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HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004
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HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

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Page 1: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

HoneyPots

Malware Class Presentation

Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen

November 2nd 2004

Page 2: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

ProblemsWhy?

Page 3: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Problems (2)

• The Internet security is hard– New attacks every day– Our computers are static targets

• What should we do?• The more you know about your enemy, the better

you can protect yourself

• Fake target?

Page 4: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Solutions? Air Attack

Real Fake

A Detected….

Page 5: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Honeypots?

• Fake Target

• Collect Infomation

Page 6: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Agenda

• Honeypots: an whitepaper

• Honeyd

• Honeynet

• Discussion

Page 7: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

History of Honeypots

• 1990/1991 The Cuckoo’s Egg and Evening with Berferd

• 1997 - Deception Toolkit• 1998 - CyberCop Sting• 1998 - NetFacade (and Snort)• 1998 - BackOfficer Friendly• 1999 - Formation of the Honeynet Project• 2001 - Worms captured

Page 8: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Definition

A honeypot is an information system resource whose value lies in unauthorized or illicit

use of that resource.• Has no production value; anything going to/from a

honeypot is likely a probe, attack or compromise• Used for monitoring, detecting and analyzing attacks• Does not solve a specific problem. Instead, they are

a highly flexible tool with different applications to security.

Page 9: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Classification

• By level of interaction• High• Low• Middle?

• By Implementation• Virtual• Physical

• By purpose• Production• Research

Page 10: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Level of Interaction

• Low Interaction• Simulates some aspects of the system• Easy to deploy, minimal risk• Limited Information• Honeyd

• High Interaction• Simulates all aspects of the OS: real systems• Can be compromised completely, higher risk• More Information• Honeynet

Page 11: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Level of Interaction

Operating system

Fake D

aemon

Disk

Other local resource

Low

Medium

High

Page 12: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Physical V.S. Virtual Honeypots

• Two types– Physical

• Real machines• Own IP Addresses• Often high-interactive

– Virtual• Simulated by other machines that:

– Respond to the traffic sent to the honeypots– May simulate a lot of (different) virtual honeypots at the

same time

Page 13: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

HoneyPot A

Gateway

Attackers

Attack Data

How do HPs work?Prevent

DetectResponse

Monitor

No connection

Page 14: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Production HPs: Protect the systems

• Prevention• Keeping the bad guys out

• not effective prevention mechanisms.

• Deception, Deterence, Decoys do NOT work against automated attacks: worms, auto-rooters, mass-rooters

• Detection• Detecting the burglar when he breaks in.

• Great work

• Response• Can easily be pulled offline

• Little to no data pollution

Page 15: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Research HPs: gathering information

• Collect compact amounts of high value information

• Discover new Tools and Tactics

• Understand Motives, Behavior, and Organization

• Develop Analysis and Forensic Skills

• HONEYNET?

Page 16: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Building your HoneyPots

• Specifying Goals

• Selecting the implementation strategies• Types, Number, Locations and Deployment    

• Implementing Data Capture

• Logging and managing data

• Mitigating Risk

• Mitigating Fingerprint

Page 17: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Location of Honeypots

• In front of the firewall

• Demilitarized Zone

• Behind the firewall (Intranet)

Page 18: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Capturing Information

• Host based:• Keystrokes

• Syslog

• Network based:• Firewall

• Sniffer

• IP not resolve name

Page 19: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Logging and Managing Data• Logging

architecture

• Managing data

Page 20: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Maintaining Honeypots

• Detection and Alert

• Response

• Data Analysis

• Update

Page 21: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Honeyd: A Virtual Honeypot Framework

By Zhanxiang HuangNovember 2nd, 2004

Page 22: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Physical V.S. Virtual Honeypots

PH (Real machines, NICs, typically high-interaction) High maintenance cost; Impractical for large address spaces;

VH (Simulated by other machines) Multiple virtual services and VMs on one

machine; Typically it only simulate network level

interactions, but still able to capture intrusion attempts;

Page 23: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

What is Honeyd?

HoneydHoneyd: A virtual honeypot application, which allows us to create thousands of IP addresses with virtual machines and corresponding network services.

Written by Neil Provos available at http://www.honeyd.org/

Page 24: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

What can honeyd do?

Simulates operating systems at TCP/IP stack level, supporting TCP/UDP/ICMP;

Support arbitrary services;

Simulate arbitrary network topologies;

Support tunneling and redirecting net traffic;

Page 25: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Illustration Simple

Page 26: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.
Page 27: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

How it attracts worms?

Honey!~ But technically they need to advertise themselves;

Three methods: Create special routes; Proxy ARP; Network tunnels.

Page 28: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

How it works?

routing

routing

Packet Dispatcher

TCP UDP ICMP

Services

PersonalityEngine

ConfigurationDataBase

Network

Page 29: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Why Personality Engine? To fool fingerprinting tools

Uses fingerprint databases by Nmap, for TCP, UDP Xprobe, for ICMP

Introduces changes to the headers of every outgoing packet before sent to the network

Page 30: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Why Routing topology? Simulates virtual network topologies;

Some honeypots are also configured as routers

Latency and loss rate for each edge is configured;

Support network tunneling and traffic redirection;

Page 31: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.
Page 32: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Why Redirect Connection?

:D

Page 33: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

How to Configure?

Each virtual honeypot is configured with a template.

Commands: Create: Creates a new template Set:

Assign personality (fingerprint database) to a template Specify default behavior of network protocols

Block: All packets dropped Reset: All ports closed by default Open: All ports open by default

Add: Specify available services Proxy: Used for connection forwarding

Bind: Assign template to specific IP address

Page 34: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Show Time!~ Real Demo by Zhanxiang

This simplified configuration was used with attract the MSBlast worm over the Internet:

create default set default personality "Windows XPPro" add default tcp port 135 open add default tcp port 4444 "/bin/shscripts/WormCatcher.sh $ipsrc $ipdst" set default tcp action block set default udp action block

Page 35: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Applications

Worm detection and blocking Combine with automated its post-

processing tools, like NIDS signature generation tool honeycomb[1];

Network decoys Spam Prevention

Page 36: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Simulation Results of Anti-Worm

Page 37: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

How real is it?

Traceroute to a virtual host Path of the hosts according to the configuration Latency measured double the one specified

Correct because packets have to travel each link twice

Fingerprinting to the Router personality

Nmap and Xprobe detected Cisco router NetBSD personality

Nmap detected NetBSD Xprobe listed a number of possibilities including

NetBSD

Page 38: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Risks?

Some smart worms may wake up! The honeyd will be snubbed;

We might become accessary if our honeyd is compromised and used as bounce;

Page 39: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Are attackers nuts?

In theory: Remote actions Local actions Cloaking issues Breaking the Matrix

Practical ways: layer 2 Sebek-based

Honeypots Fake AP Bait and Switch

Honeypots

(From securityfocus paper on Sep. 28, 2004 : “Defeating Honeypots: Network Issues”, by Laurent Oudot and Thorsten Holz)http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1803

Page 40: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Questions?

Page 41: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Honeynet

By Xiang Yin

November 2nd, 2004

Page 42: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

What is a Honeynet

• High-interaction honeypot designed to:– capture in-depth information– learn who would like to use your

system without your permission for their own ends

• Its an architecture, not a product or software. • Populate with live systems.• Can look like an actual production system

Page 43: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

What is a Honeynet

• Once compromised, data is collected to learn the tools, tactics, and motives of the blackhat community.

• Information has different value to different organizations.– Learn vulnerabilities– Develop response plans

Page 44: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

What’s The Difference?

• Honeypots use known vulnerabilities to lure attack.– Configure a single system with special software or system

emulations

– Want to find out actively who is attacking the system

• Honeynets are networks open to attack– Often use default installations of system software

– Behind a firewall

– Rather they mess up the Honeynet than your production system

Page 45: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

How it works

• A highly controlled network where every packet entering or leaving is monitored, captured, and analyzed.

• Any traffic entering or leaving the Honeynet is suspect by nature.

Page 46: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Diagram of Honeynet

Page 47: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Diagram of Honeynet

Page 48: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Data Control

• Containment of activity– Mitigate risks– Freedom vs. risk

• Multiple mechanisms – layers– Counting outbound connections– Intrusion prevention gateways– Bandwidth restrictions

• Fail closed!• Minimize risk, but not eliminate!

Page 49: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Data Control

Internet

Honeywall

Honeypot

Honeypot

No Restrictions

Connections Limited Packet Scrubbed

Page 50: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Data Capture

• This is the reason for setting up a honeynet.• Hidden kernel module that captures all activity

– monitoring and logging

• Challenge: encryption– Activities over encrypted channels (IPSec, SSH, SSL, etc)

• Multiple layers of data capture– Firewall layer, network layer, system layer

• Minimize the ability of attackers to detect – Make as few modifications as possible – Store data on a secured remote system– Also, reduce risk but not eliminate!

Page 51: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Data Analysis

• All activity within Honeynet is suspicious

• 30 minutes of blackhat activity is about 30 to 40 work hours of data analysis

• Less than 10 MB of logging per 24 hours is typical.

Page 52: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Data Collection

Page 53: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Honeynet – Gen I

Page 54: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Honeynet – Gen I

• Counts the number of outbound connections.

• Systems initiate a certain number of outbound connections and then block any further links once the limit is met.

• Useful for blocking denial of service attacks scans, or other malicious activity

• But, gives attacker more room to attack.

Page 55: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Honeynet – Gen II

Page 56: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Honeynet – Gen II

• Layer-two bridging device (called the honeynet sensor) isolates and contains systems in the honeynet.

• Easier to Deploy– Both Data Control and Data Capture on the same system.

• Harder to Detect– Identify activity as opposed to counting connections.– Modify packets instead of blocking.

Page 57: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Data Control – Gen II

• Implemented on gateway

• Connection counting (with IPTables)SCALE="day"TCPRATE="15"UDPRATE="20"ICMPRATE="50"OTHERRATE="15"

• NIPS (Network Intrusion Prevention System) – Works with only known attacks– Modify and disable detected outbound attacks instead of blocking

them– Snort-inline

Page 58: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.
Page 59: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Data Control - Snort-Inline

alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 53 (msg:"DNS EXPLOIT named";flags: A+;

content:"|CD80 E8D7 FFFFFF|/bin/sh"; replace:"|0000 E8D7 FFFFFF|/ben/sh";)

Page 60: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Data capture elements

• Honeynet Project has developed kernel modules to insert in target systems.

• These capture all the attacker's activities, such as encrypted keystrokes.

• The IDS gateway captures all the data and dump the data generated by the attackers without letting attacker know.

• multiple layers of data capture help ensure that they gain a clear perspective of the attacker's activities.

Page 61: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Data capture elements

• Layer 1: the firewall log– packet-filtering mechanism to block outbound connections

once a connection limit is met.

• Layer 2: network traffic– The IDS gateway that identifies and blocks attacks passively

sniffs every packet and its full payload on the network.

• layer 3: system activity– Capturing the attacker's keystrokes and activity on the

system.

Page 62: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Virtual Honeynets

• All the elements of a Honeynet combined on a single physical system. Accomplished by running multiple instances of operating systems simultaneously. Examples include VMware and User Mode Linux. Virtual Honeynets can support both GenI and GenII technologies.

Page 63: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Issues

• High complexity. – Require extensive resources and manpower to properly

maintain.

• High risk– Detection and anti-honeynet technologies have been

introduced.

– Can be used to attack or harm other non-Honeynet systems.

• Legal issues– Privacy, Entrapment, Liability

Page 64: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Honeypots’ Issues

Discussion

Page 65: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Honeypot Advantages

• High Data Value• Small Data

• Low Resource Cost• Weak or Retired system

• Simple Concept, Flexible Implementation

• Return on Investment• Proof of Effectiveness

• Catch new attacks

Page 66: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Disadvantages

• Narrow Field of View

• Fingerprinting

• Risks?• If being detected?

• If being compromised?

• If being mis-configured?

Page 67: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Mitigrating Risks?

• Being Detected?• Anyway honeypots can be detected

• Modifying is a good solution, but not perfect

• Fingerprinting?

• Being Exploited?

Page 68: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Building Honeypots for specific purpose?

• Bigger fish Specific trap?

Page 69: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Legal Issues

• Privacy• No single statue concerning privacy

– Electronic Communication Privacy Act

– Federal Wiretap Statute

– The Pen/Trap Statute

• Entrapment• Used only to defendant to avoid conviction• Applies only to law enforcement?

• Liability• If a Honeynet system is used to attack or damage other non-

honeynet system?

Page 70: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

More Information about Legal Issues

• Computer Crime Section

• E-Mail: [email protected]

• Computer Crime Section’s Web page:

Page 71: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Conclusion

• Honeypots are not a solution, they are a flexible tool with different applications to security.

• Primary value in detection and information gathering.

• Just the beginning for honeypots.

Page 72: HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2 nd 2004.

Worm propagation speed sim Simulate worm spreading Parameters

i(t): Fraction of infected hosts s(t): Fraction of susceptible hosts r(t): Fraction of immunized hosts β: Worm contact rate γ: Immunization rate

Worm propagation formulas ds/dt = − β * i(t) *s(t) di/dt = βi * (t) * s(t) − γ * i(t) dr/dt = γ * i(t)