort’ that misunderstands the need to provide mem-bers of Congress with the political support necessaryto vote for NAFTA” (Inside U.S. Trade 1993g). WhiteHouse NAFTA advisor Bill Frenzel acknowledgedthat local business efforts at the end of October 1993had not produced results. As Inside U.S. Trade(1993g) reported, “Frenzel said he has talked to ‘lit-erally hundreds’ of members of Congress and hasfound only one who got one-third of its [sic] mail insupport of NAFTA. The rest of members report a ratioof 100 to one on mail against the agreement, andalmost none have received calls in favor of NAFTA.”


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to determine the bottom line of labor and envi-ronmental groups and their congressional alliesbecause they wanted to maximize their rule-making leverage on U.S. trade policy field nego-tiators by not stating minimums necessary fortheir support. This strategy of leveraging uncer-tainty between fields helped state and non-statelegislative actors ratchet up the environmentalside agreement by bringing sanctions into play.U.S. Department of Labor official LawrenceKatz explained:

It was really tough to figure out what would begood enough.|.|.|. Initially, the U.S. wasn’t clear onwhether it was going to favor sanctions or not.Lloyd Bentsen was adamantly against sanctions foranything. But as Gephardt and others sort of cameinto play, and as there got more heat on the laborissue, Treasury switched, and the president camedown in favor of sort of trying to get some sanc-tions. So the negotiating position actually changed.Very early on, there was a view that there wouldbe no sanctions in the process.23

In response, USTR negotiators changed theirstrategies to incorporate the importance of tradesanctions to gaining votes in the legislativefield.

When negotiators met in April 1993 for thesecond round of talks, proposals on the table forthe labor side agreement were still stronger thanthose for the environmental agreement, withthe inclusion of labor standards enforcementand the use of labor dispute panels. Mexicannegotiators, however, expressed a willingness toaddress the same issues on the environmentalside, and advisory environmental organizationstook advantage of the opening. Working withSenator Baucus, they suggested that trade sanc-tions would be the bottom line for environ-mentally-focused House members (see Audley1997; Inside U.S. Trade 1993d, 1993e). Non-advisory environmental groups continued topress for additional demands, receiving sup-port from Gephardt, who indicated that the posi-tion taken by environmentalists operating in theU.S. trade policy field was insufficiently toughto gain congressional approval (Inside U.S.Trade 1993e). On May 11, 1993 Gephardtannounced that he intended to introduce legis-lation to allow the United States to launch cases

against countries demonstrating a persistentpattern of labor or environmental law viola-tions. He also signaled, though, that he wouldsupport NAFTA with the right supplementalaccords, which forced negotiators to continue totry to acquire concessions to obtain his sup-port (Inside U.S. Trade 1993f).

LABOR’S CRITICAL BLUNDER: RULEMAKING

BETWEEN THE GRASSROOTS POLITICS AND

LEGISLATIVE FIELDS

While the environmental and labor movements’strategies reinforced each other during the firststages of the NAFTA struggle, environmental-ists’efforts worked against labor’s strategy dur-ing supplemental negotiations. Clintonadministration officials convinced labor leadersnot to publicly oppose supplemental negotia-tions (Thorp 1993). AFL-CIO officials initial-ly complied and worked with the USTR to tryto improve the labor side agreement while min-imizing public opposition within the labormovement.24 Environmentalists, in contrast,actively organized at the grassroots level, alongwith some AFL-CIO affiliated unions that triedto prod the federation into assuming a moreactive role in the struggle.

By the summer of 1993, however, AFL-CIOleaders determined that the labor side agreementwould be too weak to warrant their support.They decided to try to kill the entire deal andfinally began to gear up for a grassroots cam-paign to bring resource leverage to bear in thelegislative field (Anderson 1993). The AFL-CIO turned its focus away from the U.S. tradepolicy and transnational trade negotiating fieldsto the anti-NAFTA campaign in the grassrootspolitics field, and to garnering support for votesagainst NAFTA in the legislative f ield(Anderson 1993). As Mark Anderson, who ledthe AFL-CIO Task Force on Trade suggests,the shift in the AFL-CIO’s strategy likely cametoo late:

And when they finally came out with these agree-ments and it was in August 1993, that’s when wesaid these agreements these suck, no, we’re goingto try to take it down. Now that may have been a


23 Personal interview with Lawrence Katz of theU.S. Department of Labor (March 13, 2001).

24 Personal interviews with Bill Cunningham of theAFL-CIO (May 5, 1998) and Greg Woodhead of theAFL-CIO (April 7, 1998).


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tactical mistake on our part.|.|.|. Because that gaveus a very short window to try to mobilize and getstuff up, it was mid-to-end of August. And so thenthe vote was when, in November? So at mostyou’re talking about a three month window.25

This decision proved to be significant for theoutcomes of both side agreements. WithoutAFL-CIO pressure in the trade fields, pro-laborU.S. negotiators had little additional ability tothreaten their Canadian and Mexican counter-parts with legislative rulemaking leverage bystating bottom-line labor demands. As U.S.labor negotiator Steve Herzenberg explained:

The U.S. labor movement was pretty ineffectual.All they [the AFL-CIO Task Force on Trade] wouldtell the U.S. negotiators is that we would never sup-port this thing, and if you strengthen it, it will bea little less of a [war] by the U.S. labor movement.So there was nobody on the outside putting anypressure on the U.S. negotiators which would leadthem to make a pragmatic calculation to make theagreement stronger.|.|.|. I think the U.S. labor move-ment could have put pressure and that could haveled to a different agreement.26

Rulemaking mechanisms between the leg-islative and transnational trade negotiating fieldsproved decisive to the final, unexpected out-come of supplemental negotiations.Environmentalists used these mechanisms tomaintain pressure on legislators and negotiators,and Mexican negotiators used them to press fortheir own preferences in the absence of suffi-cient pushback from labor. When the partiescould not reach an agreement on internationalstandards and sanctions, the lead Mexican nego-tiator met with Gephardt, who emphasized thatsanctions were essential for U.S. legislative pas-sage. As a result, Mexican negotiators agreed toaccept sanctions for both agreements inexchange for a narrower labor scope thatexcluded trade sanctions for violations of corelabor rights such as freedom of association, col-

lective bargaining, and striking.27 Environmentallaw remained broadly defined.28

Supplemental negotiations were notinevitably a zero-sum game; a stronger envi-ronmental side agreement did not have to comeat the expense of a weaker labor agreement.The AFL-CIO could have pushed harder forstronger protections or worked more closelywith environmentalists to create a common bot-tom line for both agreements. The AFL-CIOstrategy to kill the agreement in the legislativefield through pressure from the grassroots pol-itics field would likely have been successful ifenvironmental concessions had not blunted leg-islative opposition. Environmentalists utilizedfield overlap mechanisms at all stages of nego-tiations to successfully ratchet-up the environ-mental side agreement. Indeed, hadenvironmentalists not been waiting and bangingat the door, they likely would have achievednothing. Their decision to focus their pressurebetween the legislative and transnational tradenegotiating fields in the final months beforethe agreements were finalized proved to be judi-cious. It was here that the final horse-tradingoccurred, and environmentalists tipped the finalbalance to achieve an unlikely and unpredictedoutcome.

CONCLUSIONS

While field theory is central to expanded mod-els of contentious behavior, the current focus onthe dimensions and dynamics within individualfields limits an understanding of collectiveaction. Our primary contribution in this articleis to introduce a new concept of field overlap,expanding theoretically beyond a single field asa unit of analysis. A theoretical framework cen-


25 Personal interview with Mark Anderson of theAFL-CIO (January 8, 2001).

26 Personal interview with Steve Herzenberg, U.S.Department of Labor, assistant to the chief negotia-tor of the labor side agreement to NAFTA (September27, 2002).

27 Mexican negotiators’ preference for weakerlabor oversight reflects government and official unionopposition to core labor standards with enforcementmechanisms. Mexico’s labor secretary sought tomaintain the country’s corporatist system of laborrelations, and the Confederation of Mexican Workers(Mexico’s largest labor federation) supported thisnegotiating position (Cameron and Tomlin 2000).

28 For a comparison of the North AmericanAgreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC)and the North American Agreement on LaborCooperation (NAALC), see the Online Supplement.


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tered on overlapping fields is important forthree reasons. First, it provides the foundationfor a truly integrative mapping of routine andcontentious politics. Social movement scholar-ship largely discounts the routine to focus on dis-ruptive behavior, drawing rigid boundariesaround different kinds of activities. It thereforemisses the ways in which collective action oftenincludes both. We argue for a more systematicanalysis of the ways in which routine and con-tentious behavior complement one another andare often used collaboratively to take advan-tage of different leverage points. The terrain ofoverlapping fields is sufficiently complex toenable differently positioned actors to employboth “insider” and “outsider” collective actiontactics.

Second, a theory of field overlap constructsthe state as a nexus of overlapping fields.Traditional social movement and organizationsliteratures assume the state to be a monolithicactor and therefore miss how multiple logicsaffect state actors because they straddle variousfields. State officials can have considerablestatutory power in one state field and negligi-ble influence in another. Because of their influ-ence in a non-state field, non-state actors maygain access to a state field in which they are mar-ginal. The tendency of influence to permeateacross fields results from institutional config-urations that create overlapping status hierar-chies, spheres of influence, and ideologicalaffinities. The architecture of field overlap cre-ates unique points of organizational leverage thatrender particular targets more vulnerable andcertain social movement strategies more effective.

Finally, a shift in analysis to the architectureof field overlap explains a crucial but underex-plored component of contentious political activ-ity—how social movements succeed withinhostile fields. Social movement scholarshipcannot sufficiently explain how social changeoccurs within a hostile field because it missesthe critical leverage points situated where fieldsoverlap. Those who are marginalized within orexcluded from one field are not necessarilywithout political advantages or resources. Ourtheory illuminates the mechanisms by whichactors who are constrained within one field canmobilize in others to alter the rules, the distri-bution of influence, the conceptual under-standing of a problem, or the decision-makingcalculus by which policies are determined.

The NAFTA case suggests that social move-ment organizations with routinized access tooverlapping fields have better chances for trans-formative success the less insulated and absolutethe power in the field, and the less concentrat-ed the centers of influence. Assessing the pos-sible outcomes of political mobilization inoverlapping fields, we highlight key attributes:their degree of imperviousness to non-stateactors, influence hierarchies within networks,and the sources of power and legitimacy. Ouranalysis, however, only provides the first step inunderstanding the dynamics of field overlap. Anexamination of other fields will help confirm thegeneralizability of the dimensions we havedetailed and determine whether additionalmechanisms are at work. More theoretical andempirical work is also needed to determinewhether particular types of field overlap andmechanisms are relatively more important thanothers (i.e., is there a hierarchy of mechanisms),whether fields overlap according to commonpatterns (i.e., do fields with high network over-lap always also have high frame concordance),and whether thresholds for successful leverageexist for each dimension of overlap.

Our theoretical framework provides a richnew terrain for further organizations and socialmovements research. Field overlap theory offersorganizations scholars news ways to expandtheir analyses of fields, understand the interfacewith social movements, and conceptually mapcomplex institutional structures and dynamicsthat may have previously gone unexamined.Our theory also has important implications fororganizations research because it providesgreater conceptual clarity to our understandingof exogenous shocks to organizational fields.Indeed, it may help explain large-scale or rapidsocial transformations, as change moves throughoverlapping fields in “contagion” or “wave”effects, facilitated by linked interactions acrossmultiple fields. While the NAFTA labor andenvironmental cases illuminate the importanceof field overlap mechanisms, additional casesare needed to better explore the ways in whichorganizational identities, interests, and con-straints vary across fields, as well as the impli-cations of different field logics for social action.

Field overlap theory has critical implicationsfor social movement research because it pro-vides a new framework for conceptualizingpolitical opportunity structures and movement



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success and failure. The concept of politicalopportunity structure faces serious criticism forbeing too vague and too broad (see Gamsonand Meyer 1996; Goodwin and Jasper 1999),and it is disparaged because it is not clear howactivists gauge the openness of a political oppor-tunity structure, or how their strategic choicesaffect a structure’s permeability (see Goodwinand Jasper 1999; Kingdon 1995). Our frame-work allows social movement scholars to recon-ceptualize political opportunity structures notsimply as “windows” that are randomly openedor closed to movement activists (requiring clair-voyance to detect and exploit), but rather asdynamic configurations of overlapping fieldsthat can be leveraged strategically to achievespecific policy outcomes. Political opportuni-ty structures are constituted where fields inter-lock. Key allies, powerful new frames, andresources for disadvantaged actors are found atthe intersections where structural contradic-tions are highest.

By placing strategy at the center of analysis,f ield overlap theory also offers promisingavenues for new research on movement suc-cess and failure. Success results, in large part,from activists’ ability to skillfully use leverageand broker across fields. Our analysis suggeststhat activists could improve their chances ofsuccess by looking for places where significantpenetration or overlap with other fields exists,exploiting key points of leverage, and usingstrategies that take advantage of them. Historicalcomparative cases of movement success andfailure would provide additional analytical lever-age for better understanding social movementsuccess, particularly as field overlap changesover time. Comparative social movementresearch also offers a particularly rich area forexploring how dependencies on non-state grass-roots fields can be used effectively. Becauselabor and environmentalists’ divergence in tac-tics is best explained by leaders’ perceptions oftheir strengths and ability to win their objectives(labor leaders overestimated their strength whileenvironmentalists underestimated theirs), andtheir calculation of where pressure would bemost effective, the case is quite generalizable.Future research analyzing how activists per-ceive the viability of different leverage points,and how this affects their strategic choices,would be invaluable.

The NAFTA struggle contains important les-sons for understanding the opportunities andconstraints that broader movements for equitabletrade face. Most importantly, it shows that theoutcome of the creation of trade regimes is notpredetermined. While social movements may bedisadvantaged relative to capital, the possibili-ty of establishing strong regulatory safeguardsat the international level does exist. The NAFTAcase highlights the lesson that political actionis dynamic, collective, and contingent.Structural conditions can affect preferences,increase the political access of some groupsover others, and improve the likelihood of attain-ing international policy goals. But such condi-tions neither create insurmountable constraintsnor inevitably lead to particular policy out-comes. No matter how restricted policy arenasare, or how determinative influential insideactors remain in privileging particular policyaims, outside actors can mobilize in other polit-ical arenas to agitate for changes in the distri-bution of influence in a policy arena or in therules by which policies are determined. Actorsare constrained, but not inescapably defined,by the structural conditions and social contextin which they operate.

Rhonda Evans received her PhD in sociology fromthe University of California, Berkeley in 2002, andwas a postdoctoral fellow and visiting scholar atU.C. Berkeley’s Institute for Labor and Employment.She is founder and managing director of ElmResearch and Strategy, a social science researchconsultancy that advises organizations and firmsworking in complex institutional environments. Herprimary expertise is in trade policy and corporatesocial responsibility.

Tamara Kay is assistant professor of sociology atHarvard University, and codirector of theTransnational Studies Initiative, which is based atHarvard’s Weatherhead Center for InternationalAffairs. Her work centers on the political and legalimplications of regional economic integration,transnationalism, and global governance. She recent-ly completed a book manuscript titled “NAFTA andthe Politics of Labor Transnationalism” that exam-ines NAFTA’s effects on labor transnationalism inNorth America. Her new project focuses on transna-tional relationships between economic developmentorganizations in the United States and developingcountries—particularly how they negotiate culturalissues—and the effects of different organizationalstructures and strategies on development outcomes.



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