History of the U.S. Marine Corps in WWII Vol II - Isolation on … of the U.S... · 508 ISOLATION OF RABAUL at Pearl Harbor, \vllere preparations went ahead for a simultaneous assault

$Page 1: History of the U.S. Marine Corps in WWII Vol II - Isolation on … of the U.S... · 508 ISOLATION OF RABAUL at Pearl Harbor, \vllere preparations went ahead for a simultaneous assault$
PART VI

conclusion

CHAPTER 1

Encirclement

In the late summer of 1943, while theJoint Chiefs were deciding to neutralizeRabaul rather than capture it, GeneralMacArthur’s staff was preparing plans forthe operations which would follow BOLEg-ainville and Cape Gloucester anc~ COm-plete the encirclement of the key NewBritain base. With atentative target dateof 1 March 1944, MacArthur intended toseize Kavieng, using SoPac forces, and theikdmiralties, employing his own SW’PAtroops, planes, and ships. The establish-ment of Allied airfields at Finschhafenand t2ape Gloucester meant that the.Admiralties’ landings could be coverecladequately by Ian(l-based fighters, butKavieng operations required carrier airsupport. Even the boost in range givenSoPac fighters by airfields at CapeTorokina would not be enough to provideeffective escorts and combat air patrolsover Kavieng.

Once the ( ‘ent ral Pacific otfensi~e gotunderway wit]~ operations in the Gilberts,it appeared that mounting demands on thepacific Fleet’s shipping resources wou]dserve to put off D- DtLy at Kavieng untilabout 1 May 1944.1 Faced with the pos-sibility that there would be “a six monthsinterval between major South Pacific op-erations>’ which might “kill the momen-tum of the South Pacific drive,” Aclmiral

‘ ComSoPac Ist end, dtd 29API’44, to ComIII-I’hibFor Rept of the Seizure and Occupation ofGreen Islands, 15Fekl 5Mar44, dtd 16.4pr44.

Halsey consulted General MacArthur,who gave “his unqualified approval” to thescheme for an intermediate operation“which would keep the offensive rolling,provide another useful base, and keep thepressure on the enemy.” 2

.4s Halsey ordered his staff to preparethe plans for the seizure of the Green Is-lands, the intermediate target he had se-lected, he also directed them to study thepossibility of seizing Emimu Island in theSt. Matthias Group as an alternative toKavieng. ComSoPac felt that the timewas ripe for mot her bypass operation, onethat would achieve the same object ive asthe proposed large-scnle Kavieng assault,but at much less cost. The admiral arguedvigorously for his point, of view at PearlHarbor in late December, and in \5Tashing-ton in ,J:muary, during a snort leave hespent in the States.3

Although General Mac.krthur indicatedon 20 December that the possession of air-fields at either Kavieng or Emirau wouldaccomplish his mission of choking off ac-cess to Rabau],4 he was soon firm again inhis belief that the New Ireland base -wouldhave to be capturecl. This was the standthat SWPA representatives took at a co-ordinating conference he]cl on 27 ,Januury

2Ibid.3Halsey and Bryan, Admiraz Halsey’s Etory,

pp. 1%-188.4 SJC [MajGen Samuel J. Chamberlain] memo

for jnl, dtd 21Dec43, Subj : Conference at GHQ,20Dec43, in GHQ +3 JM.

507

508 ISOLATION OF RABAUL

at Pearl Harbor, \vllere preparations wentahead for a simultaneous assault on Ka -vieng and the Admiralties. The new ten-tative target date was 1 April, a monthand a half after SoPac forces were slatedto secure the Green Islands.

GREEN AND ADMIR.4LI’YISLANDS LANDINGA’5

Before the Green Is]a]lds ]ras chosen asthe next SoPac objective after lJougain-ville, several other prospective targets wereconsidered and rejected. A proposal toseize a foothold in the Tanga Islanclsj 35miles east of N’ew Ireland, was tllrneddown because the operation could not beetl’ectivel-y covered by lancl-bnsed fighters.Similarly, the capture of enemy airstripsat Borpop or NTanmtami \vasdiscxrded be-cause carrier support. as well as a largelanding force, would be requirecl to hamdle Japanese resistance,’ Nissan, the larg-est, of the Green Islands, was not. onlyclose enough to TOrOkin:l for .kirSolsfighter support, but also was weakly de-fended. (see Map 32.)

Located 37 miles northwest of Bukaand r~ijmiles east of ~ew Ireland, Nissanis an ovtil-slu~l}ed ~tol 1 8 miles long with

‘ Unless otherwise noted, the material in thissection is derived from : GHQ G–3 J?Il; ComIII-PhibFor Rept of the Seizure and Occupation ofGreenIs, 15Feb–15Mar44, dtd 16Apr44 (COA,NHD ) ; CO StrikeComdGreeu Rept, dtd 21May-44 (COA, NHD ) ; ComI)esron 45 (CTG 31.8) AR,28Jan–lFeb44, dtd 10Feb44 (COA, NHD ) ; SE.4rea NavOps—III; Halsey and Bryan, AdmiralHul.seg’s Story; Miller Reduction of Raboul;~lorison, ftrcalcin~ tlLe Bistnarcdcs Barrier; War-ren, “Fifth M’ in the Bismarcks. ”

EComIIIPhibFor Rept of the Seizure and O&vupation of GreenIs, 15Feb–15Mar44, dtd 24Mar-44 (COA, NHD), cancelled by ComIIIPhibForRept, dtd 16Apr44, op. cit.

room on its narrow, flat main island for acouple. of air strips. With Rabaul only115 miles away and Kavieng about a hun-dred miles farther off, the Allied objectivewas clearly vulnerable to enemy counter-attack once it was taken. By 15 February,however, the swing of fortune against theJapanese made that risk readily accepta-ble. 111 fact , i~dmiral Halsey reported

that the campaign to neutralize Rabaul>sair stren@ “had succeeded beyond our

fondest hopes.” 7

.\lt bough aeria] photographs and thescanty terrain intelligence available re-oarclill~ the (+reen Islancls indicated thateNissan was suitable for airfield develop-ment, nothing sure was known. .-4. 24-

hollr recol~l~aissance in force, to be1aul~cllecl close enou@ to D-Day to pre-

vent undue w-arning ancl consequent rein-forcement of the garrison, was decided

(Ipon to obtain detailed information. NewZealand infantrjmlen of the 30th Battal-ion n~ade LIp the lTL:Li]”Lbody of the 33t)-man scouting party: they were reinforcedby American Navy specialists who wouldconduct the necessary harbor, beach, anclairfield surveys.

The landing force loaded on boardAPDs at Vella Lavella at midday on 29,January, rehearsed the operation that eve-ning, and got underway for the target atd: LW1l.Escorted and screened by destroy-ers, the high-speed transports hove to otlNissan just after midnight and starteddebarking troops in~mediately The col-l~mn of LCYPS was led into the atolllagoon by two PT boats that had soundeda clear lmssuge during a previous recon-IIaissance mission. By 0100, all troopswere ashore near the proposed airfield site;

‘ ComSoPac 1st end, dtd 29AprM, to ComIHPhibFor Rept, dtd 16.kpr44, op. cit.

ENCIRCLEMENT509

SEIZURE OF THE GREEN ISLAND!SHOWING LANOING PLAN AT NISSAN

\ ~~~~~~~ ~~~

t5 FEBRUARY 1944

so 0 w

sMAP 32

R,E STIBI


there was no sign of enemy opposition.once it was obvious that the landing wassafely effected, -tile transports and escortsshoved off for the Tremurys in order tobe well away from Nissan by daylight.

The atoll reconnaissance started whendawn broke, and the findings were veryencouraging. Preliminary estimates thatNissan could accommodate a fail--sized air-base and that its lagoon and beaches couldhandle landing ships proved accurate,and, despite evidence that about, 100 ,Japa-nese occupied the islands, there was onlyone clash with the defenders. In an ex-change of fire with a well-hidden machinegun, an LCVP-borne scouting party lostthree. men and l~itd seven others wounded.,Sl~o\villg that Rabaul was well aware ofthe raid, seven Zekes appeared during theafternoon to strafe and bomb the landingcraft ; one sailor \vas killed and two werewounded.

Right on schedllle, at 0010 on 1 Febru-ary, the APDs and their escorts arrivedin the transport area off Nissan, Afterbreasting a choppy sea, the landing craftand the troops were :L1lback on board shipby 0145. On the return voyage, the es-corts added a bonus prize to the SLICCeSSfUlmission when the clestroyers &/,e,w’ andI?wdson sank a .Japanese submarine., the1–7’71. with :} barrage of depth charges.

,Since the reconnaissance 01 Nissan con-firmed earlier estimates of its value as an

objective, .ldmir~l Halsey’s operationplan for its capture, issuecl on 24 January,went unchanged. Admiral MTilkinson, asCommander Task Force “31, was directedto seize the (+reen Islands using Major(+eneral H. E. Barrowclough’s 3d NewZealand Division (less the 8th Brigade)

as the landing force. ComAirSols wouldprovide reconnaiwauce and air cover, and

as in previous SoPac operations, a com-nmn(ler and stati to control air activitiesat the objective. Brigadier General FieldHarris, well experienced in this type ofassignment after similar service at Bou-gainvillea, was designated CornAirGreen.To cover the landings, two cruiser-destroyer task forces would range the wa-tirs north, east, and south of the islands,while a tightly echeloned procession ofAPDs, LCIS, and I,STS ran in toward thetarget from the west, unloaded, and gotclear as soon as possible. The possibilityof a Japanese surface attack could not bediscounted with Truk presumably still themain (70mbhwd Pleet base, and an aerialcounterattack from Rabaul and Kaviengwas not only possible but probable.

The pending assault did not catch theJapanese unawares, but the incessant Air-Sols strikes on Eleventh Air Fleet basesat Rabaul, coupled with RAAF and FifthAir Force attacks on Kavieng, gave theenemy no chance for effective counter-measures. The original garrison of theGreen Islands, 12 naval lookouts and 60soldiers who operated a barge relay sta-tion, fled to the nearby Feni 1s1ands on1 February after briefly engaging the Al-lied reconnaissance force. About a thirdof these men returned to hTissan on the5th to reinforce a small naval guard de-tachment that had been sent by submarinefrom Rabaul after word of the Alliedlanding was received. The combined gar-rison stood at 102 men on 14 February,when Japanese scout planes reported thata large convoy of transports, screened bycruisers and destroyers, was headed northfrom the waters off Boug~inville’s westcoast.

Japanese aircraft harassed the oncom-ing ships throughout the moonlit nightapproach, but managed to score on only

ENCIRCLEMENT

one target, the light cruiser Nt. Lotu’$,which steamed cm despite damage anclcasualties from one bomb hit and threenear misses. The amphibious shippingreached its destination unscathed, and, at0620, the first wave of New Zealander as-sault troops from the API)s was boatedon the ]ine of departure. In order tospare the atoll% natives, there was no pre-liminary or covering fire as tlie LCVPSraced shoreward. AirSols pl:~l~es wereoverhead, however, ready to pounce onany Japanese resistance that showed, de-stroyers hmd their guns trainecl ashore,and LC1 gunbowts shepherded the 1andingcraft to the beaches.

All landings were unopposed, the firstat 0655 on small islets at the entrance tothe lag~on and those immediately follow-ing which were macle near the prospectiveairfield site. About 1.5 ,Jzpanese divebombers attempted to l~it the transportsat about this time, but, a fury of :lntiair-craft fire from every available gun causedthem to sheer off after some inefectuctlbombing. The .4irSols combat, air patrol,all from VMF-212, cli~imed six of the xt-tacking planes; the Japanese admittedlosses of four Bettys, two Kates, six Vals,and a Rufe during both the night hecklingand the unsuccessful thrust at tl~e landingships.

The New Zealanders sent patrols out :LSsoon as the landing force was firmly setup ashore, but tl~ese encountered onlyslight resistance. The operation pL’o-ceeded smoot My and without encounteringany unforeseen snags. As S0011 as the.IPDs discharged the assmult troops, theypicked Up an escort and headed south,

while 12 LGIs be:ached cm Nissan and

quickly unloaded. At 0835, an hour be-

fore the LCIS left, 7 LtSTs, each loadecl

511

with 500 tons of vehicles and bulk cargo,entered and crossed the lagoon and nosedinto shore. When the LSTS retired at1730, Admiral Wilkinson in his flagshipand the remainder of TF 31’s ships ac-companied them, leaving behind 6 L(3Tsto serve the budding base.

On D-Day, 5,800 men had been

landed—to stay. Although there werealmost 100,000 .Japanese troops locatedclose by on the Gazelle Peninsula and NewIreland, they were held at bay by superiorAllied air and naval strength. The situa-tion of the Japanese units located southof the newest SoPac outpost, was ‘hopel-ess” in Genera] Mac.& -t,hur’s view, and hereported to the ,JCS that the successfullanding “rings the curtain down on [the]Solomons campaign.” s

Despite the overwhelming odds againstthem, the defenders of Nissan Atoll foughttenaciously against the New Zealanders,killing 10 and wounding 21 of the 3d ~i-vision’s men in 5 days of mopping-up ac-tion.g The last pocket, of resistance wasnot wiped out until the 19th when the Jap-anese remnant sent .4dmird Kusaka themessage: ‘(lve are charging the enemy andbeginning radio silence.” I“

What little help Rabaul could offer itsdoomed outguard on Nissan was confinedto night, bombing, and even that provedcostly and futile for the Japanese. Theattacking planes lost three of their num-ber to VMF ( N) –53I Venturas vectored totheir targets by one of the squadron’s GCIteams. Even the nuisance value of nightraiders was lost when the (lom.bingd Fleetordered all flyable aircraft out of Rabaul

‘ Mar.krthur disps to Marshall, dtd 14Feb44and 15FeWM, in GHQ G-3 JnJ.

‘ Gillespie, New Zealand History, p. 188.‘0NE Area NavO@-IIT, p, 62.

512

on the 19th. With the departure of de-fending Zekes, the New Britain base laywide open to AirSols attack, particularlyto strikes that could be mounted or stagedfrom fields in the Green Islands. Evenmore important, Kavieng, where the,Japanese still had some planes, was withineasy reach of fighters and light bombersdispatched by Conl.4irGreen.

Seabee units outdid themselves and sur-passed all base development goals. Thefighter field was able to handle its first,emere%ncy landing on 4 March, the dateon which Admiral Wilkinson passed com-mand of the Green Islands to General13arrowclough. Three days later, AirSolsfighters staged through Green, as Nissanwas usually called, to attack Kavieng.Completion of the bomber field was sched-uled for 1 April, but the first group of lightbombers, 36 SBDS and 24 TBFs from Piva,was able to stage for a strike and hit

Kavieng on 16 March. On the 19th,VMSB-243, VMTB-134, and part ofVB-98 were detached from Strike Com-mand, Piva and shifted to Green andGeneral Harris’ command.

The light bombers did not get to settlein at their home field for a while though,but shared instead the fighter strip withthe Corsairs of VMF-114 and –212. TheThirteenth Air Force pre-empted thebomber field when its B-24s landed onGrem en route to strikes on Truk. Untilhandstands for the Liberators were com-pleted on 15 .4pril, the Marine and Navybombers competed with Seabee construc-tion equipment for room. ‘(Frequentlytrucks hauling coral would be sandwichedbetween sections of planes taxiing andoften [anj entire strike [group] wonldinch by fighters parked along the ends ofthe taxiway. Eacl~ T13F wonld nave to

ISOLATION OF RABAUL

taxi with folded wings and unfold themonly when in position along the strip.’) 11

The temporary crowding served a usefulpurpose, however; it made maximum useof Green’s airfields at a time when manyof the missions flown by Airsols planeshelped isolate the newest Bismarck’s bat-tleground, the Admiralties. The seizureof these islands, 200 miles from l$~ewakand 260 nliles from Kavieng, snapped thelast link between General Imamura andhis l?igh.th ~trva ~lmny troops fighting onNew Guinea.

In terms of their eventual usefulness,the Admiralties far outshone any otherstrategic objective that was seized duringthe operations against Rabaul. SeeadlerHarbor, contained in the hook-like em-brace of the two main islands, Manns andr.os Negros, is, if anything, as fine asRabaul’s harbor and well able to handlewarships and auxiliaries of all sizes. In1942, at Lorengau village on Manus, thelargest island, the Japanew had built anairfield and followed up in 1943 by con-structing another at Momote Plantationon Los Negros. Both fields were used asstaging points for traffic between Rabauland New Guinea. (See Map 33.)

When .411ied advances on the HuonPeninsula and in the Solomons threatenedthe Bismarcks area, Admiral Kusaka andGeneral Imamura both ordered more oftheir troops into the Admiralties. A navalgarrison unit from New Ireland was ableto get through to Loren~~u in early De-cember, but ships carrying Army rein-forcements from Japan and the Palauswere either s~~nkby American submarinesor turned back by the threat of their tor-pedoes. In late ,January, Imarnura clis-

patched one infantry battalion from

“ CO StrikeComd(;reen Rept, op. cit.,I).4.


514 ISOLATION OF R.4BAU14

Kavieng and another from Rabaul onboarcl destroyers that reached Seeadlerdespite harxssrnent by Alliecl aircraft.These soldiers, together with those of atransport reg-iment and the naval contin-gent already present, nl~de up a formid-able defense. force of about 4,400 men.

Realizing that he was charged with de-fending a prize that the Allies could illafford to ignore, the ,Japanese commanderin the Admiralties decidecl that, deceptionwas one of his most effective weapons.When General Kenney’s planes attackedLorengau and Momote airfields, the enemyleader ordered his men not to fire back.He tolcl them, in fact, not to show them-selves at all in daylight. His ruse had thedesired effect: reconnaissance planes couldspot few traces of enemy activity. On 23February, three 13-25s “cruised overManus and IJoS Negros for ninety minutesat minimum altitude without having a shotfired at them or seeing any signs of ac-tivity either on the airdromes or along thebeaches.”’2 To .4merican Generals Ken-ney and Whitehead, the situation seemedripe for a.reconnaissance in force, one thatmight, open the way for an early occupa-tion of the Admiralties and the consequentupgrading of the target dates for all lateroperations.

General MacArthur, impressed by thepromise of a quick seizure of an importantobjective, accepted General Kenney’s pro-posal that a small force carried on destroy-ers and APDs land on Los Negros andseize Mornote airfield, repair it, and holdit ready for reinforcement by air if itproved necessary. In case Japanese re-sistance proved too stiff, the reconnais-sance force could be withdrawn by sea.

UCraven and Gate, Guadalcanal to Saipnn,p. 559.

If, on the other hand, the enemy garrisonwas weak, the original landin~ forcewould be strong enough to hold its ownand open the way for reinforcing echelons.Acting on General Mac.<rthnr’s orders,

issued on 24 February, the 1st CavalryDivision (Major General Innis P. Swift)organized :t task force of about 1?000 men,

most of them from its 1st Brigade, tomake the initial landing. If all went well,follow-up echelons would bring in morecavalrymen pllw Seabees and other sup-porting troops to mop up the ,Japccneseandbegin base construction. Commandingthe reconnaissance force, its backbone the,2d Squadron, 5th Cavalry, was BrigadierGeneral William C. Chase. The SWPA’Sveteran amphibious force commander, Ad-miral 13arbey, was responsible for the con-duct of the operation. General Mac-Arthur decided that, both he and AdmiralKinkaicl would accompany the attackgroup that transport ed Chase:s troops inorder to evaluate at first hand the resultsof the reconnaissance.

On 27 February, two days before D-Day, a small party of ALAMO scoutslanded on Los Negros about a mile southof Momote; they reported the jungle thereto be a bivouac area alive with enemytroops. The scouts’ finding was too in-conclusive to bring about any change in

the size of Chase’s force, but the informa-tion did result in the detail of a cruiser

and two destroyers to blanket the bivouacarea with naval gunfire when the landing

was attempted. The rest of the covering

force, another cruiser and two more de-stroyers, was assigned Lorengau andSeeadler Harbor as an area of coverage.Nine clestroyers of the attack group, ewJltransporting about 57 troopers, were aS-signed fire support, areas which would di-

ENCIRCLEMENT 515

re.ctly cover the landing attempt. ThreeAPDs, each with 170 men on board, wouldland the first three waves of assault troops.

Tl~e chosen landing are~, a beach nezrthe airfield, could be reached only througha X)-yard-wide opening in the fringingreef that closed the narrow entrance to asmall harbor 0]1 tile eastern shore of 1.OSNe%ros. The site seemecl so improbablefor a landing that the ,Japauese concen-trated most of their strengtll fo meet anattack from the Seeadler Harbor side ofthe island.

On 27 February, the 1st Cavalry Divi-sion troops boarded ship at Oro Bay, andthe attack ~wouP moved out to rendezvouswith its escort off cape sudest. Througha heavy overcast on the morning of the29th, the American ships approached theAdmiralties and deployed to bombard-ment, and debarkation stations off the coastof Los h’egros. At 0728, three B–241sbombed Momote, but l)oor visibility can-celled out most of the rest of the prepara-

tory air strikes. Cruisers and destroyersbegan shelling the islaud at (Y740and con-tinued firing as the troops in LC17PS

crossed the line of departure, 3,700 yardsout, and headed for the beach. Fifteenminutes later, as the first wave passedthrough the harbor channel, enemy ma-chine guns on the headlands opened fireon the boats while heavier guns took onthe cruisers and destroyers. Counterbat-tery fire was prompt and effective; theJapanese guns fell silent. At 0810, a starshell fired from the cruiser Phoenix sig-nalled the encl of naval gunfire and

brought in three B–2%, all that, hadreached the target, in the foul flying

weather, to strafe i~nd bomb the gun posi-tions on the headlands.

The first troops were on the beach at0817 and moving inland; the few Jzpanesedefenders in the vicinity pulled back inprecipitous haste. Enemy gun crews man-ning tl~e lveapons interdicting the en-trance channel began firing again whenuaval gunfire lifted. Destroyers poundedthe gun posit ions immediately and drovethe crews to cover, a pattern of action that~vas repeated throughout the morning.Tile American landings continued despitethe ,Japanese fire, and by 1250, GeneralChase’s entire command had landed. Thecost of the operotion thus far was twosoldiers killed and three wounded, a tolldoubled by casualties among the LCVPcrews. Five enemy dead were counted.

The cavalrymen advanced across the air-field during the afternoon, but pulled backto man a tight 1,500-yard-long perimeteranchored on the beach for night defense.General 31acArthur and Admiral Kinkaidwent ashore about 1600, conferred withGeneral Chase, and heard the reports thatthe cavalrymen had run across signs ofa considentble number of enemy troops.ikfter assessing the available intelligence,and viewing the situation personally, theSWPA commander ordered General Chaseto stay put and hold his position at theairfield’s eastern edge. As soon as thesenior commanders were back on boardship, orders were dispatched to send upmore troops and supplies to reinforce the

embattled soldiers. Two destroyers re-mained offshore to furnish call-fire sup-port when the rest of the task group de-

parted at 1729.The first of the counterattacks that the

cavalrymen expected, ancl had prepared

for as best they could with their limitedmeans, came that night. The Japanese on

Los Negros, who outnumbered the Ameri-


cans handily, did not take advantage oftheir strength and made no headway in aseries of smnll-scale attacks that some-times penetrated the perimeter bl~t neverseriously threatened the integrity of theposition. ~~ith daylight, American p:l-trols pusllecl out from their lines until theyran into heavy enemy resistance, thenpulled back to let the tlestroyers and theforce’s two 75mn~ howitzers fire on t]leJapanese. .kircraft macle nine supplydrops for the cavalrymen during the day,and, towarcl evening, Fifth Air Forceplanes bombed the enemy positions, de-spite the ineffectllal attacks of se~eral,Japanese .lrnly fighters wl~icl~ showed upfrom Wewak. There was an unsuccessfulassault on the cawtl rymen’s lines at clusk,and another night of infiltration attemptsthat endecl with a two-ally count of 147,Japanese dead within American lines.

By dawn of 2 Mnrch, the ,Japnnese hadlost their clmnce to clrive out the recon-naissance force, for the first reinforcementechelon, 1,500 more troopers and 428 Sewbees, stoocl offshore. An American de-stroyer and two minesweepers of the land-ing ship escort attempted to force the en-trance of Seeacller Harbor, but uncovereda hornet’s nest of coast defense guns whichforced them to sheer off. Warned nwayfrom Seeadler for the time being, the am-phibious craft landed their troops andcargo on the beaches guarded by Chase’smen.

Once the fresh troops were ashore, Gen-eral Chase attacked and seized the airfieldagainst surprisingly ]ight, resistance.There was ample eviclence, however, thatthe Japanese were readying an all-out at-tack. It came on the night of 3-4 Marchla night, of fllrious fighting thilt S:tT\ 61

Americans killed and 244 wounde(l, witl~9 of the deacl and 38 of tlie wounded Sc:t-

bees, who backed L~pthe cavalry’s lines.At the. focal point of the attick, 167 en-emy soldiers fell; hundreds more fell allalong the perimeter.

The remainder of the 1st Cavalry 13ivi-sion joinecl its a({vance forces in the Ad-miralties during the following week. The,Japanese on Los ATegros were either killedor driven in ret rest to Manus. Air andsnip bombardment. eliminated the enemyguns that ll~cl shieldecl tl~e Seeadler en-trance, and on 9 March, the 2d cavalryBrigade entered the harbor and landed onLos Negros. Tlm cavalry division com-n~al~der, Crenerd Swift,> now planned theseizure of Lorengau airdrome and the cap-ture of Manus.

On 15 March, following a series of ac-tions that clearecl the small islands fring-ing the harbor of the enemy> the 2d Bri-gade landed on Manus and fought its w-ayto the nirfield. Even though the nmin ob-jecti~e was quickly secured, the big islandwas far from won. It was two months be-fore the combat phase of the operation wasended and the last organized resistance inthe Admiralties faded. The connt of Jap-anese dead reached 3~280,75 men were cap-tured, ancl another 1?100 were estimated tohave died and been buried by theirown comrades. The 1st Cavalry llivisionlost 326 troopers and had 1,189 of its menwoundec{ in the protracted and bitterfighting.

While the battle raged, the naval con-strllction battalions and the Army engi-neers turned to on the airfields ancl navalbase projected for the islands. ~fomotewas operltion~l I>y 7 March, and, on the!X.h, a squadroil of Australian Kitty hawksfrom Kiriwinn n~oved in as part of theg:~rrisol). The RA.I F planes, soon reil~-forced, flew cover for B–25 bombers atfirst, al~d then }~egan to fly bombing an(]

ENCIRCLEMENT 517


strafing strikes of their own in support. ofthe cavalrymen’s offensive. On 16 March,the Australian squadrons were given theprimary mission of protecting all Alliedshipping in the vicinity of the .4dmiral-ties.=3

When I.orengau zirfield proved unsuit-able for extensive development, the engi-neers and Seabees shifted their tools andmachines to Mokerang Plantation on LosNegros, about 7,OOOyards northwest ofMomote on the See~dler shore. The newfield was operational by 21 April. Thenaval base, including two landing stripsfor carrier aircraft on outlying islands,flourished. Manus, as the whole base com-plex was generally known, grew to be asimportant in staging anti supporting Al-lied operations during 1944 as Guadal-canal had been in 1!)43 and Espiritu Santoin 1942.

.EMIRA U : THE LAST LINK 14

At one time in the planning for the op-erations that would follow Bougainvilleaand Cape Gloucester, General MacArthurand his staff had considered it necessaryto make a landing at Hansa Bay betweenthe ,Japanese Eighteenth .4rmy’s bases atMadang and Wewak. The early and suc-

“ Odgers, RAAF Against Japan, pp. 174-180.“ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this

section is derived from : GHQ G–3 Jnt; CTF 31Rept of the Seizure and Occupation of EmirauIsland, 20hlm-–7.4pr44, dtd 16Apr44; CG EmirauLdgFor Rept of Ops, 15Mar-9Apr, dtd20Apr44; 1st MAW Feb–Apr~4 WarDs ; KennethW. Condit and Edwin T. Turnbladh, Hold High$k~ Torc)L, A History of the hth Mari?tes ( Wash.in~ton: HiWBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, 1960) ; Halseyand Bryan, Admiral Halsey’s S’tor~ ; Miller, Re-duction of Rabaal; Morison, Breaking the Bi.s-marclcs Barrier; Rentz Bougaineille and theNort,hern Solomons.

cessful move into the Admiralties, fromwhich planes could easily interdict bothenemy positions, crystallized opinionagainst the Hansa Bay venture. In itsstead, on 5 March, MacArthur proposed tothe J“CS that he completely bypass theMadang-Wewak area and take a long stepforward in his advance toward the Philip-pines by seizing Hollandia in NetherlandsNew Guinea. In the same message, thegeneral reaffirmed his conviction thatKavieng had to be taken to insure the com-plete neutralization of Rabaul.

In Washington, where the need for tak-ing Kkvieng had been seriously ques-tioned, considerable weight was obviouslygiven to Admiral Halsey’s opinion, voicedin person in January ~that “the geographyof the area begged for another bypass,” Isand that:

. . . the seizure of m airfield site in thevicinity of the St. Matthias Group appearedto be a quick, cheap o~ration which wouldinsure the complete neutralization of Ka-vieng and complete the isolation of Rabauland the 13ismarcks in general. Further-more, the Carolines would be brought justthat much nearer as a target for our ownaerial operation.’~

The fact that Admiral Nimitz joined inrecommending that the Kavieng operationbe dropped in favor of the much less ex-pensive seizure of Emirau may have beendecisive.

On 12 March, the J(2S issued a new di-rective for future operations in the Pa-cific, canceling Kavieng and Hansa Bayand ordering the capture of Hollandiaand Emirau, the latter as soon as possible.

General MacArthur immediately issued

“ Halsey and Bryan, Admiral Halsey’s Lltory,p. 188.

‘6 ComSoPac 1st end, dtd lNIay44, to CTF 31Rept, dtd 16Apr44, op. tit.

ENCIRCLEMENT 519

orders halting preparations for the Ka-vieng attack, then only 18 days away, anddirected .4dmiral Halsey to seize Emirauinstead, using a minimum of ground com-ba~ forces. In his turn, Con~SoPac or-dered his amphibious force commander,Admiral N’ilkinson, to take the new ob-jective by 20 March and recommendedthat the 4th Marines be used as the landingforce. The message from Halsey at Kou-mea to Wilkinson at, Guadzlcamd was re-ceived early on the morning of 15 Marchwhen loading had already started forKavieng.

The I Marine Amphibious Corps, com-posed of the 3d Marine Division and 40thInfantry Division, had been the chosenlanding force for Kavieng. For that op-eration, the 3d Division was reinforced bythe 4th Marines, and the regiment wasready to load out when word was receivedof the change in plans. Fortunately, theheadquarters of III Amphibious Force,lMAC, the 4th Marines, and the transportgroup which was to carry the troops to thetarget were close together and planninggot underway immediately. General Gei-ger notecl that the several staffs “had onlyabout six or eight hours to work up theEmirau plans”’? that had resulted fromAdmiral Halsey’s earlier interest in theisland as a SoPac objective. Late in theafternoon of the 15th, the admiral flew into Guadalcanal from h’ew Caledonia andquickly approved the concept of operationsthat had been developed.

Commodore Lawrence F. Reifsnider wasto command the amphibious operation,with Brigadier General Alfred H. Noble,.4DC of the 3d Marine Division, in com-

‘7 MajGen Roy S. Geiger ltr to LtGen Alexnn-der A. ~-rlndegrift, (ltd 2531ar44 (Vwrdegrift Per-sonal Correspondence File, 13QMC ).

mand of the landing force. General Noble,who was also slated to become the island>sfirst commancler, had a small staff madeup of IMAC and 3d Division personnel.An air commancl unit for Emirau, underMarine Colonel William L. McKittrick,was formecl from the larger headquartersthat, had been orgiinizecl to control airol)erat ions at Kavieng.

The 4th Marines, commanded by Lieu-tenant Colonel Alan Shapley, was thenewly formed successor to the regimentcaptured on Corregidor.ls It was activatedon 1 February from former raider units,after the Commandant decided there wasno longer enough need to justify the exist-ence of battalions specially raised forhit-and-run tactics.” On the 22d, the Com-mandant directed General Geiger to rein-force the regiment by the addition of apack howitzer battalion, engineer, medi-cal, tank, and motor transport companies,and reconnaissance, ordnance, war dog,and service and supply platoons. Only thetank and medical companies had beenadded by the date the regiment sailed forEmirau. For the landing operation, the3d Division provided amphibian tractorand pioneer companies and motor trans-port and ordnance platoons; the 14th De-fense Battalion furnished a compositeautomatic weapons battery.

The pace of preparations for Emirauwas so swift that it put a temporary crimp

“ The story of the 4th Marines’ defense ofCorregidor’s beaches it told in Part IV of VolumeI of this series.

“ The Headquarters and Service Company ofthe Ist Raider Regiment and the Ist, 3d, and4th Raider Battalions become the Headquartersand Service Company and the lst, 2d, and 3(1Battalions of the 4th Marines. The Xl RaiderIMttalion formed the regimental weapons cmn-pnny.

691–360 0—6:3—–34


QMASSAU KAVIENG AND EMIRAUWITH INSET SHOWING THE 4th MARINES

LANDING PLAN OF EMIRAUJ< EMIRAU

12sle 0510202040 $oBo ~o~

Q90 100

MlLES

ST MATTHIAS ISLANDS

NEW HANOVER

~h/IIRAll DJAUL

I ~4 2~4

3&J4

MAP 34 R.F STIBIL

ENCIRCLEMENT 521

in JCS plans for the employment of theMarines released by the cancellation ofKavieug. on 14 March, MacArthur re-ceived and passed on to Halsey for com-pliance, a J(lf!l directive tlmt, the 3dMarine Division, the 4th Marines, and the9th and 14th Defense Battalions were tobe released to the control of CinCPOAimmediately. By the time the. admiralreceived this order, it was too late to re-place the -lth Marines and still meetEmirau’s D-Day of 20 March; some pla-toons of the 14th Defense Battalion werealready on board ship. Consequently,ComSoPac outlined the situation to Ad-miral hTimitz and promised to release allunits required for future operations assoon as possible. In view of the circum-stances, Admiral Nimit.z concurred in thetemporary transfer of troops for use atEmirau.

The target for the operation is an irregu-larly shaped island eight miles long, hillyand heavily wooded. lt lies in the south-eastern portion of the St. Matthias Group,about, 25 miles from Massa.u, the otherprincipal islancl. Situated 90 miles northw-est of Kavieng, Em irau was consideredsuitable for development as a base forfighters, bombers, and torpedo boats. Allintelligence indicated that the ,Japanesehad not occupied the islands in any ap-preciable strength, and a photo recon-naissance mission flown by 17D–1 on 16March revealed no trace of enemy activityor installations. (See Map 34.)

Even though little opposition wm ex-pected, detailed provisions for strong airand naval gunfire support were a part ofthe Emirau operation plan. The navalbombardment gro~lp that was to haveshelled Kavieng under the cancelled plmwas orderecl to hit tile tow]] :mtl its :lir-

fields zn-jv-ay as insurance a~tinst inter-

ference from the enemy. While it was an-ticipated that there would be no need forpreliminary bombardment of Emirau bl-fore the l:anding, t~vo destroyers of the es-cort were preparec] to deliver call fire, andplanes from t~l-o supporting escort car-riers were to be overhead, ready to strafeand bomb as necessary. The cruisers andother destroyers of the escort would takestation to screen the lancling. Should a<Japanese surf ace threat materialize, the4 battleships and 15 destroyers poundingKa.vieng on D-Day would be available asz -weighty back-up power. On Green,planes of VMSB-243, VMTB–134, andTTB–98 were on standby for possible em-ployment, reinforcing the carrier planes.

The formidable support preparations forEmirau made the unopposed amphibiousoperation seem anticlimactic. The load-ing, movement, and landing of GeneralNoble’s force was conducted in an aura oforderly haste. ~Newshipping assignments,necessitated by the change in plans,forced the 4th Marines to sort and re-distribute all the supplies in its beach-sidedumps during the night of 15 March.I.oading began the next morning and con-tiuued through the 17th when the troopswent on board ship, and Commodore Reif -snider-s attack ~goup sailed from Guadal-canal.

The ships left in two echelons, groupedby cruising speed and destined to ren-

dezvous on D minus 1. The Marines of

the two assault battalions, 1/4 and 2/4, wereon board nine APDs; the remainder of the

landing force traveled to the target onthree LSDS and an APA. One LSD trans-ported the 66 LVTs that would land the:wsault wxx-es o~-er Emirau’s fringing reef,allotl]er carried three LCTS, two of themloaded with tanks, and the third had three

5!22

LCTS on boarcl bearing radar and antiair-craft guns.

At 0605 on 20 March, the attack grouparrived in the transport aren, the LSDlaunched her LVTS, and the assanlt troopstransferred to the tractors using the APDs’boats which were supplemented by thosefrom the .4PA. Then, as the men of thereserve battalion, 3/4, scrambled down thenets into boats to be reacly for enlploy -ment wherever needed, Corsairs of ?~MF-218 flashed by overhead to make. a lastminute check of the island for signs of theJapanese. Right 011scheclll]e, the assallltwaves crossed the island’s encircling reefand went ashore on two beaches about1,000 yards apart near the eastern end ofthe island, while a detachment of 2/4 se-cured a small islet that sheltered the east-ernmost beach. Soon after the assaulttroops landed, the 3d Battalion’s boatsgrounded on the reef, and the reserve-waded ashore through knee-deep water.During these landings, a few shots werefired in return to supposed enemy opposi-tion, but subsequent investigation showedthat there were no ,Japanese on the island.

Had there been opposition, one hitchin the landing plan could have, been fate-ful. The tanks were not ]aunched in timefor the assault, since their LSD’s floodingmechanism was only partially operative.A fleet tug with the escort was able todrag the loaded L(2Ts out through thestern gate by means of a towline. .41-though by this time the success of landingwas assured, the tanks were run ashoreanyway both as insurance and for training.

Supplies began coming in about, 1100,first from the APDs ancl then from theAPA, with the LCTS helping the ships’boats to unload. By nightfall, 844 tons ofbulk cargo had been landed in addition tothe weapons and equipment that went

ISOLATION OF RABAUL

ashore in tl~e assault. All the ships sailed

just after sunset, lea~’ing General Noble’sforce of 3,727 men to hold the islancl and

prepare for follom-up echelons.Emirau’s nztives told the N1arines that

only a handful of ,Japanese had been on

the islancl, aud they had left about twomonths before the landing. Intelligence

indicated tl~at there were enemy fuel andration dumps on Massau and a radio sta-

tion on a nearby island. (ln 23 March,destroyers shelled the areas where the re-ported installations lay and, according tolater native reports, succeeded in damag-ing the dumps and radio enough to causethe ,Japanese to finish the job and try toescape to Kavieng. On the 2’7th, a de-stroyer intercepted a large canoe carryingenemy troops about 40 miles south ofMassan: the ,Japanese opened up withrifles and lnachine guns, and the ship’s re-turn fire destroyed them all. This episodefurnished the last and only vestige ofenemy resistance in the St. MatthiasGroup.

The first supply echelon reached Emirauon 25 March, bringing with it the men andequipment of a battalion of the 25th NavalConstruction Regiment. The Seabees andthe supplies landed over beaches anddumps that had been prepared by the 4thMarines. Five days later, three morenaval construction battalions arrived toturn to on the air base and light naval fa-cilities. An MTB squadron began patrol-ling cm the 26th while its base was beingreadied. Sites for two 7,000-foot, bomberstrips and a field 5,000-feet-long for fight-ers were located and surveyed before themonth’s end. On 31 March, heavy con-struction on the airfields began.

In view of the island’s projected role asan important air base, General Noble’s re-lief as island commander was a naval avia-

ENCIRCLEMENT

tor, Major General James T. Moore, whohad been Commanding General, 1st Ma-rine Aircraft Wring, since 1 February.General Moore, with advance elements ofthe wing headquarters squadron, arrivedon Emirau on 7 April, following by twodays the forwarcl echelon of MAG-12.Relief for the 4th Marines by the island’sgarrison, the 147th Infantry Regiment,took place on 11 April, and tl~e Marinesleft on the same ships that brought theArmy unit. At noon on the 12th, actingon Admiral Wilkinson’s orders as opera-tion commander, General Moore formallyassumed command of all ground forceson Emirau.

Throughout April, airfielct constructioncontinued at a steady but rapid tempo inorder to ready the island for full use inthe interdiction of ,Japan’s Bismarcksbases. The first emergency landing wasmade on the 14tl) when a Nav y fightercame down on one of the bomber strips.On the 29th, SC.kT transports began oper-ating regularly from the new fields, and,on the 2d of May, the first squadron of theMAG-12 garrison, VMF-115, arrived andsent up its initial combat air patrol. Inthe next two weeks, several more Marinetighter, dive, i~nd torpedo bomber squad-rons moved up from Bougainvillea andGreen. By mid-May, Ernirau was an op-erating partner in the ring of SWPA andAirSo]s bases that throttled Rabaul andKavieng.

The prime target at tlie hub of the en-circling Allied airfields, Rabaul, had no

n Unless otherwise noted, the material in thissection is derived from : SOP(ZC AC1 Rept.s; Off

of NavAirCIntel, Com SoPac, The Reduction ofRabaul, 19Feb-15May44, dtd 8Jun44, hereafter

523

respite from attack even while the SNWAforces were seizing the Admiralties andSoPac troops were securing Emirau. Ifanything, the aerial offensive, against theenemy base inte.nsifieci, since the absenceof interceptors permitted both a system-at ic program of dest ruc.tion and t.l~eem-ployment of fighters as bombers.

First on the list of objectives to be elimi-nated was Rabaul proper. ‘1’he town wasdivided into 14 target areas which, inturn, were further subdivided into two orthree parts; each was methodically -wipedout. Two weeks after the opening attackof 28 February, the center of the townwas gutted, and most strikes, thereafter,were aimed at more widely spaced struc-tures on the outskirts. By 20 April, only122 of the 1,400 buildings that had oncecomprised Rabaul were still standing andthese were “So scattered that it was nolonger a paying proposition to try to makeit a 100 percent job.:’ 21

l$~eeks before the AirSols staff reachedthis conclusion, the task of reducing thetown to rubble and charred timbers wasleft pretty much to the fighter-bombers,while the B–24s, 13–2ss, sBDs, and TBFsconcentrated on the tmo largest enemysupply dumps, one about two miles west

of Rapopo and the other on the peninsu-la’s north coast three miles west of Ra-haul. Bomber pilots found that 500-

Reduction of Rubaul; ComAirNorSols WarD, 1*30Jun44, hereafter ComAirNort301s WarD withappropriate months; MASP Correspondence on

Ops and TacEmpl of Units, 194=4; Z’h&teenth-AF Data; Air Sols Ftr-StrikeComd WarD, 15Ma~-lJun44, dtd 15Ju144; 18t MAW Mar-Jun&j

WarDs; 17ighth Area ArmyOp8; SE Area ATav-.AirOpa-V; Craven and Cate, Guadalcanal goSa@an; Ross, RNZAF; Sherrod, If arAirHi.st.USSBS, Allied Campaign Against Rabaul.

“ Rcdurtion of Rabal[l. p. 4.

524

pound bombs containing clusters of 128smaller incendiary bombs were more ef-fective than high explosive in laying wasteto these sprawling areas of storage tents,sheds, and ammunition piles.

Over the course of three months, dur-ing which the major destruction of above--ground install ations was accomplished, anaverage of 85 tons of bombs a day wasdropped on Rabaul targets. The attackwas a team etf’ort, done in part, by all theplane types assigned to AirSols command.The. tw-o Liberator groups of the Thir-teenth Air Force provided a normal dailyeffort of 24 planes until 23 March, whenall heavy bombers were diverted to attackson Truk and other targets in the Caro-lines. The Thirteenth’s 13–25 group alsosent up an average of 24 planes a day.The strength of Marine and Navy lightbombers varied during the period, butgenerally there were three SBD and threeT13F squadrons at Piva and three SBJ3and one TBF sqlladron at C~reen; in allabout 160–170 planes were available, witha third to a half that number in daily use.Even when the ,Japanese attacked the To-rokina perimeter in March, and much ofthe air support of the defending Armytroops was furnished by Piva-based lightbombers, there was little letup in the re-lentless attack on Rabaul. The SBD-TBF squadrons at Green increased theirefforts, which were supplemented dailyby the attacks of 48-60 figl~ters equippedto operate as bombers.

Once the Zekes disappeared from thesky over the Bismarcks, .4irSols had asurplus of fighter lJlanes. Consequently,all Army P–3%, P–3%, and P-40s, andRNZAF P-4os, were fitted with bombracks, after which they began making reg-

ular bombing i~ttacks. At first, the usual

ISOLATION OF RABAUL

loading was one 500-pound bomb for theAiracobras, Warhawks, and Kittyhawksand two for the Lightings, but beforelong, the single-engine planes were fre-quently carrying one half -ton bomb apieceand the P–38s, two. Except for somebombing trial runs by Corsairs against

targets on New Ireland, AirSols, Navyand Marine fighters in this period con-fined their attacks on ground txrgets tostrafing runs. Later in the year, all fighteraircraft habitually carried bombs.zz

The pattern of attacks was truly “clock-round,” giving the enemy no rest, withthe nighttime segment of heckling raids

dominated by Mitche]ls. .4rmy B-2%dre-w the j ob at first,, but with the entry in-to action of VMB413 in mid-March, the

task gradually was given over to MarinePB,Js. The Marine squadron, the first offive equipped with Mitchells to serve inthe South and Southwest, Pacific, provedparticularly adept at night, operations aswell as the more normal daylight raids.General Matheny, the veteran bombercommander, specially commended the unitfor its development of “the dangerous,tiresome mission of night heckling againstthe enemy bases to the highest perfectionit has attained in the fourteen months Ihave been working under ComAirSols.” 23

The object of the heckling missions was

to have at least one plane over the targetall night long. For the enemy troops be-low, the routine that was developed must

“ Much of the pioneering work in perfectingthe Corsair as a fighter-bomber was done byMarine squadrons operating against enemy is-lands in the Marshalls. Their story will becovered in the fourth volume of this series.

a Quoted in VMB413 Hist, lMar4&l.Ju145,dtd 15 Ju145, D. 5.



have been nerve-wracking. .\t dusk, thefirst PBJ:

. . . appefired over Rnbanl just as the.Jalmnw+ bezan their r?~eninx meal. ltdrollped several bombs ~ln(l Ix.tired. 3[inuteslater, it came in :Ig:lin, hun(lrwls of feetIolver. 310re bombs (lroppe(l :mcl it cirrled.111-ily. This pattern !yas repeated nutil, onits last run, the pl:lne str:lfed the are:~.

.\s the sound of its n]t)t(jr die(l a\\-ay, the.J:ilxmese heard the second l)lill)~ (,omin~inon schedule to relle:lt the nl:l[l(lenin~l}rt~c.wswhiclr went (jn night after night.”’

The enemy troops that, were subjected tothe mass air raids of spring 1944 were sur-prisingly better ofi than aerial observerscould tell. Spurred on by the punishingattacks which scored heavily against majortargets, the ,Japanese dispersed a substan-tial portion of their supplies out of sightunder cover of the jungle. Even lnoresignificant was the fact that every man notbedridden or wounded labored to dig cavesand tunnels to shelter the troops and mate-riel needed to fight, should the Rabaul areabe invaded. By the end of May, enoughsupplies were underground to insure thatthe ,Japanese could make a prolonged de-fense. The digging-in process kept LIpuntil the end of the war, making Rabaul afortress in fact as well as name.

The responsibility for the defense of theRabaul area was a dual one, with ,JapaneseArmy and Navy troops holding separatesectors. The battered town and the moun-tainous peninsula east of it,, from PraedPoint to the northern cape, was defendedby elements of the. Sowthemt Area Fleet.Other naval troops, primarily antiaircraftartillery and air base units converted toinfantry, held positions in the vicinity of

2$.Tohn A. DeChant. Dcvilbirda, Tl!r Stor~/ ofUnittvl States .Vurine <’orp<y .4viation. in W@rlft~ar 11 (A’ew York : Harper and Brothers, 1947),p. 140.

Vunakanau and Tobera airfields. ~~ghth.4rea Army ciefended the rest of GazellePeninsula north of the Keravat and Wa-ranxoi Rivers. General Imamura, deeplyimbued with tlie offensive spirit, of ,Japa -nese military tradition, prepared battleplans which would meet an invasion at-tempt, wherever it occurred, with vigorouscounterattacks. If all else failed, he feltthat “the members of the whole armyshould commit the suicide attack.>’ 2s Ad-miral Kusaka believed it was his primaryduty to keep “his forces safe as long aspossible and planned to hold on and de-stroy the enemy fighting strength>’ ‘Gby atenzcious defense of the elaborate fortifica-tions tile Navy hmd constructed in the hillsback of Rabaul. Despite the, difference inphilosophy of ultimate employment, how-e~7er, officers and men of both servicesworked together well> readying themselvesto meet an attack that never came.

The -g-owing desperation of the Japa-nese position in the 13ismarcks was bornehome to General Imamura by an orderwhich the area army’s assistant chief ofstaff characterized as “a cruel, heartless,unreasonable measure,” 27 On 25 March,the units on New Guinea which had beenunder Imamura’s command, the FourthAir and Ejqhteenth Amniee, were trans-ferred by Zm.p~rial General Zeadqu.artersto the control of the Second Area AwrLydefending western New Guinea. Since bythis time the only contact the Eighth Ama.4 m,y had with its erstwhile troops wasby radio, the trausfer was a practictil move,

“ Eigltth Area .4rm@ps, p. 191.= Ibid.“ Entry of 15M:lr44 in CinCPac–CinCPOA Item

N-O.11,955. Diary of Maj Gen Masatake Kimihara,1,Tan–9,Jun44, in CinCPac-Cin CPOA Translationsh’o. 1, dtd 310ct44.

ENCIRCLEMENT

however disheartening its effect may havebeen on the army statf ~t Rabaul. &if tosoothe the sense of isolation and loss,Tokyo directed General Imamura to de-fend Rabaul as a foothold from whichfutl~re offensive operations would belaunched.

The emptiness of this promise of futlu-eJapanese offensives was emphasized bythe, rhanges Rabaul’s impotence wroughtin the dispositions of Allied forces in theSouth and Southwest Pacific. From thestart of the New Georgia operation, mostof the combat troops, planes, and ships as-signed to Admiral Halsey’s command hzldoperated in the SWP.i under CTene.ralMac.krthur’s strategic direction. On the%ith of March, the ,JCS issued a directivethat out lined a red isposit ion of forces totake effect on 15 June, by which the bulkof SoPac stren@ h was assigned to Mac-Arthur’s operational control for the ad-vance to the Philippines. CinCSWPAwould get the Army’s XIV Corps Head-quarters and Corps Troops, plus six in-fantry divisions. Added to the SeventhFleet were 3 cruisers, 27 destroyers, 30 sub-marines, 18 destroyer escorts, an amphibi-OLIScommand ship, an attack transport, anattack cargo ship, 5 APDs, 40 LSTS, and60 I,CIS. The Thirteenth Air Force wasalso to be transferred, but with instruc-tions that its squadrons would supportPacific Ocean Jlreas’ operations as re-quired.

Marine ground forces in the South Pa-cific were assigned to Admiral Nimitz’commznd, as t3inCP0.i, to take part, inthe Central Pil~iti~ drive. The majorityof Marine air units, l~owever, were de-tailed to the SIVPA as the core strengthof the aerial blockade of bypassed enemypositio]w ill tl~e tiolon)o]ls :uld Bismarcks.

527

Under the assignment of forces firstworked out by JCS planners, the Royal

New Zealand .4ir Force units, which lmdplayect such an important role in t,he .i ir-SOIScampai~n against, Rabaul, were rele-gated to the SOP:W garrison. This decisionwas unacceptable to the New Zealand C~owernmeut which wanted its forces to con-tinue their active role in the Pacific tight-ing. The end result of representations bythe New Zealand Minister in Washingtonwas the allocation of seven squadrons-four fighter, two medium bomber, and oneflying boat—to the SWPA and sevensquadrons of the same types to the SouthPacific. Since, by this time in 1944, allRNZAF units were either equipped or in

the process of being equipped with U.S.Navy planes, an overriding factor insquadron assignment was the ease of main-tenance and resupply in areas that wouldbe manned primarily by U.S. Navy andMarine units. Under the plans developed,

the deployment of the RNZAF to assignedSWPA bases, Bougainvillea, Los Negros,Emirau, and Green, would not be com-

pleted until late in the year.Many of the units that officially became

part of General MacArthur’s command intJune were already under his operationalcontrol two months earlier. By mid-.4pril,the 13th Air Task Group, comprisingheavy bombers of the Thirteenth AirForce under Major General St. Clair

Street, was operating against the Palausand Carolines to protect the flank of theHollandia task forces. One heavy bom-

bardment group of Street’s commanclmoved from Munda and Guadalcanal toMomote field on Los Negros on 20 April.The other group of the Thirteenth’s B–Msfollowed soon after, and both bombed e.n-


emy bases that threatened MzcArthur’sfurther moves up the Yew Guinea coastand ~imitz) thrust into the Marinnas.

~Sincehe was to have a second .Imericanair force operating uncler his headquarters,General Kenney recommended Rnd hadapproved the formation of a new com-mand, Far East Air Forces (FEAF),whose principal components would be theFifth and Thirteenth Air Forces. In ad-dition to heading FE.lF, Kenney re-mained Commanding Generxl, Allied i~ir

Forces, and, as such, commanded all otherair units assiegneclto the Southwest, PacificArea, including those that had been a partof AirSols.

On 15 June 1944, all military responsi-bility for the area and the Allied unitswest of 159° East Longitude and south ofthe Equator passed to General MacArthur,coincident with this change, Aclmiral Hal-sey relinquished his command of the SouthPacific Area to his deputy of eight monthsstanding, 17ice Admiral John H. Newton,and went to sea as Commander, ThirdFleet. The ~irSols units became part of

a new organization, Aircraft, NorthernSolomons, with an initial strength of 40flying squadrons, 23 of them Marine. Theseven Thirteenth Air Force squadrons that-were included in AirNorSols were underorders to join FE.4F, and eight of theNavy’s and RNZAF’S were headed for So-Pac garrison duty. 28

Reflecting the preponderance of Marineelements assignecl to i\irNorSols was theappointment of General Mitchell as itscommander. 31itchell, WI1Ohad turnedover leadership of AirSols to the ArmyAir Forces’ lMajor General Hubert R.

= ComAirNorSols OPlan No. 1, dtd 6Jun44, AnxA, EstDistr of Air Units, ComAirNorSols.

Harmon on 15 March,” had shortly there-after relieved Admiral Fitch as Com.Air-SoPac. Throu~l~out this period, the 31a-rine genernl cent inued to head MA SP al-S07 bllt with his ass~mlption of duties asConlAirNorSols, he designated Brigi~dierGeneral Claude A. I.arkin to succeecl himin the South Pacific command and presideover its dissolution. .$ccorcling to plansfor the fllture employment of its compo-nent wings, the Ist in the Southwest andthe 2d in the Cent ml Pacific, there wasno longer any need for 3fASP. Complet-ing the pictllre of Marine air command

changes, C~enmal Mitchell took over the1st Wing at the same time he becameC’omAirNorSols and established the head-qlmrters of both organizations on130ugainville.

The command reorganization of 15,June 1944 marked the end of an importantphase of the Pacific fighting, one whichsaw the onetime scene of violent battleact ion gradually become a staging and

training center for combat on other fronts.In fitting tribute to the men who drovethe ,Japanese back from the Solomons andBismarcks, Admiral Halsey sent a charac-teristic farewell message to all ships andbases when he departed Noumea, saying:“ ‘Well done’ to my victorious all-services

South Pacific fighting team. You havemet, measured, and mowed down the bestthe enemy had on land and sea and in theair.>’ 30

“ Two other Marine officers served briefly asComAirSols, Brigadier General Field Harris,who relieved General Harmon on 20 A~ril, andMajor General James T. Moore, ~~’ho relievedGeneral Harris on 31 May. StrikeCo~ld Wa~D,15Mar-15Jun44.

a Entry of 15Jun44 in ComAirNorSot8 .lun~~

warn.

ENCIRCLEMENT

f70ntrolling most of the strikes a~ainst,Jalxlllese taryets ~~llen .iirXorSols was

~ctivated was Fighter-Strike (’ommand,headed by colonel Frank H. Schm-able.

Tile title of tl~is ll~il(l~u:~lt~rsj tile sllcces-sor to .-kirhSols Strike ~ommancl. reflectedthe shift in enlplmsis of fighter missionsfrom air conlhat to strafing and bombingin company with SBDS and TBFs. The

life of the ‘new command was snort, how-ever, for General Mitchell abolished allseparate type commands on 21 Au_wstwhen lw centralized direction of tacticalair operat ions under his own headquarterswith Colonel Sch-wable as operations offi-cer. Responsibility for controlling theaircraft assigned to various missions ateach iiir~orSols base remained with thearea air commander who was also, in mostcases> a Marine :tir group commnnder.Marines of the group headquarters

doubled as members of the air command-er’s statl, serving together with represen-tatives of other .Ulied and American units

flying from the particular base.Logistic support of the AirNorSols

squadrons, except for those in the Admiral-ties, was to be the responsibility of Com-SoPac until December when agencies ofthe Seventh Fleet could take over. ForMitchell’s Marine unik this function, oncechanneled through MASP, was made the

“ Unless otherwise noted, the material in thissection is derived from : Com.4 irNori301s Jun–llec~~ WarD.~; I.st MAW ,Juu~~-Aug,j,5 WarD,~ ;

ComAirEmirau lVarDs, Jan–Aug45 ; MAG-61WarDs, Jul–.4ug45; F:igh th .4rca .4rm~jOp,~;JIaj Charles W, I% Kg% Jr., Marine Aviation inth c Phil ippiHr.s ( It’:lshington : HistDiv, HQMC,1951 ) ; Odgers, RA AF .1gainst Japa}~ ; ROSS,

R3-ZAF; Sherrml, Ma’rAirHi.st ; LTSSBS, AllimlCampaign .4gainst RaJaal.

529

responsibiltiy of Marine Air Depot Squad-ron 1, which remained in the South Pacificto handle the 1st Wing’s personnel andsupply needs. A similar role as a rearechelon for 2d Wing units staging to Cen-tral Pacific bases was performed by Mi~G-11’s service squadron. All men and equip-ment that had been part of MASP were(Distributed to other units or returned tothe States. General Larkin, who decom-missioned MASP on 31 July, wrote itsinf ormd but apt epitaph in a letter toGeneral Rowell at MAWPac:

Certainly hate to see this command gounder but it has outlived its usefulness,an(lit is always good news when units can bedone away with rather than having to formnew ones. At least it is an indication thatwe are doing okay with the war in this areaby reducing and going forward.=

The inevitable result of the continuousAllied advance was that fields that hadonce bustled -with combat air activity—atNoumea, Efate, Espirit.u Sante, Guadal-canal, Banika, and Munda-were relegatedto limited use or closed down. Newer,fully developed bases like Green andEmirau carried the burden of the attackagainst Rabaul and Kavieng, while mostof the strikes aimed at the thousands of,Japanese troops still active in the northernSolomons were mounted from the Pi-wfields. The more profitable enemy targets,how-ever, those that could be reached onlyby hea~y bombers and the few short-rangeplanes that could crowd onto advancedairstrips, were hit, less frequently than thebypassed positions. In July, as an exam-ple, SWPA land-based air forces flew over

‘“ IKkn Claude A. T,arkinltr to 31ajGen ROSS1+:.Rm-dl, dtd 31.T11144, in M.\SI>mrrespondencefol(ler on l’ormation, Organization, and Disband-ment, General Larkin, on 4 August, becameDeputy Commander, AirA-orSols.

!530 ISOLATION’ OF RABAUL

8,000 sorties against targets in bypassedareas but only 3,000 against targets in theforward areas.” ~~There was a constantdanger that bombing attacks againstblockaded enemy forces would degenerateinto what ConlAirPac called “mere weightlifting;’ “ an ineffective use of the airweapon, which was perhaps the most pow-erful available to Allied commanders.

General Kenney was well aware of thefact, that some of his most effective avia-tion units, the veteran Marine squadrons,were tied down in the Solomons and Bis-marcks. He intended to employ them inthe seizure. of Mindanao, and, to make theMarine units available, he determined toreplace them with RNZAF and R.4AFsquadrons. In like manner, General Mac-Arthur planned to relieve the Americaninfantry divisions on 130ugainville andNew Britain with Australian troops.There was a strong current of opinion-atMac.Arthur’s headquarters that furtheroperations in British and Australian ter-ritories and mandates should be under-taken by Commonwealth forces. on 12,JLlly, CinCSWP.4 confirmed this concept

in a letter to the Australian commander,(.ieneral Blarney, stating:

A rwlistribution of Allied forces in theSWPA is necessitated by the advance to theI’hilil)l)ine lS1:LUCIS. Exclusive of the Ad-miralties, it is desired that Australian forcesassume the reslmnsibility for the continue[lneutralization) of the enemy in the Australia]and British territory and mandates in theSWPA by the following dates:

Northern Solomons-Green Island-Emi-rriw—1 oct 44

Australian New Guinea—1 Nov. 44h’ew Britnin-1 Nov 44’6

“ ContAirPa.c Jul~.j Aflalysisf p. 11.wComAirPac Marh~Anal@s, p. 19.“ Quoted in Odgers, RAAF A qai.n.st Japan, p.

292.

General Blarney ordered the AustralianII Corps to relieve the American XIVCorps on Bougainvillea, the 40th InfantryDivision on New Britain, and the garris-ons on Emirau, Green, Stirling, and NewGeorgia. ‘1’he 6th Australian Divisionwas designated to replace the American

XI Corps in eastern New Guinea. Notcontent with holding defensive perimeters,the Australians intended to seek out anddestroy the .Japanese wherever this wouldbe done without jeopardizing Allied posi-tions.

.Since the ~~ustralians planned an activecampaign with a limited number oftroops-two brigades on New Britain andfour 011Bougainville-plentiful and effec-t ive close air support was a necessity.

Some of it would be provided by RAAFreconnaissance and direct support aircraftoperating under control of Australianground force commanders, but most. of theplanes would come from ComAirNorSols.According to plans, a New Zealand AirTask Force under Group Captain Geof-frey N. Roberts, was to take over controlof air operations from AirliTorSols whenthe 1st Marine Aircraft Wing moved tothe Philippines.

One big hitch in this plan for RNZAFreplacement of the 1st ltTing occurredwhen the first target in the American re-turn to the Philippines was shifted north-ward from Mindanao to Leyte. This

change cancel led the wing’s prospect ive

employment, for, as General Kenney later

explained: “. . . the movement forwardof any air units in the Southw=t Pacific

depended upon the location of the unitunder consideration, the availability ofshipping, and the availability of air-

ENCIRCLEMENT 531

dr~mes in the forward zone. “ 3s In the per-ennially tight shipping situation, the dis-tance of the wing from the Philippinesactecl against its employment as a unit. Asa consequence, the changeover date fromAirNorSols to RNZ.AF command, origi-nally projected for 1 November 1944, wasrepeatedly delayed and did not. take placeuntil 15 JLdy 1945. In the interim, the1st Winq’s operational strength was parecldown to Its transport and medium bombergroups; all fighter and dive bomber squad-rons were transferred piecemeal to thePhilippines. 37

About 20 September, wing headquar-ters received the first word that its sevendive bomber squadrons would be employedin the Luzon campaiagn. For the mostefiective combat control, it was decided toemploy two air groups, one of four squad-rons and the other of three, and on 1 Oc-tober, by transfers and joinings, MAG-24became an all-S13D outfit (VMSB-133,–236, –241, and –341 ). A new Headquar-ters, MAG-32, was sent out from Hawaiito command the wing’s remaining Daunt-less squadrons (lTMSB-142, -224, and-243 ) . Air intelligence officers with ex-perience in close air support techniques aspracticed in the Marshalls and Marianasreported from the Central Pacific to assistin training the SBD crews. GeneralMitchell issued a training directive whichindicated that the dive bombers would “beemployed almost exclusively as close snp-port for Army ground forces in an advanc-ing situation>’ and that their basic mission

3’Gen George C. Kenney Itr to Maj Charles W.130ggs.,Jr., CLtd270ct50. quoted in Boggs, Marine.<lt~i@ti07~,op. (’it., p. 8.

“ By the end of August 1944, all torpedo bombersquadrons in the 1st Wing had been transferredto the States or to other wings for employmentin the Central Pacific.

would “be largely confined to clearing ob-stacles immediately in front of friendlytroops.” 3S Army units worked closelywith the Marine squadrons during thetraining to formulate realistic problems oftroop support. Whenever <Japanese anti-aircraft concentrations were light, theSBD pilots practiced their air supporttechniques during the regular routine ofstrikes on enemy targets.

The monotonous pattern of attacks ol~the same targets, day after day, went onregardless of the pending deployment ofvarious wing units. One virtue of the sit-uation was that many Marine pilots anclaircrewmen got their first taste of combatflying during these months of strikesagainst bypassed objectives. Once, wholesquadrons had been sent back to the Statesafter completing a combat tour, but now,only the individual veterans returned andthe squadrons remained, kept up tostrength by replacements. The flying,=gunnery, ancl bombing experience gainedwhile hitting Rabaul and Kavieng andtackling the Japanese positions in thenorthern Solomons was invaluable. Al-though combat and operational casualtieswere low, there was enough oppositionfrom enemy gunners, enough danger fromthe treacherous weather, to make pilotshandle any AirNorSols mission with pru-dence. The urge for more violent action—was always present, however, and theflyers were cautioned repeatedly in orders

a~~inst “jousting with A/A [antiaircraft]positions in any area at any time.” 3S

‘* ComAirNorSols TrngMemo No. 1, dtd 210ct-44, in ComAirA”or t301s Octhh WarD.

3’ ComAirSols OpMemo So. 37, dtd 5Apr4~,Subj : Regs on Bombing and Strating, in Strikc-C’omf7 lT”arDs; ComAirNorSols opInstrn No. 13-44, dtd l’2AugW, Subj : Bombing and StrafingRegs, in Com.4irNorSol.s .lug~~ WarD.

532

About the only variety that ilyers hadin what the 1st Wing’s history called a“deadly routine of combat air patrol,milk run bombing, and night heckling”was experimenting with new weapons andtechniques.’” Incmdiaries of differenttypes were tested against Japanese instal-lations, and bomb loadings were varied tomeasure destructive effect,. This diversitybrought no letup in the weight of the at-tack delivered against major enemy ob-jectives until the end of the summer when,as the air operations commander at Pivanoted, “practically all of the good targetsin these areas had been destroyed.” 41 Asthe ,Japanese went, underground to findcover in the faceless jungle, the number ofobvious targets steadily lessened, andmany .4irNorSols strikes blasted andburned area targets in a systematic de-struction pattern much like that whichleveled the town of Rabaul. Even thegardens that the Japanese troops plantedto supplement their rations were sprayedwith oil in hope that the crops wouldwither and die.

During September and October, onespectacular new air weapon, a drone bomb,was tested against Japanese targets in theAirNorSols area. The drones, speciallybuilt planes capable of carrying a 2,000-pound bomb, were radio controlled by tor-pedo bombers of a special naval test unit.Synchronized television screens in droneand control planes enabled the controllersto view what was ahead of the drones andto crash them against point targets. Aftertest attacks on a ship hulk beached atGuadalcanal, the test unit moved up toStirling and Green and made 47 sorties inconjunction with F4LTs, SBDS, and PBJs.

401st MAW Hist Ju141–Jun46, n.d., p. 13.4’ComAirPiva WarD, 15Jun-30Nov44, p. 21.

ISOLATION OF RABAUL

The results were inconclusive. Two ofthe pilotless bombs were lost en route totargets because of radio interference,mechanical defects caused five crashes,Japanese antiaircraft shot down three, andfive drones had television failures andcould not locate a target. Of those dronesthat did attack, 18 hit their objective and11 missed or near missed. ComAir~or-Sols concluded that there was a future forthis weapon, but that, it needed more devel-opment work and better aircraft fordrones. Evidently, the chief of NavalOperations, who in August had turneddown a request to use SBDS as drones,agreed with General Mitchell’s evaluation.Since the “better aircraft” were neededelsewhere, the test unit was decommis-sioned shortly after completing its laststrike on 26 0ctober.42

Vastly more effective than the imagina-tive drone bombs were the attacks by moreworkaday aircraft. The Corsairs, in par-ticular, expanded their usefulness throughregular bombing missions, since there waslittle call for them in their role as inter-ceptors. It was this aspect of the Cor-sairs’ capabilities, however, that broughtabout their employment in the Philip-

pines.Fighter planes }~ere badly needed at

Leyte where Third Fleet carriers hadstayed a month beyond the time of theirscheduled departure for a strike on Japanin order to fly cover for amphibious ship-

ping. Two of the Seventh Fleet’s escortcarriers had been lost in the Battle ofLeyte Gulf and four more had been dam-

“ STAG One Rept of SvcTest on Drones At-tacking Reached Hulk on Cape Esperence, Gua-dalcanalIs, dtd 6Aug44; ComAirNorSols Rept onOps of STAG One Det in ATorSols Area, dtd3ooct44.

ENCIRCLEMENT 533

aged, so that Admiral Kinkaid was des-

perately short of planes for air defense.Fifth Air Force P-38s, based at a muddy,inadequate forward airstrip at Tacloban,had their hands full defending the imme-diate beachhead area and could do littleto augment the shipping protection af-forded by carrier aircraft. Greatly in-creasing the seriousness of the air picturewas the advent of the kamikazes? the Jal~-anese suicide pilots who crashed theirbomb-laden planes against shippingtargets.

Admiral Halsey, who was anxious tofree his carriers for the attack on the Jap-anese home islands, saw a solution to hisproblem in the Marine Corsairs of the IstWing. He reminded General MacArthurthat these fighters were available and hadproved themselves repeatedly when theyflew under Halsey;s command.” Theywere capable of reinforcing the Army AirForces’ planes in interceptor and groundsupport roles and would be a welcome ad-dition to the air cover of the SeventhFleet’s ships. Deciding quickly to employthe Marine planes, MacArthur orderedthem brought forward. on 30 November,General Mitchell received a directive from.411ied Air Forces to transfer four of the1st Wing’s Corsair squadrons to opera-tional control of the Fifth Air Force onLeyte. The planes were to arrive atTacloban by 3 I)ecember.

As soon as the order was received,MA~-12 (VMF--115, -211, -218, and–313 ) was alerted fort he move and ceasedall combat operations under Com.4irh-or-Sols. With Marine PB,Js as navigationalescorts, the flight echelons of group head-quarters and the fighter squadrons arrived

“ Halsey and Bryan, Admiral Halse~’s Story,P. 231.

in the Philippines on schedule, after cov-ering 1,957 miles from Emirau via Hol-Iandia ancl Peleliu. A shuttle service byR4Ds of MAG-25, supplemented by C-17Sof the Fifth ~iir Force, carried essentialmaintenance men and material forwardto insure that the corsairs kept flying.On 5 December, M.%(2–12 pilots flew theirinitial combat patrols in the Philippinesand shot down the first of a long string ofenemy planes.~~

On ‘i December, a week after the firstMarine fighters were ordered to Leyte,MAG-14 and the remaining four Corsair

squadrons in the 1st ~Ving were put on48-hours notice for a forward movement.This time the destination was an airfieldyet to be built on Samar, and the move wasnot so precipitate as that of MAG–12.The first squadron of LMJ&G-14to fly infrom Green, ITMO-251$3 arrived onSamar on 2 January. The forward eche-lons of the group headquarters and service

squadrons, and of 17MF-212, —222, and

–223, had arrived by 24 January. .4gainPBJs guided and escorted the Corsairsand, stripped of most of their .ggns andextra weight, helped transport key per-

sonnel and priority equipment from Green

“ The honor of shooting down the first enemyplme in the Philippines credited to a Marine-went to a pilot of VMI? (N ) X41, who bagged anOscar before dawn on the 5th. The squadron,equipped with a night fighter version of the F6F,had arrived at ‘1’acloban on 3 December, ex-changing places with an Army P+l night fightersquadron. MacArthur had asked Nimitz for thetemporary loan of the faster Hellcats to im-prove dawn and dusk interception at Ikyte.CinCSWPA disp to CinCPOA, dtd 26h’ov44,quoted in Sherrod, i!farAirHist, p. 275.

= VMO-251, originally an observation squad-ron, was re-equi pped as a fighter squadron in thesummer of 1942, but was not redesignated VM F–

251 until 31 January 1945.


ENCIRCLEMENT 535

and Piva in addition. Marine and kmytransports planes carried the bulk of themen and gear of the forward echelon.

The ground echelons of the Marinefighter groups were not able to begin

moving to the Philippines until Februarywhen shipping priorities eased after theLuzon landings. In contrast, a good partof the ~roun(l echelons of MA(H24 and –32

squadrons preceded their planes to Luzonand helped establish a field at Mangaldannear Lingayen Gulf. Flights of SBDSbegan arriving from the Bismarcks on 25.January, and, by the end of the month, allseven Dauntless squadrons were opera-tional.”

The withdrawal of Marine fighters anddive bombers from operational control ofComAir~orSols placed the burden ofmaintaining the aerial blockade of the by-passed .Japanese on RNZAF Corsairs andYenturas and 131.AG–61’s Mitchells. TheSew Zealal~(le~s smoothly took on z1lfigllter.bomber commitments that the Ma.

rines had handled; there was no break inthe unremitting pattern of harassing at-tacks ancl watchdog patrols. RNZAFCorsairs also flew close and direct supportstrikes for the Australian infantrymen onBougainvillea, working closely with theR.AAF tactical reconnaissance aircraftattached to the II corps. The Mitchellsand ~?enturas also flew ground snpportn~issions for the .~llstralians, b~lt spentmost of their time making bombing at-

tacks on Ral mul, ~a~’ieng, ancl the other

principal ,Ja])aneSO bases.

The Venturas, which were not fitted with

:1 bombsight suitable for medium-level

‘6 The story of Mzrine participation in thePhiliplJines liberation cam]mign n-ill he coveredin the foarth volume t~f this series.

691–360 -63—35

(9,500-13,000 feet ) drops until April 1945,relied on Marine PBJs as strike leaders inthis type of mission. When the Mitchellreleased its bombs, the accompanyingRh’ZAF bombers dropped theirs also.The resulting concentration of hits was

particularly effective against the largertargets found at Rabaul, where most ofthe mediun-level bombing was done. hw-level attacks by both the Mitchell andJTentura squadrons were aimed primarilyat targets that were not so well protectedby antiaircraft as those at Rabaul.

Only one squadron of MAG-61’s Mitch-ells was freed from the frustratinground of policing missions in the Bis-mare.ks and Solomons. On 3 March, onorders from Allied .iir Forces, VMB–611was transferred to MAG-32 with orders tomove forward from Emirau to the Philip-pines. By the end of the month, 611’s1’B,Ts were operating from fields on Min-danao. The four bombing squadrons re-maining in NL4G-61, VMB413, 423,433, and –443, served the last months ofthe war at Emirau znd Green. Orders todeploy to the Philippines were finally re-ceived just prior to the end of the fighting.

As if to sigpif y the near completion ofthe aerial campaign that had begun at(luadalcanal aimost three years before,General Mitche]l relinquished command ofAirNorsols and the 1st Marine Aircraft~l~ing on 3 June 1945 and returned to the,States two days later. .4 little over amonth after the general’s departure, thelong-awaited transfer of control of airoperations to the RhTZAF finally tookplace. On 15 ,July, Air CommodoreRoberts assumed command from Marinellri~adier General Lewie G. Merritt and

AirhTorSols was dissolved. GeneralMerritt’s 1st Tving now came under the

536

orders of the New Zealand Air TaskForce.”

By the time iiir Commodore Robertstook over the direction of air operations,the primary mission of most combat air-craft in his command was support of theAustralian ground forces of II Corps. ChBougainvillea, in a nine-months-long offen-sive, the Australians had pushed the Japa-nese back in all directions from the Toro-kina perimeter and were clriving on the

enemy positions at Buin, ~-uma-Numa,and Bonis. on New Britain, the Austra-lians, operating from a base camp at ,Jac-quinot Bay on the southern coast, kept ag-gressive patrols forward in the Open Bay-

Wide Bay region of Gazelle Peninsula,sealing off the Japanese at Rabaul from

the rest of the island. In March, when anairfield was opened at .Jacquinot, R.AAFplanes and, later, RNZAF Corsairs andVenturas, flew ground support missions

4’General Mitchell’s relief luid been 31ajorGeneral Louis E. Woods, but WOWIS held com-mand only one day before he was ordered toOkinawa to take ov?r Tactical .Iir Force, TenthArmy. General Merritt took command of Air-NorSols and the 1st \f-ing on 10 June.

ISOLATION” OF RABAL’L

and attacked the enemy at Rabaul. (SeeMap 31.)

On 3 August, General Kenney directedGeneral Merritt to move the headquartersof the 1st Wing and MAG-61 to the Phil-ippines. Six days later, Marine planesflew their last bombing mission againstRabaul. Six P13Js from VMB413, sixfrom VMB-423, five from VMB-443, andone from group headquarters took part;an RNZ~\F Catalina went along as rescueDumbo. Each Mitchell carried eight 250-pouncl bombs which were dropped throughheavy cloud cover with unobserved re-sults; the targets were storage and bivouacareas near Rabaul and \Tunakanau.

When the fighting ended on 14 August,some Mitchells had already flown to thePhilippines, the remainder made the tripby the 19th. The wing’s command postshifted from Bougainvillea to Zamboangaon Mindanao on 15 August. Ahead of theMarine squadrons lay months of hecticpeacetime employment in North China aspart of the American occupation forces.Behind the flyers and ground crews was asolid, lasting record of achievement inever-y task of aerial combat and blockadethat, had been asked of them.

History of the U.S. Marine Corps in WWII Vol II - Isolation on … of the U.S... · 508 ISOLATION OF RABAUL at Pearl Harbor, \vllere preparations went ahead for a simultaneous assault

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