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Øystein Gullvåg Holter''What's in it for Men?'': Old Question, New Data

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‘‘What’s in it for Men?’’:Old Question, New Data

Øystein Gullvag Holter 1

Abstract

This article examines the question of what men win or lose by increased genderequality, in terms of well-being and health, combining a new macro data set with

existing studies. A database was created for examining gender equality variables

and potential health effects, using a sample of eighty-one European countries and

the United States. The results indicate more positive effects for men than usually

assumed. They also imply that men’s contribution to gender equality has been under-

estimated. Some patterns, like fertility, differ between Europe and the United States,

and this article discusses different gender equality models. Also, the effects of genderequality differ for different groups of men, and this article discusses men who feel they

‘‘lose out.’’ Although the data concern associations, questions of causality are also

raised, and the last part of this article presents a tentative explanatory model that

includes structural factors as well as men and masculinity changes.

Keywords

gender equality, health, quality of life

Introduction

Does gender equality work—for men?1 Gender equality involves men as well as

women (see, e.g., Kimmel 2000; Kimmel et al. 2004). However, its effects are dis-

puted. Gender equality may have positive effects for men as well as for women.

1 Centre for Gender Research, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway

Corresponding Author:

Øystein Gullvag Holter, Centre for Gender Research, University of Oslo, Postboks 1040 Blindern, 0315

Oslo, Norway.

Email: [email protected]

Men and Masculinities

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But it is also possible that it works negatively for men, for example, by increasing

men’s depression and aggression.

This question has been debated in gender studies for a long time, with threemain answers. In the negative effects view, men are negatively affected by gender

equality. Men will lose their former status and privileges. Sharing housework and

care is seen as detrimental for men’s careers. Also, gender equality is sometimes

seen as a zero sum game where men lose what women gain. Men’s interests are

usually conceived as linked to gender inequality, and men are often portrayed as

opponents of women (Hirdmann 1988).

In the positive effects view, gender equality is mainly beneficial for men. Men and

women have a common interest in opposing patriarchy and increasing gender equal-

ity (Bennett 2006). Inequality is not really positive for men. In relatively gender equal countries, this has now found its way into policy documents also. ‘‘Gender

equality concerns both genders. Men’s smaller time with their children, greater

chance of accidents, overrepresentation in crime statistics and dropout from higher

education are examples that men, too, can profit from gender equality,’’ according to

a Norway parliamentary report [Noregs offentlege utgreiingar (NOU) 2008, 7, my

translation]. In the positive effects view, gender equality has benefits not just for

women, but also for men and for society at large. According to women’s empow-

erment theory, empowering women is good for society, for example, by reducing

violence (Kaya and Cook 2010). The view does not always work out, however—insome contexts, increasing gender equality can instead have mixed or negative

effects, increasing violence (Anderson 1997; McCloskey 1996).

A third mixed effects view therefore has also existed for a long time in research,

especially associated with more detailed research on men as well as better research

on gender equality. The emerging picture is one where gender equality can affect

men both positively and negatively. The effects depend on the context and may dif-

fer for different groups of men.

What was once called ‘‘the man question’’ in feminist debate (Holmgren and

Hearn 2009) has thereby gradually been widened into broader gender research thatincludes a stronger but still limited men and masculinities research field. In ten-

dency, this interdisciplinary effort has moved beyond static and monolithic categor-

izing of men. This effort started by acknowledging variation, and emphasized the

mixed effects view, with research showing that there are important benefits but

important costs too, especially in contexts of power. Different groups of men expe-

rience gender equality differently. Power and ranking between men, a homosocial

symbolic power system, and a hegemonic and fairly ‘‘invisible’’ form of power,

are three important patterns emerging in men and masculinities research (see,

e.g., Connell and Messerschmidt 2005).The research on men and masculinities has also problematized the link between

men’s ‘‘interests’’ and ‘‘experiences.’’ Men and masculinities are changing, and

men’s interests are restructured based on new experiences (see, e.g., Pease 2002).

If men’s interests mainly revolve around hegemonic masculinity or a sense of

2 Men and Masculinities








entitlement to privilege, it becomes less likely that any effect of gender equality is

experienced as good, and men’s participation for example in reducing men’s vio-

lence must be based on an ‘‘appeal to goodness’’ in men, rather than men’s interests(Kaufman 2001, 50). On the other hand, framing gender equality as a matter of inter-

est and benefits can lead to a narrow utilitarian view and to neglect of women’s

needs and concerns (NOU 2012).

Increasingly, socio-historical interpretations are combined with sociological

theories of social change and innovation in order to understand gender change. The

effects of gender equality are likely to vary according to the social context. Some

studies point to a U curve in men’s well-being, as discussed subsequently. Yet,

there is still a shortage of knowledge regarding the actual results of gender equality

and inequality. Is men’s quality of life higher or lower in contexts of relatively highgender equality, compared to low contexts? Do men become more or less violent with

increasing or lowering gender equality contexts? Does the chance of divorce rise, with

higher gender equality? This article contributes with some tentative answers.

Background

The ‘‘what’s in it for men’’ discussion regarding gender equality has a parallel in

the current research debate regarding the effects of income equality. Does income

equality benefit only the poor, or also the rich? Traditionally, in economic and social class research, income equality has been seen as a burden for the rich and

a benefit for the poor.

This view has recently been challenged by the ‘‘ spirit level ’’ argument (in the

book of the same name, Wilkinson and Pickett 2010). A society with low-income

inequality works better for all, not just for the poor. This is so because lower

income differences increase trust, improve health, and lower crime and violence.

Therefore, income equality not only has direct positive effects for the poor but also

indirect positive effects for all members of a society. Over the last decades, health

research has mapped various ills of income inequality including higher rates of mortality, cancer, and coronary heart disease. ‘‘Societies that permit large dispari-

ties in income to develop also tend to be the ones that underinvest in human capital

(e.g., education), health care, and other factors that promote health’’ (Kawachi

et al. 1997). Large income gaps are linked to a low level of social cohesion or

social capital, in this research.

This spirit level research has been criticized on a number of grounds (e.g.,

Goldthorpe 2010; de Vries 2010; O’Connell 2010), yet it does have empirical

support, and it has recently gained credit also in view of the current economic crisis

in Europe. Economists have argued that ‘‘social’’ forms of capitalism with low-to moderate-income differences run better than other forms of capitalism

(Wooldridge 2013).

How can income or gender equality arguments be tested? In the research on

effects of income distribution, countries with different degrees of income equality

Holter 3








have been compared on various social dimensions. In the Spirit level study, more geo-

graphical units were included in order to achieve more precision, especially, United

States. This method was applied and developed in the study presented in this article.It is only recently that gender equality has become sufficiently precisely mapped

for this purpose. This is due to conceptual, theoretical, and methodological advances

of gender equality research over the last decades, starting from what was called ‘‘the

status of women in society.’’ Today, gender equality research includes survey

research and indexing research as well as qualitative studies, mapping different sub-

dimensions like political, economic, and social gender equality. In some respects,

these measures are better than social class measures (or, a single variable like

income equality). Yet they are also limited.

Some of the new gender equality measures at first conflated gender equalitywith human development and gave the impression that gender equality was only

achievable in the rich world. It is only recently that a ‘‘ratio principle’’ has become

fairly standardized—indexes should only show the relative status of women com-

pared to men, not the absolute status of men and women today compared to, say, a

generation ago.

Due to the artificial overlap with rich world patterns, gender equality research

and indexing have been criticized for being ‘‘white’’ and ‘‘rich world oriented’’

(Permanyer 2010). Such problems are still at hand, and there are other problems

too, including index calculations that give the impression that we are ‘‘almostthere’’ (like the percentages of the Gender Gap Index). Further, there are limi-

tations regarding a ‘‘hetero’’ focus, a formal society focus, as well as method

problems of neo-positivism and insensitivity that can only be mentioned here.

Generally, statistics on social equality dimensions are often made from an

‘‘above’’ kind of view, they tend to generalize, and there are often reporting prob-

lems. Yet, compared to the qualitative methods predominant in gender studies,

they are important as one source of information. Today’s gender equality indexes

are mainly focused on women and on professional society, rather than men and

informal society, but they include men also, and informal measures can be added.Beyond their limitations, it is remarkable that the gender equality indexes that

have appeared over the last decade mainly give a consistent picture of the state

of gender equality around the world, according to the data presented subsequently.

Social research is offered a new background variable. It concerns the degree of

gender equality and also—on closer look—the type or form of gender equality.

The new research represents a paradigm shift compared to gender thinking

some decades ago (Kuhn [1962] 1996; Fagerberg, Mowery, and Nelson 2004). It

goes beyond the traditional paradigm where gender inequality was seen as univer-

sal and static. Instead, the results show strong historical and geographical varia-tion. The material presented below offers many examples of this variation as

well as the internal consistency of gender equality measures.

Gender equality research is important for men and masculinities studies for sev-

eral reasons. The field has for long held a profeminist orientation, but it needs









better information on actual gender equality. Four reasons can be mentioned. First,

the issues are important by themselves—for example, does gender equality

increase or decrease men’s well-being, violence, sexual satisfaction, or fertility.Second, gender equality research turns attention toward different sociocultural

contexts and structures, showing variation that challenges essentialist ideas of gen-

der. Third, it brings women more clearly into the picture, also when focusing on

men. Potentially, the analysis can bring more specific social and cultural structures

into light, for example, the ‘‘guyland’’ factor described by Kimmel (2008), asso-

ciated with increased violence and reduced health. Fourth, by comparing gender

equality and other types of equality like income equality, gender equality research

can help put two main dimensions in the men and masculinities field into focus—

the hierarchy or ranking between men as well as the ranking of men before women.However, there are limits also. Ideally, gender equality analyses could com-

pare the effects of different hierarchies, including—beyond gender and income/

class—ethnicity, sexuality, age, and functionality. We would like to include the

homosociality rate of a society, the status of children, and other important issues

for understanding gender equality in a wider context of social equality. Yet for most

of the world’s countries, solid comparable data on such issues do not yet exist.

Two important issues, brought up by new research, should be noted from the start.

First, there is the question of which men. The effects of gender equality are likely to

vary according to social class, gender hierarchy, and other divisions. Second, there isthe ‘‘in itself’’ and ‘‘for itself’’ distinction, well known in studies of social class.

Gender equality may have a major impact in men’s lives long before it becomes a

recognized matter for men. We will return to these issues later.

Method and Data

In order to investigate possible ‘‘spirit level’’ effects of gender equality including

effects on men, I created a new database, hereafter called the Gender Equality Sta-

tistics (GES) base. This base was made using open Internet statistics sources for 116geographical units, including fifty United States and thirty-one European countries

(including Russia), with data for 2010. Some of the variables of the GES base are

new and have only been consistently researched in the 2000s.

The innovative element lies in the design of the base. GES is specifically tuned

to show potential effects of gender equality. The version presented here is small

and simple, keeping to the most precise variables like the violent death rate, while

problematic variables (like the official rape rate) are excluded, as described in

the Appendix. The base (in this first version) is a snapshot at the 2010 situation,

not a time series. Most of the effect variables are rates per 100,000 population.In this article, I present data from the European and US parts of GES (80 of the

116 units), following the approach in the spirit level debate and focusing on effects

in a fairly similar socio-geographical setting. The construction of the base is fur-

ther discussed in the Appendix.

Holter 5








The data set is on one hand very impressive and on the other quite limited. It has

‘‘its own voice,’’ so to speak, consisting of indexes and rates among 1.1 billion

people in 2010. The variables concern averages in each unit (country or state).They mainly represent behaviors like the degree of gender equality in politics and

the economy, and the rates for divorce, violent death, depression, and suicide per

population. Most variables avoid the low response problem of survey data. On the

other hand, there are problems of statistical representation, although hopefully

more manageable with a limited core variables type of approach. Still, even the

most ‘‘objective’’ data like the violent death rate contains attitudes and forms of

representation that are important, as discussed subsequently.

Twenty years ago, mapping gender equality would have to be based on educated

guesses. This is no longer the situation. In GES, four gender equality indexes thatare now fairly well established are included. These are The Gender Gap Index, The

Social Watch Gender Equality Index, The US Gender Equality Index (USGEI),

and the US Women’s Autonomy Index (see Appendix). They are mainly focused

on women and formal society, yet they include men also. The correlation of the

four measures is very high in the base, pointing to the increasing solidity of gender

equality measurements. A cross-region measure of gender equality was con-

structed on this basis, fitting the US data into the global gender equality measures.

The other background variables relating to social equality include the level of

income indicated by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the degree of incomeequality indicated by the inverse Gini index. These are limited measures, but useful

for the purpose, to roughly correct gender equality associations for income and

social class factors.

‘‘What’s in it for men?’’ is a question with many meanings. What aspect of

men’s lives are we referring to? Is it men’s economic situation, their democratic

situation, their learning curve? In line with the spirit-level debate, my focus is

on health in a wide sense, including well-being, happiness, depression, divorce,

fertility, sexuality, suicide, and violent death. ‘‘What’s in it for men’’ is interpreted

as is it good for men in terms of health and quality of life. I use a pragmatic com-monsense approach. A good life means more well-being, happiness, and sexual

satisfaction, and less depression, suicide, and violent death. It also means a good

situation regarding establishing lasting families (not too high or too low fertility or

divorce, discussed subsequently). Having children and having fairly stable rela-

tionships is part of what is considered a good life and are therefore included.

The effect variables can also be seen as more or less personal. If I am depressed,

it is (or seems) my personal business. If I get divorced, it is more interpersonal. If a

stranger kills me, it is beyond interpersonal; it involves society as such. The health

and well-being variables can be roughly divided on a scale from personal to interpersonal to societal. This is important for discussing gender equalities and effects,

as shown later.

The data only show statistical associations between traits. This is no guarantee

that real relationships exist between them. We only know that there is some overlap









or statistical association—and not, for example, that gender equality causes a change

in some health-related factor. However, the association is interesting, especially

when it remains strong and significant even when correcting for other background variables. We do not know what has caused what—we just observe that gender

equality goes together with some other specific trend. This is clearly relevant for the

question of this article, what’s in it for men, regarding gender equality.

If an individual’s chance of positive health or lower violence varies strongly

with the degree of gender equality in the state or country he or she lives in, this

is important by itself, regardless of what has caused it. Yet as researchers we

remain curious about causes, especially in the case of strong associations that per-

sist across control variables, since it seems more likely that cause and effect are

involved, as is discussed later.As mentioned, the base only consists of national or state averages —not individ-

ual effects. For example, if gender equality is associated with well-being at the

country level, this does not mean that all men in these countries experience this

association. There is a lot of internal variation within each country which is not

shown. Gender equality may be good for some men, not all. Also, note that we

do not get historical variation in the current 2010 snapshot of the GES base. For

example, it is possible that positive effects of gender equality become more promi-

nent over time. We’ll return to these issues too.

Below, new results from the GES base are presented, and also briefly highlighted in terms of other types of research. Do the results make sense, when we look at

micro- and meso-level studies, and patterns within each country? If so, the results

are strengthened. The general point is to identify robust patterns that are supported

also by other research.

Gender Equality and Well-being

Asking, as a man—what is my chance of waking up in the morning and feel well? Is

this chance associated with the degree of gender equality in my state or country?What are the results, if we compare more and less gender-equal European countries

and the United States?

Possibly, gender-equal social contexts tend to be contexts of more trust, social

integration, and satisfaction with life. Is this true? If gender equality does not

work out, or not very well, we would expect to see less well-being in gender equal

countries and states, or at least a quite mixed picture. Figure 1 shows the US part of

the data, comparing the proportion of well-being in states that score high and low

on gender equality.

We see a clear tendency, rather than a mixed picture. In the United States, theindividual’s chance of feeling well is more than twice as high in states with a high

gender equality score, compared to states with a low gender equality score. Even if

the two items are unrelated, they do correlate. Note that the correlation is fully sig-

nificant (.000) and that only significant GES results are discussed in this article.

Holter 7








The pattern in Figure 1 is not just a US pattern, it appears in Europe too. Figure 2

illustrates the variation in the European data, comparing the three most and the three

least gender-equal countries in Europe.

In this case, the chance of feeling happy is approximately twice in the three most

gender-equal countries, compared to the three least. Further testing shows a general pattern of better outcomes in gender-equal cases. The main pattern is the same in

Europe and the United States.

For Europe, we also have gender-divided rates, shown in Figure 2, with a pat-

tern which is very similar for men and women. The chance of being happy is about

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

States with low

gender equality score

States with high

gender equality score

(50 states, 2010)

Percent with high well-

being (men and women)

Sources:

Women´s autonomy index

Gallup well-being index

Figure 1. Gender equality and well-being in the United States.

40

45

50

55

60

65

70

75

80

Percent feeling happy -

men

Percent feeling happy -

women

(24 countries, 2010)

Three least gender-equal

countries

Three most gender-equal

countries

Sources:

Gendergap index 2010

Eurobarometer 73.2, 2010

Figure 2. Gender equality and happiness in Europe.









twice as high for both genders, in the most gender-equal countries, compared to the

least gender equal. The association is very similar for men and women.

This main pattern is found across different questions or variables related to

well-being and happiness. It also appears when we look at the lack of well- being, specifically, depression (Figure 3).

In Europe, gender equality and depression show a strong negative correlation

for men (.74) and women (.64). The figure illustrates the variation. The chance

of frequently feeling depressed is less than half in the three most gender-equal

countries, compared to the three least gender-equal countries. Again, the patterns

are very similar for men and women.

The results are surprisingly clear. They indicate that living in a relatively gender-

equal country or state strongly increases the chance of happiness and strongly

decreases the chance of being depressed. Overall, the chance of well-being has astrong correlation (.52) with the degree of gender equality across Europe and the

United States.

Could this pattern be a statistical artifact? The chance that it is incidental is very

small. But is it a real relationship? It could be caused by some third factor that

increases the degree of gender equality as well as the rate of well-being. In the cur-

rent case, we can check for two important factors, income level (GDP) and income

equality (Gini index). At this point, by including variables related to social class,

GES goes a step ahead of the spirit-level methodology, since we can compare the

effects of gender and class.The results of this check show that the overall association between gender

equality and well-being is not much influenced by income/class factors. It remains

strong. The evidence indicates that lowering income difference is generally good

for well-being, but it is outranked by gender equality (in the total US/European

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Percent oendepressed - men

Percent oendepressed - women

Three least gender-equal

countries

Three most gender-equal

countries

24 countries, 2010

Sources:

Gender gap index 2010Eurobarometer 73.2, 2010

Figure 3. Gender equality and depression in Europe.

Holter 9








sample, N ¼ 80). In the European part of the data, we can do a similar check

regarding the rate of frequent depression among men. Once more, the association

between gender equality and lower depression remains strong. The income levelalso reduces the chance of depression, but income and gender equality appear to

be independent factors.

These results are based on partial correlation analyses as well as regression

analyses. A regression analysis with gender equality, income level, and income

equality as independent variables and depression among men as dependent vari-

able, using the European data, results in a model that explains the variation quite

well (adjusted R2 .63) with two factors, income level (beta .46) and gender equality

(beta .45), both clearly significant. Somewhat surprisingly—in light of the spirit-

level debate—income equality does not affect the chance of depression in thesedata and is excluded from the regression model.

Contrary to a popular belief I find little evidence that gender equality works one

way for women and a very different way for men, regarding well-being and happi-

ness. Instead, the macro associations are similar across gender. Also, the health indi-

cators are internally consistent. For example, there is a very strong negative

correlation between well-being and depression.

Are these results supported by other forms of research? Some micro-level data

show a similar pattern, especially regarding well-being among women. Research

from Nordic countries shows that women’s well-being and relationship satisfactionis positively influenced by gender equality in the family (Kitterød 2000). A detailed

survey of gender equality and quality of life shows that gender equality in the family

is associated with greater relationship satisfaction and well-being among men also

(Holter, Svare, and Egeland 2009). These are results from relatively gender equal

countries, others may differ.

Violence and Crime

Another important quality of life factor is violence. What is my chance of beingkilled, comparing more and less gender-equal countries and states?

Ideally, we would like to compare the overall level of violence in these soci-

eties, yet reliable data do not yet exist, due to threshold variation in reporting

and other factors (see Appendix). Therefore, we use the most reliable and robust

indicator, death due to violence. Figure 4 shows how the violent death rate is

associated with gender equality across the whole sample, the United States, and

Europe.

The pattern is very clear. The chance of violent death goes down with greater

gender equality. It is almost halved in countries and states with a high level of gender equality, compared to those with a low level.

The pattern is similar to the well-being pattern, and consistent with it. Since

men are the main victims (as well as the main perpetrators) of violent deaths, the

results indicate that there is indeed a benefit for men, with higher gender equality.









In the United States as well as in Europe, the violent death rate goes down with

higher levels of gender equality. The pattern is stronger in the United States than inEurope. This is probably partly due to the higher overall level of violent death in

the United States—the violent death rate is more than twice as high than in Europe

(5.8 versus 2.3 deaths per 100,000 population), and the internal variation is larger

(see Appendix).

How do the other background variables affect the association between gender

equality and reduced violent death? In the European data, the effects are not very

clear, but they tend to make the gender equality association lower and no longer

so clearly significant. The main variable that lowers the chance of violent death

in Europe is income equality, in line with the spirit level argument. This pattern issimilar in the US data—again, income equality reduces the chance of violent death,

yet here, the independent reductive influence of gender equality is also visible.

The rate of violent death decreases similarly in the two regions with greater gen-

der equality, with a consistent pattern across the two regions, like the well-being

and depression results. However, it should be noted that the violent death rate is

less well ‘‘explained’’ by background variables in the GES base than the rates of

well-being and depression. The evidence suggests that other variables come into

the picture (e.g., gun laws), that are not included in the base. Violent death is a

fairly reliable variable, but it is only the extreme version of violence—and there-fore not fully representative of violence as a whole.

The GES base includes violent death by gender in the US subsample. Once

more the results discourage ideas of very gender-differentiated outcomes of gender

equality. The results are instead quite similar across gender. There is no clear rise

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

5.0

5.5

6.0

Lile Some Much

Gender equality

(Gender equality country/state ranking, N=82 European countries and US states, 2010)

Violent death

rate (per

100.000

populaon)

Sources:

Gender gap index

US women's autonomy index

Worldlifeexpectancy.com and others

Figure 4. Violent death rate by gender equality.

Holter 11








in the violent death rate for women or a fall for men, in gender-unequal states—but

rather a similar reduction across gender. Gender equality and income equality are

both clearly associated with a reduced chance of violent death in the United States—for both genders.

What does other research say, regarding gender equality and violence? As men-

tioned, different views exist, including intermediate increased violence. Recent

results often support women’s empowerment theory—increasing gender equality

tends to reduce the level of violence (Holter 2013; Barker et al. 2011).

As an individual, what is my chance of violent death? The evidence favors

gender-equal states or countries, for men as well as women—the chance is about

40 percent lower. This is quite consistent across the two regions. In Europe as well

as the United States, the violent death rate is especially high in some countries/states with high levels of crime, and these usually score at the low end regarding

gender equality.

The violence results show somewhat different European and US patterns, more

than other variables in the base (except fertility, discussed below). Gender equality

seems to be more positive for reducing violent death in the United States than in

Europe, which may be related to the overall larger rate of violent death in the

United States. The greater income inequality in the United States, compared to

Europe has been seen as part of the background of the high US violent death rate

(Wilkinson and Pickett 2010), and the new data can be interpreted in that way too.In view of the different regional contexts, the differences in how the gender

equality measures are associated with violent death in Europe and the United States

are within the range of reasonable differences, given the somewhat varying construc-

tion of the measures (see Appendix). The gender equality measures mainly point the

same way and are internally consistent. Gender equality is associated with lower vio-

lent death, although with different strength, as well as with greater well-being and

lower depression, across the two regions.

Suicide

If gender equality (and income equality) make more people feel well, we would

expect the suicide rate to go down. That does not necessarily happen, however. The

overall suicide rate is not associated with gender equality in the new base. This is

surprising, given the associations we have seen so far. However, it repeats the

spirit-level finding—suicide is not clearly associated with income equality, either.

Suicide is not so easily explained by equality variables.

According to Durkheim (1951), suicide was mainly a matter of anomie, a lack of

social integration, a feeling of estrangement from society. Later research has givenconsiderable support for social integration views (e.g., Pelham and Nyiri 2008). Social

cohesion measures may help explain suicide rates, yet there are problems of repor-

ting and the moral acceptance of suicide plays a strong role (Krug et al. 2002).

Social cohesion variables are not included in the current database (see Appendix).









Suicide is a fairly gendered affair. The frequency and the typical means of

suicide vary by gender. Recent empirical research has focused on the fact that

actual suicide, unlike attempted suicide, is a very masculine affair. The tendencythat men kill themselves more often than women can be seen all over the world,

except some outlier cases (Hawton 2000). Failed suicide attempts, on the other

hand, is an area dominated by women (Wichstrøm 2000). In Europe, male over-

suicide is highest among older people (Scambor, Wojnicka, and Bergmann

2013, 126).

Although the new data fail to fully confirm a reduction of suicide hypothesis, it

offers a partial confirmation, relating to men. This is a new and interesting finding.

Gender equality is not associated with lower suicide—in general. Yet it is associated

with lower male suicide, compared to female suicide. There is a clear correlationwith a changing sex ratio of suicide. Gender inequality is associated with a strong

tendency that men kill themselves more often than women, or male oversuicide,

while gender equality is associated with a less strong tendency in that direction (even

though men continue to be in majority). The results show that the pattern of male

oversuicide is reduced in more gender-equal societies, as a common trend across

regions and control variables. Similarly, recent European research finds that coun-

tries with more welfare and higher gender equality tend to have a smaller gender gap

in life expectancy (cf. Scambor, Wojnicka, and Bergmann 2013, 123).

If gender equality was deeply problematic for men, as some views assume, wewould expect the ratio of male to female suicide to go up with higher gender equal-

ity. Yet, it goes down, instead. This is by itself an interesting feature (refuting the

worst nightmares of the antifeminists). Yet it does not necessarily mean that the total

number of male suicides goes down. The results only show that the male rate goes

down relatively to the female rate, with increased gender equality, while the overall

suicide rate (for the population as a whole) is not much correlated with gender equal-

ity development.

These combined results are surprising. Is there more in it for men, than for

women? Do men prosper from gender equality, while women become more exposed to suicide?

We can regard the new evidence in different ways. Suicide should go down,

along with less depression and more well-being, in more gender-equal states and

countries, but it does not. Instead, the total suicide rate varies little (or inconsis-

tently) with social equality measured by gender equality and income equality. If

the social equality argument is true, one might instead expect suicides to go down.

We should note that suicide rates are not well explained by income inequality,

either, and sometimes seems to vary inversely with homicide (Wilkinson and

Pickett 2010, 175). Social integration measures including religious and voluntaryactivity are probably important not just for mortality but for suicide too (Kawachi

et al. 1997). Even if gender equality and social cohesion are often associated, this is

not the only aspect of gender equality. It is likely that contexts with higher gender

equality also have higher moral acceptance of suicide.

Holter 13








In sum, gender equality does influence the gender proportion of suicides, reduc-

ing male oversuicide, although it has no clear consistent effect on the overall sui-

cide rate. A historical interpretation is possible. Perhaps suicide, like the averagelife span, is rather ‘‘late’’ in the total picture. Today, we just see a gender balan-

cing, but in the future we will also see a reduction.

Sexuality

According to a recent macro study, gender equality is associated with more sexual

satisfaction. ‘‘The idea that collective male power over women leads to collective

male sexual gratification appears to be quite wrong’’ (Baumeister and Mendoza

2011). Instead, gender equality is associated with lower first age sex, a higher rateof casual sex, and also more moderately with the number of partners.

Some of the new sex data are included in the new database, yet the sample is

small, and the patterns are not very clear for the Euro-US zone under investigation

(see Appendix). The main result so far is that gender equality is at least not a

minus for men’s sexual satisfaction. Rather, it seems to be a plus, although the

question is not resolved. A recent survey shows that traditional gender attitudes

and outcomes still persist in the United States (Herbenick et al. 2010), and this

is probably true of parts of Europe too. Heterosex in hierarchical, homosocial

contexts often serve relations between men, as an underlying theme, and are lesssatisfactory for women (Flood 2008). Yet these contexts seem to be weakened,

especially in the European material. In a Norway 2007 survey, gender equality

in the couple relationship was moderately associated with sexual satisfaction

among men, and a bit more strongly associated among women (Holter, Svare, and

Egeland 2009), and a similar trend was found in a recent six-country survey (Bar-

ker et al. 2011, 25).

Fertility

If men’s outcome of gender equality is mainly positive, improving well-being,

reducing depression, violence, and men’s share of suicide, we would expect it to

improve the birth rate also. As mentioned, ‘‘improve’’ in this case means an opti-

mum somewhere in the middle, as distinct from just ‘‘less’’ or ‘‘more’’. Demogra-

phers would say ‘‘sustainable’’ fertility, around two children per woman.

Some decades ago, the increasing rate of women in paid work was seen as a

minus for fertility. From the 1980s, however, the evidence changed. Areas with

high workforce participation of women were no longer automatically low fertility

areas. From the late 1980s onward, high female labor market participation instead became gradually more strongly associated with higher fertility in Europe (Engel-

hardt and Prskawetz 2002). Today, it is the areas with high rather than low partic-

ipation that have the highest fertility. We should note that the fertility debate has

been different in the United States and Europe. In Europe, low and ‘‘lowest low’’









fertility has been a topic especially in the south and east, with a general message

that fertility needs to be increased. In the United States, the situation is more

mixed. It is known that different ethnic groups have different fertility rates, butthere is no overall call to increase fertility.

The results show a strong positive association between gender equality and

fertility in Europe. There is a surprisingly large .72 correlation. Yet the US data are

different. Instead, there is a moderate negative association between the two.

Regression analyses of the US and European data suggest that two factors are

important for fertility—well-being and gender equality, and that income level,

income equality, and ethnic proportion also play a role. However, the gender equal-

ity factor points different ways in the United States and in Europe.

In a regression analysis of the US sample, gender equality, income, incomeequality, and proportion ‘‘white’’ of the population all have an impact on fertility.

Ethnicity ranks first but gender equality a close second. The proportion white has

a beta value of .33, the US women index .29, Gini .28, GDP .26 (adjusted

R2 .45).

A similar regression analysis of the European data shows two main factors, gen-

der equality (the Gender Gap Index, beta .47) and well-being (.41) (adjusted R2

.64). Ethnicity was not included (see Appendix), but this European two-cause

model ‘‘explained’’ even more of the fertility variation (.64) than the four-cause

model calculated for the United States (.45). The results imply that the contextmeans more than ethnicity. Populations of different ethnicities, over time, tend

to drift toward similar fertility patterns.

Gender equality is differently associated with childbirth in the two regions. The

results can be interpreted as showing different gender equalities. The US ‘‘career

model’’ or ‘‘market model’’ of gender equality is less child-friendly than the

‘‘welfare model’’ of Europe. This difference, combined with different discourse,

helps explain why the US connection is not just much weaker than the European

one, but somewhat negative. Welfare factors are important for fertility rates, as

discussed subsequently.In the European data, gender equality is more clearly associated with fertility than

income equality, as shown subsequently (income equality correlation in parenthesis

since not clearly significant; Figure 5).

Partial correlations show that even when controlling for income equality, gender

equality has a remarkably high .741 association with fertility.

This is so high that we intuitively ask—could it be spurious? Yet, fertility is not

part of the 14 Gender Gap Index variables (2010) used in the base (see Appendix).

Also, when known ‘‘national’’ outlier fertility cases are filtered out (France and

Ireland), the correlation becomes even higher (.87). Further, the Social Watchindex shows a similar high correlation with fertility in Europe (.61), and the same

is the case with the men’s share of unpaid work index, explained below, which also

correlates remarkably strongly with fertility (.53). The overall tendency is surpris-

ingly clear in the European 2010 data.

Holter 15








Divorce

Some decades ago, a high divorce rate was associated with gender equality and lib-

eral family norms (with Sweden as a much-discussed example). This is no longer the

case, however. Instead, the highest divorce rates appear in countries with large

inequality and social problems, like Russia. The overall correlation between gender

equality and divorce in the European and US sample is .45. In other words, gender

equality tends to go together with a lower divorce rate. However, the link is less clear

than the well-being and depression links described earlier. It is clearer in the United States than in the European part of the sample.

Divorce is influenced by traditions and norms regarding divorce, not just by the

quality of the couple relationship. Although gender equality may work well for rela-

tionship satisfaction, it is also associated with more liberal attitudes toward divorce.

Therefore, some studies find that even though gender-equal couples are generally

more satisfied with the relationship, this does not necessarily translate to a lower

chance of divorce (Hansen and Slagsvold 2012).

It is possible that the interpersonal issue of divorce is less directly influenced by

gender equality than more personal issues like well-being and depression. Womenremain the main initiators of divorce (in about three of the four cases), rather than

men, and the divorce rate may relate more directly to women’s satisfaction with cou-

ple relationships than to men’s satisfaction. European research indicates that even

though gender equality is beneficial for relationship satisfaction, especially among

Gender

equality

Incomeequality

Fertility

Gender equality, income equality and fertility

31 European countries, 2010

.763

(.306)

Sources:

Gender equality - Gender gap index 2010

Income equality – Gini index c 2010

Figure 5. Equality and fertility in Europe.









women, gender-equal relationships remain vulnerable and hard to maintain, espe-

cially since combining care and career is often difficult, for example in highly

demanding jobs (Halrynjo 2010).

Sharing Care

The question ‘‘what’s in it for men’’ can be turned around. What can men offer?

How do men contribute to gender-equal development?

The new database includes a new variable, men’s share of unpaid work in the

home, that is, men’s share of caring work and housework. This is based on the

European Working Conditions Survey, which includes questions about the home-

work division by gender. This is an improved measure compared to former

research, since men’s share of unpaid work and care have not been so well known

before (or only for a restricted set of countries).

The data show that men’s share of unpaid work correlates very strongly with the

degree of gender equality. As shown in Figure 6, the correlation is similar (.68, .69)

across two different gender equality measures (and not so far behind the correlation

between these two measures themselves at .86).

The figure shows the strength of the correlations between the three variables, with

the two gender equality variables to the left, and the strong correlation between them

marked by a thick arrow. The new finding is that there is also a remarkably strong

correlation between each of these and men’s share of unpaid work.

The results indicate that men’s contribution to unpaid work in the home is an

important underlying factor for gender equality. In today’s Europe, men’s contribu-

tion to this informal side of the economy is almost three times larger in the most

gender-equal countries, compared to the most gender-unequal countries. Also, there

has been a tendency toward a split, with the gender-equal countries moving ahead

while the gender-unequal countries stood still or went backward 2005–2010, as

shown in Figure 7.

These new data shatter the myth that men do little to nothing of unpaid care and

housework. Combined with the strong GES correlations reported previously, they

also shatter the myth that, whatever men contribute at home, including in the

‘‘individual’’ aspect of caring for a child, it has little impact on society at large.

Instead, the new result shows a very strong correlation between men’s share of

care and non-wage work input, and the gender equality situation at large among the

European countries.

Men’s share of care appears as a part of gender equality, rather than an external

variable, and it can be argued that it should be included in gender equality indexes.

Discussion

The results mainly support the positive effects view. Gender equality has large and

real benefits for men. The main pattern is strong and quite consistent, and very

Holter 17








similar in the United States and Europe, although with some exceptions. Roughly,

living in a gender-equal state or country means twice the chance of reporting high

well-being, half the chance of being depressed, and about 40 percent less risk of vio-

lent death. It also means lower divorce and lower male suicide compared to female

suicide. A second main finding is the strong association between men’s share of

unpaid care and gender equality. Men’s contribution to gender equality, as measured

by their share of care and housework, emerges as an important factor.

The evidence challenges some established myths, including the idea that men’scontribution is marginal or peripheral. However, the new material also casts

doubt on unilinear models of gender equality, especially in the cases where the

two regions differ, like fertility (clearly) and violence (somewhat). It is not true

that men lose out in gender equality or that men’s contribution is small and

Gender

Equality

(Gender gap

index)

Gender equality indexes and men's share

of unpaid work (correlations), Europe 2010

Sources:

Gender equality:

- Gender gap index 2010

-Social Watch Gender equality index

Men's share

- EWCS index 2010 (Bergman)

Men's share

of unpaid work.672

Gender

Equality

(Social Watch

index)

.860

.675

Figure 6. How men’s share of unpaid work correlates with gender equality.











It is possible that the actual effects of gender equality can be quite strong, even

if not much recognized in society, or noted among men. According to qualitative

studies, men do not usually attribute improved quality of life to the increased statusof women or increased gender equality (at least not in gender traditional contexts).

This does not mean that the effects don’t exist. To borrow a famous distinction

from studies of social class—gender equality now emerges more clearly, statisti-

cally ‘‘in’’ itself —but not so much ‘‘ for ’’ itself , for men.

Men Who ‘‘Lose Out’’

The idea that men are mainly hurt or devalued through greater gender equality is

not supported, in the sense that this is not the main trend. Yet the data do not saythat all men are included in the main trend or process. For some men, the advan-

cing status of women is exactly the problem, or perceived as the problem.

Not so much is known regarding men who feel they lose out from gender equal-

ity, but something has appeared, over the last decade. What characterizes men who

oppose gender equality? Are they mainly doing so for traditional reasons, like

holding on to power and privilege? Or are there new reasons also, perhaps increas-

ing with gender equality, like a feeling of inferiority or being overtaken by

women? Research indicates that both tendencies exist, but systematic knowledge

is lacking (Puchert, Gartner, and Hoyng 2005). One factor that stands out is thelower education level of men who are critical to gender equality. Support to a state-

ment like ‘‘gender equality has now gone far enough’’ varies strongly with the edu-

cation level of the man, his partner, and parents. Lower education levels and

probably also a feeling of being marginalized are among the key issues in recent

surveys (Holter, Svare, and Egeland 2009; Barker et al. 2011). These trends are

connected to a negative view of gender equality, and also a negative view of immi-

grants and disagreement with the statement that rape is men’s responsibility.

Some men experience harm from women, more or less independently of the

level of gender equality. For example, couple relationships are fragile, and higher equality does not always translate to a more lasting relationship, although the

chance of conflicts and splits is generally lower than in couples with higher power

differences and asymmetry. Also, couples are characterized by different gender

work divisions, which run better or worse, according to the family’s participation,

the local labor market, regulations, welfare factors, and so on.

On one hand, the results can interpret as a critique of hegemonic masculinity

theory (Connell 1995; Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). There are more benefits

for men than we should expect. On the other hand, the data mainly concern actual

effects, not the experienced effects that can be seen as the core matter of the theory.The theory is weak on political economy (beyond a vague ‘‘patriarchal dividend’’)

and social structure; what it does, is to describe an action system, mainly a homosocial

between-men system, where men tend to look at the world from the hegemonic

position, and how, in that context, gender equality is experienced as negative.









‘‘Hegemony’’ is not one and the same; there are changing hegemonic masculinity

forms including more gender-equal compromise forms (Holter 2009). There has

been an overall erosion of male versus female power over the last decades, and it appears in the new data also.

The results mainly point to contexts of gender equality, more than ‘‘gender

equal men.’’ Both elements are involved. At the attitude level, these contexts are

also often characterized by more egalitarianism generally and support of the wel-

fare state (Holter, Svare, and Egeland 2009). Yet the welfare gender equality is still

limited and gendered in traditional ways. In the Norway survey, 60 percent (similar

among men and women) agreed that men are not fully recognized as care persons.

The most advanced gender-equal countries seem unable to do away with the gen-

der wage gap (a wage bonus for men, fairly stable at around 15 percent level over the last decades).

Causal Explanations?

It is all very well to know about associations, and these are indeed relevant for

discussions of men and gender equality. Yet, we do want to know more about

causality. Is it really a case of gender equality creating improved well-being and

other positive effects? How solid are these links?

At the outset, we should recognize some general traits of the proposed cause.Studies indicate that gender equality can work both directly and indirectly. For

example, gender equality can contribute to more well-being in a couple in the form

of more mutual respect and better communication. This is a fairly direct effect.

However, gender equality may also contribute to less conflict and violence in the

relationship, which in turn causes more well-being—a somewhat more indirect

effect. Direct and indirect effects are often mixed, and may run the same way,

as in these examples, or contradict each other.

Another trait is that the gender equality effects on personal life generally are

larger and more positive the more gender equality is accepted in society as a whole.There is less of an ‘‘uphill struggle.’’ Couples who practice gender equal arrange-

ments will have better health outcomes if society is fairly gender equal, compared

to a more traditional society. This historical and sociological variation also means

that different aspects of gender equality give different effects depending on their

social acceptance. Today, gender equality in decision making is more widely

accepted than a gender-equal division of work and care. Positive health effects for

persons in couples trying out these two aspects of gender equality appear clearly in

the first case, while the effects are mixed in the second case (Holter, Svare, and

Egeland 2009). Equal decision making, so to speak, runs ‘‘downhill,’’ compared to a gender balanced work division.

A third trait is that some gender equality associations have cause and effect run-

ning both ways (two-way causality). For example, gender equality and well-being

seem to have some mutual effect on each other, although the main causal chain

Holter 21








seems to run from gender equality to well-being (Holter, Svare, and Egeland 2009,

202).

Finally, there are complex reciprocal relations between gender equality and other major background variables like social class (income equality), although gender

equality/inequality appears as a partially independent dimension, more clearly than

before, in the new data. Although gender studies can learn from class studies, we

should avoid the tendency to overload class as means of gender analysis. The gender

system is not just social class by other means (H. Holter 1970). Even if it is entangled

with other forms of social equality, it is system and process ‘‘sui generis’’ (in itself)

on many levels—personal, organizational, institutional, and cultural.

The effects emerge over time, accumulating over the individual’s life course.

Gender equality in the home is strongly associated with a lower risk of violenceagainst children, and this helps lower the chance of violence later in life (Holter

2013). The independence of gender equality as a causal factor is confirmed in the

new data checking for income equality, economic level, and gender (and ethnic

composition in one case). So far, multivariate analyses have a common message.

Gender equality retains an independent effect on health, although mitigated (or

related in complex ways) by other forms of social in/equality. This is in line with

the view of recent gender equality theory (Walby 2009). A main impression is that

structure means more than acknowledged, men’s participation means more, and

the effect on men’s as well as women’s well-being and health is much greater thanacknowledged.

On this background, how could we explain the new findings, in terms of cause

and effect? Gender equality has distinct traits compared to other forms of social

equality. It is a more personal dimension, involving family life, children, and

human ‘‘reproduction.’’ It is not surprising, therefore, that it is associated with

other personal life indicators like well-being. Mainly, the results are similar to the

income research and spirit-level study results. Social equality including gender

equality usually works well for personal life. In some contexts, gender equality

appears as an even stronger factor than income (or social class) equality. This islinked to women’s increasing education and other structural changes that make

gender equality more beneficial for families, especially among well-educated cou-

ples (Esping-Andersen 2009; Becker 1985). It relates to different household

economies as well as market economies. Some decades ago, marriage appeared

as beneficial for men and a burden for women (Bernard 1972). Later, the situation

became more mixed, and today, in reasonably gender-equal contexts, the benefi-

cial effect of living together is found among women too. Among women, living

together in a gender-equal relationship may be even more important than just liv-

ing together (Holter, Svare, and Egeland 2009).A causal hypothesis and a starting point for a model is that social equality in

gender relationships improves communication. This has gradually become more

important, in a more information-oriented society. There were benefits of gender

equality thirty years ago also, but they are clearer in the 2010 data. In turn,









communication increases the chance of good practical behaviors, cooperative

project results, and subjective well-being. On the other hand, lack of communica-

tion is a main factor of depression and suicide. It is also associated with divorce, partly connected to underlying power differences (Moxnes 1989). Divorce, in

turn, is one main contributor to lower well-being in the adult population. The

divorce rate has stabilized in Europe and the United States over the last decades.

In the 2010 data, gender equality has evolved to a reduction factor on the overall

divorce rate, in the United States as well as the European sample. Countries or

states with higher divorce rates tend to be countries with unstable or special

arrangements (e.g., divorce in Las Vegas not representative, Nevada, as outlier

case regarding divorce in the United States).

In addition to the improved communication effect, gender equality has an effecton well-being through a lower chance of conflict and violence. In sum, it has positive

communication and social integration effects and a reduced conflict effect. This

model can explain the strong and consistent association between gender equality and

well-being across Europe and the United States and across different measures. The

data show a strong overall association (correlation .80) between well-being and fer-

tility across eighty European countries and US states. The association is strongest in

Europe, but quite strong in the United States too. Clearly, well-being works posi-

tively for fertility in both regions. Yet, well-being is more clearly associated with

fertility in Europe. Why? And why is gender equality moderately negatively associ-ated with fertility in the United States, but strongly positively associated in Europe?

It is fairly obvious that some external factor is at work, accounting for the

regional differences in fertility. As mentioned, gender equality appears to be more

congruent with fertility in Europe than in the United States. A main reason is the

huge difference in child care facilities, comparing the welfare gender equality model

of Europe and the market model of the United States. The rate of enrolment of chil-

dren 3 to 4 years old in public child care facilities was one and a half times higher in

Europe than in the United States in 2010 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation

and Development [OECD] 2011). The flexibility of the European facilities washigher and the cost was lower. Child care facilities are clearly important for fertility

(Rindfuss et al. 2010). In other words, gender equality seems to work well for ferti-

lity also, given a minimum of welfare provisions.

Power and economic differences are main reasons why communication fails.

Communication is linked to well-being, and lack of communication is linked to

negative health effects and to aggression and violence. In the results, violent death

is clearly associated with low gender equality in the United States and Europe.

Although gender equality does not (yet?) reduce the total suicide rate, it balances

the gender proportions of suicide. The findings strengthen women’s empowermenttheory (Holter 2013).

The new data often highlight societal or structural factors. Yet, there are clear

indications of independent effects of male role change. Men’s participation in

unpaid care and housework is strongly associated with gender equality. Men’s

Holter 23








change in gender relations has been theorized in the men and masculinities field, for

example, in Messner’s (1997) triangle of change, starting from a critique of men’s

privileges, recognizing the costs of masculinity, and recognizing the differences and inequalities among men. This perspective can be combined with social psychologi-

cal theory of ‘‘passing’’ (Holmgren and Hearn 2009).

Variation among men emerges as an important and undervalued factor in gender

equality research. Gender in/equality variation, among men as well as women, is a

main trait in the detail gender survey in Norway 2007, in an international men and

gender equality survey (Barker et al. 2011), and in new European research on the

role of men in gender equality (Scambor, Wojnicka, and Bergmann 2013). Differ-

ences in male roles and hegemonic masculinities seem to play important roles,

together with differences in welfare regimes and national cultures.One strength of the new data is that they mainly concern the whole population.

The participation rate is high. The chance that there are men ‘‘hiding under the hor-

izon’’ should be lower than in surveys where 50 percent or more refuse to partic-

ipate. However, qualitative studies often give a more critical view of men. Do the

results still give a too optimistic picture, compared to the real situation? Do they

come with a kind of rosy glasses?

If gender equality is as beneficial for men as the new results imply, why do we

not see greater male engagement on that front? How come many men in surveys,

even in relatively gender-equal contexts, think that gender equality has gone far enough? What men actually experience and what they think in relation to ‘‘gender

equality’’ are two different things.

In recent research, male role change emerges as a central underlying factor, and

this interpretation is supported by the importance of the male share of unpaid work

in the present study (Scambor, Wojnicka, and Bergmann 2013). Yet contributions

from men, or other measures concerning men’s costs or benefits from gender

equality, are not much included in today’s gender equality indexing methods.

As an example, consider the case of India. India is perhaps one of the countries

with the highest rape rate of the world. Delhi has been described as the ‘‘rape cap-ital of the world’’ ( Rupee News 2012; Faleiro 2013). The international IMAGES

survey (Barker et al. 2011) included representative samples of men in India, Chile,

Croatia, Brazil, Mexico, and Rwanda. The results showed that India stood out

among the six countries. Men in India were far less supportive of gender equality

than the men in the other five countries. Two-thirds agreed that ‘‘a woman some-

times needs to be beaten,’’ as against 12 percent in Croatia. Men in India ranked

at the top regarding homophobia, self-reported sexual violence against a partner,

and at the bottom regarding involvement in household and care tasks, in this

six-country comparison. Whereas the men generally associated gender-equal rela-tionships with a better sex life, in this survey, men in India did not.

The role of men emerges as a very important underlying factor , in several inter-

connected dimensions. Therefore, we should add this dynamic factor to our model of

causation. This can take the form of a two-level model. The first level is partly











emerging gap between the positive actual outcomes of gender equality for men—

and the much more traditional state of the discourse.

Class theory is dualistic—for me, or for others. It concerns individuals in aneconomic system, becoming classes if their structural positions and economic

circumstances are similar. Gender theory can be used to insert a third intermediate

position. In the middle of the ‘‘in itself’’ to ‘‘for itself’’ dimension, there is a ‘‘for

someone’’ position, an interpersonal level between the individual and society.

Today, gender equality is itself deeply gendered, and conceived, primarily, as a

women’s topic. Gender equality can become something that women ‘‘have’’; men

have to follow, or be ‘‘pro’’ women, to get it. What characterizes this presumed

middle stage figure, for someone? It can mean for the other , including the partner

or spouse, the significant other, usually of the other gender. As seen from men’s point of view, gender equality has primarily been made into a theme, a problem,

as a women’s matter . Even in officially gender-equal Europe, parental leave is still

often called maternal leave (Scambor, Wojnicka, and Bergmann 2013), and jobs

are still masculine coded especially in the private sector (Holter and Rogg 2009;

Halrynjo 2010).

If the ‘‘for itself’’ position is occupied already, it is easier to understand why

men’s attitudes fail to reflect that actual state of affairs. The weak focus on men’s

role in gender equality (Scambor, Wojnicka, and Bergmann 2013) also helps

explain the results. The power and communication model proposed above can be combined with ‘‘Messner’s triangle’’ and other models of men’s movements

away from (or back to) male power positions. However, beyond masculinity

issues, there seems to be a break effect, creating a gap between actual and experi-

enced effects of gender equality, due to the fact that it is still mainly conceived as

a women’s matter. The ‘‘self made man’’ tendency described by Kimmel (1996)

and others is also relevant. Gender equality benefits tend to be categorized as

‘‘I did it myself’’ effects, while burdens and costs are more easily distributed to

others including women, a tendency that can be found in politics also (cf. the

‘‘nanny state’’ debate). This reflects a situation where gender equality is aligned to women’s interests, but not—seemingly—much to men’s.

The data point to ‘‘gender orders,’’ complex gender and social inequalities that

coexist in the emerging global society, partly competing with each other, through

different household and wage work adaptations. Are these also hegemonic orders?

It is clear that experience of gender equality benefits can be blocked by actor-level

trends like homosociality and misogyny, but not so clear that these are widespread,

compared to the widespread structural effects of, for example, lacking welfare

state arrangements for children.

Is there a gap between actual effects and perceived effects of gender equalityamong men, due to the fact that gender equal is seen as a position that is occupied

already, by women? If the ‘‘position occupied’’ hypothesis is true, we would expect

that gender equality worked well on the personal level but not well on the interper-

sonal level where men relate to women. The results, analyzing the new data, are









mixed. Gender equality seems to work very well on the personal level but also quite

well on the interpersonal level. For example, divorce rates tend to go down in gender

equal contexts and sexual satisfaction somewhat up. These are ‘‘relational’’ vari-ables, and they may show some lag behind the personal variables, but perhaps not

as much as the hypothesis would lead us to expect. By itself, ‘‘the position is occu-

pied’’ hypothesis is just a question for further research, not a new way to blame

women. Mainly, in the new data, women appear as motivators of men’s gender-

equal participation, not as barriers or hindrances.

Conclusion: Toward Gender-equal Men and Masculinities?

The new research indicates that gender equality has strong and consistent positivecorrelations with health-related variables. The correlations are quite similar for

men and women. We do not know if gender equality ‘‘causes’’ better health. The

new results show that better health is strongly associated with the degree of gender

equality, testing for US states and European countries. They show macro associa-

tions or common tendencies. Yet the results also—in the light of other studies—

indicate the existence of causal chains, discussed in the last part of the article.

The combined new evidence, as a whole, points to gender equality as a benefit for

men as well as women. There seems to be two main components to the picture. One

is a ‘‘more gender equal connections’’ structural factor and the other is a ‘‘male rolechange’’ actor-related factor. The results support male role change and reforming

masculinities, as well as social structure and welfare theory. They often highlight the

latter. If we include structural variables, for example, the better child care facilities

in Europe compared to the United States, presumed differences in actor variables

like fertility tend to shrink. It is not that fathers or mothers think or act very differ-

ently in the two regions, but rather that they have a very different level of support for

getting children, unless the couple chooses a gender traditional division of tasks.

The effects of gender equality are robust and independent of the other variables.

For example, there is a gender equality effect on well-being also when controllingfor violent death. In the United States, the correlation remains a high .37, and in

Europe a very high .73, controlling for the violent death rate. This is a typical result.

Controlling for income level and income equality does modify some of the gender

equality effects, but the main patterns remain clear and consistent. Gender equality

emerges as an independent causal dimension, distinct from other forms of equality

like social class or income equality, and from specific factors like violence.

The results can be interpreted as showing an emerging culture of gender equality,

which is generally associated with improved health and well-being, lower violence,

and less ‘‘strict’’ hegemonic masculinity. This trend has been found in internationalgender role attitude surveys from the early 2000s onward (Inglehart et al. 2004). Yet,

a gap emerges between the new health benefits evidence and the state of discourse.

An interpretation is that gender is ‘‘in’’ itself more than ‘‘for’’ itself , as experienced

from the position of many men, and further, that there is a middle ground occupied

Holter 27








already, where gender equality appears as something ‘‘in’’ and ‘‘for’’ women. His-

torically gender equality is still emerging mainly as a women’s affair. Additionally,

some men seem to associate the gains from gender equality with their own actions(rather than gender equality as such), while the costs are more like ‘‘the nagging of

the wife’’ (Holter 2007). Also, a minority of men opposing gender equality perhaps

has an influence far beyond its proportion, like a compromised but still effective

hegemony. These are important topics for further research.

Appendix

The Gender Equality Statistics Base

The base has 116 geographical units: 31 European countries, 50 US states, and

35 other countries. The 35 others are based on a fairly representative global mini-

sample made by Statistics Norway, but are only sometimes used in the analyses

in this text.

Of the twenty-five core variables in the Gender Equality Statistics base, only a

few are survey opinion based, including the measure of well-being (and sexual fre-

quency and satisfaction). The rest are rates and gender ratios measuring behaviors

usually per 100,000 population. As noted, cultural and national differences in

reporting systems (regarding, e.g., suicide, depression) play a role; official statis-tics remain approximations of the actual action or practice to be measured.

Most of the numbers for the 118 units in the GES base had to be hand-copied

into the new database from Internet sources. The base per June 2013 has 116 units

and thirty-five variables (including recodes of the core twenty-five variables), a

matrix of 2,900 cells. For practical reasons also, the number of variables had to

be restricted. Controversial variables like the official rape rate, known to be very

misleading in many cases, are not included, while violent death, less prone to

faulty reporting across countries, is included. As mentioned, the GES base is a

snapshot design for now, it has data for 2010 only; so for example, the average life-span is not included, since this is a delayed effect that would require data over time.

In some cases, it was possible to find rates for each gender—obviously interesting

in our context—but in other cases it was not.

For the US states, ethnicity is also included (proportion ‘‘white’’), since this is

relevant for discussing, for example, fertility, but I was not able to find a comparable

measure for Europe.

Detail on the GES effect variables:

Violent death (deaths caused by violence, rate per 100,000 population). Data

from World Health Organization (WHO 2010). Compare http://www.worldlifeexpectancy.com/cause-of-death/violence/by-country/.

Note that the analysis of the violent death rate in the US sample excludes one

case. The USGEI shows a strong negative correlation with the violent death rate,

as expected, while the US Women index shows little correlation. Closer analysis









shows that this is due to the District of Columbia being included in the US Women

index, not in the USGEI. This state is clearly an ‘‘outlier,’’ with a violent death rate

(28.2) which is more than twice as high as the second highest state (Louisiana, at13.0). It also tops the US Women ranking, which can be seen as debatable (or,

again, a special case). Excluding this outlier, the two indexes behave much the

same way—as expected. They have a very similar ca. .46 negative correlation

with the death rate.

Suicide—deaths caused by suicide ca 2010 (rate per 100,000 population).

Data from http://www.worldlifeexpectancy.com/cause-of-death/suicide/by-country/,

citing WHO.

Suicide by gender/sex: suicide rates per 100,000 by country, year, and sex. WHO

latest data per 2011 (most ca 2008). Compare http://www.who.int/mental_health/ prevention/suicide_rates/en/.

For US states: USA State Suicide Rates and Rankings by Gender, 2009, compare

http://www.suicidology.org/c/document_library/get_file?folder-

Id ¼228&name¼DLFE-495.pdf. Source: CDCs wisqars base, Fatal Injury Reports.

Fertility—WHO data ca 2010.

Well-being—I have used the Gallup index for well-being (The Gallup-

Healthways Well-Being Index for the US states, and a variant of this, Gallup’s

Thriving index, for other countries (2011). The index includes questions about six

types of well-being, including overall evaluation of their lives, emotional health, physical health, healthy behaviors (such as whether a person smokes or exercises),

and job satisfaction. State scores found here: http://www.livescience.com/18666-

happiest-states-2011-list.html. For scores of other countries, see http://www.gallup.

com/poll/153818/Nearly-One-Four-Worldwide-Thriving.aspx#2.

Sexuality—the Durex 2005 measures of sexual frequency and satisfaction are

included for a limited sample (twenty-six countries). Compare http://www.durex.

com/en-NZ/SexualWellbeingSurvey/Fequency%20of %20Sex/Pages/default.aspx.

Divorce—crude divorce rate, compare http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Divorce_-

demography and http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/dyb/dyb2011/Table25.pdf.

Independent variables:

Gross domestic product (GDP)—GDP per capita in USD ca. 2010. Internet

sources.

Gini index (Gini coefficient)—index of income inequality; measures the inequal-

ity among values of a frequency distribution (levels of income). Internet sources.

Gender equality measures—For the United States, the Gender equality index

developed by Sugarman and Straus (1988) and updated by De Noia (2002, with data

ca 1990) is used, while the Gender Gap Index is used for Europe and the thirty-fiveother countries. A similar Gender Gap Index for US states does not exist as far as

can be seen by 2013. The Women’s socio-economic autonomy index 2006, available

for US states, was therefore also used, as well as an additional gender equality index

(Social Watch Gender equality index) for Europe and other countries.

Holter 29








The US, European or global gender equality measures are all designed to grade

gender equality, but they do it in somewhat different ways. The USGEI has

three main areas (economic, political, and legal gender equality) with a total of twenty-four variables. Some variables map ‘‘absolute goods’’ like whether state

law defines abuse as a crime and if the state funds shelters for women, but most

variables map ratios of men and women, like male and female proportions in the

state house and senate. The original version of the index used 1982 data. The

updated version was unable to use 1995 data and had to use 1990 data instead

(de Noia 2002, 37).

The global Gender Gap Index, used for Europe and the other countries in the

base, has four main areas, with a total of fourteen variables. These are (1) eco-

nomic participation and opportunity (female wage labor ratio, wage equality,female managers, female technical work), (2) educational attainment (female lit-

eracy rate over male value, primary, secondary, tertiary enrolment), (3) health and

survival (sex ratio at birth, female healthy life expectancy over male value), and

(4) political empowerment (women with seats in parliament over male value,

women at ministerial level over male value, number of years with a female head

of state of government last fifty years over male value). Only gender ratio variables

are used. Violence and abuse, or men’s share of unpaid work, are not included.

The male care share index, or the men’s share of unpaid care and domestic work,

is based on European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS 2005–2010 adapted byBergman and Holter, cf. Scambor, Wojnicka, and Bergmann 2013).

In sum, there are many ‘‘missing variables,’’ like better social class measures, or

measures of religion and social integration. For example, one religiosity study

shows a link between masculine fundamentalism and violence against women

(Ellison, Bartkowski, and Anderson 1999). But for inclusion into the base, the vari-

able must have a clear definition and fairly solid evidence across European coun-

tries and US states. The current GES base is a first snapshot. Hopefully, a wider

time-series base can be built from it. Some variables like average life expectancy

are excluded due to the snapshot character for now—it would be misleading toinclude long-term accumulated effects. Other variables are relevant, but are not yet

clear enough or wide enough in terms of units included (e.g., social cohesion

indexes). These are ‘‘in for testing,’’ so to speak, and can be included in further

development of the database.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,

authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or pub-

lication of this article.









Note

1. I want to thank many people for helping me write this article, in this case especially

Michael Kimmel, Bob Pease, Jeff Hearn, and Elisabet Rogg, for valuable comments alongthe way.

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Author Biography

Øystein Gullvag Holter is a professor at The Centre for Gender Research, University of Oslo.

He has worked with gender equality, work–life balance, and masculinity issues since the early

1980s and has published numerous books and papers.


http://rupeenews.com/2012/12/delhi-rape-capital-india-3rd-in-rapes-woman-raped-every-20-minutes-in-india/



http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/gender_pay_gap/130424_final_report_role_of_men_en.pdf


http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10802978

http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21570840-nordic-countries-are-reinventing-their-model-capitalism-says-adrian




http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10802978






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