How do Israelis and Palestinians negotiate? Word Count: 4545 1
Outline
1. Introduction2. Mediation in diplomacy3. Nature of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict4. Need for diplomatic
relations: the nature of mediation
5. Peace process in the 1990s
6. Oslo Accords; the Declaration of Principles (DOP)
7. Peace process in the 2000s
8. Ambassador or statesman as a mediator: example of Count Bernadotte
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9. US Government’s Mediation: an ideal mediator?
10. In today’s world11. Conclusion
Introduction
During the 1990s, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict underwent profound
transformations which affected the diplomatic relations between both parties and also
among other states. Other states were often the mediators who were and still are
trying to solve the dispute between Israel and Palestine. Mediators have been always
important for the Israeli-Palestine conflict. These relations often proceeded slowly,
sometimes with disruptions, sometimes even with no results, with delays and even
with small scale conflicts; in other words, an “interlocked conflict”. My purpose in
this essay will be to examine different kinds of mediators for peace in the area, but I
will mainly focus on some of the issues of mediation. A successful mediation between
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Israeli and Palestinians will depend on timing, negotiation styles and biased and
unbiased mediation. In my essay, after having explained the theory of mediation, I
will describe both sides’ interests during negotiations in the 1990s and 2000s with the
presence of mediators, particularly the United States.
Mediation in diplomacy
Mediation is an important kind of negotiation designed to promote the
settlement of a conflict. It is a multilateral process that both sides must accept in order
to facilitate the talks. Negotiations cannot be imposed on states, so mediation is
difficult and takes time. It is also essential that states involved as mediators remain
neutral.
There can be two tracks in mediation; one official meaning between states;
and the other unofficial, between private individual and NGOs. This is known in the
US as “citizen diplomacy”. In the Israeli and Palestinian Conflict, both parties are
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involved; it is a multiparty mediation in which two or more parties are trying
simultaneously to facilitate or mediate the settlement of a conflict by giving a
continuous attention to the conflict, which could possibly take several years. This
continuous involvement will build familiarity with the problem and trust. Therefore
the task of the external actors is very important. They must examine the conflict and,
by respecting the features and the interests of both disputed parties, try to de-escalate
and calm the situation. Mediators can resolve the most intractable and most
destructive conflicts; but this has not been the case for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
During several years of negotiations, if everything goes well and both
conflicted sides negotiate and accept each others, interests and demands, they will
reach the last stage of negotiations which is “the ripe moment”. But unfortunately the
ripe moment has never come in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. In any conflict the
mediation process will have its own course of development; for some conflicts,
mediation can take a few years and for others, like Israeli-Palestinian, it can take
decades and still not deliver a result. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a very special
case.
Nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
There are different views about the beginning of the Israeli-Palestinian war.
Some say that it started in 1800 with the immigration of Jews to the Palestinian part of
the Ottoman Empire. Others say that it started with the British Mandate after World
War I, and many others give the date of the establishment of the State of Israel in
1948, which the neighbouring Arab states did not recognize, as the starting point. For
decades, the relationship between Israel and Palestine has not been peaceful; strife has
caused the flight of many Palestinians, terrorism on both sides and recurrent wars. It is
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very complicated; “the result of an extreme asymmetry of power and resources
through which Israel is able to maintain and feed the vulnerability of the Palestinian
quasi-state”1. The occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) are surrounded by Israel.
Israel controls all entry points into the Territories and the Palestinian National
Authority lacks sovereignty. The asymmetric containment is very easily perceptible in
this conflict.
Jewish immigration, to the Holy Land, which had been going on since 1880,
was terminated with the foundation of the State of Israel on May 15, 1948 when the
UN suggested the creation of two states, one being Jewish and the other one Arab.
But the Arabs rejected the UN plan. When they invaded Israel, the Jews eventually
extended their territory by defeating the Arabs. Although the extension of the territory
was not permanent, conflicts between Israel and Palestine have never stopped since its
foundation and the formation of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).
To understand the situation we need to look at the background of both states
and what, exactly, they want. On the one hand the Israelis want their state to be
recognized because of the trauma of the Holocaust. On the other hand, the
Palestinians see themselves as victims of a historical process. Jewish extremists were
willing to take the land of Israel because in their minds the land was given by God. So
for them the conflict was religious. On the other side the Palestinians were willing to
get back their ancestral. The involvement of Western actors’ was unacceptable.
With a background like this, we can already understand that reaching peace
between the two countries is not easy. With the suicide bombs launched by the
Palestinians in 2001, the Israelis became convinced that the aim of the Palestinians
was to murder Jews and not only stop the occupation.
1 Tocci, N. (ed.) “The European Union, Civil Society and Conflict”. Routledge: New York. 2011: 98.
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For Palestinians it is the issue of borders and refugees that make negotiations
difficult. Since the conflict in 1948, Palestinians who left their territories (which now
became Israel’s territories) and became refugees in other territories have not been
allowed to return and, still, the government of Israel does not want them to come
back. Another issue for the Palestinians was the occupation of the West Bank and
Gaza by the Israelis who had been living under the Israeli occupation since 1967.
Until 1970, it had not been easy to solve the problems but “during the 1970’s and
1980s the formal position of the PLO began to change and in 1988, for the first time,
the PLO recognized Israel’s right to exist within the 1967 lines”2. But even after
recognition there were some problems. Israel changed its policy and strengthened its,
military thinking that maybe they could bring Palestinians to their senses. In the
1990s, Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy failed. The parties have become dependent on
third-party mediation in order to solve problems. In the following paragraph I will
discuss the process of the third party mediation in the 20th and the 21st centuries.
Need for diplomatic relations: the nature of mediation
The existence of a dialogue between states is essential. States feel the need to
enter into a dialogue and to have a diplomatic relation with other countries because
states are aware that their domestic policies are affected by everything that happens
outside.
Many different actors take part in the mediation process. Their roles depend
on their size and power. Usually big powers have influence on the political parties of
other countries parties. These facilitators, ranging from official and unofficial groups,
help to set the agenda, select negotiating parties, decide on the venue, communicate
2 Wittes, C. T. (ed.) “How Israelis and Palestinians Negotiate: A Cross-Cultural Analysis of the Oslo Peace Process” United States Institute Peace Press: Washington (D.C.). 2005: 16.
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the information from one party to another, suggest options and try to implement
agreements. “They often actively suggest, promote and help to sustain a settlement3”.
The size of the negotiating teams does not really matter. For instance the Palestinian’s
negotiating teams were often large but they could not take decisions in an easy way 4.
There is no law that governs mediators’ methods. When hostilities cease, the peace
conferences and treaties come into play. Those peace conferences and treaties are
designed to start diplomatic relations between the belligerents. Eventually, relations
and peace settlements must be accepted by both sides.
A third party should also change parties’ perceptions and so change their
political, cultural and social view. John Burton, Professor at the Centre for Analysis of
Conflict at University College London, says that “conflict resolution is much more
than getting people to the table although that may be no small feat in some
circumstances”5.
The process by which the conflict is transformed, which is also called the
conflict transformation, started first in 1974 when the Arab states declared that the
PLO was the sole representative of the Palestinian people. In the mid-1980s, King of
Jordan and the US Secretary of State George P. Schultz, attempted to mediate
between Israel and Palestine. At that time the US and Israeli governments did not
recognize the PLO, therefore, the Palestinians were represented within the Jordanian
delegation. At this meeting, Jordan was the principal mediator because it was trying to
find a way to facilitate the communication between the US, Israel and Palestine.
Eventually all the efforts failed and this was not an effective mediation. 3 Kriesberg, L. “Mediation and the Transformation of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” Journal of Peace Research, SAGE publications: Oslo. 2001: 378. Accessed on 20th March 2014 http://jpr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/38/3/373 4 Wittes, C. T. (ed.) “How Israelis and Palestinians Negotiate: A Cross-Cultural Analysis of the Oslo Peace Process” United States Institute Peace Press: Washington (D.C.). 2005: 57.5 Sandole, D.J.D. “John Burton’s Contribution to Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: A Personal View” The International Journal of Peace Studies.
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Peace process in the 1990s
During the 1990s the peace process between Israel and Palestine was both
good and bad. William B. Quandt, who was actively involved in the negotiations for
peace in this region, describes it as a “roller coaster”6.
It was not until the early 1990s that substantial progress towards the formal
conclusion of peace treaties was achieved within the region. In October 1991, a
Middle East Peace Conference was held in Madrid, where Israelis, Syrians,
Palestinians and the US met in order to talk about driving the Iraqi forces from
Kuwait. Additionally the US government sought to initiate peace negotiations
between the Israeli government and the Arab governments, including the Palestinians.
But this was demanding participation in the coalition opposing President Saddam
Hussein, so the Palestinians were not willing to join. The Palestine Liberation
Organization7 (PLO) was therefore isolated.
Oslo I Accords; the Declaration of Principles (DOP)
When Rabin8 was elected in 1992 as the new Prime Minister of Israel, the
economy of Israel was not doing well. Costs were high and after the fall of Soviet
Union more and more Jews were immigrating to Israel for economic reasons. Rabin
also knew the importance of the “mutual recognition of other’s nationhood and
6 Wittes, T.C. “How Israelis and Palestinians Negotiate: A Cross-Cultural Analyses of the Oslo Peace Process” 2005: 13. 7 Palestine Liberation Organization founded in 1964 as a Palestinian nationalist umbrella organization dedicated to establish an independent Palestinian state. (Intelligence Research Program: https://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/plo.htm Accesses the 31st of March) 8 Yitzhak Rabin (1922-1995, Israeli politician, statesman, general. He was the 5th Prime Minister of Israel serving two terms; 1974-1977 and 1992-1995. (Encyclopaedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/487972/Yitzhak-Rabin , Accessed on 29th of March 2014)
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humanity”9; in other words political recognition and the acknowledgement of the
other parties’ legitimacy. So he concluded that a new approach to peacekeeping was
necessary and he based his policy on the principle of separation between Jews and
others. The result of this attempt was the Oslo I Accords, officially called the
Declaration of Principles (DOP)10 in Interim Self-Government Arrangements, which
started the 13th of September in 1993. The Accords were mediated by the US and also
by the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Johan Jorgen Holst11. At the beginning, this was
quite successful. For the first time, PLO President Yasser Arafat12 and Rabin shook
hands in the White House at the conclusion of the Accord. This hand shake was the
symbol of a mutual recognition between of the PLO and the Israeli State and was one
transformation of the conflict.
This first face-to-face agreement between the belligerents was an attempt to
set up a framework that would lead to a resolution and it made the world think that, at
last, peace was achieved in the Middle-East. But people were not happy in the
Middle-East. Some Palestinians and Israelis denounced the recognition and saw this
hand shake as a sign of weakness in their leaders. But this bilateral agreement was a
very important step; they agreed that there would be no dwelling on past grievances,
and from this point forward pre-negotiations and negotiations could easily take place.
9 Kelman, H.C. “Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation: A Social-Psychological Perspective” p16. http://books.google.be/books?hl=tr&lr=&id=wOo8PiX8PWMC&oi=fnd&pg=PA111&dq=Kelman,+H.C.+%E2%80%9CConflict+Resolution+and+Reconciliation:+A+Social-Psychological+Perspective&ots=-aS00HXChR&sig=luXWCw4h2xw4h-dKUZjExSx3LYE#v=onepage&q=Kelman%2C%20H.C.%20%E2%80%9CConflict%20Resolution%20and%20Reconciliation%3A%20A%20Social-Psychological%20Perspective&f=false 10 The Declaration of Principle was the main agreement signed between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation in 1993. ( Text, 1993 Declaration of Principles, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1682727.stm , Accessed on 31st of March 2014) 11 Johan Jorgen Holst (1937-1994) was a Norwegian politician, Prime Minister of Defence from 1937 to 1989 and from 1991 to 1993. He became Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1993 and remained until his death. He was very much involved in the peace process and he is best known for his involvement with the Oslo Accords. (Rothschild, E. “Obituary: Johan Jorgen Holst” The Independent. 14th of January 1994. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/obituary-johan-jorgen-holst-1399830.html , Accessed on 31st of March) 12 Yasser Arafat (1929-2004), was the chairman of the PLO and president of the Palestinian National Authority. (Jewish Virtual Library: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/biography/arafat.html , Accessed on 31st of March 2014)
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The acceptance and the recognition of the enemy and the start of a dialogue was an
important feature in conflict transformation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts in the
1990s. Within three tears, the Palestinians were going to get 75 percent of the West
Bank territory and the Israeli troops were going to leave most Palestinians cities and
towns.
The agreement (Oslo I) was going to last for a five-year interim period. During
this period, a permanent agreement was going to be signed by the parties. In 1995, the
Oslo I Accord was followed by Oslo II and both sides treated each other like partners
and met, more or less, their political needs. In September 1995, Rabin, Arafat and
Peres met again in the White House to sign an Interim Agreement on the West Bank
and Gaza Strip which was called Oslo II. But, unfortunately, Rabin was assassinated
by an extremist Israeli in November 1995. With Benjamin Netanyahu13 elected
President in 1996 the process regressed. None of the agreements made before were
executed and new resolutions started to take place. The reason given was that the PLO
had been disorganized and unprofessional in its interim management of Palestinian
affairs.
In reality there was a ‘double-minority aspect to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. Both Israel and Palestine were feeling disadvantaged and weak, which
affected the final-status talks. Israel was disadvantaged because it was surrounded by
the Arab countries. On the other side, Palestinians were feeling weaker because of the
military, economic and territorial power of Israel. We can already understand from
this that the mediators had high obstacles to overcome during the negotiations where
the issues were too complex and difficult to enable any agreement to be reached. 13 Benjamin Netanyahu (1949) is the current Prime Minister of Israel. In 1996 became the 13 th Prime Minister of the State of Israel and served until the May 1999 elections when Labor Party Ehud Barak won the premiership. During his term, he signed the Hebron and Wye Accords advancing the peace process with the Palestinians. (Jewish Virtual Library https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/biography/netanyahu.html , Accessed on 1st of March 2014)
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The city of Jerusalem is one of the toughest issues and at that time it was
agreed to be divide it into boroughs, with “each borough enjoying significant
autonomy under a roof municipality. Arab residents within Israeli borders could be
citizens of the Palestinian state”14. Today, the status of Jerusalem is still one of the
core issues in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict just like it was in the 1990s. Both
partners claim that Jerusalem is their capital. For that reason this ancient city is not
recognized internationally. Israel maintains its governmental institutions in Jerusalem
and Palestine anticipates having Jerusalem as its seat of power. Therefore the city
hosts no foreign embassies.
In 1997, with the Hebron Agreement, both sides agreed on the steps for Israeli
troop redeployment from Hebron and other parts of the West Bank. However, with
the agreement of the American mediators, this deployment was delayed several times.
“Netanyahu insisted that the extent of these withdrawals would be determined
exclusively by Israel. Palestinians insisted that they should have a voice in how much
territory would be relinquished”15. Many withdrawals were delayed. The Israelis
argued that the Palestinians had violated the terms of Oslo II which, in reality, had
never been realised because of the assassination of Rabin.
In October 1998, the Wye River Negotiations took place. During these
negotiations, frustrations arose on both sides. The Israelis felt that the Palestinians
were not taking their security responsibilities seriously, while the Palestinians felt that
the Israelis were not willing to withdraw from the occupied Palestinian cities.
Eventually,
14 Wittes, C. T. (ed.) “How Israelis and Palestinians Negotiate: A Cross-Cultural Analysis of the Oslo Peace Process” United States Institute Peace Press: Washington (D.C.). 2005: 27. 15 Wittes, C. T. (ed.) “How Israelis and Palestinians Negotiate: A Cross-Cultural Analysis of the Oslo Peace Process” United States Institute Peace Press: Washington (D.C.). 2005: 29.
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“President Clinton16 began to show signs of frustration with the stalled
negotiations and by early 1998 was pressing for a clear Israeli commitment to
withdrawal from an additional 13 percent of the occupied Palestinian
territories. The talks were difficult and Clinton’s engagement was episodic,
but in the end a deal was struck”17.
Despite America’s mediation efforts, Netanyahu refused to go further.
In 1999, Ehud Barak18 became the Prime Minister of Israel. He had completely
ignored Arafat during the first year because Arafat could not carry out the
withdrawals that had been agreed upon in the Wye River Accord, thinking that it
would have cost him politically.
Peace process in the 2000s
In spring 2000, the Stockholm talks did not solve the problems. Both sides
were not ready to take decisions, negotiate and prepare for the summit. They needed
more secret talks with other parties, particularly with Clinton. Only in mid-July,
President Clinton organized a summit meeting for Barak and Arafat at Camp David
and this meeting was called ‘Camp David II’19.
“According to most accounts, Barak and Arafat did not interact very much at
the summit. Instead, Barak submitted his positions to Clinton, who then
conveyed them to a remarkably passive and unresponsive manner to Arafat
who was being reluctant to attend, fearing that the talks might fail and that he
16 Bill Clinton (1946) served from 1993 to 2001 as the 42nd President of the US. (The White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/williamjclinton Accessed on 1st March 2014)17 Wittes, C. T. (ed.) “How Israelis and Palestinians Negotiate: A Cross-Cultural Analysis of the Oslo Peace Process” United States Institute Peace Press: Washington (D.C.). 2005: 30. 18 Ehud Barak (1942) served as Prime Minister from 1999 to 2001 as the leader of the Labor Party. (Jewish Virtual Library, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/biography/barak.html Accessed on 21st of March 2014)19 Camp David II was a summit meeting between US President Bill Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, and Palestinian Authority Chairman. (The Camp David Papers, http://www.palestine-studies.com/files/pdf/jps/2759.pdf Accessed 1st of April 2014)
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would be blamed. Barak did offer to withdraw conditionally from some 90
percent of the West Bank and Gaza; there were serious discussions but no
agreement, about refugees and Jerusalem; and Israel seemed prepared to
accept the idea of an independent Palestinian state, provided it remained
essentially demilitarized”20.
This was also an example of the asymmetric containment. In 2009, the Prime Minister
Netanyahu was willing to recognize the Palestinian, state only if it is demilitarized
and without having control over its airspace. This offer by Israel clearly shows its
superiority by the imposed parameters just like the demilitarization. Eventually the
talks failed and Clinton blamed Arafat more than Barak because of his reluctance to
negotiate.
After Ehud Barak, Ariel Sharon21 was elected in 1999. He had a very negative
view of Arafat and he had not been a partner in peace talks. He was a Prime
Minister who had taken firm and uncompromising position on some policies.
During the period of 2000-2003, the negotiations were not succeeding. Even
Israel occupied more parts of West Bank after some Palestinian suicidal
bombs in 2001 and in 2002 which mostly happened in Jerusalem.
By early, the Quartet on the Middle-East (United-States, the European Union,
Russia and the United Nations) proposed a plan to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict: the ‘Roadmap for peace’22. The principles of the plan were drafted by U.S.
Foreign Service Officer Donald Blome. America called for an independent Palestinian
20 Wittes, C. T. (ed.) “How Israelis and Palestinians Negotiate: A Cross-Cultural Analysis of the Oslo Peace Process” United States Institute Peace Press: Washington (D.C.). 2005: 33.21 Ariel Sharon (1928-2014) was an Israeli statesman, former Prime Minister. He was appointed in 1998 Foreign Minister and headed the permanent status negotiations with the Palestinian Authority. In 2001 he was elected Prime Minister. (Jewish Virtual Library https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/biography/sharon.html Accessed 1st of April)22 What is the “road map”? http://www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/middle-east-road-map-peace/p7738#p1
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state living side by side with Israel in peace. The plan was to bring an end to violence.
But the project had a deadlock and the plan was never implemented.
Other than US, European Union supports civil society in the field of conflict
transformation. This engagement which came quite late, in 2000 and 2005, first
emerged in the first years of the Oslo peace process which took place between 1993
and 2000. It is called the Partnership for Peace Programme and the European
Neighbourhood Policy in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT).
Despite EU’s being the largest donor in the OPT, US plays a much more influence on
the peace process because of her influential power. EU-funded programmes
supporting civil society involvement in conflict transformation is important. But
overall the effectiveness of US and EU is limited. Both Palestinians and Israelis could
use the EU funds to support local activities, for youth activities, cultural actions, for
calls relating to human rights and so forth. In brief, the EU has been active on issues
regarding conflict transformation but it was not enough to solve the general problem.
Many NGOs are also active in the region and their activities ranging from
“legal protection, human rights protection and awareness-raising to civic education,
democratization, information and peace promotion activities, as well as a few research
centres dealing with advocacy”23. Other than NGOs some organizations are lobbying
to transform the conflict into a securitized and a peaceful situation, as well as
workshop organized between both parties. It is said that small teams who meet
repeatedly can easily build a common language and a common view. But many of
these groups were constituted of US citizens of Palestinian and Jews and also Israeli
Palestinians. There is again an asymmetry of the participants’ views. Palestinians
living in Israel are feeling discriminated but in the same time they do not want to
23 Tocci, N. (ed.) “The European Union, Civil Society and Conflict”. Routledge: New York. 2011: 101.
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move to a separate Palestinian state because of its unrecognized statehood in the
international scope. Additionally those Israeli Palestinians are considered Israelis
living in a county with Israelis majority in Israel. Although the discrimination, they
enjoy all rights as being Israeli citizens.
Ambassador or statesman as a mediator: example of Count Bernadotte
A conflict between the two states could be solved by high-level official who
are nominated by the State in order to engage discussions between the conflicted
parties, mediate and act as a go-between. This occurred with Count Bernadotte24
appointed “United Nations Mediator in Palestine” in 1948. He acted in this way
between Israel and certain Arab states when he was Swedish Ambassador to Moscow.
It is possible that states agree for their ambassador to work in negotiations for another
state. Bernadotte laid the groundwork for the United Nations Relief (UNRWA)25 and
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. At the end there were two
proposals which came from him because the first one was unsuccessful and the
second one needed few changes and suggestions. He proposed two independent states
and had several premises. In his statement he said that peace was essential in this
region and for the restoration of Arab and Jew states. One of his proposals was
24 Count Folke Bernadotte was a Swedish diplomat appointed as mediator in the Israeli-Arab war by the UN. He furthered two plans for resolution of the conflict that were pro-Arab and he was assassinated by the LEHI group (fighters for the Freedom of Israel, a militant Zionist group). Zionism and Israel: Encyclopaedic Dictionary. http://www.zionism-israel.com/dic/Bernadotte_Plan.htm (Accessed 28th of March 2014) 25UNRWA established following the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1948 by the United Nations General Assembly resolution 302 to carry out human development, to provide jobs on public works projects and direct relief for 652,000 Arabs who fled or were expelled from Israel during the fighting that followed the end of the British mandate over Palestine. (UNRWA http://www.unrwa.org/palestine-refugees Accessed 1st of April 2014)
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pointing out that the boundaries should be fixed by the parties concerned and if that is
not possible than the United Nations must do it. Among his proposals, another one
about the Palestinian refugees willing to return or not to their homes was significant:
“Adherence to the principle of geographical homogeneity and integration,
which should be the major objective of the boundary arrangements, should
apply equally to Arab and Jewish territories, whose frontiers should not
therefore, be rigidly controlled by the territorial arrangements envisaged in the
resolution of 29 November”26.
This activity by Bernadotte is a contribution of a state to the maintenance of the
diplomatic dialogue and facilitation of diplomatic arrangements. It is perhaps a small
step and unsuccessful at the end but it shows how states are involved in a dispute
between two states which are far away from them. In order to make international
diplomacy more effective, states must be involved by sending their diplomats or
giving tasks to their statesman.
During two decades of mediation, the active mediator role was played by US
government. The US government was seen in this conflict as having its own interests
and taking side. Despite of all their bias or interest, Americans were regarded as
competent and trustworthy actors in the peace-making process therefore the US
government was the choice of the adversaries in the Middle-East. Moreover, just
being a big power is not enough because they can not impose an agreement but can
only propose formulas.
US Government’s Mediation: an ideal mediator?
26 Jewish Virtual Library https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/bernplan.html
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The ideal mediator is a facilitator who does not take any sides and makes sure
that the process and all necessary preparations are complete. Mediators should restrict
pressure, aggression and intimidation and should remain as a neutral third party who
facilitates discussions between the disputed parties. They need to have good speaking
and listening skills. Another important fact is to respect the ripe moment. Parties
resolve their conflict only when they are ready to do so and in this issue, persuasion is
important. Ripeness is a necessary condition but not sufficient.
The United States took an important role during the negotiations. As a player,
the US was sometimes pushing the parties forward and sometimes backward. Some
believe that the United States sponsors the injustices and inequities of the process. If
we look at the overall situation and results, Israel gets certainly what he wants and
most importantly the additional military aid and support from the United States.
During all the years of negotiations from 1990 until 2000, Israel had been trying to
“prolong its military occupation and settlement practices in Palestine”27. Supposedly
the liberal Israelis were looking for peace settlement and peace keeping. But when
they were asked about the military occupation of the annexation of Jerusalem or Gaza,
there were no answers coming from the Israeli government. Saeb Ereikat28, a
Palestinian chief negotiator who participated in the sets of talks said;
“I wouldn’t call the Washington track negotiations. It was a learning process
for us. We were a group who was set up to be used. The PLO wanted us to be
the bridge for them to cross towards recognition with Israel and the U.S.
27 Said, E.W. “The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and After” Pantheon Books: New York. 2000: 3. 28 Saeb Muhammed Salih Erekat (1955) is the Palestinian Chief Negotiator of the PLO Steering and Monitoring Committee until 2011. He negotiated the Oslo Accords with Israel and remained chief negotiator from 1995 until 2003 when he resigned in protest from the Palestinian government. (Palestinian biographies, http://lawrenceofcyberia.blogs.com/palestinian_biographies/saeb-erekat-biography-1.html , Accessed 1st of April 2014)
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Shamir wanted to use us against the PLO. The Americans wanted to test our
ability to be leaders or not. I don’t think anybody took us as negotiators”29.
For some, the US involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was a solution and for
others it was a complication. Usually the United States has played the role of a
mediator but not always with skill or success. The US could be a good mediator if
they hadn’t taken a stand. Because of the Israeli’s Diasporas, US never used its
economic and political power against Israel. Its contribution to the formation of the
State of Israel was an important fact which caused the main difficulty during the
negotiations. Because over the last 60 years there have been injustices towards
Palestinians, the PLO on the Palestinian side and the political entities tend to resort to
violence in order to correct the wrong
Edward W. Said, in his book called The End of Peace Process makes good
analyses on the U.S. government’s mediation. He says;
“Since the signing of the Oslo peace accords in September 1993 an
extraordinary disparity has developed between the rhetoric and the actualities
of that peace. Because the United States, the world’s only superpower, has
been the sponsor and the keeper of the “peace process,” as it has come to be
known, the arrangements agreed to by Yasir Arafat and three Israeli prime
ministers (Rabin, Peres, Netanyahu) have become synonymous with “peace,”
the only game in town, and the real problems on the ground either papers over
or ignored.”30
In today’s world
29 Wittes, C. T. (ed.) “How Israelis and Palestinians Negotiate: A Cross-Cultural Analysis of the Oslo Peace Process” United States Institute Peace Press: Washington (D.C.). 2005: 55.30 Said, E.W. “The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and After” Pantheon Books: New York. 2000: 312.
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By 2008, negotiations between Israel and Palestine started to fall apart
and today are still the same. Today, with the recent news we can see that
Palestinians are starting having a new strategy: approaching the international
organizations and taking Palestinians to the United Nations. Mahmud Abbas,
the President of the State of Palestine since 2005, increased his favorability
numbers; “support for his plan reached 81 percent in the West Bank and 86
percent in Gaza”31. Certainly this is a major move outside the Oslo parameters.
For that reason, Israel is delaying to release the Palestinian prisoners. It looks
like another blocked track of negotiations. The more Palestinians will expose
themselves in the international scope and the more Israelis will feel threatened.
It seems like there is no solution today just like the previous years.
Conclusion
It has been almost 70 years that Palestinians lost their country and that the
conflict started between the two states. All the treaties and all the talks still hadn’t
brought peace in this part of the Middle-East. No single mediating method was
completely adequate. Only Oslo brought one new thing which was the official
admission by the Israeli Prime Minister (Rabin) that there was a “Palestinian people
(approximately 7.5 million in number) with its own representative”32. Nothing was
said about the years of occupation of Palestine and about the Palestinian refugees who
were looking to come back to their homes in the Israeli territories.
31 Rumley, G. “Suicide by Statehood: Palestine’s push for international recognition is tanking John Kerry’s peace talks. Was this Abbas’s plan all along?” FP news. April, 2, 2014.http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/04/02/palestine_abbas_israel_statehood_peacetalks Accessed the 2nd of April 2014. 32 Said, E.W. “The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and After” Pantheon Books: New York. 2000: 313.
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Making and building peace in such protracted conflicts is not easy. In order to
solve the problems, both countries should look into the dispute from each other’s
perspective. Despite all they have managed to negotiate some agreements but it took
decades and mediators failed more often than they succeeded. Nonetheless nothing
had been solved. None of the sides dealt with the other’s concerns and constraints.
But diplomacy and mediation by external interveners play an important role and
facilitate the negotiation process. Diplomats are trained for this and they need a broad
conception of the issue in order to have the necessary approaches. Most importantly
unbiased mediation is the core.
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