History of the U.S. Marine Corps in WWII Vol I - Pearl Harbor to Guadacanal

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PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL

History of U.S. Marine Corps

Operations in World War II



P ea r l H a rbor

t o G ua da lca na l

HISTORY OF U S M RINE CORPS

OPER TIONS IN WORLD W R II

VOLUME I

.



:I,ibrary of Congress C atalog Card K o. 58-60002



Foreword

With t,he recent completion of our bistoricnl monograph project,, the

Marine Corps historical program entered a new phase. This book is the first

of a projected five-volume series covering completely, and we hope definitively,

the history of Marine operations in World War II.

The fifteen hist,orical monogmpl~s published over n period of eight years

have served to spotlight the high points in this broad field. The basic resea~rch

which underlay their preparat,ion vi11 be utilized again in this project. But a

monograph by its very nnt,ure aims at, a limited obje ve, and in its comxntm-

tion on B single ba t,tle or campaign necessarily ignores many related sub jects.

All too oft,en it has been dificult~ to avoid conveying the impression that the

specific operation under discussion was taking place in a vuc~um. Thus, while

mu valuable tory has been writt,en, the st,ory as R wlrole remains untold.

This lack the present project aims to rectify. The story of individual

b;rttlrs or rnmpaigns, now isolated between tire covers of separate publications,

will b e, l;w y rewrittrn and woven tog her in an att,empt to show events in

proper relation to exh other and in correct perspect,ivo to the war as a whole.

In addition, new mat,erial, especially from .Jalmnese sources, which has become

available since the \wit,ing of the monographs, will be integrated into t,be story.

Only ~lren t,he broad pict,ure is awibd~le can tbo significance of the Marine

Corps’ cont,ribnt,ioo t,o t,lx final victory in tlw Pacific be fairly evnluated.

Non a word about Vo111me I wbicb sket,cbes briefly the development of the

Marine Corps’ nmphibions mission from its incept,ion and then carries t;he story

of orld ar II t,broupb Guadnlc;~n;~l. ;Yis logistirnl officer of t,he 1st Marine

Division, I was privileged to take part, in this, our first, eflort t,o st,rike back





valueble assist~ance is gratefully acknowledg ed. Special t,hanks nre due to t,hose

people who read and comm ented on t,be ent,ire volum e: l&utenan t General

Edward A. Craig, I?. S. Marine Corp s, Retired; Dr. .John ;\Iiller, Office of t,hrC,hief of Military Hist,ory, Departm ent of t,he Army ; Captain Frederick Ii.

Loom is, Ii. 9. Navy, N:~val History Division. Ofice of tlw Chief of Naval

Operations, Departm ent of t,he Navy; and ~‘olonel H&l. who initict,ed the

original program o f mon ograph s dealing with &rine actions in World W xr 11.

Mrs. Edna Clem Kelley and her successor’ in the Adm inistrative and I’m-

duction Section of t,he Historical Bmn cb, Miss Kay I’. Sue, ably handled t,he

exacting duties involved in processing tlre volum e from first drafts tlrrougb

final printed fo rm. The many preliminary typescripts nod the JxGnst~alting

task of typing the final manuscript, for the printer were done by Mrs. MiriamR. Smallxw od and Mrs. Billie J. Twker.

Most of the maps wxe prepared by tire Reproduction Section. Marine

Corp s Schools, Quan tico, Virginia. How ever, we are indebted to the OtIice

of t,he Chief of Military History, Departm ent of the Army , for permission t,r,

use Map s Nos. 3. 14, 15, 20, 21, and 2.3-27. which were originally draft,ed by

its Cartograp hic Branch. Officinl Defense Ikpwtm rnt~ photogr;\p hs bavr

been used t~hroughont~ he test.

1 W’. SNEDEKER

WAJCIH ENF.RAL, . 8. MARI&-ECORPS

ASSr8~ANTCHIXF OF WT AFF. F-3



Contents

PART 1 INTRODUCTIOX TO THE MARTNE CORPS

CHAPI‘F.R PACX

1. Origins of a, Mission 3

2. Evolution of Modern Amphibious Wnrfuy 1920-3 941 8

3. Dcvrlopment of Landing Craft,. 234. Marine Occupation of Jrelrtnd 35

5. Thr Marine Corps 011 the Eve of Wa,r. 47

PART II W AR COME S

1. Prrver Situat,ion in the Pacific. .............. 59

2. JapanStrikes ...................... 70

3. Thr Sorrthcrn T,ifcline. .................. 84

PART III THE DEFENS E OF WAKE

1. Wa,ke.in the Shadow of War ...............

2.. The Emmy Strikes. ...................

3. Wake Under Siege ....................

4. The Fall of Wnkf .....................

95

106

121

132

1.50



PART VI THE TURNING POINT: GUADAXIANAL

CHAPTER

I. Background and Preparations

2. Guadalcanal, 7-9 August 1942

3. Tulagi and Gavut,n-Tanambogo

4. The Bat,& of t,hr Tenaru

5. The B&e of the Ridge

6. Act,ion Along t,he Matanikan

7. Jspa~nese C?ount,eroffensivc

8. critical Novemb er

9. Final Period, 9 Decembe r 1942-9 February 1943

PAGE

235

254

263

274

294

310

322

341

359

APPENDICES

A. Bibliographical Notes 375

B. C~xlronolog>- 382

C. Marine T ask Organizntion and C’ommand I,ist,s 387

D. Marine C~asualties 395

E. First, Marine Division Operat,ion Order-Gusdalcanal 396

F. Milit,ary Map Symbols 399

G. Guide to Abbrevist,ions400

H. Unit, Commendat,ions 404

Index 413

1LLUSTRATIONS

C:ontinental Marines 6

Marincs of Huntington’s B&t&n 6



II,LUSTKI1TIONS--Continucrl

( anmlmagrd lmkout ‘I’mrrr nt SWld ISliLUd ............

Japane se (‘ruisrr Mi~wna ....................

Crude Sk&b Mnp of Gundnlrarml ................

Eqnipmmt~ for the 1st Marine Division ..............

Murinc Rnidcrs and thr Cww of the Snbmarinr Argonaut

The Original Hmdrrso n Field ..................

Unloading Supplies nt Guadalcnnal ................

Tulagi Island .........................

Tann mbog o nnd Gnvrrt,u Islnnds .................

Marine Comm nr~ders on Guadnlcarml ...............

LVT Bridge Built, hy Marine Enginrrrs ..............

Solomons Nat,ives Gu ide a Patrol .................

BOmm Antinircrnft, Guns o f tbr 3d Drfcnsc Bnt,talion ........

105mm Howit~zrr of the 1 I t,ll Mnrin~s ...............

Rnidrrs Ridge .........................

~Iarincs of tlw 211 Rnidm Battalion ................

The Pagoda at IImderson Field .................

ladus Air Forcr Planes .....................

Five Blasted J~~pnncse Talks ...................

hlarinr Light, Tanks. ......................

Japnncsr Torpedo Planr .....................

lNavnl Gunfire support, .....................

:37mm Guns of t,bc Ammirnl Division ...............

1st Division M arinrs L ravc Guadelrannl ..............



x COhTENTS

MAPS+Cont,inued

PAGE

17. Battle of t,he Tenaru, 21 August, 1942 289

18. The Perimeter, 12-14 Scpt,ember 1942 300

19. Edson’s Ridge-First Phase, 12-l? Sept,ember 19 42 304

20. Edson’s Ridgo~Final Phase, 13 Scpt,rmbrr 1942 307

21. hlat~anikau Action, 24-27 Soptcmbrr 1942 314

22. Matonikati Offensive, 7-9 October 1942 318

23. October At,tacks on t,he Perimeter Map Srct,ion

24. Push Toward Kokumbona, l-4 Kovembu 1942 344

25. Koli Point, 4-9 Novemb er 1942 Mnp Section

26. Bat,& Area, Dewm ber 1942~Jnnnary 1943 Map Sect,ion

27. XIV Corps Plan-~~-First January Offensive 1’fa.p Section

28. Capt,urc of Kokumbonn and Advance t,o t,he Poha R iwr, 23-25

January 1943 .CIap &&on

29. Final Phase, 26 January-9 February 1943 370





PART ON E

I n t r oduct i on to the M ar i ne Cor ps





4 P EARL H ARB OR TO G UAD AL C ANAL

ever , for ei gn pr essu res br ou gh t t he N avy

back i n to exi stence i n 1798 under the r e-

cen t l y adopted Const i tu t i on , and on 11

J u l y of that year the M ar i ne Cor ps was

r eact i vated as a separ ate ser vi ce w ith i n

t he nava l est abl i shmen t .

Si nce that date M ar ines have fought i n

ever y off i ci al war the U ni ted States has

had—and scor es of obscur e af fai rs that

l acked off i ci al bl essi ng but i n wh i ch , to

qu ote the em inent M ar ine wr iter , J ohn W.

T hom ason , J r ., “. . . a m an can be ki l l ed

as dead as ever a chap was i n the .4r -

gonne.”’ T hey have ser ved as str ict l y

n aval t r oops, both ashor e an d afl oat , and

par ti ci pat ed i n exten ded l an d oper at i on s

under Ar my com m and, notabl y i n the

Cr eek -Sem i nol e I n di an War s of t he 1830’s,

the M exi can War , both Wor l d War s, and

i n Korea .

A l l over the wor ld , B r it i an ’s Royal M a-

r i nes wer e seei ng m uch the sam e type of

ser vi ce. F or a cen tu ry or m or e th e cou rses

of the two cor ps r an par al l el , and they

w er e as fu nct i on al ly al ike as i t i s possi bl e

for any two m i l i tar y or gan i zat i ons to be.

I nd ivi du al m em ber s of t hese ser vi ces h ad

so m any i n ter ests i n com mon that , as one

at top l evel , as wel l , and over the year s

the two or gan i zat i ons devel oped a ver y

cl ose and m ost cor di al r el at i onsh i p that

exi st s t o th is d ay, d espi te t he str an ge evo-

l ut i on ar y d iver gence that set i n betw een

them:

T he t r ansi t i on of navi es fr om sai l to

st eam began evol ut ion ar y d evel opm en ts

wh i ch pr ofound l y al ter ed the natu r e of

al l sh i pboar d du t i es, and tem por ar i l y

th r eatened both cor ps w i th ext i nct i on .

F r om th i s the Royal M ar i nes em er ged

bur dened w i th a m i scel l any of of ten i n -

congr uous dut i es never en vi si oned i n the

ol d d ays, a nd con si d er abl y em ascu l at ed by

l ack of a si ngl e m issi on of over ri di ng im -

por tance. T hat the efl ect on the U . S.

M a r i n es w -a s pr eci sel y t h e r ev er se r esu l t ed

fr om the fundam ental d i f fer ence i n the

pr obl em s faci ng the txvo nat i ons wh i ch

r equ i red L ’. S, M ar ines to car ve out a spe-

ci al m issi on for them sel ves, though they

tr avel ed a l ong, uneven r oad i n br ingi ng

th is to fu l l fr ui ti on .

T he basi c pr obl em that con fr on ted the

ear ly steam navi es w as th at of obtai ni ng

fuel . Sai l -pr opel l ed m en-of-war , on

w hi ch al l naval exper ience and tr ad i ti on















E VOLI J TI ON OF MOD E R N AMP HI B I OU S WARFARE , 192&l Ml 11

i ng r eached i n the tw ent i es. I t m ar ked

the advent of ser ious exper im entat i on

w i th adequate l and i ng cr af t for t r oops

a nd equ i pm en t . H owever , i t was m ost

notabl e for th e gr eat num ber of m istakes

m ade i n the cour se of the exer ci ses, such

a s i n ad eq ua te a tt ack i n g f or ces, i n su ff i ci en t

an d u nsu it abl e boats, l ack of or der am on g

the l and i ng par ty, super fi ci al naval bom -

bar dm en t, an d poor j ud gm en t i n th e st ow -

age of su ppl ies an d equ ipm en t aboar d t he

si n gl e t r an spor t u sed .8

T he l ast l and i ng exer ci se of th e er a w as

a joi n t Ar my-N avy affai r hel d dur ing the

spr i ng of 1925 i n H awai i an water s. I t

was actual l y an am ph ibi ous com m and

p ost exer ci se, u nd er t ak en a t t he i n si st en ce

of Gener al L ejeune to pr ove to skept i cal

A rm y of f i cer s t hat t he M ar in e Cor ps cou ld

p lan a nd execu te a n a mp hi bi ou s op er a ti on

of gr eater than br igade si ze. A for ce of

42,000 M ar in es w as si mu lated , al th ou gh

on l y 1,500 actual l y par ti ci pated . I t r an

m or e sm ooth l y than had the pr evi ous

exer ci se, bu t st i l l was hand i capped by a

l ack of ad equ at e l an di ng cr aft }

E ven th i s m eager am ph i bi ous tr ai ni ng

cam e to an end after 1925. N ew comm i t -

Wh atever t he sh or tcom in gs of t he w or k

i n am ph ibi ou s d oct ri ne an d t ech ni qu e d ur -

i ng the 1920’s, the M ar ine Cor ps scor ed

a m ajor t r ium ph w hen i ts speci al i nter est

i n the fi el d becam e par t of the off i ci al

m i l i tar y pol i cy of the U n i ted States.

~okt Action of the Ar m y and N avy, a

d i r ect i ve i ssued by the J oi nt Boar d of the

Ar m y and N avy i n 1927, stated that the

M ar i ne Cor ps wou l d pr ovi de and mai n-

t ai n for ces “for l an d oper at ion s i n su ppor t

of the fl eet for the i n i t i al sei zu r e and

defense of advanced bases and for such

l im i ted auxi l i ar y l and oper at i ons as ar e

essen t i al to the pr osecu t i on of the naval

campaign.”

Fur ther , i n ou t l i n i ng the tasks to be

per for m ed by the Ar m y and N avy i n

“L and i ng At tacks Agai nst Shor e Objec-

t ives,” th is d ocu men t f i rm ly establ ish ed

the l and i ng for ce r ol e of the M ar i ne

Corps: “M ar ines or gan i zed as l and i ng

for ces per for m the sam e funct i ons as

above stated for the .4r my, and because

of the constan t associ at i on w i th naval

un i t s w i ll be gi ven speci al t r ai n i ng i n the

conduct of l and i ng oper at i ons.” I I





E VOLU TI ON OF MOD E R N AMI ’H I B 1OC S WARFARE , 192@1941 13

own com m ander and staff wou l d have to

be or gan i zed for the pur pose, other wi se

tr ai ni ng w ou ld be con stan tl y i nt er r upted

by the d i sper sal of the t r oops to other

commitments.

N o one r ecogn i zed th i s m or e cl ear l y

than the Assi stan t Com mandant , 13r iga-

d i er Gener al ,J ohn H . Russel l . H e as-

sem bled a stat l at Quant i co to pl an the

or gan i zat i on of a for ce wh i ch cou l d be

r api d l y assem bl ed for ser vi ce w i th the

F l eet . I n August of 1933 he pr oposed to

the Comm andant that the ol d “Exped i -

t i on ar y F or ce” be r epl aced by a new

body, to be cal l ed ei ther “F l eet M ar i ne

F or ce,” or “F leet B ase D efense F or ce.”

The new for ce, wh i l e an i n tegr al par t of

the L Tn i ted States F leet , w ou l d be under

the oper at i onal con t r ol of th e F l eet Com -

m ander when embar ked on vessel s of the

F leet or en g~ged i n fl eet exer ci ses af l oat

or ashor e. When not so em bar ked or en-

gaged i t wou l d r em ai n under the M ajor

G en er a l C om m a nd an t .

R uss e 11’s r ecom m endat i ons wer e

pr om pt l y appr oved by the Com mandant

and by the Chi ef of h ’aval Oper at i ons.

T he desi gnat i on “F l eet M ar i ne For ce”

1. The for ce of ma r in es ma in t a ined by t h e

ma jor gener a l comma n da n t in a st a t e of rea di-

ness for opera t ions w it h t h e fleet is h er eby

designa ted a s fleet ma r ine force ( 1?. M. F .), a nd

a s such sha ll con st it ut e a pa r t of t he orga n iza -

t ion of t h e U nit ed S t a t es Fleet a n d be included

in t h e opera t ing for ce pla n for ea ch fisca l yea r .

2. The fleet ma rin e for ce sha ll consist of such

unit s a s ma y be design a t ed by t he ma jor gen era l

comma n da n t a n d sha ll be ma int a in ed a t such

st ren gt h a s is w arra nt ed by t h e genera l person-

nel sit ua t ion of t h e Ma rine C orps.

3. The fleet ma r ine force sha ll be a va ila ble

t o t he comma n der in ch ief for opera t ion s w it h

t h e fleet or for exercises eit h er a floa t or a sh ore

in cuun ec Liun w it h fleet problems. The com-

ma nder in ch ief sha ll ma ke t imely recommenda -

t ions t o t he C h ief of Na va l Opera tion s rega rdin g

such service in order t ha t t h e n ecessa ry a rra nge-

ment s ma y be ma de.

4. Th e comma n der in ch ief sha ll exercise

comma nd of t h e fleet ma r ine for ce w h en em-

ba rked on boa rd vessels of t h e fleet or w h en en -

ga ged in fleet exercises, eit her a floa t or a sh ore.

Wh en ot h erw ise en ga ged, comma nd sha ll bedirect ed by t he m ajor gen era l com ma nda nt .

5. The ma jor genera l comma nda nt sha ll de-

ta il t h e comma ndin g gen era l of t he fleet ma rin e

for ce a n d ma int a in a n a ppropr ia t e sta ff for

him.

6. Th e comma n din g gen era l, fleet ma r ine

for ce, sha ll repor t by let t er t o t h e comm a n der

in ch ief, U n it ed S t a t es Fleet , for dut y in con -





E VOLU TI OX OF MOD E RN AMP HH 310U S WARFARE , 192&1941 15

i fi ed by exper ien ce i n fl eet exer ci ses u p t o

the outbr eak of the war . Amph ibi ous op-

er at i ons and or d i nar y gr ound war far e

sh ar e m an y of t he sam e t act i ca l p ri n ci pl es.T he basi c d i ffer ence betw een them l ies i n

the fact that the am ph ibi ous assau l t i s

l au nch ed fr om t he sea, an d i s su ppor ted by

naval el em ents. Whi l e water -bor ne the

l an di ng for ce i s com pl et el y pow er less an d

i s dependent upon the n aval el em ents for

a ll i t s su pp or t : gu nf ir e, a vi at i on , t r an sp or -

tat i on , and com muni cat i on . I n th i s i n i -

t ial st age on ly t ie n aval el em en ts h ave th ecapabi l i ty of r eact in g t o en em y act ion . As

the l and i ng for ce, h ow ever , i s pr ojected

on to t he beach , i ts eff ect ii -en ess, st ar t i ng

fr om zer o at the water ’s edge, i ncr eases

r api d l y un t i l i t s st r ength i s fu l l y estab-

l i shed ashore.

COM M AN D REL AT ION SH IPS

T hi s basi c d i ffer ence betw een l and and

am ph ibi ou s oper at ion s cr eat ed a pr obl em

in com m and r el at i onsh i ps wh i ch has

p la gu ed am ph i bi ou s op er at i on s f r om ear l i -

est t imes. Dur ing the i ni t i al stage when

on l y naval el em ents have th e capabi li ty

of r eact i ng to enem y act i on i t has been

a p robl em t ha t r equ i red r esol u ti on .16 T h ey

si mpl y d efi ned t he “at tack for ce” as al l t he

for ces n ecessar y t o con du ct a l an di ng op-

er at i on and added that the at tack for cecom mander w as to be the sen i or naval of -

f i cer of the f l eet un i ts m ak i ng up the at -

tack for ce. H is com mand was to consi st

of t he l an di ng f or ce an d sever al n aval com -

ponents, or gan i zed as task gr oups for the

suppor t of the l and i ng. T hese i ncl uded,

am on g ot her s, t he fi r e su ppor t, t ran spor t,

ai r , scr een in g, an ti su bm ar i ne, an d r econ -

n ai ssan ce gr ou ps. T he com man der s of t hel andi ng for ce and of the sever al naval

task gr oups oper ated on the sam e l evel

under the over -al l com mand of th e at tack

for ce com mander th r ot l ghot l t the oper a-

t ion.

T hi s i ni ti al com mand concept w as des-

t in ed t o u nd er go a n um ber of m od if i cat ion s

a nd i n ter pr et at i on s w hi ch w i ll be d i scu ssed

i n t hi s h ist or y as t hey occu r. T he f i rst i m-por tan t change d i d not com e about un t i l

tow ar d the cl ose of the Guadal can al cam -

paign?’

N AVAL G U N FI R.E 8U PPORT

Ther e i s noth i ng new in the concept of





E VOLU TI OX OF MOD E R N- AMP H I B I O[l S WARFARE , I ZW1941 17

en t ered World Mra r I I , a dded U P t o t his : a bom -

ba rdmen t of ver y shor t dura t ion , deliver ed by

ships fir ing rela t ively limit ed a mmunit ion a l-

low a nces of t ypes oft en not w ell suit ed t o t h e

pur pose, fr om lon g ra nges w hile ma neuver in g

a t h igh speeds. Obviously, t he best t ha t could

be expect ed w ould be a rea neut ra liza t ion of

en emy defenses dur in g t roo~ deba rka t ion a n d

t he ship-t o-sh ore movemen t , follow ed by a lim-

it ed a mount of support on a ca ll ba sis, w it h th is,

t oo, t o be w it h dra w n a s soon a s field a rt illery

cou ld b e l a nd ed .’”

ilrea n eut ra liza t ion-t ha t w a s t h e ba sic

con cept , w it h delibera t e dest ruct ion fire

ruled out . A blood ba t h w ould be r e-

q uir ed t o explulge t his from “Th e nook.’”

.4Z~ SUPPORT

As th e M ar ine Cor ps devel oped the var -

i ou s t ech ni qu es con tr ibu ti ng t o a sm oot h

l and i ng oper at i on , i t had to gi ve m or e

and m or e consi der at i on to the fast

gr owth of m il itar y avi at i on as a pow er fu l,arm.

E ven the or i gi nal T en tat i ve L and i ng

O per at i on s M a nu al con si d er ed t he vu l ner -

abl e concent r at i ons of t r oops i n t r ans-

por ts, l and i ng boats, and on the beach

and cal l ed for a th r ee-to-one num er ical

super i or i t y over the enem y in the ai r .

naval gun fi re and ar ti l ler y. M ost i mpor -

tan t l y, i t i ncl uded r ender i ng d i r ect f i r e

suppor t to the l and i ng for ce un t i l the

ar ti l l er y was ashor e and r eady to fi r e.For th i s ai r war , em pl oym ent of M a-

r i n e squ ad r on s on ca rr i er s w as con si d er ed

i deal bu t , due to a l im i ted num ber of car -

r i er s, w as n ot al ways a. pr act ical possi bi l-

i ty. Pl anner s even consi der ed m ovi ng

M ar i ne pl anes ashor e i n cr ates and as-

sem bl i ng them , af ter the gr ound t r oops

h ad sei zed a n a ir f iel d .

H ence, the T entat i ve L and i ng Oper a-t i ons M anu a7 cal led for the N avy to car ry

m ost of the i n i t i al ai r bat t l e. M ar i ne

p i lots, however , m igh t be em pl oyed w i th

N avy ai r un i ts. Actual ly, i n or der to exer -

ci se M ar ine ai r, m ost of the ear ly t r ai ni ng

l and i ngs had to be schedu l ed w i th i n

r ound t r ip f l yi ng d i stance of f r iend l y ai r-

f i el ds, A l though by 1940 M ar ine car ri er

t r ai n i ng oper at i ons wer e becom ing r ou-t i ne, the heavy r el i ance upon N avy car -

r i er ai r over M ar i ne l and i ngs l asted

th r oughou t th e w ar .

As noted befor e, cl ose coor di nat i on of

ai r w ith gr ound r ecei ved gr eat em phasi s

i n the M ar i ne Cor ps. Even i n Santo

Dom i ngo and H ai t i and l ater i n N i car a-



18 P EARL H ARB OR TO G U.4D ALC ANAL

t o d est roy a speci fi c en em y fr on t l in e posi -

t ion w it hou t en dan ger i ng n ear by fr i en dl y

troops.

Refi nem ent of th i s sk i ll ed techn i que aswe know i t today was sl ow because of

m an y f act or s. T her e was so much for

pi lots to l ear n about r api dl y devel opi ng

m i l i tar y avi at i on that cl ose ai r suppor t

had to take i ts pl ace i n the busy tr ai n i ng

syl l abus after such basi c dr i l l as aer i al

t act ics, ai r t o ai r gu nn er y, st raf in g, bom b-

i ng, n avi gat i on , car r i er l and i ngs, and

com mu ni cat ion s, an d con st an t st ud y of t hel atest i n en gi neer ing, aer od ynam ics, an d

f l i gh t sa fet y.

A l so, whenever newer , faster , and

h i gher f l yi ng ai r pl anes tr ick l ed i n to the

M ar i ne Cor ps i n the l ean th i r t i es, they

wer e found to be l ess adaptabl e for cl ose

coor di nat i on w i th gr ound t r oops than the

sl ower , open cockpi t pl anes wh i ch sup-

por ted th e patr ol act i on s of N icar agua.I n N i car agua the avi ator i n h i s open

cockpi t coul d i d l e h i s th r ot t l e so as to

l ocat e an en em y m ach in e gu n by i ts sou nd ,

bu t i n the m aneuver s of 1940 pi lots f l ash-

i ng by i n thei r encl osed cockpi ts found i t

d i f f i cu l t to see what was goi ng on bel ow

or even t o d iffer en ti at e betw een fr ien dl y

l i abl e as the ol d sl ow but sur e system

wher e pi l ots r ead code m essages fr om

cl oth panel s l ai d on the gr ound or

swooped down wi th wei gh ted l i nes tosn at ch m essages su spen ded bet ween t wo

poles.

T he m ain key to devel opment of cl ose

a ir su pp or t l ay i n r el i abl e com m un i ca ti on s

to per mi t qui ck l i ai son and com plete un-

der stand i ng between the pi l ot and the

fr on t l i ne commander . Par t of the sol u-

t i on l ay i n m or e exer ci ses i n ai r -gr ound

coor di nat i on w it h em phasi s on stan dar d-i zed an d si mpl ied ai r -gr ou nd com m un ica-

t i ons and maps. By 1939 an avi ator as an

ai r l iai son off i cer was assi gned to the 1st

M ar ine Br i gade Staff. Wh i le both ar t i l -

l er y a nd n av al gu nf ir e, h ow ever , em pl oyed

for war d obser ver s at fr on t l in e posi ti on s,

ai r suppor t con tr ol was st i l l bei ng chan-

nel ed sl ow l y thr ough r egi mental and br i-

gade com mand pos& .Z2 I n the sam e yearon e squ ad ron sen t u p an ai r l iai son oi ii ce.r

i n the r ear seat of a scou t i ng or bombing

pl an e t o k eep abr east of th e gr oun d si tu a-

t i on and to di rect f i gh ter or di ve bomber

pi l ots on to tar gets by means of r ad i o.=

T hi s w as bet ter bu t n ot best .



E VOLU TI ON OF MOD E RN .4 J IP HI B I OU S WARFARE , 192&1941 19

i n g r a di o-eq ui p ped “obser ver s’> on th e

fr on t l i nes to con tr ol ai r suppor t for the

troops. B ut the L eather necks wer e al -

r ead y i n t he w ar befor e th e fi rst st an dar d-i zed N avy-M ar ine Cor ps i nst r uct i ons on

thei r em pl oym ent appear ed .25 Al so at

th at t i me, on Guadal canal cer tai n i nfan-

t r y off i cer s wer e gi ven add i t i onal du ty as

regimental ‘{ai r for war d obser ver s.”

T hey w er e coach ed on t he spot by avi at or s

of the 1st M ar i ne Ai r cr aft Wing.2e

T H E SH I P-T O-SH OREM O V Ei WE ZV T

T he sh i p-to-shor e m ovem ent was vi s-

ual ized by the T en tat i ve L and i ng Oper a-

t i ons M anual i n a m anner wh i ch r esem -

bl ed cl osel y a con ven ti on al at tack i n l an d

w ar far e: ar ti l l er y pr epar at ion , appr oach

m ar ch , d epl oym en t, an d assau lt by t he i n-

f an tr y . I t st r essed th at th i s m ovem ent

was no sim pl e fer r yi ng oper at i on bu t a

vi tal and i ntegr al par t of th e at tack i tsel f

and dem anded a h i gh or der of tact i cal

k now l ed ge a nd sk i ll .

T he tw o m ajor pr obl em s i n the sh i p-to-

sh or e m ovem en t ar e th e speed y d ebar ka-

t i on of the assau l t i ng t r oops and thei r

each t r anspor t and i ts accompanyi ng

t roops w ou ld be t act ical l y sel f-su ff i ci en t

for t he assau lt l an di ng, an d th e l oss of on e

sh i p wou l d not be a cr i ppl i ng bl ow . T oexped i te thei r debar kat i on the M ar ines

gen er al ly w en t over t he si de vi a car go n et s

r igged at sever al st at ion s on t he sh ip.

T o sol ve the second major pr obl em in

t he sh ip-t o-sh or e m ovem en t, t hat of con -

t r ol l i ng and gu i d i ng the l and i ng cr af t to

t hei r pr oper beach es, t he T en tat ive L an d-

i ng Oper at i ons M anual pr ovi ded for : (1)

m ar ki ng the l ine of depar tu r e w i th buoysor pi cket boats; (2) a desi gnated contr ol

vessel to l ead each boat gr oup fr om the

r en dezvou s ar ea t o t he l in e of d epar tu re,

tow i ng the boats i n fog, sm oke, or dar k -

n ess, i f n ecessar y; (3) w ave an d al ter nat e

wave gu i de boats; (4) each boat to car ry

a si gnboar d w i th i t s assi gned l et ter and

number i nd i cat i ng i ts pr oper posi t i on i n

the for m at i on ; and (5) for a gui de pl aneto l ead th e boat w aves i n.

T he system for the cont r ol of the sh i p-

to-shor e m ovement was st i l l substan-

t i al ly the sam e as pr escr ibed i n the Ten-

tat i ve L and i ng Oper at i om M anual when

the M ar ines m ade thei r f i rst am ph i bi ous



20 P EARL H ARB OR TO G UAD ALC ANAL

pr act i cal i n u t i l i zi ng ever y cubi c foot of

car go space avai labl e bu t pr even ts access

to much of the car go unt i l the sh i p i s

unloaded.

H ighest pr ior ity i tems for combat un i t

l oacl i ng var y somewhat w i th the natu r e

and pr obl ems of a par ti cu l ar oper at i on.

Rel at i ve pr i or it i es must be wor ked out

w i th m inu te car e. T he r esponsi bi l i t y for

hand l i ngt h i s was gi ven to a M ar i ne off i -

cer d esi gn at ed t ran spor t qu ar ter m ast er

(T QM ) aboar d each am ph i bi ous assau l t

sh i p. H e had to know not oi l ly the weigh t

and dim ensi ons of each i tem of M ar i ne

gear car r ied bu t h ad t o fam i li ar i ze h im sel f

w it h th e ch ar act er ist i cs of t he par ti cu lar

sh i p t o w h i ch h e w 7a sa ssi a gn ed : exa ct l oca -

t i on and di mensi ons of al l hol ds and stor -

age spaces i n ter ms of both cubi c feet and

deck space, Th i s fam il i ar it y r equ i r ed at

t i mes accur ate r em easur em ent of hol ds

an d l oad in g spaces as m od if i cat ion s, n ot

shown i n the sh i p-s pl ans, had often been

m ad e i n t he sh ip’s i nter nal st ru ctu re. I ni -

t i al ly, t he T en at iw L md in.g (l per at ion .~

M wnuai d i rected that , the T QM shou l cl be

an off i cer of the un i t embar ked , but such

w er e the var iat i ons i n shi ps that i t subse-

quent l y pr oved mor e feasi bl e to assi gn z

abi l it y of sh i ps som et i mes en tan gl ed pl an -

ni ng pr ocedur es. .4s a r esu l t , ther e was

no i deal appr oximat i on of war tim e com-

bat l oad i ng.

SH ORi? PART Y

One of the most ser i ous pr obl ems en-

cou nt er ed i n ear ly l an di ng exer ci ses w as

con gest ion on t he beach es as m en an d su p-

p l ies p i led a sh or e. T o keep such a si tua-

t i on r easonabl y i n hand r equi r es a hi gh

degr ee of con tr ol ; cont r ol d i f f i cu l t to

ach ieve u nder such ci rcu mstan ces, even

w hen th e enem y r em ai ns on ly si mu lat ed .

.kssau l t t r oops m ust push i nl and w i th al l

speed n ot onl y t o expan d t he beach head ,

bu t al so to m ake r oom for fol l ow i ng un i ts

and equ i pm ent to l and and to pr ovi de

sp ace i n w hi ch per son nel assi gn ed st r ict l y

b ea ch f un ct i on s ca n op er a te.

To sol ve th i s pr obl em the Tentai%ve

Latiing Operations Manual pr ovi d ed f or

a beach par ty , commanded by a naval

off i cer cal led a beach master ~ an d a sh or e

par ty, a speci al task or gan i zat i on , com -

m an ded by an off i cer of t he l an di ng for ce.

T he beach par ty was assi gned pr im ar il y

n aval fu nct ion s, e. g., r econ nai ssan ce an d

m ar ki ng of beaches, m ar ki ng of hazar ds





22

naval m at ter s; an t i (3) t r ansfer r i ng the

r esponsi bi li ty for u nl oadi ng boat s at , th e

beach fr om th e. n aval el em ent to th e l an d-

i ng for ce el em en t of t he sh or e par ty.3zM ar ine Cor ps H eadquar ter s sol ved the

l abor for ce pr obl em by add i ng a pi oneer

(sh or e par ty) bat tal ion of 340t li cw r san (l

669 en li st ed m en t o t }l e m ar i ne d ivi si on .x’

T hi s chan ge occu rr ed on 10 J an uar y 1942,

too l ate for the per sonnel concer ned to

gai n pr act i cal exper ien ce i n l ar ge-scal e

exer ci ses i n the techni ques of hand l ing

vast quant i t i es of sl lppl i es or to test thea dequ acy of t he st r en gt h an d or gan i zat i on

provided. .>t Gu ad al can al t hi s l ack cam e

close to having ser ious conseq l lences. :’~

Gener al Sm ith was not con ten t m er el y

to subm it h i s shor e par t-y r ecom n~enda-

t i onsto Adn~i ral K ing. .\ t h i s d i r ect i on ,

the l ogi st i cs staff of the Am ph ibi ous

3’Ibid.

a Ma rin e C or ps T/O D –94, 10J a n42.

8’ S ee P ar t VI of t his h ist ory.

I ’E .IRL H ARB OR TO G CAD ALC .4NAL

For ce At l an t i c F leet pr epar ed a detai led

Stand i ng Oper at i ng Pr ocedur e (SOP)

cov er i n g a l l p ha ses of l ogi st i cs. I ssu ed as

For ce Gener a] Or der N o. 7-42, SOP forSuppl y and Evacuat i on , i t ser ved as the

basi c gu i de to com bat l oad i ng and shor e

par ty oper at ion s d ur ing t he Gu ad al can al

operation.35

B y 7 D ecem ber 1941 the M ar ine Cor ps

had made l ong str icl es towar ds amphi b-

i ous pr epar edness. I t had n doctr i ne

wh i ch had been tested i n m aneuver s and

founcl to be basi cal l y sound. M any ofthe er r or s i n i mpl em entat i on had been

r ecogn i zed an d cor r ect ed ; st i ll ot her s w er e

aw ai ti ng r em ed ial act ,i on w hen w ar br oke

out . Bu t the si muh~ted cond i t i ons of the

nmneu\ 7er gr ound wer e now to be aban-

doned. T he M ar i nes and thei r doctr i ne

wer e now to subm i t to the u l t i mate test

of war .

‘5K ru l ak , OP.ci t .; Tw in i ng, op . C~~ .



CHAPTER 3

Development of Landing Craft

IA7TRODUCTION

The amph ibi ous war far e doct r i ne l a-

bor iou sl y d evel oped by M m in es bet ween

the two Wor l d War s cou l d never have

b een su ccessf ul l y execu t ed w i t hou t sp eci a l

equ i pm ent to t r xnspor t the assau l t i ng

t r oops and thei r suppl i es f r om sh i p to

shor e and to l and them on an enemy-

d ef en d ed bea ch .

N o one was mor e awar e of the need

for such equ i pm ent than the M ar i nes.

Shor t l y after the end of Wor l d War I

they i nduced the N avy to under take de-

si gn stud i es on tw o l and i ng cr af t , one forper sonnel and one for m ater i el . T r oop

Bar ge A, as t i l e f i r st of these types was

cal l ed , was t r i ed ou t at Cu l ebr a i n the

w in ter of 1923–24. ii shal low dr af t ,

tw i n -engi ned , 50-foot cr af t w i th a r ated

speed of about 12 knots and a car r yi ng

capaci ty of 110 fu l ly equ i pped M ar ines,

Another i tem of equ i pm ent t r i ed ou t i n

1924 w as th e Chr ist i e “am ph i bi an tank.”

Af l oat , th i s unusual m ach i ne was dr iven

by tw in -scr ew pr opel ler s at a r ated speed

of seven knots. On shor t , as a t r actor , i t

cou l d m ake 15 m ph; or , wher e good r oads

wer e avai labl e, the r em ountabl e t r acks

cou l d be r em oved, and on w -heel s i t cou l d

d o 35 m ph . I t funct i oned w el l enough on

l an d and i n the shel ter ed w ater s of r iver s,

B ut i n the open sea, under cond i ti ons th at

m ust be r eal ist ical ly an ti ci pat ed for an as-

sau lt l and i ng, i t pr oved so unseaw or thy

that the M ar ine Cor ps d i r ected i t s at ten -

t i on to other types.

T he constr uct i on of these types of

am ph i bi ous equ i pm ent const i tu ted a be-

gi n ni n g, h ow ever humble, towar ds the

sol u t i on of the pr obl em of t r anspor ti ng

tr oops and equ i pm ent fr om sh i p to shor e.

B ut a sh or tage of fu nd s m ad e i t i m possi bl e



\ Y: ls l l?s ul lw d . Th ree t ypes of lm:~ t s for

la ndin g olw mt ions w ere collt en)l)l:~ te(l by

Wrine pl : t l l l ]ers of t i le n l i(l -t l li rt i es.

T hese i l~cl u(l ed fast , sm al l, su ~f boi it s t ol i f t tbe l ead il ]g N wves; st :~n (l :t r cl h ’:~vy

bo:~t s :~n d l i fe bo:l t s of n l er cl ~a ll t r essel s

for the bu l l i of t r oops: :L i l d b:l l ges N n(l

] i gl l t er s f or ] l e:~ vy l )l :l t er i : ~] .’

Steps to sol ve t l ~e fi r st pl ’obl em , p]w

vi si on of sp eei :l l t r ool ) l an (l i l ]g l)oiltS, l~ere

i n it i at ed i n 19;).5. T ]l e 3L tr in e and XT :L Vj -

off i cer s w ho t xck le(l t l]e pr obl en l t hat ye:l r

hn d t o st :l rt pr et ty H 1l lcI 1r om scm tcl l, forTroop 13:uyge~ i , :L l ) rol l l i s i l l ge:l r l y develop

m el l t, fel l vi ct in l t o t l\ e si ze :m d \ l -ei gl l t r e-

st r ict ion s i l ]l l )ose(l by n ar :l ] sbi l )s i l l t hose

clays. N :tvy th i nk i ng nnd pl ann i ng fol ’

t h e d ev el o] )l l l en t of a m pl l i bi ol l s eq ~l i pl ] l en t

w as r estr icted by the types of sl li ])s t l )el l

ser vi ng the fl eet . T roop tr :\ nsl xj r ts w er e

pr act i ca ll y n ol ~exi st en t, so i t \ \ -:~sl :u m ed

ns m l emer gency me:umr e to l i ft M :l r ine

l andi ng for ces i n l ) t~ t tl esl l i l ) s: t l l (l cr l l i ser s.

A l ength of 30 feet , tbe si ze of chvi t s on

t hese sh i ps, :l ncl a w ei gh t of f ive t on s w hi ch

w as t he m axi mu n~ ul p:l ci ty of t i le cl nl ”i tsj

w er e t her efor e i nl posed n s basi c r equ ir e-

m ents for al l new hndi ng cr oft .

I n an effor t to expl or e tbe su i tabi li ty of

Tests of t h ese a })l )r ov ecl t yp es w er e co] )-

(l l~ct e(l :\ t (’:l lw 31:\ y, Se\ v ,J er sey, i n t il e

S ll m n l el ’of 1 ):16 . 13 ut t i l e exp er i l l l en t s f el l

shor t of t i le ol igi ll al i ntel lt i on l “to test :1sw i cl e:1 w~ r i et y of f orms M wns p r :l ct i cabl e,’?

bec:l lw .i l l dr e}v I l i ~gi ll s, :~ S ew or le:l l l s

b o:~ t bl l i l der T yi t l l :i p lon l i si l ~g cl esi gn , cl e-

cl il led t o sl lbl l l it :1 b id . I n 1926 I I iggi ns

I L : t ddesi gl ) eda sl )e(’i :l l sl l :l l l o\ v cl r : l ft er : tf t

(’:l l l ed th e L ’/ / w lY/ f or t i le u se of t r apper s

:t l l d oi l {l r i l ]er s :t l on g t be l ol ver M i ssi ssi p pi

:l n cl Gu l f Const. I t lmd :1 t unnel st ern t o

[)rot ect t h e l)ropeller :t nd a q)ecia l t y l)eof l)OI V> cn ]l ecl by H i ggi l ~s a ‘%p oon bi ]l ,”

wl l icb eililble(l it t o run wel l up on l ow

b:t nl m :~n d b e:l cl les n n(l r et rxct easi l y. I n

19 34 t l ke i l l l el l t or h :t d v isi t ecl (~ u:~ nt i cot o

i nt er est l l [:t ri l~es i n h is boat , an d t be N :t vy

J \ -:t snow- p:l rt i cl l l :l r l y anxi ous to test i t

w ith other com p:tm bl e types of smal l

(’1’;lft.~

T h e f ou r bo:~ ts \ vl l icb sl l ow -e(l u p a t Cap el hy for th e test \ Yer eof tw o gen er al t ypes.

T l~e sw sk i i f , x k )o:~tem pl oyed by A t]:t nt i e

coast f i sber nl el l, N W r el )r esent ecl by t l ~e

13xy H eacl , R ed B an k, a ncl F r eep or t boa ts.

T hi s type :~ppe:t red i n t heor y t o ofl er a so-

I ut i o] l to t l i e l and i n~ cr xf t pr obl em , as i t

\ Y:l s nor nu~l ]y l ~~uncl l ed :md landed






they tended to di g i n when r et r act i ng.

They wer e so h i gh for war d that M ar i nes

debar k i ng had to d r op 10 feet f r om the

bow to the beach . T h ey w er e, m or eover ,a ll u nsu i ta bl e f or l ow -er i ng m l dh oi st in g.G

I n the l i gh t of the dr awbacks r eveal ed

by tests, the Bur eau of Constr uct i on and

Repai r under took the const r uct i on of a

boat em bod yi ng al l th e best feat ur es of th e

f i sh i ng cra f t.’ T hi s w as the begi nn i ng of

a l ong and unsuccessfu l ef for t by the B L I -

rea u t o develop a sa t isfa ct ory la n ding

cra ft . Th e ~ ’B urea u B oa t ” in va r ious

forms show ed up regula r ly a t F leet L a n d-

ing E xercises from 1939 t hrough 1941, but

effor t s t o get t h e “bu~ s>) out of it s design

w er e a ba ndon ed in 1940.

E xper iment s w it h st a nda rd ~ a vy ships’

boa t s pr oceeded simult a neously w it h t he

developmen t of specia l t ypes. F r om the

f i r st they pr oved unsat i sfactor y. Af ter

f i ve of them founder ed i n a four -foot sur f

at San Cl em ente dur i ng F l ex 3, ef for ts

to adapt standar d N avy boats for beach

hm dings wer e abandoned. T he fact was

that , havi ng been desi gned for other pur -

poses, none of them wer e su i tabl e for

T hey do not per mi t the r api d d ebar kat i on

of t roops at th e w at er ’s edge.” 8

By 1938 a begi nn i ng had been m ade

tow ar ds the sol ut i on of the l ancl ing cr aftpr obl em . As a r esu l t of the ear ly exper i-

ments the M ar i nes had pr oved to thei r

ow n sat isfact ion w hat t hey h ad su spect ed

al l al on g—th at n on e of t he st an dar d N avy

boats cou l d be ad apted sat i sfactor i l y for

the l and i ng th r ough sur f of t r oops or

heavy equ i pm ent . N or wer e the exper i-

m en tal m od el s based on com m er ci al cr aft ,

though super ior to hyavy boats, a sat i s-

factor y m eans for l and i ng of assau l t

w aves on a d efen ded beach . T hese r esu lt s,

t hou gh n egat ive i n char acter , at l east

cl ea red t he w ay f or con cen tr at i ng d evel op -

m en t on speci al ly d esi gn ed l and ing cr af t .

T he fr u i t fu l l i ne of devel opm ent cam e

i nto vi ew w ith the r e-en t r ance of Andr ew

H iggi ns i n to the pi ctu r e. I n October

1936, about a year af ter decl i n i ng to bi d

on t he exper i m en ta l l an di n g boat con tr act ,

H iggi ns had w r i t ten the N avy offer i ng

h i s E ’weka as a t r oop l and i ng cr aft . As

funds for the pur chase of exper im ental

boats had been exhausted , the N avy was



D E YE LOP ME S T OF L.%XD I XG C RAFTa -

caught the fi r st t r ai n for Wash i ngton .

They spent abou t a week i n M cDowel l ’s

of f i ce wor k i ng out , a conver si on of the

standar d Eur eka i n to a l and i ng cr af t . .\ sfunds for t i le pur cl utse of exper im ental

boats had been exhausted , the N avy De-

par tm ent at f i rst r efused to l )u r chase the

H iggi ns cr aft . Bu t after the i nven tor

ot?er ed to bui ld a boat for ]ess t lm n cost ,

t he D ep ar t m en t r el en ted , f ou ncl t he n eces-

sar y funds, an d gave H iggi ns :L con tr act ,

for on e boat . H i ggi ns d el i~er ed i t t o h Tor -

fol k i n 30 d ays.’”

T he Zllrekw was tested i n sur f at

H am pton Roads i n the spr i ng of 1938”

an d m ad e i ts f i rst m an eu ver appear an ce at

F l ex 5 i n 1939 wher e i t com peted n~l inst

sever al Bur eau boats and the by now

ven er abl e fi sh in g cr aft . M ar in es w er e en -

t l ~usi ast i c about i ts per for mance. “T he

H i ggi ns boat gave t he best . per for man ce

under al l cond i ti ons. I t has mor e speed,

m or e l l l ~l l l et l ~er :l bi l i t y, h an d l es ea si er , a nd

l ands t r oops h i gher on the beach ,” r e-

por ted the com mand i ng off i cer of the 1st

B at tal i on , 5th M ar ines. “I t al so has

41

shar e t i l e M ar i nes’ en thusi asm for the

H i ggi l~’s ] ~z<~el ,{(. “T he H i ggi ns . . . bo:l t,

i s too heavy. . . . l ’he speed i s too sl ow .

. . . A ll th e H i ggi ns boat s h ave 250 h or se-p ow er w i th a ccom pa nyi n g excessi ~e ga so-

l i ne col l sl uupt i on for the speed ob-

t ai n ed j” 13] ~e r epor ted t o h is bu reau .

1 )a gget t’s pl ’ef er el l ce w as f or n m od i fi ed

B ur eal l boat , l xl i l t by t he Wel in Com pan y.

T he ot l ~er I ]u r eal l t ypes and the f i sh i ng

boats he found unsat i sfactor y, an d as the

M a ri ne (“or ps iLnd the Bur eau wer e i n:tgr een l el ~t l ol l th i s poi nt at l east , these

CYiLft were discarded.

h -ei ther the M ar i ne Cor ps nor the BL L-

r eau of Const r uct i on tL nd Repai r was to

l i i ~~e the l ast wor d at F l ex 5. T he Com -

l lm l l ( l er .~t la l l t i c Sq~ ladrol~ ,as represen ted

b-y h i s I .a ll d in g B oa t. D e~ el op nl en t B oa r d,

l ’ecom m en cl ed f ur t her t est s f or t he B u reau

a] lcl F. ’uvehf{ craf t . Accor di ngl y at F l ex 6

the fol l ow i ng year the dr am a was r e-

enacted. .~gai l l t he N l ar i nes d ecl ar ed t he

E ~l teka to be “the best so far desi gned.”

T he .i tl an t i c Squadr on , sh i ft i ng sl igh t l y

fr om dead center , cl eci ded that the H ig-



28 1 ’l ; .\ IL 1 /H . I RB OR TO G U AD AL CAATAI ,

cr af t i n quant i ty. But i l l vi ew- of t lw

fact that the F l eet J VaSl mabl e to m ake a

cl ea r-cu t r ecol l l ll l el l fl :~ ti {)l l f ol ’ ei th er t he

13ur e:l ~l or I I i ggi l l s types, the A“al y l et

con tr acts for the fi rst (i + l and i ng cr aft 011

a fi ft y-f if t y basi s.”

T i le qu est ion w as t il l al ]y set tl e(l i l l Sel k

tem lw r 1940. T he Xavy \ \ -:l sn ow coll-

vprting l ar ge n l er cl l al ]t sn i ps for I lse t l s

troop tr an spor ts. T hese shi l l s \ vel e

equ i pp ed w i t] i (l i lV it S ( w[ )al )l e of l ul l lcl l i l ]g

36-foot boats, al ~(l as t l ~e l ’~~,cl ,{ of 36-

foot l ength l l i l {l tw i w t i l e c:l l )ar it y of t i l e

30-f ooter t l ~el ~ i l l ser v i ce :111 (1COUI ( ln )ake

t I le san l e spee(l v-i t ho(l t an i lw r ease i n

I lor sepowel j the Sar y <l e(i de(l to a(l ol )t

t he l a rger as stan f l ar ( l .’”

~i f ter f i ve yeal ’s of \ vor k t i l e M ar ines

f i na l ly h :l d t i l e l al l (l i l l g C l> at ’tt h ey \\-il l l tP(l .

T l~e ol ~e feat li l”e t l ~at k ef)t t l w 1 Ii ggi ll s

ben t fr wl l l fu l f i l l i ng t l l c i {l ea] t l l :l t they

had bui lt l lp i l l t l ~ei r n~i l~(l swas the (l if f -

cu l ty of eu l ptyi nx i t 011 the bea(’11: al l

t r ool )s, equ i l)n len t, :u l (l sl l ])pl i es h ad t o be

~ ul l oad ed over t il e f ai r l y l l igl l si (l es. I )111’-

ing N vi si t to Ql l an t i co i l l .I ])l ’i l 1 )41,

H i ggi ns J VaSsl ~o\ J -]]a l )i ct ~l le of a .J al ):\ -

n ese l :u ~d i l~ g cr af t w i th a r :~n l l) i l l t l ~e bow

by Wjor I tr nw t 1+;.I .i nwr t. H iggi ])s l )e-

t i le Af:i r i l]e ( ‘or ps pr ocl lr e a r a]n l ~-bow

;M -foot f i l(j vl ~(. [r lw l l r ecei vi l~g t i le al )-

[)r oval of M ar ine Cor ps I l ea(l q~l ar ter s,

M ost+ an(t I ,i l l sel t went to N e\ v or leans

t o assi st 11i ggi l ls, ~ vl l oh ad i l gr eed t o m ak e

i t 1)1’Ot ot yl )e, col l ~el ’t i l l g a St ;1 l(i i l rd ;~f i-

foot Z :’I / / eJ OUnto a l an l p-bow boat at l ~i s

o\ Yl lexlwn se,

on 21 M ay, i n for l lm l tests wer e con-

ci ucte(l on l ,ake l ’ol }tcl l :l l t r tl i l l. T he n ew

cr aft , l )lwved to be seal~or t l ~y. She

beaclw(l and r vt r wcte(l w i t l ~ ease, and

w l~i l e ot l t l~e b each t lw r an lp w as l ow er ed:111(1per sol ~l l el a] l(l a l i gh t t r uck w er e d e-

bar kw l :111(1eenl b:t rked . on t i le r er on l-

l l len cl at iol ~ of t il e N avy I )epar tn len t Coi l -

t i l ~l l i l i g B oit ](l for t l l e I )evel op n~ el ~t of

I ,al l (l i l~ g l km t s, 17 a s~ )eci al 130al ’cl of M a -

r i u e (’or l )s :1] )(I 131 1r ea u of S ll i 1x3 of fi cer s

w as :I l )poi )i te(l t o col lcl l lct of i ici al accep-

t :t l]ce t est s. T Yi th (~el ier xl h ~oses as sen -

i or I l len )bel ’ t i l e boar d cal r ied ou t t il e t est s

(l l l r i ng t l ~e fi r st \ v eel <i l l ,Ju )l e. T ]l e r m nl )-

l x)J Y c r af t ~ w5 se(l \ ~ i tl ~f l yi n g col or s.’s

T ]] l l s was bor n t i l e l )r ecur sor of the

I .(’V I ’ ( l al l (l i l~g cl af t vel ]i cl e, p er son l ~el ),

the cr aft whi ch, i n the opi n i on of Gen-



D E VE LOP ME NT OF L AND I NG C R.kI ’r~ 29

L Z GI I T Z ~’I -i ,~ A N 1) i ?A R GE ,V

T he d esi gn of a successfu l tal )k l igh ter

p r oved a I ol +q-er a nd m or e d i ff icu l t pr ocess

than d i d the devel opment of t i l e per som

nel l and i ng cr af t . T he o1d -L -fOOt ar -

t i l l er y l i gh ter , devel oped i n 1927, was

consi der ed to nave a l im ited ~l sefu l ness

for l an f l i ng heavy equ i pn l en t i n the l ater

stages of a]] ol )er at i on j bu t t i l e M ar ine

(;or ps h ol )ed to obtai n a l igh ter , sel f-pr o-

pel l ed cr a ft p ar t icu l ar l y sl l i tet l tol :l l l (l i l lg

t an ks d ~w in g t i le ear ly stiiges.’”

As a stop-gap m easur e, M ar i nes at

Quant i co cam e up w i th a devi ce to adapt

th e stanchw d N avy 50-foot m otor l aunch

for l andi ng l i gh t veh i cl es and ar ti l l er y.

“B oat Ri g i i,” th is con tr apt ion w as cal led .

I t consi sted of a pl at for m fi t.tecl w i th i n

the hu l l of the boat , together w i th a por t-

abl e r am p by means of wh i ch t l ~e veh i cl e

cou l d g-o ashor e over the bo]v when the

cr af t beached. T he r amp was car r i ed

i n to the beach br oken down, wher e i t was

assem bl ed a nd h i tch ed u p f or d eba rk at i on .

T hi s com pl eted , i t w ou l d be d i sengaged

an d l ef t on th e beach t o accot nn ~od at e t he

n ext boat , com in g i n. T he r am p cou l d be

assem bled and n l ade r eady for use by

ei gh t, m en i n abou t 10 m in ut es. 011 sub-

Wi th the fai l u r e of Boat Ri g A, the

M ar ine, Cor ps tu r ned i ts at ten t i on to de-

vel op in g a sel f-p rop el l ed l i gh ter d esi gn ed

speci fi cal ly for l and i ng tanks and heavy

equ i pn l el l t th r ol l gh the su ff . I n Decem-

ber 1935 the Con l mandant r equested the

Bur eau of Const r uct i on and Repai r to

d esi gn su ch a cr af t. I t w as to be capabl e

of l and i ng the 9,500–pound M ar m on-

H er ri ngton tank wh i ch the M ar ine Cor ps

\ vas then con si der i ng. N egot iat ion s

dr agged on for m or e than a year , un t i l

i n Apr i l both the M ar i ne Cor ps and the

Bur eau had agr eed upon x design. .%

M -foot cr af t , i t m ade i ts f i rst appear an ce

at a fl eet l and i ng exer ci se i n 1938.22

The M ar ines r epor ted i t to be “a d i st i nct

i m pr ovem en t over pr ev iou s exp er i m en tal

designs. I t i s sel f-pr opel l ed , has su ff i -

ci en t speed , an d i s sou nd an d pr act icabl e

i n const ruct i on . I t i s equal l y adaptabl e

for l and i ng ar t i l l er y and i s an ef f i ci en t

ra rgo ca r r i er . :”3

A M -footer , bu i l t at the. N or fol k h -avy

Yar d i n the autum n of 1938, showed up at

Cu l ebr a the fol l ow i ng w i n ter for F l ex 5.

I t w as u sed su ccessfu l ly i n t r an spor ti ng

ashor e tanks an d t r ucks of the types then

st an dar d i n t he M a ri ne Cor ps. I ~ I l d er t h e



P E.4RL H AR B OR TO G U.4D ALC ANAL

l i gh ter pr oved super i or to the ol d i n r e-

spect to ease and safety of l oad i ng i n a

seaway as wel l as car go-car ryi ng ca-

pacity.’’”

A ll t an k l igh ter exper i men ts con du ct ed

up to the end of F l ex 5 had been bu i l t

ar onnd the M ar mon-H er r i ngton tank .

T hi s veh icl e, ad opt ed by t he Wu -i ne Cor ps

i n 1935, had been desi gned to f i t w i th i n

the weigh t l im i tat i ons imposed by the

h TL L Vyor am ph ibi ou s equ ipm en t. L i gh t-

ness was just about the on l y vi r tue pos-

sessed by t hi s t an k. By 1939 the M ar ine

Cor ps had gi ven up on i t and was test i ng

the Ar my l i gh t tank for i t s su i tabi l i t y i n

a m ph i bi ou s op er a ti on s. As the Ar my

tank weighed about 15 tons, i t cou l d not

be car ri ed i n any of the tank l i gh ter s then

i n exi sten ce. T he N “avy accor di ngl y pr o-

d uced a n ew m od el 45-feet i n l en gt h, capa-

bl e of car r yi ng one Ar my and two M ar -

m on -H er r i ngt on t an ks.2s

O ne of t h e n ew 45-f oot er s w as com p let ed

i n t i me for a tr i al at (h l ebr a dur i ng the

w in ter of 1940 i n F l ex 6. T be tests l acked

som ewhat i n r eal ism , however , because

none of the Ar m y-type tznks wer e avai l -

abl e. T be new l i gh ter per for m ed ade-

I n the fal l of 1940 the h-avy contr acted

for the constr uct i on of 96 45-foot tank

l i ghter s. After the cont r act had been

aw ar ded , d ou bt ar ose as t o t he seaw or th i-

n ess of t he basi c d esi gn . Dur i ng a l and-

i ng exer ci se i n the Car ibbeanj one of the

45-footer s capsi zed and sank when the

Ar my-type tank i t was car ryi ng sh i fted

t o on e si de i n a m od er at e sea.27

I n the spr ing of 1941 the M ar ine Cor ps

found i tsel f i n u r gen t need of al l the

l i ghter s i t coul d l ay i t s hands on for use

i n a pr oposed am ph i bi ous l and i ng i n the

.%zor es.28 N on e of t he 96 l i gh ter s or d er ed

by the N avy had been del i ver ed , and not

m or e than ei ght or ten wer e expected i n

t im e for the oper at i on . Ther efor e, on 27

M ay 1941 the N avy Depar tm ent Con-

t i nu i ng Boar d for the Devel opm ent of

I ,and i ng Boats r ecom mended that H ig-

gi ns be gi ven an oppor tun i ty to conver t

one of h i s 45-foot Eur eka boats i n to atank l i gh ter by i nstal l i ng a r amp in the

bow. I f th i s cr aft m et ser vi ce tests he

wou l d be awar ded a contr act for 50 tank

l igh ter s. T he Secr etar y of the N avy gave

hi s appr oval on 29 M ay, and H iggi ns r e-

cei ved th i s or der by tel ephone the next



D E VE L OP M EN T OF L .4N D I XG CR AF T 31

r eau of Sh i ps of f i cer s W1]O h ad com e to

N ew Or lean s to t est t he 36-foot r am p-bow

,Yu~ekz. At th e N ew Ri ver exer ci ses t l~at

sum mer the H iggi ns tan k l igh ter s pr oved

to be of excel l en t , basi c, desi gn . “T hey

wer e found to be fast , subject to r eady

contr ol znd r etr act i on , r el at i vel y l i gh t ,

and equ i pped w i th a r el i abl e power

pl an t ,” r epor ted Gener al Sm ith .’O T hey

al so pr oved t o be t oo h ast i ly con str ucted .

T he r am ps wer e so weak that sever al col -

l apse] , and the si l l was too h i gh for eff i -

ci en t hand l i ng of veh i cl es. H iggi ns, who

w as pr esent , w as confi den t that he cou l d

corr ect the def iciency.s.31

Befor e the r epor ts of the N ew Ri ver

exer ci ses h ad been r ecei ved by the N avy

Depar tm ent , a con t r act had been l et for

131 add i ti onal tank l igh ter s. T hese w er e

of a 47-foot Bur eau desi gn , a pr ototype

of wh i ch h :td never been bu i l t . As a r e-

su l t of the good show ing of t ]~e H iggi ns

tank l i gh ter at hT ew Ri ver l th i s con t r act

was l ater r educecl to ten . H iggi ns w as the

l ow bi cl der , and bu i lt one cr af t to B ur eau

sp eci f i ca ti on s, a l th ou gh l l e w as con vi n ced

that , the cl esi gn was unseawor thy. H is

fear s pr oved to be wel l founded when the

the Bur eau of Sh i ps to r emedy th i s defi -

ci ency. Accor di ngl y, i n Decem ber exi st -

i ng t an k l igh ter con tr act s w er e ch an ged t o

pr ovi de 50-footer s i n l i eu of the 45-foot

H iggi ns and 47–oot Bur eau types st i l l t o

be bu i l t . Both H iggi ns and the BLlreaLL

procll~ ced design s of W)-foot cra ft . B efor e

t t ny deliver ies could be ma de, presiden t

Roosevelt , a t a T$rhite H ouse C onfer en ce

on -1 . ~pril 19+ 21 direct ed t he procur ement

of 600 a ddit ion a l 50-foot t a nk ligh t ers by

1 S ept ember for t h e Nort h .%fr ica n op-

era t ion . Th e B LH ’e:lLL of S hips, t o meet

t his commit n ~ el~ t, orclered 1)100 of it s ow n

design:’

S in ce t his order w a s ea rma rked for ser~ ’-

ice in a project ed i~ rnly opera t ion , t h e

.~ t mly sh ow ed keen in t erest in a t est of t h e

t w o t ypes held n ea r Norfolk on 25 .lpr il

19*2. E:Lch car r ied ~ L X -ton tan k, el abo-

r at el y l ash ec] d ow n i n th e B ur eau l igh ter ,

]~l er el y bl ocked i ll pl ace i n the H iggi ns.

Wi nd vel oci ty r an 18 t .o 23 m il es per hour ,

w ith wal e hei gh ts est i mated between 11/ 2

and 2 feet . B oth l i gh ter s showed a speed

of 10 m i l es an hour over a m easur ed 11/ 2-

n] i le course. What happened after that i s

d escr ibed by th e A rm y obser ver w ho m ad e

the t r ip i n the H iggi ns type:



32 PE AR L H A RB OR T O GU AD AL CA NA L

H iggins 36-foot boa ts. N’on e of t hese vessels w as

exper ien cin g a n y d if ficu lt y. The H iggins t a nk

light er w as ma neuver in g a round in sh a rp turns

in to t he sea , t h rough t he w ave t roughs.

We t hen [a ft er B urea u light er t urned Wcklopen ed t h e engin es up t o 1,900 r. p, m. a nd pro-

ceeded pa st Lit t le C reek t o Fort S t orey. The

light er t ook n o w :it er except a lit t le spra y. P er-

f orma n ee w a s excellent in a ll respect s. The

light er w a s bea ched in t h e sur f a n d t he la nk ra n

off ont o t he bea ch dmpit e poor h a n d]in~ by t he

coxsw a in w h o fina lly a llow ed t he light er t o

broa ch t o. I u spite of t his t he ~ essel ha d such

pow er a n d ret ra ct ion qna lit ies [a sl t o get ba ck

int o deep w at er .

AS fa r a s comlmrison of cha ra ct erist ics of t het ypes of t a nk light ers a re con cern ed, it ma y be

st a ted t ha t in t he Ma y 25 tests t here w a s n o

compa r ison. .s’

As a r esu l t of these tests, the Bur eau

hast i l y not i f i ed al l yar ds to sh i f t to the

H i ggi n s t yp e. T h l ~s t he I l i . gg i ns 50-f oot er

becam e the standar d tank l i gh ter of the

h Tavy, t he pr ototype of t he I .(7M (l an di ng

cr aft , m echan i zed ) m th e, M ar ines knew i ti n Wor l d War I I , and as they knom - i t to-

d ay i n en lar ged for m .

Another veh i cl e wh i ch w as to pl ay a

vi tal r ol e i n the am ph ibi o{l s oper at i ons of

T he M im i ne Cor ps f i r st t ook not i ce of

t h e “.i l l i ~l t or ” i n 1937, w hen Rear Ad -

m i r al Edwar d C. I fal bf us, Com m ander ,

Bat t l esh i ps, 13at t l e For ce, I J . S. F l eet ,

Sh ow ecl M a jor C~en er al I .ou is ~ fcCar th y

I .i tt le, t hen com man di ng th e F leet M ar in e

For ce, a pi ctur e of th e st r an ge veh i cl e ap-

pear ing i n L i fe m agazi ne. Gen er al I ~i tt l e

was qu i ck to gr asp i ts potent i al it i es and

sen t th e pi ct ur e an d accom pan yi ng ar ti cl e

to the Com m andan t . H e, i n tu r n , passed

i t al ong to the Equ i pm ent Boar d at

Quantico.=

T he M ar in e Cor ps h acl n ot for got ten the

ol d Chr i st i e am phi bi an , of such br i gh t

pr om i se a nd d isapp oi nt in g per for m an ce.

H er e appear ed to be a possi bl e answ er .

T he B oar d d i spatch ed i ts secr etar y, th en

Xfajor ,J ohn I i al u f, to F l or i da to see the

veh i cl e per for m and to consu l t w i th M r.

Roebling. I {al u f was favor abl y i n~-

pr essed , an cl on t hi s basi s t he E qu ipm en t

Boar d r epor ted to the Com m m dant that<6. . . su bj ect boa t h as possi bi l i t i es for u se

i n l and i ng t r oops and suppl i es at poi n ts

not accessi bl e to other types of sm cdl

boats.” I n M ay 1938 the Con~m andan t

ci ted th i s opi ni on i n r ecom mend ing to the

N avy that “, . . st ep s be t ak en t o pr ocu r e



D E VE LOP ME NT OF L AND I NG CRAFT 33

men t progr a m w a s a t l ast w el l u nd er w ay,

and i t seem ed unw i se to d i ver t any of the

l im ited appr opr iat i on s t o x pu rel y exper i -

m en t al p r oj ect , CN O concur r ed i n the

r ecom m eu cl at i on of t he B oa rc{.3T

M a ri ne i nt er est i n t il e am ph ibi an t r act or

per si stecl , h ow ever , an d i n October 1939,

Gen er al M oses vi si ted Roebl i ng at h is sh op

i n Cl ear w at er j F lor i da. H e i nspect ed t he

1at est m ocl el t ract or , an d per su ad ed Roe-

bl ing t o d esi gn a m od el i ncl udi ng cl esi recl

m i l i t a r y cha racter i st i cs.3s

I n J anuar y 1940, Roebl i ng had com -

pl eted t he n ew desi gn . i kn appr opr i at ion

was secur ed fr om the Bur eau of Sh i ps,

and wor k star ted on the fi r st . m i l i tar y

model of an am ph ibi an t r actor . I n N O-

vember the com pl eted m ach i ne was

d el i ver ed at Qu au ti co w her e i t w as d em on -

st r ated for the Com m andant and a l ar ge

par ty of h i gh r ank i ng off i cer s of the Ar my

a nd h T avy.sg I t m easur ed up i n ever y

r espect save on e. I ts al um in um con str uc-

t i on was not consi der ed r ugged enough

for har d m i l i tar y use. St i l l the tr actor

w as so i mpr essi ve i n e~er y other r espect

that the N avy contr acted w i th Roebl i ng

for 200 of the mach i nes constr ucted of

steel . As Roebl ing d i d not have the faci li -

Quant i ty pr ocur em ent of L VT (1) d i d

not , hal t fu r ther devel opment of an l ph i -

bi an t r actor s. By October 1941, the

pr ototype of L VT (2) had put i n an ap-

pear ance, bu t vol um e pr oduct i on of the

new mocl el was del ayed by the ent r y of

the L ’n i ted States i n to the war . T o

ach i eve m axim um outpu t ,, the desi gn of

L VT ( 1 ) was “fr ozen” shor tl y after Pear l

H ar bor and the veh i cl e pu t i n to mass

production.”

T h i s ear l y L VT ( 1) was unar med,

though capabl e of m ount i ng m ach i ne

guns. T he M ar i nes, now that they had

m ade a star t, wanted som etk i ng m or e: an

ar m or ed, tu r r eted m o cl e 1 capabl e of

m ou nt i ng at l east a 37m m gun an d ser vi ng

as the equ i val en t of a seagoi ng tank i n

l and i ng oper at i ons. At Cl ear water i n

J anuar y 1940, Roebl i ng sketched a tu r -

r eted ver si on of the L VT , the pl ans for

wh i ch M ajor L i nser t , Secr etar y of the

E qu i pm en t B oa r d, ] at er com p l et ed .”

N oth i ng mor e was done about the

ar mor ed L VT unt i l J une 1941, when the

Com m andant r ecomm ended that such a

veh icl e be d evel oped , u si ng t he exi st i ng

L VT as a basi s. The new veh i cl e shou l d

be’’ . . . capabl e of su st ai ned poi nt -bl an k



34 lw :L\ RL H .kRB OR TO G U AD AL CAN.4L

i nc.l ud in g a 3’i nl m an ti tan k gu n an d t hr ee

.30 cal i ber mach i ne guns wou l d be r e-

qu i r ed to accom pl i sh th i s m i ssi on . T he

Ch i ef of N a\ 7al (oper at i ons appr oved the

pr oject an cl d ir ected the B ur eau of Sh i ps

to per fect a desi gl ~.

B~~re:~uel~gi l leers beg:l l l de}elo lJ1ne~~t in

cooper at i on w i th Roebl ing and the engi -

n eer sof t he F ood M a ch in er y Cor por at ion .

Bu t thei r s wasnot to be the f i r st ar mor ed

L V T con l pl et ed . l ~or l ci l l g i l l del >el l cl el l tl y

an d at i ts ow n expen se, t he B or g-War ner

C or por at i on p rocl u ced m od el “A l,” t he f ir st

t t l r r et ecl :~ l ~~p l l i bi :~ l ~ t r :~ ct or . Desi gn work

on th e Roebl ing-F ood M ach i ner y m ocl el ,

1,1’T (A ) (1) W-:Mn ot com pl et ed u nt il ~e-

cem ber 1941, and t l ~e pr ototype d i d not

em er ge fr om the Food M ach i ner y pl an t

un t i l J une 1942. I t was an L VT (2 ) hu l l

m ount i ng a 3’i mn~ gun i n a standar d l igh t

t an k t ur r et . I t was qu i ck l y pl l t i n pr o-

d uct ion , an d th e fi rst veh icl e r ol led off t he

assem bl y l ine i n August 1943.44

The, cra f t , cl escr i becl here were, of cou rse,

on l y a few of the w ide var i ety of boats

ancl beach i ng sh ips th at per for med yeo-

m an ser vi ce i n al l theater s dur ing Wor ld

War I I . T hese r anged i n si ze fr om the

bi g l um ber ing L ST (L and i ng Sh i p,

T anks, ”or “L ar ge, Sl ow T ar get”), or ig-

i nated by t he B ri ti sh , t o th e A rn ~y-d evel -

oped D I XW, an am ph ibi ous t r uck

pr opel l er -d r i ven afl oat . B L 1 M ar i nes

p la yed n o n ot abl e p ar t , i n t he d evel op men t

of any of these, and none had appear ed

d ur in g th e per iod cover ed by t hi s vol um e.

T hey w il l be d escr ibed i n su bsequ en t vol -

um es as they cam e to pl ay thei r par t i n

t he t act ical pi ct ur e of M ar in e oper at ion s.

“ I,VT His+; C roiza t, op. cit .





36

cer em ony; despi te Chur ch i ll ’s bl and as-

ser t i on t hat t he ?d r it ish occu pat ion of I ce-

l an d w as et iectecl “w it h t he con cur r en ce

of i t s peopl e,’> s they lmcl , i n fact? not

been consu l ted befor ehand. “i s the at t i -

tude l ikel y to be adopted by the I cel and i c

Gover nment towar d such an ‘i nvasi on ’

w as i n som e d ou bt th ey w er e n ot i nfor med

of the pr oposed exped i ti on . ” ~ I ndeed the

f i rst i nk l in g th e n at i ves h ad th at an yth in g

out of the or di nar y was afoot cam e when

ear ly-r isi ng fi sh er men d iscover ed a B ri t-

i sh dest r oyer nosi ng up to a jet ty i n the

har bor of the i sl and capi tal , Reyk javi k.

At 0620 on 10 M ay, a r ei nfor ced bat tal ion

of Royal M ar in es l an ded an d occu pi ed th e

tow n, m ovi ng so sw i ft l y that i t \ vasabl e to

sei ze the (3er man (’onsu l ate befor e the

h apl ess C’on su l cou ld d est roy h is paper s.

Accor di ng to pl an , the Royal M ar i nes

wer e to take the si tuat i on i n hand i n or -

der to pave t ] l e way for ]ar ger occupa-

t ion for ces. They wer e r el i eved i n ten

days by a Canad i an Ar my br i gade whi ch

was f i rst r ei n for ced and l ater r epl aced

by Br i t i sh un i ts. By the t i me I cel al ~d

began to l oom lar ge i l l ~’, S. defense

p la ns, t he bi g, bl ea k, sp ar sel y-p op ul at ed

is land ~~its occu l ~i ed by n ea r l y 25,000 13ri-

P EARI , H ARB OR TO G LI AD ALC ANAL

t o t ile h ome isla nds, seriously t h rea t en ed

~ ~ -]t l~ inva sion :I lld (I l)c{er ]le:lyv :lir :lt .

tack. T he pr ospect of l l r i t isb w ith dr aw al

cau sed son w al al .n l am on g t il e I ce]al ~d er s

and l ed to d i pl omat i c soundi ngs of the

Amer i can posi t i ol ) .

on 18 I )ecember 1 )40 t l~e 1cel and i c

M ini ster of For ei gn Affai r s, V. Stefans-

sou , ar r an ged a l )l ’i V i l te n ]eet i l lg w ith t l le

I ?. S. Consu l (+el l er al , I _l er tel E . l Kl l l l i-

1101111.After f i r m ass(l r ances that h i s

pr oposal w as str ict l y m )ot l ici al , the M i l l-

i ster suggested to I <un i hol n l that the

l ~n i ted States m ight consi der the possi -

bi l i ty of decl ar i ng I cel and l )ar t of the

ar e:l cover ed by t l~e M on roe T )oct ri ~~e, i n

ef fect joi n i ng t i l e i sl and to the Wester n

H em ispher e I fun i hol r n du l y r epor ted

t he t en tat it -e. pr oposi ti on t o Wash in gt on

and near ]y ,a month l ater l l e r ecei ved a

tau t i ous r epl y fr om the Secr etar y of State

wh i ch advi sed hi m that no act i on was

1i kel y to be for thcom i ng i n the near fu-

tu r e bu t that he sl ~ot l l d nei ther encour -

age nor d iscou rage fu r t] l er appr oach es

a lon g t hi s l i ne. )

I n u nh er al ded & n er i can -13r i ti sl l sti t ff

col ~ver sat ion s w hi ch took pl ace i n Wash -

i ngton i n the fi r st months of 1941, pl ans



MARI NE OC C I :P ATI OX OF I C E LAX1) 37

sponsi bi l it y of the U ni ted States: .~r nl y

t roops w er e to r el ieve t he B 1’i ti sl l ilS soon

as pr act im l )l e af ter the outbr eak of war ,

b(l t cer tai nl y n o soon er t l~al l 1 Sel )t en lber

1941, as t i l e .I r n l y d i d not feel i t WOU 1(l

be r ead y to t ak e ‘on SU C1la con ln li tl l~en t

un t i l then . ] () B u t as t i l e spl ’i ng of 1941

wor e on, ~$m er i can l l l easur es i l l ai d of

B ri tai n, such as I ien& I f i ase al ~d t i le pr o-

gr essi ve ext el ]si on of t i le Xel lt ral i t -y l ’t l -

t r ol i n to the m i ci --l t l an t i c, br o(l gh t t i l e

I :. S. cl oser and cl oser to con fl i ct w i th

(+er man y. Open an cl i ncr easi l]g sl lppor t

of the Br it i sh seem ed to su i t t l ~e l }ubl i c

m ood; a sur vey of publ i c opi n i on taken

by the Gal l (l p Pol l i n ear ly M ay sl l owe{l

th at an over whel nl ing m ajor i ty (75(;{) of

t he A mer i can peopl e favor ed h el pi ng B r it -

ai n even i f such a cour se was sur e to l ead

t l ~e u at i on i nt o v-ar w it h C~er nl an y.” T he

stage w as th us set for w hat OlleeXllilllStiVp

study of th i s per iod has cal l ed an “over t

act of par t i ci pat i on i n t i l e Eur opean

con f l i ct . ” ‘z

By l ate spr i ng Br i tai n fel t her b~ck

agai nst the w al l. (’hu r cl li ]l asked I ’r esi -

den t Roosevel t to send .i mer ican tr oo])s

to I cel an d to r epl ace th e B ri ti sh gar r ison .

T he Pr esi den t agr eed pr ovi ded an i nvi ta-

for ei gn for ce to occupy the i sl and ver y

n ear ly l l l )set a t im etabl e a]r eacl y i l l oper -

a t ion .

On 4 ,J l~ne, the I ’r esi cl el lt or cl er ed t i le

.~r nl y to pr epar e a pl al ~ fol t i l e i ll l n l ed i -

ate r el i ef of B r i t i sh t r oops i n I cel and .

T heql l est ion o fw ll er et h et roops J ver e go-

i l l g t o com e fr on l ar ose i m nl ed iat el y. . i l -

thou :h the . r nl y had r eached a str ength

of near l y a n l i l ] i on a nd a l ~al f n len , t i le

gr eat , bu l k of i t s sol cl l er s wer e r aw r e-

cr ll its gat ] l er ed i ll by Sel ect i ve ,Ser vi ce

an d r ecel l t]y cal l ed L lp ~ a t ion a l (}uards-

m en. ~-l l der exi st i ng l egi sl at i on these

m en COU 1(]not be sent beyond the West -

er n H en l isp l)er e (I l l l ess t he-y vol m l teer ed

for such ser vi ce. Equ i pm ent i n near l y

ever y categor y w as i n snor t suppl y, even

for t l :~ i l l i l l g~ )t ~ r l j oses. T i l e.\ rmyne.eded

i ts con lpar at i vel y sm al l for ce of r egu lar s

to for m cad r es for l ~ew un i ts. T o w i th -

d r aw these cadr es for an exped i ti onar y

for ce wou l d th r ow the whol e i mm ense

t rai ni ng pr ogr am ou t of gear .

.1 r evi ew of th e .i rm y’s i mm ed iat e capa-

bi l i t i es convi nced the Pr esi den t that the

M ar i ne Cor ps woul d have to fu r n i sh the

i ni ti al occu pat ion for ce for I cel and .

Si nce al l M ar i nes, both r egu l ar and r e-




t r y r egi ments of both d i vi si ons wer e st i l l

for mi ng, they wer e consi der abl y under -

st r ength , and i t had been necessar y to

r ei n for ce t i l e east coast ’s 1st M ar i ne

D i vi si on when i t was tabbed for a major

r ol e i n a p rop osscl l an di n g op er at i on . on

24 M ay, the Com m andant dr ew on the 2cI

M ar i ne D i vi si on at (’an ]p E l l i ot t , Cal i-

for ni a, for t he l~ ecessa ry r egi men t, an d

Colonel L eo D . H er m le’s 6th M ar i nes

(R ei n for ced ) w as sel ect ed “f or t em por ar y

shor e d uty beyon d t he seas. ” 13 T he r egi -

ment was br ought up to fu l l st r ength

by substan t i al d r afts fr om t i l e ~d and 8t ]~

Mar i nes/ ’ and on 28 M ay i t j oi ned i ts

assi gned r ei nfor ci ng ar ti l l er y, tank, and

serv ice elements. ~Si x days after he r ec-

ei ved h i s or der s, Col onel H er mle had h i s

com man d com bat l oad ed ; th e sh ips, t hr ee

l ar ge t ran spor ts an d fou r d est royer t ran s-

por ts, sai l ed fr om San D iego on 31 M ay.

When i t had em bar ked , th i s r egim ent

had or der s to r epor t to the Com mand ing

Gener al , I Cor ps (Pr ovi si onal ), FNIF,

At l an t i c F l eet . At that t im e, i t s m ost

pr obabl e m i ssi on appear ed t o be ei th er t he

sei zu re of M ar ti ni qu e or t he occu pat ion of

t he A zor es, both cl iscu ssed i n t he fol low -

i ng ch apt er . M om en tou s even ts, h ow ever ,

Roosevel t, i n fact , or der ed a su spen si on of

pl ann i ng for the Azor es oper at i on on 7

J une, wh i l e pr epar at i ons for the m ove-

m en t t o I cel an d pr oceed ed apace.

Whi le t he 6th M ar in es$ con voy WL L St il l

i n the Paci f i c head i ng for the Panam a

Canal , the wheel s wer e set i n m ot i on to

com pl ete the or gan i zat i on of the. pr o-

jected br igade. One other m ajor un i t , the

5th Defense I lzt tzl i on at Par ri s I sl and ,

was desi gnated for du ty i n I cel and ; i t s

comm and i ng off i cer , Col onel L loyd L .

I .eech , f l ew to Wash i ngton on 7 J une for

a two-day r ound of br ief i ng and r epor ts.

T he bat tal ion ’s an t i ai rcr af t gLnxs an d

gunner s wer e what was wanted , so when

the or der assi gn i ng the 5th Defense to

I Cor ps (Pr ovi si onal ) was publ i shed on

10 J une the 5-i nch Ar t i l l er y Gr oup was

shown as bei ng detached. I n add i t i on to

the 6th M ar ines (Rei n for ced) and the 5th

D efense B at tal ion (l ess 5-i nch Ar ti l l er y

Gr oup ), the budd i ng br i gade r ecei ved a

com pan y of en gi n eer s, a ch em i cal pl at oon ,

and a pl atoon of scou t car s fr om the 1st

M ar ine D i vi si on at N ew Ri ver . T he por t

for the hur ri ed assembl y of sh i ps, mate-

r i el , and men was Char l eston , S. C.

The men of the 5th Defense Bat tal i on





40 P EARL H .\ RJ 30R TO G U AD ALC ANAL

si gnal and the br i gade was headed east

by dawn on 2 ,J ul y. T he M ar ines wer e go-

i ng w i th the bl essi ng of Chu r ch i l l who

had wr it ten the Pr esi dent ear li er that :

I a m much en coura ged by . your ma rines

t a king over t ha t cold pla ce a nd I hope tha t on ce

t he first insta llment ha s a rriw d you w ill give

full publicit y t o it . I t w ould give us h ope t o

fa ce t h e long h a ul tha t lies a hea d.”

T he Pr esi den t m ade the desi r ed an -

nouncem ent on 7 ,J ul y as the convoy an-

chor ed i n Reyk javi k har bor , poi n t i ng ou t

t hat t he Am ei ican s w er e th er e “to su ppl e-

m en t, an d eventual ly to r epl ar e, th e Br i t -i sh forces, ” an d t ha t, a n ad equ at e d efen se

of the st r ategi c i sl and w as necessar y to

w ar d off a potent i al t h r eat to th e Wester n

H emi sphere.22 .~ t hi r d , bu t u r m nn on n ced ,

pur pose of th is Am er ican occu pat i on w as

the acqu i si t i on of a naval and a ir ba se in

I cela nd to fa cilit a t e t he prosecut ion of our

a nt isubma rine w a r in t he Nort h A tl an ti c .23

Wr hi le. t he th reat of Ger man at tack w asal ways pr esent ,, the l i kel i hood of i t hap-

pen in g stead il y l essen ed as th e year w or e

on .” On the day that the 1st Br i gade l eft

“ Quot ed in H ull Memoirs, op. rit.,I , 947.

‘2 S . 1. Rosen ma n ( ed ). The FWblic Papers mld

.kddreawa of Franklin D. Roo.wwelt, 13 vols

Char leston, Ger many at tacked Russi a.

H it l er r epeated l y i n the m onths that fol -

l owed i nd i cated that , he wanted to avoi d

pr ovok i ng the U . S. i n to war whi l e he

con cen tr ated on th e of l en si ve i n Russi a.H is subm ar ine com mander s wer e gi ven

or der s to spar e Am er i can sh i ppi ng as

m uch as possi bl e, even th ou gh i t h ad been

publ icl y an noun ced th at I T. S. X“avy ves-

sel s w er e affor di ng pr otect i on to B ri ti sh

and Canadi an sh i ps that joi ned Am er i -

can convoys headed for I cel and. St i l l

H i t l er decr eed that ther e wou l d be no ac-

count i ng for the subm ar ine com manderw ho san k an Am er ican vessel by m istake.

I T p unt i l t he actual U . S. ent r y i n to the

war th i s par t i al i m m un i ty of Am er i can

v essel s f rom a tt ack h el d good .zs

T he fact that H it l er had deci ded to go

easy on L T.S. sh i ps i n the N or th At l an t i c

was natu r al 1y not known to Am er i can

n wval com man der s. T her e w as con si der -

abl e pr essur e to get the br i gade and i t sequ i pm ent un l oaded i n the shor test pos-

si bl e t i me and th e con voy h ead ed back for

t he St at es. T h i s un l oad i ng pr oved an

on er ou s task . T her e w as l it t le l ocal l abor .

M ar in es had to fu rn i sh al l w or ki ng par ti es

and the m en toi l ed ar ound the cl ock ,



MARI NE OC C U P ATI ON OF I C E LAND 41

t h e wharves were r eser v ed f or t h e ca rgo

vessels w hich carried heavy equipment of

t he 5th Defense B at tal i on . The rest of

t he con voy r ode at a n chor in t h e harbor,

wh i l e men a nd supplies w e r e l ightered

a sh ore t o a gen t ly sl opi n g pebbl e beacl~

near t he cit y . Ear l y on 12 ,J ul y the job

was f i n i shed , the convoy sai led , and the

M ar in es h ad t hei r f i rst r eal ch an ce to l ook

a rou nd t hem .

T hey d rew sm al l r eassu ran ce fr om w hat

t hey saw . T he I cel and ic l andscape was

someth ing less than prepossessing , a t least

t o m en r ai sed w her e soi l pr od uces veget a-

t i on and a t r ee i s u t r ee. N o t r ees above

dwar f hei gh t gr ow on I cel and ’s r ugged,

m ountai nous ter r ai n , and vegetat i on i s

l imi ted t o a l i t tl e sh eep past ur age on t he

com p ar a ti v el y f l at st r et ch es. I t ha s been

descr ibed as the most vol can i c r egi on i n

the wor l d . Cr ater s, m any of them oc-

casi onal ly act i ve, pock i t s sur face, and

l av a f low s l ace acr oss i t .

T he m ost unpl easant th i ng about Ice-

l an d’s w eat her i s i ts ver y u ncer tai nty; t he

mountai ns usual l y i nsur e that the sam e

ki nd of weather r ar el y exi sts sim u l ta-

neousl y al l over the i sl and . Al though the

of jagged coast l i ne wer e a number of

sma ll fish in g villa ges; a n d except for t h e

a rea a roun d R eykj a vik w h er e t h ere w a s

a roa dn et , a ll commun ica t ion w a s by sea .

The prim lit t le ca pit a l boa st ed a bout

38,000 inha bit a nt s, t w o m ovie h ouses, a nd

on e first cla ss hot el; a s a liber t y t ow n for

n ea r ly 30)000 B rit ish a nd .America n t roops

it boa st ed not h in g. The on ly livin g

t hin gs t he isla nd h a d in a bunda nce w er e

sh eep a nd pon ieslz’ a nd t h e I Wa rin es n ever

developed a t a st e for mut t on a nd w ere

forbidden t o r ide t h e runt -sized st eeds.

.klt oget h er , it w a s proba bly good for

mora le t l~ a t t h e I Wa rines did n ot kn ow a t

t his t ime tha t t h ey w er e dest in ed t o see

I cela n d—a n d n ot h in g but I cela nd—for

eight drea ry mont hs t o come.

E ven before t h e first br iga de un it set

foot on sh ore, t he &I a r in es lea rned w ha t

t he t erm ‘(mut ua l coopera t ion ” mea n t t o

t h e B rit ish. Th ey could n ot h a ve been

mor e cordia l , gen erous, a n d helpful . As

t h e br iga de w a s w oefully shor t of mot or

t ra n sport , t h e B r it ish put more t ha n 50

trucks a t it s disposa l, t oget h er w it h dr iv-

ers fa milia r w it h t h e r egion a nd t he t ra ffic

problems peculia r t o I cela nd—a n d left



42 P E.4RL H ARB OR TO G U.AD AL C ANAL

comma n der , ~ la jor G en era l H . O. C urt is,

t o provide t h e ~ a rines w it h t he dist inc-

t ive pola r bea r shoulder insignia of t he

B rit ish force. G en era l lla rst on a ccept ed

for t he br iga de a ncl n ot ed la t er th a t :

Th e mut ua l coopera tion direct ive w orked, t o

t h e ent ire sa t isfa ct ion of t h e B rit ish C om-

ma nder a n d t h e B riga de. The B rit ish com plied

w it h our request s a n d w e complied w it h t h eirs.

I t w a s a s simple a s t ha t . A B rit ish comm a nder

less sympa thet ic t ha n G en era l C urt is might h a ve

upset t he a ppleca r t but un der t ha t t a lent ed ot li-

cer n o in ciden t of con flict Occur red.n

I n t heir n ew ca mps t he fila r ines ma de

t heir first a cq ua in t a n ce w it h t h e ~ Lssen

hut , a n in t roduct ion t ha t w a s t o r ipen

int o fa milia r it y th a t ra r ely rea ched t h e

fr iendsh ip st a ge. ln t h e mon t hs t o come

t h e men of t he br iga de w ere t o build a n d

ma int a in roa ds a n d const ruct defenses;

t h ey w er e t o become very pra ct iced a t t h e

a rt of t he st evedore; but most of a ll t h ey

w er e t o becom e efficien t builders of t h e

ubiq uit ous Nissen hut . Th e hut it self

“w a s a n elon ga t ed igloo covered w it h cor -

ruga ted i r on r oof i ng and l i ned w i th

beaver boar d” 30 desi gned to accom mo-

date abou t 14 men. I t was possi bl e to

erect severa l h ut s in combina t ion t o a c-

power.” T he var i ous un i ts, wh i ch wer e

spr ead out over a good par t of the coun-

t r ysi de ar ound Reykjavi k , wer e al so r e-

spon si bl e for 10C:L 1d efen se of t hei r bi v-

ouac ar eas, a r esponsi bi l i ty that gr ew to

i ncl ude l ong segm ents of coast l ine w hen

t he B ri ti sh u ni ts d efen di ng t hese possi bl e

l an di ng poi nt s w er e l ater r el ieved .

T he m ach i ne guns and 3-i nch guns of

t he 5t h D ef en se B at tal i on w er e i nt egr at ed

i n to the Br i t i sh an t i ai r cr af t defenses

ar ound the ai r f i el d and hzr bor and r e-

m ained a par t of th i s system for the r est

of the M ar i nes’ stay. As a r esu l t , the 5th

D efen se spen t m ost of i ts t im e per for m in g

the dut i es for wh i ch i t was const i tu ted ;

i t s state of t r ai n i ng was good and i t i m -

pr oved as a r esu l t of a steady r ound of

gun watches and dr i l l s and fr equent

th ou gh u npr od uct ive enemy ai rcr af t

al er ts. I n con t r ast , the m en of the 6th

M ar i nes and i ts r ei n for ci ng un i ts had

r eason to th i nk that they wer e on one

gi gan ti c an d n ever -en di ng w or ki ng par ty ,

a nd t h e r e~ iment la belled it self a “la bor

regimen t ” in it s August repor t t o G en era l

hfars ton.

A w elcom e brea k fr om t he st ea dy gr in d

of la bor deta ils occur red on 16 August



MARINE occupat i on OF I CEL AN D 43

tended a l ar ge joi n t B r it i sh -Amer ican

m i l i tar y r evi ew hel d i n thei r honor . of

th i s even t Chur ch i l l w r ote l ater : “T her e

was a l ong m ar ch past i n th r ees, dur i ng

wh i ch the t i m e ‘U ni ted States M ar ines7bi t so deepl y i n to m y m em or y that I cou l d

not get i t ou t of m y bead.’? 32

T he r eason for the cont i nuous r ound

of cam p constr uct i on W :l S t w o-f ol d .

F i r st , somebody had to bu i l d the cam ps

to accom m odate the expected i n fl ux of

b-m y t r oops; nei ther the Br i t i sh nor the

I cel ander s wer e i n a posi t i on to cl o so.

The pr ocess of sim pl e el im i nat i on gavethe M ar ines the job. Second, i t soon be-

cam e appar en t th f i t the h ’far ines them -

sel ves wer e goi ng to stay for a wh i l e and

a good par t of thei r t im e had to be spent

pr epar ing thei r own faci l it i es for the on-

set of w in ter .

A com mon, i ndeed, of f i ci al , bel ief t l mt

the M ar i nes wer e goi ng to be r el i eved i n

~Sept em ber by A rm y t roops h el d st ron gl y

for about a n l on tb af ter the br i gade ar -

r ived i n I cel and . T her e wer e numer ous

e.w idenr es that , th i s w as the i nten t i on of

the top pl anner s when the concept of the

M ar i ne Cor ps fur n i sh i ng the i n i t i al oc-

cupat i on t r oops was f i r st br oached. By

i n ser v i ce of t h e sel ect ees, R eser v e of l i cer s,

and the N at i onal (Am-dsm en st i l l l eft the

pr obl em of r est ri ct i on on ter r it or ial ser v-

i ce—a pr obl em w hi ch w as to r em ai n w i th

the Ar m y unt i l Pear l H ar bor br ought a

d ecl ar at i on of w ar .” “

T her e was r eal l y not too m uch tr oubl e

tak i ng car e of the f i r st Ar my cont i ngen t

to ar r i ve, a sm al l for ce of about 1,000

men bu i lt ar ound a pur su i t squadr on and

an engi neer bat tal i on . Thei r convoy

m ade por t on 6 August and the un i ts,

wh i ch cam e under M ar ston ’s com mand,

m oved i n to a cam p set up for them by

the M ar ines. H owe~’er , pr epar at i ons for

the ar r i val of a second Ar my echel on of

br igade str ength due i n m id-Septem ber

m eant that ever y M ar ine avai l abl e had to

tu r n to on camp const r uct i on . I t was

t he d iff i cu lt ies at ten dan t u pon th e r ai si ng

of th i s second for ce that l ed to the de-

ci si on t o h ol d t he M ar in es i n I cel an d.3A

T he comm ander of the Ar my tr oops of

t he Sept em ber ech el on w as sen ior t o Gen -

er al M ar ston ; accor d i ng to the or igi nal

occupat i on pl an , the pr inci pl e of un i ty of

com m and was to hol d i n I cel and , and

u nd er i t t he sen ior off icer pr esen t, r egar d-

l ess of ser vi ce of or i gi n , wou l d have as-



44 PE ARL H A RB OR T O GU A DA L CA N AL

shal l, had deci ded th at un ity of com mand

d i d not go far enough, at l east as far as

I cel and was concer ned . H e deter mined

that i f Gener al Bonesteel was to have

fu ll r espon si bi li ty for t he A mer ican occu -pat i on , then he shou l d al so have fu l l ad -

m i ni st r at ive as w el l as oper at ion al con tr ol

over al l the t r oops i n I cel and .

Such a t r ansfer of the M ar i nes fr om

N avy cont r ol cou l d be ef fected by execu-

t ive or der , as h ad been d one by Pr esi den t

Wi lson i n th e case of the M ar ines ser vi ng

i n Fr ance i n Wor l d War I . U n for tu -

natel y, fr om the M ar ines’ poi n t of vi ew ,th i s t r ansfer i nvol ved a gr eat deal m or e

than a sim pl e change of comm and, I t

br ought them under the Ar my’s adm i ni s-

t rat ive an d d isci pl in ar y syst em w hi ch d if-

fer ed consi der abl y fr om that of the N avy

and w ith wh i ch th ey w er e unfam il iar .

T he Com mandant , who had seen the

syst em at w or k i n W’or ld War 1, pr ot est ed

vi gor ousl y. On 4 Septem ber he w r ote

Adm ir al Star k:

Th e proposed ch an ge w ill n ot on ly necessit at e

a complet e revision of t his pla n [un it y of com-

m an dl but w ould in troduce m an y a dm in ist ra tive

difficult ies, w it h n o correspon ding a dva nt a ges

in so fa r a s comma n d rela t ions a re con cern ed.

But i t was a l osi ng f i gh t , M ar shal l

stated that he had no i n ten t i on of estab-

l i sh i ng a pr ecedent and r em ai ned ada-

m ant , T he Comm andant d i d not l ear n of

the pr oposed change unt i l i t was pr ac-t ical ly an accom pl ish ed fact , an d th e su p-

por t he r ecei ved fr om the (3N O was l uke-

war m . T he actual t r ansfer of com mand

took pl ace on 24 Septem ber and Gener al

H ol comb w-as d i r ected to r epor t to the

Secr etar y of War on al l m at ter s per tai n-

i ng t o t he br igad e.37

T h e r esu l ta nt a dm i n ist r at i ve d i ff icu l ti es

d i d not pr ove to be as bad as H ol comb andm any other s had fear ed . T he change-

over was mor e of an annoyance than i t

w as a d ef i ni te h in dr an ce,; af ter al l , as on e

bat tal i on com mander com mented l ater ,

“w hi le adm in ist r at i on d i ff i cu l ti es m ay be

bother som e they can be hand l ed .” 38 I n

the cour se of t r yi ng to master Ar my pr o-

cedur es, Gener al M ar ston w r ote the As-

i st an t C om m a nd an t :

Th ey h a ve a t r emendous a moun t of pa per w ork

w h ich t h e Ma rine C orps seems a ble t o a void.

The ba rra ge of force or der s comin g out of st a ff

sect ion s is a ppa lling. Of course w e a re get t in g

a long a ll r ight but it w il l be mon t h s befor e w e

a re “or ient ed in t he n ew direct ion . . . I f t h e



MARI NE OC C U P ATI ON OF I C E LAND

cer e thanks for the spl end i d assi stance

[gi ven ] i n the pr epar at i onof the var ious

cam psi tes and i n num er ous other ways

pr i or to and dur i ng ou r ar r i val i n I ce-

l and . T he an~ount of har d and extended

l abor i nvol l -ed i s fu l l y r ecogn i zed and

d eepl y a pp r eci at ed ,” ‘0

T he on ru sh of w in ter m ad e i t n ecessar y

for al l t r oops to devote a good par t of

thei r t im e to cam p mai n tenance and

weatherizing. A nd a s su pp li es con ti n ued

to come in for the depots bei ng bu i l t up

near Reyk j avi k l wor k i ng par t i es had to

be pr ovi ded to em pty sh i ps as wel l as to

con str l l ct t he st or eh ou ses n eed ed t o pr o-

t ect t he equ i pm en t. D ays r api dl y shor t-

ened un t i l ther e wer e on l y four hour s of

a sor t of hazy dayl i gh t to accom pl i sh

necessary funct ions.

Wi th the cont i nued r equ i r em ents for

cam p constr uct i on and pr epar at i ons for

an ar ct i c w i n ter , the br i~~de was not abl eto conduct a sat i sfactor y t r ai n i ng pr o-

g ram.

E ver y possi bl e oppor tu ni ty w as sei zed

by u ni t com man der s, h ow ever , t o i mpr ove

t he st at e of r ead in ess of t hei r m en . Many

of the speci al i sts, of cour se, l i ke the

I )ar t i es “i n or der to get i n a m i n im um

am ount of t r ai n i ng. ” ‘i T he 3d Bat tal ion ,

encam ped i n a pass that l ay r i gh t i n the

path of w i n ter w i nds how l i ng ou t of the

m ountai ns near H val fj or dur , w as for ced

to “bu t ton-up” for the w in ter alm ost as

soon as i t sh ift ed i n Sept em ber .

T he l ack of adequate un i t t r ai n i ng has

been em phasi zed by som e cr i t i cs of the

M ar ines’ em ploym ent i n I cel and . T rai n-

i ng d i d not stop; i t was ham per ed and

cur tai led by th e w eather and the r equ i re-

m ents of wor k i ng detai l s, bu t i t d i d go on

despi te al l the ver y r eal obstacl es. T he

m en, t r ai ned and i ndoctr i nated as am -

ph i bi ous assau l t t r oops, however , wer e

per tu r bed when they hear d the news of

Pear l H ar bor wh i l e hudd l ed ar ound the

stoves i n thei r N i ssen huts. Wer e they

to be l eft for got ten i n the wr ong ocean?

Once the war br oke out i n ear nest the

N avy, too, d i d not vi ew w i th favor the em -pl oym ent of a M ar i ne Br i gade on a de-

fensi ve m issi on i n I cel and . T he M ar ines

wer e needed i n the Paci f i c and pr essur e

was put on the Ar my to get them r el ieved .

Pl ans wer e l ai d to send a convoy w i th

8,000 m en fr om h“ew Yor k on 15 J anuar y



46 PE ~RL H .4R B0R T O ~U AD AL CA NA L

d efen se m issi on , an d h eavy equ ipm en t to

the Ar my. T he convoy car r yi ng the fi nal

r el i ef pu t i n to Reyk javi k on 3 M ar ch , and

t he M ar in es began l oad in g ou t t he fol low -

i ng day. .I t 1010 on 8 M ar ch , Gener al

M ar ston cl osed h i s (.71> OI L shor e and

opened i t on boar d the U SS M cCa.u ’7ey;

a t, n oon that d ate th e br igade r etu r ned

to the j u r i sd i ct i on of the 3T avy. I t i s i n -

ter est i ng to note that th i s i s the on l y i n -

stauce i n Wor l d War 11 wher e a M ar i ne

un i t was “detached for ser vi ce w i th the

,L rm y by or der of the. Pr esi den t .:’ I n the

n u t n y j oi nt , oper at i ons th zt fol low ed, al l

Ser },i ces ad her ed t o t l~e pr i uci l)]e of u ni ty

of conunanc]. Gener al B onesteel r ecog-

n i zed the M ar i nes’ d i sl i ke for the “de-

tached ser vi ce” concept bu t i n a fi nal l et -

ter to (}ener al M al ’ston comm ended the

br i gad e w hose “ever y off i cer an d en l i st ed

m an gaye h i s w hol e hear tecl sl ~ppor t an d

cooper at i on to our effor ts to a m uchgr eat er ext en t t han m er e com pl ian ce w ith

i n st r u ct i on s i m pl i ecl .:’ 4’

T he br i gade l anded at , h“ew Yor k on

~Z S l:lrch a I~ cl w a s immed ia t el y d i sbanded .

‘T he 5th D efen se B at tal ion ~~-asor der ed

l -o Par r i s I sl and , the 6th M ar i nes to the

tr ai ned r egu l ar s and r eser ves. T he br i-

gad e bad r el ieved n o appr eci abl e n um ber

of B r i ti sh tr oops, w hi ch h ad been t he or ig-

i nal pu r pose of t he ~i m er i cau occu pat ion .

T her e i s no concr ete evi dence that the

Ger m an s ev er ser i ou sl y con si d er ed a tt ack -

i ng I cel and , al though i t i s concei vabl e,

even i f som ew hat u nl ikel y, t hat t he k now l-

edge of the pr esence of the br igade m igh t

have deter red such an at tack . T he m i l i -

tar y val ue of the I cel and occupat i on

st em m ed f rom r i gor ou s ser vi ce i n t he f iel d.

I n t he m an y scat ter ed an d d et ach ed post s,

h ea vy r esp on si bi l i ti es f el l on t he sh ou l der s

of the young com pany gr ade ofl i cer s

and hT (XOs. .fdver si ty devel oped and

st rengthened l eadersh i p . Once the br i -

gade r eached I cel and ther e m -as a n~i ni -

m um r otat i on of of f i cer s and m en. Th i s

stabi l i ty of per son nel gave t he com man d-

er s an oppor tun i t y, sel dom affor ded i n

peacet i me, to devel op team wor k an d un i tespr i t de cor ps. I T pon r etu r n to the

I yn ited St at es, al most al l r an ks r ecei ved a

pr omot i on and al l un i ts of the br i gade

w er e dr awn on heavi ly to pr ovi de l eader s

for new l y act i vated un i ts, T he 6th M a-

r ines fu r ni shed l ar ge dr afts to the r ai der



CHAPTER 5

The Marine Corps on the Eve of War 1

T H E I N EVI TABL E CON FL I CT :

DEFEN SI VE EXPAN SI ON

Whi l e war cam e to Eur ope i n Septem -

ber 1939, the L Tn i ted States d i d not for -

m al ly en ter the str uggl e agai nst the Axi s

Power s for another 27 m onths. T hefor mal decl ar at i ons of war d i d not , how-

ever , pr o j ect the nat i on d i r ect l y fr om a

state of i sol at i on and i nd i ffer ence i n to

act ive bel l i gerency. Al th ou gh t he U ni ted

States decl ar ed i ts neu tr al i ty—our ai m

bei ng to avoi d con fl i ct wh i l e guar di ng

agai nst total i tar i an penetr at i on of the

W est er n H em i sp her e—w e w er e gr ad ual l y

d r awn deeper and deeper i nto shor t-of-war oper at i ons i n suppor t of Gr eat

B r it ai n an d h er al l i es,

I ni t i al l y, the Adm in i st r at i on m oved

w i th cau t i on . I n the year s fol l ow i ng the

“war to end al l war s,” d i sappoi n tm ent i n

the L eague of N at i on ’s fai l u r e and the

i ng a foundat i on for the expansi on of our

n at ion al r esou rces an d i nd ustr y. On 8

S ep tem ber 1939, seven d ays af ter H i t ler ’s

a rm i es cr ossed i n to Pol an d? t he Pr esi d en t

of fi ci al l y d ecl ar ed a l i m it ed n at i on al em er -

gency. As the r isi ng t i de of N azi aggr es-

si on sw ept over E ur ope i n 1940 and 1941,

Am er i cans awakened mor e and mor e to

the per il and suppor ted i ncr easi ngl y the

n at ion al pol icy of st r engthen i ng our

a rmed forces.

As of 30 J une 1939, two m onths befor e

H i tl er ’s ar m ies l au nch ed t hei r B Zi tzh wi eg,

M ar in e Cor ps st ren gt h st ood at 19,432 of-

f i cer s and en l i sted? of whom 4,840 (i n -

cl ud i ng avi at i on com ponents) wer e as-

si gned to the F l eet M ar i ne For ce. FM F

gr ou nd for ces w er e or gan ized i n t wo u ni ts

op ti m i st i ca l ly d esi gn at ed “br i ga des,> ’ ea ch

i n actual i ty an under str ength i n fan tr y

r egi m en t 4 r ei n for ced by sk el et on i zed su p-

48 P EARL H ARB OR TO G UAD AL C AN’AL



States defense effor ts. And fr om that

poi n t on the Com mandant ’s Annuzl Re-

p or t s r ef lect a st ea dy su ccessi on of u pw ar d

r evi si ons i n per sonnel pl ann i ng unt i l by

30 N ovem ber 1941 total st r ength stood at65,881, the number , gi ve or take a few ,

w i th wh i ch the M ar ine Cor ps w ou l d en ter

the war agai nst the Axi s Power s a week

l at er at Pear l H ar bor .

Bu t of gr eater si gn i f i cance than the

i ncr ease i n over -al l st ren gt h w as t he gr ow -

i ng pr opor t i on of that st r ength r epr e-

sen ted by the F leet M ar ine For ce. F iscal

1940 saw the num ber s of the Cor ps’ st r ik -i ng ar m mor e than doubl ed : fr om 4,525 to

9,749; and th i s f i gur e i n t l l r n had m or e

t han tr ipl ed by 30 h ’ovem ber 1941, r each -

i ng 29j 532. On e fact or l ar gel y r espon si bl e

for t hi s i m pr essi ve i ncr em e w as n lobi l i za-

t i on i n N o\ -en l ber 1940 of the ent i r e Or -

gan i zed M ar i ne Cor ps Reser ve, both

gr ound and ai r , thus maki ng avai l abl e a

l ar ge n um ber 5 of off icer s an d m en , at l east

par ti al l y t r ai ned , for i ncor por at i on i nto

the FM F w i th a m in imum of del ay.

T hi s i ncr eased str en gt h m ad e possi bl e

or gan i zat i on of a un i t l ar ger than the

M ar ine Cor ps hzd ever oper ated befor e:

m on th s p assed bef or e ei t her d i vi si on cou l d

be bu il t, u p t o au th or ized str en gt h.

Gr owth of M ar i ne Avi at i on kept pace

w ith that of the g-r ound for ces, and agai n

that , pace l ooked faster on paper than i twas i n actual i ty. Si mu ltan eou sl y w it h

the conver si on of the two br i gades i n to

d i vi si ons, the east coast and west coast

FM F ai rcr aft gr oups, based at Quant i co

and San D iego r espect i vel y, wer e act i -

vat ed as th e 1st L L nd 2c1M ar in e A ir cr aft

Wi ngs (J f.~W). ~~ut , as w i th the d i vi -

si ons, br i ngi ng them up to au thor i zed

st r en .g l l p roved n o over n i gh t pr ocess.I n lt lal ly, each cou ld boast , on ly ~ si ngl e

ai rcr af t gr oup of m ixed com posi ti on ,

d esi gn at ed M .l C~-11 an d M A G-21 r espec-

t i vel y. On the eve of Pear l H ar bor , FM F

ai r per son nel n um ber ed 2,716 ot li cer s an d

en l i sted out of a total avi at i on str ength

of 5,911.C T hese w er e di vi ded am ong th e

two w ings and the detached squadr on i n

the Vi r gi n I sl ands. The 1st M AJ J 7 had

r em ai ned based at Qu ant i co. Bu t the

con l i ng of war found the 2d M AW scat-

ter ed far and w ide, w i th a squadr on at

Wake I sl and : a detachm ent at M idway

I sl and , and the bal ance of the w ing at

E wa> on Oahu , T . H .’






ar mam ent consi sted of an t i ai r cr af t and

coa st d ef en se gu ns.8 T he f i r st four of

th ese, w it h con secu ti ve n um er ical d esi g-

n at ion s, w er e act ivat ed d ur i ng f iscal 1940.

By the t i m e of Penr l H ar bor the number

had r eached seven w ith two m or e i n pr oc-

ess of f orma t i on .g

Concur r en t w i th i ncr eased num ber s

came increased responsi b i l i t i es. T he

N avy, too, w as expand i ng at an unpr ece-

d en ted r at e, d iver ti ng m or e M ar in es fr om

the FM F to per for m the Cor ps’ t r ad i -

t i on al funct i ons: secur i ty of n aval i nstal -l at ion s ash or e an d ser vi ce afl oat . By 30

Sover nber 1941, sh ips’ d et ach men ts h ad

gr own to 68, m anned by a total of 3,793

M ar in es.’”

A sh or e th e N avy’s stepped -u p t rai ni ng

pr ogr am s, par ti cu lar ly i n n aval avi at ion ,

cr eated m or e an d m or e bases, secur i t y of

w hi ch i mposed a ser ious add i ti onal d r ai non M ar i ne m an power . I n f i scal 1940 the

Cor ps was cal l ed upon to pr ovi de guar d

detachm ents at four new naval ai r sta-

t i on s i n th e Con ti nen tal U ni ted Stat es an d

th r ee i n U . S. over seas ter r itor i es.” T he

fol low ing fi scal year ad ded another four

ai r stat i ons, a naval am muni t i on depot ,

a naval suppl y d epot ,12 and 18 other new

i nstal lat i ons r angi ng i n char acter and l o-

cat i on fr om Davi d T ayl or Basi n , Car -

der ock, M ar yl and , to N aval M agazi ne,

I nd i an I sl and , Wash i ngton . Fu r ther -

m or e, ga rr i son d et ach m en ts w er e d et ai l ed

to tw el ve stat ion s over seas, as w il l be d is-

cussed subsequentl y.

Si mu l taneousl y w ith f i ll ing the N avy’s

dem ands, the M ar ine Cor ps assum ed ad -

d i t i onal secur i ty pr obl em s of i t s own as

exi st i ng bases expanded and new ones

wer e establ i shed . (See bel ow .) Thus,

the per iod under d i scussi on saw th e act i -

vat i on of seven new guar d com pan i es of

a non-FM F char acter : at Quant i co, San

D iego, Duned i n (F l or ida), and Br em er -

t on (Wash i ngton ).

GRO WT Z/ OF M ARI AT E T RAZN I N GA.VD OPERA TZON AL BASES

I nevi tabl y the pr obl em s of housi ng,

t r ai ni ng, and equ i ppi ng r api dl y expand-

i ng m anpow er i mposed i ncr easi ng pr es-

sur e on the Cor ps’ exi st i ng faci l i t i es,





TH E MARI NE C ORI ’S OX TH E E VE OJ ’ W.$R 53



D ur in g th e year s betw een w ar s, th e per -

vasi ve spi r i t of paci f i sm wh i ch l ed to r e-p ea ted at tem pt s by t hi s cou nt ry t o cooper -

ate i n r educt i on of naval ar mam ents and

i n i nt er na ti on al t rea ti es m i li tat ed a gai nst

adequate defense pr epar at i ons, as d i d

budgetar y r est r i ct i ons. Such peace as

these measures :~cl~ ie~ ’ed l }l ’ oved~ l l~easy at

best , bu t the fact that the U . S. l i ved up

t o i ts agr eem en ts, w her eas som e oth er n a-

t i on s d i d not , cont r ibu ted tow ar d m ak i ngol w defense pr ogr am a shadow of w hat

i t m i gh t , have been . T h i s was par t i cw

l ar ly ser iou s i n th e Paci fi c, N w il l be seen .

B ut i n 1939%41, w i th w ar f l am in g th rou gh

Eu rope, th e m or e i mm ed iate d anger l ay i n

the At l an t i c. wher e H it l er ’s subm ar ines

a pp ea r ed n ea r l y i n vi n ci bl e.

I n the fal l of 1939 the U ni ted States

ar med for ces w er e bar el y ad equ ate for th e

defense of the Wester n H em i spher e. As

l ong as the nat i onal sen t i m en t d i d not

sanct i on total r ear mam en t and m il i tar y

exp an si on , t he a dm i n ist r at ion w tL s f or ced

to r el y on exi sten t m eans and a par t i a l

m obi li zat i on of both n mn pow er an d m ate-

t l i e Savy to guar d agai nst .J apanese ag-

gr essi on i n the Paci f i c. H owever , the

Ger m an ofi el i si ve i n the spr i ng of 1940

ser ved to jol t Am er icans fr om thei r com -

pl acency. Ger m:u l t r oops over ran Den-m ar k , N or way, the I ~ow Count r i es, and

France. Pr esi d en t R oosev el t r ecogn i zed

the danger i n th i s and caused a sh i f t i n

ou r m i l i t ar y pol i cy to pr ovi de gr eater

secu r it l~ i l l t i l e .I t lan ti c.

Du r & the sunm l er and fal l of 1940,

Congr ess stepped up the pr ocur em ent of

:LiL’CL’ilft, m obi li zed th e r eser ves, passed

sel ect ive ser vi ce l egi sl at ion an d l au nch edthe t~~o-ocean navy bu i l d i ng pr ogr am .

]tu t com pl et i on of th ese m easu res w ou ld

take t i m e, and we had no assu r ance that

the Axi s par tner s woul d si t i d l y by and

en joy t he f r ui ts of th ei r i ni ti al aggr essi on .

T o i n~pl em en t th e r ear mam ent pr ogr am ,

I ’r esi dent Roosevel t ad opted th e pol icy

of i ~i di ]l g ] ;r i ta i n an d RL l ssi :L (aft er r TL L l le

1941 ) wh i l e cen t i nu i ng d i pl om at i c r el a -

t ions w i th Ger m any and ,J ap:L n. ~f~i th

i nd nst r y expan di ng an d th e ar med for ces

i l i cm asi ng i n si ze an d equ ipm en t, th e .k d-

n l in i st r at i on d id ever y t l ~i ng sh or t of w ar

t o bol ster B ri ta i n’s t ot ter in g posi ti on .

54 P EARL H AR B OR TO G UAD AL C ANAL



er s17 i n r etu r n for 99-year l eases on cer -

tai n base si tes i n var ious str ategi cal ly

p la ced 13r i ti sh p ossessi on s: t he B ah am as,

J am ai ca, A nt i gu a, Sai nt L uci a, T r i ni dad ,

an d B ri ti sh Gu i ana.

Si nce pl ans cal l ed for devel opm ent of

t hese si tes i nt o n aval act ivi ti esof var yi ng

natu r e, the f i r st Amer i cans to m ove i n

w er e M a ri nes of t he sever al secu ri ty gu ar d

detachm ents. T he sam e hel d tr ue i n the

case of tw o add i ti om d bases not i ncl uded

i n the destr oyer deal : at Ar gen t i a ( N ew f-

ound l and) and i n Ber m uda. T hus, wh i l e

i n the th r oes of expand i ng the FM Fj the

M ar ine Cor ps found i tsel f, sadd l ed w i th

st i l l m or e gar r ison duty beyond the con-

t in en tal l im it s of th e U ni ted St at es.

DEFEN SE OF T H E WEf.7T ERiV

H EM ISPH ERE : M AA?T I A ’I QU E

T he fal l of F rance and th e N ether lands

al ar med th e tT ni ted States to the dangerthat N ew Wor l d possessi ons of these

count r i es 15 m igh t fal l i n to Ger m any’s

hands shou l d H i t l er for ce the conquer ed

n at ion s t o ced e th em , or t o pr ovi de ser vi c-

i ng ther e for Ger man L ’-B oats oper at i ng

Amer i can i n ter est and concer n . For

shou l d the th r ee F r ench war sh i ps ther e,

i ncl ud i ng the ai r cr af t car r i er B eam

( l oaded w i t h 106 Amer i can -manu factu red

fi gh ter pl anes dest i ned for pr e-V i chy

Fr ance), be taken over by the enem y, the

secu r i t y of B r i t i sh and Am er i can sh i p-

pi ng i n the At l an t i c wou l d be ser i ousl y

threatened. Fur ther mor e, the F r ench

H i gh Com mi ssi on er for t he A nt il les, Rear

Adm ir al Geor ges Rober t had decl ar ed h i s

al l egi ance to the Vi chy gover nm ent and

was em phat i c i n h i s r efusal to accept

Amer ican and Br it i sh offer s of “pr otec-

t ion.”

One sol ut i on , an d one whi ch w as i mm e-

d iat el y d iscar ded , cal led for an A mer i can

br eak w i th Vi chy and the occupat i on of

the i sl ands by Am er i can for ces. I t was

n ot expect ed , h ow ever , t hat A dm ir al Rob-

er t wou l d yi el d w i thou t a fi gh t -and we

wer e not r eady to scr ap our neu t r al pol -

i cy and d r aw accusat i ons of Yankee im -

per ial ism fr om fr iend l y Wester n H em is-

ph er e n at i on s. D ir e n ecessi ty, h ow ever ,

r equ i r ed som e plan of oper at i on . On

8 ,J ul y 1940, the J oi nt Pl ann ing Com mi t-

t ee com pl et ed a pl an for an exped it ion ar y

TH E MARI NE C ORP S ON TH E E VE OF WAR 55



can r epr esen tat i ve i n negot i at i ons that

fol l owed, Rear Adm i r al J ohn W. Gr een-

sl ade, ar r i ved at an agr eem ent w i th Ad-

m i ral Rober t to m ain tai n the status quo;

and the ‘i hot :’ M ar t i n i que pr obl em wastem por ar i l y r esol ved w i thou t the U ni ted

States bei ng for ced i nto m il itar y act i on .

H owever , hei gh tened tensi ons dur ing

the l ate sum mer of 1940 agai n i nd i cated

t he possi bi li ty of F ren ch con ni van ce w it h

Germany. Accor di ngl y, l at e i n October

1940 the Pr esi den t “ . . . ask ed t he N avy

to dr af t a pl an for an em er gency oper a-

t i on . . . .“ 20 T h i s pl an cal l ed for an as-sau l t on M ar t i n i que, by a naval for ce i n -

cl ud i ng a l and i ng par ty of som e 2,800

M ar i nes of the 1st M ar i ne Br i gade, to be

suppor ted by two r ei n for ced Ar my r egi -

m ents. L ater pl ans i ncr eased the si ze of

t he f or ce; r evi sed est im at es w er e based on

the possi bi li ty of m or e than token r esi st -

ance fr om the seven to ei gh t thousand

F rench sol di er s an d sai lor s on th e i sl an d.Fortunately, the oper at i on agai nst

Mar t in ique d i ed st i l l bor n. Admi ra l

Gr een sh id e r each ed a n ew “gen tl em en ’s

agr eement ’> w i th Adm i r al Rober t ., al -

t hou gh t her e w er e f requ en t i n st an ces l at er

w hen Pr esi den t Roosevel t st i l l t hought i t

t he L “n i ted S tat es a nd t he M ed i ter r an ea n,

and Eur ope and South Amer i ca. Whi l e

the Ar my consi der ed them of l i t t l e val ue

i n W est er n H em i sp her e d ef en se con si d er a -

t i ons, thei r danger was m easur abl e bythei r val ue to Ger m any. F r om ai r bases

and naval faci l i t i es i n the i sl ands, Ger -

m an ai rcr af t an d su bm ar in es cou ld sor ti e

after the bu l k of B r it i sh sh i ppi ng.

Our deep concer n for the safety and i n-

tegr i t y of the i sl ands l ed to a ser ies of d i s-

cu ssi on s w it h bot h t he B r it ish , Por tu gal :s

al l y, and the L i sbon gover nm ent. By

October 1940, U n i ted States Ar m y andN avy pl ann i ng off i cer s had dr afted a pl an

for a sur pr i se sei zur e of the Azor es.

H ow ever , t he pl an t o l an d on e r ei nfor ced

d i vi si on was bu i l t on sand: the Ar m y d i d

not h ave the necessar y t r oops to com mi t,

nor di d the N avy have adequate sh i ps to

t r anspor t and suppor t the l and i ng for ce.

And, pol it i cal ly, i t w as cont r ar y to Am er -

i can pol i cy at th i s t im e to becom e a. defacto par ti ci pan t i n the Eur opean war .

By M ay 1941 i n tel l i gence est i m ates

fr om E ur ope agai n i nd icat ed t he possi bi l-

i t y of a Ger m an movem ent i n to the I ber -

i an pen i nsu l a an d Ger man occupat i on of

the Azor es and ad jacen t i shm ds. On the




al ter ed th e or igi nal mi ssi on of th e m ixed

force. Por tu gal w as opposed t o a n A n~ er -

i can occu pat i on of t he Azor es, an d U ni ted

St at es pl an ner s becam e pr eoccu pi ed w i th

the th r eat of Ger m an effor ts to occupySou th Am er ica, par ti cu lar ly 13r azi l. T he

succeed i ng w eeks w itnessed a ch an ge i n

both t he u rgen cy for t he Azor es oper ~t i on

and i n the m issi on of the M ar ine con~pl e-

m en t of t he. A zor es f or ce.

Du r ing the ear ly par t of ,J une, i n tel l i -

gen ce sou rces i n E ur ope pr od uced cr ed it -

abl e evi den ce t hat C~er n~an y di d n ot pl an

to i nvade Spai n ancl Por tugal bu t i n -tended r ather to at tack i n t i l e opposi te

d i rect i on . Ru ssi a w ou ld be H i t l er ”s n ext

objective. T he for ecast of the Ger n l an

pl ans pu t an end to Am er i can fear s for

the safety of the Azor es, and per m it ted

the U ni ted States to cl i ver t t he M ar i nes

t o I cel and .

H ow th i n the M ar i ne Cor ps hacl to

spr ead i ts m anpow er i n or der to fu l f i l l

i ts m any com mi tm ents i s i nd i cated by the

tabl e that fol l ows show i ng the d i st r ibu -

t i on effect i ve 30 N ovem ber 1941, on the

Con ti nen tal U . S’. TLOft-FiWF

Ma jor Ma rine C orps B ases ‘------------ 14,707

P osts & S t a tions (43) ------------------ 10, 089

Headquar ters & Sta f f ------------------ 780

R ec ru i t in g (4 d i st r i ct s ) ________________ 847

Tot al --------------------------- 26, 423

P ost s & S ta tions (24) ------------------ 3,367

Ta ct ica l U nits ‘2----------------------- 5, 498

S hipboa rd D et a ch ment s (68) ----------- 3, 793

Tot al ---------------------------- 12, 658

F leet M a?<n e F or ce, con ti nen tal G. 8.

1st Ma rD ir -------------------------- 8,918

2d Ma rD iv (less det s) ----------------- 7, 540

2d D efB n _____________________________ 865

1st MA}v ----------------------------- 1, 301

2 d M AW (l es s d et s ) ------------------ 682

M is cel la n eou s _________________________ 633

Tot al --------------------------- 19,939

5 D efB ns (P acific) -------------------- 4, 399

2d MAW ( element s) ( P acific) __________ 733

2d Ma rD iv (elemen t s) ( P a cific) -------- 489

Tota l --------------------------- 5,621

Tot a l a b ov e ca t eg or ies ___________ 64, 641

Tot al st ren gt h Ma rin e C or ps _____ 65, 881



PART T WO

war Comes



60 PE ARL H A RB OR T O GU AD AL CA NA L



Whi l e the polit ica l sent iment of t he ma -

jor it y of ~ merica ns in t he la t e 1930’s

WOU IC 1 con don e no direct milit a ry int er-

vent ion, t he govern men t a nd t h e na t ion

w ere open ly sympa t het ic to t he ~ hin eseca use. B ot h mora l a nd lega l emba rgoes

a gy~ inst mun it ions shipment s t o J a pa n

w ere put int o effect a n d in crea sing

amounts of ma teria l a id given t o C hina .

Am er ican pi lot s, i ncl ud i ng m em ber s of

t he ar m ed for ces, w er e per m it ted t o vol un -

teer to f l y for the Ch i nese Ai r For ce

aga i nst t he ,Japanese.2

By ear ly 1941 ,J apan was hu r t i n pr ide$pu r se, a nd pot en cy as a r esu lt of .l r ner i ca n

pol it i cal and econ om ic m easu res tak en to

h al t i t s exp an si on . I n M ar ch a new Am -

bassador , Adm i r al N om ur a, w as sent to

Washi ngton to negot i ate a set t l em en t of

,Tapanese-Amer i can d i f f erences. H e w as

con fr onted w i th a statem en t of fou r pr in -

ci pl es w hi ch r epr esen ted t he basi c A n~ er i-

can posi t i on i n n egot i at i on s. T hese w er e:(1) Respect for t h e terr it or ia l int egrit y a nd

t h e so~ ereignt y of ea ch a n d a ll na t ions:

(2) S upport of t he pr inciple of n on in t er fer-

en ce in t he int erna l a ffa irs of ot her coun t ries ;

(3) S upP ort of t he pr in ciple of equa lit y, in -

clu din g eq na ]it y of com mer cia l oppor tu nit y;

(4) Nt )n dist urba nce of t he .$t af?{s quo in t h e

ach i eve a peacefu l sol ut i on of th e th reat -

en i ng si tuat i on i n the Paci f i c. I t was

n ot K on oye, how ever , w ho cal led th e tu rn

i n I m per i al pol i cy, bu t the J apanese

Ar m y. And the Ar m y adam an t l y r e-fused to consi der any concessi on that

m i gh t cau se i t t o l ose face.

.& f ter Ger man y at tack ed Ru ssi a i n J un e

1941, th e l ongt i me th reat of Sovi et i nter -

ven t i on i n ,J apan ’s pl ans for expansi on

was vi r tual ly el i mi nated . T he J apanese

Ar m y m oved sw i f t l y to gr ab m or e ter r i -

tor y and to add to i ts st r ength . Sou ther n

I nd o-Ch in a w as occu pi ed an d con scr ipt sa n d r eser v i st s w er e ca l led Lip. ln t h e fa ce

of t his fresh evidence of ,J a pa nese in-

t ra nsigence, P resident Roosevelt froze a ll

,J apa nese a ssets in t he lJ nit .ed S ta t es, ef-

fect ively sever in g t he la st commercia l

cont a ct bet w een t he t w o na t ions.

I n Oct ober t he Army forced t he ~ onoye

ca binet t o resign a nd repla ced it w it h a

government ent irely sympa t het ic to it sposit ion .’ The new premier , G en era l

T oj o, sen t a sp eci al r ep r esen ta ti ve, Sa bu r u

I < ur u su , t o ~ ~T ash i ngt on t o a ssi st h “or n ur a

and r evi tal i ze negot i at i ons. T he J apa-

n ese d ipl om at s w er e i n an u nten abl e posi -

P RE WAR S I TU ATI ON I NT TH E P AC I FI C 61



oi l, wh i ch th ey had to have to suppl y thei r

m i l it ar y m ach i ne.

T he on l y event that , m i gh t have hal ted

J apanese war pr epar at i ons wou l d have

been a com pl et e a lm eg-a ti on by t he [ J ni t ec]States of i t s pr i nci pl es of negot i at i on .

On 22 N ovem ber A mbassad or K lw {u +u r e-

cei ved the th i r d and l ast of a ser i es of

com muni ques fr om ,T apan set t i ng dead-

l in es for su ccessfu l n egot i at ion s. H e w as

i nfor med that , af ter 29 N ovem ber th i ngs

wer e “au tom at i cal ly goi ng to happen.” 6

A s f ar as t he ,J apan ese w er e con cer n ed

negot i at i ons wer e at an end and the t im efor d i r ect act i on had com e. T he two

J a pa nese en voys w er e ca r ef u ll y i n st r u ct ed ,

however , not to gi ve the im pr essi on that

tal ks had been br oken off. T he stage had

been set for “the day that w i l l l i ve i n

infamy.”

A fter an extr em el y t hor ou gh i nvest i ga-

t i on of th e n egot iat i on s d ur in g t hi s per iod

pr i or to the outbr eak of the war , a ,J oi n t

Con gr essi on al Com nl i t t ee su mm ed u p t he

d upl ici ty of J apan ese n egot i at i on s i n t hi s

succinct sta tement :

I n con sider in g t he n egot ia t ion s in t heir en -

t iret y t h e con clusion is in esca pa ble th a t J a pa n

con si der ed t he ot her t o be i ts m ost pr oba-

bl e enem y. T her e w as, how ever , a funda-

m ental m or al d i f fer ence between the r e-

spect i ve war pl ans. T he Am er i cans

pl an ned f or d efen se an d r et al i at ion i n caseof at tack ; th e ,J apan ese i nt en ded t o st ri ke

t he fi r st bl ow . (See M ap 1, M ap Sect ion )

J apan ’s pr im e obj ect i ve w as econ om ic

sel f-su ff ici en cy, an d t he pr i ze sh e sou gh t

w as cont r ol of the r ich natu r al r esour ces

of Southeast Asi a and the i sl ands of the

East I nd i es, her “S ou t her n R esou r ces

Ar ea.” T he ,J apanese wer e wel l awar e

that , i nvasi on i n th i s ar ea wou l d br i ngthem in to con f l i ct w i th a coal i t i on of

powers. The l ands they aspi r ed to con-

q uer w er e t h e p ossessi on s or p r ot ect or a tes

of Gr eat B ri tai n, A ust r al ia, N ew Zeahm d,

the N ether la.nds, and the U ni ted States.

By means of sur pr ise at tacks, l aunched

si mu ltaneousl y on a hal f dozen d i ffer en t

f r on ts, t he ,J a pa nese. exp ect ed t o ca tch t he

A ll ies off -bal an ce an d i l l-pr epar ed .

T he obvi ous th r eat of war w i th J apan

had not been i gnor ed by any of these Al -

l ied nat i ons, bu t the t r em endous advan -

tage of choi ce of t i m e and pl ace of at -

tack r ested w ith the aggr essor . J apan i n-







P RE WAR S I TC TATI ON I AT TH E P AC I F IC 65



l yi ng sand i sl ands w i th i n a fr ingi ng r eef.

Each atol l had at l east one i sl and bi g

enough to con tai n an ai r st r i p; M idway

had two. The l agoons w i th i n the r eefs

w er e al l l ar ge en ough t o per m it t he d red g-

i ng and bl ast i ng of seapl ane l and i ng

l anes and anchor ages for sm al l cwr go

sh i ps; M idway’s and Wake’s wer e al so

sl ated for devel opm en t as for war d bases

for t he Paci fi c F leet ’s su bm ar in es. Ci vi l-

i an con t r actor s wer e h i red to bu i ld the n a-

val base i nstal lat i ons, bu t un t i l w ar actu -

al l y br oke out , m ost of the wor k on the

i sl and defenses w as done by the m en w ho

wer e to m an them , M ar i nes of the l st , 3d ,

a nd 6t h D ef en se B at ta li on s.

T he or gan izat i on of th e d efen se bat tal -

i ons var ied accor d i ng to t i m e and pl ace

of em pl oym en t, bu t by l at e 1941 t he stan d-

ar d T / O cal l ed for a un i t , w i th m or e than

900 m en assi gned to a headquar ter s bat-

ter y, th ree 5-i nch coast defense gun bat -

t er i es, t hr ee 3-i nch an ti ai r cr af t bat ter i es,a sound l ocator an d sear ch l igh t bat ter y, a

bat ter y of .5o cal i ber an ti ai r cr af t m ach in e

guns, and a bat ter y of .30 cal iber m ach i ne

guns for beach defense. M idway was the

on l y ou tpost that actual l y d r ew an ent i r e

bat tal i on , al though Wake or igi nal l y was

l and si nce 1903. M ost constr uct i on , l i ke

t he passen ger h ot el on Wak e an d th e qu ar -

ter s for th e ai r l in e’s an d cabl e com pan y’s

per son nel , w as of l i t tl e m il i t ar y val ue.

M idw ay, wh i ch had the m ost am bi ti ous

base pl an , w as al so t he fi r st ou tpost sch ed -

u l ed to r ecei ve a M ar ine gar ri son-the 3d

Defense B at tal ion wh i ch ar r i ved at Pear l

H ar bor on 7 M ay 1940. T he bu l k of the

bat tal ion r em ai ned i n H aw ai i for the next

ei gh t m on t hs w h i l e r econ n ai ssa nce d et ai l s,

fol l owed by sm al l advance par t i es, d i d

the pr el im ~l ar y wor k on suppl y and de-

f en se i n st al l a ti on s?’ On 27 J anuar y1941, i n the face of the th r eat posed by

,T apan ’s aggr essi ve act ion s, t he Ch ief of

N aval Oper at i ons ( CN O) d i r ected that

the r est of the 3d Defense Bat tal i on be

moved to M idway, that detachments of

t he 1st D efen se B at t al ion be est abl ish ed

at J ohnston and Pal m yr a, and that the

6th D efense B at tal ion , then i n t r ai ni ng atSan D iego, m ove to Pear l H ar bor as a r e-

pl acem ent and r eser ve un i t for the out-

posts?’

On 15 Febr uar y, the sam e day that the

3d B at tal i on began un l oad i ng i ts heavy

66 r lMR1 , H AR BOR TO G U AD AI .C AN AL

to r each t i ny J ohnstonwher e on 3 M ar ch r otat i on for the m en at the out l yi ng posts,



two 5-i nch guns, si x M ar i nes, and two

naval cor psm en wer e set ashor e. After a

few days l ayover to hel p the car etaker de-

tai l get set up, the r est of the advance

par ty (3 off i cer s and 45 en l i sted men)

went on to Pal myr a, appr oxi matel y 1,100

m i les sou th of Oah u.

After the r em ai nder of the 1st Defense

B at tal i on ar r ived a t Pear l , sm al l r ei nfor c-

i ng detachm ents w er e gr adual ly added to

the souther n ou tpost gar ri sons as the i s-

l ands’ suppl y and qww ter i ng faci l i t i es

were expanded . On tJ ohnston and Pal -

m yr a, as at M idw ay, the ci vi li an con t r ac-

tor s’ cr ews and const r uct i on equ i pm ent

wer e heavi l y com m i t ted to the naval ai r

base pr ogr am , and on l y occasi onal l y

cou l d the M ar i nes bor r ow a bu l l dozer ,

t r uck , or gr ader to hel p ou t i n thei r own

ex tensi ve schedu l e of defense const ruct i on .

For the m ost par t, the gar ri sons r el ied on

pi ck an d sh ovel t o get t hei r gu ns em pl aced

ancl to d i g i n the am muni ti on m agazi nes,

com m an d post s, an d fi r e d ir ect ion cen ter s

necessa ry f or i sl ancl defense.

Duty on the sm al l atol l s was ar duous

and du l l w i th l i tt l e r el ief fr om the m onot-

r epl aci ng those th at had been l ongest “i n

the fi el d” w i th men fr om Pear l H ar bor .

I n m idsum mer a gr oup of 1st Defense

Bat tal ion per sonnel was sent to M idway

to star t the r el i ef of the 3d Bat tal i on and

on 11 Septem ber the 6th Defense B at tal -

i on ar ri ved to take over as the atol l ’s gar -

r i son , T he 3d Bat tal i on r etu r ned to

H awai i for a wel l-deser ~-ed br eak fr om

the gr uel l i ng monotony and wor k of

bu i ld ing defenses.

By August 1941 the wor k on the naval

ai r base at Wake was wel l al ong and the

n eed f or a gar r ison t her e. w as i m per at ive.

An advance detachment of the 1st De-

fense Bat tal i on ar r i ved at the atol l on

19 .$ugust and im m ediatel y began the

now fam i l i ar pr ocess of backbr eaki ng

wor k to d i g i n guns, dum ps, ai d stat i ons,

and com mand posts. Agai n the cont r ac-

tor ’s men and mach i nes wer e l ar gel y de-

voted to wor k on the ai r f i el d and the

l agoon, and the M ar ines had to get al ong

w i th the hand tool s or gan i c to the un i t .

I n l ate October r ei n for cem ents f r om the

par en t bat tal ion m ad e t he 2,000-m il e t ri p

fr om H awai i to br ing the gar r i son L ~pto






i m m ed i at el y. T l ~el l a~ ’a l got ’er l l or \ \ -:~ sl l -

t hor i zed t o begi n con st ru ct ion of coast cl e-

fense and ant i ai r cr aft gun posi t i ons.

M ost of the guns to be m ounted wer e al -

r eady i n stor age at the naval stat i on andthe B ur eau of (l r dnance was d i r ected to

pr ovi de the am muni ti on cL nd add i ti onal

weapons st i l l needecl .l ~

The pr imar y pur pose of r ai si ng the 7th

Defense B at tal ion w as the m ann i ng of the

four 6-i nch naval gl u ]s an(l si x 3-i nch

ant i ai r cr af t guns pr ovi ded for i n i n i t i al

defense pl ans. T he w i sdom of i ncl ud i ng

i n fan tr y i n the bat tal i on and mak i n~ pr o-vi si on for r ei n for cem ent by t r ai necl Sz-

m oan r eser ves can h ar dl y be qu est i on ed .

T u tu i l a was far too l ar ge an i sl and to be

ad equ at el y pr ot ect ed by CLr el at ivel y f ew

bi g guns, m ost of wh i ch wer e concen-

t r ated ar ound Pago Pago har bor . Smal l

beach defense gar r i sons wer e needed al l

ar ound the i sl and shor el i nes to check

enem y r ai d i ng par ti es. I t was i n tendedthat m ost of the Samoan r eser ves woul d

be equ i pped and t r ai ned w ith r if l es taken

fr om naval stor es and used i n the beach

defenses wher e thei r know ledge of the

t er r ai n w ou ld be i nval uabl e.

I t was m idsum mer befor e the fi r st Sa-

m oan M ar ine was actual l y en l i sted , bu t

m any nat i ves vol un tar il y took weapons

tr ai ni ng on an u npai cl stat us, con ti nu ing

a pr act i ce begun by the naval gover nor i nN ovem ber 1940.” T he fi rst n at ive r ecr ui t

was en l i sted on 16 .~ugust 1941 and the

1st San loal ~ B at tal ion , M ar in e Cor ps Re-

ser ve, was a goi ng concer n by the t i me

war br oke. T he author i zed st r ength of

the bat tal i on was 500 en l i sted m en, bu t

t hi s f i gu re cou ld n ever be r each ed becau se

of the gr eat num ber of m en needed as

l a bor er s on essen t i al ba se con st r u ct i on .T her e was one factor of the defense

pi ctu r e at T utu i ]a that , m atched the si tu -

at ion at M i dw ay, ,J oh nst on , an d Pal m yr a.

N one of these i sl ands had, at the onset

of war , any l and pl anes. T he M ar i ne ai r

squadr ons wh i ch wer e schedu l ed to joi n

the defender s wer e ei ther st i l l i n the

States or el se based on Oahu, wai ti ng for

the si gnal that the ai r f i el ds wer e r eadyfor u se. T hat par t of M ar i ne Ai r wh i ch

was i n the H awai ian I sl ands was based at

Ewa Fiel d , l ocated appr oxi matel y four

ai r m i l es west , of Pear l H ar bor . Just

pr i or to the J apanese at tack , the un i ts

P RE W.I R S ITI”.I TI OX I X TH E P .\ (’I FI C 69

Asi de fr om the M ar i ne for ces i n the Stat i on at For d I sl and . M ar i nes pr o-



N ’ester n Paci fi c assi gned to the .I si at i c

F l eet ,” the on l y si zeal de M ar ine un i ts i n

t he Paci fi c n ot al read y accou nted for w er e

guar d detachm ents on Oahu and the Xi

Engi neer B at t al i en (l ess Com pan i es C

and D) wh i ch had been sent to Oahu to

est abl i sh an ad van ce am ph ibi ou s t rai ni ng

base for the, 2d M ar i ne D i vi si on . T her e

was a 485-n~an M ar i ne Bar r acks at the

Pear l H ar bor X ’avy Yar d and 102 m en

assi gn ed t o t he bar r ack s at t he X Taval A ir

S t a t ion a t E\Vii , (): 11111.Terr it ory of H n\ ~n ii”

(31S , H ist L)i~ , H QM(’, .J i in ll:]r y 1 )43), 3-8. h er e

in a ft er cit ed ?IS f;lr~ f .Vo)lo(lroph. Th e ot her

sq umlrons n ssigned t o 31.4{+ –21 w ere eit h er i~t

sea }Yit h lh e X:lvy’s (.iir r iers or st ill in t h e V. S .

“ S ee I ’r t r t I V, “ 31a rin es in t he I ’h i]ippin es ,”

for t he I mew :ir sit ua tion in (’hin:l Nn d t he I ’h ilip-

pilles,

vi ded the guar d (169 m en ) at the YT aval

.%m m ~ul i t i on Depot at L ual ual ei i n the

h il ls n or th west of H on oI L du . T he d efen se

bat tal i on s w hi ch w er e ql ~ar ter ed i n or n ear

t he n avy yar d w er e u nder t he oper at ion al

con tr ol of the Com mand ing Offi cer , M a-

r i ne B ar r ack s, Col on el P ick et t.

T her e wer e an :I dd i ti onal 877 M ar ines

pr esen t i n Pear l H ar bor on 7 Decem ber

as m em ber s of the guar d detachments of

t he bat t lesh ips an d cr ui ser s of th e Paci fi c

F l eet .” I n al l , ther e wer e m or e than

4,500 J lar in es on Oal lu t hat f i rst d ay.

“ T h e st r en gt h of m ost h l ar h l e un i ts on O ah u

i s l ist ed i n Hca/ ”inys Record, P ar t 24, E xhibit

A“(). 40. “L oca t ion of r egula r ly a ssigned t om-

lut rnding officers of shil)s I )resen t dur in g t h e

,Ta pa nese a tt ack of ‘i D ecem ber 1941.”



J AP AN S TRI KE S

str afe and bomb the major Ar my and

71

T he Am er icans d i d not take thei r beat -



N avy ai r fi el ds i n an at tem pt to catch de-

fend i ng ai r cr af t on the gr ound. Simu l -

taneousl y, the bat t l esh i ps m oor ed to pi l-

i ngs al ong the shor e of For d I sl and

w ou l d be h i t by h i gh- and l ow-l evel bom b-

i ng at tacks. T he shi ppi ng str ike gr oups

i ncl uded l ar ge num ber s of d i ve and hor i-

zon tal bom ber s, si n ce t he J a pa nese an ti ci -

pated that pr otect i ve net t i ng m igh t pr e-

ven t thei r l ethal . tor pedo bomber s fr om

bei ng fu l l y effect i ve. I n al l , & 21 pl anes

took par t i n the r ai d , whi l e 39 fi gh ter s

f l ew pr otect i ve cover over the car r i er s toguar d agai nst a r etal i ator y at tack that

never mater ia l i zed .

At 0755 the soft st i l l ness of Sunday

mor n i ng was br oken by the scr eam ing

w hi ne of d ive bom ber s an d t he sh ar p ch at-

ter of m ach i ne guns, At hal f a dozen

d if fer en t bases ar ou nd th e i sl an d of Oah u

J apanew pl anes si gnal ed the outbr eak of

war w i th a tor r en t of sudden death . Pa-t r ol bomber s wer e caught i n the water at

K aneohe N aval A i r Stat i on , acr oss the

i sl and fr om H onol u l u ; cl osel y par ked

r ow s of pl anes, concent r ated to pr otect

them fr om sabotnge, w er e t r ansfor med

i nt o sm ok in g h eaps of u sel ess w r eck age at

i ng l yi ng down. T he fi r st scat ter ed sh ot s

fr om sentr ies ashor e and w atch stander s

who manned ant i ai r cr aft guns on boar d

sh i p f l ashed back at the enem y even be-

for e the bugl es and boatswai ns’ pi pes

sounded “Cal l to Ar m s” and “Gener al

Quar ter s.” T he sh i ps of the Paci fi c F l eet

wer e on par t i al al er t even i n por t and

m ost of the off i cer s and men wer e on

boar d. Cr ew m ember s pour ed up the l ad-

der s and passages fr om thei r ber th i ng

com par tm en ts t o bat t le st at ion s, Whi le

dam age contr ol team s tr i ed to pu t downfi res and shor e u p weakened bu l kheads,

gun cr ews l et l oose ever yth i ng they had

agai nst the oncom ing pl anes. I n m any

cases guns wer e fi r ed fr om posi t i ons

awash as sh i ps set t l ed to the bot tom and

cr ewm en wer e sear ed w i th f l am es fr om

fuel and am muni t i on fi r es as they con-

t i nued to ser ve thei r weapons even af ter

r ecei vi ng or der s to abandon sh i p. Onm an y vessel s t he f ir st t or ped oes a nd bom bs

tr apped m en bel ow deck and snuffed out

the l ives of other s befor e they wer e even

aw ar e th at t he at tack w as on .

The r eact i on to the J apanese r ai d was

fu l l y as r api d at shor e bases as i t was on



J AP AN S TRI KE S73

T he m en of I WI G-21 recovered q uickl~ ~ Yit hin t he sa me ha lf I I ollr t ha t , w it -



from t h eir init ia l surpr ise a nd sh ock a n cl liessed t he, loss of l~ wa ’s pla nes, t h e possi-

fOLl@t ba ck w it h w h a t few rifles a I I c{ n la - bilit y of effect ive a er ia l resist a n ce w a s

ch in e guns t h ey ha cl . S a lva gea ble gun sca l~ celed ol~ t by simil:t r en emy :I t t :t cks a ll

w er e st r ipped from {la n~ a ged pla n es a n t iover Oa llI I. ~ orcl isla nd’s sea pla ne ra mps

set LI p on ha st ily i n ~p r ov isecl m ou n ts; on e

scou t-bom ber r earand r l l l ~ways wer e m ade a sham bles of

machine ~Ll11 I Ta sw recked aI I d bu rn in g ai rcr aft i n th e open -

m annecl to swel l the vol [une of an t i ai r -

cr a ft f ir e. A l th ou gh t he .gr ou l ) con l m an cl -i ng st ase of t l~e ,J apan ese assau lt . The

M ar in es of t he ai r stat ion ’s gu ar d d etach -er , I ,i eu ten an t (?ol on el Cl au cl e :1. L ar k i n,

had been wounded alm ost as soon as he m ent n lal ~l ~e(l r i f l es I nd m lch i ne gm ls to

ar ri ved at t i le f i el d t l mt m or ni ng, he con- beat ot f f l l r ther enemy thr usts, bu t the

t i nued to coor d i nate the effor ts to meet cl i r e bom ber s had done thei r job wel l .

f ur th er en em y at tack s.T her e was no need for them to r etu r n. T he

T wo ,J apanese d i ve. bom ber s st r eaked fer ns of al l at tacks becam e the l ar ger sh i ps

over the fi el d fr om the d i r ect i on of Pear l i n t he h ar bor .

H ar bor at 0835, d r oppi ng l igh t f r agn~en- T he r ai d d rew al l t om at i c r eact ion s fr om

tat ion bom bs an d st rat i l~g t il e M ar in e gu n t i le few M ar ines i ll t i le navy yar cl w ho sawposi t i ons. A few m i n~~tes af ter the th e f i rst en en )y pl an es d ivi ng on t he sh ips.bom bm s l ef t , the fi rst of a steady pr oces-

Wl li le the guar d bugl er br oke t l ~e n ~ajor -si on of enem y f i gh ter s at tacked Ewa as

t he ,J apan ese began ~ssem bl in g a coveri ty of t he m en of t he bar r acks d et ach men t

for ce at near by B ar ber ”s Poi nt to pr otect

an cl t he 1st an cl 3d D ef en se B at tal i on s ou t

the w i thd raw l of t l ~ei r st r ike gr oups. T heof thei r ql lar ter s, th e ear ly r iser s w er e al -

M ar i ne m ach i ne g~u]s accounted for atr eady r un l ~i ng for the ar mor ies and gun

l east on e of t il e el len ly pl an es ai l d cl ai m ecl sheds. By 0801 when Colonel Pi cket t or -

another p robab l e. T wo and thr ee pl ane d er ed t he d efen se bat tal i on m ach in e-gu n

sect i ons of f i gh ter s or bi ted over the fi el d , ~YNUpS to nl;Iu t liei r I yea pon sj eigh t of t he

74 PE A RL H .l RB OR T O G~ AD .A L CA ~A L

sen t t hei r h eavy ear th -m ovi ng equ ipm en t get sh i p sunk; four bat t l esh i ps, thr ee



to H i ckam F iel d t o h el p cl ear t he r un ways.

Th i r teen machi ne guns wer e i n act i on

by o& 20 and the gunner s had zl r eady ac-

cou nt ed for t hei r f i r st en em y d ive bom ber .

Dur i ng the next hour and a hal f the fi r e

of twenty-f i ve mor e .30’s and .5o’s was

ad ded t o t he yar d’s :m ti ai r cr aft d efen ses,

an d tw o m or e pl an es, one cl ai med j oi nt l y

w i th the sh i ps, wer e shot down. T he

3-i nch gl ms w er e never abl e to get i nto ac-

t i on. T he amm uni t i on tr ucks d i d not r e-

tu r n fr om the I ,lm l ual ei depot un t i l 1100,

m or e t han an h on r aft er th e l ast J apxn eseai r cr aft h ad h ead ed back for t hei r car r ier s.

By that t im e the per sonnel of al l M ar ine

or gan i zat i ons i n the navy yar d ar ea had

been pool ed to r ei n for ce the guar d and

an ti ai rcr af t d efen se, t o pr ovi de an i nfam

tr y r eser ve, an d to fur ni sh th e su ppor ti ng

t r anspor t and suppl y detai l s neecl ed to

susta i n t hem.

I n the cour se of thei r at tacks on bat t l e-

shi p r ow and the sh i ps i n the navy yar d$s

dr ydocks, the enem y pl anes had st r afed

an d bom bed t he M a ri ne bar r ack s ar ea, an d

n i ne men had been wounded. They wer e

cr u iser s, t hr ee d est r oyer s, a nd t hr ee a uxi l -

i ar i es damaged. M ost of the dam aged

shi ps r equ ir ed ext en si ve r epai rs. A mer i-

can pl ane l osses wer e equal l y h i gh: 188

ai r cr af t total l y destr oyed and 31 mor e

damaged. T he N ’avy and M ar ine Cor ps

h ad 2,086 of fi cer s a nd m en k il l ed , t he A r my

194, as a r esul t of the ~t tack: 1,109 men

of al l t he ser vi ces su rvi ved t hei r w oun ds.

B al an ced agai n st t he st agger i ng .h ner i -

can total s was a fan tast i cal l y l i ght tal l y

sh eet of .T apan ese l osses. T he en em y car -

r i er s r ecover ed al l bu t 29 of t he pl an es t hey

had sent ou t ; sh i p l osses am ounted to f i ve

m idget subm ar ines; and l ess than a h~L n-

d red m en w er e k il led .

D esp it e ext en si ve sear ch m i ssi on s f low n

fr om Oahu and fr om the Enter pr i se,

wh i ch was l ess than 175 m i l es fr om por t

w hen t he sn eak a tt ack occu r r ed , t he en em y

str i k i ng for ce was abl e to w i thdr aw ml -

detected and unscathed . I n one r espectthe J apanese wer e di sappoi nted w ith the

r esu l ts of thei r r ai d ; they had hoped to

cat ch t he Paci fi c F leet ’s car r ier s ber th ed

at Pear l H ar bor . For tunatel y, the ur gent

need for M ar ine pl anes to str engthen the

J A PA N ST RI K E S 75

er at i ons i n the Cen tr al Paci f i c that had fr om at tack s by an y m ean s, bu t thei r posi -



been ou t l i ned i n Rai nbow 5. .i com pl et e

r eeval uat i on of Paci fi c st r ategy w as nec-

essar y.

T he cr i ti cal si tm ct ion faci ng t he ou tpost

i sl an ds w as cl ear ly appr eci ated an d an at -

tem pt was nm de to get r ei n for cem ents to

Wake befor e the ,J apanese st r uck ; i t d i d

not com e i n t i m e. T he t i ny atol l ~~ils one

of the f i r st object i ves on the enem y t i m e-

t abl e of conquest } M i dw ay w as m or e for -

tunate; when the Lexington r etur ned to

Pea r l on 10 D ecem ber w i th i t s u n de.l i veyecl

l oad of M ar ine scout bom ber s, they wer e

or cl er ecl to at tem pt an over -l vat er f l igh t to

th e atol l. On 17 I )eeem ber , ten d ays xfter

th e or igi nal ly sch ed ul ed f l y-ot l, 17 pl an es

of VM S13-231, sheph er ded by a m cval pa-

t r ol bom ber , su ccessf ul l y r n acl e t l ~e 1,137 -

m i l e f l i gh t , fr om Oahu to M idway. I t was

t h e l on gest si n gl e-en gi n e l a nd p l an e m a ssed

f l i gh t on r ecor d , bu t m or e i m por tant i t

market ] il vi tal add i t i on to M idway’s de-

f ensi ve pot en t i a l .

T he ou tpost i sl ands needed m en and

m ater iel as w el l as pl an es. Rear Ad mi ral

(l aud e C. Rl och , Com mand an t of th e l +l tb

N ava l D ist r i ct , gave t he r esl J on si bi l i ty for

or ga ni zi n g a ucl equ i pp in g t hese r ei n for ce-

t ion s w er e m ar k ed l y st r on ger .

T he Wash i ngton N aval D isar mam en t

T r eaty of 1922 pr ovi ded for the m ai n te-

nance of the status quo i n r egar d to for ti -

f i cat ion s an d n aval ba ses i n cer tai n ar eas of

th e Paci fi c. Am er ican ad her en ce to th ese

ter m s thr ough the 14-year l i fe of the

t r eaty had the pr act i cal effect of w eak en-

ing the defenses of the Phi l i ppi nes and

pr event i ng the devel opm ent of Guam as a

naval st r onghol d . T he H epbu r n Boar d of

1938 r ecom men ded th at Gu am be h eavi ly

for ti fi ed an d gar r i son ed, 7 bu t Congr ess

fai led to au thor ize th e expen di tu re of th e

n ecessa ry fu nd s. I J n hap pi l y, t he p lan ner s

of Rai nbow 5 had to concede the captur e

of the i sl and i n the f i r st stages of a war

w i th the J apanese. I t was al m ost as i f

th ey cou l d l ook over enem y shou l der s an d

see th e ter se d ir ect i on to th e com man der

of the J apanese Fou r th F l eet to “i nvade

Wake and Guam as qui ck l y as possi bl e” 8

at th e on set of h ost i l i ti es. (See M ap 2)

Guam w as a fuel i ng stat i on for naval

vessel s m ak i ng the l ong r un to and fr om

the Or i en t , a r el ay poi n t for the, t r ans-

76 PE .4R L H .I R BO R T O GU A DA L CA XA L

M ar i nes. Backi ng them up was a Guam - few local J apanese wer e r ounded up and



an i an i n fan t r y un i t , the 80-m an I nsu l ar

For ce Guar d , and a vol un teer nat i ve

naval m i l i t i a w i th 246 i l l -ar m ed znd i l l -

t r ai n ed m em ber s.’ T he i sl an d’s gover n-

m en t depar tm ents and naval stat i on ac-

t i vi ti es w er e m anned by 271 r egu l ar N avy

personnel. A naval off i cer , Captai n

Geor ge J . M cM i l li n, was both i sl and gov-

er n or a nd ga rr i son com m an der .

T he war th r eat was so r eal by October

1941 that al l wom en and ch i l dr en of U . S.

ci ti zensh i p wer e evacuated fr om Guam .

On 6 Decem ber th e gar r i son dest r oyed al li ts cl assi fi ed paper s an d l i ke ot her Paci fi c

ou tposts aw ai ted t he ou tcom e of t he U . S.-

Japanese n egot i at ion s i n Wash in gton .

The wor d came at 0545 on 8 Decem ber (7

D ecem ber , Pear l H ar bor t i me). Captai n

M cM il l i n was i n for m ed of the enem y at -

tack by the, Com mander i n Ch i ef of the

Asi at i c. F l eet . I n l ess than th r ee hour s

S ai p an -b ased J a pa nese b om ber s w er e ov ert h e i sl a nd .

T he i n i t i al enemy tar get was the m ine

sw eeper U SS Penguin i n Apr a H ar bor ;

th i s sm al l shi p’s 3-i nch and .50 cal i ber

guns wer e the on l y weapons l ar ger than

interned.

T hat n i gh t a nat i ve dugout l anded near

Ri ti di an Poi nt on the nor ther n cape of the

i sl and , and the th r ee m en in i t wer e cap-

tu r ed . T hey cl ai med to be Sai pan nat i ves

sen t over to be on hand as i n ter pr eter s

w hen t he J apan ese l an ded . T hese n at i17es

i nsi st ed t hat t he J apan ese i nt en ded t o l an d

the next mor n i ng (9 Decem ber ) on

beaches near Agana. Captai n M ciM i l l i n

su spect ed a t ri ck . H e bel i eved that by

th is r use the J apanese sought to dr aw the

M ar ines out of thei r pr epar ed posi ti ons i nthe but ts of the r i f l e r ange at Sumay on

Orote Pen i nsu l a. H e deci ded not to al low

th i s i n for m at i on to cause a sh i f t of h i s

major defensi ve for ce fr om a posi t i on

wh i ch guar ded im por tan t Apr a H ar bor .

By guess or know ledge the Sai pan na-

t i ves had one of the l and i ng si tes l ocated

accu rat el y, bu t th ey w er e off on t hei r t i me.

The 9th br ought no l and i ng, bu t thebom ber s cam e back t o gi ve Gu am an oth er

pound i ng. T he I nsu l ar For ce Guar d was

post ed t o pr ot ect gover nm en t bui ld in gs i n

Agana, bu t the r est of the i sl and ’s gar ri -

son r emained at thei r assi gned posts.

, J AP AN S TR IK E S 77



RI TIDIAN POINT

TUMON

BA)’

&J,

CAEIRAS

OROTE

ENINSULA

YONAo

7rAGO BAY

78 I WARL I I ARB OR TO G UAD AL C ANAL

South Seus Detm hd For ce (appr oxi -10 ,I l ade separa te 1a l l d -m at el y 5,500 m en )

Dur ing the two cl ays of bom bing and i n

t he fi gh ti ng on 10 D ecem ber , th e t ot al gar -



i ngs at ‘r L l l l lOl l Bay i n the nor th , on t i l e

sou thwest coast near M er izo, and on the

easter n shor e of the i sl and nt T al afofo

Bay.

At .~gana’s l >l xz1 the l i gh t l y-ar med

Ch am an i an s, com n ~a nd ecl by M a r i ne F i r st

I ,i el l t en an t (’h ar les S. T ocl d, st ood off t he

en r l y ,J n pa nese a tt ack s, bl :t t hei r r i fl es a nd

m ach in e gu lw d icl n ot pr ovi de en ol ~gh fi r e-

power t o I 101cIaga i nst a coord i na tec~ ~ t tf i ck

by the Dun.gcas 13each l and i ng for ce.

Captai n M cM il l i n , awar e of the over -

whel mi ng super ior it y of t i l e enemy? de-

ci d ecl I l ot t o el ]d an ger t i le l i ~-es of t he t l lol l -

san ds of ci vi l i an s i n h is ch ar ge by fu rth er

an d fr ui tl ess r esi st an ce. “T l~e si tu at i on

w as si mpl y h opel ess,>’ h e l at er r el ated .11

H e su r r en der ed t he i sl an c{ t o t i le ,J a pn nese

naval com mander shor tl y after 0600, ancl

sen t , or der s to the M ar ines at Sun l ay not ,

to r esi st . T i l e wor d cl i d not r each al l de-f en der s, h ow ever , al }cl scat ter ed f igh ti ng

con t i nued th r oughout t l ~e day as the

en em y spr ead ol l t t o com pl et e occu pat ion

of t i l e i sl and . I ll l t th i s an)oun ted to on l y

t oken resi st ance. T l~er e was no clm nce

r i son l osses w er e 19 k i ll ed a nd 4 2 wou nc] ed

i ncl ud i ng four M ar i nes k i l l ed ancl 12

w ounded.12 T he ci vi li an popu l at i on su f-

fer ed com par abl e bu t u nd et er m in ed casu -

a l ti es. T h e .J a pa nese ev acu a ted .k m er i ca n

m em ber s of the gar ri son to pr ison cam ps

i n ,J apan on 10 ,J anuar y 19+2, ancl the

enem y naval for ce th at had been pr esen t

zt the sl ~r render set t l ecl down to du ty as

occupat ion t roops.

F I RST A T T .4 PK ON M l l ?WA Y “

Par t of the J apanese str i k i ng for ce

w hi ch r ai ded Pear l H ar bor w zs a task un i t

of tw o dest r oyer s an d a tanker w hi ch pr o-

ceeded i ndependen t l y f r om T okyo B ay to

a separ ate tar get—M i dw ay. T he m issi on

of the cl estr oyer s was im pl i ed i n thei r

d esi gn at i on a s t he M i d w ay N eu tr al i za ti on

U ni t: th ey w er e to shel l th e atol l ’s ai r base

on th e n i gh t of ‘i Decem ber w hi le the ,J ~p-

znese car r ier for ce r et i r ed fr om the H a-

wai ian ar ea. (See M ap 10, M ap Sect i on)

D a w I L of 7 Decem ber found f i ve sea-

pl anes of M idw ay’s pat r ol bom ber squad-

r on (VP-21 ) al oft on r ou t i ne sear ch m i s-

si ons; two other (Dutch) pat r ol bomber s




ai d st at ion , bu t for t hi s act ion l ~e r ecei ved

posth um ou s aw ar d of th e M ed al of H on or .

M ar ine bat ter ies kept up for f i ve m inu tes

bef or e t h e J a pa nese su cceed ed i n k n ock i ng



H e was the fi r st M ar i ne so honor ed i n

Wor l d War H .

M ean wh il e t he en em y sh ips open ecl f i re

agai n, t hi s t im e at cl oser r an ge, an d Com -mander Sim ar d or der ed Slm nnon to en-

gage tar gets of oppor tl lu ity. .Japanese

sh el ls set t he r oof of t l~e seapl an e h an gar

on San d abl aze, 1i gh ti ng I lp th e t zr get for

the enem y gunner s , and accur ate sal l”os

st r uck the Pan .tm er icau r ad i o i nstal h l -

t i on , the i sl and l aunci r y, and ad j scent

shops. .i t 2153 the M ar ine sear chl igh t

cr ew s got Sh an non ’s or der s t o i l lu mi nat e,bu t by then on l y the l i gh t on the south end

of Sand cou l d bear on the sh i ps. Th i s

l igh t si lh ou et ted t he .4 Z e60n o abou t 2,500

yar ds south of the i sl and , befor e z near

m iss fr om one of the destr oyer s pu t i t ou t

of com mi ssi on . Cr ewm en r eacted i n lm e-

d i atel y to get the l i gh t back i n zct i on and

on t ar get , bu t 1 3a tt er y k ’s t 5-i n ch er s st ayed

si l en t b eca use com n ~u n i ca ti on d am a ge h adpr even ted p assi n g of Sh an non ’s com m an d

t o op en f ir e.”

13n t Captai n ,J ean H . Bl l ckuer , col n -

m an cl i ug B at ter y D ’s 3-i ncl ~ an ti ai r cr aft

gl ~ns, coul d now see the l ar ge ,J apauese

out the sear ch l i ght . A l though some ob-

ser ver s bel i eved that the U il ci o had al so

been hu l l ed, r esu l ts of th i s M ar i ne fi r e

have never been determined .’G B ot h J apa-nese sh i ps r et i red soon after the l ight w as

shot ou t and a Pan Amer i can cl i pper

capt ai n f l yi ng over h ead t hat n igh t en r ou te

fr om Wake r epor ted seei ng an i nt en se fi re

on the sur face of the sea and the wakes of

t wo sh ips on th e l ogi cal r et i rem en t cour se

of t he destr oyer s. Both enemy sh i ps,

h ow ever , r et ur n ed t o J a pan saf el y, d esp it e

my damage t l mt m igh t have been done byt he M a ri ne gu ns.

T he enem y fi re h ad cost t he 6t h D efense

Bat tal i on two ki l l ed and ten wounded; ‘7

two men fr om the naval ai r stat i on wer e

k i l l ed and n i ne wounded. M ater ial dam-

age on M idw av w as not too sever e and w as.con fi ned to Sand I sl and : the ai r f i el d on

E aster n I sl and was not touched. T he sea-

pl ane hangar had bur ned, al though thefr ame was st i l l i n tact , and one pl ane was

l ost i n the fl ames. Another PRY was

bad l y dam aged by shel l fr agments, and

fr agm ents al so caused m inor dam age to a

num ber of bu i l d i ngs. T he ~l r r i son had

t J~PAN STR IKES 81

si gh t of the ci vi l i an con t r actor % heavy subm ar ines i n the fi r st m onth of the war .



equ i pment tu r ned to on dugout and bat-

ter y constr uct i on . Au thor i t i es at Pear l

H ar bor w er e d et er m in ed toget r ei nf or ce-

m er it s to the atol l and w i th i n a w eek afterVM SB-231 made i ts h i stor i c l ong fl i ght

fr om Oahu, two bat ter i es of the 4th De-

fense B at tal ion w i th add i t i onal naval 3-

i nch and 7-i nch guns for coast defense

wer e bei ng un l oaded. On Chr istmas, the

Br ewster Buffal oes of VM F-221 fl ew i n

f r om t l ~e ,Y ar at ogt i w bi cl l h ad been r u sh ed

out to Pear l fr om San Diego af ter the

,Japanese at tack . T hi s car r i er had takenpar t i n the abor t i ve at tem pt to r el i eve

Wake. T he next day the i sl and r ecei ved

another con t i ngen t of 4t l ~ Defense Bat -

tal ion men, the gr ound echel on of VM F-

221, an d m uch needed defense m ater iel

w hen t he seapl an e t en der T an @er , w hi ch

h ad al so been h ead ed for Wak e, u nl oad ed

at M i d way i nst ead . B y t he en d of D ecem -

ber the atol l , wh i ch was now H awai i ’sm ost i mpor tan t ou tpost , had for i ts gar ri -

son a h eavi l y r ei n for ced d ef en se ba tt al i on ,

a M ar i ne scout-bom ber and a fi gh ter

squadr on , and VP-21’S patr ol bom ber s.

M idwmy was i n good shape to gr eet . the

I t w as too cl ose to th e Paci fi c F leet base at

Pear l and too l im i ted i n ar ea to m ake i t a

pr i ze wor th r i sk i ng an am ph ibi ous as-

sau lt , bu t i ts st r at egi c l ocat ion , l ike an ar -r owhead poi n t i ng at the .J apanese M ar -

sha]l s, made dam age to i ts ai r faci li t i es

wel l wor th the r i sk of bom bar dm ent at-

tempts. T he ai rf i el d on the atol l ’s nam e-

sak e, .J oh nst on I sl an d, w as on ly par t i al l y

com pl eted on 7 D ecem ber , bu t t em por ar y

seapl an e h an dl i ng faci l i ti es w er e i n oper -

at i on at Sand I sl et , the onl y other l and

ar ea w ith in th e fr in gi ng r eef. T her e w asno per man en t pat rol pl an e com pl em en t,

bu t ,J oh nston w as an i mpor tan t r efu el in g

stop and a coupl e of PBYs wer e usual l y

an ch or ed i n t he l agoon .

T he news of the outbr eak of war cr e-

ated a fl u r ry of act i vi ty on J ohnston , and

t he ci vi l i an con tr act or ’s em pl oyees t ur n ed

to at top speed to er ect add i t i onal ear th -

wor ks ar ound the M ar ine guns and to pr e-par e bom b sh el ter s.zo N o J apan ese sh ip or

submar ine m ade i ts appear ance on 7 De-

cem ber , per haps because the fi rst day of

war found the I nd i anapo7i .y and fi ve de-

st r oyer m i nesw eep er s a t ,J ol l nst on t est i ng

82 1’E .4RL H ARB OR TO G U AD ALC ANAL

i m med iatel y r ecal l ed towar d Pear l to

for m par t of the extensi ve sear ch pat ter n

seem ed doom ed.?”2 T he J apanese ccm-

t i nued to t i re for ten m inu tes at th i s wel l-



for the enem y car r i er for ce, and .J ohn-

ston ’s defense r ested w i th i t s own slim

gar ri son . M ajor F r anci s B . I ,oom is, <J r.,

E xecu t i ve (M i ter of the 1st J )efense I hl t-

tal i on , caught wh i l e r etu r n i ng to Pear l

by ai r fr om an i nspect i on of the wester n

ou tpost s> assu med com m an d of t he ,J oh n -

ston d etacl ~m en t as sen ior M ar in e ot l icer

present.

Shor tl y af ter dar k on 12 Decem ber it

su bm ar i n e su r fa ced 8,000 yi~tds of f Sand

I sl et an d began t ir in g gr een st al ; cl ust er swh i ch bur st h i gh over the i sl and . T he 5-

i uch bat ter y cou l d not pi ck up the vessel

i n i ts si gh ts, bLlt i t t i r ed one star shel l i n

the gener al d i rect i on of t i l e subn l ar ine.

T he su bm ar i ne ceased fi r in g i m med iat el y

as she, evi den t l y was not seek i ng a duel .

T he next enemy at tack can l e at d t l sk

t hr ee d ays l at er . T he suppl y sh i p i %ur -7’0~os had del iver ed a bar ge I OM 1 of SU P-

pl i es or i gi nal l y i n tended for the Wake

g:l rr isol l :I nd pi cked {I p 77 ci vi li an C O I ~ -

str uct i on em ployees for r et l l r n to Pear l

when a sent r y atop ,J ohnston% water

l igh ted tar get and they h i t sever al other

bui ld ings. T he 5-i nch glm s del i ver ed

sear ch i ng fi r e, m nd just as the M ar i nes

wer e convi nced they wer e h i t t i ng cl ose

aboar d t hei r t ar get s, t he en em y t ir e ceased

abrupt ly .

T he enem y vessel s had fi r ed fr om the

obscu ri ng m i st s of a sm m ll squ al l an d spot -

t er s ash or e n ever cl em l y SilW t hei r t a rget s,

bu t the defender s bel ieved that they had

engaged tw o sur face vessel s, pr obabl y a

l igh t cr ui ser an d a dest r oyer . I .ater anal -

ysi s i nd icated , how ever , that one or m or e

subm ar ines had n~ade th i s at tack . For -

t l l nate]y no one i n the gar r ison was hur t

by t i l e enem y t i r e. al though f l am es and

fr agm en ts cau sed con si der abl e d am age t o

the power house and water d i st i l li ng m a-

ch i ner y. T he Bur r ow, al though cl ear ly

ou t l i ned by the fi r e, was not har med. T he

fi~ ct t ha t i ts nnchor age ar ea was known

t o be st ud ded w it h su bm er ged cor al h ead s

pr obabl y d iscou raged th e J apan ese fr om

attempt ing an under water at tack , and

,J oh nst on ’s 5-i nch bat t er y r ul ed ou t a su r-

face. approach.

J AP AN S TRIK ES

next n i gh t , j ust as the r eady duty P13Y

l an ded i n th e l agoon, an oth er su bm ar in e,

sur faced 3,000 yar ds south of the main

i sl and and began fi r i ng on the dr edge



per haps t he sam e on e t hat h ad fi r ed i l l um i-

nat i on over Sand, f i r ed si x shel l s at the

i sl ets. Both 5-i ncher s on J ohnston now

wer e back i n act i on and each gun fi red tenr ou nd s befor e t he su bm ar i ne su bm er ged .

The pat r ol pl ane was just l i f t i ng fr om the

water as the l ast enemy shot was fi r ed .

Onl y one shel l h i t Sand, bu t that one

knocked down the CAA hom ing tow er and

sl igh tl y w ou nd ed on e M ar i ne.

J oh nston I sl an d w as cl ear ly a di scou r-

agi ng pl ace to at tack, and the shel li ng of

22 Decem ber mar ked the l ast enemy at -tem pt at sur face bom bar dment . I t was

just as wel l th at the ,J apanese deci ded to

avoi d J oh nst on , becau se r ei nfor cem en t

fr om Pear l soon had the atol l bur st i ng at

i ts seams wi th men and guns. .& n add i -

t ional 5-i nch an d a 3-i nch bat t er y, 16 m or e

mach i ne guns, and the men to man them

ar r i ved on 30 Decem ber . I n J anuar y a

pr ovi si onal i n fan t r y com pany was sentan d even tu al l y t he gar r ison i ncl ud ed even

l igh t t an ks. T he expected per man en t M a-

r i ne f igh ter com pl em en t n ever got set tl ed

i n at J ohnston ’s ai r f i el d . T he i sl and be-

cam e i nst ead a fer r yi ng an d r efu el in g st op

Sacramento whi ch was anchor ed i n the

l agoon and cl ear l y vi si bl e between two

of Palmyr a’s numer ous t i ny i sl ets. On l y

one h i t was r egi ster ed befor e the fi r e of

the 5-i nch bat ter y dr ove the submar ine

under. Dam age to the dr edge was m inor

an d n o on e w as i n ju r ed .

Col onel Pi cket t ’s comm and at Pear l

H ar bor had or gm ized str ong r ei nfor ce-

m ents for Palmyr a and these ar ri ved be-

for e the end of Decem ber . L i eu tenant

Col onel B er t A. Bone, Com mand i ng Offi -

cer of the 1st Defense B at tal ion , ar r i vedw ith th e ad di ti on al m en , gun s, an d equ ip-

ment to assume command of the defense

force. On 1 M ar ch the off i ci al desi gna-

t i on of the M ar ine gar r i son on Pal myr a

w as ch an ged t o 1st D efen se B at t al ion an d

for mer 1st Bat tal i on men at other bases

wer e absor bed by l ocal commands. The

M ar in e D etach men t at J oh nston becam e a

separa te un i t ,Af ter these submar ine at tacks of De-

cem ber , Pal myr a an d J ohn st on d rop fr om

the pages of an oper at i onal h i stor y. T he

atol ls h ad ser ved t hei r pu rpose w el l; t hey

d~u a~ ed :1 vu ln er abl e fl ank of th e H aW,ai -

CHAPTER 3



The Southern Lifeline

STRAT EGI C REAPPRAI SAL ’

I n D ecem ber 1941 r ever se fol lowed r e-

ver se i n the for tunes of the Al l i es i n the

Paci f i c. The Japanese seemedtobeevery -

w h er e a t on ce a nd ever yw her e su ccessf ul .

Setbacks to the enem y schedu l e of con-

quest wer e i n f r equent and tem por ar y.On the Asi an m ain l and H ong K ong fel l

and J apanese t r oops advanced stead i ly

dow n the M al ay Pen i nsu l a tow ar d Si nga-

por e. I n the Ph i li ppi nes M an i la w as evac-

uated and Amer ican-F i l i pi no for ces r e-

t r eated to Bataan and Cor r egi dor for a

l ast-d i t ch stand . T o the south the f i r st

~Japanese l and i ng had been made on

Bor neo, and super ior enemy for ces pr e-par ed to sei ze the N ether l ands East

I nd i es. T he captu r e of Wake and Guam

gave t he J apan ese effect ive con tr ol over

the Cen tr al Paci f i c f r om the Ch i na coast

to M idway and J ohnston . (See M ap 1,

ci f i c to N ew Zeal and and Aust r al i a wer e

st i ll i n A l li ed hands. T he r esponsi bi li ty

for hol di ng open the l ines of com muni ca-

t i on to the Anzac ar ea 2 r ested pr imar il y

w i th the U . S. Paci f i c F l eet . On 31 De-

cem ber t hat f l eet cam e u nd er t he com m an d

of the m an who was to d i r ect i t s oper a-

t i ons un t i l J apan uncond i t i onal l y sur -

r ender ed—.kdm i r al Chester W. N im i tz

(CinCPac).

As soon as he ar ri ved at Pear l H ar bor ,

N im i tz was gi ven a d i spatch fr om Ad-

m i r al E r nest J . K i ng, the new l y ap-

poi n ted Com mander i n Chi ef, U n i ted

Stat es F leet (Ci nCU S, l at er abbr evi ated

as Com inCh). K ing’s message out l i ned

N im i tz’s two pr im ar y tasks as Ci nCPac.

H e was to use h i s sh i ps, pl anes, and men

i n :

(1) C over in g a nd h old in g t he H a wa ii-Midw a y

lin e a nd ma int a inin g it s commun ica t ion s w it h

TH E S OU TH E RN LI FE LI NE 85

sh ips r at her t han i nst al lat ion s, an d t he r e-

pai r faci l i t i es of the navy yar d wer e vi r -

w i th the str ategi c d i r ect i on of the war ,

subject onl y to the r evi ew of the pol it i cal



t ual ly u ntou ch ed . Rou nd -t he-cl ock w or k

pr om pt ly r est or ed t o oper at ion m an y ves-

sel s w hi ch m igh t oth er wi se h ave been l ost ,

for good or l ong del ayed i n thei r r etu r n to

f leet serv ice. Bu t N im i tz’s st r ength was

not enough to hazar d a l ar ge scal e am-

ph ibi ou s offen si ve, even w it h t he ad di ti on

of r ei nfor cem ents sen t fr om the At l an t i c

F l eet . I n the f i r st few months of 1942,

A l l i ed st r ategi sts had to be conten t w i th

defensi ve oper at i ons. T he few loca] at -

t ack s t hey m ou nt ed w er e h it -an d-r un r ai ds

whi ch di d l i t t l e mor e than boost ] l ome.

fr on t and ser vi ce m or al e at a t im e when

m ost news deal t w i th defeat and sur -

render.

Fr om 22 Decem ber to 14 J anuar y, the

pol i t i cal and m i l i tar y l eader s of the

U n i ted States and Gr eat B r i tai n m et i n

Washi ngton (the .4RCAD I A Confer -

ence ) to char t the cour se of A l li ed oper a-

t i ons agai nst the .4xi s power s. T he

Amer icans, despi te the enor mi ty of the

J a pan ese a tt ack , r ea ff ir m ed t hei r d eci si on

of ABC–1 that Ger many was the pr e-

dom i nant enem y and i ts defeat wou l d be

deci si ve i n the outcom e of the war . T he

h ead s of stat e. T he n ecessi ty of pr esen t-

i ng a un i ted Amer i can vi ew in CCS di s-

cussi ons l ed d i r ect l y to the for mat i on of

the U ni ted States ,J oi n t Ch i efs of staf f

(J CS) as t he con tr ol l i ng agen cy of Am er -

i ca n m i l i t ar y op er a ti on s.

On 9 Febr uar y 1942, the f i r st for -

m al m eet i ng of Gener al Geor ge C. M ar -

shal l (Ch i ef of Staff , ~J n i ted States

Army), lJ ieut ena nt G enera l H enr y H .

,Arnold (C h ief of t he ilrmy Air C ’orps),

~ dmira l H a rold R. S ta rk (C I J O), a n d

Admira l K in g ( C omin C h ) t ook pla ce,

~ xcept for t h e combina t ion of t h e offices

of C omin C h a n d C ~ O in t he per son of

Admira l K in g w h ich t ook eflect on 26

Ma rch (.4dmira l S t a rk beca me C om-

ma n der C T. S . Na va l F orces E urope) a nd

t he a ddit ion of ~ dmira l ~ vill ia m D .

I ~ a h y a s chief of S t a ff t o t h e P resident

on 20 J uly , t he membership of t h e J C S

rema in ed const a n t for t he dura t ion of t he

w a r . As fa r a s t he Ma rin e C orps w a s

con cer ned t h eir represent a t ive on t he J CS

w a s Admira l K in g, a n d h e w a s con sist -

ent ly a ch a mpion of t h e use of Ma rines a t

86 P EARL H .4RB OR TO G ~ .4D ALC .4hTAL

On 10 ,J anuar y 19+2, the CCS, ack i ng

w i th the appr oval of Pr im e M in i ster

Bur ma. Ch 1 M ar ch ABDA C’omm and

w as f or m a l l y d i ssol ved .



Ch ur vh il l an cl Pr esi den t Roosevel t, set u p

a uni f i ed , i n ter -A l l i ed comm and i n the

}vest.ern Pil(’ifiC t o con t r ol d ef en si v e op er a -t ion s agai nst t l~e ,J apan ese al on g a br oad

sweep of posi ti ons fr om Bur nl a th r ough

I .u zon t o N Tew Gu in ea. l ’l ~e com man der

of A BD A (.\ l ~l er i ca ll -B r i t i sl ~-I )t ~t cl l -.i ~~s-

t r al i an ) for ces hol d i ng the bar r i er zone

was the Br i t i sh Con lm ancl er i n Ch i ef i n

I nd i a, Gener al Si r .i r ~l li bi t l d P. Wavel l ;

h i s ~iBD.1 ai r , naval , and gr ound con l -

m ander s wer e r espect i vel y an F.ngl ish -

m an, an .i mer ican , and u I hl tchn l un . But

. i l lD.k ~OIllllliillCl h:td 110 chance tO StOp

t il e ,J apan ese i n t he E ast I nd ies, M al aya,

or t he P hi l i ppi n es. Wavel l ’s for ces w er e

beaten b:w k, cu t ofi , or defeat ecl befor e h e

cou ld be r each ed by r ei n for cen ~en ts t hat

cou l d m ake a si gn i fi can t d i ffer ence i n the

f i gh t i ng-. By the end of Febr uar y Si nga-por e had fal l en :u l d the .%B I ).I ar ea was

spl i t by an enem y thr ust to ,Sum at r a.

Wavel l r etu r ned to I nd i a to m uster t r oops

to bl ock ,J apanese encr oachm ent i n to

Al though th i s f i r st at tem pt at , un i f i ed

.M l i ed com mand was shor t-1 i ved and un-

su ccessf ul , i t set a p at ter n w hi ch gover n ed

oper at i onal con tr ol of the w ar thr ough i ts. .

r em am m g year s. T hi s pat ter n am ou nt ed

to the sel ect i on as over -al l com mander of

a theater of an ot l icer fr om the nat i on hav-

i ng the m ost for ces i n that par t i cu l ar

theater. H i s pr in ci pal su bor di nat es w er e

appoi nt ed fr om oth er n at ion s al so h avi ng

i nt er est s an d for ces t her e. Realist ical ly,

t he CCS t ri ed to equ at e th eater r espon si -

bi li t y w i th nat i onal i n ter est . Ch 3 M ar ch

the Con l bi ned (“l ~i efs appr oved for the

w ester n Paci fi c a n ew d ivi di ng 1i ne w hi ch

cu t th r ough the defunct ABDA ar ea.

Bur m a and al l Sou theast Asi a west of a

nor th -sou th l i ne between ,J ava and Su-

m at r a wer e added to Wavel l ’s I nd i an

com mand ancl the B ri ti sh Ch i efs of Staffs

w er e ch ar ged w it h th e str at egi c d ir ect i on

of th i s theater . T he whol e Paci f i c east

of the new 1ine was gi ven over to Amer ic-

an .J CS con tr ol .

The ,J oi n t Ch i efs d i vi ded the Paci f i c

TH E S O~ TH E RN I >I FE I .I NE 87

an ar ea of l ar ge l and m asses l yi ng r el a-

t i vel y cl ose together \ vher e l and power

S .4.I 1 OA I V B A )S ’T Z Oi V 5

The concer n fel t i n Wash i ngton for the



su ppor ted by sh or e-based ai r cou ld be d e-

ci si ve. T othe N avy the,J CS assi gned the

d i rect i on of the w ar i n a vast sex ar ea w ith

w idel y scat ter ed i sl and bases wher e the

car r i er pl an e r ei gn ed su pr em e.

T he Amer ican comm ander i n the Ph i l-

i ppi n es, C~en er al D ou gl as M a cA r th ur , w as

t h e ,T oi n t (.’h i ef s’ ch oi ce. t o t ak e ov er d i r ec-

t i on of SWPA oper at i ons; Adm i r al hT i~n-

i t z was sel ected to head POA act i vi t i es.

For mal al mol ll lcem ent of the new set -u ])

~vas not ma(]e l l n t i l M ac.f r th l l r had es-

caped fr om (’or r egi dor an d r each ed safet y

i n .fust r al i a. On 18 M ar ch , w i th the con-

sen t of the Austr al ian gover nm ent, M at ’-

Ar thur was announced as Supr em e (Yon l .

mander of the SWP.k ( Ci nCSWPA)

T he ,J CS d ir ect ive ou tl in in g m issi on s for

bot h Paci fi c ar eas w as i ssu ed on 30 M a rch ,

and the confi r mat i on of hT im itz as Com -

m ander i n Ch i ef of the POA ( Ci n(’PO.1)fol l owed ou 3 xi pr i l . By CCS and ,J CS

i ~gr eer n en t, bot h com m an der s w er e t o h ave

op er a ti on al con tr ol over an y f or ce, r egar d -

l ess of ser vi ce or n at ion , t hat w as assi gn ed

t o t h ei r r esp ect i ve t h ea ter s.

secu r it y of t he sou th er n r ou te t o A ust ral i a

w as acu te i n the days and w eeks i mm ed i -

atel y fol low i ng the Pear l H ar bor at tzck .

I )espi t e w or l d -w i de d em an ds on t he t r oop s

and equ i pm ent of a nat i on just en ter i ng

the war , (l ener al M ar shal l and Adm i r al

K i ng gave speci al at ten t i on to the need

for hol di ng- posi ti ons that w ou l d pr otect

.i ust ral i a’s l i f el in e. Gar r ison for ces, m ost

of them pr ovi ded by the h-m-y, m oved

i nto the Paci fi c i n substan ti al st r ength to

guar d what the Al l i es st i l l hel d and to

bl ock fu r ther ,J apanese advances. 13e-

tween ,J anuar y and Apr i l near ly 80,000

.l r my t r oops l eft the States for Paci f i c

bases.

An i n fan t r y d i vi si on was sent to .%us -

t r al i a to take the pl ace of Aust r al i an

un i ts com mi t ted to the fi gh t i ng i n the

M idd l e East . At the other end of the

l i fel i ne, a new d i vi si on was added to the

H awai i an I sl and gar ri son . M ixed for ces

of i nfan tr y, coast and ant i ai rcr af t ar ti l-

l er y, an d ai r cor ps u ni ts w er e est abl ish ed

i n ear l y Febr uar y at Canton and Chr i st -

m as I sl an ds, sou th west an d sou th of Pear l

88 P EARL H ARB OR TO G UAD ALC ANA1,

al most d i vi si on st r ength ar ri ved i n N ew

Cal ed on ia an d th e ,J oi nt Ch iefs sen t ad di -

pr inci pal un i ts assi gned to the new con~-

m and wer e the 8th M ar i nes, the 2d Bat -



t ion al .i r my gar r ison for ces t o T on gat abu

i n the T ongs I sl ands, sou th of Sam oa,

and nor th to E fate i n the hT ew H ebr ides.

By the end of M ar ch 1942 the suppl y

r ou te to Austr al ia r an th r ough a cor r i dor

of bur geon i ng i sl and str ong poi n ts and

the poten t i al th r eat of m ajor <J apanese

at tack s h ad been su bst an ti al ly l essen ed .

(See M ap 1, M ap Sect i on and M ap 3)

Actual ly the i ni ti al ,J apanese w ar pl an

con tem pl at ed n o ad van ces i nto t he Sou t l ).

Paci fi c t o cu t th e l in e of com mu ni cat i ons

to .~l l st r al i a. T i l e A l l i ed l eader s, how

ever , can be for gi ven for not bei ng cl ai r -

voyan t on th i s poi n t , for the enemy’s

chance to sei ze bl ock i ng posi ti ons al ong

the l i fel i ne was qu i te appar en t . Samoa

seem ed to be one of the m ost i nvi t i ng

tar gets and i ts t i ny gar ri son of M ar i nes

whol ly i nadequate to stand off anyth i ng

but a m inor r ai d . T he necessi t y for

bu il di ng u p Sam oan d efen ses as a pr el ud e

for fu r ther m oves to F i j i and h~ew Cale-

don i a had been r ecogn i zed by Adm i r al

K ing i n h i s i nstr uct i ons to N im itz to hol d

t he H aw ai ian -Sam oa l in e , ti and rein force-

ments fr om the States to back up those

tal ion , I (kh M ar ines, and th e 2d D efense

B at tal i on (d i spatched by r ai l f r om the

east coast ). (;ol onel (l ater B r i gad i er

Gener al ) H enr y L . L ar sen was named

br i gade comm ander . A qu i ck est im ate

was m ade of the speci al engi neer i ng

equ i pm ent w hi ch the br igade wou l d need

to accompl i sh one of i t s m ost im por tan t

m i ssi ons-com pl et i on of the ai r f i el d at

T utu i l a. Per mi ssi on was obtai ned to ex-

pend up to $.200,000 i n the comm er ci al

m ar ket for the pur chase of such ear th -

movi ng equ i pm ent as cou l d not be sup-

pl i ed fr om quar ter master stocks. When

the f i r st car go sh i p ar ri ved at San D iego

on h“ew Year ’s day, the br igade went on

a r ou nd -t he-cl ock l oad in g sch edu le. Si x-

t y-t wo h ou rs l ater al l assi gn ed per son nel

and gear had been l oaded and the 4,798

off i cer s and m en wer e on thei r way to

Tutu i la .

When the news of Pear l H ar bor

r each ed Sam oa, L ieu ten an t Col on el L es-

ter .1. Dessez, com mandi ng the 7th De-

fen se B at tal ion , or der ed h is t roops t o m an

thei r posi t i ons. The Samoan M ar ine Re-

ser ve B at tal ion was cal led to act i ve du ty

TH E S OU TH E RN LI FE LINE 89

On 19 J anuar y r adar pi cked up si gns of

n um er ou s sh ips, an d obser vat ion st at ion s

m inu tes the r esu l ts of hour s of pi ck and

sh ov el w or k .

Gener al L ar sen took im med iate steps



on t he i sl an d’s h ead lan ds soon con fi r med

th e ar r ival of t he 2d B ri gad e.

Whi l e st i l l at sea, Gener al L ar sen had

r ecei ved or der s fr om the l iT avy Depar t-m ent appoi n t i ng h im M i l itar y Gover nor

of Am er i can Sam oa and gi vi ng h im r e-

sp on si bi l i ty f or t he i sl an ds’ d ef en se a s w el l

as super vi sor y con tr ol over the ci vi l gov-

ernment. As soon as the sh i ps dockecl

an t i ai r cr af t m ach i ne guns of the 2d I )e-

fense B at tal ion w er e pr om pt l y un l oaded

and set up i n the h i l l s ar ound Pago Pago

har bor . T he %h M ar ines took over beachd efen se posi ti on s occu pi ed by th e 7t h I )e-

fense Bat tal i on and im mediatel y began

impr ovi ng and expand i ng them . T he

ar ti l ler ym en of 2/ 10 and the 2d Defense

set up thei r guns i n tem por ar y posi t i ons

wh i l e they went to wor k on per m anent

em placem ents. N avy scout i ng am ph i b-

i ans of a shor e-based squadr on ( VS-I -

D14 ) at tached to the br igade soon wer eal oft on a bu sy sch ed ul e of an ti su bm ar in e

and reconnai ssance m i ssi ons.

T he ai r f i el d on T utu i l a was on l y 10

per cen t com pl et ed w hen L ar sen ar r ived ,

bu t he d i r ected that constr uct i on be

fl f ter h i s ar r i val i n Amer i can Samoa to

ascer tai n the status of the defenses i n

Wester n (B r i t i sh ) Samoa, 40 or so m i l esn or th west of T ut ui l a. On 26 J anuar y the

br igad e i ntel li gence off i cer , I .i eu ten an t

Col onel Wi l l i am L . Bal es, f l ew- to Api a,

the seat of gover nm ent on the i sl and of

U pol u , to con fer w i th the N ew Zeal and

au th or i t i es an d m ak e a r econn ai ssan ce of

U pol u and Savai i , the two pr i nci pal i s-

l ands. T he N ew Zeal ander s wer e qu i te

anxi ous to cooper ate w i th the M ar i nessi nce they had a defense for ce of on l y 157

m en to guar d two l ar ge i sl ands w i th a

com bined coast l i ne of over 250 m i l es.

B al es, w hose i nvest igat ion w as ai m ed pr i -

mar i l y at d i scover i ng the feasi bi l i t y of

devel opi ng ei ther or both of the i sl ands

i n to a m i l i tar y base, r epor ted back that

U pol u ’s har bor faci l i t i es, r oad net , and

sever al poten t i al ai r fi el d si tes m ade i t

r ea di l y su scep ti bl e t o ba se d evel op men t.

H e found, on the other hand, that Savai i

had no safe m ajor anchor ages and that i ts

l ava-cr usted sur face d i d “not offer ai r -

90 P E-4R L H A R BO R T O G ~A D AL C AN A L

of occupyi ng Wester n Sam oa and ex-

tended thei r i n ter est to i ncl ude Wal l i s

(L T ea) I sl an d, a sm al l F ren ch possessi on

son. T o exer ci se over al l au thor i t y,

“Headquarters Samoan Ar ea Defense

F or ce w as est abl i sh ed on T u tu i la. Major



320 m i l es fr om T utu i l a on the wester n

a pp r oa ch es t o S am oa . N egot i at i on s w er e

en ter ed i nt o w it h N ew Z eal an d r egar di ng

the defense of Wester n Samoa, and the

Fr ee Fr ench gover nment i n r egar d to the

occupat i on of Wal l i s. I n M ar ch war n-

i ng or der s wer e sent ou t to I ,ar sen ’s br i-

gade and both m ar i ne d i vi si ons to be

pr epar ed to fu r ni sh tr oops for the gar ri -

soni ng of Wester n Sam oa and Wal l i s.g

h ’egot i at ion s for th e use of l an d an d oth er

faci l i t i es i n Wester n Sam oa wer e com-

pl eted on 20 M ar ch when I ,ar sen and a

h’ew Zeal and r epr esen tat i ve si gned an

agr eem en t gi vi n g t he A m er i ca ns r esp on si -

bi l i ty for defense of al l the Sam oan i s-

lands. T hi s gr ou p, t oget her w it h Wa]l is,

was now consi der ed a tact i cal en t i ty and

a new M ar in e br igad e w as to be or gan ized

t o occu py t he w est er n i sl an ds.

.4s an advance for ce of th i s new gar ri -

son , the 7th Defense Bat tal i on was sent

to U pol u on 28 M ar ch, and a sm al l de-

tachm ent was establ i shed on Savai i . I n

t he St at es, th e 1st M ar in e D ivi si on at N ew

Ri ver , N or th Car ol i na, or gani zed the 3d

Gener al Char les F. B . Pr ice, who was ap-

poi nted to th i s com mand, ar r i ved w ith hi s

staff at Pago Pago on 28 Apr i l fr om the

States. On 8 M ay the 3d M ar ine Br i gade

convoy ar r i ved off Api a and Gener al B ar -

r et t assum ed m il itar y com mand of l JT est -

er n Sam oa. At the end of the month , the

8th Defense Bat tal i on (Rei n for ced) un-

der Col onel Raphael Gr if f i n moved i n to

Wal l is .

M or e th an 10,000 M ar in e gr oun d t roops

wer e stat i oned i n the Sam oan ar ea by the

begi nn in g of ,J un e, an d r ei nfor cem en ts ar -

r i ved i n a steady fl ow-. M ar i ne ai r was

al so wel l establ ished . Gener al L ar sen ’s

i n ter est and pr essur e assur ed that T u-

tu i l a’s ai r f i el d was r eady for use on 17

M ar ch , t wo d ays befor e t he ad van ce ech e-

l on of M AG–13 ar r i ved . The new ai r

gr oup, or gani zed on 1 M ar ch at San D i -

ego, w as ear m ar ked for Pr i ce’s com man d.

I ni ti al ly th e gr oup com man der , L ieu ten -

an t Col onel T hom as J . Wal ker , J r., had

on ly one t act ical squad ron , T TM F -l ll , op-

er at ing fr om T ut ui la’s ai rf i el d, bu t VM O-

151, a--scou t-bom ber squ ad ron , j oi ned i n

TH E S OU TH E R N LI FE LI NE 91

m.-,

“o



za

i i

N

o

0

0

0—al


wel l nave becom e a tar get for enem y at -

tacks, bu t , the deci si ve B at t l e of M i dw ay

for l ear n i ng t i l e fundam ental s of tean l -

w or k i n com bat oper at ion s. As the need

for defense constr uct i on w as m et and the



for ced t l~e , Japan ese t o cu r b t hei r soar i ng

ambit ion. ’ [ ’ ,Sam oa becam e a vast ad -

vanced com bat t r ai ni ng cam p instead of

a bat t l egr olm cl . M ost of the un i ts com-

i ng ther e af ter the ar r i val of the 2d Br i -

gade dr el v heavi l y on the r ecr ui t depots

for thei r per sonnel :’ and for these M R-

r il l es Sam oan cl n ty was an oppor tun i t y

‘0Cattlpai.vn.s of the Puriik War, 3. See P r r r t

V, “D ecision rr t Midw ay” a nd especia l ly C ha p-

t er 1, “S et t ing t he S t a ge—E a rly Na va l Opera -

t ions” for even t s lea ding up t o t he Midw a ybat t le .

“ At lea st 407. of t h e 3d Ma rB rig init ia l com-

plemen t w rrs st ra ight out of boot ca mp. 3d Ma r

B rig An Rept , 6S ept 42, 9.

d an ger of ,J apan ese at tack s l essen ed , Sa-

m oa becam e a stagi ng ar ea t hr ou gh w hi ch

replacements and r ei n for cem ents wer e

fu nn el led t o t l~e am ph ibi ou s ot ien si ves i n

t he Sol omous.’2 U ni ts and i nd i vi dual s

paused for a wh i l e her e and then m oved

on, u l or e jungl e-w i se and com bat r eady,

t o m eet t h e ,J a pa nese.

“ F rom D ecern t mr 1942 t o .J uly 1943 S a moa

w :is t he t ra in ing cen t er for a ll Ma rine repla ce-

men t ba t ta lions ra ised on t h e ea st coa st of t h eu. s. ~. l v. C ondit , G . D irrm ond, a n d E . 1’.

Turn bla dh, Ma rin e C orps Ground Training in

World War II ( Wa shin gt on : H ist J 3r , G –3,

H QM C, 1956), 181–186.



PART I I I

The Defense of Wake

CHAPTER 1

Wake in the Shadow of War 1



I n t i l e st r ategi c context of 1940 and

1941, the impor tance of lVake, both to

t i l e I Tl l i ted States and ,J apan, was con-

si der abl e. <I t th i s t i me the [-l l i ted States

l tad not w on i ts oceam gi rd l ing l ~et of 1’~~-

ci f i c bases, and, w i th the except i ons of

Wake, M i dw ay, an d Gu am , th e i sl an ds be-

tween the H aw ai ians and the Ph i l i ppi nes

w er e t er r a incognz’ta. Wake, a pr yi ng out-

post nor th of the M ar shal l s and on the

fl ank of the M ar i anas, wou l d be a st r a-

t egi c p ri ze f or ,J a pa n’s ocean i n ter est s a nd

a cor respondi ng em bar rassm ent whi le i t

was i n the hands of the ~T ni ted States.

T hese factor s had been noted by the

~T .S. i n th e H epbu rn Repor t of 1938 w hi ch

recommended a $7,500 ,()()() t h ree-yea r p ro-

gr am to cl evel op th e at ol l as an ad van ced

ai r base and al ] i n ter med i ate stat i on on

the ai r r oute to the Far East . .~ ct in g 0] 1

t h ese r ecor r l r ] lel ~d :t ti ol l s, i n i ti al d ev el op -

n ~ent of Wake began ear ly i l l 1941.2 B ase

By 18 Apr i l 1941, Adm i r al H usband E .

K imm el . Commander i n Ch i ef, l :. S. Pa-

ci t i c F l eet , becan)e fear fu l that the de-

fensi ve effor ts had star ted too l ate. h~ a

study sent to the (’h i ef of N :L val (.)per a-

t ion s, K i mm el st ressecl t il e i mpor tan ce of

Wake and asked t l ~at wor k on defense be

gi ven a h i gher pr i or i ty than base com

str uct i on. H e al so r equested that a M :v

r ine defense bat tal ion be assi gned to the

atol l . ’

I n 1941 t he st r en gt ]l of a t yp ica l d ef en se

bat t a ]i on w as 43 ot li cer s an d 939 en li st ed

men, and i ts two most char acter i st i c at-

t r i bu tes wer e bal anced st r uctur e and a

]~i gb d egr ee of st r ategi c m obi l i ty. ~Llt

m obi l i ty d i sappear ed at t l i e bat t al i en ’s

dest i nat i on. once i ts guns wer e i n posi -

t i on , a d efen se bat t al ion su ffer ed fr om i n-

su ff i ci en t t ran spor tat ion an d a sh or tage of

mPn.4

‘lh Paci fi c st r ategy of 1941 contem -

96 P EARL H ARE OR TO G UAD .4LC ANAL

r ine, f i r st aucl l ast> i s an i n fan tr ynm l .~

Wi th i n and t tbcm t the str uctu r e of sl l c] l

l ixh tl y l lel tl bu t secu re bases, t l )e l ’aci fi c

had been pr epar ed i n Tokyo.’[ ’ Bu t i t v-as

I l ot u nt i l N oveu lber l M 1 t l~at d et ai le~l i l~-

stn~ct i ous for comm ander s w i th i n t i l e



F leet wou l d pl y, awai t i ng t i l e n l on l en t

when bat t l e cou l d be joi ned w i t l ~ el ]en l y

] M val for ces—’bt o get at n aval for ces w i tl ~naval for ces,’-~ as Adm i r al K i mm el pu t

i t—in deci si ve act i on for con tr ol of the

sea.

;i s t n i gl i t b e exp ect ed , t h e .J a p:l l l ese con -

cept of st r at egy i ll t he (Yeu tr :d l ’aci fi c w as

to sei ze or neu t r al i ze t i l e few advanced

I T ni ted St at es bases w est of t he H aw ai i an

I sl ands as qu i ck l y as possi bl e after the

ol l tset of w ar . F or t hi s ptqose ,J apau esef or cesi l l tl l e~l ar sl ]a ll s: l l l ci (x:t r ol i ]l es (t he

Four thF?eet ) w er e or ~ani m d along l ines

resembling an -Imerican amphib ious

for ce.’ Comm anded by Vi ce .l dm i r al

,N ar iyosh i I nou ye, th e Four th f i ’l eet w as

com posed of am pl ~i bi o~l s sh ip])i l l g, n few

ol d cru i sers, dest royers, submar i nes, shore-

based ai rcr aft , an d a ,J apan ese ver si on of

OI W ow n F leet M ar ine For ce: the speci al

n ava l l an di n g f or ce.g F l eet headqua r t er s

w er e at T rn k, w ]l er e A dm ir al I nou -ye’s f l ag

fl ew i n the l igh t cr ui ser Ku.~h{tna.9

T he war m i ssi ons of .i dn~i ral I uouye

(’0 / l l b~)/ < {?F / @@t ~~el ’e f ol ’n l l l l :l t ed and iS -

suecl . I ]] these i nstr uet i ol l s, I yake was

(l ism issed i n a si ngl e ph rase :

F orces of t he I ’our t h Fleet :

D efen d t h e S out h S ea s Isla nds. pa trol , ma in -

t a i n s ur f a ce c~(}llll)lllniea tions, capture

Wa ke . . . .“

Wake wou l d be str ict l y a l ocal oper a-

t i on . By .4dm i r al I nouye’s scheme, 450

speci al naval l and i ng for ce t r oops cou l d,

i n a pi nch , tu r n the tr ick .l z

F I NAL PZL EPARAT ION E,

AU TU M N, 1941 ‘3

On 23 ,J u le 1941 the Ch ief of N aval

oper at i on s d i rected that , el em ents of the

1st Defense 13at tal i on , FM F, be estab-

l ished at Wak e “as soon as pr act icabl e.”

T hi s d i rect i ve (as even tual ly m od i fi ed)

‘0U SSB S(Pac), Na vAn a lysisD iv, ln t erroga -

t icw s of J a pa nese O~ cia t& 2 vols (Wa sh ingt on:

G P O, 1946 ), “J a pa nese Na va l P la n nin g,” I , 176,

h erein aft er cit ed a s 7,’S SB S’ Iwter rof la t ions w i t h

s ub ject or i nt er vi ew ee.

WAK E I N TH E S H .4D OW OF WAR 9’7



98 P1~L4RLHARROR TO GU~D.4LCANTAL

speci fi ed th at , t il e fol low in g u ni ts sbon ld

com pose t he d efen si ve gar r ison :

F our 3-in ch a nt ia ir cr aft ba tt er ies

tauces var yi ng fr om 30 to 1,000 yar ds.

T i l e beaches and m uch of t i l e ter r ai n i n -

l and wer e cover ed w i th cor al bou l der s,



Th ree fi -i nch s ea r oa st b at ter ies

Appr olm ia te a ut om at ic w ea pon s

Oa e S (’R –268fir e-c(jT~ t r(~ l r ad ar , a n d on e S CR -

270R s ea r ch r a (lt ir . (’

(U NO’S “a s soon a s pra ct ica ble” w a s

t ra usla t ecl int o immedia t e a ct ion by t h e

P a cific Fleet . .%bout 1 .%ugust Y1a jor

l~ w is .A. H olln w it h five officers a n d 173

enlist ed Ma rin es a nd sa ilors from t h e 1st

D efen se lla t t a lion com men ced loa din g t h e

I ~ S S R~gu7us, a t wen ty-year -ol d “H og I s-

l and” t r anspor t wh i ch wou l d car r y the

bat tal i on ad van ce d et ai l t o Wak e. Regw

ZU .Ssai led on 8 August , and ar ri vecl off

Wake on 19 August . Weapons and cam p

equ ipm en t, w er e l igh ter ed ash or e, an d by

the t i m e the Regu7m depar ted on 22 Au-

gust , a cam p faci ng the l agoon had been

set up on a si te near the west end of

J 1’ake+s west l eg. T o d i st i ngu i sh th i s

cam p fr om the one west of H eel Poi n t

housi ng the 1;200 Paci fi c N aval A i r Base

cont r act wor km en, the M ar ine cam p was

desi gnated as Cam p One. T he ci vi l i an

establ i shm ent becam e known as Cam p

T wo. (See M ap 4)

som e l ar ge en ou gh t o con ceal sever al m en .

T he i n ter ior l agoon, al though at for di ng

su ff ici en t su r fa ce a nd d ep tl ~ f or sea pl an es,was studded w -i tb cor al heads and fou l

gr ound wh i ch l ~ad to be dr edged befor e

sl ~i ps cou ld en ter the si ngl e ch ann el be-

tw eel ~ Wi lkes and Wake I sl and . D espi te

Wake’s l im it ed l an d ar ea, i ts coast l in e ex-

ceed ed 21 m i les. A u excel len t vi gn et te

of Wake i n 1941 was gi ven by Colonel

13ayler:

Wa ke is by n o mea n s t h e ba re sa n dy spit on et hinks of w h en a tolls a r e ment ion ed. C on sid-

era ble a rea s of it a re covered by w oods, a n d

t h ough t he t rees a r e sma ll, t heir t h ick folia ge

a n d t h e scrubby t a n gled underbrush pr ovided

a dmira ble cover . Wa lking in t hese jun gles

w a s difficult but not impossible . .“

I n August 1941, Wake was i n r api d

t r ansi t i on fr om i ts past sol i tude to the

m echan i zed moder ni ty of an out l yi ng ai r

base. Pat r ol pl ane faci l i t i es and a con-

cr ete r am p, th e r esu l t of Pan Am er ican ’s

pioneering, wer e al r eady avai l abl e on

Peal e.’i .J ust i nshor e of Peacock Poi n t

al ong the west , l eg of Wake I sl and a nar -

WAKE IN THE SHADOW OF WAR 99

men blasted, slashed, and dozed the ter-

rain of Wake.became Island Commander, an additionalduty which he would hold until relieved



In spite of the need for haste, rigid

official separation existed between the con-struction efforts of Marines and those ofthe contractors.18 Operating on a semi-private basis with their heavy equipment,supplies, and facilities the naval air basecontract workers were concerned withbuilding roads, shops, utilities, quarters,

air base facilities, and the like. Theybuilt no defense installations. This con-struction fell solely to the Marines whohad little engineering equipment exceptpicks and shovels or the infrequent lux-ury of a borrowed civilian bulldozer.

The Marines installed their heavy weap-ons by hand, hewed emplacements andfoxholes from the coral, and erected theirown living quarters. Understanding thisbasic difference in available means the

late in 1941 by a naval officer, Commander

W. S. C’ unningham, at this time still nari-gator of the USS Wright.

Major Devereux, as he saw Wake at thistime, describes it as follows :

When I arrived on the island, the contractor’ s

men working on the airfield near the toe of Wake

proper had one airstrip in usable condition and

were beginning the cross-runway. Five large

magazines and three smaller detonator maga-

zines, built of concrete and partly underground,

were almost completed in the airfield area. A

Marine barracks, quarters for the Navy fliers

who would be stationed on the island, ware-

houses and shops also were going up on Wake.

On Peale Island, work was progressing on anaval hospital, the seaplane ramp and parking

areas. On Wilkes, there were only fuel storage

tanks and the sites of proposed powder maga-

zines, but a new deepwater channel was being

100

by t i le M a r in es.22 T h i s they d i d i n udcl i -

t ion t o t hei r n or mal d ut ies, an d t he fu el in g

tasks cam e at al l hour s of the day or ui gl ]t .

P EARL H ARB OR TO G UAD .4L C ANAL

Dur ing October ancl N ovember pr og-

r ess on and about the ai r st r i p, by now

a goi ng col ~cer n, i nd icated t hat th er e w as



I t was i ron i c that m any of these ai rcr aft ,

whi ch cost Wake so m any man-hour s of

vi tal defensi ve pr epar at i ons, wou l d bet r apped on the gr ound by the i ni ti al .J apa-

l ~ese at tack s on Cl ar k an d & T i ch ol s F iel ds

i n t he P hi l i pp in es.

.U thougb th is ser vi ci ng of .i rm y pl anes

r epr esen ted t he h ea vi est si n gl e a dd i ti on al

d ut y i m posed L l pon t he M a ri nes, t hey w er e

al so r equ i r ed to act as stevedor es i n the

t i me-con su m in g a nd exh au st i ng pr ocess of

u nl oad in g sh ips w hi ch ar r i ved at th e at ol l .

T hi s w or k w as r equ i red l mt i l th e channel ,

ber th i ng and tu r ni ng faci li ti es i nsi de th e

l agoon cou l d be com pleted . These ad(l i -

t ion al d ut ies h am per ed d efen se w or k d ur -

i ng the autum n of 1941; bu t for tunatel y

t he d et ach men t n eed ed l i tt le com bat t rai n-

i ng becau se i t con tai ned a n um ber of “ol (l

M ar i nes” of t i l e best type.” On 2 N o-

vem ber , t w o w eek s a ft er M a jor I )ever eu x’s

a r ri va l, t he W ak e ga rr i son w as a ugm en te(l

by a dr aft fr om t i l e par en t ] st l )efense

B at tal ion . T hi s gr oup i ncl uded 9 off i cer s

r oom on Wake for the avi at i on com po-

nent of f i gh ter s necessar y to bal ance and

r ou nd ou t t he d efen se for ce. Com m an der ,A i r cr aft B at t l e For ce, had deter m ined

that th i s was to be M ar i ne F i gh ter

Squ ad ron 211, su ppor ted i n i ts i nd epen d-

en t, r ol e by a pr ovi si onal ser vi ce detach-

m ent dr awn fr om M ar i ne Ai r Gr oup 21,

to wh i ch VM F-211 was assi gned. T o es-

tabl i sh the gr ound faci l i ti es r equ i r ed to

m ai n tai n th i s squadr on , M ajor wai ter

L . J . Bayl er fr om the staff of I M AG-21,together \ vi t ] l a detachm ent of ~~ M a.

r in es com man ded by Second L i eu ten an t

Rober t ,J . Con der man y w er e d ispat ch ed

fr om Pear l on 19 N ovem ber i n U SS

W~i gh t j an ai rcr aft tender w hi ch was al so

br in gi ng ou t, t he pr ospect i ve I sl an d Com -

m ander and com mandi ng off i cer of the

N aval Ai r St at ion .

Whi l e the Wti qh t pl owed westwar dbear in g VM F -21 1’s gr ou nd com pon en ts,

t il e ai r ech el on of t hat squ ad ron , con si st -

i ng of the squadr on com mander , n i ne of-

f i cer s and tw o en l isted pi lots,” had on the

WAK E IAT TH E S H AD OW OF WAR 101

aft er n oon of 27 hTovember received secret

ver bal w ar ni ng or der s to pr el )ar e for en l -

bar kat i on on boar d a car ri er . S LIA or -

st a nd is t f~ ren]a in so a t lea st unt il this F orce

ha s ret urn ed t o H a w a iia n oI )era t in g a rea .

Th er efore I a m sending t his t irst repor t via gua rd

na iil (m t his ship, ra t h er t ha n by a ir ma il a ft er



der s had been expected by the squadr on

com mander (though not by the pi lots, vi r-

tual l y al l of whom car r i ed l i t t l e m or eth an toi let ar ti cl es and a change of cl oth i -

ng ), an d few pr epar at i on s w er e r equ ir ed .

T he squadr on had on l y to f l y t l ~e 12 new

F4F–3 (Gr um m an Wi ]dcat ) f i gh ter s

fr om 13wa M oor ing M ast (as that ai r st a-

t .i on was then desi gnated) over to For d

I sl and , the naval ai r base i n the m idd l e

of Pear l H ar bor , for fu r ther t r ansfer by

ai r to the fl i gh t deck of the L T SS Eriter-fw i .w. T h i s was a r ou t i ne oper at i on for

M ar i ne pi l ots, and except for thei r un-

fam il iar ity w i th the new ai r cr aft , and the

f act t h at , on e p l an e’s st ar t er m i sb eh av ed ,”

the m or n i ng fl i gh t of 28 hTovem ber on to

the l?n.ter~~~~e w en t off w i t hou t i n ci d en t .”

T he best d escr ipt i on of VM F -21 1’s voy-

age to Wake i s con tai ned i n a per sonal

l et t er , com posed on t he e~’e of t he squ ad -r on ’s debar kat i on , fr om M ajor Pau l A.

Putnam to Colonel Cl aude i i. L ar ki n w -ho

commanded M AG-21, Excer pts ar e

quoted:

& r SEA,

la nding . .

You t ~ ill reca ll th a t I left on e pla n e a t Ford

I sla nd. The Admira l a t on ce ga ve m e a pla net o repla ce it , fr om VF–6 ; a ncl h e nia (le it pla in

t o me a nd t o t h e w l]ole ship th a t n ot h ing sh ould

be over looke(l n or a n y t rouble spa red in or der

t o in sure t ha t I w ill get a shore w it h 12 a ir-

l)la nes ill a s n ea r l)er fect con dit ion a s possible.

I n )media t t = ly I ~ va s given a full complement of

mechs a n d a ll ht in ds a boa rd h a ve cont in ua lly

vied w it h ea ch ot her t o see w h o could d o t h e

]nt )st for me. I feel a bit like t h e fa t t ed ca lf

being groomed for w h a t ever it is th a t h a ppen s

t o fa t t ed ca lves, but it surely is n ice w hile itla sts a n d t h e a irpla n es a re pret t y sleek a n d

fa t t oo. l ’hey h a ~ e of course been ch ecked a n d

double ch ecked from en d t o end, a nd t hey h a ve

a lso h een pa in t ed so t ha t a ll 12 a re n ow of

st a nda rd blue a nd gra y .

The Admira l seems t o be most det er min ed t o

ma in t a in secrecy r ega rdin g t h e posit ion a nd a c-

t ivit y of t his Force. There h a s been a cont in u-

ous inn er a ir lnt rol clur in g da yligh t , a n d a full

sq ua dron ha s ma de a lon g sea rch t o t he fron t

a nd fl ,a nks ea rh m orn in g a nd even in g. They a re

a rmed t o t h e t eet h a nd t h e or der s a r e t o a t t a ck

a ny J a pa nese vessel or a ircra ft on sigh t in order

t o pre~ en t t h e discovery of t his F orce.

My orders, h ow ever , a re n ot so direct . I n fa ct

I h a ve n o orders. I h a ~ e been t old in forma lly


for com bat , ser vi ce;’ accor di ng to M ajor

Putnam . H owever , he added, i t was:

. . . seriously h a ndica pped by la ck of expt ?r i-

passage of ai r pl an es over t hem , even w hen

pu sh ed by h an d, cou ld cau se ser i ou s pl an e

damage. Fuel ing st i l l depended on hand



en ce in t h e t ype of a irpla ne t h en used. I t is

believed t ha t t h e sq ua dron w a s excellen t ly

t ra in ed a nd w ell q ua li fied for w a r dut y in agenera l sense, but it w a s unfor t un a t e t ha t t h e

n ew t ype of a irpla ne, so ra dica lly differ ent from

t he t ype in w hich t ra ining h a d been conduct ed,

h a d been received t oo recen t ly t o permit fa n lil-

ia riza tion in ta ct ica l fly in g a nd gun ner y .ze

On t h e morn in g of 4D ecembert h is force

w a s met by a h -a v-y P E Y sent out from

Wra ke,” a n d t h e ~ &lF-211 a ircra ft t ook

off from t h e Entwpr k and fol lowed th i s

pl ane to th e atol l. Wi th i n l ess than two

hour s the l ast F4F–3 had pancaked on the

nar row str ip at Peacock Poi nt ,.

M ajor 13ayl er had ar r i ved on 29 N o-

vember and al r eady was busy set t i ng up

a ir ba se com m un i cat i on f aci l i ti es. com-

m ander Cl mn i nghar n had succeeded M a-

jor Dever eux as I sl and Com mander , and

I.ieUkIlal l t Conder man and h i s 49 head-

qu ar ter s an d ser vi ce per son nel w er e w ai t-

i ng t o gr eet th e squ ad ron , bu t t he ai rcr aft

oper at i ng faci li ti es at Wake w er e har dl y

i n a fi n i shed stage. T he l and i ng st r i p,

al th ou gh su ff i ci en t i n l en gt h, w as too n ar -

pL lm ps and n~an power . N o shel ter s or

ai rcr aft r evetm ents exi sted , and the new

pl anes w er e som ew hat puzzl ing to pi lots

and m echan i cs who had no i nst r uct i on

manuals . M ajor Putnam began im me-

d iatel y to negot i ate for the constr uct i on

of r evet men ts,30 an d h e al so began a t rai n-

i ng pr ogr am to be car ri ed on i n con junc-

t i on w i th the dai l y dawn and dusk pa-

t r ol s wh i ch star ted on the m or ni ng after

V M F-211 ar r ived .

T hese pat r ol s, execu ted by four ai r -

cr aft , ci r cl ed the atol l appr oxim atel y 50

m il es ou t , and pi lots com bined th i s du ty

w ith n avi gat ion an d i nstr um en t t r ai ni ng.

I nst r um ent pr act i ce w as par ti cu l ar ly i m-

por tan t because Wake had no el ect r on i c

hom ing or navi gat i onal ai ds su i tabl e for

t i gh ter oper at i ons , and the atol l was a

smal l m ar k for pi l ots to l ocate th r ough a

f loor of i n ter m i tt en t cl ou ds.3’

Ot her ch an ges h ad t ak en pl ace si nce t he

ar r i val of the Wt i gh t . Com mander

3““B a cked by a w rit t en req uest from t he C om -

WAKE I N TH E S H AD OW OF WAR 102

Cunni ngham had br ought w i th hi m Com-

mander Campbel l K eene, ei gh t N avy of-

f icer s, an d 58 bl uej ack et s w ho com pr i sed

t l ~e i ni ti al detachn l en t of the N aval Ai r

cr aft . Onl y the cr ews of the 5-i nch sea-

coast bat ter i es w er e at or n ear au th or i zed

st r engths, and they al so wer e devi ll ed by

l mend ing m inor sh or tages of t ool s, spar e



Stat i on . Al l these per sonnel , l i ke the

.i r my Ai r For ce com muni cat i on detach-n l en t 32 of ol le off i cer and four sol di er s,

wer e w i thou t ar ms or f i el d equ i pment .

I n spi te of t he efl or ts, m en , an d equ ipm en t

consi gned to Wakej the si tuat i on was

st i l l gr im 011 6 Decem ber 1941. The

gr ou nd d ef en ses, em bod yi ng t he com pl et e

ar ti ll er y of a defense bat tal ion , had been

em pl aced dur ing 12-hour wor ki ng days,

and som e pr otect i ve sandbaggi ng and

camoufl age accom pl i shed. But to m an

t hese w eapon s t he 1st D efense B at tal ion

detachm ent had on l y 15 ot l i cer s and 373

en l i sted men, al though the 1941 T / O

cal led for 43 off i cer s and 939 m en. Th i s

meant that one 3-i nch ant i ai r cr aft bat-

tery 33~ ,as el l t i r el ~ Wi t hou t personnel and

that each of the other two bat ter ies cou l d

m an on l y thr ee of i ts four guns. Thus

on l y si x of the twel ve 3-i nch guns on the

i sl and cou l d be ut i l i zed. Onl y Bat ter y

D had i ts fu l l al l owance of f i r e-con tr ol

equ i pment . Bat ter y E had a d i r ector but

no hei gh t f i nder , and i t had to get al t i -

p ar t s, a nd m i scel l an eou s or d n an ce i t em s.”

l ’eal e I sl an d’s base d evel opm en t an d d e-

fensi ve or gan i zat i on wer e the most ad-

vanced i n the atol l . A l though Bat ter y

B, the 5-i nch seacoast uni t at T oki Poi nt ,

had been fu l l y or gan i zed onl y af ter the

ar r i val of per sonnel on 2 N ovember , i ts

posi t i on was i n good shape. M uch the

same coul d be sai d of Bat ter y D , 3-i nch

an ti ai r cr af t, set u p n ear t he sou th east en d

of the i sl and. Al l em placem ents had not

been completel y sandbagged, bu t ther e

w er e ad equ at e per son nel sh el ter s pl us u n-

der gr ound stowage for 1,400 r ounds of

3-i nch am muni ti on. T el ephone l ines, al -

though not bur i ed , l i nked al l posi t i ons

w i th the i sl and comm and post . Wor k on

Wake I sl and was not far beh i nd . Bat-

ter y A, the 5-i nch seacoast un i t at Pea-

cock Poi nt , w as com pl et el y em pl aced an d

w el l cam oufl aged al th ou gh i t l acked i ndi -

vi dual shel ter s. Bat ter y E, (3-i nch ant i -

ai rcr af t t ), al though wor ki ng w ith on l y 43

M a ri nes, h ad com pl et el y em pl aced , san d-

bagged and cam ou fl aged t wo gu ns an d th e


gUUS. w h ich h :ld been empla ced. All brush ea st

of t h e n ew ch a nn el ha d been clea red. The re-

ma in in g brusl] w est of t h e n ew cha n n el w a s

t hick a nd ils a result of . t his [t h e]

1st D efen se B at ta lion 13 of fi cer s, 373 en li st ed

det ach men t :

VMLI -211 a nd a tt ach- 12 of fi cer s, 4 ) en lis ted

ments :



. .50 ca liber ma chin e guns h a d been pla ced

fa ir ly close t o t h e w ’a t er line. Th e bea ch it -

self d ro~ )lw d a brupt ly from 2>fi t o 4 feet justa bove t h e h igh w at er ma rk.~ ’

I n add i t i on to four .50 cal i ber lY.A and

four .30 cal i ber m ach i ne guns, Pl at t had

t wo sezr cl l l igh ts an d on e 5-i nch seacoast

bat ter y (I .) w l }i cb was set up at K uku

Poi ll ~. T he four 3-i nch guns dest i ned for

Bat ter y F wer e par ked on I $r i l kes w i th -

ou t per sonn el or f i re con t r ol gear . Wi re

com muni cat i ons wer e i n between the i s-l and com mand post an d al l un i ts.3’

Wake, i n tended pr i m ar il y as a pat r ol

pl ane base for P13Y’s, “the eyes of the

F l eet ,” had no scout i ng ai rcr af t af ter the

PBY’s depar ted on 5 December , and on l y

the m ost pr im it i ve faci li ti es for any type

of ai r cr aft oper at i ons. I ts d efen di ng

fi gh ter squadr on was l ear n i ng wh i l e

wor k i ng, and these pl anes had nei ther

ar mor nor sel f-seal ing fuel tanks. I n ad-

(I i t i on , thei r naval type bom b r acks d i d

not , m atch the l ocal su ppl y of bom bs.3i

E xcl usi ve of th e 1,200 ci vi l i an con tr act

U . S , Na va l .\ ir S t a - 10 officer s, 58 en list ed

t iou : (w it hout a rms ).

Ar my .\ ir C orps : 1 officer , 4 en list ed(w it hou t a rm s).

U S S Z’ritOn : 1 enlist ed (w it h out

a rms, la n ded for

m ed ica l a tt en tion ).

TIIus ther e wer e on l y 449 M ar ines on the

at ol l W11Ow er e equ ippecl an d tr ai ned for

combat.

Su ppl ies on Wak e, al th ou gh aggr avat-

i ngl y shor t , i n m any par t i cu l ar i tem s,

wer e gener al ]y adequate. T he M ar ines

had a X)-day sL ~ppl y of r at i ons, and the

ci vi l i an w or ker s l ~ad a si x-m on th su ppl y.

h~o natu r al water suppl y exi sted , bu t a

su i lk i en t num ber of evapor ator s wer e i n

ser vi ce. Am muni t i on and avi at i on or d-

n nl l ce su ppl i es i n i ti al l y cou l d suppor t

l i m i ted oper at i ons, bu t wou l d not w i th -

stand a pr otr acted defense. M ed i cal sup-pl i es wer e those nor m al for a r emote,

ou t l yi ng stat i on and cou l d thus be con-

si dered adequate.3g I n add i t i on to the

n aval m ed ical equ ipm en t an d per son nel on

Wak e, t he con tr act or ’s or gan izat ion oper -

WAK E I N TH E S H AD OW OF WAR 105

i ssued to i nd i vi dual M ar ines, and r eady-

ser vi ce am muni ti on was stowed at ever y

gun posi t i on . A comm on ‘l ,J ’’-l i ne (so-

cm l l ed) wh i ch augmented nor m al tel e-

On the mor ni ng of Satu r day, 6 I )ecem-

ber , M ajor Dever eux found t im e to hol d

the fi rst gener al quar ter s dr il l for the en-



ph on e ci rcu it s, j oi ned al l bat t er ies, com -

m an d post s, obser vat ion post s, an d oth eri nstal lat i on s w i th wh i ch the com mander

m igh t, n eed con tact , cl ur in g bat t le,’] an d

pr im it ive “w al ky-t al ki es” for mecl a r ad io

n et establ ish ed t o par al lel w ir e com mu ni -

cat i on s betw een com nm nd post s on Wak e

I sl and , Wi l kes, and Peal e. Atop the 50-

foot steel water tank at CU m p One, the

h i ghest poi nt on Wzke, M ajor I )ever eux

h ad establ ish ed a vi su al obser vat i on postl inked by fi el d tel ephone to the com mand

post . Th i s OP, w i th a seawar d hor izon of

about n i ne m il es, was the onl y subst i tu te

for r ad ar .

4’ Ma j W. 1,. J . Iiuglev h’cpt, 3,

t i re defen se bat tal ion . ‘T ’al l to A rm s” w as

sou ncl ecl , an d al l gu n posi ti on s w er e m am

ned (to the exten t wh i ch per sonnel shor t-

ages per m it ted ), com m un icat ion s t est ed ,

an d si mu lated t ar gets w er e “en gaged .’> “

T he dr il l r an sm ooth l y, and M ajor Deve-

r eux gr an ted h i s m en an al most unhear d-

of r ewar d : Satu r day af ter noon off, and

h ol i day r ou ti ne for Su nd ay.

H i s t i mi ng of t hi s “br eat her ” w as bet ter

t ha n h e k new .

u P rior t o t he out brea k of w ar , n o opport unit y

h a d been foun d for t est fir in gs, ca libra t ion, or

ot h er gun nery exercises a ft er empla cement of

w ea pon s on Wa ke. Th e first a ct ua l fir ing w a s

in comba t a ga in st t he J apa nese. Ctf??ninghorn

Interview, 3.

CHAPTER 2

The Enemy Strikes’



T he Pm n A mer ican A ir ways Ph il ippi ne

Cl i pper wh i ch had spent the n i gh t of 7-8

D ecem ber at Wake r e-em bar ked passen -

ger s shor t l y after sunr i se on M onday ‘

8 D ecem ber , taxi ed i nto the cal m l agoon,

and soar ed tow ar d Guam . Ashor e br eak-

fast was near ly over , and some M ar i nes

wer e squar i ng away thei r ten ts pr i or tofal l i ng ou t for the day’s wor k . M ajor

Dever eux was shavi ng. I n the Ar m y Ai r -

ways Com muni cat i ons Ser vi ce r ad i o van

n ear t he ai rst r ip, an oper ator w as com in g

up on fr equency w i th H i ckam Fiel d on

Oahu when at 0650 a fr an t i c uncoded

t ran sm i ssi on cu t t hr ou gh : Oah u w as u nd er

en em y a ir at ta ck .

Captai n H enr y S. Wi l son snatched the

m essage and r ushed to Dever eux’s ten t.

T he m ajor t r ied unsuccessfu l l y to r each

Com mander Cunn i ngham by tel ephone,

an d t hen cal led th e base com mu ni cat i on

Ar ms.’ Gu nn er y ser gean ts br oke ou t t hei r

m en and made sur e that al l had thei r am -

mun i t i on . T he M ar i nes then pi l ed i n to

t r ucks wh i ch r ushed them to the bat ter y

ar eas. B y 0735 al l posi ti on s w er e m an ned

and r eady, the pl anned w atch w as estab-

l i shed atop the water tank i n Cam p one,

and defense bat tal ion off i cer s had hel d abr ief conference.

T he dawn ai r patr ol was up befor e the

news cam e fr om Pear l,5 bu t avi at i on per -

sonn el t ook h ur r i ed st eps t o safegu ar d t he

new Wi l dcats st i l l on the gr ound. T he

Ph i l i ppi ne Cl i pper was reca lled t en

minutes after i ts takeoff , and i t ci r cl ed

back down to the l agoon. B ut i n spi te of

th ese m easu res, t hi ngs w er e n ot r unn in gsm oot hl y at t he ai rst r ip. VM F-211 had

been on Wake onl y four days and cou l d

har dl y cal l i tsel f wel l establ i shed . A i r -

cr af t r evetm ents st i l l bei ng dozed wou l d

TH E E NE MY S TRIK E S 107

t )rogressiug sinlult a neously on six of t he ~ aw -

t ect ive bunkers for t h e a irpla nes. a nd w hile

n on e w as a va ila ble for immedia te occulmn cy, a ll

w ould be rea dy not la t er th a n 1400. P rot ect ion

a nd ca mout lfa ~ e for fa cilit ies w ere n ot a va ila ble

manne(l. Ma rine unit s a n d t he I sl an {l

Com m an der h ast i ly set u p com m an d post s.

Com mander Cunni ngham l ocated hi s CP

in (’am p T wo, and ~M F-211>s r emained



but could be ma de rea dy w it h in 24 hours. F ox-

holes or ot her pre~ a red posit ions for person nel

did n ot exist but w ould be complet ed not la ter

t h a n 1400. To move t he a irpla n es out of t h e

regula r pa rkin g a rea ent a iled gra ve risk of

da ma ge, a n d a ny da ma ge mea nt t he complet e

loss of a n a irpla n e beca use of t he complet e a b-

sence of spa re pa rt s . . The S q ua dron C onl-

ma nder decided t o a void cer t a in da ma ge t o his

a irpla n es by moving t hem a cross t he rough

groun d, t o dela y movenlen t s of ma t er ia l unt il

some pla ce could be prepa red t o receive it , a nd

t o t rust his person nel t o ta ke na t ura l cover if

attacked.”

T hus VM F-211’S handfu l of pi l ots and

m ech an ics spen t th e m or ni ng d isper si ng

ai r cr aft as w id el y as possi bl e i n t he u sabl e

par ki ng ar ea, r el ocat i ng the squadr on

r ad i o i nstal lat i on fr om i ts tem por ar y si te

to a cover ed one, and ar mi ng and ser vi c-

i ng al l ai rcr aft for com bat.

At l 0800, on l y a few hour s after t i l ebl azi ng an d d yi ng A ri zon a h ad br oken ou t

her col or s under enem y fi re at Pear l H ar -

bor , M or ni ng (Vol or s sounded on Wake.

D efen si ve pr epar at ion s h um m ed . T r uck s

del iver ed fu l l al low an ces of am mu ni ti on

i ll the squadr on ot f i ce ten t . Avi at i on per -

son nel l ~ad t o st i ck w it h th ei r j obs of bel t-

i ng ext r a am muni ti on and tr ansfer ri l ]g

bul k fuel i nto m or e di spen sabl e dr um s.

A t 0900 t he fou r-pl an e com bat ai r pat rol

r etur ned to base. The pl anes wer e r e-

fuel ed wh i le the four pi lots 7 took a sm ok-

i ng br eak, and then cl amber ed back i n to

F4F ’s 9 th r ough 12 and took off agai n to

scou t the m ost l i kel y sector s for enem y

appr oach . Shor t l y n fter th i s the pi l ot of

the Ph t%pp;n e Cl ~pper , Captai n ,J . H .

H am i l ton , r epor ted for du ty to M ajor

Putnam at VM F-211’S headquar ter s, H e

l md or der s fr om the I sl and (’om mznder

to m ake a l ong-r ange southwar d sear ch

w i tl ~ f i gh ter escor t. T hese or der s, how-

ever , were l a t er cancel l ed .s

Whi l e VM F-211’s com bat ai r patr ol

made a sw ing nor th of Wake at 12,000

f eet , 36 t wi n-en gi ned ,J apan ese bom ber s

wer e fl yi ng nor thwar d towar d the atol l .

Th i s was Ai r At tack For ce N o. 1 of the

Z ’zw nt y-F ow ’t h .+ li r F l ot i ll a, ba sed a t R oi ,

720 m i l es to the south .’ As the enemy


d ow n i n h i s 10,000-f oot ap pr oach , h e n ot ecl

that t l ~e sou th coast of ’ the atol l was

m asked by a dr if t i ng r ai n squal l at about

2,000 feet . T he t hr ee ,J apan ese d ivi si on s,

For a second t im e w i th i n l ess than ten

m inu tes the ai r st r i p was bom bed md

st r afed . By 1210 the str ike was over . The

enem y pl anes tu r ned awmy and com-



i n 12-pl an e VS, d ropped r api dl y d ow n i nto

t he squ al l a nd em er ged a f ew secon cl s l at eral m ost on top of the J ?T ake ai r st r i p.

F i r st L ieu tenant Wi ll i am W. L ew i s, com-

m andi ng B at ter y E at Peacock Poi nt , saw

these pl anes at 1150, and he gr abbed a

“J ’’-l i ne tel ephone to war n Dever eux.

,J ust as the major answer ed , a spr ay of

br igh t spar ks began t o sai l t hr ou gh t he ai r

ahead of the enem y for mat i on . One ci vi l-

i an thought “the wheel s dr opped off the~i rpl anes.” But the pl anes had not com e

t o l ose t hei r w h eel s. ,J a pa nese bom bs w er e

fal l i ng on Wak e.

L ew i s, an exper i enced ant i ai r cr aft

ar ti l l er ym an, had not on l y com pl ied w ith

t he com m an di ng ofl i cer ’s d ir ect ive t o k eep

one gun manned, bu t had added another

for good m easu re. Wi th i n a mat ter of

seconds he had two of Bat ter y E ’s 3-i nch

guns f i r i ng at the J apanesej l o and .50

cal i ber guns al ong the south shor e of

N Take qu i ck l y took up the fi r e. A t i gh t

pattern of 100-pound fr agm entat i on

menced thei r cl im b to cr ui si ng al t i tude.

“T he pi lot s i n ever y on e of t he pl an es w er egr i nn in g w id el y. E ver yone waggl ed h i s

w in gs t o si gn ify ‘B anzai ’.:’ 1’

The ener il y at tack bur ned or bl asted

seven of t he ei gh t F 4F –3’s fr om pr opel l er

t o r ud der , an d t he r em ai ni l)g Wi l dcat sLls-

tai ned ser ious but not i r repar abl e dam-

age to i t s r eser ve fuel tank . A d i r ect

bom b h i t destr oyed M ajor Bayl er ’s ai r -

gr ou nd r ad io i nst al lat i on , m ncl t h e w hol eavi at i on ar ea f l amed i n the bl aze fr om

the 25,000-gal l on avgas tank wh i ch had

been h i t i n the fi rst st r ike. Fifty-gal lon

fuel dr um s bur st i nto f l am e. VM F-211’S

t en ta ge, con tai n in g t he squ ad r on ’s su r et y

st ock of t ool s an d spar es, h ad been r i dd led

and par t i al l y bur ned . Wor st of al l , 23 of

the 55 avi at i on per sonnel then on the

gr ound wer e k i ll ed ou t r igh t , or w oundedso sever el y that they d i ed befor e the fol -

l ow i ng m or ni ng, el even m or e w er e woun-

ded but sur vi ved . At one str oke, VM F-

211 had sustai ned near l y 60 per cen t

TH E E NE MY S TRI K E S 109

T wo an d th e ad j aceu t Pan Am er icau ar ea,

the hotel and other Sei ll )l :l ne faci li t i es

w er e af ir e, t he PhiZi~~jine ~v7~]I]Mr hacl r e-

cei ved a few str ay m ach i ne-gun bu l lets,

i n a r eefer box at Cam p T wo, and m ble-

bod i ed avi at i on per sonnel tu r ned thei r

at te,n t ion t o t l l e ai r pl an es an d t o t he gaso-

l i ne t i r es. T he th r ee pl anes st i l l abl e to



and som e ten ci vi li an em pl oyees of P.f.l

l ~ad b een k il led .” T he el ~en ly d id n ot l ose

n si n ~yl e bom ber a l tl ~ ou gh “sev er a l ” were

d am aged by an ti ai rcr aft f i re.l s ‘1 ’he Ma-

r in e com bat ai r pat rol , w el l above t l~e r ai d

and m om entar i l y scou t i ng to the nor th ,

had n ot m ad e contact . T hese pi lots r e-

tu r necl for l and i ng shor t l y af ter the at -

tack, and by a fi nal st r oke of i l l for tune

Captai n H enr y T . E l r od dam aged h i s

pr opel l er ser i ousl y on a m ass of bomb

debris.

W ak e’s d ef en der s w er e m ost con cer n ed

that th i s f i r st r ai d had str uck alm ost be-

for e they knew that enemy pl anes wer e

overhead. T he r ai n squal l had hel ped the

,J apanese, bu t the atol l ’s l ack of ear l y-

war ni ng equ i pm ent was al most as bene-

f i ci al t o t he en em y. T he gar r ison n eed edr adar , bu t none w as avai l a bl e. T ll rougl l-

ou t the si ege the ,J apnnese pl anes col l -

t i nued to el ude the m ost vi gi l an t vi sual

obser vat i on , and w i th the sound of thei r

f l y wer e sent up on com bat ai r pat r ol . I n

t l ~e sky they wou l d be safe fr om another

sur pr ise r ai d . Cr ews and off i cer s r e-

or gan ized an d r eal located j obs. Seconcl

I .i eu tenan t J ohn F . K inney becam e engi -

n eer i ng ofi cer t o r epl ace F ir st I .i eu ten an t

Gr aves w -h o h ad been k il led .’5 K in ney’s

pr inc ipal assi stan t was T echn i cal Ser -

geant Wi l l i am ,J . H am il ton , an en l isted

pi lot , and th ese tw o m en begi n sal vagi ng

tool s and par ts f r om bur ned pl anes.T hei r et for ts i mm easur abl y ai ded fu tu r e

oper at i ons of VM F-211. Captai n H er -

ber t C’. F reu ler r eor gan ized th e or dn an ce

sect ion , 1.i eu ten an t D avi d D . K l iew er t ook

over t l ~e r a di o sect i on , a nd (“a pt ai n s E l r od

an d T har in su per vi sed con st ru ct ion of i n-

d ivi du al foxh ol es, sh el ter s, an d i nfan tr y

defensi ve wor ks i l l the VM F-211 m ea.

Ot l ~er wor k i ncl uded m in i ng the ai rst r ip

at 150-foot i nter val s w it h h eavy d yn am ite

char ges to guar d agai nst ai r bor ne l and-

i ngs. Fur rows wer e bu l ldozed th r ough-

ou t t i le open gr ound wher e such l and i ngs

110 P EARL H ARB OR TO G CAD ALC ANAL

El sewher e on the atol l new defense

woqk pr ogr essed just as r api d l y.l e Em -

pl acem ents, foxhol es, and cam ouf l age

wer e im pr oved at al l bat ter y posi t i ons.

took off at 0545 over Peacock Poi nt . T hey

r en dezvou sed i n sect i on over t he f i el d an d

then cl im bed upwar d to scou t 60- to 80-

m i l e sect or s a lon g t he m ost p roba bl e r ou tes



A N avy l i gh ter l oaded w i th dynam i te sur -

r ou nd ed by con cr et e bl ock s w as an ch or edi n Wi l kes channel to guar d th i s dr edged

w at er way. T el eph on e l i nes wer e r e-

pai r ed , key tr unk l i nes wer e doubl ed

w her ever possi bl e, an d ever y possi bl e at -

tem pt was m ade to bur y the m ost im por -

tan t w i r es.” Constr uct i on of m or e du-

r abl e and per man ent com mand posts and

shel ter s began befor e the day ended i n a

col d dr i zzl e. Wor k i ng that n i gh t underbl ackou t r est r ict i ons, avi at i on M ar ines

and vol un teer ci vi l i ans com pl eted ei gh t

bl ast-pr oof ai r cr aft r evetm ents. T he

atol l’s four oper at i onal pl an es w er e thus

r el at i vel y safe w ith i n these. r evetm ents

when 9 Decem ber dawned br i gh t and

cl ear , and Captai n E lr odk pl ane al so, w as

i n a bunker under goi ng r epai rs to i ts pr o-

p el l er a nd en gi n e.Gener al quar ter s sounded at 0500, 45

m i nu tes befor e dawn, and the defense

com mander set Cond i t i on 1. T hi s r ead i -

ness cond i t i on r equ i r ed fu l l m ann i ng

of en em y a pp roa ch . A t 0700 th e fi gh ter s

f i ni sh ed t hei r sear ch w ith ou t si gh ti ng an yen em y pl an es an d t hen t ur ned back t ow ar d

the atol l. T her e the defense detachm ent

sh i fted to Cond i ti on 2 w hi ch r equ i red th at

on l y hal f the guns be manned, and that

fewer m en stood by the fi r e con t r ol i n -

st r um ents. T hi s per mi tted M ar ines to get

after other necessar y wor k ar ound thei r

posi ti ons. At the ai rst r ip L ieu tenant K in -

ney cont i nued w or k on E lr od ’s pl ane, andt he squ ad ron ’s en gi neer i ng pr obl em m ad e

i t evi den t t hat h an gar over hau l an dbl ack -

ou t faci li t i es had to be set up. M ajor Put -

nam deci ded to en l ar ge two of h i s new

pl an e sh el ter s for th is pu rpose. E ntr an ce

r am ps wer e cu t bel ow gr ound l evel , and

the r evetm ents wer e r oofed w i th “I ”

beam s, l um ber , an d l i gh tpr oof t ar pau l i ns.

T hese exped ien ts al l ow ed ext en si ve over -hau l and mai n tenance at al l hour s, and

pr ovi ded m axi mum pr otect i on for pl an es

and mechan ics.

As the mor n i ng wor e on, m en began to

wor k cl oser to thei r foxhol es and to keep

TH E E NE MY S TRI K E S 111

th i s al ar m to the com bat ai r patr ol , and

bat ter y cr ewm en r ushed to gener al quar -

ter s. Soon th r ee bur sts of an t i ai r cr aft

f i re, th e n ew al ar m si gn al , “ w er e expl od-

scor ed a d i r ect h i t on the r ad i o stat i on .

T hi s destr oyed m ost of the N avy’s r acl i o

gear .’” M eanwhi le the ant i ai rcr aft guns

cont i nued to f i re i nto the t i gh t ,T apanese



i ng fr om al l sector s, and Wake stood by

for i t s second at tack of the war .T he l ead i ng ,J apanese pl anes ap-

pr oached fr om the southeast at 13,000

feet , and ant i ai rcr aft bat ter ies on Peal e

I sl an d an d Peacock Poi nt open ed fi re j ust

befor e the f i r st bom bs wer e r el eased.

M inu tes ear li er the com bat ai r patr ol had

m ade contact w i th one f l ank of the ,J apa-

nese pl anes south of Wake, and L i eu-

tenant K l i ewer and T echn i cal Ser geantH am il ton m anaged to cu t of f a st r aggl er .

T hey shot i t down despi te hot r etu r n fi r e

fr om a top tu r ret , and as the enemy pl ane

spu n aw ay i n f lam es t he gr ou nd bat ter i es’

3-i nch shel l s began to bur st among the

,J apan ese. T he M a ri ne fi gh ter s br ok e con -

t act a nd w i th dr ew .

The fi r st st i cks of bombs expl oded

ar ound Bat ter i es E and A on Peacock

Poi n t and dam aged a 3-i nch gun i n the E

Batter y posi t i on and a r ange t i nder at

Bat ter y A. Other bom bs cr ashed al ong

the east l eg of Wake I sl and and i n to

Cam p Two. Ther e d i r ect h i ts destr oyed

for mat i on , and fi ve bom ber s wer e sn~ok-

ing by the t im e Peal e I sl and was h i t . Amoment l ater one of these pl anes bur st

i n to f l ames and bl ew up i n the ai r . T hat ,

was Wake)s second cer tai n k i l l . T he

oth er s l im ped aw ay st i l l sm oki ng.zl

The hospi tal bur ned to the gr ound—whi l e the two sur geons saved fi r st the

pat i en ts and then as m uch med i cal sup-

pl i es and equ i pm ent as they had t ime to

sal vage. Cam p T wo and the N aval Ai r

Stat i on wer e now as badl y wr ecked as the

avi at i on ar ea had been on the pr evi ous

day, and four M ar i nes and 55 ci vi l i ans

had been ki l l ed . Bu t the defender s had

l ear ned som e l esson s, and th e J apan ese

wer e not to have such an easy t ime her e-

after . M ajor Putnam summed i t up:

The origina l ra id . . w as t a ct ica lly w ell con -

ceived a nd skillfully execut ed, but t herea ft er

t heir ta ct ics w ere st upid, a nd t he best tha t ca n

be sa id of t heir skill is tha t t h ey ha d excellen t

flight disciplin e. Th e h our a nd a lt it ude of t heir

a rriva l over t he isla nd w as a lmost const a nt a nd



TH E E N’E MY S TRI K E S 113

an d s~~ept~;atte~yJ ’S emp]~~ement dei~n

of accessor ies, 1i gh t f i tt i ngs a]l d other

n l ovabl e objects. For tunatel y on l y one

M ar i ne was k i l l ed . Four other s wer e

by next m or ni ng they wer e i n posi t i on

an (l agai i l r ead y t o sh oot .

GEi’Vl?i’lZ,Y OF T H E REL I EF



wounded, and one ci vi l i an sust a i necl

shock . B ut m ater iel -w i se, B at ter y 1, wasi n ser ious sl mpe. A l l f i r e con tr ol i nst r u-

m ents except t i le tel escopes on (hm 2 had

been b l ast ed away ordamagedbeyond re-

pai r , the gun tubes wer e dented , f i r i ng

l ocks wer e tor n of f, and tr aver si ng and

el evat i ng r ack s w er e bu r r ed an d d i st or t ed .

E qu i pm ent l oss at B at ter y F , or gan i zi ng

th at m or ni ng, was l ess ser ious. C)ne gun

was dmnaged fr om bl ast and fl yi ng de-br is. I n ad cl i t ion , t he 60-i nch sear ch li gh t

on Wi lkes h acl been kn ock ed en d over en d.

T hi s ser iousl y dam ageci the l igh t ’s del i-

cat e ar cs, bear i n gs, a nd el ect r on i c f it ti n gs.

.\ f ter th i s r ai d M ajor Dever eux agai n

or der ed B at ter y 1? t o d i spl ace. T hi s t i me

i t wou l d set . up nor th of t i l e ai r st r i p and

near the l agoon i n the cr otch of Wake.

T il e dumm yguns at Peacock Poi nt , dam-

aged by t hi s t hi rd r ai d, }~er e r efl u-bi sh ed

d ur in g th e af ter noon of 10 I )ecem ber , an d

B at ter y E ’s unn l a]i l l ed four th gun w as de-

tached for an t i boat em placement el se-

E .r PK I )l T I oN 28

After the Pear l H ar bor at tack , Pr esi -

d en t Roosevel t w ar ned t he A mer ican peo-

pl e to be pr epar ed for the fal l of Wake.

Yet befor e the Ar i zona’s hu l k stopped

bur ni ng, pl ans wer e under way to send r e-

l i ef to the atol l . Bu t w i th m uch of the

Paci f i c F l eet on the bot tom of Pear l H ar -

bor , l it t l e assi stance cou l d be pr ovi ded .

Wake, l i ke other ou ter i sl ands, }vou l dstand or fal l on i t s own L mless i t cou l d be

au gm en ted fr om t he m eager r esou rces

then at Pear l H ar bor . M ar i ne for ces on

oah u i ncl ud ed t wo d efen se. bat tal i on s, t he

3d and 4t l ~~’ el em ents of the I st D efense

B at ta li on , a nd m i scel l an eou s bar r ack s an d

sh ips’ detachments. Any per sonnel sen t

to r el i eve Wake wou l d have to com e fr om

th ese, u ni ts, an d t hat . m ean t t hat ot her i m-por tan t jobs wou l d have to be sl i gh ted .

T her e w as a l im ited sour ce of equ i pm ent

i ncl ud i ng r adar and other suppl i es at

Pear l I kbor i n the, hands of the M ar i ne

D efen se F or ce qu ar ter m ast er ; an d fi gh ter

P EARL H ARB OR TO G UAD .4L C AATAL

ai rcr af t , needed al most as m uch as r ad ar ,

wer e al r eady en r ou te fr om San Diego on

boa rd t l ~e I JSS ,~ara toga.:+ ()

on 9 December ‘1 Adm i r al K im r nel ’s

r etu r n to or igi nal bat ter y posi t i ons. T he

Ci nCPac st at l w an ted t o m ak e a com pl ete

new study of the Paci fi c si tu at i on befor e

i t sen t, th is r el ief of f to Wake.33 B esi des,



staf f deci ded to send r el i ef to I IT ake i n a

t ask for ce bu il t ar ou nd t hi s car r ier , Cr ui s-er D i vi si on 6 (cr u i ser s A st on ”a , M kneapo-

7L i , a ncl ,Ym n F r am wko ), t he n ine dest roy-

er s of D est royer Squ ad ron 4, t he seapl an e

t en der T an gi er , w ll icl l w ou ld car r y t roops

an d equ ipm en t, an d th e fl eet oi ler i17eC7WS.

T hese sh i ps wou l d com pr ise T ask For ce

14, Whi l e i t sai l ed for Wake, T ask For ce

11 bu il t ar ou nd t he U SS L exi ngt on ,, w ou ld

m ake d i ver si onar y st r ikes i n th e vi ci ni ty

of J al u i t some 800 m i l es sou th of Wake.

A th i r d task for ce, com m anded by Vi ce

.I dm ir al H al sey i n t he car r ier E nter pr ise,

wou l d pr ovi de. gener al suppor t by com

duct i ng oper at i on s w est of ,J oh nston I s-

land.32

M en and equ i pment to ai d Wake wou l d

be dr aw n fr om the 4th D efense B at tal ion ,

and on 10 D ecem ber th i s un i t w us al er ted

for i m med iat e. em bar kat ion . T he d est in a-

t i on was not announced, bu t i t d i d not r e-

qu i r e m uch i m agi nat i on for r um or to cu t

th r ough m il itar y secr ecy. “l $r e’r e goi ng

the task for ce had to awai t the ar r i val of

the 17anztoga.Ci n (7Pac fi nal l y deci ded to m ake the

at tem pt to r ei n for ce Waket and em-

bar kat i on of cer tai n un i ts of the 4th De-

fense Bat tal ion began two days l ater , on

12 Decem ber . By th i s t im e the Wake de-

fen der s h ad sen t, a par ti al l ist of t hei r m ost

cr it i cal needs, and Pear l H ar bor suppl y

act i vi t i es f i l l ed th i s as best they COU IC1.

l -’h ese i m por t an t i t em s, w h ich w er e l oa ded

i n the Z’~mgie/ ’ at pi er 10 i n the N avy

l -a rd , 3’ i n cl u ded a n S CR –270 ea rl y-w ar n -

i ng r acl ar un i t and an SCR–268 r adar set

for f i r e con tr ol . A l so stowed on boar d

w er e 9,000 r ou nd s of 5-i nch am mu ni ti on ,

12,000 of t he :1-i n cl ~ sh el l s w i th 30-secon d

t im e fu zes, m or e t han t lm ee m il l i on r ou nd s

of bel ted am mm li t i on for .50 and .3o cal i-

ber m ach in e gu ns, qu an ti ti es of gr en ad es,

am muni ti on for sm al l ar ms, bar bed w ir e,

an ti per son nel m i nes, an d ad di ti on al en gi -

n eer i ng t ool s. (N h er equ ipm en t. w ou ld en -

abl e the men at Wake to r epai r thei r







118 J ?E ARL H ARB OR TO G CAD ALC ANAL

Bat ter y A, w i th no r ange fi nder , had est i -

m ated the. r ange to these sh i ps, and the

r an ge sect ion per son nel w er e pl ot ti ng t he

tar get wh i l e the gun sect i on cr ews stood

by to fi r e. T he or der to t i r e cam e fr om

t ran spor ts, an d t he l igh t cr ui ser s T at su ta

and T er wyu wh i ch had br oken of f fr om the

Yubar i at the west end of her f i r st f i r i ng

run . T hese cr u i ser s and transports

steam ed nor th at a r ange of about 9,000



D ever eu x’s com m an d post at 0615, an d t il e

guns at Peacock I ’oi nt opened t i r eol l the

Yubar i and the sh i ps w i tl ~ her wh i l e Bat -

ter y L engaged the other enemy sh i ps

w i th i n r ange of Wi l kes I sl and . Bat ter y

A ’s f ir st sa lvo w en t over t he ,Ja pal l ese f la g-

sh i p, and L ieu tenant %r ni n~~er or der ed

the r ange. d r opped 500 yar ds. T h i s f i r e

fr om the beach caused the cr ui ser to veer

away on a zi g zag cour se, and to concen-

t r ate her f i r e on the B at ter y A guns. H er

sh ot s st r ad dl ed t he M a r i ne p osi t ion s ils she

pu l led aw ay r api dl y. B ar ni nger ad justed

as best he cou l d for the evasi ve tact i cs of

the ,J apanese sh i p, ancl h i s guns soon

scor ed two h i ts. Both shel l s en ter ed the

cr ui ser at the water l i ne am id sh i ps on her

por t si de, an d th e sh ip bel cl lecl steam an d

sm oke as she sl ackened speed. T wo m or e

sh el ls t hen cau gh t h er sl igh tl y :aft of th ese

fi rst w ou nd s, an d sh e tu rn ed to st ar boar d

to h i de i n her own sm oke. A d est r oyer

then at tem pted to l ay sm oke between the

t rou bl ed cr ui ser an d t he sh or e bat ter y, bu t

yar ds sou thwest of K uku Poi n t wh i l e the

cl est royer s (pr obabl y D est royer D ivi si on

29 consi st i ng of the H uyate, (Xte, and

ei ther the Mutszdi or M och izu ki )’7

h ead ed d ir ect l y for sh or e an d open ed f i re.

At about 4,000 yar ds fr om th e i sl and th ey

execu ted a l eft (westwar d) tu r n , and the

l i?cr yate l ecl them i n a r un cl ose al ong the

shore. At that poi n t Bat ter y L opened

fire. At 0652, j ust after the th i r d two-

gu n sal vo, th e H ayat e er upt ed i n a vi ol en t

expl osi on , and as the smoke and spr ccy

(I r if ted cl ear , th e gun ner s on Wi lkes cou ld

see that she had br oken i n two and was

si nk i ng r api d l y. Wi th i n two m inu tes, at

0652, she had d i sappear ed fr om si gh t .”

T hi s pr om pt ed su ch spon tan eou s cel ebr a-

t i ons i n the Bat ter y L posi t i ons that a

T ’et er a n n on com m i ssi on ed of fi cer h ad t o r e-

m ind the gun cr ews that other tar gets r e-

mained.

F i r e then sh i fted to O;te, next i n l i ne

beh i nd the H ayate. Th i s dest r oyer was

n ow so cl ose t o sh or e t hat , M a jor D ever eu x

TH E E A-E MY S TRIK ES 119

su rvi vor s an d si nk , bu t r el i abl e en em y r ec-

or ds i nd i cate on l y that she sustai ned

damage.4g

Bat ter y I J now shi fted fi r e to the tr ans-

por w K ongo .V~r u and K on~yu .U ur u

com m an d p ost , and pu t. C~L mT wo ou t. of

act i on w i th a {I isabl ed r ecoi l cyl i nder .

L i eu ten an t. J Vood row W. K essl er , t he bat -

ter y conm lander , con t i nued hi s duel w i th

on l y one gun, and used per sonnel fr om



t hen st ea mi n g a ppr oxi m at el y 10,000 ya rd s

south of Wi l kes. One shel l h i t the l ead-

i ng t mn spor t., an d th is sh ip L L ISOu rned t o

seawar d ancl r et i r ed behi nd a smoke

scr een wh i ch pr obabl y was pr ovi ded by

the two fl eei ng destr oyer s, T hei r cour se

wt r ri ed them past the tr anspor t ar ea. By

th i s t ime ci vi l i ans on Wi l kes had joi ned

t h e d e.f en si ve ef f o r t.s a s v ol u n teer a m mu n i -

t i on hand l er s, and the bat ter y next en-

gaged a cr ui ser steam in g n or th war d 91000

yar ds of f the west end of the i sl and . T h i s

was ei ther the Tenr yu or the T atsu ta; bu t

whatever her i den t i t y, she hur ri ed away

t r ai l i ng smoke af ter one shel l st r uck her

near the ster n . T he depar tu r e of th i s

sh ip, at abou t. 0710, r em oved th e l ast tar -

get fr om the r ange of Bat ter y L . I n a

busy hour , th i s un i t had fi r ed 120 5-i nch

sh el l s w hi ch sa nk on e d est r oyer , d am aged

another , and i nfl icted dam age to a t r ans-

por t and a l i gh t cr u i ser . ~wo M ar i nes

h ad su st ai ned sl igh t w ou nd s.

M eanwhi l e the other hal f of the ,J ap-

GL m T wo to hel p keep up the fi r e.. T en

rounds lilt er a shel l caught the Ya.yoi i n

her ster n :L nd set , her afi re. K essl er then

sh i fted h i s f i r e to t l ~e second shi p wh i ch

was maneuver i ng to l ay a sm oke scr een

for the i l ] j u r ed Y<~yoi . U nder th i s con-

ceal ment al l th r ee destr oyer s r ever sed

cour se and r et i r ed southwar d out of

range.

T he J apanese for ce was now in fu l l

retirement. .k t 0700 Adm i r al K aj i oka or -

der ed i L w i thdr awal to K wajal ei n . Bad

weather and ~cc~l r ate M ar i ne fi r e had

com pl etel y wr ecked the adm ir al ’s pl an to

take Wake w i th 450 m en. But comm and-

er s on the atol l took i mm ed iate pr ecau-

t i ons to gu ar d agai nst a d an ger ou s r el ax-

at ion of defen ses. T hey r eason ed th at t he

,Japunese m igh t have car r i er ai r cr af t

r eady to con t i nue the at tack wh i ch the

sh i ps had star ted . and M ajor Putnam was

al ready al oft w i th (T aptai ns E lr od , Fr eu-

l er , and Thar i n to r econnoi ter the ar ea

fr om 12,000 feet . Wl~en th i s sear ch l o-

120

fr om these two tar gets. Bu t the T er wyu

su ffer ed bom b d am age t o h er tor ped o bat -

t er y, a nd t he T at su ta.’.~ t op si d e r a di o sh ack

was h i t . (T nptai n F r eu l er l anded a 100-

pound bom b on the ster n of the t r anspor t

P EARL H ARB OR TO G U.4D ALC AXAL

t he d es tr oy er H ayate was sunk by shor e

bat ter ies and the dest r oyer K i sam gi by

the VM F-211 bom bs. T wo m or e destr oy-

er s, t he Oi te an d t l~e Y uyoi , w er e d am aged

as w as a dest r oyer -t r anspor t. T he tr ans-



K ongo M ar u , and saw h i s tar get f l ar e upw i th gasol i ne f ir es. Af ter d roppi ng thei r

tw o bom bs each , the fl ier s hur r i ed back to

Wake to r ear m.

T wo fr esh pi l ots, I ~i eu tenant K inney

an d T ech ni cal Ser gean t H am i lt on , su bst i-

tu ted for two of the or igi nal f l i er s dur ing

on e of th ese sh ut t les bet ween th e at ol l an d

the enem y sh i ps, and the ai r at tacks con-

t i nued for a total of 10 sor t i es dur i ngwh i ch the M ar ines dr opped 20 bom bs and

fi red appr oxi matel y 20,000 r ounds of .50

cal i ber am m un it ion .51 T he d estr oyer

K isar a.gi , pr obabl y h it ear l i er by Capt ai n

E lr od , f i nal ly bl ew L ~pj ust as L i eu ten an t

K i nney nosed over at her i n an at tack of

h is ow n. One of t he dest royer - tr anspor t s

1so sustai ned damage fr om the ai r

strikes.T h i s act i on was not al l “ducks i n a bar -

r el ’> to the M ar ine f l ier s, and any dam age

to the scanty Wake ai r for ce w as a ser ious

one. ,J apan ese f l ak cu t. t he m ai n fu el l in e

por t K ongo M ar u was bom bed and setafi r e. .M 1 t hr ee cr ui ser s ( Y u bat i, T at su ta,

an d T enr yu ) r ecei ved i nj ur ies fr om ai r or

sur face a t tacks.52

,J apan ese per son nel casu al ti es can be

fi xed on l y appr oxi matel y. Assum ing that

th e tw o sunken dest r oyer s wer e m anned

by cr ew s com par abl e to those r equ i red by

si mi lar U . S. types (abou t 250 off i cer s an d

m en per sh i p ), i t w ou l d be l ogi cal to cl ai mappr oxim atel y 500 for these two l osses

w i th the fai r assum pt i on that few i f any

su r vi vor s escaped i n ei th er case. Per son -

nel l osses on the other seven sh i ps dam -

aged ar e not known, bu t i t must be

assu med t hat casu al ti es d id occu r .53

5’T h e w i del y-cr ed i ted cl ai m , or i gi n at ed i n

good f ai t h, t h at d i ve-bom bi n g a tt ack s sa nl i acru i ser of f ~ J ’akecannot be suppor t ed . M l t h ree

cru i sers ret u rned to 11’akel ess than two w+eeks

l at er t o su ppor t t he t i nal at tack on t he atol l.

T h e of fi ci a l ly est ab li sh ed occa si on of t h e l oss

of each i s as fol l ow s : ~u har i { Ph i l i ppi ne S ea,

CHAPTER 3

Wake Under Siege ]



,Scar cel y had t i l e VM F-211 pl anes r e-

tu r ned to the f i eld befor e i t was t i m e for

L ieutenants Davi dson and K i nney to f l y

the on l y two ser vi ceabl e f i gh ter s on the

ear l y m i dday com bat pat r ol . I t was

then near l y 1000, al m ost t i m e for the

.Japanese bom ber s to ar r i ve, and the

M ar ines soon spot ted 30 of these enem y

pl anes com i ng out of the nor thwest

at 18,000 feet . Davi dson downed two of

these ai rcr aft , and K inney tu r ned a th i r d

homewar d w i th sm oke t r ai l i ng beh i nd i t.

T hen the f l i er s pu l l ed aw ay as the enem y

for mat i on enter ed t i le r ange of t i le Wake

gu n s .

T h i s an t i ai r cr af t f i r e spl ashed one

bom ber i n the water off Wi l kes and

d am aged thr ee oth er s. Bom bs hi t cl ose to

Bat ter y I ) on Peal e, and other s expl od ed

on Wake. T her e wer e no M ar i ne casual -

t i es, and dam age was sl i gh t , bu t the pat -

gan th i s d i spl acem en t after dar k. Sand -

bags nt the ol d posi t i on cou l d not be r e-

cl ai med , an d cem en t bags an d em pty ar r-

m un it i on boxes h ad to ser ve th is pu rpose

at the I l ew l oczt i on . T he wor k was

fi n i shed by 04L 5, and Bat ter y D agai n

was r eady to f i r e.

On 12 Decem ber the J apanese cam e to

w or k ear ly. T wo four -engi ne K aw ani sh i

pat r ol bom ber s ar r i ved fr om M ajur o at

abou t 0500 an d bom bed an d st r afed Wak e

an d Peal e I sl and s. B om bs hi t th e ai rst r ip

bu t cau sed l it tl e d am age. Capt ai n T har in ,

v-ho had just taken off on the m or n i ng

r econ nai ssan ce pa tr ol , i nt er cept ed on e of

the bi g f l yi ng boats and shot i t down .

After t his ra id t he I t ’a ke defenders Went

on w it h t heir w ork. Rea ch defenses w ere

improved on l~ illt es, a nd t he ordna nce of-

t icer , G unn er ~ ~ a rold C. ~ or t h, serviced

B a t t ery L’s ba t t ered 5-inch gun s. At t he

122 P EARL H .4RB OR TO G UAD AL C AN.4L

enem y d i d not ar r i ve for the usual noon

raid.3

T h i s fr eedom fr om attack was a wel -

com e and pr of i tabl e i nter lude for the gzr -

r isen . Captai n F reu l er ,w h ohadbeenat -

the sun beh i nd h i m . H e st r afed the J ap-

anese boat w i th h i s .5o cal i ber guns, and

then dr opped h i s two bombs as he pu l led

ou t of h i s gl i de. Sei ther bomb h i t ., bu t

K l i ewer est i m nted that they expl oded



tem pt i ng si nce the open i ng of the war tod evi se som e m ean s of em pl oyi ng w el der ’s

oxygen to augm ent the dw i nd l ing suppl y

for the fi gh ter pi lots, f i nal ly m an aged, at

gr eat per son al h azar d , t o t ran sfer t ,l ~egas

fr om com mer ci al cyl i nder s to the fl i er s’

oxygen bot t l es. Wi thou t th i s n ew suppl y

th e pi lots cou l d not h ave fl own m any m or e

h i gh a lt i tu d e m i ssi on s.

Another i mpor tan t exper im ent fai led .M ar i nes tr ied to fash i on a wor kabl e ai r -

cr aft sound l ocator ou t of l umber . I t was

“a cr ude pyr am i dal box w i th four un-

cur ved pl ywood si des,” by M ajor Deve-

r eux’s descr i pt i on . I t was too cr ude to

be of any val ue; i t ser ved on l y to m agn i fy

the r oar of the sur f.

T hat even i ng I J i eu tenants K inney and

K l iew er an d T ech ni cal Ser gean t H a mi l tonr ead i ed Wake’s th r ee pl anes for the fi nal

pat r ol of the day. K l i ewer dr ew a pl ane

th at w as al ways d i ff i cu l t to star t, 4 a nd h i s

takeoff was del ayed for near l y f i f teen

w i th i n f i f teen feet of the tar get . Bombfr agm ents punctu r ed h i s w i ngs and tai l

as he made h i s l ow pu l l -ou t , and wh i l e he

cl im bed to cr u i si ng al t i tude he saw the

enem y cr aft submer ge i n the m i dst of a

l ar ge oi l sl i ck .’

A fter thei r var ious act i vi t i es on 12 De-

cem ber , t he atol l d efen der s en ded t he d ay

w i th a sol em n cer em ony. A l ar ge gr ave

had been dug appr oxim atel y 100 yar dssou th west of t he M ar in e ai d st at ion , an d i n

th i s the dead r ecei ved a comm on bur ial

w hi le a l ay pr each er f r om t he con tr act or s

cr ew r ea d si m pl e p r ayer s.

N ext , d n~ 7t h e ,Japan ese d id n ot bot her

Wake at , al l, and M ar ine off i cer s thought

i t possi bl e that K l i ewer ’s at tack on the

enem y subm ar ine lm d br ought them th i s

day of fr eedom . T he. t i l ~y atol l , fr e-

q(l el lt l y conceal ed by cl ouds, w as a d i ff i -

‘ Th e fa t e of th is subma rin e is n ot kn o\ ~ 7n .

E n emy records a re n ot clea r . B ut a ft er t h e fa ll

were killetl :\lltl one wounded, :1lld n direct

hmb llit in ail ;~iq)lniie Ye\-etiiielit fill-

idled oti aiiotlier figllter pl:iiie, lea\-iiig tile



atoll‘ s a\-iat ioii niiit only one plane tliatc~ollltl f ly . ! ’ Lieutellant K i n n e y , I’ MF-

I l‘ s engineering ofker, spriiitetl for tile

revetinent where he w-as joined by Tech-

iGal Sergeant TI:mlilton tint1 ,~Gtion

M:tchinist’ s Mate F i rs t (‘ l a s s ,James F .

Hesson, l’ SS,10 his two assistants. kspite tlie fire

of the plane,

rear’ end

islletl the

mbelierable feat of removing tlie unclain-

aged engine fiviii tlie fuselage ;ii1d drag-

ging it clear.

Thwiiig his iiiori ing patrol fliglit of 15

I)ec+eiiiher, Rlajor Putiinni sighted another

shnarine southwest of Wake. ISut it ap-

J>eilre<l to llare orange markings, :lllcl Put-

nam thought it


T hei r bom bi ng was l ess et fect i ve. T hey

appar en t l y t r ied to h i t B at ter y D cm Peal e

I sl and , bu t m ost of the bom bs fel l har m -

l essl y i n to the l agoon and the other s

cau sed n o d am age.

B ut exper ience h ad taught the atol l de-

fender s not to expect ~ r est af ter th is day-

l i gh t r ai d was over . T he f l yi ng boats had

becom e al most as per si st en t as t he sh or e-

ba sed bom ber s, a nd a t 1745 t ha t a ft er n oon



M eanw hi le defensi ve \ vor k con t i nueddur i ng ever y dayl i gh t hour not i n ter -

r upted by such bombing r ai ds. Another

ai rcr aft w as patched up, per sonnel shel -

ter s for al l hands had been com pl eted i n

the VM F-211 ar ea, and at Peacock Poi n t

Bzt ter y A now - had two deep under -

gr ou nd sh el ter s w ith r ock cover t hr ee feet

th i ck .” And befor e n i gh t fal l on 15 De-

cem ber t he ga rr i son com pl et ed i t s d est r uc-t i on of cl assi fi ed docum ents. T hi s secur -

i t y wor k began on 8 Decem ber when the

Com m andant of the 14th N aval D i st r ict

or der ed Com mander Cunn i ngham to de-

st roy r eser ve cod es an d ci ph er s at t he h Ta

val A i r Stat i on l lz bu t codes r em ained i n -

tact i n the VM F-211 ar ea. N ow M ajor

Rayl er and Captai n T har i n shr edded

these cl assi f i ed paper s i n to au oi l d r umand bur ned them i n a gasol ine fi re.”

On t h e l(l t h t lie , Japanese made anot ] l er

dayl i gh t r ai d . T w en ty-t hr ee bom ber s

fr om Roi cam e out . of the east at 18,000

on e of t he K aw au isl l is cam e d ow n t hr ou gha l ow cei l i ng to st r afe Bat ter y D on Peal e

I sl and . Poor vi si bi l i ty pr even ted the

M ar i nes fr om r etu r n i ng fi r e, bu t the at -

tack bacl caused l it t l e dam age. T he pl ane

dr opped four hea~y bom bs, bu t th ese fel l

l ~ar ml essl y i nto th e l agoon. M ar ines w ho

wer e keepi ng scor e—and m ost of them

wer e-m ar ked th i s down as Wake’s 1(M

ai r r ai d.After th i s at tack Wake had an uneasy

n i gh t . I t was bl ack w i th a heavy d r i zzl e,

an d m aybe. t hi s pu t sen ti nel s on ed ge j ust

en ou gh t o ca use t hem t o “see t hi n gs’’-al -

though no one cou l d bl am e them for th i s.

At any r ate l ookouts on R7i lkes passed an

al ar m at (E200 t l )at they had si gh ted 12

sh i ps, an d ever ybody fel l ou t for gener al

quar ter s. N oth i ng cam e of th i s al ar m andpostwar ,J apanese and I T. S. r ecor ds i m

ci i cate that ther e wer e no sn i ps n t al l

ar ou nd Wake t hat n igh t.

At 0600 on 17 I )ecem ber I ,i eu tenant

WAK E L?ND E R S I E G E 1 25

en gines a nd propellers from scra p pa rt s sa l-

va ged from w recks. . . a ll t his in spite of t he

fa ct tha t t hey w ere w orking w it h n ew t ypes

[of a ircra ft ] w it h w hich t hey ha d n o previous

exper ien ce a nd w ere w it hout inst ruct ion ma n -

ua ls of a ny kind. . . Their per forma nce w a s

t he outst a nding even t of t h e w hole ca mpa ign.”

i m pr ovem en ts com pl et ed . T he i sl an d com -

m and er pr efaced h i s pr el im in ar y r epl y to

th is qu er y w ith an accou nt of th e l atest ai r

r ai d , and fol l owed th i s w i th a dam age r e-

por t wh i ch sum mar ized h i s bat t l e l osses

si nce the begi nn i ng of the w ar . H e



“~ n~ illes ha l ,e been t ra ded from pla n e

t o pla n e, h a ve been jun ked, st ripped, re-

built , a n d a ll but . crea t ed,” a not her repor t

sa id of K inney ’s engin eer in g w ork.16

.% 131’7 tha t a ft ernoon 27 J a pa n ese

bombers from Roi ca me out of t h e sout li-

w est t it 193000 feet . Their bombs ignit ed

a diesel oil t a nk on TVilkes a nd dest royed

t ile defen se ba t t a lion messha ll a s w ell a s

mueli t ent a ge a nd q ua r terma ster gea r a t

C a mp On e. ~ bomb explosion a lso da nl-

a ged on e of t he eva pora t or units upon

w hich lt r t ike depen ded for it s w a t er sup-

ply. The 3-incl~ guns bronglit dow n on e

of t h ese pla nes,

lJ a t er t ha t da y on e of t he K inn ey-

pa t ched fight er pla nes w a shed out dur ing

take-oflj and i t had to be sent back to the

boneyar d . T hen at I ’i 50 cam e the heavi -est r ai d the K awan i sh i f l yi ng boats ever

put i n to the ai r agai nst Wake.’i E i gl ~t of

t hese pl an es bom bed an d st r afed th e atol l

bu t i n fl i ct ed l i tt l e d am age.

poi n ted ou t that hal f of h i s t r ucks and en-gi neer i ng equ ip men t h ad been d est royed ,

that m ost of h i s d i esel fuel and dynam ite

w er e gon e, a n d t h at h i s ga r age b la ck sm i t h

sh op, m ach in e sh op , a nd bu i l di ng su ppl i es

war ehouse ei ther had been bl asted or

bu rn ed to th e gr ou nd .

I n a suppl em en tar y r epor t sen t l ater ,

Com mander Cunn i ngham tol d the Pear l

H ar bor au thor i t i es that ever ybody onWake had been busy defend i ng the atol l

an d k eepi ng t hem sel ves al ive. T hey cou ld

not do const r uct i on wor k at n i ght , he

poi n ted ou t , and i f t hey used too m uch

heavy equ i pm en t dur i ng the day they

cou ld n ot h ear th e bom ber s appr oach in g.

B esi des, h e r ei ter ated , m uch of h is equ ip-

m en t h ad been d est r oyed by th e bom bi ng

r ai ds, an d m ost of h i s r epai r faci l i ti es h adm et the sam e fate. On top of al l th i s, he

ad ded , ci vi la n m or al e w as ba d. Cunning-

ham sai d he cou l d not pr om ise a com pl e-

t ion d at e on an yth in g u nl ess th e J apan ese

126

Wake, however , and the defender s con-

si der ed i ts act i vi t y om inol l s. I t l v l S al -

m ost d i rect l y over h ea d a t a bou t 25,000 f eet

when f i r st si gh ted. Wel l beyond ant i ai r -

cr aft or f i gh ter r ange, i t f l ew nor thwwt

al ong t he axi s of th e atol l , an d th en tu rn ed

P EARL H ARB OR TO G UAD AL C ANAL

.it 105012’7 bombers from R oi ca me in

from t he n ort hw est a t a bout 18,000 feet .

They w orked over t h e VNI F–211 a rea

sout h of t h e a irst r ip, fin ished off t h e Ma -

r in es’ messha ll a nd t en t a ge a t ~ a mp Onel

a nd st ruck t he P a n.Lir a rea . B a t t er ies D



sou th, pr esu mabl y r et ur ni ng to Roi . De-fen der s bel ieved t hi s t o be ~ ph ot o-r econ -

na issance f l i gh t.

N ext m or ni ng th e d efen der s con ti nu ed

thei r r ou t i ne wor k, t r yi ng to add to thei r

d ef en si ve i n st al l at i on s bef or e t he bom ber s

wer e due. T h i s was a r ou t i ne now fa-

m i li ar to them . After bei ng cl ear ed fr om

mor ni ng gener al quar ter s, the m en went

about thei r wor k un t i l the m idday r ai d

sen t them to gun posi t i ons or to cover .

After that r ai d w as over , the m en cl eaned

up after the bombs or went ahead w i th

thei r other du t i es. T hen l ate i n the after -

noon they had to take t ime out to deal

w i th the fl yi ng boats. At n i ght they coul d

u su al ly sl eep w hen t hey w er e n ot on sen tr y

du ty, or stand i ng some other type ofvwtch. Fol l ow i ng th i s pat ter n , cr ew

n ~em ber s of t he va ri ou s bat ter i es h ad com -

pl eted thei r stu r dy em placem ents, and

ever ybody had cont r i bu ted to the con-

a nd F, hit four of t hese bombers, a n d ob-

servers on t he a t oll sa w on e of t h em spla sh

a ft er it s cr ew ba iled out , over t h e w a t er .

llomh da ma ge a t C a mp On e w a s ser ious,

but elsew h ere it w a s slight , a n d t h ere w ere

n o ca s ua l t ies .

D ecember 20 da w ned gloomily w it h

hea vy ra in, a nd ceilings viere low a n d visi-

bilit y poor a ll da y. This w ide w ea t h er

front a ppa rent ly dissua ded t h e J a pa nese

from a t t empt in g t h eir usua l n oon visit ,

but it did n ot st op a U . S . Na vy’ P B Y

w h ich a rr ived th a t da y a n d pr ovided

~ ~ ~ a ke w it h it s first physica l cont a ct w it h

t he fr ien dly out er w orld since t h e sta rt of

t he w a r . This pla n e la nded in t h e la goon

a t 1530 t o deliver det a i led informa t ion

a bout t he p] t in ned relief a nd r ein force-

ment of t he a t oll. Th ese repor t s coll-

t a in ed good new s for nea r ly everyon e.

~ ~ 11 civilia ns except . high-pr ior it y w orkers

w er e t o be eva cua t ed. fl Ma r ine fight er

squa dron (VhlF-221 ) w ould ff y in t o re-

WAK E L’ND E R S I E G E 12’7

tenant Com mander Gr eey pr epar ed r e-

por ts to seucl back to Pear l I I ar bor .

M aj or B ayl er , h is m issi on l on g si nce com -

pl eted , w ou l d car ry the paper s back as he

com pl ied w ith h i s or der s d i rect i ng h i m to

r et ur n fr om Wak e bi by fi r st avai labl e Gov-

t i ve, Pl atoon Ser geant , J ohnal son E .

Wr igh t , and wounded the, r ange off i cer

a nd t hr ee ot her M a r in es.

N OW t her e w as on ly on e fi r i ng d ir ect or

l uechan i sr n l eft . on the atol l , and i t be-

l onged to B at ter y E l ocated i n t i le cr otcl ~



er n m en t a i r t r al l sl )o > t:l t i ol l .” M r . H eve-

nor , the B ur eau of the Budget ofl ici al who

had m issed the Ph i l i ppi ne Vl i pper on 8

December , i ~l so pl anned to l eave on the

P13Y, bu t , som eone poi n ted out that he

cou l d not t r avel i n a N aval ai rcr af t , w i th-

ou t par achu te and M ae West , nei ther of

w hi ch w -as avai labl e. So M r . I levenor

m i ssed another p l ane.

A t 0700 n ext m or ni ng, 21 D ecem ber , th e

PRY d epar te~l . Wi th i n l ess than two

h our s, at 0850, 29 ,T apau ese N avy at tl ck

bom ber s, cover ed by 18 fi gh ter s, l ashed

cl own at Wake thr ough the over cast and

bon lbed an d st rafed al l bat ter y posi ti on s.

T hese w er e pl an es fr om (7u rr i er D ivi si on 2

(Sor yu and H i,yu), cal led i n by the ,J apa-

nese to hel p soften Wake>s unexpected

toughness.” Due to the l ow cei l i ng, the

at tack w as con su m mat ed bef or e t he 3-i n ch

bat t er ies cou ld get i nto act ion , but th e .50

cal i ber an t i ai r cr aft mach i ne guns em

ga ged t h e en em y. T he at tack cau sed l i tt le

of Wake I sl and . But Bat ter y E had no

hei gh t f i nd er , al th ou gh B at ter y I ) st i l l h ad

on e of t hese. T ]l u s t i le t wo ;l -i ncl ~ bat ter i es

had onl y enough fi r e con tr ol equ i pm ent

for on e bat ter y. B ecause of B at ter y E ’s

m or e d esi r a bl e l oca ti on , a nd beca use. i t h ad

esca ped d am age si nce i ts m ove t o t hi s spot ,

M ajor Dever eux deci ded to main tai n i t as

hi s pr imar y ant i ai r cr aft defense of the

atol l . Thus by tak i ng over Bat ter y D ’s

hei gh t , f i nder , cer tai n other f i re con tr ol

gea r , one gu ] ], ancl t he necessa ry personnel ,

B at ter y E becam e a fu l ly m anned and fu l -

l y equi pped four -gun bat ter y. T wo other

B at ter y D gu l )s ~ver e sh i fted to a new po-

si t i on on Peal e I sl and wher e they cou l d

assu me beach-d efense m issi ons, an d t he

four th gun r emzined at the or i gi nal bat-

ter y posi t i on . I hunmy guns al so wer e

m ou nted th er e to cr eat e th e, i mpr essi o~l

that the bat ter y was st i ll i n tact . As a fur -

ther measur e of decept i on , Bat ter y F on

Wi l kes, al so r educed to two guns, woul d

128

By 22 Decem ber VM F-211 agai n had

tw o ai rpl anes capabl e of f l igh t , and C’ap-

tai n Fr eu l er and T ~i eu tenan t Davi dson

took them up for m or n i ngpatr ol . Davi d -

son had been out n lm ost an hour and was

P EARL H ARB OR T() G UAD AL C ANAL

t ir e f r om th e ,J apan ese pl an e w ou nd ed t he

M ar i ne pi l ot i n the back and shou l der .

F reu ler pu sh ed h is pl an e over i nt o a st eep

d i ve, m an aged t o sh ak e of f l ?i s p u r su er , a nd

d ragged t he sh at t er ed , scor ch ed F 4F i nt o



cover i ng t he n or th er n appr oach es t o Wak eat 12,000 feet when he spot ted enem y

pl anes com ing i n . H e cal l ed Captai n

F r eu ]er , who YVaS hen south of the atol l ,

and the M ar i nes began i ndependent ap-

pr oaches to cl ose w i th the enem y. T he

J apan ese f l igh t con si sted of 33 car r ier at -

t ack pl an es (d ive bom ber s) escor ted by si x

f i gh ter s, al l fr om t he Sor yu -H i ryu car r ier

division. T he fi gh ter s w er e at 12,000 feetan d t he d ive bom ber s at 18,000. T he f i gh t-

er s w er e of a sl eek n ew type, t he f i rst Z er os

t o be en cou n ter ed ov er W ak e.

Captai n F reu l er d i ved h i s patched-up

F4F–3 in to a d i vi si on of si x f i gh ter s,

down ing one and scat ter ing the other s.

Com i ng ar ound qu i ck l y i n a d i f f i cu l t op-

p osi t e a pp r oa ch , F r eu l er a tt ack ed a not her

of the Zer os and saw i t expl ode on l y 50f eet bel ow . T hi s expl osi on t em por ar i ly

engn l fed the (2r um r nan i n a cl oud of

thun es and fl yi ng fr agm ents. T he M ar ine

pl nne w as bad l y scor ch ed, i ts m an i fol d-

the fi el d for a cr ash l and i ng. I n the wor dsof L i eu ten an t K in ney> w hose sh oest ri ng

m ai nten an ce h ad k ept V M F-211 fl yi ng for

f i f teen days: ‘(T h i s l eft us w i th no ai r -

pl anes.>’ I n spi te of the M ar i ne squad-

r on -s I ast bl aze of h er oi sm , t he en em y d ive

bom ber s cam e on i n to st r ike at al l bat ter y

posi t i ons. Bu t the atol l pi l ots wer e not

m uch im pr essed by the wor k of the J ap-

an ese n aval avi at or s. ‘(We w ho h ave beenused to seei ng on l y th e pr opel ler hub ar e a

bi t taken aback by thei r sh al low d i ves an d

t hei r i n accu r aci es,” L i eu ten an t B ar n i nger

sai d . T he J apanese bombs d i d not cause

m uch damage, and ther e wer e no casual -

t i es on t h e gr ou n d.

Bu t now that , car r i er ai r was bei ng

br ought to bear agai nst them , the Wake

defender s concl uded that i t wou l d not bel ong befor e th e J apanese cam e back w ith

a bi gger task for ce and a bet ter an l ph i b-

i ou s pl an . Gr ou nd d efen se pr epar at ion s

i n ten si fi ed t h at a ft er n oon . VM F-21 1’s



130 P EARL H ARB OR TO G U.4D .4LC AA’AL

32 and 33) wou l d r un agr ound on the

sou th shor e of the atol l near the ai r st r ip,

and the appr oxi m atel y 1,000 m en of the

speci al n aval l an di ng for ce ~“ l voL d d t l ~en

be car r i ed to the beach i n fou r to si x l ancl -

i ng bcr r ges. T \ ~o of the~e woL dd l and on

the i sl and and to l ook out for L -. S. sur -

face forces.

Wi th these f i nal pl ans i ssuecl , t he i n -

vasi on for ce w el l r eh ear se], an d car r i er s

Sor y71j an d I Fi ryu on thei r w ay dow n fr om

nor th of M idway, the oper at i on agai nst



Wi l kes I sl and , two on Wake I sl and be-

tw een th e ai rst ri p :u ld (U am p on e, an cl th e

other tw o pr obabl y pr ovi ded for wou l d

pu t thei r t r oops ashor e just west of Pea-

cock Poi n t .’” I f t hese speci al l and i ng

for ce t roops r an i nto ser iou s t rou bl e on th e

atol l , the naval for ce WOL I I CIend i n 500

m en or gan ized fr om sh ips’ la n [] in g f or ces .

.lnd if this combined force fa iled t o sl~ b-

due t he a t 011 clef enc~ ersj more help w oulcl

be sent , by mea ns of a n t I1t inla t e rcncl des-

pera te exped ien t. Th e clest royers of t he

ta sk force w ould be bea ch ed, a nd t heir

crew s w ould sw a rm n shore. i kcl m i rn l

I n on ye W:LS det ermineci tha t t his second

a t t a ck should not f a il.

The possibilit y of l.~ . ~ . na 17a l surfa ce

in tervent ion w -a s t aken irit o considera tion.

This possibilit y lia d been clkimissed duril~ g

pla n nin g for t he a t t a ck of 11 I )ecember

beca use t he ,J a pa nese rea soned t l~ a t t ile

shock of P ea r l H a rbor w ould immobilize

llmerica n surfa ce ~ l~ era t ion s for some

Wake w :l s r e:u l y to go. At 0900 on 21

Decem ber Acl r ni r al K aj i oka cl ear ed Roi

w it h t ] l e sh ips of h is am p]l ibi ou s for ce an d

l l ea cl ecl b ack u p t ow a r d t h e A m er i ca n -h el d

atol l .

Z ’H E REL IEF AT T EM PT ,

1,5–?.j D KI J EM RER “

N ow the U . S. com mander s tak i ng hel pto Wake wer e i n a r ace w i th Adm i r al

K aj i oka, even i f they d i d not know i t .

.i dm ir al F let ch er ’s T ask F or ce 14 sor ti ed

f 1om Pear l H ar bor i n two task gr oups on

15 and 16 I )cwem ber ,32 r endezvoused

southw est of Oahu dur ing the after noon

o f t ] l is secon d d ay, an d sai led w estw ar d t o-

w ar d Wake. F l etcher ’s for ce was to ar -

r i ve at t l ~e atol l on 23 Decem ber (east]on gi tu de t i me). T her e the pi l ot s of

M ajor Ver ne ,J . M cCaul ’s VM F-221

woL dcl f l y i n fr om the car ri er ,~m ’atogc~

w hi l e t l ~e T angi er anchor ed off Wi l kes



CHAPTER 4

The Fall of Wake’



.A t Wak e, 23 D ecem ber began w it h i nt er -

n l i tt en t r ai n squ al l s, an d sh or t l y aft er 0100

t he d ef en der s saw a su ccessi on of vi vi d, i r -

r egu l ar f l ash es beyond the hor izon nor th

of Peal e I sl and . M en on the atol l cou l d

hear noth i ng above the r ai n and the boom

of the sur f, bu t i t was obvi ous that the

fl ash es w er e n ot si gn al s or se:l rch li gh tsc

They wer e too br il l i an t and i r regu l ar for

t hat . Ol cl f leet -d ut y h an ds w er e r em i nd ed

of n igh t bat tl e pr act ice at sea. W as t her e

a n aval bat t le, or w er e t he ,J apan ese com -

i ng back ? T i l e defender s con l d on l y

guess.

By th i s t im e the M ar i nes wer e used to

seei ng l igh ts, even though these w er e um

uwm l . B u t at 0145 cam e a m or e ur gen tal ar m . T he wor d over the “,J ’’-l i ne an -

l ~cn m ced t ha t t he .J ct pa nese w er e l an di n g

at ,T ok i Poi nt on Peal e. Ma j or I ) evereux

al er ted al l un i ts and then tel ephoned

where of f shore. By th i s t im e al l un i t s

had sent thei r men to gener al quar ter s,

and at (’am p one. ~Second I ~i eu tenan t

Poi ndexter l oaded h i s scan ty m obi l e r e-

ser ve un i t of ei gh t M ar ines 2 a nd four .30

cal iber m ach i ne gL ms i nto thei r t r uck , r e-

por ted h i s act i ons to the com mand post ,

an d m oved ou t, t ow ar d Peal e I sl an cl . Bu t j

the wor d fr om K essl er lm d convi nced

Deve~eux th at i f the enem y wer e l and i ng,

they wer e not doi ng i t on Peal e I sl and .

H e pl l t a dam per on the gener tcl a]ar m ,

a]d or der ed t l ~at Poi ndexter be i n ter -

cepted when h i s t r nck passed t ]~e com -

m and post . H e hel d the m obi l e r eser ve

t her e t o a wa it d evel op men ts.

I )evel opm en ts w er e n ot l on g i n com in g.

Adm ir al K a j i oka’s am ph i bi ous for ce had

at l ast si gh ted the atol l ’s fai n t ou t l i ne,



1:34 1’lMRL H ARB OR T() G UAD AL C ANAL

c-ess. l ~ igl l t st ’{}u l cl bseel l ot k hor el ~ or t l l

of Peal e I sl and and al l al ong the south

coasts of Wake an(l Wi l kes I sl and . At

about 0230 3L ~r i nes on Peacock Poi n t ,

thought they cou l d see the out ] i nes of two

bar ges h ead i l ~g i i l on g t he coast t ow ar {l t he

above t l ~e sur f, and M ar i ne Gunner M c-

K in st r y opened fi re w ith a .50 cal iber m a-

ch i ne gun at , a dar k shape near the beach

below. T en m inu tes l ater Captai n Pl at t

r equested per m i ssi on to i l l um inate the

beach w i th h i s 60-i nch sear ch l i gh t ., and



ai rf i el d, bu t these evi den t l y w er e the pa-

t l ol cr aft l l w~d i ll gi l lt o\ v:l rcl t l ler eef . B y

now M ajor Dever eux, M ajor Pot ter , h i s

execu t i ve off i cer , a radioman, and a

sw i tchboar d oper ator i n the defense de-

t ach men t com man d post w er e sw am ped by

r epor ts of sounds, l igh ts, an d shapes. As

l ~e col lect ed t hi s i nf or m at ion an d r el ayed

r epor ts to Com mander (’unn i nghar n,

l )ever eu x sa w t ha t t he gr ea test tllLX2ilt was

devel opi ng al ong the south coast of t i l e

at ol l , an d h e d ispat cl )ed L i eu tel )au t Poi w

d ext er >s ei gh t-m an m obi le r eser ve to d e-

fen si ve posi ti on s bet lveen (’am p on e an d

t i l e a i r st r i p.

Poi nd ext er ’s m en h ad n ot l eft t l~e tr u ck ,

an d t he l i eu ten an t, h ad t hen ) t ran spor ted

down the i sl and and i nto posi t i on w i th i n

15 m inu tes. The ar ea i n to wh i ch the-y

m ovecl w as just w est of the r oad junct i on

]l ear the w est end of the ai rst r ip. There

th i s sm al l for ce comm anded the south

shor e r oacl as wel l as the cr it i cal beach

the l and i ng was d i scover ed . T wo bar ges

cou l d be seen on the beaches at Wi l kes,

the l i gh ts al so r eveal ed the patr ol cr aft

agr ou nd of f Wak e.

N ei ther of the 5–nch bat ter i es wh i ch

comm anded the south appr oaches to

Wake’ cou l d bear agai nst the l and i ngs.

T er rai n m asks l ikew i se pr even ted them

fr om fi r i ng at Pat r ol Cr aft 3.2 and 33 on

the r eef}” T he on l y weapon l ar ger than

a m ach in e gu n t hat cou ld engage th ese d e-

st royer -t ran spor ts, al read y begi nn in g to

sp ew O L L th ei r h um an ca rgo, w as t he 3-i n ch

gu n em pl aced on t he r i se bet ween t he bea ch

r oad an d V M F-2117S h ar d-st an d par ki ng

ar ea. But th i s gun was not m anned.

Real izi ng th e i mpor tan ce of t hi s w eapon ,

Second L ieu tenant Rober t M . H anna, i n

com man d of t he an ti ai rcr aft m ach in e gu ns

about the fi el d , gather ed a scr atch cr ew

con si st i ng of on e M ar in e, Cor por al Ral ph

J . H ol ew insk i , and th r ee ci vi l i ans” and



136 P EARL H ARB OR TO G TJ AD ALC ANT.4L

r aced to th i s gun . M ajor I )ever eux al so

r eal ized t he cr i ti cal i m por tan ce of h ol di ng

th i s ar ea, and he or der ed M ajor Putnam

and the 20 men of VM F-211 to for m an

i nfan tr y suppor t. between the 3–nch gun

an d t he en em y l an di ng.

mach i ne guns wer e i n the Peacock Poi n t

ar ea. At the bat ter y posi t i ons gun cr ews

stood by thei r w eapons an d m anned such

l o~i ~l per i met er d efen ses as t hei r m eager

st r ength perm i t t ed .

L i eu ten an t H an na an d h is j ur y-r igged



Al l defense un i ts on Wake I sl and wer ed i sposed to meet the enem y. H anna and

the VM F-211 “i n fan tr ym en” hel d the

l ef t f l an k sou th of t he ai r fi el d par ki ng ar ea.

T o the west , and squar el y i n the path of

the enemy’s i ni t i al r ush towar d the west

end of the fi el d, w er e Second L ieu tenant

K l i ew er an d th ree avi at ion M ar in es. T hey

guar ded one of the gener ator s wh i ch was

w i r ed to detonate the m i nes bur ied i n theai r st r i p. At the r oad junct i on far ther

west Poi ndexter ’s mobi l e r eser ve was

al ready fi ri ng i ts four m ach i ne guns east -

war d al ong the beach at Pat r ol Cr af t 32

t i ’h er e t he en em y t r oops h ad r ev ea led t hem -

sel ves by i nj ud ici ou s u se of pyr otech ni c

si gnal s. At Cam p One four .30 cal i ber

m ach i ne guns w er e m anned for beach de-

fense by B at ter y 1’s gun shed cr ew and the

N aval A i r Stat i on sai l or s who had been

ser vi ng as l ookouts on th e w ater tank OP.

Beh i nd th i s gener al l ine, two .50 cal i ber

cr ew qu i ck l y got the 3–nch gun i n to ac-t i on . T hey l ai d the weapon by est i m ate

an d “K en tu cky w in dage”;’ an d fi red th ei r

f i rst r ound at Patr o7 ~~r(~~t J3 w ll icb w as

l ess than 500”yar cl s away. The shel l h i t

t he br id ge of t he d est royer -t r an spor t, an d

w ounded the captai n, th e navi gator , and

f ive seam en . T w o ot her sai lor s w er e k il led .

Whi l e men of the U ch i da and Z taya un i ts

swar med off the sh i p, H anna and h i s cr ewf i red 14 m or e r ou nd s i nt o t he su per str uc-

tu r e and hu l l of the cr af t . F i nal l y i t bur st

i nto f l am es, i l l um in at in g th e l an di ng ar ea.

“T he scen e w as t oo beau ti fu l t o be a bat tl e-

f i el d,” r epor ted a ,J apanese obser ver on

boa rd t he cr u i ser Y uba ri .’4

F l am es fr om th i s sh i p l i gh ted Pat r ol

Cr [(~t 32 far th er w est al on g t he beach , an d

H anna sh i fted h i s f i r e to th i s vessel .T h r ee-i n ch sh el l s h u l led t h i s t r an sp or t -d e-

st r oyer , and cr ews fr om both these sh i ps

joi ned the SN L F’ t r oops l andi ng on the

i sl and . T h i s added possi bl y 100 extr a





‘rH E FAr,r J OF J Y.lK E 139

B ui i nter ior l and i I lgs or 110, ti le Wake

(I ef en del ’s l u ~d t l ~ei r l M n d s f ul l . ,J a pa lw se

cr ~~ iser s began t o bom bar d t he a tol l ”s m ai n

i sl an d at abou t (1330. ‘1’h e l an di n gs com

t i nued i n spi te of the fact that Bat ter y F .

l ~ow t i ret l a il ’ bl l r st s ov er t he. bea ch es, an d

however , by enemy nm cl~i ne-gun a]~d

s]ll:~ll-i~~ms t i r e wh i ch k i l l ed one M ar ine

and l )i l lned C1O]VUhe other s. zo .i f ter a

t i me (+r aves w it ll (l rew h is u ni t n or th war d

tow :ud t i le con~]t l an d post w her e i t l ater

l )ar t i ci lm ted i n defensi ve efi or ts col n-



et lem y i nfan tr y col l t i l ~u ed t o pl ess cl oserto H anna’s ?-i nch gun south of the ai r -

st r i p. T he VM F-211 t r oops st i l l hel d ,

bu t th ei r par t i al per in let er w as bei ng com -

pr essed t i gh ter a]}d t i gh ter ar ound t i l e

gun. T h i s act i on was now l i t t l e m or e

than a bat t l e for ~j r eser vat i on of t i l e

w eapon an d t l] e ~f:l r i l lesi l l vol ~r ed . M aj or

l ’l ~t l mm ’s m en cou l d l ~ot check th e , J a p -

anese pel let rat i oj l far th er t o th e w est , n or

cou l d they pr even t the enen]y fr on l m ov-

i ng beh i nd them or i n to t l ]e i sl and t r i -

a nxl e a bov e P ea cock P oi n t . .I n d t he ,J al }-

al }ese J vantecl to concent r ate i n th i s t r i -

al ]gl e so t l ~ey cou l d l aunch an at tack u1)

t l ~e i sl al ~d ’s east l eg. T he ~IIF–211

troops col dd on l y hope to cl i ng to the

sl i gh t h i l l ock of thei r posi t i ol ~j and stay

t her e a s l on g a s possi bl e.l i

M eal lw ll i l e (V opor al (i raves an d h is de-

t:lClld gllll S(~llit(l f r ol l l Bat ter y 1) wer e

t ry ing to r each H ti l l l l a~s 3-i nch gun.

Dever eux had tol (l then l to detr uck at the

m al lded by M ajor Pot ter .I tJ i s not cl ear what sor t of an enem y

for ce Cor por al (i raw xs en col mt er ed i n t il e

Peacock t ri an gl e, or h ow t he ,J apan ese got

ther e. T her e ar e i nd i cat i ons that a l and-

i ng n~l gl ~t ha~~ebeen m ad e i n that ar ea,

w i th bar ges com ing i n on t i l e sou th coast

between I Iat ter y A o]) Peacock Poi n t and

t i l e I I ann :~-T M F-211 posi t i on . Dev-

er eux sai d after th e w ar that , he bel ieved

a l and i ng took pl ace at th i s poi n t , bu t the

I I l at ter never has been confi r med. $ ome

.Jalml ~ese accou] l ts , i ncl l l d i ug those of

Capt ai n K oyam a an d a cor r espon den t,”

m en ti on a l an di l~g “n ear t he sou th east t ip

of Wake” to over r un Bat ter y A, wh i ch

n l ust l ~a ve been l ’el ~~eu l ber ed f rom t he a c-

t i ol ~ of 11 I )ecen~ber -especi al ly by m en

in the cr u i ser J ’vbar i. 13u t Captai n K o-

ya n] a a l so i l ~si st ed t h at t l ~e ,J a pa nese m a de

on l y t \ vo bar ge l al ~d i l ~gs w i th a. total of

f ou r barges. .~u d t hese a r e accol m ted f or

140 I ’E .\ RL H .\ I {R OR TO G U .kI ).\ LC AN.kL

euen l y for ce i n the t r ial lg]e. And fr on l

t her e t he .T apan ese t hr et r ten ed t he en ti r e

ei lst el ’11 r i m of t il e at ol l . I k t ter y E was

n ow r ecei vi ng l igh t m or tar an d l ol l g-r xl lge

n lach il ~e-gu n t ir e, an d B at ter y .~ l i kew ise

began to r ecei ve enemy m or tar f i r e.” I n

t he face of th is, Capt ai n Rar ni nger ar mecl

al ong t i l e r oad , bl l t t i l e enen l y now at -

tem pte(l to i nf i lt r ate ar ound t i l e st r ol l s

poi n t . M c:i na]l y con tar tecl another n~:b

ch in e gu n posi ti m~ son ~e 400 yal ’d s t o t i le

sou th on t il e atol l ’s f3ilSt sh or e, an d t hese

two sect i ons al ter nated i n fi r i ng at the’

enemy.



l ~i s r an ge sect ion w it h t wo .30 cal iber n ]:l -

ch i ne gu]~s and for m ed an i n fan tr y m l t -

post l i ne on the l ~i gl ~ gr ound beh i nd hi s

5 -i n ch gu n s.

T he enemy f i r e agai nst B at ter y E

seem ed to com e fr om the th i ck br ush o]~

t i le other si de of a]] i nl et sou thwest of the

bat ter y posi t i on . I )i r ect 3-i nch fi r e i n to

t hi s xr ea si len ced on e au tom at i c w eapon ,bu t t hi s di cl n ot seem t o ease t il e pr essl lr e

much. L i eu tenan t L ew i s then sent i ~

pat r ol of appr oxi matel y 10 m en under

,Ser ~ean t Raym on C~r agg t o i nvest igat e.

Gr agg went ou t to t i l e r oad nor th of the

ai rst r i ])l and l )at r ol led to the sout l ~west

al ong th i s l o:l d . Wi t l l i l l 50 yar ds of t l ~e

bat ter y Gr agg’s l x~t r ol r an i l i to heavy

.J a pa l~ ese t i r e w l ~i cl l f ol ’ced t l w l fa ri l ~es t o(l epl o-y. .I nswer i ng t i l e euwny fi r e, the

pat rol h el d h er e u nt il t he su rr en der .

At about 0430 the .50 cal iber nm ch i ne-

gw n sect i on at t il e east en d of t he ai rst r ip,

T hi s .J apanese for ce pr obabl y w as the

Zt ([ya unit . T h i s r ei n for ced com pany

evi den t l y i nf i lt r ated beh i nd the Putnam -

H annz posi ti on at the 3-i nch gun wh i le t i le

U ch i d{t co~ np at i y r em ai n ed n ear t he bea rl l

to deal w i th that weapon whi ch had fi r ed

on the pat r ol cr aft . T he enemy at f i r st

h ad t rol lbl e ]ocat in g M c.?M m ]l y’s gL m sec-

t i on , bl l t befor e dayl i gh t they wer e al la r ou n d t h e p osi t i on . M c.L n a ll y’s n l en con -

t i n ued t o ] l ol d , h ow -ev er , a nd t h e cor p or a l ’s

r epor ts to I )ever eux gave the major h i s

on l y l ink w ith t i le act i on sou th of t i le con l -

n la ncl post .

By 0500, a hal f hour befor e dawn, i t

w as cl ear t hat t he J apan ese h ad a su per i or

for ce. f i rm ly establ ished on the atol l, and

t hat t he en em y w as fr ee t o i nf il tr at e al m ost

at w i l l ar ound and between the i sol ated

posi t i ons of the defender s. At th i s t i me

Com mander Cunn i ngham sent h i s m es-

sage, ‘t En em y on i sl an d i ssu e i n d ou bt .>’ 23

-— ... .-—141H E FALL OK }\ .%K Yj

hal f of the 200 defender s had to r em ai n at

Bat ter i es A and E, and another 15 M a-

r ines m anned m ach i ne guns and sear ch-

l igh ts at H eel Poi nt w her e t he i sl an d’s en st

leg cr ooks towar d Camp Two. T1l us On lY

abou t 85 m en cou ld oppose t he en em y l an d-

i ng for ce, an d h al f of th ese w er e nm cl li ne-

T hi s w as r epu lsed by cl ose-i n f i gh ti ng w it h

submachi ne guns and gr enades, bu t the

,J apan ese cam e back agai n at daw n. T hi s

t i me the enem y m ade a shout i ng bayonet

char ge agai nst , the M ar i nes, bu t agai n

K li ewer and h i s men, now ai ded by the .50

cal i ber mach i ne guns at the west end of



gu n cr ew m en . M ar ines ser vi ng as r if l e-

m en agai nst the enemy on Wake I sl and

n um ber ed bet ween 40 an d 45.

When Cunn i ngham sent hi s message,

M ajor Putnam st i l l hel d the posi t i on

a r ou n d H a n na J s .ggn , bu t t h e ,J a pa nese n ow -

had these M ar ines sur rounded. H er e. the

defen der s h ad su st ai ned a nu mber of cas-

ual t i es, i ncl ud i ng the death of Captai nElrod.z4 Camp One al so cont i nued to

hol d , and L ieu tenant Poi ndexter had r e-

j oi ned h is sm al l m obi le r eser ve for ce near

the r oad junct i on west of the ai r st r i p.

T her e at f i r st d aw n t he M ar i nes w er e t ak en

under heavy fi r e f r om the br ush off thei r

l eft (nor th ) f l ank. L i gh t m or tar shel l s

began to fal l ar ou nd th e gu n posi ti ons, an d

on e of t he .30 cal iber w eapon s w as pu t ou t

of act i on. I n danger of bei ng out f l anked

her e, Poi ndexter or der ed a w i thdr awal to

Cam p One w her e h e w oul d con sol idate for

t he. a ir st r ip, m an aged t o h al t t he a tt ack .

E nem y pr essu re agai nst M cA nal ly’s m a-

ch in e-gu n posi ti on east of t he ai r st ri p al so

i ncr eased dur ing the hour befor e dawn.

T he M ar i ne str ong poi n t now had been

l ocated , and the defender s wer e under

heavy xt t ack by sm al l-ar ms f i re an d gr en-

ades. M cAnal l y’s gunner s al r eady had

broken LI p a n umber of en emy rushes by

h oldin g t heir fire unt il it w ould be most

effect ive, but t hese 10 men could not ex-

pect t o hold out for long a ga inst t he

rein forced compa n y opposin g t h em.

This w a s clea r a lso t o D evereux a t t he

comma nd post , a nd a t 0530 h e direct ed

lI n jor P ot t er, w h o unt il now ’ ha d a ssisted

in t h e comma nd post , t o a ssemble every

l~ ea dq ua rt ers, service, supply , or ca sua l

~ ~ a r in e in t h e comma n d post a ~ a , includ-

ing (Xorpora l G ra ves$ det a ched squa d from

~ ~ a t t ery ~ j a nd t o form a fina l defensi~ ’e

142 P EARL H .4RB OR TO G UAD ALC ANAL

t r y25 a tt ack . Cn less h e w as t o l ose t hese

per sonnel , M ajor Dever eux had no al ter -

nat i ve bu t to pu l l them back . Th i s he d i d

shor t l y after 0600, when M cAnal l y was

or der ed to ~vi t.h dr aw n or th war d an d joi n

M aj or Pot t er ’s l in e.

After Captai n Godbol d’s r eser ve for ce

M eanw hi le Secon d L i eu tenan t Rober t

W. Gr eel ey h ad r each ed t he com man d post

w i th the fi r st 20 men fr om Batter y D .

T her e M ajor Pot ter , t r yi ng to pi ece out

and extend h i s spar se l i ne to the r i ght

(w est ), d i rect ed t hat t he r ei nf or cem en ts be

pl aced on t hat f l an k ar ou nd t he ed ge of t he



l ef t P eal e I sl an d, F i r st L i eu ten an t K essl er

becam e comm ander ther e si nce h i s Bat-

ter y B was al l that r em ai ned on the i sl and .

I n the l i ght of dawn K essl er cou l d see on

Wi lkes a l in e of .T apan ese fl ags acr oss t he

center of t i l e i sl and , and a l ar ge enemy

fl ag w avi ng fr om t he appr oxi m at e posi ti on

of M ar i ne C~unner M cK instr yk pr ovi -

si onal 13at ter y F. Th i s he r epor ted toM aj or D ever eu x, w ho cou ld on ly con cl ud e

that Wi l kes, wh i ch had been si l en t si nce

abou t 0300~ h ad sh ar ed t he f ~t e w hi ch n ow

appear ed i mm in en t for Wake I sl an d.

Above the br ush znd sl i gh t r i se of

gr ou nd w hi ch t opped t he w est , l eg of Wak e

I sl and , K essl er cou l d al so see the super -

st r uctu r e of Patr ol Cr aft 39. obser vi ng

that the sh i p appear ed i n tact , K essl er at0600 r equ est ed M a jor D ever eu x’s p er n li s-

si on to fi r e on i t . Al though the l i ne of

f i re an d i nt er ven in g par ti al m ask 2em ad e

t hi s h aza rd ou s, t he r equ est w as a pp roved ,

cl ear ing or igi nal ly dozed out to pr epar e

for the nor th -south l eg of the ai r st r i p.

Captai n Godbol d ar r i ved w i th other r e-

i nfor cem en ts at abou t 0700,27 an d th ese

men joi ned those al r eady emplaced by

Gr eel ey. T hi s l ine now tur ned to the r igh t

(nor th ) to r efuse the f l ank al ong the edge

of th e cl ear ing. Pot ter ’s l ine, now con-

tai n i ng about the equ i val en t of a r i f l epl atoon , thus extended fr om near the

beach , acr oss the two r oads south of the

CP, and to the ai r st r i p cl ear i ng wher e i t

made a nor thwar d tu r n . Thus a gap of

appr oxi m at el y 450 yar ds exi st ed bet ween

the sk i r m i sh l i ne and the shor e of the

l agoon. T h i s gap the defender s wou l d

at tem pt to cover by fi r e.

By dayl ight the atol l defender s cou l d

make out the l ar ge task for ce wh i ch sup-

por ted the l andi ng oper at i ons. T her e

wer e then 13 shi ps at var ious posi ti ons

ar ound the i sl and (the four cr u i ser s of





TH E FALL OF WAK E 145



/

146

of the bel eaguer ed m en cm (;L Iu 9. F r om

t hem h e l ear n ed t ha t t he en em y w er e bn i l d-

i ng u p pr essu r e t o ext en d t hei r beach head

far ther i n l ancl . At about WOO Captai n

I ’l at t m oved out to the Gun 11 posi t i on

near the beach, and fr om ther e he cr ept

t h r ou gh t h e b r ush t o a ~’:l n t agel ~ oi l ~ tex stof ~I L 1n10. I t was now abou t 0500, ancl

J ?E AR L H AR ROR TO G l_’.kD AL C.4NAL

der ed h i s l i ne to open fi r e. On e en em y

w as k i ll ed an d th e oth er s sought cover be-

h i nd a l ar ge cor al r ock near the beach .

M c.%l i ster ’s m en con t i nued to f i r e i n to

th i s ar ea to keep the .J apanese pi nned

down wh i l e Gunner M cK i nst r y and Pr i -

vate F i r st Cl ass ~Vi l l i am (’. H al stead

wor ked thei r way ou t to th i s r ock and fi n -



Pl at t d eci ded qu ick l y th athem ust m oun t

a cou ]l ter zt t ack i f th e ,J apan ese w er e to be

pr even ted fr om stagi ng dayl igh t at tacks

w hi ch ~ vou ld en abl e t hem t o over r un GL U 19

and spr ead out i n to the i n ter i or of the

is land.

H e hur ri ed back to Gun 10 and or der ecl

l ’l atoon Ser gean t Raym ond L . C’ou l sonto r ound up the .30 cal iber m ach i ne-gun

(*r ews ancl sear ch l i gh t per sonnel fr om

K nku Poi n t , pl us anyone el se he cou l d

1ay hol d of, and assem bl e them at Gun 10

for the coun ter at tack . I n 2,5 m i nutes

Cou l son was back w i th the two m ach i ne-

gun cr ews ancl ei ght r i f l em en-about a

sq{m d i n al 1. ‘1’hese m en the capt ai u l ed

back thr ough the under br ush towar d the

,J apa nese.

‘1’h e M ar in es cr ept an d cr aw led to w it h-

i n 50 yar c]s of th e ,J apanese. Pl at t th en

pl aced h is t wo m ach in e gu ns on each f l an k

i sh ed of t t he r est of th e pat r ol .

M et i nwh i l e Pl at t ’s coun ter at tack had

su r pr ised the other f l ank of the penet r a-

t i on , and the J apanese at that poi n t wer e

i n t r ou bl e. Obvi ou sl y t hey h ad expect ed

no opposi t i on fr om the west , and thei r

l i gh t m ach i ne guns had been si gh ted for

f i r e t o t he ea st agai nst t he M c.k li st er -M c-

K in st r y l in e. Pl at t ’s at tack car ri ed the

M ar i nes i n to the for m er posi t i on of I lat -

ter y F , and the J apan ese w er e dr iven back

towar d the beach and towar d the M ar i ne

defen se l ine by the i sl an d r oad.

I t w as now dayl i gh t , ancl M c.i l i ster

cou l d see th i s M ar i ne at tack on the far

si d e of t he ,J a pa nese p osi t ion . When h i s

m en fi n i shed m oppi ng up the enem y

i ~~ou l id th e r ock n ear th e beach, th e l ieu -

t en an t gat her ed 24 M a ri nes i nt o a sk ir m ish

l i ne of h i s own and l aunched a counter -

at t:l ck fr om h is si de of th e bat tl ef i el d. T he

TH E FAI ,I , OF WAK E 147

thei r fr on t l ines. T wo wounded J apanese

w er e capt ur ed . T he ot her fou r J apan ese—

i f the T al cano un i t actual l y i ncl uded an

even 100—wer e not accounted for . M a-

r ines found sever al smal l m aps of Wake

i n the ef fects of the dead J apanese, al ~d

M ar i ne posi ti on s w er e m ar ked accu rat el y

act i on agai nst the M ar i nes sudden l y

ceased.

Pl at t moved the m en for war d agai n i n a

d i sper sed for m at i on , and near the ol d

ch an nel h e saw t hr ee m en advan ci ng fr om

the other d i rect i on . T wo w er e obvi ousl y

M ar ines, Pl at t deci ded , bu t the fi gur e i n



on these m aps. The photogr aph i c m i s

si ons over the atol l had obvi ousl y pai d of f

wel l .

B y 0800 Capt ai n Pl at t h ad r eor gm ized

h i s Wi l kes defender s, and he agai n t r ied

to establ ish con tact w ith Wake I sl and . H e

w as abl e t o con tact t he m otor pool at Can lp

One wher e Poi ndexter ’s for ce had nmn-

aged to hol d thr oughout the ni ght , bu the cou]d not g-et thr ough to Dever eux I t

the defense bat tal ion (3P. At about noon

t he m en on W il kes obser ved J a pa nese l an d-

i ng boat s h ead ed f or ~$r ak eI sl an d an d sev -

er n l sh i ps appr oach i ng towar d Wi l kes

channel . Pl at t or der ed M cAl li ster to get

h i s 5-i nch guns i nto act i on agai nst these

vessel s, bu t the gun cr ews found that the

~v ea pon s w er e beyon d u se. T he t rai ni ngm ech an ism on Gu n 1 w as w recked , an cl th e

Gun 2 r ecoi l cyl inder had been r iddl ed by

bomb f ragmen t s.

Wi lkes h ad been un der at tack by t he d ive

t he r ear w as a ,J apan ese off i cer ar m ed w it h

a l ar ge swor d . The captai n m oved for -

w ar d an d soon r ecogn i zed M a jor D ever eu x

who tol d h im that the i sl and had been

surrendered. I t was then shor t l y af ter

1330. Pl at t ’s for ce d i d not get a chance

to hel p i n the t i ght i ng on Wake I sl and , bu t

i t h ad gi ven sL ~cha good accou nt of i tsel f

i n ear l ier act ion t hat a J apan ese off icer w asl )r om pted l ater to m ake th i s est im ate of

th e Wi lkes fi ght in g: “I n gen er al , th at par t

of t he oper at ion w as n ot su ccessf ul .;’ 3’

T l i E ,vL ’l L ’RK :T Z)K 12 .I .V D A FT ER

Pr i or to m ovi ng down the r oad towar d

th e J apan ese, w ho w er e st il l r ecei vi ng d e-

t er mi ned sm al l-ar ms fi re fr om th e few M a-

r ines south of the comm and post , M ajorI )ever eu x passecl w or d of t he su rr en der t o

al l nn i t s i n com muni cat i on w i th h i s com -

m and post . T hese wer e Bat ter i es A and

E on Wake I sl and , Bat ter y B on Peal e,

148 P EARL H ARB OR TO G UAD .4LC ANAL

r esu lts, t he fi r i ng l ock s w er e r em oved an d

sm ash ed , an d gr enad es w er e r ol led dow n

t he m uzzl es to expl od e i nsi de an d d am age

t he r i fl i ng. .411 el ect ri cal f i r e con tr ol d at a

r ecei ver s wer e sm ashed, el ect r ic cabl es

chopped up, and the bat ter y com mander

f i r ed t wen ty r ou nd s of .45 cal i ber am m un i-

he and M al l eck wal ked on towar d the

,J apan ese.

N ear t he h ospi tal D ever eu x an d t he ser -

geau t w er e h al ted by a J apan ese r i f l em an

w l~o mot i oned for them to th r ow down

t l ~ei r ar ms an d h el mets. T hen t he sol di er

took them to the hospi tal wher e the ,J ap-



t ion th rou gh th e d el icat e opt ical an d el ec-

t r o-m ech al li cal par ts of t he hei gh t f i nd er

an d d ir ect or . After com pl et i ng these

m ea su r es, L i eu ten an t L ew i s assem bl ed t he

m en of B at ter y E and m ar ched them under

a wh i te f l ag to the bat tal i on com mand

post.

At Bat ter y A, the 5-i nch fi r i ng l ocks

wer e br oken and bur ied , and al l gun tel e-scopes smashed. The r ange keeper was

damaged beyond r epai r . A fter that a

wh i te f l ag was r un up, and L ieu tenant

B ar ni nger or der ed hi s m en to eat as m uch

as t hey cou ld h ol d. H e then hel d h i s m en

on the posi ti on to aw ai t ar r i val of the J ap-

an ese. E lsew her e, t he h ar d-pr essed r i fl e-

m en st ri pped th e bol ts fr om t hei r r i f l es an d

fl ung them i nto the br ush .I t w as af ter 0800 befor e al l th is h ad been

at tended to, and the r if l e f i r e of Pot ter ’s

l i ne w as st il l cover i ng t he f in al oper at ion s

anese al r eady wer e i n char ge. They had

ki l l ed one pat i en t and wounded another

w hi le capt ur i ng t he h ospi tal , an d n ow t hey

h ad al l t he pat ien ts ou tsi de t ru ssed u p w it h

t el eph on e w ir e. Com m an der (h nn in g-

] l am Ar r i ved by tr uck wh i le Dever eux was

expl ai n i ng h i s m i ssi on to an Engl i sh -

sp ea ki n g t J ap an ese of fi cer , a nd t he M a r in e

m ajor tur ned over h i s sur render du t i es tot he i sl an d com m an der . A < J ap an ese of fi cer

then escor ted Dever eux and M al leck for -

war d to pass the sur r ender or der to M a-

r i ne un i ts on the west l eg of Wake I sl and

and on Wi lkes I sl and .

T hey found the VM F-211 r if l em en and

H auna’s un i t st i l l hol d i ng ar ound the

3-i nch gun i n spi te of con t i nu i ng effor ts

by the ,J apanese. T he J apanese, unabl et o ad van ce, h ad t ak en u p posi ti on s beh in d

n ear by pl an e r evet men ts, an d t he fi gh ti ng

l ~er e was a dead l ock. Captai n T har in w as








over m uch of the bat t l e, bu t he al so-and

per haps m or e i mpor tan t t o th is case—be-

cam e u navoi dabl y d ecei ved as t o t he pr og-

r ess of the si tuat i on . I n i gnor ance of

w hat happened on Wi lkes or at Cam p One,

h e su r mi sed t hat al l w as l ost i n t hose ar eas.

B ur ied tel ephone l ines an d r el iabl e f i el d

t i onal . Enem y d i ve bomber s on 23 De-

cem ber h ad com p l et el y d i sa b-l ed on e 5-i n ch

bat ter y (Wi l kes) and l ar gel y dest r oyed

t he fi re con tr ol i nst ru men ts of th e r em ai n-

i ng two. Wi thou t ai rpl anes, f i re con t r ol

i nst ru men ts, r ad ar , spar e par ts, an d per -

son nel t o br i ng t he d efen se t o fu ll st ren gt h



r ad i os w ou l d have pr evented th i s fai lu r e

of com muni cat i on , an d the sur render de-

ci si on wou l d not have been m ade at that

par ti cu l ar stage of the act i on . T he Wake

gar ri son , however , had nei ther the per -

sonnel to di g by hand, nor the mach i ner y

to di g by m echan i cal m eans, the m any

m i l es of d i t ches wh i ch wou l d have been

n ecessar y t o bu r y t he t el eph on e l in es.

P er h aps on e. of t he f un da men ta l r eason s

for the state of the Wake defenses

st em med fr om th e fact t hat base d evel op-

m ent had consi sten t l y r ecei ved pr ior i ty

over defense pr epar at i ons. T hat the de-

fen si ve i nst al l at ion s w er e i n as good a con -

d i t i on as they wer e when the J apanese

st ru ck m ay be cr ed it ed t o t he tr em en dou s

ef for ts of th e sm al l M ar in e gar r i son .

A ll th in gs tak en i nto accou nt , h ow ever ,

the deci si on to sur render Wake was r ea-

sonabl e, especi al ly when consi der ed i n

Wake cou l d not car r y on . T he on l y

answer was sur r ender . T h i s took pl ace

f i fteen days af ter the i ni ti al at tack , an d i t

was el even hour s af ter the fi gh t i ng com -

m en ced on sh or e befor e Wi lk es I sl an d su r-

rendered.

Dur i ng th i s per i od the M ar i nes sus-

tai ned al most . 20 per cen t casu al ti es, bu t

they exacted a heavy tol l fr om the J ap-

anese. N ear l y 500 enemy had been l ost

i n the abor ti ve l and i ng at tem pt of 11 De-

cem ber , the defender s on Wi l kes I sl and

accou nt ed for n ear ly 100 i n t hei r d efeat of

t he T ah mn o unit, a nd Poi n dext er cou nt ed

appr oxi mat el y 80 en em y bod ies du ri ng h is

mor ni ng at tack fr om Cam p One. Gi ve the

H anna-VM F-211 posi t i on cr ed i t for atl east 20 mor e k i l l s, and th i s wou l d br i ng

the Wake total to 700 enem y. Other s m ust

have l ost thei r l ives on Wake I sl and l and-



PART W

M ar ines i n the Ph i l i ppi nes

CHAPTER 1

China and Luzon

I n the fi r st few months after Pear l H ar - I -”’ ..-. ,– .- ., . – ,.uacue nas Iascea ro r aDouL mree mont n s a s com-



bor , i t seem ed that noth i ng cou l d stop the

J apanese. One by one, the wester n ou t -

posts i n t he F ar E ast w er e over wh el med.

A l l i ed gr ound t r oops, i n desper atel y un-

equ al con t est s, w er e f or ced t o r et r ea t, f i gh t ,

and r et r eat agai n ; at sea and i n the ai r

the pi t i fu l l y few sh i ps and pl anes whi ch

had sur vi ved the i n i t i al onsl aught wer e

hoar ded agai nst the sur ety of fu r ther en-

emy advances. A gr im hol d i ng bat t l e was

joi ned al ong a l ine pr otect i ng Aust r al ia

an d N ’ew Z eal and an d th ei r Sou th Paci fi c

l i fel i ne to the States. Yet , despi te i ts

st rat egi c i m por tan ce, t hi s vi tal d efen si ve

act i on gave fi r st pl ace i n the news to the

ou tcom e of a h opel ess st r uggl e h un dr ed s of

m i l es beh i nd the enemy’s for war d posi -tions.

For alm ost f i ve months, two names—

B ataan and Cor regi dor —dom inated the

head l i nes, tak i ng fi r e i n the m inds of the

pa red w it h our speedy vict or ies in Ma la ya , D ut ch

E a st I ndies, a nd ot her a rea s in t he P hilippines.

As t he Ant i-Axis pow ers propa ga ndize a bout this

ba t t le a s bein g a uniquely hopeful ba t t le a n d t he

first st ep t ow a rd even t ua l vict ory , t he rest of

t h e w orld ha s con cent ra ted upon t h e progress of

t he ba tt le t act ics on t his sma ll penin sula . H ence,

t he vict ories of t hese opera tion s do not only mea n

t h e suppression of t h e P hilippin es, but w ill a lso

h a ve a bea rin g upon t he E nglish a nd America nsa nd t heir a tt it ude t ow ard cont inuing t he vva r.1

L i eu tenan t Gener al M asah ar u H om ma

w as r i gh t: the ou tcom e of the bat t l e d i d

have a d i r ect bear ing on the .411i ed at t i -

tude towar d vi gor ous pur su i t of the war .

Per haps i n no i nst an ce si nce th e defense

of t he .41am o st i rr ed A m er i ca ns i n an ot her

cen tu r y d i d an unsuccessfu l bat t l e car ry

w ith in i ts w agi ng and i ts en di ng t he sou rceof so m uch n at ion al pr id e an d d ed icat ion.

T H E AH AD O W OF TJ T AR2

156 P EARL H ARB OR TO G IJ AD AL C ANAL

Depar tm ent , wh i ch had r equested th i s

m ove, fol l owed thr ough w i th a d i rect i %r e

or gan i zi ng a new comm and, ~T Si4FFE

(U n i ted States Ar my For ces i n the Far

E ast ), w hi ch i ncl uded al l Am er ican Ar my

and Com monw eal th t r oops i n th e Ph i li p-

pi nes. T o head U SAFFE the Ar m ycal led ou t of r et i rem ent i ts for mer ch ief of

T he d i vi si ons had never oper ated as such

i n fi el d m aneuver s and wer e scant i ly pr o-

vi ded w ith ar ms an d equ i pm ent .. I n or der

to m old an effect i ve fi gh t i ng for ce fr om

the Ph i l i ppi ne Ar my, M acAr thur needed

just abou t ever yth i ng i n the m il itar y sup-

pl y catal ogs, bu t m ost of al l he neededt im e—ti me for t rai ni ng, t i me for m at er iel



st aff , Gen er al M acA rth ur , w ho h ad ser ved

as M i l i t ar y .4d vi sor t o t he Com m on weal th

Gover nm ent si nce 1935. H e was gi ven

r an k as a l ieu ten an t gen er al an d w ith ch ar -

act er i st ic en er gy t ack led t he en or m ou s j ob

of pu t t i ng the Ph i l i ppi nes i n to a state of

r ea di n ess a ga in st a tt ack .

T he bu l k of U SAFFE ’S tr oop str ength

was dr awn fr om the Ph i l i ppi ne Ar my

whi ch was, i n J ul y 1941, an ar my i n name

on l y. I t consi sted of the i sl ands’ pol i ce

f or ce, t he 6,000-m an Ph il i ppi ne Con st ab-

u l ar y, a token ai r for ce and i nshor e naval

pat r ol , and ten ter ri tor ial r eser ve d i vi s-

i ons. Si nce the star t of the Com m on-

w eal th % d efen se tr ai ni ng pr ogr am i n 1936

abou t 110,000 F il ipi nos h ad r ecei ved a f ew

m onths of basi c m il i tar y i nstr uct i on , bu t

m ost of t hese r eser vi st s h ad n o exp er i en ce

w ith cr ew-ser ved weapons and on l y r ud i -

an d m en to r each the Ph i li ppi nes fr om the

U n i ted S ta tes.

T he i nst r uctor s and cadr es need ed for

t r ai ni ng the Ph i li ppi ne .4r my w er e dr aw n

fr om the, Constabu l ar y and the r egu l ar

Ar my un i ts avai l abl e to U S.4FFE. M ost

of the 22,000 U . S. Ar my tr oops i n the

i sl ands wer e ser vi ng i n Coast Ar ti l l er yr egim ents, the Ar my .4i r Cor ps, or the

Ph il i ppi ne D ivi si on , sol e r egu lar i nfan tr y

d i vi si on i n the i sl ands. Over h al f of these

m en wer e m em ber s of cr ack Ph i l i ppi ne

S cou t u n i ts.s T h e r egu lar s su ff er ed , t oo,

f r om a gen er al l ack of u p-t o-d at e w eapon s

an d equ ipm en t,4 bu t t hey w er e w el l t rai ned

to use what they had.

T he T t’ar Depar tm ent suppor ted M ac-

Ar thur ’s r equests for add i ti onal t r oops

an d su ppl ies t o t he fu ll est exten t possi bl e

i n l igh t of the countr y’s wor ld -w i de com -





C H I NA AND LU ZONT 159

t i on of concr ete bl ockhouses on al l r oads

l ead ing ou t of Sh an ghai .

B oth t he M ad ison an d H ar ti ~on needed

to be conver ted to t r oop use after thei r

ar r ival at Shangh ai , an {d t he fi rst sh ip w as

not r eady unt i l 27 N ovember . By 1600

that date, the M adi son w i th hal f the r egi -

ment and hal f i t s equ i pment on boar d

the r i ver wer e al i ve w i th f l ag-wavi ng

Ch inese as a power l i gh ter took the M a-

r i nes downst r eam to thei r sh i p. At 1400

the H ar ri son weighed anchor and sai l ed

for the Ph i l i ppi nes, mar k i ng the end of a

col or fu l er a i n M ar i ne an nal s.

AS soon as the H am”son cl ear ed the

Whangpoo Ri ver , mach i ne guns wer e



sai led for Ol ongapo. Whi le th i s for war d

echel on, the 2d Bat tal i on and hal f of the

Regi mental H eadquar ter s and Ser vi ce

Com pa ni es, w as l oad i ng ou t, a m essage w as

r ecei ved fr om CinCAF to exped i te the

evacuation. E ven t hou gh t he con ver si on

wor k on the Eation w as t hr ee d ays sh or t

of complet i on , the deci si on was made to

cl ear Shanghai the fol low i ng day w i th the

r est of the r egiment and i ts r emain i ng

equipment.

D espi te t he sh or t n ot ice an d t he h ar ass-

i ng tact i cs of the J apanese, 12 the Regi -

m ental R4 and Quar ter m aster , M ajor

Regi nal d H . Ri dgel y, J r., was abl e to l oad

al l or gan izat i on al gear , over 500 t on s, by

1300 on the 28th. At 0900 that mor n i ng,

the r egi ment assem bl ed at the 1st B at ta-

l i on ’s bi l l et , for med up beh i nd i ts band,

an d m ar ch ed d ow n B ubbl ing Wel l-N ank-

ing Roads to the Pr esi den t L ine’s dock on

br oken out and m anned for an t i ai r cr af t

d ef en se, an d bl ack ou t r egu la ti on s w er e p ut

i nt o eff ect .13 F li gh ts of J apan ese ai r cr aft

checked the l i ner r egu l ar l y as i t moved

out i n to the Ch ina Sea, bu t ther e wer e no

i nci dents, and contact was made on the

29t h w i th su bm ar i ne escor t s d i sp at ch ed by

.Adm i r al H ar t . On 30 N ovem ber and 1

Decem ber the two t r anspor ts ar r i ved at

Ol on gapo w her e t he t roops d isem bar ked .

Onl y a few suppl ies wer e unl oaded at the

n av al st at i on , ost en si v el y beca use C in CA F

h ad i ssu ed or der s t hat th e shi ps m ust pass

th r ough the m ine fi el d i n to M an i l a Bay by

n i gh t fal l on the cl ay of ar r i val . Actual ly,

Adm i r al H ar t had gi ven or al or der s to hi s

staff that the M ar i nes wer e to be l anded

w ith f i el d equi pm ent on l y, because i t was

h is i nt en ti on t hat :

. . . t h ey w ould get in t o t he field, nea r Olon-

ga po, a s soon a s t hey could. We [H a rt a nd his

160 P EARL H ARR OR TO G UAD AL C ANAL

r eady too l ate, however , to r escue the

N or th Ch i na M ar ines. T he J apanese war

pl an s h ad been act ivat ed , an d t he car r ier

task for ce th at w ou ld st r ike Pear l H ar bor

was at sea en r ou te to i t s tar get . T he

t r oops, sh i ps, and pl anes that wou l d be

sen t agai nst t he Ph il i ppi nes w er e con cen -

t r ated at For m osa, the Ryukyus, and the

m ach i ne guns and sever al T om m y guns

and BARs had al r eady been br oken out

of thei r cosm ol ine pack i ng. D espi te thei r

cl esper ate si tuat i on the M ar i nes wer e

r ead y t o f i gh t.

H ui zenga and a J apanese captai n hel d

an ar med par ley w her e the l ieu ten an t w asgi ven t i me t o com mu ni cate t o h is su per ior



Palaus w i th or der s to begi n thei r at tack

on X-Day—8 Decem ber 1941 (M an i l a

T i me) .’5

8 DECEM BER 1941”

When the dawn of the fi r st day of the

Paci fi c War r eached the Ch i na Coast , the

at tack on Pear l H ar bor was over and the

t roops i n t he Ph il ippi nes h ad been al er ted

to thei r danger . At the Ch inwangtao

d ock s, Secon d L i eu ten an t R ich ar d M . H u i-

zenga w as super vi si ng the stockpi li ng of

suppl i es for the expected ar r i val of the

Pr esi den t I ?ar r i son . A t r uck dr i ver

br ought h i m wor d that the r ad i o at h i s

r ai lhead , Cam p H ol com b, w as fu l l of new s

of Pear l H ar bor . A l though the J apanese

m ad e h al f-h ear ted at tem pts t o st op h im on

h i s th r ee-m i l e dr i ve back to the cam p,

H ui zenga was abl e to get th r ough to h i s

at T i en tsi n , M ajor L uther A. B r own, the

en em y’s d em an d t hat h e su rr en der th e d e-

t ach men t. Or der s soon cam e back t o offer

no r esi stance and the M ar i nes wer e

st r i pped of thei r weapons. L ater i n the

day they wer e r etu r ned under J apanese

guar d to the M ar i ne bar r acks at T i en t -

sin.”

T he si tuat i on of the detachm ents at

T i en tsi n and Pei pi ng was sim i l ar to that

of the one at Cam p H ol com b; J apanese

tr oops sur r ounded thei r bar r acks i n

str ength and d em anded thei r sur render .

Si nce t he em bassy gu ar d w as n ot r equ ir ed

to m ain tai n a cont i nuous watch on Cin-

CA F’S com man d” r ad io ci rcu it , ‘8 th e f i rst

w or d t hat th e sen ior M ar in e off i cer , Col o-

nel Wi l l i am W. Ashur st , had of the ou t-

br eak of host i l i ti es cam e fr om the J apa-

nese. H e was gi ven t i l l noon to m ake h i s

C H I NA AND L U ZON 161

Ashurst could h a ve open ed t ire on t he be-

siegers—his men h a d a lrea dy demon -

st ra t ed a t ~ a mp H olcomb tha t t hey w ere

w ill ing t o t a ke on hopeless odds. B ut

t here w a s n o purpose in fight in g if t he en d

result could only be useless bloodsh ed.

I n t h e a bsen ce of in st ruct ions t o t h e con -

t ra ry , C olonel Ashurst t ook t h e on ly sen -

sible course open t o h im a nd order ed his

A cacophony of sound br oke the st i l l -

uess at Ol ongapo w hen the al er t r eached

the naval base at 0350; the bugl er of the

guar d bl ew “Cal l to Ar ms ;“ the steam

w hi st le at t he pow er pl an t bl ast ed a r ecal l

si gnal to PBY cr ewm en; and the sh i p’s

bel l at the main gate cl anged cont i nu-

ousl y.” Compan i es im med iatel y mus-

ter ed i n f r ont of thei r wooden bar racks



men to l ay down thei r ar m s. A str ong

possi bi l i t y exi sted that i f no r esi stance

was offer ed the em bassy guar ds w ou l d be

consi der ed par t of the di pl om at i c en tou-

rage, en t i t l ed to r epatr i at i on . As the

i ni ti al t r eatm ent of the M ar ines was r el a-

t i vel y m il d and they r epeatedl y r ecei ved

i nfor mal assur ances fr om the J apanese

that they wou l d be exchanged, few at-

t em pt ed escape. J JT hen these r um or s

pr oved fal se, the oppor tun i t y had

passed.lg

By the t i me Ashur st ’s r epor t of h i s de-

ci si on to sur r ender r eached H ar t i n M a-

n i l a, the Phi l i ppi nes wer e i n the th i ck of

the war . T he fi r st news of the J apanese

at tack was pi cked up at 0257 by a r ad i o

oper ator at Ci nC.4F H eadquar ter s who,

r ecogni zi ng the techni que of the sender ,

vouched for the r el i abi l i t y of the now

and i n the str eets of ten t ar eas and wer e

put to wor k set t i ng up mach i ne guns for

an ti ai rcr aft defen se and di ggi ng i nd ivi d-

ual pr otect i ve hol es. Col on el H ow ar d

i n i t i ated the fi r st m oves i n what was to be

a hect i c per iod of r ed i sposi ng, r eor gan-

i zi ng, an d r ei nfor ci ng t he r egi men t w hi ch

l ast ed t hr ou gh ou t t he m on th of D ecem ber .

When the 4th M ar i nes ar r i ved fr om

Shan ghai i ts st r ength stood at 44 off i cer s

a nd w ar r an t of fi cer s an d ’728 en l ist ed m en ;

or ga ni c n ava l m ed i cal per son nel r ai sed t he

total st r ength to 804. The r egiment “had

been per mi tted to dw i ndl e by at t r i t i on” 22

i n Chi na so that i t consi sted onl y of H ead-

qu ar ter s Com pan y, Ser vi ce Com pan y, an d

t wo ba tt al i on s—t he ba tt al i on s sh or t on e of

thei r r if l e com pan i es and the com pan i es

each sh or t on e of t hei r t hr ee r i fl e pl at oon s.

B y u t i li zi ng the m em ber s of the r egi men-







CH INA AND LU ZON 165

fen se of th e i sl and nor th of L ingayen Gul f

and was of necessi t y spr ead so th i n that

i t cou l d of fer n o ef fect iv e r esi st a nt e.

T he sam e si tuat i on hel d t r ue i n sou th-

er n L uzon w her e th e d efen di ng for ces, tw o

Ph i l i ppi ne Ar m y d i vi si ons, were com-

pl et el y u nabl e t o cover al l possi bl e l an di ng

beach es. On 12 D ecem ber , w hen a J apan -ese convoy car ryi ng th e ad vance assau lt

detachm en t of the 16th D i vi si on , staged

ar m or pl ate to pr event penet r at i on .)’ 38

T he enem y at tacked agai n on the 13th ,

th is t i me bom bin g fr om al ti tu des beyond

the r ange of the M ar i ne au tom at i c

weapons. T he few h i ts scor ed wer e al l i n

the town of Ol ongapo; ther e was no dam -

age to the naval stat i on and on l y a few

M ar ine casual t i es. T he F i l i pi nos who i g-nor ed th e ai r r ai d w ar ni ng suffer ed heav-

i l y; a bomb hi t r i gh t i n the m i dst of a



f r om t he Pal au s, r each ed L egaspi i n sou th -

easter n L uzon , ther e was noth ing to op-

pose thei r l and i ng. T he t r oops wer e

a sh or e, h ad t ak en t hei r a ir fi el d obj ect ive,

and wer e m oving nor th by n i ght fal l . I n

a ll t her e w er e l ess t ha n 10,000 en em y t r oop s

ashor e at th i s t i m e, but they had beh i ndthem the r est of the Fou r teenth Arm y and

com mand of the SeL Land ai r to i nsur e i ts

a r ri va l on sch ed ul e.

T he heavy ai r at tacks of the 8th and

10th were on l y har bi nger s of fu r ther

a er i al a ssa ul ts. Rei n for ced by Ar m y

fi gh ter s and bomber s oper at i ng fr om

n ew ly-sei zed ai r fi el ds, t he n aval pl an es of

t he F or m osa-based l ?l eu en th AiT FZeetsp rea d ou t ov er L u zon seek in g n ew t ar get s.

T he f i r st tu r n of Ol ongapo and the 4th

M ar i nes cam e on 12 December , the day

that mar ked the end of effect i ve U ’. S. ai r

l ar ge gr oup of townspeopl e who wer e

‘(stand ing un der a t r ee w atch ing the per -

f or m a nce,” 3 7ki l l i ng 22 and woundi ng at

l east as m any m or e. Al though al ar m s

w er e fr equ en t t her eaft er , t he J apan ese d id

not at tack agai n un t i l the 19th and then

thei r ai m was bad and they l i ber al l ypl ast er ed t he bay w it h bom bs.

Du r i ng th i s per iod , wh i l e the or i gi nal

J apan ese l an di ng for ces w er e ad van ci ng

t ow ar d M a ni la, t op-l evel d iscu ssi on s w er e

hel d between H ar t and M acAr thur and

thei r staf fs r egar di ng em pl oym ent of the

4th M ar i nes.’s On 2’0 Decem ber , M ac-

Ar thur for mal l y r equested that the r egi -

m ent be assi gned to h i s com mand “as de-vel opm ents of the N avy pl an can m ake i t

a va i l ab le.” 3 g Adm i r al H ar t concu r r ed

and d i r ected H owar d to r epor t to









170 PE ARL H A RR OR T O Gu AD AL CA NA L

m ach i ne guns and a bat ter y of four 3-i nch

gu ns t ak en fr om Cavi te t o th e an ti ai rcr af t

defenses, bu t the pr imar y funct i on of the

bat tal i on was now that of i n fan t r y. I t

w as r eor gan ized an d r e-equ ipped a t M a ri -

vel es t o fi l l t he r ol e of t he m issi ng bat tal i on

of the 4th M ar ines; the for mal change of

t i t l e to 3d Bat tal i on , 4th M ar i nes cam eon 1 J an uar y.

Wi th the except i on of B at ter i es A and

to som e m en w as the vi si on of a Gi br al tar ,

and they tal ked know i ngl y of the (non-

exi st en t ) i nt ri cat e u nd er gr ou nd syst em of

defenses.54

At 080029 Decem ber , Col onel H ow ar d

r epor ted to Gener al M oor e for or der s as

F or t M i l l s’ beach d efen se com man der an d

t hen st ar ted ou t t o m ak e a r econ nai ssan ce

of the i sl and . H i s men, tem por ar i l y



C and the r adar detachm ent of Adams’

bat tal ion wh i ch r em ai ned on Bataan , the

whol e of the 4th M ar i nes m oved to Cor -

r egi d or i n su ccessi ve ech el on s on t h e n i gh t s

of 27 and 28 Decem ber . Enough r at i ons

for 2,000 m en for si x m onths, ten un i ts

of f i r e for al l weapons, two year s suppl yof sum m er khak i , and the med i ci nes and

equ ipm en t t o ou tf i t a 100-bed h ospi tal ac-

com pan i ed the m ove. F or tunatel y, the

Qu ar ter m ast er , M a jor Ri dgel y, d isper sed

t hese su ppl i es i n sm al l , scat ter ed d um ps as

th ey ar r ived an d th ey em er ged r el at i vel y

u nscat hed fr om t he f i rst J apan ese ai r r ai d

on Cor reg i dor .

M any of the M ar i nes i n the bam boojungl es sur round i ng M ar ivel es, who had

to sh ift cam p con st an tl y t o avoi d bom bi ng

an d sl eep “on the gr ound near a foxhol e or

quar ter ed i n M idd l esi de Bar racks, wer e

star tl ed to hear the ai r r ai d si r ens sound

shor t l y befor e noon. N o one pai d too

m uch at ten t i on to them as Cor regi dor had

never been bom bed, bu t soon thei r t r ust-

i ng at t i tude changed. “Al l hel l br oke

l oose,” and as one 1st B at tal i on off i cer

d escr i bed t he scen e, “t her e w e w er e—t he

whol e r egi ment f l at on our bel l i es on the

l ower deck of M idd l esi de B ar racks.” 55

T he J apan ese pl an es, 40 bom ber s of t he

5th Ai r Gr oup w i th 19 cover i ng fi gh ter s,

at tacked at 1154. For the next hour a

par ade of Ar my ai r cr aft f l ew the l ong

axi s of Cor r egi dor d roppi ng 200- an d 500-

pound bom bs fr om 18,000 fr et , and d i vebomber s at tacked the ant i ai r cr af t bat -

ter ies, st r af i ng as t hey pl unged down. .& t

1300, the Ar my pl anes gave way to the









B ATAAN P RE LU DE 175

T H E .N A VAL BA T T AL ZON ‘

A lth ou gh th e far th est d istan ce fr om th e

r ear boundar ies of the cor ps ar eas to the

souther n shor e of Bataan was on l y ten

m il es, t he d efen si ve pr obl em faci ng B ri g-

ad ier C~en er al A ll an C. M cB r id e’s Ser vi ce

Com mand was acu te. J $’i th a r el at i vel yfew m en M cBr i de had to guar d over 40

m il es of r ough, jungl e-cover ed coast l ine

cr ewm en fr om the subm ar i ne tender

Can opu s, 80 sai lor s f r om t he Cavi te N aval

Amm uni t i on Depot , and 120 gener al

du ty m en fr om Cavi te and M ar i vel es.

H e was al so assi gned appr oxim atel y 120

M ar i nes, m em ber s of Bat ter i es A and C

whi ch had r em ai ned beh i nd on B ataan

under naval con t r ol when the r est of the

1st Separ ate B at tal i on (now 3/ 4 ) had

m oved t o Cor r egi d or .



agai nst enem y at tack . A successfu l am -

ph ibi ou s t hr ust w hi ch cu t t he vi tal coastal

suppl y r oad cou l d m ean the pr om pt end

of the bat t l e for 13ataan . To pr otect the

east coast he had the new ly-or gan i zed 2d

(Constabu l ar y) D i vi si on ; on the west

coast he had a m ot l ey com posi te for ce ofser vi ce t r oop s a nd p la nel ess p ur su i t squ ad -

r ons conver ted to i nfan tr y, backed up by

a few el ements of the 71st D i vi si on and

a Con st abu lar y r egi men t. Respon si bi l it y

for th e secur i ty of the n aval r eser vat i on

at M ar ivel es r em ai ned w i th the N avy.

I n or der to pr ovi de pr otect i on for

M ar i ve]es and suppor t the Ar m y i n the

defense of the west coast , Adm ir al Rock -wel l on 9 J anuar y d i r ected Captai n J ohn

H . S. I )essez, com mander of the sect i on

base. to for m a naval bat tal ion for gr ound

T he m en of F i rst L ieu tenant Wi ll i am F.

H ogaboom ’s Bat ter y A had or i gi nal l y

been sl at ed t o pr ovi de r epl acem en t an d r e-

l i ef gun cr ews for Bat ter y C (F i r st L ieu-

tenant Wr i l l ar d C. H ol dr edge ) whose 3-

i nch guns wer e set up i n a r i ce paddy

between the town of M ar i vel es and the

sect i on base. But on 5 J anuar y H oga-

boom had r ecei ved i nst r uct i ons fr om a

U SA FF E st aff off i cer , “appr oved by n aval

au thor i t i es on the ‘Rock ’,” G to move h i s

un i t to the si te of M acAr thur ’s advance

CP on B ataan wher e the M ar i nes wer e

to fu r n i sh the i n ter i or guar d . T h i s as-

si gn men t w as sh or t-l ived , h ow ever , si nce

Com mander Br i dget needed the m en to

ser ve as t act ical i nst ru ct or s an d cad r es for

the naval bat tal ion , and on 14 J anuar y he

176 PE ARL H A RB OR T O GU AD AL CA NA L

. . . perh a ps t w o-t h irds of t he sa ilors kuew

w h ich en d of t h e r ifle should be pr esen t ed t o

t h e en emy, a nd h a d even pra ct iced on a t a rget

r a nge, but field t ra in in g w as pra ct ica lly a closed

book t o t h em. Th e exper ien ced Ma rin es w er e

sprea d t hinly t hr oughout ea ch compa ny in h ope

th at t hr ough precept a nd exa mple, t heir qua lit ies

w ould be a ssimila t ed by t h e rests

E ven a ft er t h e forma t ion of t he na va l

ba t t a lion, t h e pr ima ry responsibili t y for

a n t ia ircra ft defen se of M ar i vel es st i l l

oped an d fi xed Par ker ’s d efen ses an d w er e

pr obi ng for weak spots pr epar ator y to an

al l -ou t a ssau l t. I t was i nevi tabl e that

th ey fou nd th e open an d h igh ly vu ln er abl e

l ef t f l ank. By 22 J anuar y Par ker ’s posi -

t i on al on g t he sl opes of M t . N at i b h ad been

t ur n ed an d al l r eser ves w it h t he except ion

of one r egim ent had been com m i t ted tocon tai n the penetr at i on . I n or der to pr e-

ven t the defend i ng for ces fr om bei ng cu t



r ested w ith th e M ar ine bat ter ies and on l y

a r el at ivel y f ew men , m ost ly h TCO’s, cou ld

be spar ed to hel p t r ai n the bl uejacket

com pan i es. H ol d r edge’s 3-i nchen r e-

qu i r ed at l east skel eton cr ews and H oga -

boom ’s un i t , af ter i t s r etu r n fr om

L ’SAFFE con tr ol , was d i r ected to m ount

and m an n i ne .50 cal i ber m ach i ne-gun

posts i n the h i l l s ar ound the har bor .

T her efor e, i n bot h bat t er ies t he m aj or i ty,

of m en avai labl e for gr ound com bat wer e

sai lor s; Bat ter y A joi ned one of f i cer and

65 bl uejackets on 16-1’7 ,T anuar y and a

N avy othcer and 40 m en joi ned H ol -

d r edge’s bat ter y on the 18th and 19th?

T hr ough out th e n aval bat tal ion , t r ai ni ng

w as con fi ned t o fu nd am en tal s as B ri dget

st r ove to qual i fy h i s m en as i n fan t r y. AS

w as the case so of ten i n the Ph i li ppi nes,

of f, U SAFFE or der ed a gener al w i th -

d r awal to the Bagac-Or ion defense l i ne,

to be com pl eted by the 26th .

T he enem y advanci ng al ong the m oun-

tai nous west coast d i d not con tact Gen-

er al J $r ai nw r igh t’s f or w ar d posi ti on s u nt il

15 ,J anuar y. By that date, H om ma, im -

pr essed by the l ack of r esi stance i n th i s

sector , had al ready or der ed the 2(W I n -

~an tr y of the 16th D i vi si on to r ei n for ce

and expl oi t the dr i ve, st r i ke th r ough to

th e B agac r oad junct i on , and gai n th e r ear

of Pa r ker )s cor p s. A l though I Cor ps had

been st r i pped of r eser ves to back up the

sagg i ng eastern defense l i ne, Wainw r i ght ’sf r on t-l in e t roops w er e abl e t o st an d off t he

i ni ti al J apan ese assau lt s. Wh en H om m a’s

f r esh t r oop s a tt ack ed on t he 21st , h ow ever ,







180 PE ARL H A RROR T O GU AD il L CA N AL

oskaw ayan had been counted . B ri dget ’s

un i t had l ost 11 k i l l ed and 26 wounded i n

act ion ; th e Scou t casu al ti es w er e 11 d ead

and 27 wounded; and the J apanese had

l ost t hei r en ti r e l an di ng for ce.

Dur ing the next few days patr ol s, ai ded

by shi p’s l aunches ar mor ed and m anned

by cr ew men fr om the Canopu-s, m opped

up the ar ea, k i ll ing st r aggl er s and tak i ng

a few pr i soner s, bu t the th r eat to M ar i -

th e J apan ese offen si ve spu tt er ed t o a h al t

i n fr on t of the Bagac-Or i on l i ne. T he

i n i ti al enem y advance on B ataan had not

been m ad e w it hou t cost , ,an d th e casu al ty

r ate now soar ed so h i gh that the at tack -

i ng t r oops wer e r ender ed i nef fect i ve. On

13 Febr uar y H om ma found i t necessar y

to br eak con tact , pu l l back to a l i ne of

bl ock i ng posi ti on s, an d to r egr ou p h is bat-

ter ed for ces. T he l u l l i n the Fm wteenz%



vel es was ended. Sim i l ar act i on by ade-

quatel y suppor ted Scout un i ts w i ped out

the Quinauan Poi n t l and i ng for ce by 7

Febr uar y. T he major J apanese at tem pt

to r ei n for ce the bel eaguer ed t r oops on

Quinauan was beaten back by the com-

bi ned f i re of ar ti ll er y, naval guns, and the

st r afi ng of the four P40’s r em ain i ng on

B ataan . E lem ents of an enem y bat tal ion

wh i ch d i d get ashor e on a poi n t of l and

just above Qui nauan on 27 J anuar y and

2 Febr uar y wer e al so f i n i shed off by the

scouts.

B y 13 Febr uar y the l ast sur vi vor s of the

amph ibi ous at tem pts had been ki l led or

captured. T he m ak e-sh ift beach d efen se

for ces wh i ch had i n i t i al l y con tai ned the

l an di ngs h ad bar el y m an aged t o h ol d t hei r

Ar my’s at tack was on l y tempor ar y, how-

ever , as H om ma was pr om i sed r epl ace-

m en ts an d r ei nfor cem en ts. When the

second phase of the bat t l e for Bataan

opened, the scal es wer e heavi ly t i pped i n

favor of t he J apan ese.

T he detachm ent of Canopus cr ewm en,

the sai lor s fr om the Cavi te N aval Am mu-

n i ti on D epot , and the m ajor it y of the gen-

er al du ty m en, n i ne off i cer s and * 27 en-

l i sted m en in al l , wer e tr ansfer red to the

4th M ar ines on Cor regi dor on 17-18 Feb-

ruary . Com man der B ri dget an d h is n aval

avi at ion con ti ngen t m oved t o F or t H u gh es

on the 30th wher e Br idget became beach

d efen se com man der w ith M aj or St uar t W.

K ing of the 4th M ar ines as h i s execu t i ve

off i cer . Bat ter y C of 3/ 4 r em ained at







CH APT ER 3

The Siege and Capture of Corregidor

T H E J APAA7ESE PL AN fl ‘

On 9 A pr i l t he vi ct or iou s F ou rteen th

Am y paused on the shor e of I %taan w i th

pl an . I n m id-Apr i l a sever e ou tbr eak of

m alar ia i n the r anks of the .@h Di vi si on ,

H om m a’s ch osen . l an di ng for ce, sever el y

ham per ed at tack pr epar at i ons, bu t am -



i t s n ext t ar get .—Cor r egi d or —d ea d cen ter

i n i t s si gh ts. M any enem y staf f off i cer s,

both i n T okyo and on L uzon, wanted to

l aun ch an i mm edi ate am ph i bi ous at tack ,

tak i ng advantage of the ar my’s success

on B at aa n. T he dear th of l and i ng cr aft

i n M a ni l a B ay, h ow ever , ef fect ivel y ser ved

to postpone the oper at i on . M ost of the

.J apanew l and i ng bar ges and boats w er e

l ocated i n L i ngayen Gul f or Subi c Bay

and had to he m oved past Cor regi dor ’s

guns to the desi gnated stagi ng ar eas on

the easter n coast of Bataan . (See M ap

8, M a p Sect ion )

On the n i gh t of 14 Apr i l the fi r st sm al l

gr oup of boats sl ipped by T he Rock , hug-

gi ng B ataan ’s shor e wh i l e the enem y

shel l ed and bom bed the i sl and ’s nor th

p hi bi ou s t r ai n i n g a n d r eh ea r sa l s con t i nu ed

despi te the tem por ar y decr ease i n the

d ivi si on ’s eff ect ive st ren gt h. E mer gen cy

suppl ies of qu i n i ne tabl ets wer e fl own to

L uzon i n t im e to check the spr ead of the

d isease an d r estor e fi gh ti ng t ri m.T he Four teen th Ar my was obsessed, w i th

the need for decept i on and secr ecy and

st r ingen t secur i t y m easur es w er e taken

t o con ceal t he pr epar at ion s for th e at tack

on C or r egi d or . A consi sten t effor t was

m ad e to cr eate t he i mpr essi on th at Cavi te

Pr ovi nce w as the J apan ese am ph i bi ous

base and that For ts F r ank and D r um wer e

the tar gets. L and i ng cr af t m aneuver edoff Cavi te’s shor es wh i l e the ar my’s ai r

and ar ti l l er y pou nded the defenses of the

souther n i sl ands. Two bat tal i ons of the

TH E S I E G E AND CAP TU RE OF C ORRE G I D OR 185

i sl an d’s d efen ses.s N in e J apan ese bom b-

i ng squ ad ron s, ca pi tal i zi ng on t he gr ad ua l

w eak en in g of an ti ai rcr af t f i re, w er e over -

head to add thei r bom bar dm ent to the at -

t ack p r ep ar a ti on .

T h e en em y Jth Divt i ion was rein forced

for the assau l t w i th two i ndependen t en -

gi neer r egi m ents to m an the t r anspor t

and suppor t l and i ng cr aft as wel l as

a tank r egi m ent and th r ee m or tar bat -

tal ion s to pr ovi de ad di ti onal f i repow er .

an te of Sate’s un i t wh i ch w as schedu l ed

to m ak e a con cur rent at tack agai nst Ram -

say Bat ter y h i l l . T hr oughou t the whol e

oper at i on the ar t i l l er y on Bataan , op-

er at i ng u nd er ar my con tr ol , w as to d el iver

pr epar ator y and suppor ti ng t i r es, and i n

dayl igh t hou r s the ar my’s ai r squad r ons

w er e t o f l y cl ose su ppor t m issi on s,

T he _@h Divi sion had th r ee i nfant r y

bat tal ion s i n r eser ve for i ts at tack but d id

not expect th at th ey w ou ld be need ed. T he



T he actual l and i ng oper at i on was to be

m ade i n two stages w i th Col onel Gem -

p ach i Sa te’s 6 1st Z n fa n .t r y R e@r n en t ( two

i n fant r y bat tal i ons, a tank com pany, a

m oun tai n ar t i l l er y bat ter y, and m or tar

u ni ts) d esi gn at ed t he i ni ti al assau lt for ce.

Sato was to l and h i s un i t i n successi ve

w aves, bat tal i ons a b r e as t al ong the

beaches betw een I nfant r y and Caval r y

Poi n ts on the n i gh t of 5 M ay. After es-

t ab li sh i ng a bea ch h ea d, h e w as t o sen d m ost

of h i s m en agai nst M al i n ta H i l l wh i l e the

r em ai nd er of th e r egi men t d rove acr oss t he

tai l of th e i sl and to i sol ate an d con tai n the

defender s east of I n fan t r y Poi n t . T he

pl an cal l ed for the 61st Regi m en t to be i n

possessi on of M al in ta H i l l by d aw n, r ead y

t o su pp or t a secon d l an di ng.

J ap an ese w er e con fi den t t ha t t hei r pr epa r-

ator y bom bar dm en t had knocked m ost of

the f i gh t out of Cor r egi dor . Ever y ter -

r ai n featu re on th e i sl an d w as pl ot ted an d

r egi ster ed on ar t i l l er y tar get m aps and

any si gnal for suppor t fr om the assau l t

for ces wou l d cal l down a sm other of ac-

cur ate f i r e on the defender s. T he enem y

fel t cer tai n that dusk of 7 M ay wou ld see

thei r assau l t t r oops i n con t r ol of Cor -

regidor.

L I FE OAT A BU L L ’S EYE 4

Dur i ng the 27 days between the fal l of

Bataan and the assau l t on Cor r egi dor ,l i fe on T he Rock becam e a l i vi ng hel l . T he

m en i n the open gun pi t s and exposed

b ea ch d ef en ses w er e su bj ect ed t o a n i n cr ea s-



TH E S I E G E AND C AP TU RE OF C ORRE G I D OR 18’7

i sl and by dayl i gh t ; enem y ar ti ll er y spot -

ter s al oft i n obser vat i on bal l oons on Ba-

taan and i n pl anes over head had a cl ear

vi ew of thei r tar gets. T he dense vegeta-

t i on whi ch had once cover ed m ost of Cor -

r egi dor w as st r i pped aw ay by bl ast and

fr agm en tat ion t o r evea l t he d isp osi ti on s of

H ow ar d’s com man d. T he t un nel s th rou ghM al i nta H i l l , thei r l ater al s cr owded w i th

h ead qu ar ter s i nstal lat i ons an d hospi tal

beds, offer ed r efu ge for on ly a fr act i on of

st ain ed fr om per spir at ion a nd dirt . Th ei r g a un t ,

un sha ven fa ces w er e st ra ined a nd ema cia t ed.

S ome of t h em w ere a lrea dy suffer in g from beri-

ber i a s a result of a st a rva flon diet of rice for

w eeks. We did w ha t w e could for t h em a n d t hen

put t hem t o w ork on t h e bea ch defenses.’

The sa ilors from Ma riveles, most ly

crew men from t he now -scut t led Cizn.opus,wer e kept together and for med i n to a new

275-m an r eser ve bat tal i on for the r egi -

m en t , the 4th Bat tal i on , 4th M ar i nes.a



the 11,000-m an gar r i son and the r est of

the defender s had to st i ck i t ou t ~i th l i t t l e

hope of pr otect i on fr om th e d ead ly dow n-

pour .

M ost of the escapees fr om Bataan wer e

or der ed to joi n the 4th M ar ines, thus add -i ng 72 off i cer s an d 1,173 en li sted m en to i ts

st r ength between 9 and 12 Apr i l .5 T he

m ajor i ty of the Ar my com bat veter ans,

h ow ever , “w er e i n su ch poor ph ysi cal con -

d i t i on that they wer e i ncapabl e of even

l i gh t wor k ,” ‘ an d h ad to be h ospi tal ized .

T he m i xed col lect ion of i nfa nt ry, a rt il l er y,

avi at ion , an d ser vi ce per son nel fr om both

Am er ican an d Ph il ippi ne u ni ts assi gn ed t oth e beach defen se bat tal ions w as i n l it t l e

bet ter shape than the m en who had been

com mi tted to the hospi tal under M al i n ta

N ot on l y was the desi gnat i on of 4/ 4 un-

usual , bu t so was i ts m akeup and i t s per -

sonnel. On l y si x M ar i nes ser ved i n the

bat tal ion : i ts com mand er , M ajor F r an ci s

H . Wi l l i am s, and f i ve N COS. T he staff ,

com pany com mand er s, and pl atoon l ead -

er s wer e d r awn fr om the n i ne Arm y and 18

N a vy of fi cer s a ssi gn ed t o a ssi st W il l ia ms.g

T he fou r r i f l e com pan ies w er e d esi gn ated

Q, R, S, and T , the h i ghest l et ter ed com -

pan i es the m en had ever hear d of. An -

oth er boast of th e bl uejackets tu rned M a-

r in es w as th at th ey w er e ‘the h i gh est pai d

bat tal i on i n the wor ld , as m ost of the m en

‘ Jenk ins ,~~.

* Most su r vi vor s of 4/ 4 r ef er t o t he ba tt al i on



TH E S IE G E AND CAP TU RE OF C ORRE G I D OR 189

an u t ter d i sr egar d for h i s own safety i n

the face of any need for h i s pr esence.

Sur vi vor s of h i s bat tal i on agr ee w i th

star t l i ng unan i m i ty that he was a gi an t

am ong m en at a t i m e when cou r age w as

commonplace.

R aw cou rage w as a n ecessi ty on t he for ti -

f i ed i sl an ds a ft er B at aa n’s fal l , si nce t her e

was no defi l aded posi t i on that cou l d not

be r each ed by ,J apa nese 240m m h ow it zer s

fi r i ng fr om Cavi te and Bataan . T he

There w ere ma n y more ca sua lt ies th a n w e ha d

suffer ed in t he pr eviou s five m on th s.la

About th r ee days pr ior to the J apanese

l an di ng, L ieuten an t Col onel B eecher r e-

por ted to Col onel H ow ar d th at d efen si ve

i nstal lat ion s i n th e 1st B at tal ion % sector

were:

,.. p r act i ca l ly d est r oy ed . V er y l i t tl e d ef en -si v e w i r e r em a i ned , t a n k t r a ps con st r u ct ~ w i t h

great di f f i cul tyhad been rendered useless, and al l

my weaponsw ere in temporary emplacementsas

t he or i g i nal emp l acemen t s had been dest r oyed .



bom ber s over head , i ncr easi ngl y bol d as

gu n af ter gu n of the an ti ai rcr aft d efen ses

w as knocked ou t, cam e d ow n l ow er to pi n-

poi nt tar gets. Counter bat ter y and an t i -

ai r cr aft t ir e si len ced som e en em y gu ns an d

accoun ted for a num ber of pl anes, bu t

noth i ng seem ed to hal t the bu i l dup of

p r ep ar a tor y f i r es.

On 28 Apr il H owar d i ssued a war ni ng to

h i s bat tal i ons that the next day w ou l d be

a r ough one. I t was the Em per or ’s bi r th -

d ay an d th e J apan ese cou ld be expected t o

“cel ebr ate by u nu su al aer ia l an d ar ti l l er y

bombardment.”’4 T h e col on el ’s p r op h ecy

pr oved to be a t r ue on e, an d on th e 29th on e

obser ver n oted t hat even “th e k itch en si nk

cam e over .”’5 T he bi rth day cel ebr at i on

I tol d Col on el H ow ar d at th i s t i me th at I w as

ver y dub i ousas t o my abi l i t y t ow i t hst anda l and -

i nga t t ack i n f or ce. Col onel Howard repor t ed t hef act s t o Genera l Wai nw r i gh t, who, accord i ng t o

C ol on el H ow ar d , sa id t h at h e w ou l d n ev er su r -

r en d er . I p oi n ted ou t t o Col on el H ow ar d t ha t I

h a d sa id not hing a bout surren der but tha t I w a s

merely report ing t h e fa ct s a s it w a s my dut y

t o d o?f

T he i ncr ease i n th e fur y of th e J apan ese

bom bar dm ent w i th the com i ng of M ay,

coupl ed w i th the fr equent . si gh t i ngs of

l and i ng cr aft al ong the easter n shor e of

B ataan , cl ear ly poi nt ed to th e i mm in en ce

of an enem y l and i ng at tem pt . T he l ast

successfu l effor t t o evacu ate per son nel

fr om the i sl and for t s was m ade on the

n i ght of 3 M ay. T he subm ar ine Spear t sh

190 P EARL H AR B OR TO G UAD ALC AATAL

sen t ou t thei r r egim ental jour nal , i ts l ast

en t r y, dated2 M ay, the l ist of the fi ve m en

who had been ki ll ed and the n i ne who had

been ~vou nd ed d ur i ng t he d ay’s bom bar d-

ment.

T o one of the l ucky few who got or del s

to l eave on the A’pear $sh the r eced i ng i s-

l and l ooked “beaten and bu r n t to acr isp.>’ lD I n one day, 2 M ay, U SF I P est i -

m ated that 12 240mm shel l s a m inu te had

fal len on Cor reg-i dor dur ing a fi ve-hour

r ed uced . Casu al ti es m ou nt ed as t he m en ’s

f oxh ol es, t r en ch es, a nd sh el t er s cr u m bl ed

l mder th e fi re. L -n i t l eader s check i ng the

st rr te of t he d efen ses w er e especi al ly vu l-

ner abl e to the fr agments of steel wh i ch

sw ept the gr ound bar e. B y the J apanese-

i tppoi nted X-Day (5 M ay) the 1st Bat tal -

i on h ad l ost th e com man der of Com pan y A ,

M ajor H ar r y C. I .ang, and Captai n Pau l

A. B r own, com m and i ng Com pany B , had

been h ospi tal i zed as a r esu lt of sever e con -



per i od . On the sam e day the ,J apanese

fl ew 55 sor ti es over the i sl ands dr oppi ng

12 1,000-pound, 45 500-pound, and 159

200-pound bom bs.’” T he dam age w as ex-

t ensi ve. Bat ter y Gear y’s ei gh t 12-i nch

m or tar s w er e com pl et el y d estr oyed as w ason e of B at ter y Cr ock et t’s t wo 12-i nch gu ns.

T he enem y fi re al so knocked ou t of act i on

two mor e 12-i nch m or tar s, a 3-i nch gun,

th r ee sear ch l igh ts, f i ve 3-i nch and th ree

.50 cal iber an ti ai rcr af t gu ns, an d a h ei gh t

f i nder . Data tr ansm i ssi on cabl es to the

guns wer e cu t i n m any pl aces an d al l com -

~nun i cat i on l i nes wer e damaged. T he

beach defenses l ost four m ach i ne guns, a

37m nl , and a pi ll box; bar bed w i r e., m i ne

fi el ds, an d r m~i boat obstacl es w er e tor n

cu ssi on su ff er ed d ur i ng a n en em y bom bi n g

at tack .” T hr ee Ar my off i cer s at tached to

th e Reser ve Com pany, an off i cer of Com -

pany B , and another of Com pany D had al l

been severel y wounded .D espi te t he d am age t o d efen ses i t h ad so

l abor iou sl y con st ru ct ed , t he 4t h M ar in es

w as r eady, i ndeed al most eager , to m eet a

,J apan ese assau lt af t er d ays an d w eeks of

absor bi ng pu ni sh men t w it hou t a ch an ce t o

str ike back . On the eve of a bat t l e -wh i ch

n o on e d ou bted w as com ing, t he r egi men t

w as per haps th e m ost u nu su al M ar in e u ni t

ever to take the fi el d . F r om an under -

st r ength two-bat tal i on r egi ment of l ess

than 800 M ar i ne r egu l ar s i t had gr own





TH E S I E G E AND C AP TU RE OF C ORR E G I D OR 193

pl an m i scar r i ed , and for a wh i l e i t . was

t ou ch an d go for th e assau lt t r oops.

T he ar t i l ler y sh oot w en t off on sch ed ul e,

bu t Sat e’s f i r st w aves, t ran spor t i ng m ost of

h i s IstBat ta l ion, w er e car r ied by an u nex-

pect ed ly st ron g i ncom i ng t id e h un dr ed s of

yar d s t o t he east of t he d esi gn at ed l an di ng

beaches. Gu i des i n the oncom ing cr aftw er e u nabl e t o r ecogn ize l an dm ar ks i n th e

dar kness, and fr om water l evel the tai l of

the i sl and l ooked mar ked l y un i for m as

Sate, who l anded w i th the fi r st waves,

sor el y n eeded h is gd Battal ion’s strength.

T hi s st r aggl ing bat tal ion w hi ch began

head i ng shor ewar d abou t m idn i gh t su f-

fer ed m uch m or e dam age than the fi r st

w aves. T he r em ai ni ng coast d efen se gun s

and mor tar s on Cor regi dor , backed up by

the f i r e of For ts H ughes and D r um ,chur ned the channel between B ataan and

Cor regi dor i nto a sur gi ng fr oth , wh ipped

by shel l fr agm ents and expl osi ons, T he



sm oke and dust r ai sed by the shel li ng ob-

scu red th e sh or el in e. T he 61at Regiment’s

2d B at tal ion , sl ated to fol low cl ose on the

h eel s of t he Ist,w as d el ayed a nd d i sr u pt ed

by fau l ty boat hand l ing and t i de cur ren ts

un t i l i t cam e i n wel l ou t of posi t i on andunder the fu l l l i gh t of the moon.

When the J apanese pr epar ator y f i r es

l if ted shor tl y after 2300, the t r oops al ong

t he E ast Sector beach es spot ted t he scat -

ter ed l and i ng cr af t of the I st Bat t& ion ,

61st head i ng i n for the beaches at N or th

Poi n t . T he few r em ain i ng sear ch l i gh ts

i ll um inated the bar ges, and the i sl and ’s

tai l er upted w i th f i r e. Enemy ar t i l l er yk nock ed ou t t he sear ch l igh ts a lm ost a s soon

as they showed them sel ves; bu t i t made

l it t l e d i ffer ence, si nce st r eam s of t r acer

m oon ’s stead y l igh t r eveal ed m an y d ir ect

h i ts on bar ges and showed heavi l y bur -

dened enem y sol d i er s st r uggl i ng i n the

water and si nk i ng under the weigh t of

thei r packs and equ i pm ent . St i l l , som e

m en r eached shor e and Colonel Sato wasabl e to or gan i ze a dr ive towar d h i s objec-

t ive, M al in ta H i ll .

I n di vi du al en em y sol di er s an d m ach in e-

gu n cr ew s i nf il tr at ed acr oss K i nd ley F iel d

and th r ough the r ubbl e of tor n bar bed

w ir e, bl asted t r ees, an d, cr ater -pocked

gr ound to D enver B at ter y, a sandbagged

ant i ai r cr aft gun posi ti on wh i ch stood on

r el at i vel y h i gh gr ound south of Caval ryPoint. T he Am er i can gunner s, whose

weapons wer e out of act i on as a r esu l t of

t he bom ba rd m en t, w er e u na bl e t o beat back


br ought up some m en to establ i sh a l i ne

“al on g t he h ogsback t o pr even t t he en em y

fr om com ing dow n on the backs of the m en

on the beaches. ;> 30

Pi ckup cam e up shor tl y af ter Gunner

F er rel l got h i s m en i nto posi ti on and con-

si der ed pu l l in g L i eu ten an t H ar r is’ pl at oon

out of i t s beach defenses to l aunch an

at tack agai nst t he en em y. After a con-

fer ence w i th H ar r i s the company com -

m ander deci ded to l eave the 1st Pl atoon

i n posi t i on . ,J a pan ese l an di n g cr af t w er e

th i s t i me or how- m any casual ti es the 61st

Zn~an .t r y’s assau l t compan i es had su f fered ,

bu t i t was pl ai n that the enemy at Denver

B at ter y ou tnum ber ed the sm al l for ce tr y-

i ng t o con tai n t hem , an d ,J apan ese sn iper s

an d i nf i lt rat i ng gr ou ps soon began t o cr op

u p i n t he. r ear of Pi cku p’s posi ti on .

T he si tu at i on cl ear ly cal led for th e com -

m it men t of ad di ti on al m en i n t he E ast Sec-

tor . Col onel H ow ar d had m ade pr ovi si on

for th i s soon af ter get t i ng wor d of the

l an di n g a tt em pt . H e a ler t ed S ch aef fer ’s



st i l l com i ng i n , and the pl atoon ’s w i th -

d raw al w ou ld l eave sever al h un dr ed yar ds

of beach open. T he fact that enemy

t r oops wer e ashor e had been com muni -

cat ed t o L i eu ten an t Col onel B eech er ’s CP

j ust i n si d e M a l iu ta T u nn el ’s east en tr an ce,

and sm al l gr oups of m en, a squad or so at

a t im e, wer e com ing LI p to bu i l d on the

l i ne i n f r on t of Denver Bat ter y. T he

en em y n ow f ir ed h i s m ach i ne gu ns st ea di l y,

an d i nt er m it ten t bu t h eavy sh el l f i r e st ru ck

al l al ong the r oads fr om M al i n ta to Den-

ver . Casu al ti es w er e sever e th rou gh ou t

t he ar ea.

B y 0130 su rvi vi ng el em en ts of 1/ 4 on t he

easter n t i p of the i sl and w er e cu t off com -

pl etel y fr om the r est of the bat tal i on .

com man d of tw o com pan ies fi rst , bu t h el d

off com mi t t i ng Wi l l i am s’ bat tal ion un t i l

the si tuat i on cl ar i f i ed i t sel f. T her e was

n o gu ar an tee t hat t he ,J apan ese w ou ld ac-

com modate the 4th M ar ines by l and i ng al l

thei r t r oops i n the E ast Sector ; i n fact ,

ther e w as a gener al bel ief am ong th e m en

m an ni ng th e d efen ses w hi ch com man ded

the r avi nes l ead i ng to T opsi de that the

East Sector l and i ng was not the main

effor t an d t hat th e en em y w ou ld be com ing

i n agai nst West and M idd l e Sector

beach es.3] Com pl icat in g t he en ti re pr ob-l em of com man d i n t he con fused si tu at ion

dur i ng the ear ly mor n i ng hour s of 6 M ay

was the fact that , onl y r unner s cou l d get



196

the fl ar es was r igh t , and Fer guson ’s pl a-

toon was for tunate i n tak i ng i ts shel li ng i n

an ar ea w her e t he J apan ese h ad pr ovi ded

deep bom b cr ater s. T he pl atoon cam e

thr ough w i th on l y ei gh t casual t i es. As

soon a s t he bom ba rd m en t l i ft ed , F er gn son

m oved tow ar d D enver un t i l he w as for ced

to depl oy by heavy m ach i ne-gun and m or -tar f i r e. H e l ooked for the 3d Platoon to

com e u p on h i s r igh t accor di ng to pl an , bu t

on l y i ts com mander , Quar ter master Ser -

geant J ohn E . H ask i n , and f i ve m en ap-


Ma ny close fr ien ds died th a t morn in g in

t h e da rkness a n d choking dust a s t h e J a p-

a n ese a nd t h e America ns a n d Filipinos

fa ced ea ch ot h er from posit ions less t ha n

for t y ya rds a pa r t . S ome men cut off be-

h in d t h e en em y lin es st ill kept fir in g a t

occa sion a l la n ding cra ft th a t w ere comin g

in t o reinforce sa te. H oga boom could seet h e t ra cers of a single .50 ca liber a nd felt

th a t “t he bullet s sma cking int o t h e a r mor

of t h e ba rges sounded like r ivet ha mmers

ra t t ling a w a y.” % 13very movemen t of t he



pear ed , th e r est h ad been l ost i n t he sh el l-

i ng. Capt ai n Ch am ber s sen t u p t he r eser ve

pl atoon , wh i ch was i n even wor se shape,

havi ng been caugh t i n the open near the

tunnel en t r ance. Quar ter m aster Cl er kH er m an L . Snel l i ngs had on l y four sur -

\ ,i vor s a li ve a nd u nw ou nd ed .

Com pany O now contai ned bu t one pl a-

toon an d had not yet m ade i ts at tack .

M a jor S ch aef fer est abl i sh ed con tr ol over

the scat ter ed gr oups of m en fr om the 1st

Bat tal i on and the r eser ve and l aunched

t h r ee sep ar a t e cou n ter a tt ack s on t h e d u g-i n

J apanese. Som et i mes th e m en w ou l d getup the sl opes l ead i ng to the bat ter y gun

pi ts, bu t they wer e always dr iven back ,

J apa n ese bot a t s w h ich st ood in n umber off-

shore w a s coun t ed a s a n a t t empt a t la n d-

ing, a lt hough ma n y of t hem w ere impro-

vised gun boa t s w h ose mission w a s pr ot ect -

in g a n d support in g t h e la n din g cra ft . B ut

det a ch men t s of S a t e’s force kept coming in

a ll n ight , a n d on e en emy lieut en a n t , prob-

a bly a member of one of the 61.~t’support -

i ng un i ts, gave a vi vi d descr i pt i on of the

hel pl ess feel i ng of the m en i n the bar ges

as they wer e caught i n Cor regi dor ’s f i r e:

America n h igh pow er ed ma ch in e gun s pour ed

a st rea m of bullet s on us from a ll direct ion s.

Rifle fire a dded t o t h e ha il of dea t h . Our men

w ho w er e h uddled in t he cent er of t he boa t w er e

a ll eit her kil led or w oun ded. Th ose w ho clun g

t o t h e sides w ere hit by sh ells t ha t pierced t h e

TH E S I E G E AND CAP TU RE OF C ORRE G I D OR 197

f i r epow er of the Denver posi t i on . Each

at t ack by Sch aeffer js m en th in ned t he M a-

r in e l in e st i l l m or e, L ost w er e off i cer s an d

N (2OS whose l eader sh i p w as vi tal t o the

oper at i ons of m i xed un i ts such as those

wh i ch hel d the J apanese at bay. Captai n

Cast l e of Com pany D was k i l l ed t r yi ng to

si l ence a m achi ne gun , and m any sm al l

un i t l eader s who st i l l hel d thei r pl ace i n

l i ne wer e bad l y wounded. T he si tuat i on

was so desper ate that Col onel H owar d

cou l d no l onger hol d h i s l ast r eser ves ou t

m an down . At 0430, Col onel H owar d

or der ed Wi ll iam s to take h is bat tal ion ou t

of the tunnel and at tack the J apanese at

D en ver B at ter y.

T he com pan i es m oved out i n col um n.

About 500 yar ds out fr om M al i n ta they

wer e caugh t i n a heavy shel l i ng that

sh ar pl y r ed uced t hei r st ren gt h an d t em po-

r ar il y scat ter ed the m en . T he su r vi vor s

r eassem bl ed an d m oved t ow ar d th e f i gh t-

i ng i n l in e of sk ir mi sh er s. Com pan ies Q

and R, com manded by two Ar my off i cer s,



of the act i on . H e or der ed the 4th Bat -

tal i on to m ove i n to the East Sector and

j oi n t he em bat t led d efen se l in e.

T H E 4T H BAT T .4L IOi V

I ,3J A 12T I Oi V 38

M ajor Wi ll iam s’ 4th B at tal ion h ad been

al er ted ear ly i n the n i ght ’s act i on , and he

h ad or d er ed t he i ssu e of ext ra a mm u ni ti on

and gr enades. A t about 0100 he got the

wor d to m ove the bat tal i on i n to M al i n ta

T unnel and stand by. T he sai l or s pr o-

ceeded cau t i ousl y down the sou th shor e

r oad, w ai ted for an enem y bar rage whi ch

was h i t t i ng i n the dock ar ea to l i f t , and

t hen d ash ed acr oss t o t he t un nel en tr an ce.

Captai ns Pau l C. M oor e and H ar ol d E .

D al ness, r esp ect ivel y, m oved i n on t he l eft

t o r ei nfor ce th e scat ter ed gr oups of r if l e-

m en fr om Com pani es A and P w ho wer e

t r yi ng to con tai n the J apanese i n the

br oken gr ound nor th of Denver Bat ter y.

T he bat ter y posi ti on i tsel f w as assi gn ed to

Com pany T (L ieu tenan t Bethel B . Ot ter ,

U SN ), and two pl atoons of Com pany S,”

or i gi n al l y d esi gn a ted t h e b at t al i on r eser v e,

wer e br ought up on the ext r em e r i gh t

w her e L ieu tenant Ed war d N . L i t t l e, U SN ,

was to t r y to si l ence the enem y m achi ne

guns near the water tower . T he bl ue-

j ackets f i l l ed i n the gaps al ong the l i ne—

wi de gaps, for ther e was l i tt l e that cou l d

be cal led a f i rm defen si ve l in e l eft—an d

198 PE ARL H A RB OR T O GU ~D AL CA NA L

practical ly nonexi sten t . Wi l l i ams, by

m utual consent ( Schaef fer w as seni or ),

took over comm and of the fi ght i ng si nce

he was i n a far bet ter posi t i on to get the

best ef for t ou t of h i s bl uejackets when

they a t tacked .~

At dawn M ajor Wi l l i ams m oved al ong

the fr on t , tel l i ng h i s off i cer s to be r eady

to jump of f at 0615. ‘l ’he company and

pl atoon com mand posts wer e r igh t up on

the fi ri ng l ine and ther e wer e no r eser ves

l eft ; ever y off i cer and man st i l l abl e to

w eapon s t hat m ight h ave open ed a br each

i n the D enver posi ti on , the at tack stal led

com pl etel y. M ajor Schaeffer sen t . War -

r an t off i cer F er gu son , w ho h ad su cceed ed

to com mand of Com pany O when Captai n

Ch am ber s w as w ou nded, t o Col on el H ow -

ar d ’s CP to r epor t the si tuat i on and r e-

quest rei n f or cemen t s. Fer guson, l i ke

Schaef fer and m any of the sur vi vor s of 1/ 4

and the r eser ve, was a wal k i ng wounded

case h imsel f. By the t im e Fer guson got

back th r ough the enemy shel l i ng to M a-



stand took par t i n the at tack . C)n the l ef t

the J apanese w er e dr iven back 200–300

yar ds befor e Wi l l i ams sent a r unner to

check th e ad van ce of M oor e an d D al ness;

the r i gh t of the l i ne had been unabl e to

m ake m or e than a few yar ds befor e the

w i ther i ng fi r e of the Denver and water

t ow er d efen ses d rove t he m en to th e d eck .

T he l ef t com pan ies sh ift ed t ow ar d D en ver

to cl ose the gap that had opened whi l e

the m en on the r i ght t r i ed to knock out

t he ,J apan ese m ach in e gu ns an d m or tar s.

L i eu ten an t ot t er w as ki ll ed w hi le l ead in g

an at tack , an d hi s execu ti ve, Capt ai n Cal -vi n E. Chunn, took over : Chunn was

w ou nd ed soon aft er as C om pan y T ch ar ged

a ,J apanese un i t whi ch was set t i ng up a

l in ta at 0900, Wi ll iam s had r ecei ved w hat

few r ei nfor cem en ts H ow ar d cou ld m ust er .

Captai n H er m an H . H auck and 60 men of

th e 59t h Coast Ar ti l l er y, assi gn ed by Gen -

er al M oor e to the 4th M ar i nes, had come

up and Wi l l i am s sent them to the l eft

f l ank to bl ock J apanese sn i per s and m a-

ch i ne-gun cr ews i n fi l t r at i ng al ong the

bea ch es i n t o t h e r ea r a r ea s.

At about 0930 m en on the nor th f l ank of

the M ar ine l ine saw a coupl e of J apanese

tanks com ing off bar ges near Caval r y

Poi nt , a m ove th at spel led the end on Cor -

r egi dor . T he tal ~ks w er e i n posi ti on to ad-vance w i th i n a hal f hou I , and , just as the

m en in fr on t of Denver Bat ter y spot ted

them , enem y fl ar es went L lp a gai n and ar -

TH E S IE G E AND C AP TU RE OF C ORRE G I D OR 199

t he ar ti l l er y on B ataan to i ncr ease i ts f i re,

and a r ol l i ng bar r age swung back and

for th bet ween M al i nt a an d D en ver , d em ol -

i sh ing any sem bl an ce of or der i n t he r ank s

of the m en str ai ni ng to r each the dubi ous

shel ter of the tr ench . “D ir t, r ocks, t r ees,

bod i es, an d d ebr i s l i ter al l y f il l ed , t h e a ir ,” 4’

and pi t i fu l l y few men made i t back to

Mal in ta .

Wi l l i ams, who was wounded, and

r ou gh ly 150 off i cer s an d m en , m an y of t hem

al so casu al ti es, gat her ed i n t he t r en ch r u in s

cer h e con su l ted , t hat t he d ef en ses ou tsi d e

M al in ta coul d l ast m or e than the r em ai n-

i ng hour s of the day, and he set the hour of

sur render for noon i n or der %o avoi d the

hor r or s wh i ch woul d have accr ued had I

l et the fi gh t goon unt i l dar k.” *

T he or der to sur rend er w as passed to t he

tr oops on T opsi de and M idd l esi de al ong

w ith i nstr uct i ons to dest r oy al l w eapons

l ar ger t han .45 cal iber . T he si ck ened m en

of the 4th M ar ines’ 2d and 3d B at tal ions,

w ho h ad been for ced t o st an d by h el pl essl y



to make a stand. T he J apanese wer e l ess

than thr ee hundr ed yar ds fr om thei r posi -

t ion an d en em y t an ks cou ld be seen m ovi ng

up to out f l ank thei r l i ne on the r i gh t . T he

M ar i ne major , who had been a tower ofst r ength th r oughout the hopel ess fi ght ,

w en t i nt o th e tu nnel at 1130 t o ask H ow ar d

for an t i tank guns and m or e men. But the

bat t l e w as over : Gener al Wai nw ri ght had

m a de t h e d eci si on t o su r r en d er .

SU RREN DER 4’

Col onel H owar d had per sonal l y r e-

por ted the l and i ng of the J apanese tanks

to Gener al Wainwr i ght at 1000. The

U SF IP com man der , w ho h ad k ept cu rr ent

as t hey h ear d and w atch ed th e bat tl e t o th e

ea st , car r i ed t he or d er even f ur t her , sm ash -

i ng t hei r r i fl es agai nst t he r ock s. V et er an s

of f i gh t i ng i n Wor l d War I and a dozen

“ban an a w ar s” st ood u nash am ed ly cr yi ng

as they wer e tol d they wou l d have to sur -

r ender , I nsi de M al in ta, Col onel H owar d

or der ed t he r egi men tal an d n at ion al col or s

of th e 4th M ar in es bu rn ed, t o pr even t th ei r

fal l i ng i n to enemy hands. T wo 1st Bat -

t al i on of fi cer s, Ca pt ai n Cl ar k an d L i eu ten -

an t M anni ng, a fi el d musi c, and an i n ter -

p r et er w er e sel ect ed t o ca r r y W ai n w r igh t’s

f l ag of t ru ce to t he J apan ese. .4s t he w hi te

f l ag was car ri ed ou t of the tunnel , M ajor

Wi l l i ams or der ed sur vi vor s of the East

Sector f i gh t i ng to m ove i nsi de the h i ll and

200 P EARL H ARB OR TO G UAD .4LG ANAL

den i ed by a few sen i or off i cer s and ai des,

wal ked out of the tunnel and up the l ong

sl ope towar d K ind l ey F i el d , he saw dead

and dyi ng men on ever y hand, a gr im

r ecor d of th e fer oci ty of the fi gh t i ng i n the

past 12hou rs.

N o com pl et e fi gu res exi st for t he casu al -

t i es su ffer ed by ei ther si de on 5–6 M ay;est i mates of the J apanese l osses r ange

fr om 900 to 4,000.* - T he str ai t betwe~n

B at aan an d Cor r egi dor w as h eavi l y d ot ted

w i th enem y bod i es, and Amer ican pr i s-

h ad 315 off i cer s an d m en k il led , 15 m i ssi ng

i n act i on pr esumed dead, and 357 m en

wounded; ~ the gr eat major i ty of these

casual ti es occur red dur ing the bat t l e for

Corregidor.

T he bl ood y bat t le for t he i sl an d for tr ess

d i d not end w i th Wai nwr igh t ’s deci si on to

su rr en der . T he J apan ese w en t r i gh t. ah eadw i th thei r assau l t pl an and pr epar ator y

bom bar dm ents, payi ng no heed to the

wh i te f l ags d i spl ayed on al l the i sl ands i n

t he bay. E igh ty-ei gh t. t on s of bom bs w er e



oner s on Cor regi dor est i mated that ~hey

h el ped col lect a~d cr em at e t he r em ai ns of

hundr eds of J apanese sol di er s.” T he de-

tai led l osses of the 4th M ar ines w i ll pr ob-

abl y never be known because of the joi nt -ser vi ce natu r e of the r egi ment at the t i me

of bat tl e an d t he scar ci ty of con tem por ar y

r ecor ds. T he casual ti es of M ar ines al one

ar e kn ow n, h ow ever , an d th ey m ay be con -

si der ed i nd i cat i ve of the fate of sol d i er s

and sai l or s who ser ved w i th them . I n the

w hol e Ph il ippi ne cam pai gn th e r egi ment

MMost America n survivors of t he ba t t le men -

t ion t ha t t h ey h ea r d from t he J apa n ese la t er in

pr ison ca mp t ha t t he en em y h a d suffered a lmost

dr opped on 6 M ay, a good par t of them

after the sur r ender .” Wainw r i gh t , who

h ad r el eased h is sou th er n Ph il i ppi ne com -

m ander s to M ac.4r thur k con t r ol befor e he

at tem pt ed t o m eet t he en em y com m an der ,t r i ed t o su rr en der on ly t he for t i fi ed i sl an ds

to the J apanese. H e was r ebuffed col d l y

by H omm a’s em i ssar y and tol d that the

J apan ese k new t hat h e w as com man der of

al l the for ces i n the Ph i l ippi nes and that

t hey w ou ld n ot accept h is su rr en der u nl ess

i t m eant the capi tu l at i on of ever y m an i n

h i s com mand, ever ywher e i n the i sl ands.

T he A mer ican gen er al , con vi nced t hat t heJ apan ese w ou ld t reat th e m en on t he for ti -

f ied i sl an ds a s h ost ages, p er h ap s even m as-

TH E S I E G E AND C AP TU RE OF C ORR E G I D OR201

i sl ands i f he d i d not i nsur e a complete

su r r en der of al l h is f or ces.

The str uggl e for con tr ol of M an i l a Bay

fi nal ly end ed on 7 M ay w hen th e J apan ese

occupi ed the l ast of the i sl and for ts, bu t

for most of the captu r ed men “the fi gh t

for l i fe had just begun.” 50 Thousands

su ccu mbed i n t he n ext t hr ee year s t o br ut al

m i st r ea tm en t, m al n ut r it ion , an d d i sease i n

J ap an ese p ri son cam ps i n t he Ph i li ppi n es,

i n the enemy home i sl ands, and i n M an-

chur i a. Two hundr ed and th i r t y-n i ne

easter n beaches. U nt i l the n i gh t of 5 M a y

t her e w as n o com pel l i ng r eason t o bel ieve

that the East Sector woul d dr aw the fi r st

assau lt . A nd even after t he enem y l and ed

at N or th Poi n t the ver y pr esen t th r eat to

w ester n Cor r egi dor exi sted an d cou ld n ot

be i gnor ed . To meet i t, a n umber of .4r my

u ni ts w er e al er ted t o back u p t he posi ti on s

of 2/ 4 and 3/ 4.51

T he pr obl em whi ch Colonel H owar d

faced of w hen , w her e, an d i n w hat st ren gt h

to comm i t the r eser ves avai l abl e to h im



ofl i cer s and men of the 4th M ar ine Regi -

ment d i ed i n enemy hands,

CONCLUSION

The bat t l e for Cor r egi dor was bi t ter

and con fu sed ; r el at ivel y few m en su rvi ve

who fought i n the E ast Sector th r ough the

n i ght and mor n i ng of 5–6 M ay 1942.

H undr eds of wel l-t r ai ned i nfan tr ym en i n

posi t i ons w i th i n a m i l e or so of M al i n ta

H i l l wer e onl y spectator s and audi tor s of

the fi ght i ng. T he poor est-t r ai ned el e-

m ents of the 4th M ar ines const i tu ted the

vi tal mobi l e r eser ve. On the sur face and

i n hasty consi der at i on i t woul d seem that

th e t act i cs of th e beach d efen se l eft m uch

was a cl assi c one for comm ander s at al l

t r oop l evel s. I f he comm i t ted al l h i s r e-

ser ve at one t i me and i n the ar ea of

gr eatest exi st i ng th r eat , he di st i nct l y i n-

cr eased t he vu ln er abi l i ty of oth er sect or s

to enemy at tack. I f he commi t ted on l y

par t of h i s r eser ve and r etai ned the capa-

bi l i ty of r ei nfor ci ng agai nst fu r ther at -

tacks, he stood the chance of not usi ng

enough men to have a deci si ve ef fect i n

any sector . T he deci si on to commi t the

r eser v e p i ecem ea l r ef l ect ed t h e r egi m en t’s

est i mate of the enem y’s capabi li ti es and

i nten t i ons i n l ight of thei r act i ons.52 T he

J apanese, al though opposed by a r el a-

t i vel y sm al l for ce, d i d not or coul d not

vi gor ousl y pur sue thei r advance af ter

202P EARL H ARB OR TO G UAD ALC ANAL

r ather than as soon as the M ar i nes

expected.

I n l ar ge par t the 4th M ar i nes’ r eser ve

st r en gth w asal read y com rn it te d on5 M ay,

T h e ,J a pa n ese p r ep ar a tor y f i r es, esp eci a ll y

those wh i ch wer e l ai d on ar eas i n pl ai n

si gh t of Bataan , m ade m ovem en t by any

b od y of t r oop s ext r em el y d i ff i cu l t -w i t ness

the fate of Com pany O. T he bom bar d -

m en t had the effect of tyi ng the r egi m ent

to i ts d efen ses. T he t r ai ned i nfan tr ym en

i n i t s r anks wer e kept wher e they cou l d do

pr em iu m on h avi ng th e best i nfant r ym en

at the poi n t wher e thei r val ue woul d be

greatest—the beaches.

T he fal l of Cor regi dor w as i nevi tabl e;

the gar ri son si mpl y d i d not have enough

food to hol d ou t unt i l r el i ef cou l d ar ri ve.

A l though the enem y, pr i m ar i l y for pr es-

t ige a nd p rop aga nd a r ea son s, ch oose t o a s-

sau l t the i sl and , they cou l d easi l y have

star ved i ts defender s i n to subm i ssi on.

When the J apanese d i d m ake thei r at tack

they pai d a h i gh pr i ce for thei r haste,



th e m ost to bol ster th e cr uci al beach posi -

tions.53 I f any si zabl e num ber of these

m en h ad been w ith dr aw n fr om th e beach es

t o f or m a r eser ve, i t i s q u est ion abl e w h et her

the r em ai ni ng m en cou ld h ave w ith stood

a n y en em y a ssa u l t. O nce t he J a pa nese be-

gan to bom bar d Cor r egi dor i n ear nest

ther e was no such th i ng as a st r ong beach

d efen se posi ti on ; t he ver y fu ry of t he bom -

bar dm ent , dest r oyi ng as i t d i d m ost of the

pr epar ed defenses and dem ol i sh i ng the

m ajor suppor ti ng w eapons, pl aced a h i gh

bu t ext r acted as gr eat a one fr om the de-

fen der s. I n th e i mm ed iate tact i cal sense,

h ow ever , th e enem y ar ti ll er y w as th e vi c-

tor i n the siege and fal l of Cor r egi dor ; no

defend i ng for ce cou l d have w i thstood i t sd ev ast at i n gl y a ccu r a te b om b ar d m en t .

A l though i t was a defeat , the bat t l e of

Cor regi dor i s m ar ked down i n the annal s

of the 4th M ar i nes as a f i gh t to be pr oud

of. T hose who fough t and d i ed i n i t s

r anks, whatever thei r ser vi ce of or i gi n ,

wer e, i f on l y for a br i ef m om ent , Cor -

r egi d or M a r i n es.



PART V

Decisi on at M idway



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S E TTI h’G TH E S TAG E: E ARLY NAVAL 01’E RATI OA”S207

m oves wou l d be a r ai d a~~i nst the M ar -

sbal ls, f r om whi ch m uch of th i s ,J apanese

act ion w asm ou nt ed . H al sey’s E nt et p?i w

for ce ther efor e set ou t to st r i ke W’ot je

an d M al eol ap, seapl an e bases i n th e M ar -

shal ls. wh i le F letcher pr epar ed to at tack

M i l i and ,J al u i t (al so i n the M ar shal l s)

pl us M aki n w i th h i s l ’or l cto~cn gr oup.

(See M ap 9)

A subm ar ine r econnai ssance found the

M ar shal ]s l i gh t l y defended and spot -

t ed t he l ar gest con cen tr at i on of J apan ese

pl nnes and sh i ps at K waj al ei n Atol l i n

f i gh ter opposi t i on , and that the r epor ts

br ou gh t, back by pi l ot s w er e en th usi ast ic,

dam age to the J apanese i nstak t i ons and

sh i ppi ng was sl i gh t . F i ve Wi l dcats shot

d ow n t wo J apan ese pl an es over M a loel ap,

and n i ne S13D ’S that r etu r ned fr om Roi

l at er sor t i ecl agai n an d d am aged som e ai r -

f i el d i nst al lat ion s. T he su rface bom bw -d -

ment , too, was d i sappoi n t i ng, and the

bom bar dm ent f l agsh i p, Chester , took a

l igh t bom b t hr ou gh her m ai n cl eck an d l ost

ei gh t m en ki l l ed and el even wounded.

T o t he sou th , F let ch er h ad bad l uck over



the cen ter of the i sl and gr oup. H al sey

deci ded to add th i s choi ce tar get to hi s

l ist , and for the m issi ons he d i vi ded T ask

For ce 8 i nto th r ee gr oups. T he Enterpm”.se

with th ree d estr oyer s w ou ld str ike Wot j e,

M al oel ap, and K wajal ei n; Rear Adm ir al

Raym ond .1. Spr uance w i th the cr ui ser s

i Vor th am pt on an d ,Sa~t L ak e Ci ty pl L M on e

destr oyer wou l d bom bar d Wot je; and

Captai n Thom as M . Sl~ock i n U SS

(’hester , an d w ith tw o dest r oyer s, w oul d

shel l Ma loelap . T he t hr ee sou th er n at ol l s

i n the M ar shal l s gr oup and M ak i n i n the

n or th er n Gi l ber ts w ou ld , be at ten cl ed t o by

F l etcher i n the Yon l town w i th h i s i nde-

pendent com mand ( TF 17) m ade up of the

,T al ui t w hen h i s f l ier s found thei r tar gets

conceal ed by thunder show er s. T wo ,J kp-

anese sh i ps off ,J abor Town wer e h i t, bu t

not sunk, and the dam age ashor e w -as

sl i gh t . A m ine l ayer was h i t at M aki n ,

an d d am age at M i li w as al so sl igh t.

Si mi lar act ion s w er e con ti nu ed i n oth er

ar eas of t he Paci fi c t o h ar ass t he .J apm ese

an d t o pr ovi d e a t l east on e ou tl et , f or ef for t s

to f i gh t back at the enem y when the news

fr om al l other fr on ts was gl oomy. M ost

n ot abl e w er e st ri kes i n ear l y M a rch agpi nst

VT ake and M ar cus I sl and , and the dar ing

r ai d by pl anes of Adm ir al Wi lson B rown ’s

t ask f or ce over Y T ew G ui n ea ’s 15,000-f oot

Owen Stan l ey M ountai ns to h i t the ,J ap-



SE TTING TH E S TAG E: E ARLY NAVAL OP ER.4TI ONS 209

After secu ri ty-sh rou ded pl ann ing an d

t r ai n i ng, Dool i t t l e’s 16 B–25’s l eft San

Fr anci sco on 2 Apr i l 1942 on boar d the

H or net whi ch was escor ted by cru i ser s

V in cen nes a nd N a sh vi l le, f ou r d est r oyer s,

and an oi l er . After a 13 Apr il r endezvous

w ith th e E nter pr ise of H al sey’s T F 16, th e

r ai di ng par ty con ti nu ed al ong th e nor th -

er n r ou te towar d the J apanese hom ei sl and s.3 Enem y pi cket boats si ghted the

convoy when i t was m or e than 100 m i les

shor t of the i n tended l aunch i ng r ange,

a nd , w i th D ool i tt le~ s con cu r r en ce, H a l sey

both car r i er s r etu rned to Pear l H ar bor on

25 Apr i l . A l though the r ai d d i d m or e to

boost Am er i can m or al e than i t d i d to

d am age J apan ese m il itar y i nst al lat ion s,

m or e pr act i cal r esu l ts cam e l ater . I t al -

l owed a J apanese m i l i t ar y gr oup whi ch

favor ed a fu rth er expan si on of th ei r ter r i -

tor i al gai ns to begi n execu t i on of these

am bi ti ou s pl an s, an d t hi s expan si on effor tl ed d i r ect l y to the Bat t l e of M i dway

whi ch “. . . al one was wel l wor th the ef-

for t pu t i n to th i s oper at i on by . . . [ those]

. . . who had vol unteer ed to hel p even the



l aunched the f l i er s at 0725 on 18 Apr i l

wh i l e the H oww t bucked i n a heavy sea

668 m i l es fr om the I m per i al Pal ace i n

cen t r a l T okyo.4

M uch of the r ai ~s ant i ci pated shockeffect on T ok yo w as l ost by t he coi nci den ce

of D ool it t l e’s ar r i val over th e ci ty at abou t

noon just as a J apanese ai r r ai d dr i l l was

com pl eted . T he J apanese, con fused by

the at tack whi ch fol l owed thei r own

m an eu ver s, offer ed on ly l igh t opposi ti on

to the B–25’s wh i ch sk i m m ed the ci t y at

t r eetop l evel to dr op thei r bom bs on m il i -

t ar y tar gets. One pl ane wh i ch st r uckK obe r ecei ved n o op posi ti on , al th ou gh t wo

ot her s over N agoya an d Osak a d rew h eavy

score. ’> 5

T he fi rst of J apan ’s pl an ned expan si on

m oves i n the spr i ng of 1942 ai m ed for

con t r ol of the Cor al Sea thr ough sei zur e

of the Souther n Solom on I sl ands andPor t M or esby on N ew Gu i nea as bases

fr om whi ch to knock ou t gr ow i ng A l l i ed

ai r power i n nor theaster n Aust r al i a.

Sei zu re of N ew Ca led on ia , pl an ned as pa rt

of t he th ir d step i n t he secon d m aj or ser ies

of offen si ves, w ou l d com pl ete en ci rcl e-

m en t of the Cor al Sea. T h i s wou l d l eave

the L T. S. comm uni cat i ons r ou te to the

A nza c a r ea d an gl i ng u sel ess a t t he Sa moa nIslands; and l ater ,J apanese advances

wou l d push the U . S. Paci f i c F l eet back to



S E TTI NG TH E S TAG E : E ARLY NAVAL OP E RATI ONS 211

that she had to be dest r oyed four days

later.

N ot t o be ou td on e, t he A m er i can s r ea ct ed

sim i l ar l y a shor t t i me l ater to a scout

pl an e’s r epor t of t wo J apan ese car r ier s an d

four cr ui ser s nor th of the L ou i si ades. Ac-

t ua ll y t hese cr af t w er e a su bor d in at e en em y

task gr oup consi st i ng of two ol d l i ght

cr ui ser s and th r ee conver ted gunboats.

B ut m or e by good l uck than good m anage-

m en t, th e at tack i ng pl an es i nvest i gat in g

t he r epor t si gh ted t he J apan ese cover i ng

For ce, then pr otect i ng the l ef t f l ank of the

Ear l y the fol l ow i ng m or ni ng, U . S.

sea rch pl an es f in al l y l oca ted t he J a pan ese

car r ier s at abou t th e t im e t he J apan ese r e-

d i scover ed the U , S. f l at tops. At l ast the

stage w as set for t he bi g sh ow .

L oss of th e fl hoho had cu t the J apanese

d ow n t o si ze. T he oppon en ts w ho sl ugged

i t ou t on 8 M ay 1942 w er e even l y m atched,

ph ysi cal ly an d m or al ly, to a d egr ee r ar el y

found i n w ar far e, af l oat or ashor e?’ H ow -

ever , at the t i me th e bat t l e devel oped, the

J a pa nese en joyed t he gr ea t t act i ca l a dva n-

tage of havi ng thei r posi ti on shr ouded by



I >or t M or es by i n .vasi on Gr oup, an d con-

cen t r ated on the N fi oho to the vi rtual ex-

cl usi on of h er con sor ts. Agai nst 93 ai r -

cr aft of al l t ypes, th e l on e l igh t, car r ier h ad

no m or e chance than T ask F or ce N eosho-

A ’i m.s h ad agai nst th e J apan ese, an d, h er

dem ise pr om pted the m or al e-boost i ng

ph rase, “Scr atch one fl at top ” g

As a r esu l t of these al ar m s and excur -

si ons, both comm and i ng adm i r al s had

m i ssed each other once agai n . By m id-

after noon, how ever , T akagi had a pr et ty

good i cl en of the L T. S. car ri er s’ l ocat i on

an d, sh or t l y befor e n igh tfal l , d ispat ch ed a

bom ber -t or ped o st ri ke agai nst F letch er .

T hanks to a heavy weather f r on t , these

the same heavy weather fr on t that had

cover ed the U . S. car r ier s the pr evi ous

after noon, whi l e F l etcher % for ce l ay i n

cl ear t r opi cal sunl i gh t wher e i t cou l d be

seen for m any m il es fr om al of t .

T he at tack i ng ai r cr af t of both par ti es

st ru ck t hei r en em y at n ear ly th e sam e t im e

(ap pr oxi m at el y 1100), p assi n g each ot her

en r ou te,’2 T he t wo J apan ese car r i er s an d

t hei r r espect ive escor ts l ay abou t t en m i les

apar t . As the Yorktown’s p l anes orb i t ed

over the tar get pr epar ator y to the at tack,

the Zu i kaku and her scr een i ng for ce d i s-

appear ed i nto a r ai n squal l and wer e seen

on e esca ped. I n this a ct ion t he J apa n ese lost 9



S E TTI XG TH E S TAG E : E ARLY XAVAI , OP ERATI ONS 213

exl )l osi on . T hi s r es(d ted on l y i nd i rect l y

fr om enem y :~ct i on : r el ezsed gasol i ne

f l m les wer e i gn i ted by spar ks fr om a gen-

er a tor son l eon e h a cl ca r el essl y l ef t r u n n in g.

T hi s set off l vhat an l oun ted to a chai n r e-

act i on . T he best el for ts of h er cr ew avat led

noth i ng, and at 1707 her sk i pper gave the

or (l er to abandon sh i p. T h i s m ovem en t

w as car r i ed ou t i n th e best or der , I vi th ou tthe l oss of a m an. A t abou t 2000, near l y

n i ne hour s after the ,J apanese had w i th -

d r awn fr om the bat t l e, t or pedoes of her

own escor t pu t her under the waves

forever.

I .oss of th e L ei w%gton gave t act ical vi c-

tor y to the J apanese. 13u t by thwar t i ng

the i nvasi on of Por t M or esby, pr inci pal

object i ve of the en t i r e oper at i on , the

L “n i ted States won st r ategi c vi ctor y. At

the t i m e the enem y r egar ded th i s m er el y

a postponem ent of thei r i nvasi on phm s;but even ts w ou ld pr ove th at . n o ,J apanese

seabor ne i nvasi on ever wou l d near Por t

M o r esb y a ga i n.





J .4P ANE S E P LANS : TOWARD MI I )WAY AND TH E NORTH P AC I FI C 215

m an d an d t o cover d iver si on ar y J apan ese.

l and i ngs i n the wester n Al eu t i ans by the

Occupat i on For ces for .& dak-At tu and

K i ska. N ext the (’om ier Str ik i ng Fom e,

comm anded by Vi ce Adm i r al Chu i ch i

N agumo, wou l d soften M idway w i th the

pl anes fr om the bi g fl eet car ri er s Akagi ,

K aga, H ir yu , and f l or yu ,5 an d w ou l d then

m ove on to st r ike the f i rst bl ow at , the U . S.

Paci f i c F l eet i f i t chal l enged i n a sor t i e

fr om Pear l H ar bor .

Adm i r al Yam amoto’s M ain Body, i n -

cl udi ng th r ee bat t l esh i ps and a l i gh t

m ism and over con fi dence to cast the U . S.

Paci f i c F l eet i n the r ol e of a t im i d char -

a ct er a ct or cu ed f or a vu l ner abl e “w al k -on ”

par t. T hey begged the quest i on of tact i cs

befor e t hei r pl an m oved t o t he oper at ion al

stage. T he U . S. F leet , accor di ng to J apa-

nese pl ans, woul d be steam ing for the

Second M obi le For ce i n the Al eu t i ans, or

w oul d be vaci ll at i ng i n H aw ai ian w ater s,

u nt il t he st ron g (7ar r ier St m”k in g F or ce h it

M i dway and r eveal ed the tar get of the

m ain effor t.G I n ei ther even t noth i ng but

the sm al l M ar i ne gar r i son for ce wou l d



cr u i ser of h i s for ce pl us the .47eut i an .

Scr een i ng For ce of four bat t l esh i ps and

two l i gh t cr u i ser s, then wou l d go i n for

the k i l l agai nst the U . S. F l eet . T h i s en-

gagem ent w ou l d be fol low ed, af ter dar k-

n ess on 5 ,J un e, by V ice A dm ir al N obl l take

K ondo m ovi ng i n to shel l the U . S. base

for two days. T hen K ondo’s conr oyed

T ranspor t Or oup wou l d appr oach to l and

the M idway Occwpct i on For ce of 5,000

gr ou nd t roops. Wh il e cr ossi ng t he Paci fi c,

Yam am oto r em ained some hundr eds of

m i l es to the r ear w i th h i s M ain , Body,

awai ti ng wor d fr om the .4dvcm ce Expe-

d it i on ar y F or ce of l ar ge f l eet subm ar in es

al r eady m ann i ng stat i ons on the ap-

stand i n the w ay of the occupat i on of M id-

way, and the J apanese wou l d have an ai r

base of thei r own ther e befor e the U . S.

F l eet cou l d r ea ch t hem .

But , as at the Cor al Sea encounter , the

U .S. F leet al read y h ad sor ti ed t o aw ai t t he

,J apanese. For m or e than a m onth N im itz

had been awar e that som eth i ng l i ke th i s

was i n the w ind , and he bet near ly ever y-

th i ng he had that the str ike w ou l d h i t M id -

way. T he weakened Paci f i c F l eet stood

som e 300 m il es n or th east of M i d way, t her e

t o r efu el , befor e t he J apan ese pi ck et su b-

m ar ines took posi ti on . As a r esu l t, these

boats si gh ted no U . S. sh i ps and r ad i oed

CH APT ER 8

Midway Girds for Battle’

E ven befor e th ese J apan ese pl an s w er e

m ad e, an d l on g befor e A dm i ral Y am am ot o

sor ti ed eastwar d, al l U . S. m il itar y pl an-

n er s r ecogn ized t he vu ln er abl e posi ti on of

the M idway Atol l .’ Especi al l y was th i s

posi t i on cl ear i n the l i gh t of ear l y J ap-

an ese su ccesses el sew her e i n t he Paci fi c,

i ncl ud i ng about 100 off i cer s and men of

Bat ter ies A and C of the 4th Defense B at -tal ion , l ef t Pear l H ar bor on 19 D ecem ber

w i th the ol d N avy 7-i nch b a nd, the 3-i nch

gu ns w hi ch h ad been sh ipped to Pear l H ar -

bor for M idway pr i or to the ou tset of war .

(See M a p 10, M a p S ect ion )



and none w -as mor e keen l y awar e of the

gr im si tuat i on than the atol l’s sm al l gar -

r ison for ce. T he 12 PBY>S of VP-21 wer e

soon w i thdr awn, and l it t l e hel p w-as ex-pected fr om the cr i ppl ed fl eet . B u t on 17

D ecem ber , w hi le the 6th M ar ine Defense

B at tal ion w or ked to i mpr ove exi st i ng de-

fense i nst al lat i on s, 17 SB 2U -3’S (V in di -

cator s) of M ar ine Scout -B om ber Squad-

r on 231 ( V M SB -231 ) f l ew i n u nexpect ed ly

fr om H awai i . L ed by M ajor Cl ar ence J .

Ch appel l , J r ., an d assi st ed i n over -w at er

n avi gat ion by a PB Y, t he obsol escen t cr af tm ad e t he 1,137-m il e h op i n n ine h ou rs an d

t w en ty m i nu tes.’ O ther rei n f or cemen t s,

T h i s for ce, on boar d the U SS Wr i gh t ,

ar r ived on Ch ri st mas E ve, an d L i eu ten an t

Col onel H ar ol d D . Shannon, who com -

m an ded M a ri ne d ef en se for ces on t he at ol l ,tu r ned over to Bat ter y A (Captai n Cust i s

Bur ton , J r. ) the m i ssi on of i nstal li ng and

m ann i ng the 7-i nch and 3-i nch bat ter ies

t o be em pl aced on E ast er n I sl an d. B at ter y

C (F i r st L ieu tenant L ew i s A. J ones) was

assi gned the job of set t i ng up i ts 3-i nch

bat ter y on San d I sl an d.’

N ext day M idway r ecei ved another

Ch r i st m as pr esen t: 14 B r ew st er F 2A –3’s,the ai r echel on of M ar ine F i gh ter Squad-

r on 221 ( VM F-221 ), f l ew i n fr om the U SS





MI D WAY G IRD S FOR B .4TTLE 219

rehearsals. By the l ast week of M ay, al l

,J ap an ese f l eet el em en ts w er e u nd er w ay,

an d on decks I mper ial sai lor s su nbath ed

an d sang son gs—vocal er upt i on s of w hat

has been descr i bed as the “Victory

Disease.”’

M eanwh i l e on M idway, the focal poi n t

for these vast effor ts, M ar ines got thei r

f i r st i nk l i ng of al l th i s at ten t i on whenN im itz f l ew i n on 2 M ay to see thei r sen i or

of l icer , L i eu ten an t Col on el Sh an non , an d

the atol l com mander , Com mander Cyr il

T . Si m ar d. T he adm ir al i nspected the i n-

stal lat i on s, and th en d ir ected Sh an non to

the steps bei ng taken to r ei n for ce thei r

atol l agai nst the an t i ci pated at tack .

J apan ese D -D ay, th e ad mi ral pr ed icted,

wou l d be about 28 M ay. On the day they

r ecei ved th is l et t er , Si mar d an d Sh an non

con fer red on t hei r f i nal pl an s for d efen se,

and that even i ng Col onel Shannon as-

sem bl ed h is k ey su bor di nat es an d w ar ned

them of the i m pendi ng enem y at tack ..A dd i ti on al d ef en si ve m ea su r es a nd p r ior i -

t i es of f i nal effor ts wer e ou t l i ned , and al l

r ecr eat ion al a ct ivi ti es su spen ded . M a y 25

was set as the dead l i ne for com pl et i on of

t he m ea su r es or d er ed .



subm i t a detai l ed l i st of al l suppl i es and

equ i pm en t he wou l d need to defend the

atol l agai nst a st r ong at tack . N i m i tz

p rom i sed t h at a ll a va il abl e i t em s r equ est ed

woul d be for war ded i m m ed i atel y, and

w i th i n l ess than a week m en and m ater ial

w er e bein g em bar ked i n H aw ai i to bol ster

t h e i sl a nd st r en gt h .

T hr ee m or e 3-i nch an ti ai r cr aft bat ter i es

total in g 12 guns, a 37m m an ti ai rcr af t bat -

t er y of ei gh t gu ns, a nd a 20m m a nt ia ir cr aft

bat ter y of 18 guns wer e tem por ar i l y de-

tached fr om the 3d Defense Bat tal i on at

Pear l H ar bor ; and tw o r if l e com pani es of

th e 2d M ar in e Rai der B at tal ion , t ogeth er

On the 25th , however , cam e two wel -

com ed changes for the pi ctu r e. F i rst ,

N im it z passed th e w or d t hat th e J apan ese

at tack w as n ot expected u nt i l ear ly J une,an dj secon d, the f i rst r ei nfor cem en ts ar -

r i ved. On th i s date the U SS St . L ou i s

cam e i n w i th the 37m m an t i ai r cr aft bat -

ter y of the 3d D efense Bat tal i on pl us the

tw o com pan i es of r ai der s. Four of the

37’s wer e em pl aced on each i sl and wh i l e

Rai der Com pany C (Captai n Donal d H .

H ast i e ) wen t to Sand I sl and , and Com -

pany D (F i r st L ieu tenant J ohn Aper gi s)to E aster n I sl an d.

N ext d ay th e ai rcr af t ten der K it tyh aw k

220P EARL H ARB OR TO G UAD ALC ANAL

For the gr ound for ces and key ci vi l i an

w or ker s who had r em ai ned beh i nd to hel p

defend the i sl and , the week was equal l y

busy. Rei n for ci ng weapons wer e i n -

st al l ed , t an ks t est ed i n t he san d, al l d ef en -

si ve con cen tr at ion s r egi ster ed i n, an d t he

em placi ng of an extensi ve system of ob-

st acl es, m i nes a nd d em ol i ti on s com pl et ed .

Sand I sl and now w as sur rounded w ith tw o

d ou bl e-apr on bar bed w ir e bar r i er s, an d al l

i nst al lat i on s on bot h i sl an ds w er e r in ged

by pr otect i ve w i r e. An t i boat m ines of

seal ed sew er pi pe, and obstacl es of r ei n-

er ed l i kel y beach exi ts; and bot t l es of

m ol ot ov cock tai l st ood r ead y at ever y posi -

t i on . A decoy mockup ai rpl ane (a ,J FU —

J a pa nese f ou l er -u pp er ) w as sp ot ted pr om -

i nen t l y on the seapl ane apr on , and al l un-

der gr ound fuel stor age ar eas on Sand

I sl and wer e pr epar ed for em er gency de-

st r u ct i on by d em ol i t i on .’l

“ Th e demolit ion syst em w orked, t oo. On 22

Ma y a sa ilor t h rew t he w r on g sw it ch a nd blew

up a good port ion of t h e a via t ion ga soline. Th e

supply w a s so crit ica l a ft er t his t ha t t he pilot s

w h o a r r ived on t h e K it t vh a w k did n ot get a



f or ci n g st eel l ay of fsh or e; t he beach es w er e

sown w i th homem ade m ines of am m uni -

t i on boxes fi l l ed w i th dynam i te and 20-

pen ny n ai ls; ci gar box an ti tan k m in es cov-

preba tt le ch a nce t o ch eck out in t heir S B D–2’S .

P ipe lines a lso w ere w recked in t h e bla st , a n d

MAG -22 t h erea ft er h a d t o refuel a ll pla n es by

h a nd from 55-ga llon drums.

CH APTER 4

Midway Versus

4 5 June 1942

the Japanese

A M idway PBY spot ted the appr oach-

i ng J apanese fi rst , at about 0900 on J une

3:- and tr acked them long enough to r e-

por t el even shi ps mak i ng 19 knots east -

ward . T hese vessel s wer e pr obabl y the

wer e goi ng up to pat r ol fr om M idway, he

h ad r eached a posi ti on appr oxi matel y 250

m i l es nor thwest of the atol l . Ther e at

0430 the J apanese adm i r al l aunched 36

“K ate” tor pedo pl anes and 36 “Val ” d i ve



t r an spor t an d sea pl an e gr ou ps of t he Occu -

pat i on For ce, and they wer e at tacked at

1624 by n in e B –17’s w hi ch Capt ai n Si mar d

sent ou t fol l ow i ng the PBY’s con tact r e-por t. T he pi lots r epor ted havi ng hi t “tw o

bat t l eshi ps or heavy cr ui ser s’s and two

tr anspor ts i n the gr oup then 570 m i l es

away fr om M idway, bu t the fl i er s wer e

m i staken i n both sh i p i den t i f i cat i on and

i n cal l i ng thei r shots, for they actual l y

h i t noth i ng. A Catal i na scor ed on one of

these oi l er s l ater that n i ght i n a moon-

l igh t tor pedo r un .T hi s w as enough to convi nce F l etcher

that the bat t l e wou l d soon be on, and he

bom ber s, pl us 36 escor ti ng Zer os, for the

fi r st st ri ke agai nst t he at ol l .

At 0545 one of the M idway PBY’s

si gh ted these pl anes about 150 m il es ou tfr om the i sl and , and a shor t t im e l ater

an ot her PB Y r epor ted vi su al con tact w it h

two enem y car ri er s and the bal ance of the

Japanese Cu rvi e~ Str+king Fo~ce some 200

m i l es fr om M idway. Enter pr i se inter-

cept ed this repor t , but . F let ch er w a nt ed t o

recover his sea rch pla nes a n d sift fur t her

in t elligence before la un ch ing his st rike,

a nd so he ordered S prua nce t o t a ke t he va n

sout hw est er ly a nd lea d off t h e a t t a ck

a g-a inst t he en emy ca rr iers.



MID WAY VE RS U S TH E J AP ANE S E , 4-5 J UNE 1942 223

ai r i n l ess than 10 m i nu tes, VM F–221

h ead in g to i nter cept t he en em y pl an es an d

VM S13-241 off to r endezvous stat i on 20

m i l es east wher e the d i ve bom ber pi l ots

w ou l d r ecei ve f ur t her i n st r uct ion s.

T he VM F fl i er s under M ajor F l oyd B .

Par ks si ghted th e Zer o-escor ted Val d ive

bom ber s at 0616 abou t 30 m il es ou t fr om

M i dway, and Captai n J ohn F . Car ey,

l ead i ng one of Par ks’ d i vi si ons i n an

F4F-3, l aunched the at tack fr om 17,000

feet . T he M ar ine f l i er s wer e hopel essl y

outnum ber ed , and they found that the

Zer o f i gh ter s cou l d “f l y r i ngs ar ound

them.” T hey had t i m e for on l y one. pass

th ei r st r ik e. Si nce each of th ese J apan ese

for m at i ons had l eft t he car r i er s w i th 36

pl an es, i t i s possi bl e t hat th e M ar in e f l ier s

scor ed som e k i l l s.z

T he K aga ai r cr aft gr oup i n the f i r st

w ave, assi gn ed to at tack th e pat r ol pl an e

faci l i t i es on Sand I sl and , d r opped n i ne

242-k il ogr am bom bs on an d a bou t t he. sea -

pl ane hangar s, set t i ng them afl am e and

star t i ng a l ar ge f i r e i n the fuel oi l tanks

500 yar ds to the nor th . T he Akagi pl anes

pl aster ed the nor th shor e of Easter n

I sl and to dest r oy the M ar i ne m ess hal l ,

gal l ey, and post exchange. T hese the r e-

t ur n i ng en em y f li er s d escr i bed a s h a nga rs>



at the bom ber s, and then had to tu r n thei r

at ten t i on to the sw ar m of Zer os, fr om one

to f i ve of wh i ch got on the tai l of each

M ar in e f i gh ter . On ly th ree of th e or igi nal

12 M ar ine pi l ots sur vi ved th i s br aw l , and

al th ou gh th e d am age th ey i nf l icted on th e

enem y has never been assessed , i t i s be-

l i eved that they spl ashed a num ber of the

bom ber s and som e of the Zer os. Other

Zer os w er e l ed i n to the M idway ant i ai r -

cr af t f ir e.

M ean wh il e anoth er gr ou p of 13 M i dw ay

f i gh ter s under Captai n K ir k Ar mi stead

cam e i n for an at tack agai nst the enem y

ai r for mat ion . Agai n th e d am age i nf l icted

Other tar gets of the J apanese d i ve

bom ber s i ncl ud ed t he al r ea dy-f l am i ng fu el

stor age at the nor th end of Sand I sl and ,

th e San d I sl an d d ispen sar y, an d th e E ast -

er n I sl and power house wh i ch su ffer ed

d i rect h its fr om tw o 805-k i logr am bom bs.

T hese h its vi rtu al ly d est r oyed th e en ti re

pl an t . And at the ver y end of the st r i ke,

t he 6t h D ef en se B at ta li on ’s F ,a st er n I sl an d

com man d post r ecei ved a d ir ect h i t w hi ch

k i l l ed the M ar i ne sector com m ander ,

M ajor Wi ll iam J $’. Ben son , an d w ou nd ed

sever al other m en . A fter these bom ber s

com pl eted thei r r uns, the Zer os cam e i n

for st r af i ng at tacks. T h i s one and on l y


M a ri ne d efen se bat ter i es fi r ed t hr ou gh -

ou t t hese at tack s, an d on e sou rce cr ed it ed

th i s an t i ai r cr af t f i r e w i th 10 k i l l s,’ Re-

por ts fr om M ar ine fl yer s wou l d appear to

r equ ir e an i ncr ease of t hi s est i mate, h ow -

ever , si nce r etu r ni ng M idway pi l ots de-

scr i bed enem y pl anes fal l i ng ou t of

for mat i on and other s fl ounder ing i nto the

water.5 B ut ,J apan ese au th or i t ies cl ai mthat on l y si x of thei r pl anes—thr ee l evel

bom ber s, t w o d i ve bom ber s, a nd a f igh ter —

fai l ed to make i t back to the car r i er s.’

T h is con tr over sy pr obabl y w il l n ever be r e-

sol ved , for r egar dl ess of h ow m an y of t hese

ar m them for the new at tack of the atol l .

Wh i l e h i s men wer e i nvol ved i n th i s wor k

on the f l i gh t deck and i n hangar spaces,

N agu m.o got th e bel a~ed w or d fr om a T on e

sear ch pl ane that U . S. sh i ps, i ncl ud i ng at

i east one car ri er , wer e i n the ar ea. T h i s

caused another change of m i nd , and the

adm i r al or der ed the pl anes’ or dnance

changed agai n , fr om bom bs back to tor -pedoes w i th wh i ch to at tack the sur face

sh i ps. B u t th i s deci si on was just tar dy

enough to al l ow Spr uance to catch h i m

w it h h is pl an es d ow n, an d w it h tor ped oes

an d bom bs st rew n i n gr eat con fu si on abou t



,J apan ese pl an es m ad e i t back t o t hei r car -

r ier d ecks, F letch er an d Spr uan ce—w ith a

certain un i nten t i on al assi stan ce fr om

N agum o-i ni ti ated act i on wh i ch r esu l tedi n the dest r uct i on of al l these pl anes,

anyway.

N “agu mo’s m i st ak e w as a n at ur al on e for

a com m ander who bel i eved h im sel f to be

unopposed on a “fi el d” of bat t l e of h i s ow n

choi ce. L ieu tenant J oi ch i T om onaga, the

fl igh t off i cer w ho h ad com man ded t he fi rst

at tack w ave agai nst M i dw ay, r ad ioed d ur -

i ng h is r etu rn fl igh t t hat “T her e i s n eed fora secon d a tt ack w ave.’; M ean wh il e, w it h

N agum o st i ll i gnor an t of the U . S. f l eet ’s

t he h an gar d eck .7

M ean wh il e, as N agu mo vaci l lat ed , ..A d-

m ir al N im itz’s or der s for Captai n Si mar d

to “go al l ou t for the car r i er s,” wh i l eM ar ine an t i ai r cr af t bat ter i es wor r ied

about M id way, w er e u nd er execu ti on .

V M SB -241, l ik e t he fi gh ter squ ad ron , h ad

d i vi ded i n to two st r i k i ng un i ts, the fi r st

com posed of 16 SBD–2’S l ed by M ajor

L ofton H ender son , and the second of 11

S B2U –3’S com m an d ed by M a jor B en ja mi n

MT.Korr is . H en der son ’s gr ou p cl i mbed t o

9,OOO f eet to l ocate the enem y car r i er s,wh i ch wer e then under goi ng the at tack

fr om the T BF’s and the B–26’s. F l i er s of

MI D WAY VE RS U S TH E J AP ANE S E , 4-5 J UNE 1942 225

N ext cam e an at tack by 15 B -17’s l ed by

L ieu tenant Col onel Wal ter C. Sweeney,

U SA, bu t agai n cl aim s of h i ts wer e opt i -

mist ic. And as these F l yi ng F or tr esses

pu l l ed away, M ajor N or r i s cam e in w i th

h i s 11 Vind i cator s wh i ch had taken of f

w it h H en der son . Beset by the Zer os,

N or r is t ur ned t o t he n ear est t ar get at h an d,

and the M ar i nes cr owded thei r anci en tpl anes i n to a standar d gl i de r nn al m ost

on top of the .J apanwe bat t l esh i p

H cu -w w—pr evi ou sl y cl ai med as an A rm y

B–17’s vi ct im off L uzon. Some of the

f li er s al so w en t af ter t he K i ri sh ir na, w hi ch

gone i n agai nst the at tack i ng J apanese

pl anes, on l y 10 r etu r ned , and of th i s num -

ber onl y two wer e i n shape to l eave the

gr ou nd a ga in . T h ir t een F 2.4–3’s a nd t wo

F4F ’s wer e m issi ng, al ong w ith the ei gh t

cr aft l ost f r om the H ender son gr oup and

the th r ee shot away fr om the N or ri s for ce.

Sl ick bl ack sm oke fr om oi l f i res bi ll ow ed

up fr om the i sl ands, and r uptu r ed fuell in es l eft m or e t han tw o-t hi rd s of t he avi a-

t i on fuel tem por ar i l y unavai labl e. Cr aso-

l i ne had to be sent to the f i el d fr om Sand

I sl and , and hand-pum ped fr om dr um s.

T he M ar in e gr ou nd d efense for ce h ad su s-



w as near by, bu t nei ther at tack m anaged

any h i ts. T hr ee M ar ines wer e shot down,

an d t he gr ou p w as cr ed it ed w it h spl asi l in g

t wo en em y f igh ter s, p lu s t w o pr oba bl es?

By 1100 al l su r vi vi ng M ar i ne ai r cr af t

had m ade thei r way back to the atol l

w h er e a l l h an d s gr i m l y a ssessed t h e b at t l e’s

dam age and pr epar ed for subsequent ac-

t i on . Of the VM F-221 fi gh ter s wh i ch had

a i r f i el d : cap tu red two mon ths l a t er , was named

in }I a j Henderson ’shonor . Rea r gunnerso f t h i s

st r i k e gr ou p a r e cr ed i t ed w i t h f ou r en em y killsplus t w o a ddit ion al pr oba bles.

9 ONI Review, 19; U SS B S Intcrrogatiorw, Na v

NO 2, C a pt S usumu K a w a guchi, I J N,I ,6. S ee

t ai ned 24 casu al ti es, an d fou r or dn an ce-

m en of VM F-221 had been l ost to a d i r ect

bom b h i t.

.4t 1700 a bur ni ng en em y car r i er w as r e-

por ted 200 m i l es nor thwest of M idway,

and M ajor N or ri s pr epar ed VM SB -241>S

si x op er a ti on al S BD –2 ’S a nd f i ve S B21 J –3 ’S

for a n i gh t at tack . T he pl anes took of f

at 1900, bu t cou l d not f i nd the car r i er .

M ajor N or r i s fai l ed to r etu r n fr om th i s

m i ssi on , a lt hou gh t he ot her p il ot s m an aged

to hom e by the l i gh t of oi l f i r es and

the an ti ai rcr af t sear ch l igh ts wh i ch wer e

tu r ned up as beacons.’” M eanwhi l e, the

Bat t l e of M idway had been deci ded at sea

CHAPTER.5

Battle of the Carrier Planes

4 June 1942

While t h e la nd-ba sed fl iers h a d t heir

morning go a t t h e J a pa nese St r i k i ng

Force, a nd w hile Na gumo juggled his

pla nes a nd decision s, S prua n ce st ea med

sout hea st t o lea d off t he a t ta ck a ga inst t he

en emy. The America n a dmira l int ended

t o hold his pla n es unt il h e dr ew w it hin

t he ta sk force. The str ike w a s led by 29

D eva st a t or (TB D –1 ) t orpedo bombers,

a nd t hese w er e follow ed by 6’7 D a unt less

dive bombers a n d 20 Wildca t fight ers.

E igh t een ot h er Wildca ts, plus a like n um-

ber w it hh eld t o relieve t hem la t er, pa -

t rol led ov er hea d . Yorktown h eld ba ck its



a bout 100 miles of t he J a pa nese. B ut w h en

h e h ea rd of t he st rike on Midw a y, S pru-

a nt e. la un ch ed t w o h ours before t his in-

t ended ra n ge w ould h a ve been rea ched.

B y t his ca lcula t ed risk h e h oped t o ca t ch

t he J apa nese pla nes ba ck on t heir ca rriers

rea rmin g for a second a t ta ck of t h e a t oll.

An d a bout t w en t y minut es la ter NTa gumo

ma de t h e decision w hich set up himself

a n d his pla nes a s exa ct ly t he ta rget S pru-

a n ce h oped his pilot s w ould fin d.1

Enteqnise a n d Hornet bega n la un ch in g

a t a bout 07007 sen din g off ever y opera tion a l

pla ne t h ey ca rr ied, except a few t o cover

pla nes for a bout t w o hours; Flet cher con-

sidered t ha t t he a ircra ft from his ca rr ier

might be n eeded a ga inst ot h er en emy ca r-

riers not yet loca t ed, but by 0838 t here h a d

been n o enemy sight ings, a nd h e decided

t o la un ch ha lf his dive bombers a n d a ll

his t orpedo pla nes, a long w it h escort ing

fight ers. 13y shor t ly a ft er 0900 t he Yor~ -

town ha d 17 S B D ’sj 12 TB D ’s, a nd six

F4F–3’s in t he a ir , a nd ot her pla nes rea dy

for t akeoff.

As S prua n ce ha d hoped, Na gumo con -

t in ued for more t ha n a n h our t o st ea m t o-

w a rd Midw a y, a n d t he first U . S . pla nes

B ATTLE OF TH E C ARRIE R P LANE S, 4 J UNE 1942 227

in.g Force, a n d pulled dow n upon t hem-

selves t he bulk of t he Zeroes pa t rolling

overhead. Aga inst this combin ed fire, few

of t h e pla nes got close en ough t o J apa nese

ships to la unch t orpedoes, a nd a ga in, a s in

t he C ora l S ea ba t t le, a ny hit s scored by t he

slow unrelia ble t orpedoes of tha t per iod

proved duds. This a nt ia ircra ft a nd

fight er opposit ion st a rt ed w hile t he pla nes

ha d yet eight miles t o go t o rea ch t he J a pa -

n ese ships, a nd on ly one D eva st a t or pilot

l ived to pull up from t his a t t a ck,’

The 14 TB D ’s from t he Enterprise fa red

only a lit t le bet t er. Four of t hese pla nes,

likew ise st riking w it hout figh t er escor t ,

& ’oryu>s ga soline st ow a ge exploded a n d

broke t h e ship in ha lf.

B y 1030, Na gumo ha d lost t h e services of

t h ree ca rriers, a nd in a ll t hree ca ses, a s

S prua nce ha d h oped, t h e America n a t t a ck

h a d ca ught t he ships in process of refuel-

in g a nd re.a rrn ing t he pla nes of t heir llid-

w a y st r ike. B ut even w it h t hese ships a n d

t heir pla nes gon e, ~ agumo st ill w a s det er-

mined t o fight ba ck w it h his surviving ca r-

r ier , t he E liryu, w hich ha d esca ped da ma ge

by get t ing fa r out of posit ion in some of

t he ea r lier eva sive a ct ions t o esca pe t he t or-

ped o pla nes. ‘t .llt hough defea t now st a red

t h e J a pa nese st a rkly in t l~ e fa ce, t hey felt



survived t heir t orpedo runs a ga inst t h e

,J a pa nese shipsj a lt h ough t hey scored no

hit s. B ut t hese t w o D eva st a tor a t t a cks,

cost ly a s t hey w ere, served t o pull dow n t he

Zero ca nopy t o such a low a lt it ude t ha t t he

follow ing S B ~ ’s from Enterpr ise a nd

Yorktown ha d a n ea sier t ime of it .

These D a unt less dive bombers ca me in a t

a bout 1020 w hile ~ agumo>s ships st ill w ere

dodging t he D eva sta t ors. Th e ~ lt a g; t ook

t w o hit s w hich set her a fire, a n d Admira l

Na gumo t ra nsferred his fla g t o t he light

cruiser Nagara.3 The Xa ga susta ined

four hit s, a n d a t 1925 she blew up a nd sa nk.

t ha t t he ba t t le h a d t o be cont in ued a s long

a s w e ret a ined even a sma ]l pa rt of our

st riking pow er .>’ 5

~ ~ rh en t h e Alcagi was shot from under

N“a gumo, t he J a pa nese A “t r %i n g F or ce com-

ma nder t empora r ily pa ssed his comma nd

t o Rea r Admira l H iroa ki Abe on boa rd t he

hea vy cruiser Tone, a nd comma n d of a ir

opera t ions simult a neously pa ssed t o Rea r

ildmira l Ta mon Ya ma guchi in t he lliryt i.

.At a bout 1050 t w o floa t pla nes from t h e

cruiser Ph%uma si~ hteil t he Yorktoum

i,a sk group a n d guided t o it a st rike of 18

dive bombers a nd six fight ers up from t he



B ATTLE OF TH E C ARRI E R P LANE S , -1 . J ~ NE 1942 229

r el i eved N agumo of com mand i n favor of

Rear .I dm ir a] K ondo; bu t l ater n~essnges

tol d t he com m:u ld er i l l ch ief t hat t her e w as

l i tt l e ch an ce of f in di n g t l ]e 1“. S . “F l eet u nt i l

af ter dawn next day. I t 0255 on 5 ,J une

t l ~e a dm i r al ch an ged h i s l n il ~d , a ba nd on ed

t he M i d way ven tu re, an d or d er ed a gen er al

w i thdrawa l .

A dm ir al Spr uan ce, n ow m or e on hi ., ow il

t han ever , fol low in g F let ch er ’s m ove fr om

the dtm laged l ’or lto~r n to the A.sto~i a/ ’

of cour se d i d not know of Yam amoto’s

deci si on ; bu t he d i d know th at vast l y m or e

pow er fu l en em y su rface for ces cou ld w el l

w i th the dest r oyer s to scr een them , the

M ogm wi w i th a dam aged bow and the

MzXWna t r ai li ng oi l. T l~e subm ar ine com

t i nued to stal k these four sh i ps, d i d not

m anage to gai n a fi r i ng posi t i on , bu t at

br eak of d ay r el )or ted t hei r posi ti on .

(“apt ai n Si m ar d sen t 12 B –17’s ou t fr om

M idway to at tack these sh i ps, bu t theF l yi ng For tr esses had t r oubl e l ocat i ng

thei r tar gets, and Si mar cl then or der ed a

M ar ine bom bi ng squadr on off on th i s m is-

si on . Captai n M . A. T yl er w i th si x

S 13 1)–2 7sa nd (’a pt ai n R i ch ar d E . F l em i n g

w i th si x SB2L ”-3’S took off at abou t 0700



be n ear by, qu it e possi bl y w ith ad di ti on al

car r ier s that , had com e in w i th the M ain

Body or w i th another enem y for ce. H i spr obl em , m h e sa~v i t, w as t o avoi d com bat

i n w h ich h e cou l d be h opel essl y ou tcl assed ,

especi al l y at n i gh t , and yet at t i l e sam e

t i m e keep w i th i n ai r suppor t d i stance of

M i dw ay i n case t he ,J apan ese sh ou ld per -

si st i n thei r assau l t pl ans. T h i s he suc-

ceeded i n doi ng, bu t i n the pr ocess l ost

con tact w i th the enemy fl eet . H e d i d not

r egai n con tact u nt il 6 .J u ne.I n t i l e ear l y mor n i ng hour s of 5 J une,

however , a r et i r i ng ,J apan ese col um n of

to at tack the sh i ps wh i ch wer e then r e-

por ted to be 170 m i l es west of the atol l .

T hey l ocated the sh i ps at abou t 0800, and‘~yl er l ed h i s d i I isi oI l ou t of the s~~r ~o.

w ar d the ster n of th e M ogam i wh i le F lem -

i ng and the other V i nd i cator pi l ots went

down at the Mikw ta

B oth d i vi si ons m et heavy ant i ai rcr aft

f i r e, bu t T yl er aucl h i s f l i er s br acketed

thei r tar get w i th si x near m i sses wh i ch

caused some topsi de dam age to the M o-

gumi.” F l em ing’s pl ane was h i t , bu t thepi l ot , stayed on cour se at the head of h i s

at tack for m at i on and cr ashed h i s pl ane

930P EARL H ARB OR TO G LTAD ALC ANTA1,

cr ui ser s, an d A dm i ral Spr ur r nce’s car r ier

I )l anes found t i le cr ippl es the fol low i ng

day, the 6th . T lw at tack of these pl anes

sank t i le ill;l:?(/}/a and i r l f li ct ed en ou gh

ad di ti on al d am age on t i le i11~9~/ti i to keep

her ou t of the }var for the next two year s.

T he B at t l e of M idwzy-wh i ch many h i s-

tor ians and m il itar y exper ts consi der the

d eci si ve n aval en gagem en t of th e Paci fi c

War -was over , and al l act i ons fol low ing

those of 4 J une wer e ant i -cl im act i c. T he

U . S. h ad l ost 98 car r i er pl an es of al l t ypes,

and w oul cl l ose the Yor ktow., then under

tow . T he J apanese car r i er s sustai ned

I n an oth er ai r -ai r act ion , si mi lar t o t hat

at Cor al Sez, F l etcher and Spr uance had

sent the pr oud I mper ial F l eet scur ryi ng

hom e to J apan w i thou t f i r ing a shot fr om

i ts su per ior n aval r i f l es. Yam am ot o cou ld

gai n l i tt l e consol at i on fr om the fact that

the nor ther n oper at i on had secur ed two

Aleut i an bases: what good the bow l i f the

r i ce i s gone? For ”. . . u nl ike m ost of t he

N ipponese war l or ds, [Yam am oto] ap-

pr eci ated Am er i can st r ength and r e-

sour ces.” ‘7 H e knew that destr uct i on of

t l ~e U . S. F leet ear ly i n 1942 was a neces-

sar y pr er equ i si te to the year ’s pl ans for



total l osses of about 3Y2 pl anes of al l

t ypes.” And w i th the four car r i er s had

gon e th e cr eam of t hei r exper ien ced n aval

pi lots. T hi s, al ong w ith l ater l osses i n ai r

bat tl es over Gu ad al can al , w as a bl ow fr om

wh i ch the ,Japanese never f u l l y recovered .15

A lt hou gh t he car r ier pl an es h ad cl eci ded

t he l ar ge i ssu e, t he con tr i bu ti on of M a r in es

to the defense of M idw ay had hen consi d-

er abl e, f r om t he i n cept i on of br r se d evel op -

m ent , to the end of the act i on . N ot on l y

h ad t he i ld an d 6t h D efen se B at tal ion s con -

t ri bu ted t hei r sh ar e of l abor , vi gi lan ce, an d

f l ak, bu t the avi at i on per sonnel of M AG-

con tr ol of t he Cor al Sea an d th e Am er ican

sea hm es to Aust r al i a and N ew Zeal and ,

and , i n the fi nal anal ysi s, the necessar y

pr er equi si te to t he su ccess of J apan ’s en -

t i re w ar ef for t .”

B ut n ow t hat t he ,J apan ese. cl ear l y w er e

defeated at M i dw ay, they no l onger cou l d

over look t he set back th ey h ad r ecei ved at

Cor al Sea i n ph ase on e of th ei r 1942 pl an s,

and phase th r ee-occupat i on of the F i ji s,

,Samoa and N ew Caledoni a—soon was

scrapped. “The catast r ophe of M idway

defi ni tel y mar ked the tu r ni ng of the t i de

i n the Paci f i c War . . .“ ‘g and fr om ar -

B .ATTLE OF TH E C ARRI E R P LANE S , 4 J [’XE 1942 231

d efeat , and th ey en d on an i nt r ospect i ve

n ote :

I n t he f i nal anal ysi s, t he root causeo f Japan ’s

d efeat , n ot al on e i n t he B at tl e of k li dw ay bu ti n t he en ti r e w ar , l i es d eep i n t he J a pa nese n a-

t ion al ch ar act er . T h er e i s a n i r r at ion al i ty a ndimpuls i venessabout our peop le which resu l t s i n

act i ons t ha t a r e haphaza rdand of t en con t r ad i c-tory. ~ t r ad it ion of pr ovi nci al ism m ak es u s

na r r ow -m i nded and do~ rna ti c, r el uct an t t o d i s-card prejudices and slow to adopt even necessary.i m pr ov em en ts i f t hey r equ i re a n ew con cep t.I ndeci si ve and vaci l l a t i ng , we succumb read i l y

t o d ecei t , w h i ch i n t u r n m a kes u s d i sd ah r fu l o fot her s. Oppor tu ni st ic bu t l ack in g a spi r it of

da rh r gand i ndependence,we a re won t t o p l acer el i an ce on ot her s a nd t o t r uck le t o su per i or s.

Ou r wan t of r a t i ona l i t yo ft en l eadsus t o con f usedesi re w i th rea l i t y ,andthus toclo th ingsw i thout

ca ref ul p la nn i ng. On l y w h en ou r h ast y a ct i on

hasended i n f ai l u r e dowebeg i nt ot h i nk r a t i on -

a ll y a bou t i t, u su al l y f or t he p ur pose of fi n di ngexcuses f or t he f ai l u r e. I n sh or t, as a n at ion ,

w e l ack m atu ri ty of m in d an d t he n ecessar y

cond i t i on ingto enab leus to know when and what

t o sa cr i f ice f or t h e sa ke of ou r m a i n goa l .

Such a re t he weaknesses of t he Japanesena -

t i ona l character . T hese weaknesses were re-f l ect ed i n t he def ea t we su f fer ed i n t he Ba t tl e of

M i dway ,wh i ch rendered f r u i t l ess a l l t he val i an t

d eed s a nd p reci ou s sacr i fi ces of t he m en w h o

fought there. In these weaknesse sl i estheeause

of Japan’sm isfor tunes.z”

~ I b id . , 2 47 –24 8.





PART VI

T he T ur n i ng Poi n t : Guadal canal

CH APTER 1

Background and Preparations ]

Scar cel y h ad A dm i ral Y am am ot o pu ll ed

h i s Com bi ned F l eet aw ay fr om i ts defeat

at M i dw ’aybefor eth eU . S.,J oi nt Ch iefs of

Staff began r econsi der ing basi c Paci fi c

pol i cy. T hey wanted an ~fl ensi ve wh i ch

w ou ld ai d con tai nm en t of t he J apan ese ad -

van ces t ow ar d A ust ral i a an d safegu ar d t he

U . S. comm uni cat i on l i nes to the Anzac

Er nest J . K i ng, Com mander i n Ch i ef of

the L ’. S. F l eet and Ch i ef of N aval Oper a-

t i ons, tol d Ch i ef of Staf f Geor ge C.

M a rsh al l t hat h e con si der ed i t n ecessar y t o

gar r i son cer tai n South and Southwest

Paci fi c i sl an ds w it h Ar my t roops 2 in pr ep-

ar at i cm for l aunch i ng U . S. M ar ines on an

ear ly offensi ve ag%inst the enemy: And



ar ea. As ear ly as 18 Febr uar y, Adm i r al

‘ U n less ot herw ise not ed t he ma t er ia l used in

P art VI is der ived from 1st Ma rD iv Fina lRept on

t h e G ua da lca na l Opera tion, P ha ses I t h rough V,

issued J un e-August 1943, h ereina ft er cit ed a s

1,’tnalRept ( w it h P ha se h ’o) ; a ct ion repor t s, w ar

dia ries, a nd journ a ls of t h e va rious unit s w hich

served w it h or a s pa rt of t h e 1st Ma rD iv; Ma rine

Air Hi.storg; Strateyic Planni??q; W. F . C ra ven

a nd J . L . Ca te (ed s. ), T1/e Pacific: Guadalcanatto Saipan—The Army Air Forces in Warld War

11 (Chicago : L-nivers i tyof ChicagoPress, 1%0) ;

J .~ l i l l e r , J r . , Guudakx/nal: The First Offensioe—

.Vt~itcd States Arm?t ia World War II (Washin~-t on : H i st Di v, 11~ 1949), h er ei n af ter ci t ed as

shor t l y af ter the Bat t l e of the Cor al Sea,

Gen er al M acA rt hu r ad van ced pl an s for an

at tack agai nst the J apanese at Rabau l .

For th i s m ove he r equested ai r cr aft car -

r i er s, ad di ti on al t roops, an d m or e pl an es.4

But N im i tz r ejected th i s pl an . H i s car -

r ier s w er e too pr eci ous for com mi tm ent i n

w at er s so r est ri ct ed as t he Sol om on Sea, h e

tol d th e gen er al . B esi des, t he ad mi ral h ad

a pl an of h i s own. H e wanted to captu r e

T ul agi w ith on e M ar in e r ai der bat tal ion .5Adm i r al K i ng’s r eact i on to th i s pl an was

i ni ti al ly favor abl e, bu t on 1 J une he si ded

236 1’E ARL H AR BOR T() G U AL )AL C:AATAL

B ut now t i me and the vi ctor y at M idway

had im pr oved the U . S. posi t i on i n the

Paci f i c, and on 25 J une Adm i r al K ing ad-

vi sed N im itz and Vi ce Adm i r al Rober t L .

Ghor mley, Com mander of South Paci f i c

F or ces: t o pr epar e f or an off en si ve agai nst

the L ow er Sol om ons. Santa Cr uz I sl and,

T u la gi , an d a dj acen t ar ea s w ou l d be sei zed

an d occu pi ed by M ar i nes u nd er Ci nCPac,and Ar my tr oops fr om Aust r al i a then

woul d for m the per manent occupat i on

garrison.7 D -Day woul d be about 1

A ugu st ,

The task seemed al most i mpossi bl e.

Ghor ml ey had just taken over hi s Paci fi c

Paci fi c’s n ear est l an d-based bom ber fi el d

w as 975 m il es fr om T ul agi . T he com man d

setup must be made w i th a vi ew towar d

success, K ing sai d, but tbe pr im ar y con-

si der at ion w as t hat t he oper at ion be begu n

a t once. H e stated unequ i vocal ly th at i t

m ust be un der h ’i mi tz, an d t hat i t coul d n ot

be con du ct ed i n a ny ot her w ay.’

T he J oi nt Ch i efs r esol ved th i s con fl icton 2 J ul y w i th i ssuance of the ‘(tJ oi nt D i -

r ect i ve. for Offensi ve Oper at i ons i n the

Southwest Paci f i c Ar ea Agr eed on by the

U ni ted St at es Chi efs of Staff.” T he d ir ec-

t i ve set t he sei zu r e of t he h ’ew B r i tai n -N ew

I r el an d-N ew Gu in ea ar ea as t he obj ect ive



j ob after a hur r i ed t r i p fr om L ondon

w h er e h e h ad been S peci al h T av al O bser v er

and Com mander of L T.S. N aval For ces i nEur ope: the I st , M ar ine D i vi si on , sl ated

for the Sol om on l and i ng, was maki ng an

adm i n i st r at i ve move fr om the U n i ted

States to N ew Z eal and ; and M ar shal l and

K ing cont i nued to debate m atter s of com -

m and. T he gener al contested the N avy’s

r ight to com mand the oper at i on. T he ar ea

l ay i n the Southwest Paci f i c, M ar sl m l l

poi nted out , and so M acAr thur ought to bei n ch ar ges

N ever m i nd ar bi tr ar y geogr aph y, K in g’s

of these oper at i ons, bu t i t br oke th i s god

d ow n i n to t hr ee p hases d esi gn ed t o r esol ve

the d i spu te between M acAr thur andN im itz. Phase One wou l d be the sei zur e

of the i sl ands of Santa Cr uz and Tu l agi ,

al on g w it h posi ti ons on ad j scen t. i sl and s.

N im itz woul d com mand thi s oper at i on ,

w i th M acAr thur concentr at i ng on i n ter -

d i ct i on of enemy ai r and naval act i vi ty to

the west . And to r emove M acAr thur ’s

geogr aph ic cl ai m on t he Ph ase On e t ar get

a rea , t he J oi n t Ch i ef s sh i ft ed t he bou nd ar ybetween the gener al and Adm ir al N im itz

to pl ace the L ower Sol om ons i n the ad-



238 P EARL H ARB OR TO G UAD ALC AN.4L

pl at oon s, an d som e l abor er s-occu pi ed

T ul agi w hi le a si mi lar task or gan i zat i on

fr om the 3d l i7wr e F or ce went a sh or e on

Gavutu , a sm al l er i sl and near by. T hey

met no opposi t i on , except that fr om Ad-

m i ral F l etcher ’s pl anes i n the act i on an-

ci l l ar y to the Bat t l e of the Cor al Sea, and

d ef en si ve i n st al l at i on s w er e set u p i m m ed i -

at el y t o pr otect t he base con str uct i on an d

i mpr ovem en t w or k w hi ch soon goh u nd er -

w ay. T he J apan ese set u p coast watch er

st t i ti ons on Savo I sl and at the nor thw est

end of the channel between Flor i da and

Guadal canal , and on both t i ps as wel l as

t he sou th coa st of Gu ad al ca nal .

T ul agi has an excel lent har bor ,= and i n-

J apan st i ll had her eye on Por t M or esby.

T he t r oops sl ated for that occupat i on

al ready wai ted at R abau l , and now a new

fl eet , the Ei gh th , under l ’i ce Adm i r al

Gun ich i M i kaw a, w as cr eated t o hel p l ook

after th i s souther n end of the J apanese

conquest st r ing. T hi s f l eet , w i th the hel p

of ai r cr aft fr om Rabau l and the L ower

Sol omons, woul d pr otect the fer ryi ng of

t r oops to B un s, an d th e su bsequ en t over -

l and mar ch of these t r oops acr oss N ew

Gui nea’s Ow en Stanl ey M ou nt ai ns t o cap-

tu r e Por t M or esby. T hus Austr al ia w ou l d

be w el l bl ock ed i f n ot com pl et el y i sol at ed ;

and maybe i f the J apanese d i d not th i nk

about the defeat at M idway the st i ng



i ti al ef for ts of th e J apan ese l an di ng for ce

i mpr oved th i s and devel oped a seapl ane

base th er e. T he enem y took n o i mm ed iate

st eps t o d evel op ai r fi el ds, an d a fu ll m on th

passed befor e sur veyi ng par t i es and

pat r ol s cr ossed the 20-m i l e channel to

Guadal canal wher e they staked out an

ai r st r i p si te on the pl ai ns of the L unga

Ri ver . T hey fi n i shed th i s sur vey l ate i n

<J un ean d began to gr ad e a r unw ay ear ly i n

Ju ly .

Wi th a scr appi ng of the pl ans to occupy

Sam oa, F ij i, an d N ew Cal ed on ia, an d w it h

wou l d just go aw ay and ever yth i ng wou l d

be al l r igh t agai n .”

A fter r ei nfor ci ng t he A nzac l ifel ine (see

Par t I I , Chapter 3), the U . S. began edg-

i ng towar d i ts Sol omon I sl ands tar get

ar ea. N ear the end of M ar ch some 500

Ar my tr oops fr om M ajor Gener al Al ex-

ander M . Patch>s Amer i ca D i vi si on i n

N ew Cal edon i a w ent up to gar ri son E fatei n the l ower N ew H ebr i des. On 29 M ar ch

th e 4t h M ar in e D efen se B at tal ion an d M a-

B AC KG ROI J ND AND 1’R EP AR ATI ONS 239

est tow n, w as i mpr oved , an d an oth er su ch

base was bu i l t i n H avannah H ar bor on

t he i sl an d ’s n or t hw est coa st .

T h i s was a. h azar dous and r ather un -

ner vi ng extensi on of defensi ve l i nes for

th e m eager Am er ican for ce of th at per iod .

T he J apanese wer e just 700 m i l es to the

nor th i n the L ower Sol om ons, and th i s

fact gave th ese N ew H ebr id es i sl and s an dw at er s t hat sam e h ost il e, “cr eep y” feel in g

t hat m em ber s of t he u nsu ccessfu l Wak e r e-

l i ef exped i t i on had sensed wh i l e on that

ventur e deep i n to the enem y zone. T he

J apanese m ade a few ai r r ai ds i n to th i s

a rea , bu t t he gr ea test op posi ti on ca me f rom

cupi ed as an add i t i onal ou tpost of the

com mu ni cat i on l in es t o Au st r al ia. T h i s

m ove w as postponed , how ever , and i t w as

not unt i l October that M ar i nes l anded at

Funafu t i i n the E ]l i ce gr oup. Espi r i tu

San to was i m m ed i atel y i m por tan t to the

Sol om ons oper at i on , however , and on 28

M ay a for ce of abou t 500 Ar m y tr oops

m oved fr om Efate to the l ar ger N ew H e-br i des i sl and far ther nor th . T he f i r st at -

t em pt of these t r oops to bu i l d an ai r fi el d

ther e bogged down i n a st r et ch of swam p

an d new outbr eaks of m al ar ia.

By th i s t i m e, pl ans for the WAT CH -

T OWER l and i ngs wer e f i rm i ng up, a nd



t he a nop hel es m osqu i to.

I n the N ew H ebr i des Am er i can t r oops

of Wor l d War I I had thei r f i r st whol esal een cou nter w ith th is car r i er of m al ar ia, an d

the f i el d m edi cal u ni ts w er e n ot pr epar ed

to cope w i th the d i sease i n such pr opor -

t i on s. A tabr in e tabl et s w er e n ot yet avai l-

abl e, a nd even qu in in e w as i n sh or t su ppl y.

By the end of Apr i l ther e wer e 133 cases

of m al ar ia am on g th e 947 off i cer s an d m en

of the 4th Defense Bat tal i on , and by the

t i m e of the Guadal canal l and i ng ear l y i nAugust the ent i r e N ew H ebr ides for ce r e-

por ted t he d isea se i n even gr eat er pr opor -

t he effor t a t . E spirit u Sa nto w a s reinforced

so tha t t he a ir field w ould be complet ed in1

time. On 15 J u l y a detachm ent fr om the ~4th M ar ine Defense Bat tal i on went up to

San to w i th a heavy ant i ai r cr aft bat ter y

and an au tom at i c weapons bat ter y. T he

ai r f i el d was com pl eted in t i m e, bu t the

Ar my tr oops and M ar i nes wer e m ost l y

wal k i ng cases of m al ar i a by then . H ow-

ever , i m por tan t i sl ands had been rei n -

for ced, n ew gar ri sons for med to pr otect

the com muni cat i on l i nes, and these d i s-pl acem en ts tow ar d en em y bases h ad been

accom pl i shed . T he t i m e had com e to

-..P EARL H ARB OR TO G UAD ALC ANAL24U

tra ining h i s d i vi si on i n N ew Zeal and .”

T he d ivi si on , t he M ar in e Cor ps’ m aj or u ni t

avai l abl e for em ploym ent on such shor t

not i ce, wm under str ength by about one

th i rd because of detachm en t of the r ei n -

for ced 7th M ar ines to Sam oan du ty.

.L rm y t r oops i nthear ea, or igi nal l y un-

der Ghor ml ey’s com mand, cou l d pr ovi de

l i t t l e m or e than m or al suppor t to the

l and i ngs. T hi s shoestr ing ven tu r e wou l d

not r em ove the need for gar r ison for ces

el sew her e i n the South Paci fi c. B esi des,

Ghor mley l ost h i s d i rect con t r ol of these

t r oops on 1 J u l y when M ajor Gener al

were opposed by ci rcu mstan ces of w hi ch

N im it z w as n ot aw ar e}’

T o com pl ete t he pi ct ur e of com man d for

WAT CH TOWER, Rear Adm i r al Ri chm -

ond K . T ur ner ar ri ved fr om Wash i ngton

on 18 J u l y and r epor ted to Ghor m ley as

comm ander of the am ph i bi ous for ce.

Ghor rn l ey, under N im itz, w as i n over -al l

st r ategi c com mand, bu t he wou l d r em ai n

at h is h ead qu ar ter s i n 3T ou mea. A dm ir al

F l etcher wou l d com mand the joi nt expe-

d i t ion ar y f or ce. B ut i n pr act ice F let ch er

con fi ned h im sel f al m ost com pl et el y t o pr o-

vi al in g ai r cover fr om h is car r ier s, an d t hi s

l eft . T ur ner , i n add i t i on to comm and i ng



M il l ar d F. H ar m on, U SA, becam e Com -

m an di ng C~en er al , Sou th Paci fi c A rea, t o

head al l Ar my for ces i n the theater . E venthough H ar mon wou l d be under Ghor m-

l ey’s com m and , the adm i r al at f i r st d i s-

l i ked th i s comm and setup. B ut he l ater

cam e t o r egar d H ar mon as on e of t he fi nest

adm in i st r ator s and coor di nator s he had

ever met .lG

Adm i r al Ghor r nl ey’s job i n the Sol~th

Paci fi c seem ed al most t o r esem bl e t hat of

a t r af l i c d i r ector mor e than i t d i d the r ol e

of a com mander . Accor d i ng to pl ans,

l ’andegr if t and h i s d i vi si on , i n char ge of

al m ost ever yt hi ng el se as w el l .

T hi s com man d set up w hi ch pl aced Van -

d egr i ft u nd er t he h T av y’s am ph i bi ou s f or ce

com mander r ank l ed unt i l near ly the t im e

of the w i thdr awal of the 1st M ar ine D i vi -

si on fr om Guadal canal f i gh t i ng. I t was

n ot a case of sm al l j eal ou sy abou t con tr ol

or an y sor t of pet t y peevi sh ness on t he par t

of ei ther Vandegr i f t or T ur ner . Rather

i t w as a cl ash of ser iou s opposi ng con vi c-

t i on s abou t h ow su ch an oper at i on sh ou ld

be conducted . Tur ner and m any other

B AC KG ROL ’XD AXD P RI IE ’AR ATI OXS 241

necessary i n the Paci f i c. Vandegr i f t ,

faced w i th the task of pu t t i ng these

stud i ed opi n i ons and exper i m en ts i n to

pr act i ce, w an ted z cl ear -cu t com m and

r i gh t , fr ee fr om any vest i ge of d i vi ded

r esp on si bi l i ty sh ar ed w i th t he com m an der

af loat. (hce f i r ml y establ i shed ashor e,

M ar i ne opi n i on hel d , the l and i ng for ce

com m an der sh ou ld com m an d h is ow n l an doper at i on . H is t r ai n i ng and posi t i on on

t he bat tl egr ou nd m ad e h im m or e qu al if i ed

for th is job th an w as th e am ph ibi ou s for ce

commander. I t took som e ar gu i ng, and

th i s m at ter f i nal l y had to be taken to the

top of m i l i t ar y h i er ar chy, bu t the N avy

H e w as i nst r um en tal i n br ingi ng abou t th e

con st ru ct i on of th e I kpi r i tu San to ai rf i el d

and seei ng that i t was avai l abl e for ai r -

cr aft on 28 ,J ul y, i n spi te of al l th e t r ou bl es

w hi ch befel l t he for ce i n t he N ew H ebr i des.

VM O-251 cam e i n to N oum ea on 12 J ul y

on boar d the U SS H eyzuood. T he ou t f i t

bar el y h ad t i me to set up cam p at T on tou ta

and uncr ate i t s ai r cr af t befor e i t got thewor d to go up to that new fi el d at San to

and back up the l and i ng. On 2 August

the un i t began to ar r i ve at th i s nor ther n

N ew H ebr ides f i el d , and w i th i n n i ne days

I&UtWLEHlt Col onel J ohn h ’. H ar t had h i s

squ ad ron i nst ai led th er e w ith i ts si xteen



even tual l y saw the poi n t and agr eed

w i th i t .

T ur ner ’s second i n com mand was RearAdm i r al V . A. C. Cr u tch l ey, RN , whose

cover in g for ce w ou ld i ncl ud e ei gh t cr ui se-

r s (th r ee Aust r al i an and fi ve l ’. S.) and

f i fteen d est r oyer s (al l U . S.). T hese sh ips

w er e to pr ovi de n aval gun fi re su ppor t an d

a n ti a i r cr a ft p r ot ect i on . I n al l , t he naval

con ti n gen t i n cl u ded t hr ee a ir cr a ft , ca rr i er s

w i th a st r ength of 250 pl anes; a num ber

of l i gh t and heavy cr u i ser s; tw o new

batt leships; an d th e avai labl e scr een i ng

F 4F –3P l on g-r an ge ph ot ogr ap hi c pl an es.

H ar t st i l l was shor t h i s w i ng tanks for

l ong-r ange fl yi ng, however . T hese wer ef i nal l y f l own ou t fr om Pear l H ar bor and

ar r i ved on 20 Au gu st .

M a cA rt hu r ’s con tr i bu ti on t o t he Gu ad al -

can al oper at ion con si st ed of abou t si xt een

11–17’s w hi ch f l ew r econ nai ssan ce over

the ar ea west of the 1t i ?th m er i d i an east

(the boundar y between the Sou th and

Sou th west , Paci fi c Ar eas for ai r sear ch )

and at tem pted to pu t a stopper on the

en em y ai r f r om Rabaul .

242 P EARL H AR B OR T(} G UAD AL C ANAL

fense duty}’ T he 1st Base Depot had set

up an advance echel on i n Wel l i ngton on

21 J un e, an d oth er su ppl y bases w er e t o be

establ ish ed l at er at N ou mea an d E spi r i tu

Sante.

T he gener al st r uctu r e or gan i zed to em -

p loy t hese r esou r ces a ga in st t he J a pa nese

was l ai d down i n N im itz’ or der to Ghor m-

l ey of 9 J ul y, and Ghor rn l ey’s Oper at i on

Pl an 142 of 17 J u l y 1942.20

Ghor mley, exer ci si ng str ategi c com-

mand, set up h i s or gan i zat i on i n th r ee

ma in groups:

Car r ier F or ces (T ask F or ce 61.1 ) , com -

m anded by Rear Adm i r al L ei gh N oyes,

destroyers; and a sm al l m ine-sweepi ng

group.

Sh or e-13ased A ir cr af t (T ask F or ce 6:3),

under Rear Adm i r al J . S. M cCain

(Com Ai rSoPac), i ncl uded al l ai r cr aft i n

t he a rea except t hose on car r i er s.

Com pl i ca ti n g t hi s sym m et r ical st r uct ur e

was the tact i cal com mand r ol e pl ayed by

Vi ce Adm i r al F l etcher . H e was i n over -

al l com mand of T F 61 whi ch i ncl uded the

for ces of N oyes an d T ur ner .

Ghor mley cal l ed for a r ehear sal i n the

F i j i ar ea and d i r ected that al l task for ce

com m an der s ar r an ge t o h ol d a con fer en ce

n ear t he r eh ear sal ar ea. H e h im sel f w ou ld



was com posed of el ements of th r ee task

for ces fr om N im itz’s ar ea—n, 16, an d 18.

I t w ou ld i ncl ud e th ree car r ier s, Sar atoga,

E nt er pr i se, an d WcM p, t he f ast n ew bat tl e-

sh i p N or th Car ol ina, f i ve heavy cr ui ser s,

on e so-cal led an ti ai rcr aft cr ui ser , an d 16

destroyers.

Am ph i bi ous For ce (T ask For ce 61.2),

comm anded by Rear Adm i ral Ri chm ond

K . Tur ner , i ncl uded the M ar ine l and i ng

for ce car r i ed i n 13 at tack t ran spor ts, fou r

d est royer t ran spor t s, an d si x car go sh ips;

a f i r e suppor t gr oup of one ant i ai r cr af t

m ove fr om Auck l and to h~oum ea about 1

August . i n or der to com pl y w ith h i s or der s

to exer ci se st r ategi c com mand w ith i n the

op er a ti n g a r ea .zl

By th i s t i m e the pl ans and or der s wer e

for med , t he t ar get sel ect ed , t he for ces or -

gan i zed , and the N avy gi ven l eew ay to op-

er ate w ithou t poach i ng i n the ter ri tor y of

the Southw est Paci fi c. On l y the d etai l of a

l an di ng d ate r em ai ned u nset tl ed . V and e-

gr i f t poi n ted out to Ghor m ley that the

l ate ar ri val of h i s second echel on , and a

st r et ch of ba d w eat her , h ad so com pl i cat ed

be described as more than a stab in thedark. When General Vandegrift receivedhis initial warning order on 26 June 1942,neither his staff nor the local New Zealandauthorities had more than the most gen-

eral and sketchy knowledge of the objec-tive area or the enemy’ s strength and dis-position, and there was but a month avail-able before the scheduled date of mount-

ing out, 22 ,July.

*ls in the case with most tropical back-

gia group the Russells, Guadalcanal, andSan ‘ ristobal. Buka and Bougainville atoutbreak of the war were part of the Aus

traliail Mandated Territory of NewGuinea ; the remainder of the double chain

formed the British Solomon Islands Pro-tectorate. In all, the islands number sev-eral hundred, with some 18,600 squaremiles of land area. (See Map 11)

Florida, the largest island of the NggelaGroan, lies between Malaita and Guadal-



pwaters, the charting and hydrographic in-

formation was scanty and out of date.Lieutenant Colonel Frank B. Goettge, In-telligence Officer of the 1st RJarine Divi-sion, therefore set out to locate traders,planters, shipmasters, and a few minerswho had visited or lived at Guadalcanal

or Tulagi. A number of likely sources re-sided in ,\ustralia, and while his subordi-

nates tabulated the formal data available

cm l and between the northern tips of

Guadalcanal and Florida is the small,nearly-conical island of Save. Indispens-able Strait separates Florida from neigh-boring Malaita to the east, and the twenty-mile-wide strait between Florida and

Guadalcanal to the south is known gen-

erally as Sealark Channel. (See Map 1.3,Map Section)Nestled into the northwest rim of a


azCj

—-J



o

U i

33

&. .0

w

‘o

B AC KG ROU ND AND P RE PARATI ONS 245

i ng ter rai n that becam e a n ightmare formi l i t a r y opera t i ons.

Guadalcanal , some 90 m i l es i n l ength

and abou t 25 miles w i de, p r esen ts a va r ied

topogr aph y r angi ng fr om pl ai ns an d foot -

h i l ls al on g the nor th coast to a mountain

back bon e d roppi ng r api dl y t o t h e south

coast. Rain fa l l is ext r em el y heavy, an d

chan ges i n sea son a re m ar ked on l y by

changes i n i n tensi ty of pr eci pi t at i on .T hi s, together w ith a n average t empera -

t u r e in t he h i gh 80’s, r esu lts in a n un-

heal thy cl i m ate. M al ar i a, dengue, and

ot her f ever s, as well as f ungus i n f ect i ons,

aff l ict the populat ion.

Rivers a re n um er ou s an d fr om the mili-

t ar y poi n t of m ay be d i vi ded ar bi -

by the B r it i sh , n ot a single a ccura t e orcomplet e ma p of @a da lca na l or Tula gi

exist ed in t h e summer of 1942. The hy -

drogra phic cha r ts, cont a in ing just sufi-

cient da t a t o ena ble t ra ding schooners t o

keep from groun ding, w er e lit t le bet ter ,

a lt h ough t hese did loca t e a few out st a nd-

ing t erra in fea t ures of some use for ma k-

ing a la n dfa ll or conduct ing t r ia ngula t ion.

S uch loca t ions w er e not a lw a ys a ccura t e.~ I oun t ilusten, for exa mple, w a s a ssigned

a s a n ea r ly la nding object ive, but t he la nd-

ing force discovered t ha t inst ea d of being

but a few hundred ya rds a w a y from t he

bea ches, t h e mount a in a ctua lly la y severa l

miles a cross a lmost impa ssa ble jungle.n

.Ier ia l ph ot ogra phs w ould h a ve been a



view’

t r a r i l y int o t w o cla sses. Th e first of t hese

is t he lon gj sw ift j rela t ively sh a llow river

t ha t ma y be forded a t numerous point s.

G en era lly deep on ly for a shor t dist a nce

from its mout h , it present s few I )roblems

in t he ma t t er of crossing. F ,xa mples of

this t ype on (lua da lca na l a re t he Ten a rul

t he Lunga , a n d t h e 13a lesuna . The secon d

t ype is t ha t of t he slow a n d deep la goon.

S uch st rea ms a re somet imes shor t , a s in

t he ca se of t he I lu Ri~ er , a nd some la goons

a re merely t h e delt a st rea ms of rivers of

considera ble size, a s in t he ca se of t he

profit a ble source of up-t o-da t e informa -

t ion, but t h e short a ge of lQng-ra nge a ir-

cra ft a nd suit a bly loca t ed ba ses, a nd t h e

short per iod a va ila ble for pla nn ing, corn q

bined t o rest r ict a va ila bilit y of a eria l

phot os in t he qua nt it y a n d qua lit y nor-

ma lly considered necessa ry.

P erha ps t he most useful phot ogra phic

sor t ie ca rr ied out pr ior t o t he G ua da l-

ca na l-Tula gi la ndings w a s t ha t un der-

t a ken on 17 J uly by a n Army B –17 a ir-

cra ft in w hich Lieut ena nt C olon el Tferrill



RACKGROLXL~ ASD PREPARATIONS 47

the 1st Rfarine Division, and Major Wil-

linrn H. McKean, member of the staff of

Transport Squadron 26, conducted a per-

sonal reconnaissance of the landing areas.

They assured General Vandegrift that

tile ~mg x beaches appeared suitable for landing.23

The coastal real) of G~~acialcnnal finally

adopted by the 1st Marine Thvision (and

employed, with such corrections as could

later be developed, through the entire

issued at the Koro Island rehearsals in the

Fijis on 30 July, estimated that 1, 850

enemy would be found on Tulagi and

C*arntu-Tanambo,rro, and 5,275 on Gundal-

canal. 130th figures were high. A count

of enemy dead in the Tulngi and Gavutuarea placed the number of defenders at

about 1,500 ( inc luding 600 laborer s) ,

\vhile study of positions, interrogation of

prisoners, and translation of enemy docu-

ments on G~~aclalcnnnl proper indicated



p , g

campaign was traced f lvll-l a .erial strip-

map obtained by Colonel Goettge on his

mission to Australia. It was reasonably

accurate in general outline, but contained

no usable indications of ground forms or

elevations. The Goettge map was supple-

mented by aerial photos of Tulagi, Gavutu,

and Tnnambogo Islands, and these con-stituted the sum of the Marines knowledge

f d i h

that about 2,230 troops and laborers had

been in the Lunga area at the time of tlie

Marines landing.

Close and determined combat was antici-

pated with these forces; and on 17 J uly

Admiral Kimitz notified Adnlir:tl King

that it would be unsafe to assume that the

evenly would not attempt to retake thearea to be attacked, and tlmt, if insuficient

248

manded by Lieutenant Colonel Merritt A.

Edson; the 1st Parachute Battalion of

Major Robert H. Williams; and the 2d

Battalion, 5th Marines under Lieutenant

Colonel Harold E. Rosecrans, all with

their reinforcing units att’ ached. Edson

would be the commander of the Tulagi

landing force ; Williams the commander

at Cravutu-‘ I’ nnambogo. The Guadalcanal

group included Colonel Clifton 13. Gates‘

1st Marines and Colonel Leroy P. Hunt’ s

5 h M i (l b h i f d

primary goal was to establish a beachhead

in an area not strongly defended.“”

To make up for the division’ s manpowe

shortage caused by the detached duty of

the 7th Marines in Samoa, ,1dmiral King

on 27 ,June had proposed that Vandegrift

be allotted the 2~1 Marines of the 2d Ma-

rine Division. ,\ccordingly this unit re-

inforced) sailed combat loadecl from San

Diego on 1 J ~dy.~” The regiment ~~ou be

the landing force reserve.3”

Whil t ff l t l t d t



5th Marines (less 2/5 , both reinforced.

l)lus the balance of the division special andservice ti~00ps.27

The Tulagi plan called for the 1st

Raider Battalion and 2d Ratt alion, 5th

Marines to land in column on the island’ s

south coast, turn east, and attack down

the long axis of the island. This would

be followed by 1st Parachute I3attalion

landings on and and a

While staff planners contemplated a tar-

get area nearly as unfamiliar to them asthe back side of the moon, other members

of the la ncling force wrestled the monu-

mental chore of preparing for the move-

ment to combat. “Seldom,” General Van-

degrift said later, “ has an operation been

begun iunder more disadvantageous cir-

cumstances.”

When the decision to land on enemy

B AC K G ROI J ND ANI ) I ’RE I’ARATI ( }NS 249

the way fr om San Diego to the South Pa-

ci f i c; the 1st Rai der Bat tal ion was i n Sa-

m oa, and the 3d Defense I ]at tal ion was i n

Hawai i . Pr el im i nar y pl ans and moves

had to assem bl e these w i del y scat ter ed

uni ts i n to u fi gh t i ng for ce wh i ch cou l d

make an amphi bi ous l and i ng, one of the

most i n t r i cate of m i l i tar y maneuver s.

Fr om the under stand i ng that i t wou l d bethe nucl eus for the bu i l dup of a for ce

wh i ch woul d be t r ai ned for oper at i ons

wh i ch m igh t come late i n 1942, the 1st

M ar i ne I )i vi si on had to sh i ft at once i n to

hur r i ed pr epar at i ons to mount ou t for

act ion.

M ost , of the sh i ps tr anspor ti ng uni ts of

Aotea Quay at Wel li ngton w as t he scen e

of th is squar in g aw ay. I t w as i n ad equ at e

i n al l w ays save t hat i t cou ld accom mod at e

fi ve shi ps at a t i me. L abor di ff i cu lt i es w it h

t he h igh ly u ni on ized st eved or es r esu lt ed

i n the ent i r e task being under taken and

car ri ed th r ough by M ar ines. Because of

secu ri ty r egu lat ion s, n o appeal t o pat ri ot -

i sm coul d be made to the r egu l ar dockw or ker s si nce car e w as t ak en t o h ave ci vi l -

i an s bel ieve t hat al l th e fl ur ry w as m er el y

pr epar at ion for a t rai ni ng exer ci se. D ock -

si de equ ipm en t w as m eager , an d t her e w as

n o sh el ter cl ose at h an d.

As the gear began to be juggl ed fr om

shi p to dock and back agai n , a col d , wet



t h e d i vi si on h ad been l oa ded or ga ni za ti on -

al l y for the voyage to N ew Zeal and, bu tfor t he pr oposed am ph ibi ou s assaul t, th e

suppl i es had to be r eshu ff l ed and sh i ps

com bat l oad ed so t hat , i t em s fi r st n eed ed i n

t i l e f i gh t i ng woul d be. r ead i l y at hand i n

t he h ol ds. T he r el oad in g an d r e-em bar k-

i ng of Com bat Gr oup A (5th M ar i nes,

r ei n for ced ) w en t sm oot h ly, u n com p li ca ted

by t he n ecessi ty for si mu lt an eou s u nl oad -

i ng and r el oad i ng wh i ch pl agued the r earech el on . T he gr ou p began em bar kat ion on

2 ,J ul y an d r em ai ned on boar d i ts t ran spor t

“sou th er l y> ’ set tl ed d ow n t o l ash h T ew Z ea-

l and. But i n spi te of the weather , wor kh ad to con ti nu e ar ou nd t he cl ock. Car ton -

p ack ed f ood a nd ot her su pp li es “d et er i or -

ated r api dl y,” t he d ivi si on l ater r epor ted

by way of an under statement , and the

m or al e of t roops fol low ed th e d ir ect i on of

t he d ow n-sl an ti ng r ai n.

on th e dock, cer eal , sugar , an d oth er r a-

t ion s m ush ed t oget her w it h gl obs of br ow n

pu lp th at on ce h ad been car dboar d boxes..L gr eat ~l um ~r of ~vet car tons that ~ver e

y~(-) P E AR 1> H .I RF IOR TO G ~ l .kI ).\ J , (: AXAI ,

an dr el oad in g. T r an spor t qu ar ter m ast er s

of the var ious sh i ps super vi sed wor k on

hoar d wh i l e a r el ay of ot tker s fr om t l ~e

d i vi si on took char ge of the ei gh t -hour

sh i ft s docksi de. T he I Sew Zeal an d Ar my

fur ni shed 30 fl atbecl l or r i es an d 18 t en -

w }l eel er s t o t ran sfer fu el , sm al l-ar ms am -

n lu ni ti on an d expl osi ves t o d um ps sever al

m i l es a w ay.

T her e was not enough hol d space for al l

t i l e d i vi si on m otor t r anspor t. M ost of the

quar ter - and one-ton tr ucks wer e pu t on

boa rd , bu t 75 p er cen t of t he h et avi er r ol ]i n g

stock was set asi de to stay w i th the r ear

ech el on t hat w ou ld be l ef t beh in d w hen th e

d i vi si on sai l ed f or t he S ol om on s.

R ega rd l ess of t he d i ff icu l ti es, h ow ever ,

the for ce sai l ed as schedu]ed at 0900 on

22 .J ul y, under escor t of cr ui ser s of Ad-

m i ral T ur ner ’s T i ~sk F or ce 62.3:+ Gen er al

Y an degr i ft , d esp it e h i s r equ est f or a vessel

bet ter su i ted i l l com muni cat i ons and ac-

com modat i ons, had been d i rected to em -

bar k h i s com mand post i n t i l e U SS

M c(7o lo ley.

8Z7H EARSAL S .4fYD 1710T ’ E M E NT

T O TH E OB.7E(7T ZVE

I n a ccor d an ce w i th or d er s r ecei ved f r om

N i m i tz on 1,J u ly,34 G hor m l ey h ad d i rect ed

t l mt al l for ces i nvol ved i n t he assau lt m ak e



E ngi neer s l oad ed \ vh at 1i tt le d ir t -m m-

i ng equ i pm ent they owned, bu t i t lYilS so

m eager that they hoped the ,J apanese

wou l d have m ost of the ai r f i el d bu i l t by

the t im e i t was captu r ed . The engi neer

bat tal ion al so l oaded br idgi ng m ater ial ,

d em o] i ti on s, an d al l avai labl e w at er S U P -

pl y equ ipn len t. h To n laj or con st ru ct ion

was contem plated i n ear ly phases o f the

oper at i on , l low ever l and equ i pm ent and

suppl ies for sucl ~ w or k w er e not taken .

Wi th t he l J –4 or an assi st an t i n con st an t

tou ch w it h th e d ock master , or der began to

r en d ezv ou s a t i~ posi ti on sou th of F i ji , ou t

of si gh t of l and so that ther e wou l d be no

Cl l ii l l ce of obser va ti on by en em y a gen ts a nd

n o ch an ce t hat an i nad ver ten t t ip-of w ou ld

be m ad e by f r ien dl y obser ver s.” At that

poi n t t her e w ou l d be a con fer en ce bet ween

the comm and i ng ot l i cer s who had not as

yet been abl e to d iscu ss i n per son t he var i -

ou s I sp ect s of t h e op er a ti on .

T he com pon en ts of th e assau lt for ce n ot

pr evi ousl y i n N ew Zeal and w i th the d i vi -si on w er e con ver gi n g u pon t he r en dezvou s



252 P EARL H ARB OR TO G ITA1)ALC ANAL

scr een .:{’ T he 1st Rai der B at tal ion , i n t he

four destr oyer t r anspor ts of T ranspor t

D i vi si on 12, had been pi cked up at

Noumea.

T he 3d Defense Bat tal i on (Col onel

Rober t H . Pepper ) on boar d the L -SS

Z~ete geu~e and Ze~7in was en r ou te fr om

Pear l H ar bor wher e i t had been stat i oned

si nce the outbr eak of the war . I t woul dmeet the r em ainder of the for ce on 2

August . T he Car ri er For ce, bu i lt ar ound

the . ar atoga and the En ter pm ”se, w i th

F letch er f l yi ng h is f l ag i n th e for mer , l ike-

w i se was on i ts way fr om Pear l H ar bor .

Ren dezvou s w as m ad e as pl an ned , at 1400

on 26 J ul y, some. 400 m i l es sou th of F i j i .

th r ee or four days.” 3’ Ghor ml ey, too, be-

l i eved that the sh i ps cou l d not be pu l l ed

ou t t hat soon .

L an di ng r eh ear sal s at t he i sl an d of K or o

i n the F i j i s wer e conducted fr om 28

thr ough 30 J ul y, bu t Vandegr if t l abel ed

them a waste of t im e and effor t. “A com-

pl et e bu st ,” h e obser ved l at er .” N ecessi ty

for conser vi ng l and i ng cr af t m ade i t im -

possi bl e t o con du ct t he pr act i ce l an di ngs

i n a r eal i st i c way, al though the m en in -

vol ved wer e gi ven add i ti onal t r ai n i ng i n

d ebar k at ion ,3g an d a tt ack f or ce S hi pS w er e

abl e t o p ra ct i ce t hei r gu nf ir e su pp or t .

On 31 J u l y, as n i gh t was fal l i ng, the

sh i ps wei ghed anchor and depar ted fr om



T he con fer en ce con ven ed at on ce on boar d

t he N a ra .t oga. Gh or m l ey, u na bl e t o a tt en d,w as r epr esen ted by h is Ch ief of St aff , Rear

Adm i r al Dan i el J . Cal l aghan and h i s

Com m un i ca ti on s Of fi cer , L i eu ten an t Com -

m ander L . M . L eH ar dy.

T he con fer en ce poi nt ed u p sever al ser i -

ou s pr obl em s. Gen er al V an degr i ft l ear ned

h e w ou ld n ot h ave ad equ at e ai r an d su rf ace

suppor t for the com pl et i on of the un l oad-

i ng phase of the oper at i on . F l etcherwanted to r et i re w i th i n two days af ter the

K or o. T he car ri er task for ce pr oceeded

nor th and west wh i l e the tr anspor ts andthei r scr een pl odded stead i ly towar d the

Sol om ons. A l most 19,000 M ar ines. w er e

em bar ked i n the 19 t r anspor ts and four

destroyer-transports.m

A ll ci rcu mstan ces favor ed t he ad van c-

i n g con voy. Weath er con di ti on s du ri ng

the f i nal two days wer e ext r em el y favor -

abl e: sky topped by a l ow cei l i ng and

w in ds gu st y w it h i nter mi tt en t r ai n SCIUdk.

Ther e was no si gn of enem y ai r cr af t or

B AC KG ROU ND AN’D P RE P AR ATI ONS 253

pat r ol pl an es w er e gr ound ed I t I latm ul on5 and 6 Au gu st becau se of bad w eather .41

T lw con voy headed genen dl y w est fr om

F i ji and w el l to t l ~e sou th of th e Sol om on s

chai n . T he cou r se gr adual l y sh i f ted to

the nor thw i l r d , and the n i ght of 6–7

.I ugust found the en t i r e gr oup of sh i ps

due west of the wester n ext r em i ty of

t%adalcana].

T ask F or ce 62, com man ded by .k dm ir alT u r ner , was d i vi ded i n to two T r anspor t

Gr oups. T r anspor t Gr oup X-Ray (62.1 )

com man ded by Captai n L aw rence F . Rei f -

sn icl er , w ith th e C~u ad al can al for ces em -

bar ked, consi sted of four subgr oups, as

fol low s :

Tr an sdiv .4: Fuller, America Legion, Bellutrix.

and seven sn i ps each w i th a d i stance of750 yar ds between sh i ps and an i n ter val

of 1,000 yar ds between col L unns. T he

r ugged ou t l i ne of the (+uadal canal h i l l s

was just vi si bl e to star boar d when the

cou r se was sh i f t ed to 0400 , and a few

n l i nu tes l t i ter the two gr oups separ ated

for the com pl et i on of thei r m i ssi ons.

X -R~y, sh if t i ng st i l l fu rth er to st ar boar d,

set t ied on cou rse 0750, w hi ch t ook i t al on g

the Guadal canal coast , wh i l e Yoke, on

cou r se 058° cr ossed ou tsi de Sa vo I sl an d,

towar d F l or i da. T he f i nal appr oach to

the t r an spor t ar ea w as m ade w ith ou t i nci -

d en t, an d th er e w as n o sou nd u nt i l , at 0614,

the suppor t i ng sh i ps opened fi r e on the

island.43



Tra nsdiv B : MPCOWICV, Barnett, Elliot, Libra.

Tra nsdiv C : Hunter Ligflett, .4tchil]a, Fomal -

haut, Betelgeu$e.

Tra nsdiv I ) : Crescent City, President Hffyefi,

President .4da?ns, Al?tena.

T r an spor t Gr ou p Yok e (62.2 ) com m an ded

by Captai n Geor ge B. Ashe, an d car ryi ng

th e assau lt t r oops for the T ul agi l and ing,

con si st ed of t he fol low in g su bgr ou ps:

Tra nsdiv E : A’6>1.ll(,,rilit),cywood, Pre8iti(’nt

.Iaclwon.

Tr an sdiv 12: Calhoan, Gregory, Littlf’, MrKea??.

(the dest royer t ra nspor t group ) .42

T her e ar e som e i nd i cat i ons that the

(h ad al can al oper at ion on D -D ay m or ni ng

w as som eth i ng of a m i nor Pear l H ar bor

i n r ever se for the ,J apanese. A r ecen t

st ud y of ,J apa nese w ar t i m e m essages i nd i-

m t es the enem y was awar e that a U . S.

for ce had sor t i ed fr om H awai i . War n-

i ngs wer e i ssued to (’eu t r al Paci f i c ou t -

posts; Rabau l and poi n ts sou th wer e to be

not i f i ed for i n for mat i on on l y. Conv

m an der of th e ,J apan ese T wen ty-F ou rt l

.4i r F l ot i [ l a (M ar shal l -Gi l ber t -Wake

ar ea ) r el ayed h i s w ar ni ng m essage sou th

CHAPTER 2

Guadalcanal 7 9 August 1942

T I IZ> ’ L .4 YD1,V (+

When ‘l ’ask Gr oups X-Ray and Yoke

separ at ed n or th west of (Xpe E sper an ce at

0240, the for mer gr ol ~p m ade for the Ret{

l leach tr anspor t ar ea off Guadal canal i n a

(I ouh l e col ~unn at 12 knots. N o enem y ac-

t i vi ty w as oh ser vecl , an d t he pr el im in ar y

l ~aval bom bar dm ent of the coastal ar ea,

w hi ch bega n a t 0613, a rou sed n o r espon se.

these ai r cr i~f t nmr ked the beach fl anks

\ vi tl ~sm oke to assi st nnval gun fi re and to

gu i de the l andi ng boats. Vm ndegr if t , andh i s d i vi si on ai r of i i cer hel d th i s use to be

u n wa r r an t ed a nd u n necessa r y.

13[ lt .I d m ir al T u r ner con si d er ed i t n eces-

sar y t o “accu ratel y m ar k t he extr em it ies

of t he l au di ]l g beach es’> as d ir ect ed by t he

oper at ion or (l er , an d he m ar ked them for

t w en ty m i nu tes. T he pl an es n lad e. ei gh t



T h e <X -R ay sh i ppi u g r each ed i t s t r an spor t

ar ea at 0645 and begym to l ow er the l and-

i ng cr aft . Acr oss the channel , Gr oup

l “ok e 1i k e~ vi se ar r i ved a t i t s assi gn ed a rea

ot f T u l agi w i thou t i nci den t at 0630 and

st r ai gh taway got the wor d fr om Captai n

Asl l e that H -hour wou l d be 0800. T he

un i ts sl ated for F l or icl a I sl and wou l d h i t

thei r beaches fi rst , as w i ll be descr ibed i n

t he n ext ch apt er .

T he di vi si on ’s com man cl post i n th e M c-(;aw?ey br oke r ad i o si lence at 0519, and

r (u ls at ext rem el y l ow al ti tl ld es, fou r r uns

on each beach ext r em ity. V an degr i f tI )oi u ted out t lm t th i s woLIlcl r esul t i n a

ser i ol l s i f not com plete l oss of pl anes i f

t i le. beacl ]es w er e d efen ded -t hi s l oss at a

t i nl e when ai rcr aft ar e cr i t i cal ly needed

as “eyes” to gai n i ll for nl :l ti on abol ~t the

I )r ogr ess of a l a nd i l ~g.

.k ct ua ll y t he l i ai son p lan es ov er G ua da l-

ca nal ’s r an dom cl ou ds zn cl spl ot ch y j un gl e

fu rn ish ed V an (l egr i ft pr eci ou s l i t tl e i nfor -mat i on . I t was not the fau l t of the pi l ots,



256 I ’N AL L1, H AR B OR T() (l [l AI )AI .t ’AN AI ,

ai r fi el cl sever al thousand yar ds west of

t he l an di ng beach .

M ean wh il e th e 5th M ar in es (l ess 2d B at-

tal i on) had cr ossed i ts l i ne of depar tu r e

an cl m oved i nto t he 5,000-yar d appr oach

to the heacl l . N aval gun fi r e l if ted i nl and

as th e cr aft n ear ed t he sh or e, an d m in ll tes

l ater , at 0910, the assau l t wave h i t the

beach on a 1,600 yar d fr on t and pushedi~~to t i l e sl mr se jungl e gr ow th beyond.

V ’i tl l I .i eu ten an t Col on el Wi l l iam E . M ax-

wel l ”s 1st Bat tal i on on the r igh t (west .)

an d L i eu ten an t Col on el F red er ick C. B ie-

bu sh ’s 3d B at tal ion on t he l eft , t he beach -

l )ead expan ded r api dl y agai nst n o opposi -

t i on . .i per im eter som e 600 yar ds i nl and

soon est abl i sh ed a h ast y d efen se. T he l in e

t i el {l p i eces. Needed were t~vo- :~ l ~cl - :~ -l l a l f -

tol l si x by si xes and r am p boats to pu t ,

t l ~ese ~el l i c] es on the beach simu l t aneol l s] y

w i t] l t i le h ow i tzer s. .Su ch pr i me m over s

w er e au th or ized , bu t so w er e a l ot of oth er

t l~i l ~gst he M a ri nes d id n ot h ave.

I n spi te of these tr oubl es, the ar ti ll er y

un i ts r eached thei r assi gned fi r i ng posi -

t i ons by m aki ng over land pr i me m over sou t of am ph i bi an t r actor s that began to

wal low ashor e heavy w ith car go.z Once

i n posi t i on , however , the gunner s found

the amph i bi an was a cr eatu r e of m i xed

virtues: t r ack ed v eh i cl es t ore LI p t h e

cor ~l l l l~l ~l i c:l t iol ~sw i r e, cr eat i ng ea rl y t he

pat ter n of com bat even ts that becam e too



an ch or ed on th e w est , at t he T en ar u Ri ver ,

on t l ~e east at the T enavatu Ri ver , and

l ’each m l ol l t he sou th a n ea st -~ vest br zn ch

of t he T en al w.1

Re.ginlental l l ead ql lar tem cam e ash or e

at 0938 to be fol l owed two m i l i u tes l ater

by heavy weapons tr oops. L and i ng of the

reserve reg imen t , Col onel Cates’ r ei n f or ced

1st M ar ines, al ready was under way. Be-

gi nn in g at 0930, t li i s r egi men t cam e ash or ei n a col um n of bat tal ions w i th 2/1 in t h e

t l~ e va n fol l owed by the 3d and 1st Bat-

fan li l iar t o pl agu ed w ir er nen .

M eanwhi le the l i gh t 75m m pack how i t -zer s h ad m ad e i t ash or e w ith l i t tl e t r ou bl e,

and the advance towar d the ai r f i el d got

unclerway. A t 1115 t he 1st M a ri nes m oved

thr ough the hasty per im eter of the 5th

M ar in es an d str uck ou t sou th west t ow ar d

M ou nt A usten, t he “Gr assy K nol l.” Cate.s

pu t h i s r egim ent acr oss the T enar u at an

en gi neer br id ge su ppor ted by an am ph ib-

i an tr actor , and the 1st M ar i nes pr o-gr essed sl ow ly i nt o t he t hi ck en in g j un g]e.

(; IT.kD.kJ ,cANAL, 7–9 AU GI :S T 1942 257

Colonel Cates r eal ized alm ost at once

t hat i t w ol ll d be i mpossi bl e to r each M ou nt

Austen as h i s day’s object i ve. T he so-

cal l ed Gr assy K nol l , vi si bl e fr om t he sh ips,

cou l d not , b e seen fr om the beach . I t com -

manded the L unga ar ea, bu t i t l ay m uch

far ther i n l and than r epor ts of for mer

p la nt er s a nd sch oon er p il ot s h ad i n di ca ted .

U n d er h ea vy p ack s, som et i m es excessi ve

l oad s of am m un it ion , an d w it h i nsu ff i ci en t

w ater and sal t tabl ets,3 the 1st M ar in s by

l ate after noon had str uggl ed but a m i l e

when Gener al Vanci egr i f t or der ed the

r egi men t t o h al t, r eor i en t, an d est abl ish i n-

ter nal con tact . T he m en dug i n a per i m -

et er i n t he j un gl e, som e ;~ ,~()()ya rd s sou th

of the I l u ’s m outh wher e 1J 5 had ended

wor k , fai l u r e to extend the beach l im i ts

pr om pt l y enough and, to some exten t , a

l ack of con tr ol and d i rect i on over t r oops

i n the beach ar ea. Rut the t r oubl e and i ts

causes wer e nei ther as cl ear -cu t nor as

damning as that . M ar ine pl anner s had

for eseen a danger ous shor tage of m an

power at th i s cr it i cal poi n t , bu t under the

uncer tai n ci rcum stances on th i s host i le

beach they fel t they cou l d al l ot no mor e

m en to the job than the 500 fr om Colonel

Geor ge R. Row an ’s 1st Pi on eer B at tal i on .

Vandegr if t d i d not want wor ki ng par ti es

to cu t the st r ength of h i s f i gh t i ng un i ts to

a l evel wh i ch m igh t r isk get t i ng them de-

feated.

H indsi gh t now m akes i t cl ear that the



i ts ad van ce, t o set u p for t he, n igh t.

I n spi te of the br eakneck pace w i th

wh i ch the shoestr i ng operation had

m ounted out and th r own i tsel f i n the path

of the J apanese advance al ong the Sol o-

m on chai n, the l and i ng w as a success. Al -

though the l ack of opposi t i on (on t l ~e

Gu ad al can al si de on ly) gave i t. som ev-l l at

t i le ch ar act er i st i cs of a t r ai n in g m an eu ver ,

the need for add i ti onal t r ai ni ng th at Van-

degr i f t had hoped to gi ve h i s men i n N ew

Zeal and becam e appar en t . T he gener al

su ppl ies m ou nt i ng u p as a j ui cy beach tar -

get jeopar di zed the oper at i on m or e than

a cal l for ad di ti on al w or ki ng par ti es w ou ld

have done. T her e wer e har d l y enough

.J a pan ese f igh ti n g m en ash or e on t he i sl an d

to bother the Vandegr if t for ce, bu t i f en-

em y pl an es f r om R aba ul h ad con cen tr at ed

on h it t i ng t he congested beach th ey w ou ld

h ave pl ayed h avoc w it h t hi s w hol e ven tu re.

M ar ines wer e awar e of th i s r isk , bu t they

al so expected to r un i n to a si zabl e J ap-

an ese for ce som ew her e i n th e t hi ckeni ng

.~ugust th :l t the I :l nd i ng for ce had to ask

t lw sl ~i ps to stop un l oad i ng. T her e had

been ai r at tacks that af ter noon, and m or e

wer e expected on the 8th . T he exhausted

w or ker s ueeded t i me to cl ear the beaches

ccl ~dspr ead ou t t he, gear so i t w ou ld be l ess

of a t ar get .

For tunatel y the ai r at tacks dur i ng the

cl ay h ad con cen tr at ed on t he sh ippi ng. At

about 1100 on the ~th a coast watcher i n

the U pper Sol om ons passed the wor d on

t l ~e watcher s’ l ~etwor k t l ~at about 18

bom ber s w er e on t il e w ay t o Gu ach ~l can al .

T hi s w ar ni ng w as r el ayed t o Ck ad al can al

t l uougl l B r isbane w i th i n 25 m i nu tes, and

t i l e p l an es a r r i ved at 132 ().he destroyer

M ugfcwd sut fer ed 20 casual ti es under a

W;II’(l :t lol l g t i le l)eil(>ll toward tl)e I .uuga.

.l t t l ]e sam e t i me t i l e 1st M ar ines m ovecl

fr om i ts u igl l t l )er i met er . (’ou tact bet ween

l l l ~i ts w i th in t hi s r egi nw nt w as fal l l ty, bu t

by n ig]l tf al l I.iel~te]]allt (’ol on el I .en ar cl

13. ( ‘r essw el l ’s 1st I h l tt a l i ol ~ l )a(l o~’er r u u

t i le f iel d a ncl r e:w l led t he I ~ un ga . T l ~e ot her

t wo ba tt a] i on s, sl ow ed by d it li cu lt t er r ai n,

advanced about , 500 yar ds an hour and

bi vouacked for the n i gh t sou th of the

ai r f ie ld.

Al ong the beach , 1/ 5 and the tanks m et

t h e f i r st sca tt er ed r esi st an ce a s t h ey p assed

th r ot@ the ar ea i n wh i ch the m ai n ,J ap-

anese for ce h ad been l ocated . A few pr is-

oner s wer e taken , and i n tel l igence i nd i -

cate(l that the e~~em y w as i n no posi ti on



250-pouncl bomb h i t , bu t i t was the on l y

sh i p st r uck by the at tack . ~i n t i ai r cr af t

t i re dow ned tw o of the tw in -engi ned T yl w

97’s. L at er i n th e aft er noon , at abou t 1500,

1() A i ch i d i ve bom ber s had no l uck :at al l ,

bu t t i re fr om the sh i ps scr atched an oth er

t wo ,J apan ese pl an es. Ot her pl an es fr om

both these at tacks wer e downed by

F l et ch er ’s ca r r i er a i r cr a ft .

A t 2200 011 7 August , Vandegr i f t i s-su ed h is at tar k or der for t he fol low in g d ay.

to at tack the super i or M ar i ne l and i ng

for ce. Cent i nued l ack of r esi stance el se-

wher e seem ed to con fi rm th i s, and at 1430

t he h l ar i n es con tr act ed t hei r f r on t, cr ossed

the I mnga by a br idge im mediatel y nor th

of t he a ir f iel d , a ud a dv an cec{ n ~or e r a pi d ly

towar d t i l e K ukum River , a st r eam iu t l ~e

w ester n fan of the I ,unga del ta.

N ’i th Com pauy D l ead i ng, th i s ad vance

can l e upon the ma in ,Japanese encan~pmen tar ea a t 1500.” T he en em y f or ce, obvi ou sl y

(:11.\ D .\ I.C.\hT.\I,,7–9 .II ’(; ITST1W2

son , Pi lot ot l icel ’, R.l .i F , w nr necl fr on l h is

Boug:iillville hi(le-olt t t ll:lt :1 l :lyge llt lln -

h er of l )l :l l l es T v er e wi n gi n g t ow ar d ~ r l l :t d :l l -

( ’ t i l )al . I n another l ~ol l r sonl e 4{) tw i l l -

el lgi ne t or ped o pl :l nes :l ppe:ar ed over t il e

n r ea to t i nd the task for ce, :~l er ted by t i le

w :lr llin g, ma n euver ing a t t ol) speed wh i l e

el l )l )l oyi n g ev asi v e t xct i r s.

-k tor pedo sent the dest r oyel ’.larl~i.s

l i n lp ing son t i~ e:~ st for t h e brew 1 lebr ides.

,S lw w a s s~ lnk n ext da y by nn en en ~ ~ a ir

: t t t :~ck. ‘I ’h e t r :t nspor t i’:’lziot t , set a fire

w hen Nn en en ly I )la ne cra shed flboa rcl, ht lcl

t o be be:t c]ied a n d dest royed by h er sist er

shil}s. survivors w en t 011 bo:t rd t he

fl t lnter l~qqett.

Sn ip m l ti :l i rcr aft j t ir e an d t igl ~t er pl nn es

259

b :~ck 11] ) t i l e islill](l co:lst U l)t i] t l)e l ) l :~ne

( l el )+t r t e(l . ‘1 ’l l ei ~ t urn i ng agxi l l , t hey s:l i l ed

b et \ v eel l B ol l gn i l l vi l l e a nd (yl ~ oi se(l l n or t h -

e:~st of the Shor thands :l nd set cour se

(1OJVI1The S lot ” t ow :~ rd (}l l :l c] :t l ~ :l l l :l l .

Wor d of t hi s :l ppr on ch in g f ol ce r e:l ch ed

.I(ll]]i]itl Tl~r ]~~l :~ t 1800,”:~1](1,~y l ]p l ] ~$(1-

l ~~ ir :l l Fl et ch er l l ot it i ecl h i m Sl l ol tl y t her e-

:\ f ter t lm t the mr ri er for ce was to be w i t l l -

(l r:~w l ~, T ur ner c:i ll ed Vm ldegr i f t to the

f l : tgsl l i p .l I cCc/ lo7e,7 /a ]~cl in formed the gen-

er al t lm t, d e])r i vecl of c:l r r i er pr ot ect ion ,

t he t r :~ ll sp or t s m t lst l e:l ve :t t 0600 t he n ext

(l:ty.

~ ~sea r l y n s 2 .f ugu st .k d m ir :a l ~ xl l or m l ey

l ]:td kuow l l of F letcher ’s i nten t i ons to r e-

t i re the car r i er s befow 1)-D :I y pl LH three.’



f r or n .4d rn i m l N oyes’ car r iel s sl ~ot d ow n12 ,J: tp i l l )ese p l ane s :~ nd sl l or e-ba se(l a m

t i :l i r cr ai l :~ccou ntec{ for t \ vo n lor e. St i l l

other s wer e spl ashed by c:~r ri er -bmed

fi ghter s west of the t r anspor t nr en . A

t ot al of seven -i n ler i ca n p la nes w er e l ost .’

Tf~K ,7.4 Pi l iVE ,YK A?K TAL [A~ T K

T hese ear ly :t t tacks ham per ed M ar ineoper at ion s n nd u nl o:l cl i ng, bu t t he be:w h-

At 18~ ~ on 8 .iu~ ust F letch er ci ted fu elsl l or t :l ge n n d l )l al l e l osses t h :~ t ] M d r ed u ced

h i s f i gh ter cr :t f t f r om 99 to 78 nnd :tg~t i n

r eq[l ested per nl issi ol ] to w ithdr aw nnt i l

sl l f fl ci el }t I :t n cl -l m sed :t i r cm f t :l n d f uel w er e

+ ~w l i:l bl e t o su pp or t sh i pp in g.~ I t seem s

that Ghor mley h l d not r eal l y expectecl

th i s I )r obl en l to come l l p, i n spi te of

F let ch er ’s an nou ncem en t :n bou t t ]l i s n mt -

ter :t t j the F i j i r el ~e:usal s. ]~ Llt 11OI Yt h a t Fl etcher W:l S n l :l ki ng the r equest ,

260 I ’E AR L H AR BOR TO G I TAI )AL CAATAI ,

l T andegr if t hel d that r et i rem ent of the

sh i ps wou l d l eave h im in a “m ost al ar m -

i ng” posi ti on .’” D i vi si on pl ans assum ed

the sh i ps wou l d r emai n i n the tar get ar ea

fou r d ays, an d even t hen al l avai labl e su p-

pl i es w ou ld pr ove scan ty en ou gh , su ch w as

t l~e h ast e w it h w hi ch t he assau lt m ou nt ed

out w i th l ess than the nor m al m i n im um in

basi c al low an ces. B ut a w ithd raw al ear ly

on ) .i ugust wou l d take m uch of the sup-

pl i es and equ i pm ent away i n the hol ds of

sh i ps and l eave beach dum ps i n a state of

ch aos. T he ‘(sh oest ri ng” of t hi s f i r st A ll ied

ot ien si ve seem ed t o be pu ll in g apar t. T hi s

w as the fi rst of the oper at i on ’s m any dar k

hours. ( See M ap 14, M ap Sect ion )

T l r h i l e Vandegr i f t . con fer r ed w i th

came in . .fdm ir al T ur ner h ad est i mated

th at , the ,J apanese sh i ps w ou l d hol e up i n

Rekata B ay on Santa I sabel I sl and and

str ike at the am ph i bi ous for ce w i th tor -

pedo-ca r r yi ng f l oa tp] anes.

.i t 0316 M i kawa or der ed i ndependen t

f i r i ng, and tor pedoes l eaped fr om thei r

tubes two m inu tes l ater . J apan ese f l oat -

pl an es i ll um in at ed br ief l y. T he Can ber r a

cau gh t t wo t or ped oes i n h er st ar boar d si de,

the Pfi i mgo l ost par t of her bow , and then

the ,J apanese tu r ned towar d the Al l i ed

sh ips bet ween Savo an d F lor i da.

T he r esu lt in g m el ee w as on e of t he w or st

defeats ever su ffer ed by the I T. S. hT avy.

T he Vkcenfle.s and the Qui ncy wer e l ost ;

the Aust r al ian Can ber ra bu rned al l n i gh t



T ur ner , th e ,J apan ese sh i ps, el em ents of

the enemy’s B i gh th F7eet , appr oached

,Savo I sl ancl undetected by destr oyer s

Ral ph T al bot and B l ue on pi cket du ty

nor thwest of that sm al l i sl and . T hey

sl i pped past these sh i ps towar d the two

A ll i ed cr ui ser s, H J WA S Panberra and th e

1’SS Ch im go, an d d est royer s 11SS B agl ey

and Pat tem on w hi ch patr o] ]ed th e w ater s

betw een Savo an d Cape E sper ance. Far -ther nor th cr u i ser s I J SS T~incennes,

and had to be abandoned and sunk; de-

st r oyer Ral ph T al bot was dam aged, and

.4storia went down at noon the next day.

For tunatel y M i kawa r et i r ed w i thou t

pr essi ng h i s advantage i n an at tack on the

am ph ibi ous sh i ppi ng far ther down the

channel , and Adm i r al T ur ner , del ayi ng

h i s depar tu re, or der ed un l oad i ng to con-

t i nue. L ate i n the af ter noon the t r ans-

por ts got under way for N oum ea, l eavi ngthe M ar i nes on thei r own w i th four un i ts

G UAD ALCANAL, 7.9 AU G US T 1942 261

away, l eavi ng a m ost i na dequ at e f ract ionbeh i nd. And w i th ai r suppor t so sketchy,

ther e was no way to know when the t r ans-

por ts cou l d com e back agai n . T he stacks

of captu r ed ,J apanese r at i ons began to

gai n i n i m por tance i f not i n pal atabi li ty.

.kccor di ng to the war d i ar y of the Com -

m ander , T ask For ce 62, the fol l ow i ng

t r oops were l eft i n the Guadal canal -

T u l agi ar ea when the t r anspor t s and—su pp ly sh i ps w i th d rew :

.4t Gwdalcanal:

D ivision H ea dqua r ters C ompa n y (less de-

t ach men ts )

D ivision S igna l C ompa ny (less deta ch ment s)

5t h Ma rin es (less 2d B at ta lion )

I st M ar in es

llt h Ma rines (less B a t t ery It , 1st a nd 4t h

B at ta lions )

(’(mLI Ia ny A. Xi .I mphihia u Tra {t or B at t alion

(2d P la t oon, C ompa n y A, Ist An)phibia n

‘lYa ct or B a tt alion a tt ach ed)

(’o]mmn y D . 2d Mediea l B at ta lion

L’ompa ny A, 2d P ioneer B at ta lion (2d I ’la toon.

C om pa ny A, 1st l’ion eer B at ta lion a tt ach ed)

B at t ery E , llth 31a rines

(’om pa uy C , 2d S ervice B at ta lion

L ova l h -a va l I )ef en se F or ce

Total o?~Tulagi, 6,075

Total personnel left in. area, about 16,073

T he $M M ar in es un der Col on el ,J ohn M .

Ar thur had for med the d i vi si on r eser ve

and w as or igi nal ly sl ated for the occupa-

t i on of N den i , bu t al l i ts bat tal i ons now

wer e i n act i on i n the T u l agi ar ea. T he

r egi m en tal h ead qu ar ter s r em ai ned afl oat ,

however , as d i d wor k ing par t i es fr om al l

com pan ies, m ost of t he H ead qu ar ter s an d



1st Ta nk B a tt alion ( less det ach men ts)

1st E ngin eer B a tt alion ( less det ach men ts)

1st P ioneer B at ta lion (less det achment s)

1st Amphibia n Tra ct or B a t ta lion (less de-

tachments)

1st S er vice B at ta lion (less det ach men ts)

1st Medica l B at ta lion (less det a chu]ent s )

1st Milit ary P olice C ompa ny

2d P la toon, 1st S cout C omla my

I -n it s, 3d D efen se B a tt alion

Loca l Na va l D efen se Force

Total on (ltiadalcanal, a ~ wut 10,NX)

.4t Tatagi:

Ser vi ce Com pan y, R egi m en tal ‘J J 7ea pon s

Com pany, adm in i st r at i ve un i t s fr om the

var iou s bat t al ion s, an d (1 an d H ead qu :l r-

ter s an d Ser vi ce B at ter ies of 3/ 10.

T he sudden w i thdr awal of the t r ans-

por ts car ri ed these un i ts, wh i ch total ed

abou t 1,400 ofl icer s an d m en, back to Es-

pi r itu San to wher e they wer e used to “r e-

i n for ce the gar r i son th er e, ” accor di ng to

the r epor ts of Adm i r al T u r ner . On 14

.~u gu st , T ur ner or der ed Col on el Ar th ur to

r epor t for dn ty w i th the Comm andi ng

P E .t RL H .\ RB OR TO G [’A]}AL CAN.%J .

m or e gl ar i ng exam pl e of h i s theor y of

p er son al com m a nd p ossessi on . H e or d er ed

those “i d l e’> 2d M ar i nes to for m a “2d

Pr ovi si onal Rai der B at tal i on .” T hen he

w rote to Adm ir al (l hor ml ey r ecom mend-

i ng an over hau l of al l M ar i ne r egiments

i n the Am ph ibi ous For ce, South Paci f i c.

A l ] r egi ments then wou l d con tai n r ai der

bat tal i ons wh i ch coul d be sent ou t on

speci al m issi ons. T ur ner sai d he di d not

th i nk M ar ine r egim ents woul d be su i ted

to oper at i ons i n the Paci f i c. ‘(T he em -

pl oym en t of a d ivi si on seem s l ess l ikel y,”

the adm i r al added. H e wou l d use r ai der

bat tal ions l ike bu i ld i ng bl ocks, an d f i t the

l and i ng for ce to the speci al pr obl em . Ob-

vi ousl y, he expected the Paci fi c w ar to he

imtion of M ar ine For ces shou l d be m ade

on l y i n case of d i r e necessi t y.?> N im i tz

t hen for war ded t hi s cor respon den ce on t o

I ,i eu ten an t C~en er :d T hom as I -l ol com b,

M a ri ne ( ‘om m an dan t.

(+m er al H ol com b r espol ~d ed t o N im it z

that t l ~e l at ter ’s object i ons had sur el y

st opped T ur ner ’s pl an vi i th ou t t he n eed for

t he (’com m an da nt t o ad d ot her obj ect i on s,

bu t H ol com b noted “w i th r egr et” that

Tur ner had not , seen t i t to ask Gener al

V an cl egr i f t abol l t t hi s pl an t o r eor gan ize

h is t roops.

Th i s r eact i on fr om N “i mi tz, and the ar -

r i val at about that t im e i n the N ew H eb-

r i des of the “au then t i c’> 2d Raider Bat -

t al i on of L i eu tenant Col onel Evans F .



sm al l an d t i dy.

.I dm i r a] (l hor m ley answer ed that

T ur ner ought to hol d u p such r eor gan i za-

t i on un t i l he found out . what the Com-

m andant of the M ar ine Cor ps thought , of

:111this. .i dn l i r al (l hor m ley then sent

t l ~i s l et ter and h i s endor sem ent to the

(’com m an dan t v ia .I d r ni r al N T i m it za t P ea rl

Harbor. N im itz agr eed w i th Ci hor ml ey,

iilld h e st r essed t ha t ‘ext em por i zed or ga n-

Car ]son , caused T ur ner to hal t h i s pl an to

tu r n al l .hph i bi ous For ce M ar i nes i n to

r ai der s. Bu t i t took the adm i r al m uch

l on ger th an th is t o aban don h is t heor y t hat

t h ese M a r i n es w er e d i r ect , “p ossessi on s” of

his.”

“ ( ‘om P h i bF or S oP a c lt r t o C omS oP a@’or ,

2 ).An g42; (’on ] S oP a cF or lt r t o (’in CP OA, 6S ep42;

(’inC P ~ .l lt r t o C M(’. 24 S e 2: C MC ltr t o

(“inCI’().A, 30ct42.

CHAPTER 3

Tulagi and Gavutu Tanambogo

T i7_L .4 (7Z : T H E F I RST DA 1’

.~fter T ask Gr ou p Yoke separ at ed fr omth e l ar ger bod y of sh ips at 0240 on D -D ay,

i ts apl lr oach t o T ul agi w as accom pl ish ed

w i thou t , i nci den t . A l l el ements of the

gr ou p :I r r ived i l l posi ti c~n at :l bol ~t 06;30 1

an d m ad e r ead y for t he l an di ng.

.i s the sh i ps appr oached the t r anspor t

ar ea, 15 f igh ter s an d 15 d ive bom ber s f rom

Wasp st rafed an d bom bed t he. t ar get ar ea;

a sm al l i sl and south of the sam e poi n t of

land. ’

.I t 0740, 20 m inu tes befor e H -hour ,Company B (r ei n for ced) of the 1st Bat -

tal i on , 2d M ar i nes, under com mand of

Captain Edwar d tJ . Cr ane, l anded on

Flor i da near H al eta to pr otect the l eft

f l al ~k of the T u l agi For ce. T he l and i ng

was unopposed, al though enem y tr oops

had been r epor ted i n posi ti on ther e on 25



set t i ng fi re t o seapl an es t hat w er e cau gh ti l l t h e h ar bor .3 (See M a p 15, M a p S ect i on )

F i ve-i nch navzl gun fi r e fr om the de-

str oyer i l fonwen, opened up at a pr om on-

tor y of F l or i da I sl and , west of Tu l agi ,

an d 60 r ol ln ds w er e expen ded on t he t ar get

bet ween 0727 an d 0’732. I n t he m ean ti m e,

both the Buchanan and San Juan (an

ant i ai rcr aft cr ui ser ) pum ped 100 r ounds

ea ch i n to n ear by t ar get s. Buchanan con-cen tr at ed on a poi nt of l an d east of H al eta,

,J ul y.’ Cr ane, h i s com pany r ei nfor ced by

the Ah pl atoon of Company D and 21 menfr om H ead qu ar ter s Com pan y, r eached h is

object i ve w ith i n 40 m inu tes. T he 252 ot l i-

cer s an d m en w en t ash or e i n ei gh t l an di ng

boats and w er e gu i ded to thei r object i ve

by one of the sever al Aust r al i ans on duty

w i th t he d i vi si on .e

Whi l e th i s cover ing for ce depl oyed i n -

l an d fr om i ts F lor i da beach , t he r em ai nd er

of the 1st Bat tal i on , 2d M ar i nes (L ieu-

tenan t Col onel Rober t E . H i l l ) m ade a

264 1’13AR 1, H .\ R ROR TO G U AI ). AL C AN AL

cor a l f or m a t ion sa t d i st :t l l ces v :t r yi l ~gf r or n30 to wel l oyer 100 yar (l s fr om the beach

l i ne, and the assau l t per sonnel of r ai der

Com pan ies PI an d 1) w ad ed ash or e aga in st

no opposi t i on , t l m ough Wi t ter i n i t i al l y

fr om wai st to ar mpi t deep.’

M eanwhi l e the enem y defense for ces,

con cen tr nt ecl i u t he sou th ei ~st er n t hi r d of

t l~e i sl an d, r eal i zed t ha t a n al l -ou t assau lt

\~its u nd er ~~ay. B et ween 072 5 an d 074 ),

th e Tu7Qgi C’o~)~)))~(nic(~tior ~i’~[sz noti fied

t l ~e (’on ] m and ing Off i cer of th e T uw nty-

F i ~t f i A i r F70t i 77a at Rabaul th at T ul agi

w as u nd er bom bar d men t, t ha t t he l an di ngs

had begun, and that the sender s wer e de-

st r oyi ng al l equ i pm ent i mm ed i atel y. At ,

0800 t he ,Jzpanese messages sa i d shel l s were

fal l i ng near the r ad i o i nstn l ]at i on . T en

si t i on , the nat i ve vi l l age of Sasapi . T hi scom pauy then swung to the r igh t . and , t y-

i ng i n w ith M ajor ,J ust ice (M am ber s’ Com -

pan y D w hi ch had gai ned the h igh gr ou nd,

began m ovi ng south east . T he ad van ce of

t hese t wo com pan ies w as stead y an d w ith -

ou t opposi ti on un t i l Com pany B r eached

Car pen ter ’s Wh ar f, h al fw ay d ow n th e east

sh or e of t he i sl an d, w her e i t en cou nt er ed

a ser i es of en em y ou tp ost s.M eanwhi l e a d d i t i o n a 1 r ai der s had

l anded . Captai n L ew i s W. Wal t ’s (’om -

pany A, l and i ng to fol l ow the l ead i ng

com pani es, swung r i gh t atop the r i dge

spi ne, and t i ed i n on the l eft w i th (’on l -

pany D . M ajor K enneth Bai l ey’s (Xon l -

pan y C al so sw ung r igh t, t i ed i ts l eft f l ank

to Com pan y .%, a nd ech el on ed i tsel f to th e



m in ut es l ater , th e f i nal m essage w en t ou t:“E nem y tr oop st r en gth i s over wh el mi ng.

We w i l l defend to the l ast m an .” *

Com pan i es B and D had r eached the

beach, and the l and i ng cr aft car r yi ng

r ai der Com pan i es A and C now began to

l lt in g u pon t l ~e cor al . T he Weapon s (’on -

pany (Captai n Geor ge W. H er r i ng) of

th e r ai der bat t al ion , w hose 60n m m or tar s

had been at tached to the assau l t com -l )an ies,’ h ead ed ash or e t o a ssu m e r esp on -

r igh t r ear to th e, beach . Spr ead ou t acr osst l l e i sl and, the r ai der s swept sout l ~east

agai nst l it tl e o~,posi ti on u nt i l Ph ase L i ne

.%, fr om th e ] l igb gr ou nd n or th west of H i l l

281 to (Xar peu ter ’s Whar f, was r eached

at 1120. H er e M ajor (’l l am ber s was

wounded by I I l or t ar t i r e, i t ] ]d (‘apt ai n

Wi ll ian l F ,. Sper l i ng assu med com man d of

(“om pa uy D .

B y th is t i me Col onel E dson, com mand -

i ng the 1st Rai der Bat tal ion , w as ashor e

T(TLAGI AS I ) GA VU TI : -T. k NAM B O GO 265

the r ai der s m oved out towar d the h i gh

gr ound beyond the sadd l e. Com pany C,

on the r i gh t f l ank of the at tack , d r ew fi r e

al most i mm ed i atel y fr om H i l l 208, a knob

for war d of the r i dge that had just been

cl ear ed . T he bu l k of th e J apanese r esi st -

ance con cent r ated i n the seaw ar d face of

the h i gh gr ound, and Com pany C was

caught by fi r e fr om enem y in fan tr y

weapons as i t t r i ed to pass between the

h i l l and the beach . The r ai der company

then tu r ned i ts at tack towar d the h i l l and

fought for near ly an hour befor e the J ap-

anese posi t i ons were si l enced .

Rad io com mu ni cat i on s betw een E dson

and Gener al Ruper tus deter ior ated r ap-

i dl y af ter t hi s at tack w as l au nched , bu t th e

opposi t i on si nce m idmor n i ng, when the

fi r st en em y en cou nt er ed w er e fl ush ed n ear

Car pen ter ’s 1$’h ar f by Com pan y B . Af ter

th i s con tact Com pany D pushed south

zl ong the easter n beach and at dusk

r eached the cr est of H i l l 281. M eanwhi le

Com pany B moved up agai n , now on the

r i gh t of Company D, and gai ned hi gh

gr ound over l ook i ng the cu t of a cr oss-

i sl and r oadway th r ough the sadd l e be-

tween H il l s 281 and 230. Company D, on

the far si de of the r oad and to the l eft of

B , took up n i gh t defensi ve posi ti ons w ith

i ts r i gh t f l ank r est i ng on the souther n

br ink of the cu t . Company B , augmented

by el em ents of H ead quar ter s Com pany,

r est ed i ts l ef t f l an k on t he cu t an d ext en ded



r ai der com mander r em ained i n con tact

w i th h i s f i r e suppor t sh i ps, Operation

or der s cal led for the var ious fi re suppor t

sect ion s to pr ovi de th e l an di ng for ce w it h

naval gun fi r e l i ai son par ti es, and two of

these wer e i n Edson ’s CP w i th thei r

radios.11 W hen t he ot her r ai d er com pan i es

cam e under f i re fr om H il l 281 wh i l e Com -

pany C fought agai nst H i l l 208, E dson put

these naval gun fi r e team s to wor k . T he

,$ ”a n .J u a n f i r ed a sev en -m i n u te, 28 0-r ou n d

concent r at i on of 6-i nch shel l s on to H il l

i ts l i nes gener al l y westwar d al ong the

br ink.” Both com pan i es pu t l i sten i ng

posts for war d of the l i nes.

Com pan i es .4 and C (l ess one pl atoon)

m ean w hi l e en cou nt er ed t he t er r ai n f ea tu r e

w hi ch har bor ed the i sl andk m ost ser ious

r esi stance. I n the for war d sl ope of H il l

281, a deep r avi ne l ay alm ost par al l el to

t he r ai der ad van ce an d d ebou ch ed sever al

hundr ed yar ds southeast of H il l 208. I ts

si des wer e pr eci pi tous, and w i th i n i t the

vi ne’s l ong axi s, and l isten i ng posts w er e

established.13

D ur ing E dson’s sw eep dow n th e i sl and ,

the i ?d B at tal i on , 5th M ar i nes (Rose-

cn wn s), h ad l an ded 1,085 off i cer s an d m en

and com mi t ted i t s un i ts to var ious tasks.

(’om pan y F scou ted t he n or th west sect ion

of the i sl and but m et no opposi t i on . At ,

1000 Com pany E was or der ed to oper ate

gener al ly i n suppor t of Com pany B (r ai d-

er s), and one hour l ater the 3d Pl atoon of

~’or npany H (weapons) went for war d to

assi st , (Y om pan y C (r ai der s) i n t he l at ter ’s

at tack agai nst H il l 208. 13y 1300, when

the r ai der bat tal ion began i ts at tack fr om

Phase L ine A, Con l pany G moved down

t he t rai l al on g t he r i dge l in e an d su ppor ted

the r ai der bat tal i on .

back Wal t ’s m en fr om the r efused fl ank.

Rut the f l ank hel d , k i l l i ng 26 .T apanese

w i th i n 20 yar ds of the M I~R.

T lm t ended the concer ted at tacks of the

n i gh t. T h er ea ft er , en em y ef for t s con si st ed

en ti rel y of at t em pt s at qu iet i nf i lt rat ion of

t he M ar in e posi ti on s. I nd i vi dual s and

sm al l gr oups wor kecl f r om the r avi ne

thr ough the r ai der l ines and l aunched f i ve

separ at ,e sm al l-scal e at tack s agai nst t il e

com mand post , between 0030 and 0530.

T hese wer e r epu l sed , and effor ts on the

par t of two other enemy gr oups to sk i r t

the beach fl anks of Com pan i es D and C

l i kew ise w er e t ur n ed back .

On the mor n i ng of 8 August , tw o com -

pan i es of the 2d Bat tal ion , 5th M ar ines,



R osecr n ns’ com -

m an d post l at er d ispl aced sou th east fr om

near Beach B lue towar d the scene of th i s

action.

T L I’L .4GI —T I IE F [12L ST i VI GI JT

AN D SU CCEE DI N G D AY

T he f i rst n igh t on T ul agi set th e pat ter n

for m any fu tu r e n i gh ts i n the Paci f i c war .

D ur i ng d ar kn ess, ~ou r separ at e at tack sstr uck the r ai der l ines, and , al though m i-

m oved up to assi st i n the sweep of the

southeaster n par t of the i sl and . Com pa-

n ies I ? an d F , 5t h M a ri nes, passed t hr ou gh

Company D r ai der s, at tacked down the

for war d sl ope of H i l l 281, and swung r igh t

tow ar d t he en em y pocket i n th e r avi ne.

h’ow f l an ki ng t hi s t rou bl esom e t er r ai n

feat ur e on t hr ee si des, M ar in es l ai d d ow n a

heavy m or tar concentr at i on fr om the

60mm weapons of the r ai der s and 2/ 5’s

81s. By m i daf ter noon the pr epar at i on

w as com pl ete, and at 1500 the r ai der s and

267

by a 50(J -yar d causeway. Gavutuqs h i ll ,1M feet i n h ei gh t, st an ds som e 25 t o 30 feet

l )i gh er t lu u~ T an am bogo’s h ighest poi nt ,

a] l d (+ar ntu th~~s becam e the m ain ob-

ject i ve of the l and i ng wh i ch aim ed at the

l ~ i gher ground .

T he pl an s” cal l ed for t i l e l and i ng to

str i ke the nor theast coast af ter an ap-

pr oach fr om the east , and si nce T anan-

bogo l i es appr oxi matel y nor thwest ofGavu tu t l~e assau lt for ce faced t he possi -

bi l i ty of f l ank i ng f i r e f r om that i sl and as

wel l as fr on tal r esi stance fr om the m ain

object i ve. opposi ti on fr om both i sl ands

w as expect ed fr om t il e t er r ai n d om i nat in g

t h e f l at bea ch .

N aval gun fi r e and cl ose ai r suppor t by

SBD ’s fr om the Wmp wer e expected to

Oug]l ll ess l yi tl l ~yh i ch the ant i ai rcr aft ,cr ui ser N an ,l ua~, l md car r i ed ou t l ~er t i re

su ppor t m issi on -280 r ou nd s of (i -i nck fi re

agai nst Gavutu i n four m inu tes ‘s—and

t h e i n t en si t y of t h e W a.sp ’,S d i ve-bom ber s’

pr epar at i o] l caused heavy dam age to the

en em y i nstal lat i on s, bu t t hi s d est ru ct i on

actual l y wor ked to the d i sadvantage. of

the par achute bat tal ion i n one i nstance.

T he un i t i n tended to l and on a seapl aner am p fr om w hi ch th e beach cou ld be easi ly

r eached, bu t the r am p had been r educed

to an unusabl e m ass of r ubbl e. obser w

i ng t hi s, th e l an di ng w ave com man der s al -

ter ed cour se sl i gh t l y to the nor th wher e

cr aft becam e even m or e vu l ner abl e to

fl ank i ng fi r e. Par t of the tr oops, scr am-

bl ing over a concr ete pi er th at j ut ted four



I l eu t r al ize m ost en em y em pl acem en ts on

t l~ese h i ll s, bu t t he fi r e pl an d id n ot r eck on

w i th the cor al cave. Caves of th i s type

began to appear as ser ious obstacl es for

t he par ach ut e bat tal i on on Gavu tu at abou t

t i l e sam e t im e the r ai der s began to en-

cou nt er t hem on T ul agi .

Sur pr i se was impossi bl e. T her e wer e

n ot su ff i ci en t cr af t for si mu ltan eou s h ul d-

i ngs, and the hour of assau l t was estab-

1i sh ed i n G en er al V an cl egr i ft ’s O per at i on

feet ou t of the water , wer e exposed to fi r e

fr om both i sl ands. Gener al Vandegr if t

est i mated that t r oops l andi ng i n th i s ar ea

su ff er ed t en p er cen t ca su al t ies.

Com pany A, the fi r st wave, got ashor e

w ith ou t casu al ti es t o w or k i nl an d agai nst

n o ser i ou s opp osi t ion . The four boats

car r yi ng Company B and the fi nal wave,

w i th Com pany C and m iscel l aneous at -

t ach men ts, cam e u nd er f i r e as t hey n ear ed

th e i sl and . T he l and i ng succeeded, hovr -



TI T. AG I AN 1} G AVI ’TI ; -T. W’J A YI B O G O 26 )

Eal ions, M h lar i l l es ( r ei n for ced) em-bar ked , wer e or der ed to cr oss fr om the

t ran spor t ar ea oi l’ (+u ad al can al ’s B each

I {ed to t i le T ul agi t r anspor t zr ea. Si nl ul -

i an ew l sl y ba tt al i on com m an der s r ecei ved

or der s to l and thei r t r oops at l l each

]J l ue on T u l agi and r epor t to Gener al

Rupertus.’7

U pon ar r i val at the tr anspor t ar ea off

Beach l l l ue at 0730, the 3d Bat t :d i on wasd i rected to pass to (k tvu tu j r ei n for ce the

t r oops engaged ther e, and sei ze T anan l -

bogo. (l r der s for the 1st Bat tal i on wer e

cancel led and th i s un i t d i d not l and .

l ’he 3d I Iat tal i on , under L ieu tenant

Col on el Rober t G. H u nt , l an ded on Gavu tu

i n a successi on of boat waves, w i th com-

pani es i n the fol l ow i ng or der : Company

E igh t of t i l e casual t i es wer e men of thes(l ppor t i l l ,g l )l at oon of Com pan y M .

.ft 1W5, Captai n W. B . T i nsl ey, com -

l ~l an di i l g (’om pan y 1, w as or der ed to pr e-

par e for a l ancl i ng on T anambogo. H e

woul d have the suppor t of tw o tanks fr om

(’om pany (.” of the 2d T ank Bat tal i on

(one of the r ei nfor ci ng un i ts of t i l e AI

M ar i nes ), and hi s at tack wou l d be pr e-

ceded by a l o-m inu te navalg l l n f i re

pr epar at i on by the Buchanan. T he com -

l N L nyw ou ld n ot be accom pan ied by i ts su p-

por ti ng m ach i ne-gun pl atoon , wh i ch was

to stay i n posi t i on on Gavu tu and l ay

dow n suppor ti ng t i res fr om ther e.

At 1315 the tanks l anded on Gavut .u .

I .i eu ten an t E . ,J . Sw een ey, com man di ng

them , w as or der ed to l and at 1615 on T an-



L , w ith M b Pl at oon , (’om pan y M att ach ed ,at 1000; Com pany K , w i th 4th Pl :l toon ,

(’om pan y M at tach ed , at 1025; (Yom pan y

I , w i th M Platoon , (’om pany M attached,

at 1050; Com pany M , l ess 3d , M , and 5th

Pl at oon s, w i th H ead qu ar t er s (’om pal ~y, a t

1120.

T roops depl oyed i ni ti al ly to el im inate

(kw l tu opl )osi t i on and to take Tanan l -

bogo u nd er f i r e. (’om pan y 1,, for exm npl e,assum ed posi ti ons gener al ly ar ound the

am bogoj l lsi ng on e tan k t o cover t he sou thsi de of the h i l l on that . i sl and and the

ot her t o cover t he east er n sl ope.

T he n aval gun fi re pr epar at i on began at

1600. T wenty m i nutes l ater the assau l t

COlll])illl~j fol l ow i ng the tanks, m ade i ts

l an di ng. L ieu tenan t Sw een ey w as ki ll ed ,

bu t h i s tank r ender ed val uabl e suppor t to

t he r i f l emen . T he other tank , get t i ng too

far ahead of the assau l t t r oops, was d i s-abl ed by an i r on bar and set afi r e by oi l -

270 P EARL H ARB OR TO G CAD AL C ANAI ,

gun fire. from ~ TS S @ri~ ley w a s direct ecl

upon G a omi a t 1’700 a n d posit ions on t he

sma ll isla n d w ere silenced. .lt t his t ime

t h e 1st pla t oon of C ompa ny ~ a t t a cked

a cross t h e ca usew a y from G ccvut u, secured

t h e .Ta na mbogo en d of t h e ca usew a -yj a nd

t ook up posit ions for t he nigh t .

B y 21oo, t he sout h ea st ern t w o-t hirds of

t h e isla nd h a d been secured, a nd a t 2300

a light n mch in e-~ un pla t oon from (20m -

pa n y &l repor t ed t o compa ny I for sup-

por t a ga inst en em y count era t t a cks. C on -

sidera ble close-in fight ing t ook pla ce dur-

in g t h e nigh t bet w een t h e ~ la rines a nd

,J a pa n ese w h o sa llied from foxholes a nd

dugout s. No ch a n ge in posit ion occurred,

h ow ever , a nd by la te t h e n ext da y con -

t inued a t t a cks ha d secur ed t h e isla nd.

one .30 and one .50 ca liber j t h e t ra ctor%

crew n eut ra lized t he en emy fire a nd t h en

eva cua t ed t he w oun ded ~ I a r ines.ls The

five t ra ct ors of t h e pla t oon w er e t a ken

ha ck on boa rd t he Adcz)n,s before sun dow n

011 ~ .< U ~ LI St .

lVit h t he fa ll of Ta na mbo~ o, t h e la st

effect ive resist a nce in t he Nggela isla ncl

gr oup cea sed. S ubsequen t opera tion s

consist ed of moppin g up, con solida t ing

defen sesj a n d occupyin ~ severa l sma ll

peripheral i sl and s i ncl ud in g M :zk :m ~bo,

M bangai , K okom tum bu, and Songonan-

gona.”

T he m issi on of cl ear ing ou t these sm al l

i s] ands fel l to var i ous un i ts of the 2d

B a t t a lion, 2d h la r in es. h la ka mbo w a s

t a ken by ~ ompa n y )3, ~ ~ ba n~ a i by C om-



l~ h ile G a vut u a n d Ta n a mbogo w er e

mopped up, t he 1st a n d 2d B a t t a lions, 2d

13fa r ines un loa ded a t Tula gi. Th e 1st

B a t t a l ion, un en ~ a gecl sin ce it s 7 I lugust

la ncling on Florida , w en t a sh ore a t 13ea ch

B lue a t 0900 on 9 .lu~ ust . The 2d 13a t-

t a lien ( Nfa jor or in K . P ressley ) follow ed

a n h olu- la ter .

H ere, a s a t G ua da lca na l , t h e a mphibia n

t ra ct or emer ged a s a versa t ile piece of

eq uipmen t w h ose import a n ce a n cl ut ilit y

pa ny F, a n d K okomt a mbu a n d S on~ on a n-

gon i L,by C ompa n y G . occupa t ion of a ll

t h ese sma ller isla nds w a s complet ed

clur in g t h e mor ning of 9 .Lugust . I n :L1l

cases> opposit ion w a s sl@t .

Occupa t ion of t h e en t ire isla nd gr oup

a n cl dest ruct ion of t h e ,Ta pa n ese ga rr ison

h a d been a ccomplish ed in t hree da ys. Th e

few prisoners t a ken w ere q uest ioned a nd

sent t o rea r a rea s. l fost of t h em fina lly

w ere pla ced in a pr ison er of w a r ca mp

271

bat tal i on had su f fer ed 50-60 per cen tcasual ti es can on l y be expl ai ned i n ter ms

of i nad equ at e com mu ni cat ion s bet ween

h im an d h is t roops ash or e.

T h e exa ct n u m ber of ,T a pa nese ca su al t i es

w i l l never be known. An est im ated 750-

800 enemy wer e pr esen t i n the Tu l agi -

Gavu tu -T anam bogo ar ea at the t im e of

the l and i ngs. T wenty-th r ee pr isoner s

w er e tak en , an d an i ntel l i gen ce su mm ar ygi ves 70 as the appr oxim ate num ber of

su r vi vor s w ho escaped t o F lor i da.

I m m ed iat el y af ter or gan ized r esi st an ce

ceased an d t he i sol at ed d efen di ng gr ou ps

wer e r ounded up or w i ped out , T ul agi and

i ts satel l i te i sl an ds w er e or gan ized for d e-

fense agai nst counter at tack. T he 1st

Par achute Bat tal i on , depl eted by i ts ex-

roads. on l y i lf ter noon of the seconcl dayw as i t possi bl e to m ove suppl ies ashor e at

the pi er s on the easter n coast . Both

Gavu tu an d T an am bogo w er e so sm al l t hat

on ] y amm uni ti on and water wer e 1anded

u nt il t he i sl an ds w er e secu r ed .

N aval gun fi r e on th i s si de of the Sol o-

m on I sl an ds oper at i on h ad m or e of a w or k-

ou t, t ha n i t h ad r ecei ved acr oss t he ch an nel

i i t (l uadal canal wher e opposi t i on was atf i rst l i gh t ,, bu t i t was not an unqual i f i ed

success. As a m atter of fact i t was “ver y

poor ,” accor di ng to n aval h ead qu ar ter s i n

Washington.2’ B ut t hi s fai l i ng w as cau sed

m ost l y by l ack of i ntel li gence and t i me for

pl ann i ng and coor d i nated tr ai n i ng. I m-

pr oper or d nan ce m ad e for an ot her fai l in g.

On l y ar m or -pi er ci ng shel l s cou l d have



per i ence on Gavu tu , m oved fr om thati sl an d at 1700 on 9 Au gu st t o T ul agi , w her e

i t went i nto posi t i on i n the Gover nm ent

bu i ld i ng ar ea, The 2d Bat tal i on , 5th

M a r in es occu pi ed t he sou th ea st er n sect or

of the i sl and , wh i l e two bat tal i ons of the

2d M ar ines took over the defensi ve m i s-

si on i n the nor thwest . T he 1st Bat tal i on

occupi ed the ext r em e end of the i sl and

wh i l e the 2d Bat tal ion establ i shed posi -t i ons at Sasapi . Th i r d Bat tal i on , 2d

bl ast ed t he J apan ese f rom t hei r caves, bu tt he sh ips r epeat ed ly f i red h igh -capaci ty

bom bar dm en t pr oj ect i les. A lt hou gh m an y

N aval of f i cer s w er e st i l l of t he opi ni on t hat

a sh i p was a “fool to f i gh t a for t ,” som e

began to agr ee w i th the M ar ine Cor ps that

naval gun fi re pr oper ly em pl oyed cou l d be

a bi g hel p i n an am ph ibi ous assau l t . I t

W;W a case of the gunfi re sh i ps need i ng to

m ov e i n cl oser f or t hei r f ir e m i ssi on s. T hecom m an der of on e sh ip r epor ted :



TU L AG I AN D G AVU TU -T. 4N AM B OG 0 273

l a ter op er a ti on s, the M ar i ne Cor ps wasgener al l y sat i sf i ed w i th the sh i ps’ f i r e.

“T he oper at i on d i d not i nvol ~7e a r eal

test . . . [bu t ] noth i ng devel oped dur -

i ng the oper at i on to i nd i cate the need for

an y fu nd am en tal ch an ge i n d oct r in e.” 23

After these th r ee days of f i gh t i ng i n the

T u l agi ar ea, th i s si de of the oper at i on r e-

m ai ned qu i et . Enem y pl anes bypassed i t

t o st r i ke at the m or e tem pt i ng Guadal -

2’ Final Rept, P ha se V, 6.

canal ai r f i el d and per i m eter . Surfacecr a ft sh el l ed T u la gi occa si on al l y, bu t n ever

was i t subjected to the k i nd of bom bar d -

m en t th at st r uck Gu ad al can al i n October .

T her e i s no r ecor d th at en em y r ei nfor ce-

m ents l anded ei ther on T u l agi or on F l or -

i da I sl an d. Wi th th i s shar p f i gh t i ng out

of the way, the d i vi si on cou l d gi ve al l i t s

at ten t i on to th i ngs on the l ar ger i sl and of

Guadalcanal . T her e the pi ctu r e w as not

a br i gh t on e.



CH APT ER 4

The Battle of the Tenaru

Wi th n aval su ppor t gone, abou t t he on ly

hope was the ai r f i el d . Sh i ppi ng wou l d

need ai r cover befor e r egu l ar r uns cou l d

bol st er t he M a ri nes’ sl i m su ppl y l evel s, an d

t im e w as of t he essen ce. I f t he J apan ese

str uck har d wh i l e the l and i ng for ce was

abandoned and w i thou t ai r suppor t, the

pr ecar i ou s fi r st st ep t ow ar d Rabau l m igh t

wel l have to be taken al l over agai n . Van-

degr if t cen ter ed ]l i s defense :l t t ] l e f i el d

and gave com pl et i on of the str ip top pr i -

A l r eady the U . S. for ces wer e i ndebted to

the enemy for par t of thei r dai l y two

m eal s, and now they wou l d f i n i sh the ai r -

f i el d l ar gel y th r ough the use of enem y

tool s. T hi s equ i pm ent i ncl uded ni ne r oad

r ol l er s (on l y si x of wh i ch wou l d wor k),

tw o gas l ocom ot i ves w ith hopper car s on a

n ar r ow -gau ge r ai lr oad , si x sm al l gen er at -

or s (two wer e damaged beyond r epai r),

on e w in ch w ith a gasol in e en gi ne, abou t 50

h i tnd ca r ts for dir t , some 75 h a nd shcw els,



or it y equal to the task of bu i ld i ng the per -

i m et er ’s M L R .

On 8 August , al most as soon as the fi el d

was captu r ed , L ieu tenant Col onel Fr ank

Ger aci , t he D ivi si on E ngi neer Of fi cer , an d

M ajor K enneth H . Wei r , D i vi si on Ai r

Off i cer , h ad m ad e an i nspect ion of t he ,J ap-

an ese pr oj ect an d est i mat ed t he w or k st i l l

needed. They tol d Adm i r al T ur ner that

2,600 feet of the st r i p wou l d be r eady i n

a nd 2?80 pieces of explosives.

I n spit e of this unin t ent iona l a ssist a n ce

from t he J apa nese, t h e Nla rin e en gin eers

did not w a st e a n y a ffect ion on t he previous

ow ner s of t h e eq uipmen t . The ma ch in ery

evident ly h a d been used con t in uously for

some t ime w it h n o t h ough t of ma int e-

n a nce. K eepin g it run nin g proved a lmost

a s big a job a s finish in g t h e a ir field , a n d

on e of t he ta sks h a d t o be d on e pra ct ica lly

TH E B ATTLE OF TH E TE N’ARU 275

Pr obl em s faci ng the i n fan t r y t r oopswer e just as gr eat . T her e had been no im -

pr essi ve gr ound act i on on Guadal canal

si nce the l and i ng, bu t i n tel l i gence i n the

i mm ed i ate vi ci ni ty as wel l as i n the South

Paci fi c i n gener al w as not yet abl e to i nd i -

cate when, how , and wher e ,J apanese r e-

act i on wou l d st r i ke. Est im at i ng a

counter mand i ng to be th e m ost pr obabl e

cou r se of J a pa nese act i on , G en er al V an de-gr i f t pl aced h i s M LR at the beach . T her e

the M il r i nes bu i l t a 9,600-yar d defense

fr om the m outh of the I I L ~ Ri ver west

ar ound L ungs Poi n t to the vi l l age of

K ukum. T he I l u f l ank was r efused 600

yar ds i nl and on the r iver ’s w est bank, and

at K l l ku r n the l eft f l ank tu r ned i n l and

acr oss t he f l at l an d bet ween th e beach an d

attacks. .~t n i gh t the enem y patr ol s be-cam e i ncr easi ngl y bol d, and t r oops on th e

M L R m ounted a cont i nuous al er t dur ing

the hour s of dar kness. South of the ai r -

f i el d the ol ~tpost l i ne had to be suppl e-

n l en ted by r ovi n g p at r ol s.

I n spi te of th i s har assm ent , the per im -

eter shaped up. T he 1st Speci al Weap-

ons Bat tal i on dug i n i ts 75mm tank de-

st royer s (h al f-t rack s) i n posi ti on s i nl an dfr om the beach , bu t kept them r eady to

m ove i n to pr epar ed posi t i ons near the

water. H ow i tzer s of the l l th M ar i nes

w er e si tu at ed to d el iver f i re i n al l sector s.

T il e 2d and 3d Battal i ons of the ar ti ll er y

r egim ent had 75m m pack how i tzer s and

the 5th B ~t tal ion had 105m nl how i tzer s.n

T her e wer e no 155mm howi tzer s or guns ~



the f i r st h i gh gr ound of the coastal h i ll s.T he 5th M ar ines (l ess one bat tal ion) hel d

the l eft sector of the l i ne fr om K ukum to

the west bank of the L unga, and the r e-

m ai nder of the l i ne (i ncl usi ve of the

L ung-a ) w as hel d by the 1st M ar ines. (See

M ap 16)

T he l i ne was th i n . T he bu l k of the com -

bat for ces r emained i n assem bl y ar eas

i nl an d as a r ead y r eser ve to ch eck at t acksor pen etr at i on s fr om an y sector . I n l and

for counter bat ter y, ther e was no sound-f l ash equ ipm en t for t he l ocat i on of en em y

bat ter ies, and the 3d Defense Bat tal i on

had n ot h acl a ch an ce t o u nl oad i ts 5-i nch

seacoast ~ L I n s or r adar un i ts pr i or to

t he d epar tu r e of t he am ph ibi ou s sh ippi ng.

.1 i r d efen se w ith in th e per im eter al so w as

inadequate. T her e wer e $l Om m ant i ai r-

cr af t guns i nshor e, bu t the r est r icted si ze

of the per im eter kept them too cl ose to thef i el d f or b est em p loym en t .

2?6 P EARL H AR B OR TO G UAD AL C ANTAL

Admi r al Ghor m ley, al so concer nedabou t th e pr ecar iou s M ar in e posi ti on ,3 on

12 August or der ed Adm ir al M cCai n’s T F

63 to em pl oy al l avai labl e t r an spor t sh i p-

pi ng t o t ak e avi at ion gasol in e, l ubr i can ts,

am muni ti on , bom bs, an d gr ound cr ew s to

Guadalcanal . T o avoi d J apanese ai r at -

tacks, the sh i ps wer e to l eave E spi r itu

San to i n t im e to r each Sea]w -k Channel

l ate i n the cl ay , un l oad under cover ofd ar kn ess, an d d epar t ear ly th e fol low in g

day.

F or t he “bl ock ad e r un ” t o Gu ad al can al ,

Adm ir al M cCai n r ead i ed four dest r oyer

t r anspor ts of T ransD i v 12. T hey wer e

l oaded w i th 400 dr ums of avi at i on gaso-

l i ne, 32 dr um s of l ubr i can t , 282 bom bs

fr om 100- t o 500-pou nd er s, bel ted am mu -

m ud af ter each of the fr equent t r opi calra ins.

Gener al H ar mon bl amed a fau l ty pl an-

n i ng concept for the ser ious shor tages of

t ool s, equ ipm en t, an d su ppl ies. T he cam -

pai gn , he sai d , “. . . had been vi ewed by

i ts pl an ner s as [ an ] am ph ibi ou s oper at ion

suppor ted by ai r, not as a m eans of estab-

l ish i ng str ong l and based ai r act i on .” 4

But i n spi te of these shor tages at theai r fi el d and el sewher e, the L unga Poi nt

per im eter w as tak i ng on an or der ly r ou ti ne

of im pr ovem ent and defense. M otor

t ran spor t per son nel h ad pu t t hei r m eager

pool of t ru cks i nt o oper at ion sh or tl y aft er

the l and i ng, and they had added some 35

.T apanese tr ucks to the avai l abl e l i st .

Pi oneer s had bu i lt a r oad fr om the ai rf i el d



n i t i on , tool s, and spar e par ts. A l so onboar d w er e f i ve off i cer s and 118 N avy en-

l isted m en fr om a N avy const r uct i on base

(Seabee) un i t , Cub-1. U nder the com-

mand of M ajor C. H . H ayes, execu t i ve

off i cer of VM O–251, th i s un i t was to ai d

the M ar i ne engi neer s i n wor k at the f i el d

and to ser ve as gr ound cr ews for f i gh ter s

and d i ve bomber s schedu l ed to ar r i ve

w i t h i n a f ew d ays.M cCai n’s sh ips ar r i ved off Gu ad al can al

to the L unga Ri ver wher e they er ected abr i dge to the far si de of the per i m eter .

Suppl y dum ps al so had been put i n or der .

T he pi oneer s cl ear ed the l and i ng beach ,

m ovi ng gear west to the L ungs-K ukum

ar ea, an d sor ted an d m oved J apan ese sL l p-

pl ies. T he ol d ,J apanese beach at K ukum

w as cl eaned L L pan d r econd i ti oned to r e-

cei v e U . S . m a ter i a l .

M ost of the wor k of m ovi ng the beachd um ps t o per man en t si tes w as com pl et ed

TH E B ATTLE OF TH E TE NARU 277

agai n . T he am ount of suppl i es at eachof the new cl assi fi ed dum ps was kept l ow

t o a voi d excessi ve l oss f r om b om ba r dm en t .

Captu r ed mater i al i ncl uded alm ost ,

ever y t ype i tem u sed by a m il i tar y for ce—

ar m s, a mm u ni t ion , equ i pm en t, f ood , cl ot h-

i ng, fu el , t ool s, an d bu il di ng m at er i al s:

A s t he d ivi si on w as acu tel y sh or t of ever y-

t h i ngneeded for i t s opera t i on , t he captu red ma-t er i a l r ep r esen t ed a n i m por t an t i f u n for eseen

fact or i n t he d evel opm en t of t he ai r fi el d an d

beach defenses and the subsi st ence of t he ga r -risons

T he l an di ng for ce w as par t i cu lar l y sh or t

of fuel , bu t i n th i s case the suppl y l eft

beh i nd by the J apanese gar ri son was not

as hel pfu l as i t m igh t h ave been. Marines

found som e 800 to 900 dr um s of J apanese

avi at ion gasol in e on (%ad al can al , bu t t hi s

th ei r passes al on gsi de w ith th e u nw iel dy1i gh ter s i n t he w ay, an d sh ips off i cer s qu it e

fr equent l y took a d im vi ew of dr aggi ng

al ong su ch bul ky par asi tes w hen t hey h ad

to take evasi ve act i on dur ing the sudden

ai r r ai ds. Bu t the system often wor ked

wel l when ear ly pr epar at i ons wer e made

w ith par ti cu lar ly fr iend ly shi ps.

T hi s over -water wor k i n Seal ar k Chan-

nel , m ai ntai ni ng con tact betw een T ul agiand Guadal canal as wel l as meet i ng the

sL ~ppl y sh ips w hi ch began t o sn eak i n m or e

fr equ en tl y, poi nt ed t o an ot her ser i ou s d e-

f i ci en cy: t her e w as n o or gan ized boat pool

avai labl e to the d i vi si on . M or e often than

not the per sonnel and cr aft that the di vi -

si on used i n those ear ly days had m er el y

been aban don ed w hen th e at tack for ce de-



9@octan e fuel w as n ot qu ite good en ou gh

for our ai r cr af t , and i t was too “hot” and

pr oduced too much car bon i n tr ucks and

H iggi ns boats un l ess m i xed even l y w i th

U . S. ‘72-oct an e m ot or fu el . L i kew ise som e

150,000 gal lon s of ,J apan ese m ot or fu el of

60 or 65 octane pr oved unr el i abl e i n our

veh i cl es al though some of i t was m i xed

w i th our fuel and used i n emer gency i n

noncombat vehic les.

par ted , and ther e was no sembl ance oforganization among them . Even the

cr eat i on of or der di d not sol ve al l the

pr obl em s. A hi gh per centage of the boats

w er e dam aged an d cr ew men h ad n o r epai r

facilities. T he si tuat i on was gr adual l y

i m pr ov ed bu t w as n ev er sa ti sf act or y.

At l ast , on 18 A ugu st , t he en gi neer s an d

Seabees had a chance to stand back and

adm ir e thei r wor k. T he ai r fi el d was com-pl et ed . On 12 A ugu st i t h ad been d ecl ar ed



TH E B ATTLE OF TH E TE NARI J 2T9

however, “r ead i ness>’ w as a com par at i ve

th i ng. Ther e wer e no bomb hand l i ng

tr ucks, car ts or hoi sts, no gas t r ucks, and

n o pow er pu mps.

The state of r eadi ness had a way of

f l uct uat in g r api dl y, t oo, an d t he br eat hi ng

spel l for the wor ker s d i d not l ast long.

W’i th m ost sad i st i c t i mi ng, a l ar ge f l ight

of J t i pan ese pl an es cam e o~er an cl scor ed

17 h i ts on the r unway. (he engi~l eer was

ki l l ed , n i ne wer e wounded, and t i l e f i el d

“w as a m ess.’: G

‘I ke r un ww y d am age w as d isqu iet in g bu t

n ot al toget her a su rpr i se. .i i r r ai ds had

been f requ en t, sh el l i ng fr om offsh or e su b-

m ar i nes l ik ew ise w as com m on , an d pl an es

dr oned over head fr equent l y dur i ng the

hour s of dar kness to dr op sm al l bombs

Bomber Squadr on 232 wer e l ed by L ieu-

tenant Col onel Ri char d D. M angr um .

Ar r i val of pl anes ended an er a for the

(i uad al can al d efen der s—t he h azar dol ls

per iod fr om 9 to 20 August when the l and-

ing for ce oper ated ent i rel y w i thou t ai r or

sur face suppor t. Dur ing th i s per iod l ines

of com mu ni cat i on s w er e m ost u ncer tai n.

~“oth i ng w as known of the gener al naval

si tu at i on or th e extent of l osses at sea, an d

l i tt le i nfor m at ion w as r ecei ved fr om aer i al

r econ na issa nce f rom r ea r a rea s. Ashore,

patr ol l ing was constan t , bu t the ter rai n

w as su ch t hat m uch cou ld be m issed . Sh or t

r at i ons, cont i nuous har d wor k, and l ack

of sl eep r ef lect ed i n t he p hysi ct d con di t ion

of t he t roops. M or al e, h ow ever , r em ai ned

high.



her e and ther e at wel l-spaced i nter val s.

After the bi g r ai d on the 18th, the wel l -

l ] r act i ced r epai r team s mer el y went to

wor k agai n . I n f i l l i ng the cr ater s, the

engi neer s and Seabees fi rst squar ed the

hol es w it h h an d sh ovel s an d th en ai r h am -

m er ed th e new d ir t sol id by tam pi ng ever y

foot and a hal f of f i l l . They had found

that th i s system kept set t l i ng to a m ini -

n Ju m an d pr even ted d an ger ou s pot h ol es.

For med i n M ar ch of 1942 at E wa, Oahu,M .4G-23 r em ai ned i n t r ai ni ng th er e, w ith

m uch sh ift in g of per son nel an d u ni ts, u nt il

t hi s t wo-squ ad ron for war d ech el on sai led

to the South Paci f i c on 2 August on boar d

the escor t car ri er L ong Islancl. Smith ’s

men had just been i ssued new F4F’s w i th

t wo-st age su per ch ar ger s, an d M a ngr u m’s

un i t had tu r ned i n i ts ol d S13D-2’S for the

n ew er 3’s w it h sel f-seal i ng gasol in e t an ks

280 Pl l ~R L H .4R BOR T O GU ~ DA I J CA N AL

T wo days l ater , on 22 August , the fi r stAr m y Ai r For ce pl anes, f i ve P-400’s 7 of

the 67th F igh ter Squadr on , l anded on the

i sl and . On 24 August , 11 N avy d i ve bom b-

er s fr om the bat t l e-dam aged E nter pr ise

m oved to H ender son F i el d to oper ate for

th r ee m onths, an d on 27 August n i ne m or e

Ar m y P-400’s cam e i n . Per for m ance of

these Ar my pl anes was d i sappoi n t i ng.

T hei r cei l in g w as 12,000 feet becau se t hey

had no equ i pm ent for the Br i t i sh h i gh-

-pr essu re oxygen syst em w it h w hi ch t hey

wer e f i t ted , and they cou l d not r each the

h i gh-f l yi ng enem y pl an es. A l ong w ith the

,M ar in e SB D’S, th e P400’s spen t t hei r t i me

dur ing J apanese ai r r ai ds of f st r af i ng and

bom bi n g gr ou nd t ar get s, a nd t hey r et ur n ed

to H ender son after the host i le pl an es de-

Ear ly i n Septem ber he suggested thath eavy bom ber s st age t hr ou gh t he Gu ad al -

canal f i el d fr om the N ew H ebr i des and

thus str ike Rabau l and other J apanese

bases; bu t a cl oser i nvest igat ion poi nt ed

up the i m pr act i cal i t y of th i s pl an . I t

wou l d have m eant hand-pum ping mor e

than 3,500 gal l ons of gasol i ne i n to each

bomber l and i ng at Guadal canal on the

1,800-m i l e r ound t r i p fr om the N ew

H ebr ides to the N or ther n Sol om ons; and

al though th i s m anual l abor was not too

gr eat a pr i ce to pay for an oppor tun i t y

t o st ri ke at t he J apan ese, i t w as i m possi bl e

to m ain tai n ‘a fuel stock of that pr opor -

t ion at H en der son F iel d.

GROUND ACTION



parted.

A shor t wh i l e l ater -ear l y i n Septem -

ber —suppl y and evacuat i on f l igh ts w er e

i ni ti ated by tw o-engi ned R4D ’s ( C47’S)

of M ar i ne Ai r cr aft Gr oup 25, F l yi ng

dai l y fr om Espi r i tu Santo and E fate, the

car go pl anes each br ought i n som e 3,000

pounds of suppl i es and wer e capabl e of

ev acu at i n g 16 st r et ch er p at i en t s.

A l though th i s i ncr eased ai r act i vi t y at

Com bat t r oops m eanwhi l e pr obed the

j un gl es w it h pat rol s, an d ear l y r econ nai s-

san ce i nd icat ed t hat t he bu lk of J apan ese

t r oop s w as som ew h er e bet ween t he M a ta n-

i kau Ri ver , about 7,000 yar ds west of the

L unga, and K okum bona, a nat i ve vi l lage

som e 7,500 yar ds w est of the M atan i kau .

Gener al Vandegr if t w anted to pur sue the

enem y and dest r oy h i m befor e the J apan-ese cou l d r ei n for ce t h i s sm a l l, d i sor ga ni zed

TH E B .4TTI,E OF TH E TE NARU 281

pat ter n had star ted as ear ly as 9 August

w hen on e off i cer an d sever al en li st ed m en

wer e wounded whi l e t r yi ng to cr oss the

r iver . Th i s patr ol had r epor ted the west

bank of the r i ver wel l or gani zed for de-

fense. T he enem y kept shi ft i ng h i s posi -

t ion, thOLlgh, to m aneuver for an

ad van tage agai nst t he pat rol s w hi ch cam e

to seek h im out . F i nal con fi r m at i on of

the enem y l ocat i on cam e on 12 August

w hen a J apan ese w ar r an t off i cer capt ur ed

beh in d th e 1st B at t al ion , 5t h M ar in es sai d

that h i s un i t w as between the M atan i kau

and Kokumbona .

U nd er qu est ioni ng, th e pr ison er ad mi t-

ted that possi bl y som e of h i s fel low gar r i -

son mates wer e wander i ng aim lessl y

th r ough the jungl e w i thou t food and that

d ivi si on su rgeon , L i eu ten an t Ral ph Cor y,

a J apan ese l in gu ist , an d sever al m em ber s

of the 5th M ar ines i ntel l i gence sect i on .

The boat got away fr om the per im eter at

about 1800 and l anded af ter dar k at 2200

at an undeter m ined poi n t west of the

M at an ik au . T he J apan ese, i nst ead of su r-

r ender ing, at tacked the patr ol and cu t off

fr om the beach al l bu t thr ee m en who

escaped back i n to the sur f to sw im and

wade to sa fet y.

One of these m en, Ser geant Char les C.

Ar nd t , ar ri ved i n the per im eter at about

0530 on 13 .4u gu st t o r epor t th at t he pat rol

h ad en cou nt er ed en em y r esi st an ce. Com -

pany A, 5th M ar ines set off im medi atel y

as a r el ief pat r ol to be r ei n for ced l ater by

two pl atoons of Company L and a l i gh t



some of them m igh t sur r ender . Fi rs tSer gean t St eph en A . Cu st er of t he d ivi si on

i ntel li gen ce sect i on m ad e pl an s to l ead an

am ph ibi ous pat r ol to the ar ea. Mean-

wh i l e, a M ar ine pat r ol r epor ted seei ng

what i t took to be a wh i te f l ag west of the

r iver . H ear in g th ese r epor ts, L i eu ten an t

Col onel F rank Goet tge, d i vi si on i ntel li -

gence off i cer , deci ded to l ead the pat r ol

himself.T he or igi nal pl an h ad cal led for an ear ly

m ach i ne-gun sect i on . M eanwhi l e, theot her t wo esca ped p at r ol m em ber s, Cor po-

r al ,J oseph Spau l d i ng and Platoon Ser -

geant F r ank L . Few, cam e back at 0725

a nd 0800 r espect i vel y a nd r eveal ed t hat t he

r em ai nder of the Goet tge pat r ol had been

w i ped ou t.

The r el i ef pat r ol l anded west of Poi n t

Cr uz, a coast al pr oj ect ion a sh or t d ist an ce

w est of th e M at an ikau % m out h. Com pan y

A m oved east al ong the coastal r oad back



T H E B ATTLE OF TH E TE NARU 283

th i s at tack wh i l e Com pany I of the sam e

r egi m en t m ad e an am ph ibi ou s r ai d fa rt her

w est , at K ok um bol li l , w her e i t. w as h oped

t hat a ny J ap an ese r et rea ti ng fr om M a tan i-

kau cou l d be cu t off . (h 18 August ,

Com pany I . m oved i n l and , cr ossed the

M atan i kau som e 1,000 yar ds fr om the

coast , and pr epar ed to zt tack nor th i n to

the vi l l age the next day. Com pany )3, to

at tack w est , m oved a]on g t he coastal r oad

t o t he east ban k of t he r iver .

h ’ext d ay, :L f tt ?r pr ep ar a ti on f ir e w as l ai d

CIOWn by the 2d, 3d, and 5th Bat tal i ons of

the 1l th M ar in es, Com pan y 1, l au nched i ts

at tack . Shor tl y after j u ml ~i ng oH , scou ts

d iscover ed a l in e of em pl acem en ts al on g a

r idge som e 1,000 yar ds to the l ef t f l ank of

t he com pan y fr on t. T he pl atoon on th i s

f l ank engaged the sm al l enem y for ce i n

t hese em p la cem en ts w h il e t h e r em ai n der of

succeeded i n r epu l si ng the at tack on l y

a,f ter cl ose-r an ge fi gh ti ng. D efen di ng i n

depth , the J apanese d r ew up on a l i ne

whi ch extended fr om the r i ver som e 200

yar ds west thr ough the vi l l age. Whi l e

t he M ar in es m an eu ver ed for an at tack , t he

,J apan ese t ir e becam e m or e spor ad ic, an d

an assault at about, 1600 revea led t ha t t h e

en emy pocket h a d dispersed.

Mea nw hile t h e a mphibious ra id of C om-

pa n y I a lso a roused opposit ion. Tw o

enemy dest royers a nd a cruiser lobbed

shells a t t h e la nding cra ft w h ile t h ey

sw un g from t h e Ma rine per imet er t o K o-

kurn bona , a nd t he ra iding pa r t y esca ped

t l~ is t hrea t on ly t o be met a t t he bea ch

by J a pa n ese ma chin e-gun fire. The la nd-

ing succeeded, how everj a nd t he en emy re-

sista nce bega n t o melt . B y t he t ime a

Ma rine a t ta ck sw ept t hrough t h e villa ge,



th e com pan y m oved on t ow ar d t he vi l l age.

I n th i s act i on of l the l ef t f l ank , Ser gean t

~J oh n H . B r an ic, t he a ct in g pl at oon l ead er ,

was k i l l ed . T he com pany execu t i ve off i -

cer , I ,i eu ten an t Geor ge H . M ead, J r . n ext

took com m and . When he w as k i l l ed a

shor t, t i m e l ater M ar ine Gunner Edwar d

S. Rt l st , a l i a i son off i cer fr om the 5th M a-

r ines headquar ter s took com mand . T h i s

p]tLtOOll continued to cover th e ad van ce of

t lm defenders ha d ret ired in to t he jungle

t o a void a conclusive en ga gement . The

t hree compa n ies killed 65 ,J apa nese w hile

suffer ing t h e loss of four lla rines killed

a nd 11 w oun ded.

Alt hou@ t hese a ct ions served only t o

loca t e t he gen era l a rea int o w h ich t he

ori@na l ,J a pa n ese a a rr ison of G ua da l-

ca na l ha d w it hdra w m in t he fa ce of t h e

Ma rine la nding, a n ot h er pa t rol on 19 Au-

284 1’I M R L H A RB OR T O G U ~D ~L C ~h T .4L



TH E B ATTLE OF TH E TE XARU 285

ol i c p r i est f r om M et h uen , M a ssa ch u set t s,l ]

who r el ated nat i ve r umor s of a n enemy

for ce al on g t he coast to the east.

T wo days l ater a par t i al ver i fi cat ion of

t he p r i est ’s i n f orma t i on was m ade by Cap-

tai n (of the Br it i sh Sol om on I sl ands De-

fense For ce ) W. F . M , (M ar ti n ) Cl em ens,

t h e district officer w ho h ad w it hd raw n into

t h e h i l l s to becom e a coast -wa t cher when the

,J apanese enter ed h i s i sl and . On 14

.%u gu st Cl em en s l ef t h is w at ch in g st at ion

near Aola Bay w i th hi s 60 nat i ve scouts 12

an d enter ed the M ar i ne per im eter .

Cl emens and h i s scouts r ep or t ed seei n g

si gns of a n ew J apanese for ce. And on

the h eel s of Cl em en s’ r epor ts came word

fr om .i dm i r al Tur ner that naval i n tel l i -

g-ence indicated a .Japanese at tack in force.

T o i n vest i ga te, Captai n Char l es H .

t he j un gl e. Thr ee M ar ines wer e k i l l ed

a nd t hr ee w ou nd ed .

I t w as clea r t ha t t hese t r oops w ere n ot

wander ing l abor er s or even mem ber s of

the or i gi nal gar r i son . H el mets of the

d ea d sol d ier s bor e t he J a pan ese A r my s tar

ra t h er t ha n t h e a n chor a n d ch rysa n t he-

mum device of t h e specia l la n ding force.

A code for sh ip-t o-sh ore commun ica t ion s

t o be used for a la ndin g opera t ion a lso w a s

foun d a mong t he effect s, a nd t h e a ppea r-

a n ce of t h e uniforms in dica t ed tha t t h e

t roops w ere recen t a rr iva ls t o G ua da lca na l.

There a ppea r ed lit t le doubt t ha t , t he J apa -

nese w ere prepa r in g a n a t tempt t o r e-

ca pt ure t h eir lost :I ir field . And B rush

founcl t hey h a d a lrea dy complet ed some

excellent a dva n ce w ork:

Wit h a com plet e la ck of kn ow ledge of J a pa nese



B r ush , ,J r . t ook a par t of h i s Com pany A

of the 1st M ar i nes and at 0700 on 19

.~ugt l st began a p at r ol ea st w ar d along the

coastal t r ack towar d K ol i Poi n t and

Tetere. At about noon n ea r K oli P oin t

t h e pa t rol spot t ed a gr oup of four ,J a p-

anese oficers and 30 men m oving, w i th no

security t o front or f lanks, bet w een t he

r oad an d t he beach . Capt ai n B ru sh str uckfr ontal ]y w i th a par t of h i s unit wh i l e

on my pa r t , t h e ma ps t he J apa n ese ha d of our

posit ions w ere so clea r a s t o st a r t le me. Th ey

sh ow ed our w 7ea k spot s a ll t oo clea rly .*?

1~ ’bile t hese pa t rols sea rched for t he

en emy on G ua da lca na l} a n ot her force of

a pproxima t ely 200 Ma rines moved in t o

en emy w a ters fa r t h er n or t h a n d ra ided a

J a pa nese a t oll in t he G ilbert I sla nds.

C ompa n ies A a nd B of Lieut ena n t C olonelE va ns F. (’a r lson’s 2d Ra ider B a t t a lion

286 P EARL H .4RB OR TO G UAD AL C ANAL

stat i ons, fuel , and other suppl ies and i n-

stal lat i ons, and w ent back on boar d thei r

submar i nes on 18 August for the r etu r n

to Pear l H ar bor . T h i s r ai d at t r acted

m uch at ten t i on i n the statesi de pr ess but

i ts m il itar y si gn i fi cance was negl igi bl e.

Guadal canal st i l l hel d the center of the

stage i n the Paci fi c and at ten t i on qu i ck l y

t ur ned back t o t hat t heater .14 (See M ap

12)

BAT T L E OF T H E T ,L ?N ARU ‘5

The pi ctu r e that began to take shape as

th ese bi ts of i nt el li gen ce fi tt ed t ogeth er

pr ovi ded an ear l y war n i ng of J apanese

pl ans that al r eady wer e wel l under way.

On 13 Au gu st , T okyo or der ed L i eu ten an t

Gen er al H ar uyosh i H yaku tak e’s f7even -

teenth Army at Rabau l to take over the

kg suppl i es at T r uk, the adm i r al got

or der s to hur r y down to Rabau l and take

900 off i cer s and m en to Guadal canal at

once. H yaku take had deci ded that the

at tack wou l d begi n w i th a par t of the 7th

D ivi si on ’s f 38t h I nf an tr y Regi m en t an d t he

l ’ok ost ~k a N peci al N av al Landing Force.

T hese un i ts wou l d be fol lowed by the 35tJ ~

Brigade.

Adm ir al T anaka thought he was bei ng

pr essed a l it tl e too h ar d, consi der in g th at

t h e E i gh t h Fleet u nd er w hi ch h e op er at ed

h ad j ust been for med at Rabau l on 14 J ul y,

and that the adm i r al h im sel f had har dl y

been gi ven t i me to catch h i s br eath after

hur ryi ng aw ay fr om Yokosuka for h i s new

job on 11 .I ngust . T he adm i r al r epor ted

later:

lVit h no rega rd for my opin ion . . . this

order ca lled for t he most difficult opera t ion in



gr ou nd act ion on Gu ad al can al an d sal vage

the si tuat i on . T he naval si de of th i s r ei n-

for cement effor t wou l d be conducted by

Rear Adm ir al Rai zo T anaka, a wi l y I m -

perial sea dog who was a vet era n of ea r ly

la n din gs in t he. P hilippines a n d I n don esia

a n d of t h e ba t t les of C ora l S ea a n d llid-

w a y. I vit h n o clea r pict ure of h is oppo-

nent ’s st rengt h, H ya kut a ke clecided t o re-

w a r-la n ding in t he fa ce of t h e en emy—t o h e

ca rr ied out by mixed unit s w hich ha d n o oppor-

t unit y for rehea rsa l or even prelimin a ry st udy.

. . . I n m ilit ary st ra tegy expedien ce som et im es

t a kes pr ecedence over pruden ce, but this order

w a s u t ter ly u nr ea s on a bl e.

I could see t ha t t here must be grea t confusion

in t he h ea dqua r t ers of E ight h Fleet . Yet t h e

opera t ion w a s orda in ed a n d un der w a y , a n d so

t h ere w as n o t ime t o a rgue a bout it .”

B ack bon e of t he i ni ti al ef for t w ou ld con -


,-:

z-

-s



..


,Japanese plans. T he un i t was d i ver ted toT r uk wher e i t l anded on 12 August and

was at tached to the 35th B m”gade whi ch

then gar r i soned the Pal au I sl ands. T he

br igad e’s com man der w as M aj or Gen er al

K i yotake K awaguch i . T he 900 or 1,000

m en whi ch Adm ir al T anaka l oaded for h i s

f i r st r ei n for cem ent r un to Guadal canal

wer e fr om th i s I ch i k i un i t .

T h e r ei n for cem en t sh i ps l an ded Col on elI ch i k i and th i s for war d echel on at T ai vu

I ’oi nt on Guadal canal d lw i ng the n i gh t of

18 A ugu st . Whi l e th i s for ce l anded at

th i s poi n t some 22 ai r m i l es east of the

L LU ~ga, som e 500 m en of the Yokosuka

F ift h Speci al .Waval Landing Force ar -

r i ved at K okum bona. Th i s was the f i r st

of m any r uns of the T okyo Expr ess, as

M ar in es cal led t he ,J apan ese d est royer s

an d d est roy th e en em y, or , secon d, to con -t i nue wor k on defensi ve posi t i ons wh i l e

l im i t i ng act i ons to the east to st r ong pa-

t r ol s a nd ou t post s. T he fi r st cou rse, Gen -

er al V an degr i ft r eal i zed , i nvol ved accept -

i ng the pr em i se that the m ai n J apanese

for ce had l anded to the east and that i t

cou l d be deal t w i th by one M ar i ne bat-

t :L l ion. B u t i f B r ush’s pat r ol had en-

counter ed on l y a sm al l par t of the newenemy un i t wh i l e the bu l k of the for ce

st ood poi sed to st ri ke fr om an ot her d ir ec-

t ion , or fr om t he sea, absen ce of t he r eser ve

bat tal i on wou l d becom e a ser i ous m an-

power shor tage i n the per im eter . T he

i nt el l i gen ce V an degr i f t h ad gl ean ed fr om

al l sour ces was good, bu t ther e wasn ’t ,

enough of i t . So the d i vi si on sat t i gh t to

awai t devel opm ents. Wor k con t i nued on



and cr ui ser s wh i ch sh ut t l ed suppl ies an d

r ei n for cem ents up and down T he Sl ot i n

h i gh-speed n i gh t r uns. B r ush ’s pat r ol

had encounter ed par t of I ch i ki ’s for war d

echel on , and the J apanese com mander ,

shaken by the fact that he had been d i s-

cover ed , d eci ded t o at tack at on ce.

.i t that t i m e the M ar i nes had fi ve i n -

fan tr y bat t al ion s avai labl e for d efen se of

f i el d for ti fi cat ion s, n at ive scou ts w or ked

far to the east , and M ar ines m ai ntai ned a

str on g w at ch on t he per im et er each n igh t.

T he M ar ines d i d not have l ong to wai t .

Col onel I ch i k i had wasted no t im e pr e-

prr r in ~ his a t t a ck, a n d dur in g t he n igh t

of 20–21 August Ma rine list en ing post s on

t lt e ea st ba nk of t he I lu det ect ed en emy

t roops movin g t h rough t he jungle t o t h eir

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290 P EARL H AR B OR TO G U.4D .4LC ANAL

By th i s t im e I ch i k i had assem bl ed h i s

for ce. on the br ush-cover ed poi nt of l and

on the east bank of the r i ver , and al l was

qu i et un t i l 0310 on 21 August when a

col umn of som e 200 J apanese r ushed the

exposed san dspi t at th e r iver m ou th . M ost

of them wer e stopped by M ar i ne smal l -

ar ms fi r e and by a can i ster -f i r ing 37m m

an ti tank gun of the 1st Speci al Weapons

Bat tal i on . Bu t the M ar i ne posi t i on was

not w i r ed i n , and the weigh t of the r ush-

i ng at tack got a few enem y sol d i er s i n to

Pol lock ’s l in es w her e th ey captu red som e

of h i s em placem ents. T he r em ai nder of

t he l in e h el d, h ow ever , an d fi re fr om t hese

secur e posi ti ons kept the penet r at i on i n

ch eck u nt il , t he bat tal i on r eser ve cou ld get

up to the fi gh t . T hi s r eser ve, Com pany G,

l aunched a counter at tack that w i ped outthe J apanese or d r ove them back acr oss

Al though outnum ber ed at the actual

poi nt of con tact , Pol lock assessed t he si tu -

at i on at daybr eak and r epor ted that he

cou l d hol d. H is bat tal ion had fi re super i-

or i t y because of the excel l en t ar ti l l er y

su ppor t an d becau se t he cou rse of t he r i ver

gave par t of h i s l ine en fi l ade t i r e agai nst

the enem y concen tr at i on i n the poi n t of

gr ound funnel i ng i n to the sandspi t . I n

vi ew of th i s, Gener al Vandegr if t or der ed

Pol l ock to hol d at the r i ver m outh wh i l e

th e d ivi si on r eser ve, t he 1st B at tal ion , 1st

M ar ines envel oped I ch i ki . Wh i le th i s bat-

tal ion pr epar ed for i t s at tack , Com pany

C of the 1st Engi neer Bat tal ion went for -

w ar d t o Pol l ock ’s com m an d t o h el p bol st er

defensive posi t i ons. D ur ing th e m or ni ng

t he en gi neer s bu il t an ti tan k obst acl es, l ai d

a m i ne f iel d a cr oss t he sa nd sp it , a nd h el pedthe 2/ 1 M ar ines str ing tact i cal w i r e and



t he r i ver .

I ch i k i was r eady w i th another bl ow .

Al though h i s for ce on the east bank had

not d i rect l y suppor ted th i s f i rst at tack , i t

now opened up w i th a bar r age of m or tar

and 70m m fi r e, and th i s was fol l owed by

a not her a ssa ul t . A secon d en em y com pan y

had ci r cl ed the r iver ’s mouth by wad i ngbeyond the br eaker s, and when the fi r e

i m pr ove f iel d f or t if ica ti on s. T hey wer e

under i n ter mi tten t r if l e f i re dur ing m ost

of th i s wor k.

M ean wh il e, L i eu ten an t Col on el L en ar d

B . Cr essw el l’s d ivi si on r eser ve bat tal ion

had r ever ted to par en t con t r ol and r e-

por ted to Col onel Gates to r ecei ve the

at tack pl an for the envel opm ent . B efor e0700, Cr essw el l cr ossed t he I l u u pst ream ,

TH E B ATTLE OF TH E TE NARC 291

t i on , Aonther i gh t and Bon the l eft . As

the advance cont i nued, the enemy was

for ced i nto the poi n t of l and on the I lu ’s

east bank. By 1400 the enemy was con-

f i ned com pl etel y by the r iver , the beach ,

and the envel opment fr om the l eft and

r ear . Some of the ,J apanese made un-

su ccessfu l at tem pt s t o escape t hr ou gh t he

sur f and al ong the beach ; another gr oup

bur st ou t tem por ar i l y to the east but r an

head-on i n to Company C movi ng up fr om

i ts bat t l e at the m outh of the Bl ock Four .

The fi gh t cont i nued , w i th (l esswel l

t i gh ten i ng hi s enci rcl em ent , and m or e of

t he J apan ese at tem pt ed t o st ri ke t hr ou gh

t o th e east . T hese br eak ou t at tem pt s gave

th e new Gu ad al can al f l ier s, On t he i sl and

l ess than 24 hour s, a chance to fi r e thei r

f i r st shots i n anger , and the F4F pi l ots

fr om V M F–223 gave Cr essw el l ’s M ar i nes

th r ower s, 700 r i f l es, 20 pi stol s, m l unde-

t er m in ed n um ber of saber s an d gr eu acl es,

th r ee 70m m guns, l ar ge quant i ti es of ex-

pl osi le char ges, and 12 fl am e thr ower s.

The fl ame thr ower s wer e not used i n the

action.

Adm i r al T anaka l ater had th i s to say

abou t t he d i sast er :

I kn ew C olon el I ch iki fr om t he Midw ay opera -

t ion a n d w as w ell a w are of his ma gnificent lea d-

ersh ip a nd in dom it able figh tin g spir it . B ut this

episode ma de it a bunda nt ly clea r t ha t infa nt ry-

men a rmed w it h rifles a nd ba yonet s h a d n o cha nce

a ga inst a n en emy eq uipped w it h moder n h ea vy

a rms. This t ra gedy should ha ve t a ught us t h e

h opelessn ess of ‘ba mboo-spea r’ t act ics. ‘“

BAT T L E OF T H E EAST ERN

SO L O M O.WS

Whi l e Col onel I chi k i pr epar ed for h i s



a h an d w i th st r af in g at tack s t ha t d est r oyed

th e ,J apan ese or t ur ned th em back i nt o th e

i nfan tr y t rap.

T o concl ude the act i on by n i gh t fal l ,

I ’andegr i f t or der ed” a tank at tack acr oss

the sandspi t and i nto what now had be-

com e the r ear of the I ch i k i For ce. The

pl at oon of l igh t t an ks st ru ck at 1500, f i r in g

at the enemy wi th can i ster and machi ne

i ll -fat ed at t ack, Rear Ad mi ral T an ak a an d

Vi ce Ad mi ral (l un icbi M i kaw a, th e E ;gh th

F leet com man der , w or ked to get th e col o-

n el >s secon d ech el on ash or e f or w hat t hey

hoped w ou ld be an or der ly, w el l-coor di -

nated effor t agai nst the M ar ines. These

tr oops w er e on boar d t he K inr yu M cw u an d

four dest r oyer t r anspor ts, and they w er e

escor ted by th e seapl ane car r ier (7hi tose

292 P EARL H ARB OR TO G UAD AL C AiYAL

i ng rout ine sea rch es t o t he nor t h w est .

F let cher believed t h e a re~ t o be t empo-

ra r ily sa fe from J apa nese na va l t respa ss,

a n d h e ha d sen t t he ca rr ier l~ a t sp off t o

refuel. This left him on ly t he ~ nt erpr ise

a n d t he ,S a rw t oga for his a ir support .

On 23 .iugust , t w o da ys a ft er t he B a t t le

of t h e Ten a rul .I merica n pa t rol pla nes first

sight ed t h e ,J a pa nese t ra n spor t s a n d t he

Ta na ka escort some 350 miles nor t h of

(lua da lca na l. Ma r ine pla n es from H en -

derson Field a t t empt ed t o a t ta ck t h e t roop

ca rr iers, but a hea ~ 7y overca st forced t h em

ba ck t o Lun gs. Th e fliers ha d a bet t er da y

on t h e )Mth , h ow ever . .\ t 1420 t he F4F

pilot s in t ercept ed 15 ,J apa nese bombers

bein g escor t ed t ow a rd G ua da lca n a l by 12

fight ers fr om t he ca rr ier Ryu jo. M ar ines

br oke th i s r ai d up befor e i t got cl ose.

T hey downed si x of the Zer os and ten

fr om the dam aged Enterpr ise. At the

t im e the sh i p was str uck, L i eu tenant

T t l r ner Cal dwe]l , U SN , was t~p w i th h i s

“F l i gh t 300,” and , l ow on gM , he l ed h i s

f li er s t o Gu ad al ca na l w -h er e t h ey m or e t ha n

pai d for thei r keep unt i l 27 Septem ber .

M ean wh il e .%d mi ral F let ch er ’s car r ier

pl anes l ocated the enem y task for ce i n the

E ast er n Sol or non s at abou t t he sam e t i me

,J a pa nese p lan es sp ot ted F l et ch er . L i ke

the B at t l e of M i dway, the r esu l ti ng act i on

I VN San ai r -sur face and ai r-ai r Contm t.

Su r fa ce vessel s n ei t her si gh tecl n or f ir ed a t

each other.

The Ry/ / j o, whose Zer os had far ed so

poor ly w ith J ohn Sm ith ’s F4F pi lots, took

r epeated h i ts that f i nal l y pu t her ou t of

con tr ol and l ef t her hopel essl y af l ame.

one enemy cr ui ser and a destr oyer wer e

sunk ; a second cr ui ser w as cl am aged; th e



bom ber s i n w hat w as VM F-i Z23’s f i rst bi g

success of the war . Captai n M ar ion Car l

spl ash ed tw o bom ber s an d a Z er o, an d tw o

pl an es each w er e d ow ned by L i eu ten an ts

Zenn i th A. Pond and K enneth D . Fr azi er ,

and M ar ine Gunner H enr y B . H am il ton :

T hi s w as a good day’s wor k by the fi gh ter

p i l ot s o f l W F-2 23. I t i s n ecessa r y t o r em em ber

t ha t t he J a pa nese Z er o a t t hi s st age of t he w ar

Ch i tose su st ai n ed sever e w ou nd s bu t m an -

aged t o l im p aw ay; an d 90 J apan ese pl an es

wer e shot down. On the Am er i can si de,

20 pl anes wer e l ost and the damaged

E n f er pr i .ve l ur ch ed aw ay t o seek r epai r .

T hi s act i on tu r ned back th e l ar ger J ap-

an ese at tack for ce, an d F let ch er l ik ew ise

w i thdr ew. H e expected to r etu r n next day

and r esum e the at tack , bu t by then the


F iel d fou nd h i m. T he J in tst~ sh ook un der

an expl od i ng bom b that L ieutenan t L aw -

r ence Bal d i nus d r opped just for war d of

her br idge, and Ensi gn Chr ist i an F i nk of

the En ter pr i ~e scor ed a h i t on the t r ans-

por t K i n r yu M ar u am i dsh i ps. .4dm i r al

T anaka w as knocked unconsci ous by the

expl osi on on h i s f l agsh ip, an d a n um ber of

cr ewm en wer e k i l l ed or i n ju r ed . T he sh i p

d i d not l i st under the bow dam age, how -

ever , and she st i ll was seawor thy. When

T an ak a r ecover ed he t r an sfer red h i s f l ag

to the dest r oyer K ager o and sen t the

J i ntsuto T r uk al on e .Z 1

F l am es br oke ou t on the K i nr yu .l l ar u

w h ich ca r ri ed a pp r oxi m at el y 1,000 t roops

of the l ’okosu l a 5th AS’AT L F,and the de-

st r oyer I l l u2uZ i w en t al on gsi de to r escu e

su r vi vor s. A t j ust that m om ent th i s sh i p

beca me “on e of t he f ir st J a pa nese w ar sh i ps

w ent . t o the r escue of the m en fr om the

X i nr yu M ar u . T hese m en wer e pi cked up

just as the .Var u al so wen t to the bot tom .

M eanwh i l e another pass at the sh i ps had

r esu lted i n l igh t d am age to th e d est r oyer

Uzu?ci, and .4dm ir al T anaka tur ned back

for Rabau l . M any of the SN L F m en had

been l ost , an d h is for ce w as bad ly shaken

and d i sordered :

M Y w orst fea r for this opera t ion ha d come t o

be rea lized. Wit hout t h e ma in comba t unit , t he

Yokosmka 5th S 1)ecia l Xa va l La nding Force, it

w a s clea r tha t t he rema inin g a uxilia ry unit of

a bout 300 men w ould be of n o use even if it did

rea ch G ua da lca na l w it hout fur t h er misha p.zi

T hus had t i l e 1st M ar i ne D i vi si on

gai ned som e val uabl e t i me to pr epar e for

th e next ,J apan ese at tem pt to d isl od ge i ts

Lunga def ense. T ?’i tb ai r su ppor t on H en -

der son F i el d and w i th a tenuous sL ~ppl y



to be h i t by a B–17 si nce the w ar began” 22

when these big pl anes fr om the l l th Bom -

bar d men t Gr ou p a t E spi r it .u Sa nt o ar r ived

to l end a hand to the Cactus f l i er s. T he

M uzu ki san k at once. ~ ll lot her sh ip t hen

m oved i n to r escu e th e su rvi vor s fr om th is

d est royer w hi le t wo d est r oyer t ran spor ts

“ Tanaka .4rtick?, I , 69 3,

1r ou te est ab li sh ed t o t he S ’T ewH ebr i des, t he

d ivi si on ’s gr ip on Gu ad al canal w as m uch

i n~pr oved at n lonth>s end . B ut i t st i ll w as ...

a l ong w ay fr om bei ng com pl etel y secur e,

especi al l y now that I ch i k i ’s act of har a-

M r i had poi n ted up for the tJ apanese the

i mpr opr iety of t r yi ng to d isl od ge th e l an d-

i ng for ce w i th on l y 900 or 1,000 m en .

CHAPTER 5

The Battle of the Ridge

Gener al Vancl egr if t and h i s staff wer e

awar e that the defeat of the l ch i k i Fo~’ce

l eft the di vi si on ’s posi t i on on the i sl and

on ly tem por ar i l y i mpr oved . Obviously

t he ,J apan ese cou ld be. expect ed t o m ou ntl ar ger an d bet t er pl an ned at t acks a~~i nst

t he sm al l M ar in e per im eter ; ai r an d n aval

act i vi ty at Guadal cmxd i nd i cated no

wan i ng enem y i nter est i n the South Sol o-

m ons ar ea. A noon-hour vi si t f r om Ra-

bau l bom ber s was an al most dai ly occur -

r en ce, a nd en em y w ar sh i ps a nd su bm a r in es

enter ed Seal ar k Channel near l y ever y

n i gh t to shel l H ender son F i el d.{’” A l though the Bat t l e of the Easter n

Si nce M ajor J ohn Sm ith and L ieu ten-

an t Col onel M angr um ar ri ved w i th thei r

F 4F ’s and SB D’S on 20 Au gust , t he ai rf i el d

h ad taken on a m or e pr ofi ci en t and per nm -

nent l ook. By the end of August a dai l yr ou t i ne of schedu l ed pat r ol f l i gh ts had

been i ni ti at ed . F ou r-pl an e fi gh ter pat rol s

f l ew fr om 0545 to 0830 each mor ni ng and

fr om 1400 to 1830 each after noon, and

m i xed fi gh ter -bomber squadr ons fr e-

quent l y m ade ni gh t , sear ches for enem y

sl ] i ppi ng to the nor thwest . Cactus avi a-

tor s f l ew cover for the .U li ed sh i ppi ng to

t he i sl an d, an d w en t L l pon i nt er cept d ur i ngthe .Japanese ra i ds.



~Sol om ons gave Al li ed shi ppi ng fr om E s-

;pi r itu Santo an oppor tun i t y to i ncr ease

k he fl ow of su ppl ies t o t he bel eagu er ed M a -

r in es, th e L un gl defend er s st il l oper at ed

on a h an d-t o-m ou th basi s.

T he Cact us A ir F or ce per for m ed beyon d

al l pr opor ti on to i ts faci li ti es and equ i p-

m en t, an d t he 3d D efen se B at tal ion f in al ly

T he U . S. f i gh ter s d i d wel l agai nst the

enemy bomber s, bu t thei r onl y chance

agai nst t he h igh ly m an eu ver abl e Z er o w as

to pai r L ~p n m utual suppor t. I n th i s way

they cou l d pr otect them sel ves when the

Z er os cam e d ow n to d ri ve t hem aw ay fr om

the bomber s. T hey found that the Gr um -

m an d id h ave cer tai n ad van tages over th e

TH E RATTLE OF THE RI D G E 295

minl~tes. Dum p t r ucks wer e kept l oaded

w ith gr avel an d san d, an d “f l yi ng squ ad s”of en gi neer s r ush ed ou t to r epai r an y d am -

age i mm ed i atel y af ter the depar tur e of

.Japanesebombers.

I lu t not even count i ng enemy i l Ct i Ol l ,

H ender son per sonnel st i l l had pl enty of

problems. ii n ear l y m ethod of fuel i ng

em pl oyed dr um s st r ung up i n the r after s

of par ti a l l y bu i l t J apanese hangar s, and

even when gasol i ne t r ucks ar ri ved l aterthe fuel had to be hand pum ped fr om

dr um s to the t r ucks, T her e was no steel

m at t i ng, and the f i el d was com pl etel y at

the m er cy of the whi m si cal t r opi cal

weather:

H en derson Field w a s a bow l of bla ck dust

w hich fouled a irpla ne engines or it . w as a qua g-

mire of bla ck mud w hich ma de t he t a ke-off

resemble not hing more t ha n a fly t rying t o r ise

from a run w ay of mola sses.’

w as a per iod w hen i ~m er icau f i gh ti ng m en

wer e thank fu l for sm al l favor s. on 20i ku gu st t he t ran spor t Wi Z/ i a7}2Wu rd I {u r -

r o 20scam e u p fr om t he N ew H ebr id es w it 1~

the for ward echel on ot ’ M AG-23. .W the

m en fi nd som e of th e gear w er e pu t ash or e,

bu t th en the sh ip scu rr ied acr oss Seal ar k

Ch ann el for T ul agi w hen th e w or d cam e i n

t h at a ,J a pa n ese cr u i ser f or ce w a s exp ect ed

th at n igh t. h -ear T u l agi the t r anspor t

w ent agr ou nd and m uch of the equ i pm en tst i l l on boar d had to be jet t i soned to f l oat

h er f r ee.

N ext d ay Col on el Wi ll iam ,J . Wal lace,

gr ou p cor n m an cl er , ca me u p t o H en d er son

w i t h mor e pl anes: 19 F4F ’s of M ajor

Rober t E . Gal er ’s V? M F-224, and 12

S131~-3’s of VM SB-231 com manded by

M ajor L eo R. Sm i th . T hat br ough t the

Cactu s st r en gth t o 86 pi lot s an d 64 pl an es,10 of them N avy and thr ee Arm y.



When engi neer s and Seabees had no

bom b cr ater s to patch , they st i l l had to f i x

L I pth e f i el d i n th e w ake of th e ear ly SBD ’S

whi ch had hard -r ubber tai l wheel s de-

si gned for l and i ng on the stur dy decks of

car r i er s. On the H ender son ear th these

wheel s “. . . chewed up the r unway l i ke

a pl owsh ar e. ”z T he sor r y cond i t i on of

t he f i el d ad ded ser i ou s oper at ion al l osses

On 1 Septem ber the gr oun d cr ew s got

m or e hel p. F i ve off i cer s and 387 m en of

the 6th N aval Const r uct i on Bat tal i on

(Seabees) l anded w i th two bu l l dozer s.

T hey woul d “. . . hel p m ake an ai r f i el d

out of H ender son and . . . cl ear a shor t

gr assy st r i p a m i le to the east cal l ed

Fi ghter 1.”3 But next day cam e one of

the i n fam ous H ender son d i saster s that ,



TH E B ATTLE OF TH E RI D G E ~ g~

SBD, and when i t expl oded i t spewed

fl am i ng gasol i ne i n al l d i r ect i ons. (l ne

90n ml sh el l d um p w as i gn ited , an cl th e f i re

br i gade cou l d l ~ot do i t s best wor k w i th

a ll t he exp losi on s t ha t resl~ lt ed. S evera l

of t he fire-fight ers w ere injured, a nd t h e

trucks seemed t o be ma king lit t le hea clw a y

sin ce t hey ha d t o t a ke t urns cla shing off t o

t l~ e Lungs River , t he closest supply of

w a t er . I f t he fire expa n ded mucl~ mor e

it w ould set ot l’ a cha in rea ct ion a nd a llt he a mmunit ion in t he a rea w ould be lost .

H a d n ot t he sit ua t ion been so gr im, some

olcl ha ncls might h a ve been remin ded of t ile

Ch inese fire drill of a n cient . B lur in e legend,

The bla ze w a s even t ua lly brough t un der

cont rol , h ow ever , a nd t h e loss w a s serious

but not cr it ica l. .ift er t his, la rge w a t er

ta nks from coconllt pla nt a t ions w er e

spot t ed a round t he a mmun it ion dumps;

but this fire pr oved t o be t he most serious

ot ’ t he ca mpa ign. S ubsequen t losses

a w el l-or gal li zed ai r h ead qu ar ter s w ith

whi ch to deal as d i vi si on ai r of i cer . ~

Fuel i ng and ar m i ng of the pl anes con-

t i n l ~ecl i n a m ake-sh i f t m anner fo~ som e

t im e, a nd :LS l at e :L SN ovem ber bom bs h acl

t o be m an han dl ed . R ad io com m un ica ti on s

l ikew ise posed pr obl em s. Ar my an d N:Lvy

r ecei vi ng channel s d i d not m esh) and the

.i rm y pl an es of th e Cactus For ce col dd not

r ecei ve N avy t mt li c. ( l per a t i ons resol ved

th i s by em pl oyi ng the ~ildio f r om agr ou n ded .$r m y P--4O Oa lon gsi d e t he N a vy

set an d th er eafter nm ki ng si mul tal ieous

br oadcasts over tw i n m icr ophones. T h i s

was a bi g l ~el p, bu t com mun i cat i ons st i l l

wer e far fr om sat i sfactor y. 13eyond 20

m i l es the pl anes cou l d not depend on r e-

cei vi ng the f i el d , bu t the f i el d cou l d nor -

m al l y r ead the pl anes’ m essages fr om as

f ar a s 1 00 m i l es.

,Si l~cet he f i gh t aga in st I ch ik i ; t her e h acl

been l i t tl e op por tu ni ty for cl ose a ir su pp or t



occurred in division dumps a s a result of

na va l she]ling a t nig% j. These losses w ere

ne@gible since t he a mmunit ion by t ha t

t ime ha d been buried,

This b.ombin~ ra id ha d a rr ived a t 1135,

a nd w hile t he fire depa r t ment below

w orked t o sa ve t he a mmun it ion dumps,

Ca ctus fliers w er e LIp a mong t he bombers.

of gr ou nd t roop s, b~~ t M ar i nes con ti nn ec{

to pl an for th i s sor t of ai r -gr ound team -

work. (’com m u ni ca ti on s w as t he bi g p rob-

l em h er e, t oo. A t t ha t st age of oper at ion s

on ly vi su ul si gn a]s w er e u sed , con si st i ng

m ai nl y of col or ed pan el s w hi ch th e gr ou nd

t r oops had , bu t they l eft m uch to be de-

si r ed , Pl anes now fl ew h i gher and faster

298 P EARI. H .4RB OR TO G ~ .kD .kLC .\ NAL

might be helpful for a ir -ground signa ls,

B ut , w ha t th ey r eal ly h ad t hei r eyes ou t for

wer e some r ad i o sets. T hat seem ed to be

t he on l y p ron ~i si n g sol u ti on f or a ir -gr ou nd

coor di nat i on . Rad i os i ni ti al ly avai labl e

to the d i vi si on woul d not ser ve the pu r -

pose, and i t wou l d not be unt i l October

that Vandegr i f t coul d detai l an off i cer

an d su it abl e r ad io equ ipm en t zn d per son -

nel to t r ai n as ‘(ai r f or w ar d obser ver s”

fr om each i nfan t r y r egi ment and ther eby

pi on eer i n w hzt l at er becam e an i m por tan t

ph ase of M a ri ne com bat oper at ion s.

Whi l e Geiger bu i l t up h i s ai r ar m ,

V and egr if t l ik ew ise ad ded st ren gth t o th e.

L u n gs p er i m et er . Wi th T u l agi qu i et , he

br ou gh t som e of Gen er al R uper tu s’ t roops

a cr oss t he i ch an nel t o (l u ad al ca na l. T he

2d I lat t ,al ion , 5th M ar ines m ade the m ove

on 21 .~u g~M , an d t he 1st Rai der 13n tt al i on

amph ibi ous l and i ng w i thou t i nci den t at

:~ bo(~ t0 73 0, b ut l a ter r a n i n t o t h e ,J a pa nese

for ce dug i n to posi t i ons th r oughout a

n ar r ow coast al gor ge. M axwel l was be-

yond ar ti l l er y r ange of the per im eter , and

al though the 2d and 5th Bat tal i ons of the

l lth M ar ines fi red d i ver si onar y m issi ons

east of h i m i n M atan i kau vi ll age, the J ap-

an ese faci ng t he i nf an tr y M a ri nes seem ed

incl i ned for once to m ake a st r ong stand

r ather than to sl i nk OH in to the br ush as

they had fr equent l y done i n other such

engagements.

F au lt y com mu ni cat i on s an d oth er d if f i -

cu l t i es bogged the M ar i ne at tack, and

L i eu ten an t Col on el M axw el l w it hd rew h is

for ce to com pl y w it h a.por ti on of h is pat rol

or der wh i ch r equ i r ed h im to r etu r n to the

per im eter by n i gh t fal l . Bu t the r egi -

m en tal com m an der , Col on el H u n t, or d er ed



and the 1st Par achu te B at tal ion cr ossed

to the Guadal cana] si de on 31 August . I n

ear l y Sept em ber , w hen a d et ach men t of t he

5th Defense Bat tal i on cam e ashor e at

T ul agi , a 90m m batter y of the 3d D efense

B at tal ion j oi ned i ts par en t or gan izat i on i n

t he H en der son F iel d ar ea.

Fr om al l i nd i cat i ons these add i t i onal

t r oops w oul d be needed. Aer ial obser va-

th e bat t al ion back i nt o th e fi ght , r el ieved

M axw el l of com m an d, an d soon t her eaft er

ar ri ved on the scene h i msel f. M ajor M i l -

ton V. O’Connel l sl ;cceeded to com mand

of the bat tal i on , bu t the at tack was not

r esum ed unt i l the pr edawn hour s of the

f ol l ow i ng m or n i ng. A few J apan ese w er e

k i l led , bu t m ost of them had w i thdr awn.

The M ar i nes r et i r ed to M atan i kau vi l -

TH E RATTLE OF TH E RI D G E 299

and the r ai der ss advanced west i n to the

r ear of t he r epor ted ,J apan ese posi ti on s.

At about 0630 pl anesof M AG-23 bom bed

a nt { st r af ed t he su sp ect ed st r on g p oi n t, a nd

t w o d est r oyer t r an sp or t s, Manley an d M c-

A-can, opened u.p on the ar ea. At 0830

E dson m ade con tact ag~i nst l igh t r esi st -

ance, and h i s advance over ran two ar ti l -

l er y pi eces. H e st i l l cou l d not deter mine

the str ength of the enemy, bu t the for ce

appear ed to be w i thdr aw ing towar d the

vi l l age, an d h e r equ est ed t hat su ppor t i ng

d i ve bomber s r em ai n on stat i on i n the

even t t hat t he en em y pock et cou ld be l ocal -

i zed for an ai r st r ike. Gen er al V an degr if t

or der ed ten pl anes to r em ai n i n con t i n -

uous suppor t and pl aced another squad-

r on on cal l t o E dson .

B y 1045 t he r esi st an te h ad st i t l en ed , an d

the r ai der s r equested that mor e tr oops

l and to the w est of the vi ll age and suppor t

t he par ach ut e bat tal i on r epor ted t o E dson ,

and the com mander deci ded to m ake a co-

or di nated at tack agai nst th e f i rm opposi -

t i on . T he col onel cal l ed i n a P+OO str af-

i ng at tack and then fol l owed th i s w i th an

envel opment i nl and by h i s r ai der s wh i l e

the par achut i sts pr otected h i s f l ank and

r ear . ‘1’h e assau lt car r ied t he vi l l age, bu t

agai n the ,J apanese had el ected to br eak

con tact , an d pr epar e for an at tack at a t i me

an d pl ace of t hei r ow n ch oosi ng.

T he vi l l age was deser ted , bu t the ap-

pear an ce of t he aban don ed en cam pm en t

i nd icat ed t hat r epor ts of n at ive scou ts h ad

been m ost accu rat e. E dson est im at ed t hat

som e 4,000 ,J a pa nese h ad been i n t he vi ci n -

i t y un t i l shor t l y befor e h i s at tack , that

h i s for ce had m et on l y ou tposts and r ear

guar c]s of a new l y ar ri ved un i t wh i ch ob-

vi ousl y was pr epar ing a str ong at tack on

H en der son F iel d. T wen ty-seven J apa-



thei r at tack . N ot want i ng to weaken the

per i meter , d i vi si on r epl i ed that such a

m ove w as n ot feasi bl e. V an degr i f t su g-

gest ed t hat t he r ai di ng for ce r eem bar k an d

r etu r n to the per i m eter i f the J apanese

pr oved too str ong to hand l e. Edson r e-

m ai ned , h ow ever , an d 45 m i nu tes l at er h ad

oyer run m or e ar ti l l er y pi eces as the bat -

nese had been ki l l ed . M ar ine casual ti es

n um ber ed t wo d ead an d si x w ou nd ed .

E dson ’s est i mate of the J apanese

st r ength w as a. l it t l e l ow , bu t he was r igl ~t

about the enem y’s i nten t i ons. J ust as the

1st M ar ines had pr evi ousl y scou ted el e-

m ents of the Zchz%i For ce i t l ater m et at

the m outh of the I I L ~ Ri ver , so Col onel

300 P EARL H ARB OR TO G UAD AJ J CANAL



TH E B ATTLE OF TH E RI D G E 301

st r vyer D ivi si on z4, and put , the t r oops of

I ch i k i ’s r ear echel on on boar d two de-str oyer t r anspor ts. T hen he stood by for

t il e a rr i va l of K aw agu ch i .

Kawaguchi ’s %’th l~r;~f(f~e. a par t of t i l e

1$’tA l )~u ;s;o?? in C’hi~lii, w as bu il t ar ou nd

Col on el .M {i nosu ka ok a’s 12J th Znfunt ry

R eqi 7n en t . ~ rom (Xhina t h e unit ha cl

moved in D ecember 1941 t o 130rneo. I n

l~ a rch 1942 it moved t o (’ebu in t he P h ilip-

pines, in .~ pr il t o l~ in da na o, a nd in J un e

t o P a la u. .fler t ed for a ~ Tew (%~ inea

opera t ion t ha t n ever ca me oH , t he force

rema ined in t he P a la u Isla nds unt il la t e in

;iugust w h en it bega n t o sta ge in ech elons

t h rough Truk for t he Ra ba ul a rea . lyl len

it a rr ived for this n ew mission it w a s

formed up t o inclucle t he rea r ech elon of

t h e gd Battalion, .429th Znf an tr y (I cf i i k i

For ce), t h e 12’h t h. I n f mt r y, the 2?d l la t -

~a/ ;on , ~th l ?l fan tr y, an d u ni ts of ar t i l l er y,

men, too. T he i m pat ien t T an ak a r efer r ed

th i s d i spu te to M i kawa of the A’i gh th Fl eet

an d H yak ut ak e of t he ,Se?’en t een th .4 r T ~/.

T h ese of li cer s pr evai l ed u pon K aw agu ch i

to tem por ar il y cur b h i s wnr m r egar d for

bar ges. I [e wou l d m ake al l of the t r i p on

T :l n ak a’s d est r oy er s,. an d l an d on G uad al -

canal f r om them, besi des.7

F or t he bu il d-u l) on Gu ad al can al , K aw a-

gucl l i spl i t h i s com mancl . T he gener al

wou l d l and i n the Tasimboko ar ea w i ththe I ch i ki r ear echel on and the Ista nd t ?a

A’attaliom, 1~.$th 171/’an try Regiment.

{;ol onel (l ka wou l d l ancl w i th the remain-

der of the for ce—the E d B attal ion, l .%j th

Znfwn t r y—west of L ungs Poi n t near K o-

kumbona. Each of the two for ces was

r ei n for ced by a shar e of the ar t i l l er y,

en gi n eer s, an d ot her sp eci al t r oop s. T h er e

w as on l y one h i tch i n the r ei nfor cem entefl or ts, even i f K aw agu ch i m i gh t h ave been



engi neer , si gnal , and ant i tank tr oops. I n

that for m the l{mwaguch i Fo~ce nllmberecl

m or e t h an 6,000 n ~en .G

.i dm i r al Tanaka had hi s dest r oyer s al l

r eady when K awag~~ch i ar ri ved . T he ad-

m i r al met immediatel y w i th the gener al

to hur ry th i ngs al ong, bu t he r an i n to d i f-

f i cu l ty at once. K awaguchi was a bar ge

un easy w ith ou t a bar ge u nd er h im , bu t th is

bobbl e had no ser i ous over -al l r esu l ts.

Capt ai n Yon osu ke M ur akam i, com mand -

i ng D estr oyer Squ ad ron .Z ~. w as t o clear

the w:L y for the l and i ngs by goi ng down

The Slot on the n i gh t of 29 .~ugust to at -

t ack a U . S. t ask for ce w hi ch w as r epor ted

to be off L ungs Poi nt . I nstead , M ur akam i

30$2 1’E ARL H ARB OR TO G TJ AD AL CAA-AL

manellver that pr oposed to st r i ke theI .un ga per im eter i n a th r ee-j aw ed envel -

opm ent fr om the w est ,, sou th , and south -

east . I t was to be a coor d i nated at tzck

w i th ai r and naval suppor t . T o the

l ~or mal pr obl em s i nher en t i n such an i n -

v ol ved p] an , K aw agu ch i i m posed u pon h is

for ce the ad di ti ol ~a] tm k of cu t t i ng a t r ai l

over th e steep jungl e-cover ed r idges an d

gor ges fr om t l~e T asi m bok o ar ea t o a poi ntsou th of H ender son F i el d . T he jungl e

t r ai l , pl anned as a r ou te wh i ch wou l d

enabl e t he ,Japanese to escape observat i on ,

was begun about 2 Septem ber by K awa-

gu chi ’s en gi neer s. I nfan tr y, ar ti l l er y, an d

other un i ts fol low ed th e engi neer s al ong

th i s hand-hew n jungl e r ou te tow ar d th ei r

1i nes of depar tu r e for the at tack agai nst

t h e M a r i n es.

On 11 Sept em ber , t he pace of t he at tack squ ick en ed . T wen ty-si x bom ber s an d ei gh t

Zer os cam e over at 1210 to pock th e fi el d,

k i ll 11 M ar in es, an d wound 17 other s, and

cl est r oy on e 1’%00 p ar k ed besi d e t he st r ip ;

and a heavy cr u i ser and two dest r oyer s

wer e sl )ot ted steam i ng south about , 100

m i l es to the nor theast . B u t on the sam e

day (he (~act l l s A i r For ce added to i ts

strength. At 1620 a f l i gh t of 24 F4F ’sthat h:Ld been i d l e si nce thei r car r i er

~~(~ru.to yaa d been t or p ed oed on 31 A ugu st

cam e L l p to H ender son fr om Espi r i tu

San to under the com mand of L ieu ten an t

Com m ander L er oy C. Sim pler . Befor e

noon the next day (12 Septem ber ) Si mp-

l er ’s m en got thei r chance to l ear n Cactu s

oper at i ons, T wenty-one of them wen t up

w ith 11 ‘{ol d” Cactu s fl ier s to shoot down12 bom ber s and th r ee f i gh ter s ou t of a



YH Z3 BA TT L Z7 OF T H E R[DGL ’

K aw ag-uch i ’s fad e-ou t i nto the jungl e

\VtLS successful . H e was not spot ted by

M ar i nes agai n un t i l he was r eady to at -

tack , bu t i t soon becam e appar en t to the

I .unga defender s that he wou l d have im -

posi ng suppor t fr om Rabau l . Far -r ang-

i ng i nt el l i gen ce sou rces r epor ted a J apa-

42-pl an e .J apan ese st ri ke t hat cam e over

a t 1 10 0.

M eanwhi l e pat r ol s fr om the 2d Bat -

tal i on , 1st M ar ines began to encounter

fr eqn el l t opposi ti on east an d sou th east of

t he p er i m et er . N at i ve scou ts br ought ,

w or d of l ar ge. bod ies of t roops t hat cl ear ly

w er e not wander ing r em nants of I ch i ki ’s

TH E B ATTLE OF TH E R I D G E 303

i ts f l ank i n l and for appr oxim atel y hal f

t hat d istan ce. T he space i nl an d bet weent hese fl an ks st il l posed a ser i ou s pr obl em ,

bu t i t had been par t i al l y sol ved by the

establ ishment of wel l -pr epar ed str ong

poi nts and outposts. (See M ap 18)

T roops fr om th e 1st A mphi bi an T ractor

n nd Pi on eer B at tal ion s m ai ntai ned posi -

t i ons sou th (i n l and) of the 5th M ar i nes

sector west of the L ungs, whi le east of the

L u ngs a 4,000-yar d ou tpost l in e w as m ai n-tai ned by the 1st M ar ines, ar ti ll er ym en,

t he engi neer bat t al ion, t he bu lk of th e pi o-

n eer bat tal i on , an d t he r ai der -par ach ut e

bat tal i on . Gener al Vandegr i f t had or -

der ed the r ai der s and par achut i sts ou t of

d i vi si on r eser ve to augm ent , th i s l i ne by

pr epar ing posi t i ons on a l ong l ow r i dge

that extended south of H ender son F i el d

and par al l el to the L ungy Ri ver . Thethousand-yar d-l ong r idge was but a m il e

ridge. T h i s was for war d of the fl anks of

engi neer s on hi s l ef t (east ) and the pi o-neer s on h i s r i gh t , bu t Edson wanted to

hol d al l the gr ound he coul d and to l aunch

an at tack agai nst the enem y the next day.

At about 2100 that , n i gh t a J apanese

l igh t cr ui ser an d t hr ee d est royer s en ter ed

Seal ar k Channel to shel l the ai rf i el d, and

at about the sam e t i me the enem y gr ound

for ce pr obed l i ght l y at the r ai der -par a-

chu te for ce on the r i dge. F i ght i ng wasspor ad i c al l al ong the l ine, and al though

one desul tor y J apanese at tack actual ly

made a sl i gh t penetr at i on of the M ar i ne

l i ne, the enem y made no at tem pt to con-

sol id ate or expan d th is gai n.

Ear l y the next mor ni ng (the 13th ) Ed-

son l au nched h is cou nter offensi ve, bu t h e

found the enemy too st r ong and wel l -

pr epar ed to be thr own back. I n the after -noon the M ar ine off i cer w i thdr ew h i s ex-



south of the ai r fi el d and , un l ess wel l de-

fend ed , offer ed t he J apan ese an i nvi ti ng

aven ue of appr oach to th e fi el d,

T he pi oneer bat tal i on (m inus i ts com-

pany west of the I .unga) hel d posi t i ons

just sou th of H ender son F i el d between

the L ungs and the nor th spur of the r idge

occupi ed by Edsonk for ce. F ar ther to the

hausted men nor th of the posi t i ons they

had hel d the pr evi ous n i ght and estab-

l ished a str onger l ine on a h i gher por ti on

of the r idge cl oser to the engi neer s and

pi oneer s to hi s l eft and r ight r ear . C)n the

r ight , i n the jungl e betw een the r idge and

the L ungs, a sketchy contact was m ade

wi th the pi oneer bat tal i on ; on the l eft

1’I IMRL H AR BOR TO G U AD AL CAS AI ,

.: t ““Henderson Fie ld ’----.: 1700 Ya rd6”--- I/ . .. ”: b : .’

I I :; I I >-* I I :-.

~ I I :I I :

N

t

EDSON’S RIDGE

FIRST PHASE

-. NIGHT OF 12-13 SEPTEMBER 1942

,~ ji ‘- Moin enemy thrust

w - Marine front lines

-Command posts

Scaleo 100 200 300 400 500

Yards

MAP 19



TH E 13.kTTI .E OF TH E RI D G E

from E spirit u S a llto. Ninlit z a n d E lhormI -

ley w ere doiug a ll t l~ ey could t o bolst er

t l ~e Sol om ons toe h ol d agai nst th e J apa-

nese at tack t l mt w as com ing. I J ater i n t i le

d ay L i eu ten an t Com nm nd er L ou is ,J . Ki m

br ol l gl l t i n a f l i gh t of 12 SBD ’S of ~~S-3

and the f i el d al so got i ts f i r st t or pedo

pl an es w hen I ,i eu ten nn t H ar ol d H . L ar seu ,

I TSA T,flew in l ead in g si x T BF ’s of VT -8,’O

l ~l l t wh i l e t i l e H ender son f l yi ng for ce

gai ned by 60 pl an es d ur in g th e ]J er ’i oc{ of11–1 3 Sel )t em ber , Rabal d ’s zi r power

jum ped an adcl i t i onal 140 phmes cm 12

Sep t ember a l one.

T ak i ng per iod ic cover fr om sni pi ng an d

bom bi ng r ai ds, E dson ’s m en ccm t i nu ed t o

d i g i n for one m or e n i ght on the r i dge; on

the m or n i ng of the 14th they wer e to be

l ’el i ev ed b y t i l e $ 2clB a tt al i on > 5 th M a r i n es.

But i t l ooked as i f t he n i ght wo~l l d be thew or st th ey had seen yet ; scout i ng pl anes

E cl son ’s (I i sl )osi t i ol l })l a ce(l I I i s t w o p ar a -

chute Conl l )an ies OIL the exposed let+ f lankand t i ed them i l l on the r i gh t w i th r ai der

“OllllXlll~11 which helcl the r i dge knol l i n

t i l e cen ter of the M ar ine l i ne. ~OIIl~ l :LIl~

A of th e r ai der s exten ded dow n t l ~e w est

sl ope of the r idge towar d the L ungs and to

th e m akesh if t con tact w ith th e pi oneer s.

Rai der Com pany C, on L Lh i gh knol l t o the

nor th (r ear ) of Com pany B, was Edson ’s

r eserve.A t sun set un its w er e or gan i zed i n sm al l

com bat gr oups of about pl atoon st r en gth

d i sposed at i n ter val s al ong the m ai n l i ne

of resi stance. T her e w er e. open fi el ds of

t ir e on ly i n th e cen ter of t h e posi ti on w her e

t he M L R cr ossed t he gr assy r i dge, bu t even

h er e th e abr upt sl opes an d br ok en gr ou nd

m ade coor d i nat i on of f i r es d i f f i cu l t . I n

t i l e l ast hou r s of day] i gh t the t r oops i n l -pr o~ecl t hei r foxh ol es a nd t he f i el ds of t ir e,



spot ted seven d est royer s com in g d ow n T i l e

Sl ot , evi den tl y t o aci d t hei r bou ~bar d men t

to the gr ol m d at tack that appear ed

shapi ng L L pi n the jungl e to the soL tth .

Du r i ng the after noon the r eser ve bat -

t td iol ~ (2,/ 5) m ovecl to an assem bl y ar ea

east of t he L u nga an d betw een th e ai rf i el d

and F .dson ’s Ri dgej and ot l i cem of th i s

but , th e r esu l ti ng posi ti on s w er e nei ther

con t i nu ou s n or com p l et e.

I n th e f i rst hou rs of d ar kn ess, L ou i e th e

L ouse, or Wash i ng-M ach i ne Char ley/ ’

chugged over to d r op h i s i nconsi stent

scat ter in g of bom bs, an d abou t 2100 h e l et

go a f l ar e that hung over the f i el d as a

r egi st r at i on poi n t for the dest r oyer task

306

pany B ’s cen tr al sector on the h i gh knol l

cau gh t m ost of t hi s f i r st assau lt an d t ur n ed

i t back, bu t the other at tack col um n foun d

an open i ng to th e w est and cam e thr ough

to cu t ot f and envel op Com pany B’s r igh t

pl atoon . Whi l e the J apanese dr ove

th r ough th i s gap between Com pan i es A

and B , the i sol ated pl atoon fought i ts w ay

back al ong 250 yar ds of the r i dge to joi n

Com pany C on the knol l to the nor th .

St i l l engaged and n ear ly over pow er ed ,

Com pany ~ r efused i ts r igh t f l ank al ong

the r idge’s w est sl opes. (See M ap 20)

Edson had been cal l i ng i n f i r e fr om

5/ 1 1’s how i tzer s si nce the begi nn i ng of

t he at tack , an d as t he J apan ese con ti nu ed

t o h am mer at h is m en t he col on el d ir ect ed

the ar ti ll er y cl oser and cl oser un t i l i t was

fal l ing w i th i n 200 yar ds of the Com pany

B l i nes. But st i l l t he J apanese cam e on,

and by 2200 E dson est i mated th at th e tw o

pany .1 wou l d joi n the for ce ther e, and

E dson or der ed h i s m en to hol d at al l costs.

I t w as t i le l ast dom inat i ng ter rai n featu r e

sol l t b of t he ai r f i el d.

Scr een i ng the w i thd r awal of the two

com pan i es w i th ar ti l ler y f i r e, Edson col -

l ected h i s m en as they f i l ter ed back and

bu i l t them up in what he hoped wou l d be a

1i ne st ron g en ou gh t o m ak e t he f in al st an d.

T he col onel and h i s off i cer s i roned out the

con f~l si on of set t in g i n t he n ew d efen se i n

dar kness an d und er f i re wh i le hol di ng off

r epea ted ,Tapauese assau l t s. I n al l , the

enem y str uck m or e than a dozen t im es

th rough out the n i gh t , the K aw aguch i m en

gr i ndi ng them sel ves i n to the fi r e fr om

M ar ine ar ti l l er y, m or tar s, m ach i ne guns,

i t ]~d r if l es i n vai n at tem pts to d i sl odge

l h l son fr om hi s f i nal knol l of B l oody

Ridge.1~ ,J a pa nese f l ar es “t el egr a ph ed ”

each at tack , pr o~i d i ng the l l th M ar ines



u nd er st reu gt h par ach ute com pan ies an d

Com pan y B (l ess th e w ith dr aw n pl atoon )

wer e opposed by at l east two enemy bat-

t al ion s at tack i ng i n fu ll for ce.

J a pa nese i n fi l tr at i on p ar t i es w er e t ak i ng

over some of the Com pany B foxhol es,

com m un i ca ti on ] in es w r er e cu t t hr ou gh ou t

the ar ea, and the J apanese now began to

gu nn er s w it h r efer en ce poi nt s for t hei r al l-

n igh t t i r i ng i n w hi ch th ey expen ded 1,992

r ounds of 105m m pr oject i l es, som e at

r a nges a s sh or t a t 1,600 yards .

A t 0400, w ith t he ,J apan ese at tacks st i l l

i n p r ogr ess, com p an i es of r eser v e b at t al i on

2/ 5 began to move si ngl y th r ough the

d ar kn ess an d i nt o posi ti on s on th e r ai der -

TH E RATTLE OF TH E R I D G E307

ED SON’S RIDGE

FINAL PHASE

NIGHT OF 13 SEPTEMBER 1942

--khin effort by Knvog.chi

Detachment

@ -Enemy secondq ot+.cks

& - Marine frant lines a s of dusk

- Finol defensive l ine held by

Morines

- Routes of retirement on finol

defensive poeitian

MAP 20



308 I ’1. :. iR I , H AR B (-)R TO C J I T. kD .+ TJ ( ’. \3” .i I,

for ce of abou t t wo r ei nfor ced com pan ies,

the ,J apauese engaged the M ar ines i n a

n igh t-l on g t ir e t igh t bn t fai led t o pen et rat e

t i l e l i ne.

I n another , l esser act i on of the ni gh t a

p at r ol of som e 30 .J a pa nese, evi d en tl y f rom

t he f or ce t ha t p en et r at ed E d son , w an der ed

i n to m th i n l i ne of Company C, 1st FJ ngi-

neer s i n the ar em east of the d i vi si on CP

an d n ear 5/ 11’s H ead qu ar ter s an d Ser vi ce

Bat ter y sou th of the ai r f i el d . T he l i ne

h ad been th in ned ear l i er i n th e n ight w hen

(’ompany .k of t i l e engi neer s l ]ad been

cal led hack to ai d t i le CT ’ defense, and th e

J apan ese pat ro] w hi ch st ru ck at 05;30 sn c-

ceeded i n tak i ng two l eft f l ank n ]ach i ne-

gun posi ti ons befor e headql tar ter s a]l d

ser vi ce al ’t i l ler ym en cam e l l p t o bol st er t he

l i ne and hel p evacuate wounded. T he

,T apal lese heckl ed the 1i ne for the shor t

t im e r em ai ni ng u ]] ti l d ayl i gh t, t hen r et ir ed

tanks w e r e h it al m ost at on ce by a J apan ese

an t i tank gun. Another tank char ged

acr oss the pl ai n an d over a gr ass hut on l y

to pl unge down a 3t l -foot bank i n to the

‘l ?el ~ ar u ; a l l f ou r cr ew m em ber s w er e k i l l ed .

.l four th tank was h i t by th i s an t i tank gun

shor tl y after th i s, t i le f i fth tank r etu r ned

to the i n fal ~t r y l i nes, and t i l e si xth tank

\ vas stopped by a wr ecked tr ack ,50 yar ds

i n fr on t of the ,J apan ese gun. T he n~el ~i n

th i s tank bai l ed ou t . and r etu r ned to the

i l l f a l l tr y p osi t i on . T he t an k at t ack l lacl t o

be chal ked off as a cost l y fai l ur e, bu t the

.J apan ese cau sed l i t t le t rou bl e i n th e ar ea

af ter th i s. .1 desu l tor y f i r e f i gh t con-

t in ued acr oss t he pl ai n u nt il 16 Sept em ber

w l ~en t he en em y w i th dr ew .

T act ical ly th e en ti re Kau~aguclt; Fwce

coL d d be scr at ch ed . .I bou t 400 of the

I ch ik i r ear ech el on su bsequ en tl y r each ed

K ol i Poi n t as di d some tr oops of the .%l



i n to the jungl e. Four engi neer s wer e

k il led an (l 14 w er e w ou nded . T en ,J n p:v

n ese bod ies w er e bu ri ed i n t he ar ea.

.%I so by dayl i gh t (14 Septem ber ) t i l e

at tack s on F .d son >s R id ge. an d t he 3/ 1 l i ne

had dw ind l ed to spor ad i c sni pi ng, and i l l

th e E dson Ri dge sect or th e d isor gan ized

.J apanese wer e bom bed an d st r afed i nto

Bat tal i on , @h I n fan tr y, hu t these wer e

h ar dl y m or e. t han st raggl er s. T he r em ai n-

d er of t he for ce—t he l ar ger el em en t w hi ch

h ad st ru ck E dson ’s Ri dge—r ed uced i tsel f

to a r abbl e wh i le cu t t i ng z tor tuous jungl e

t r ai l over the souther n sl opes of M ount

.I u st en , acr oss t he u p-cou nt ry M a tan ik au

terri tory, and fi nal l y to K okur nbona.



CH APT ER 6

Action Along the Matanikau

Ret r eat of the K mcaguch i For ce pr om -

i sed the M ar ines of the. L ungs per im eter

another br eath i ng spel l f r om gr ound at -

t ack s, bu t t her e w as n o t i me for r el axat i on

or r el i ef fr om concer n about the fu tu r e.

.l ir and n aval st r ikes con t i nL led to pound

t he H en der son F iel d d efen der s, an d aer i al

r epor ts of a con ti nu ed J apan ese bu il d-u p

at , Rabau l for ecast ad di ti on al at tem pt s t o

r et ake th e Gu ad al can al ar ea. Patro l l ing

sch ed ul es w er e st ep ped u p; i t w as d i squ i et -

i ng to know that both the l ch i k i and

K aw agu ch i F or ces had l anded on the

i sl and and m oved i n to at tack posi t i ons

w i th ou t t he M a r i nes on ce bei n g com pl et el y

safety of other A l li ed posi ti ons far ther to

the south . So these. ar eas cou l d not be

st r ipped of defender s, and even i f som e

spar e t roops cou ld be fou nd t her e st i l l w as

another oper at i on sl ated . F rom the fi rst ,

the pl an for th i s i n i t i al A l l i ed of fensi ve

i n th e Paci fi c h ad i ncl ud ed an occu pat ion

of N den i I sl and i n the San ta Cr uz gr oup

sou th east of t he Sol om on s.

T he 2d M ar i nes f i r st had been sched-

(~l ed for t hi s j ob> bu t V an degr i f t h ad been

al l owed to keep th i s r egim ent when the

opposi t i on becam e so bi t ter on T u~agi .

lJ ?~ ter t h e genem d r equested that h i s d i -

vi si on ’s th i rd or gm ic i nfan t r y r egi ment ,



sl we of t hei r exact l ocat ion s.

At the concl usi on of the B at t l e of the

Ridge on 14 Septem ber , the M ar ines had

been ash or e for 38 d ays vvi th ou t r ecei vi ng

ei th er r ei nfor cem en ts or ad di ti on al an un u-

ni t ion. For m ost of th i s per i od the m en

cou l d be fed on l y tw o m eal s a day, and par t

the 7th M ar i nes, com e over f r om i ts

Sam oan gar r ison duty w i th i t s suppor t -

i i l g ar t i l l er y, the 1st Bat tal i on , l l th M a-

r ines. B ut Adm i r al Tu r ner dem ur r ed ; he

st i l l saw w need for the N den i oper at i on ,

and the r ei n for ced 7th M ar i nes was the

on l y am ph ibi ous for ce r ead i ly avai l abl e

AC TI ON AI J ON-G TH E MATAN IK AU 311

But by 9 Septem ber , w i th the 7th

M ar in es’ CO11VOJ 7t il l en r ou te, T ur neragr eed w it h V an degr i ft .’s A ugu st r equ est

for cont r ol of th i s i n fant r y r egi men t , and

h e r equ est ed A dm ir al Gh or r nl ey’s p er m is-

si on to d i ver t th e r egi ment fr om the N deni

operation. T he i ssue st i l l w -as not won

for th e M ar ine gener al , how ever . T ur ner

bel i eved t l ~i s fr esh un i t shou l d set L ~p

coastal st r ong poi n ts ou tsi de the L ungs

per i m eter , wh i l e Vandegr i f t hel d that ar ei n for cem ent of h i s per i m eter was the

m or e p ressi n g n eed . T ur ner r el ayed th i s

quest i on to Gh or rn l ey on 12 Septem ber ,

the sam e day the T th M ar i nes ar r i ved i n

th e N ew H ebr id es, an d Gh or rn ley n ext cl ay

or der ed th e r ei nfor ced r egi ment to m ove

as soon m possi bl e to the Guadal canal

perimeter.

A fter un l oad i ng the 5th Defense Bat -

tal i on un i ts at Espi r i t u Sante, the sh i ps

bear i ng the i n fant r y r egim ent and the

N or t h C’cw ol i na was dam aged as was the

destroyer 0’Bn%n,whi ch l ater br oke i n

two and went down whi l e head i ng back

to the V. S, fol l ow i ng tem por ar y r epai r s.

Bu t for H ender son F i eld ther e was ad -

van tage even fr om such gr im di saster s as

th i s; pi l ot s and pl anes that other w i se

w ou ld h ave been fl yi ng fr om th ei r car r i er s

cou l d now com e L I p to gi ve the Cactus

F or ce a h an d. On 18 Septem ber si x N avy

T BF ’s ar r i ved i n the L unga ar ea, and OIL

28 September 10 m or e p la nes, som e SB I )’S

and the other T BF ’s, f l ew i n . A l though

enem y r ai ds dr opped off som ew hat af ter

th e d efeat of th e K aw agu ch i F or ce, oper a-

t i onal l osses st i l l d r ai ned Gei ger ’s ai r

pow r er , an d sL l ch r ei nfor cem en t m an aged

on l y to keep the Cactus For ce at a 50-to-

70-pl an e l evel , bu t for th is L un gs w as m ost

thank fu l .

Septem ber l tl th WM a r ed-l et ter d ay for

the Guadal canal defender s. Whi l e the



ar ti l l er y bat tal i on depar ted for Guadal -

eanal on 14 Septem ber , the sam e day th at

the 3d B at tal ion , 2d M ar ines w as br ou gh t

acr oss Seal ar k Channel fr om T ul agi .

oper at i ng w i th thr ee cru i ser s pl L ~s t he

d est r oy er s a nd m i n e s-w eep er s of t h e n ew l y-

for m ed T ask F or ce 65, t he t ra nsp or ts spen t

r ei nfor ced 7th M ar in es u nl oad ed i ts 4,262

m en , t hr ee ot her t ran spor ts w hi ch w er e n ot

par t of T F 65 en ter ed the channel w i th an

em er gen cy sh ip men t of avi at ion gasol in e.

I n al l , th i s sh i pping pu t ashor e 3,823

d ru ms of fu el , 147 ~-eh ic]es, 1,012 t on s of

r at i on s, 90 per cen t of th e 7th M ar in es su p-



AC TI ON AL ONG TH E MATANIK .4U 313

r at i ons, and Gen er al Vand egr if t w as abl e

to adopt new defensi ve concepts for h i s

for ce of som e 19;200 m en now at L unga.

L ocal ai r power m ade a coun ter mand i ng

l ess l i kel y, and the at tack pat ter n set by

I ch ik i an d K aw agu ch i i nd icated th at m or e

at ten ti on sh ou ld be gi ven to t he i nl an d r im

of the per i m eter . On 19 Septem ber ,

Van degr i f t ’s oper at i on al Pl an 11-42 pr o-

vi ded for th i s new concept by d i vi d i ng the

d efen ses i nto n ew sector s w ith i ncr eased

a l l -a r ound st r engt h .

Rel i evi ng speci al t r oops such as the

en gi n eer s a n d p i on eer s, i n fa n tr y b at ta l i on s

f i l l ed the yawni ng gaps that pr evi ousl y

h ad exi st ed sou th of th e ai rf i el d an d al on g

the sou ther n por t i ons of the new i n l and

sector s. T he pi on eer s, en gi neer s, an d th e

am ph i bi an t r actor per sonnel now were

abl e to per for m thei r nor m al funct i ons

dur i ng the dayl i gh t hour s and at n i gh t

bol ster th e beach defenses w her e few er

cr easi ng quan t i t y, and i n m ost sector s

doubl e apr on fences st r etch ed acr oss th e

ground i n fr ont of i n fan t r y posi t i ons of

foxh ol es an d l ogged an d san d-bagged m a-

ch in e-gu n em pl acem en ts. Col on el R ober t

H . Pepper ’s 3d Defense Bat tal i on , w i th

the 1st Speci al Weapons Bat tal i on at -

t ach ed , r et ai ned r esp on si bi l i ty for an ti ai r -

cr aft and beach defense, and Col onel

Pedr o A. del l r al l e’s l l th M ar i nes, bol -

ster ed by i ts 1st Bat tal i on , r em ai ned i n a

cen tr al p osi ti on su ppor ti ng al l sect or s.

T h e 1st M a r in es r et ai n ed r esp on si bi l it y

for the east si de of the per im eter , fr om an

ar ea near the m ou th of the I l u Ri ver i n -

l and to a poi n t beyond the for m er r i gh t

f l ank wher e M c.K el vy’s bat tal i on had

fough t the J apanese acr oss the gr assy

pl ai n . T he fr esh t r oops of the 7th M a-

r ines joi ned the 1st M ar ines at that poi n tand extend ed acr oss Edson ’s Ri dge to th e

L unga Ri ver . Beyond that r i ver the 3d



m en wer e needed. Each i n fant r y r egi -

m en t m ai nt ai ned a on e-bat .t al ien r eser ve,

on e or al l of w hi ch cou ld be m ad e avai labl e

a s a d i vi si on r eser v e. i f n ecessa r y.3

Gaps st i l l exi sted i n the per i m eter .

Gener al l y the l i nes fol l owed the h i gh

gr ound of the r i dges, bu t i n ter ven i ng

Bat tal ion , 2d M ar ines bu i l t up a l i ne that

t i ed i n on the r i gh t to the posi t i ons of the

5th M ar i nes, and th i s l at ter r egi m ent

cl osed the per i m eter w i th i ts r i gh t f l ank

whi ch connected w i th the l eft f l ank of the

3d D efen se B at tal ion a t t he beach .

T en tat i ve pl an s i n th e r eor gan i zat i on

314 P E.4RI . H ARB OR TO G U .4D ALC ANTAL



AC TION ALONG TH E MATANI K AU 315

t he 1st Ra ider B at t a lion 4 w as t o a dva nce

a long t he coa st t o K okumbon a w here aperma n ent pa t rol ba se w a s t o be est a b-

lished.

i~ ft er pa ssing t hrough t he perimet er on

23 S ept ember , P uller’s ba tt alion next da y

surprised a J a pa nese force bivoua cked on

t he Moun t Aust en slopes, a nd sca t ter ed t he

enemy in a brief cla sh t ha t ended sh ort ly

a ft er night fa ll. The a ct ion cost P uller 7

killed a n d25 w ou nd ed , a n d t he com ma n derreq uest ed a ir support for a con tin ua tion

of his a tt ack t he next da y (25 S ept ember)

a nd st ret ch ers for 18 of his w ounded men .

Rea lizing t ha t a prompt eva cua tion of

18 st ret ch er ca ses over t he rugged t erra in

w ould t a ke a t lea st 100 a ble-bodied men,

G enera l Va ndegrift sent I .ieut ena nt

C olonel Rosecra ns’ 2d B at t a lion, 5t h Ma -

rines out t o reinforce P uller. Wit h t hisn ew st rengt h t o ba ck him up, P uller sent

a t wo-compa ny ca rry in g a nd securit y force

dow n by fire from a ut oma t ic w ea pons.

P uller ca lled in a rt illery a nd a ir, but t heenemy posit ions rema in ed a ct ive. B y 1600

t h e combin ed forces of P uller a nd Rose-

cra ns h ad sust ained 25 ca sua lt ies, a nd t he

a ct ion + $’a s broken off w hile t he Ma rines

st ren gt hen ed t heir posit ion s for t he n igh t.

Mea nw hile t h e ra ider ba tt a lion, on it s

w a y t o est a blish t h e pa t rol ba se a t

Kokumbona , h a d rea ch ed t he vicinit y of

t h e fire fight , a nd division direct ed G rif-

fit h t o join w it h 1/7 a n d 2/5 a n d t o pre-

pa re for a renew a l of t he a tt a ck next da y.

J fTit h t his la rge provisiona l group n ow

formed, Va ndegrift . sent C olonel E dson

up t o t a ke comma nd. P uller w ould a ct a s

ex ecu t iv e of ficer . E dson ’s pla n for t he

coordina ted a tt a ck next da y (27 S ept em-

ber) ca lled for t h e ra iders t o move some

2,000 ya rds inla nd, cross t he Ma ta nika u,

a nd en velop t h e enemy right a nd rea r

w hile 1/7 s uppor ted by fire a nd 2/5 st ruck



ba ck w it h t he w ounded a nd pushed on

t ow a rd t he Ma t an ika u.

Th e g en er a l’s 24 S ept em ber com mu nica -

t ion s w it h P uller a lso ga ve t h e colonel

t he preroga tive of a lt er ing t h e origina l

pa t rol pla n so t ha t , he could conform t o

t he t ermina t ion da te of 26 S ept ember .

front a lly a cross t he river nea r it s mout h.

Th e a tt a ck bega n ea r ly on 27 S ept em-

ber , but fa iled t o ~ ~ in. Ma rines of 2/5

could not force a crossing, a nd t he ra iders’

in la nd m an euver st opped sh or t w hen G rif-

fit h ’s ba tt a lion en count ered a J a pa nese

force w hich h a d crossed t h e river during

316 P EARL H ARB OR TO G UAD AL C Ah TAL

2/5 t o resume t heir a tt acks a t 1330 w hile

t he I st 13a tt alion,7t h Ma rines (less C om -pa ny C ) m a dea n a mph ibious en velopm en t

w est of P oint C ruz t o st r ike t he ,J a pa nese

Ma ta nika u line from t he rea r.

U nder t he comma nd of Ma jor Who

Rogers, t he 1/7 t roops left K ukum in la nd-

ing cra ft just a s a st rong bombing ra id

ca me over from Ra ba ul. Th e d iv is ion

comma nd post t ook hea vy hit s w hich

w recked communica t ions, a nd t he de-

stroyer Bal la rd , suppor tin g t he la nd in g,

ha d t o slight her mission w hile t a king

ev a siv e a ct ion . The la nding a t. 1300 w as

unopposed, how ever, a nd t he compa nies

pushed ra pidly inla nd t ow a rd a high

gra ssy ridge + bout 500 ya rds from t he

beach.

B ut a s t he lea ding element s rea ched t he

t op of t his r idge, t hey w ere t a ken under

mortar a n d sma ll-a rms fire. Ma jor

Rogers w a s killed by a mort a r round a nd

hunt ing likely t ar get s w hile st aying clea r

of t he field a nd a ir enga gement s. .1s l~ ecircled overhea d, t he Ma r ines below

spel]ed out t he w ord “H elp” in w hit e

un der sh ir ts la id on t he h illside, a nd L eslie

ma na ged t o ma ke ra dio cont a ct w it h F ,d-

son a t t he mout h of t he Ma t a nika u xn d

r ela y t his d ist ress sig na l.

Tha t w as summons a plent y for P uller ,

ch afin g in F ,d son ’s pr ovision al com ma nfl

post w hile his ba tt zlion w ent off t o ba tt le

w it hout him. The combined a tt a ck a t t he

river mout h a nd inla nd clea rly ha d mis-

ca rr ied, a nd his men in 1/7 st ood exposed

t o t he full w ra t h of t he ,J a pa nese w est of

t he river . Wit h cha ra ct er ist ic direct ness,

t he lieu ten a nt colon el collect ed t he la n din g

cra ft a n d churned out t o boa rd t he B a 7-

Za rd. The ship a nd her skipper, soon

under t he P uller spell, st ea med t o t he

r escue close a sh or e, t he la nd ing cr aft in t he

w ake rea dy t o be used for a w it hdra wa l.



C a pt a in Za ch D . C ox, C ompa ny B com-

ma nder, w as w ounded. C a pt a in C ha rles

W. K elly, <J r ., act ing second in com ma nd,

t ook cha rge of t he ba t t a lion just a s t he

enemy cut t he Ma rines off from t he bea ch.

Kelly found t ha t he could not communi-

I t w a s a da y for heroic a ct ion. WThen

t he force t ra pped a shore sa w t he ship

coming dow n t he coa st , S ergea nt Robert

D . Ra ysbrook st ood out on a hillock of t he

ridge a nd sema phored for a t t ent ion.

F rom t he bridge of t he B cdla rd P uller

AC TI ON ALONG TH E MATANI KAU 317

t hon y P . J la la now ski, ,J r . t ook a B row nin g

a llt ommt ic r ifle from a ma n drol)pecl ina ct ion a nd covered t h e w it h dra w a l of

(’om p a n y .4 un til lle h im self was overrun

a]id killed by t h e ,J a pw n ese. B ut by t l~ en

l~ is compa ny I Md r ea ched t he bea ch w here

it set up a ha st y defen se int o w h ich C om-

pa ny B a nd element s of C om pa ny D drew

s hor t ly t h er ea f ter .

Wit h t he Ma rines figh ting off t he en emy

I t t heir rea r, t h e la nding cra ft n ow m ovedshorew ar d t o begin t heir eva cua tion , a nd

t hereby exposed t hem selves t o h ea vy J a p a-

n ese fire from t he h igh gr ound a bove t h e

Ma rin es on t h e bea ch a n d from t h e pro-

ject in g t erra in of P oin t C ruz t o t he ea st .

Th e J a p an es e w er e d et er min ed n ot t o a llow

a t hw art in g of t heir t ra pj a nd t h e st iffen-

ing crossfire drove t he cra ft ba ck offshore

w here t he-y bobbed in ground sw ells a ndindecision.

Th is w a s obs er ved by L ieut en a nt L eslie,

Tile minia ture flot illa r et ur ned t o t h e

per im et er h ~ ndin g sit e a t K ukum by n igh t-fa ll. The a ct ion h a d cost t h is ba tt a lion 24

killed a nd 23 w oul~ ded. The ra iders a nd

2/5 likew ise w it hdrew a ft er l/~ got sa fely

clea r of t he P oin t C ruz a re:l , a n d t heir

ca sua lt ies a dded a not h er 36 dea d a nd 77

w oun ded t o t he t idly fOr t he OP er ilt iO1l.

A{ ’TION (7F 7-9 (?(YTQ13ER

(>ost ly a s t h is a ct ion a t t h e Ma ta nika uha d been, it confirmed t he da ta being col-

lect ed by int elligence a gen cies, a nd t hese

fa ct s over-a ll w ere a s import a nt a s t hey

w ere disq uiet in g. J a pa n ese sh ips st ill

en t ered G ua da lca na l w at ers n ea rly every

night , ba rges bea ch ed n long t he coa st indi-

ca t ed ma ny new la ndin~ s, a ir a t t a cks ha d

picked up a ga in since a compa ra t ive lLI1l

follow in g t he B a tt le of t he Ridge, a nd n owit w as clea r t h a t t h e ,J a pa nese t roops a s-

s em blin g on t he is la n d w er e con cen tr a tin g



st ill keeping a w at ch ful eye on t he a ct ion

from his S B D , a n d he ca me dow n a ga in

t o len d a h a n d. Th e pilot st ra fed t h e

<J a pa nese posit ion s a nd t hen t urn ed t o

ma ke a few sw oopin g pa sses over t he la nd-

ing cra ft t o h er d t h em on t h eir w ay. Thus

just beyon d t he Ma ta nika u. An ot h er a nd

a stronger ,J a p a nes e cou nt er of fen siv e

loomed, a nd a lt hough defea t of t he lchiki

a n d K’awaguchi Forces ga ve t h e Ma rin es a

n ew con fidence in t h eir a bilit y t o hold t h e

per im et er , t h er e W:LS yet a not her fa ct or .

318 1’E ARJ , H AR BOR T() G U .kD .kLC ANAI .

.



.%C TI ON AL OXG TH E MATANI KAU 319

C olonel Willia m ,J . Wha lin g,’ w ho com-

n mllded 3,/2 a nt i t he s cou t-s niper s on t his

special l ll issif)l l, lv :ksto le: lc ito ellvelol linel lt

by crossing t he M:~ t imika u some 2,()()()

ya rds upst rea m a nd t hen a tt a cking nort h

il~ to t he villa ge on t h e first r idge w est of

t he river. NI R1 ing w ould be follow ed by

t ile ‘it h Ma rin es ba tt a lion s w hich w ould

a lso a tt a ck nort h a brea st a ncl t o t he left of

t h e Wh al in g groLIp.

The 1st Ma rine Aircra ft Wing, w it h it s

composit e C a ct us F orce, w as t o provide

pla nes for infa nt ry lia ison, close a ir sup-

port , a nd a rt illery spot t ing. I n t he a rt il-

lery pla n , 1/11 w ould support t h e 7t h

Marines; 2/11, t he 5t h Ma rines; 5/11,

t h e Wh a ling G roup ; a nd 3/11 w ould be

in gen era l support . of t he Lun gs perim-

et er . I f a ll w ent w ell, Wh a ling>s a ssa ult

of t J apa nese posit ion s n ea r t h e coa st

w ould be follow ed by a 5t h Ma rin es river

crossin g, a pa ssa ge of Wha lin gt s lines,

a nd a pursuit of t he en emy t ow a rd P oin t

ma nd post , w ould coordina te t he ent ire

opera tion . Movement s of t he forces w ere

t o get underw a y on ‘i Oct ober, a n d t h e,

coordina ted a tt a ck w -ould j urnp off on 8

october.

F rom r ecen t, exper ien ce w it h t his gr o<’-

ing J a pa nese force, t he Ma rin es expect ed

a st iff t ight w it h a ll t he usua l a nd un usua l

obst a cles en count ered in ba tt le. B ut in

t h is ca se t h ere w as t o be one la rge fa ct or

t h ey h a d no rea son t o suspect . B y a n un-

for t una te coincidence t h e J a pa nese a lso

h a cl set 8 Oct ober a s t he da t e for a n a t -

t a ck of t heir ow n, a nd t h eir scheme could

ha rdly h a ve been a bet ter count er a ga inst

t he Ma rines ha d t hey been looking over

t he shoulders of Va ndegrift ’s st a ff. Ra -

ba ul h a d order ed C olonel Ta da ma su

Na ka gurna t o cross t h e Ma t a n ika u on 8

Oct ober w it h his .@h lnfa.nt t~y a nd est ~ b-

lish a rt illery posit ions -w hich could sup-

port t h e n ew count era tt a ck t h en in pla n-

n ing-. To a ccomplish t his mission, Na ka -



C ruz w here t he 7t h Ma rin es on Wha ling’s

left . w ould close t he t ra p in fron t t o t h e

w it hdra wing enemy. The 3d B a tt a lion,

1st Ma rin es provided t he division reserve

for t he opera tion,’ a nd Va ndegrift ’s com-

W-ha ling h a d been promot ed t o t he ra nk of

guma sent a n en veloping force inla ncl

a cross t h e Ma ta nika u on 6 Oct ober w hile

he slipped t h e ca ut ious first echelon of a

br idgeh ea d a cross t he r iver n ea r t he coa st .

Th er e t he ,J a p a nes e for ces m et t he M a rin es

w h o moved from t he Lungs perimet er a t



AC TI ON ALONG TH E MATANI KAU 321

I t w as a most , efiect ive a rra ngement for

methodical extermination, a nd P uller

a nd his men kept it up unt il mort ar a mmu-nit ion ra n low . Then t l~ ey w it hdrew t o

join t he Wha ling G roup a nd H a nneken,

a nd by 1400 t he combined ra iding force

ha d r et ired ea st of t he Ma ta nika u t hrough

t he covering posit ions of t he 5t h Ma rines

a nd t he r aid er s.7 Th e t hr ee-da y oper at ion

ha d cost t l]e Ma rines 65 dea d a nd 125

w ounded. .1 ,J a pa nese dia ry found la ter

by Ma rines pla ced t he -&h Znfant?y losses

a t 700 m en .

‘ positions at t h e r iver mout h w er e ret a ined t o

gua rd a ga inst a n ew J a pa nese crossing.

Ra in a nd t he t hrea t of a new count er-

offensive ha d t hw art ed t he Ma rines’, t it -

t a ck pla ns, but , t he a ct ion could st ill godow n in t he ga in column. The ra id ha d

t ripped up t he a tt ack Colonel Na ka gurna

ha d pla nned for t he sa me period, a nd it

ha d done a wa y w it h a grea t number of his

men. .knd in t he short t ime t ha t men of

t he ‘it h Ma rines ha d been a shore on t he

isla nd, t hey ha d ea rned ~ right t o ident ifi-

ca tion a s vet era n t roops. S o -w it h a com-

plet ely comba t-w ise division on ha nd—

m~ d Army reinforcement s on t he w ay—

Va ndegrift a nd his st a ff n ow m a de p]a n s

t o meet t he st rong J a pa nese a t t a ck t ha t

w as bea ring dow n upon t hem,



CHAPTER 7

Japanese Counteroffensive

In spit e of t he misca rria ge of Na ka -

g-unM’s effort t o est a blish a bridgehea d

a cross t he Ma t a nika u, t he J apa nese

Seventeen th , Avmy con t i nu ed p rep a ra t i on s

for it s big push. on 9 Oct ober, t he sa me

d ay t ha t L ieut en ant C olonel P uller ca ugh t

a ma jor port ion of Na ka guma % @ ln.-

~ a nt iry bet w een t he devil of sma ll-a rms

a nd t he deep sea of a rt illery a nd mort a r

concentrations, Lye ven teen th .4n??y General

H aruyoshi H ya kut a ke la nded on G ua da l-

ca na l t o t a ke persona l cha rge of t he

J a pa n es e ca m pa ig n.

Things w ere ser ious but not despera te.

~ llt houg-b Icl]iki a nd Ka wa guchi ha d a l-

low ed unfounded opt im ism a nd overcon-

fidence t o sw amp t heir missions a gya inst

t a lions plus one ot her A.4A ba t t ery; a

hea vy regiment a nd a n independent t a nk

compa ny; one regiment a nd one ba tt alion

of mount a in a rt illery; a n engineer regi-

ment , a nd ot her t roops including a mort ar

ba tt a lion a nd a .unit of r econ na issa nce a ir -

cra ft . Inclllded in t his genera l list ing

w ere t he K tn mgw hi bm ”gad e, t he I ch iki

r ei n f ow ed 7 xzt t a7i on a nd ot her ba t ta lions

of t he ~th a nd I i?@h I nfan tr y Reg~m en ts

( Na ka guma ) a lrea dy defea t ed or w ea k-

ened by t he Lunga defenders.

B y rea son of t he odd impa sse in w hich

bot h t he ,J a pa nese a nd t he Allied na vies

chose t o a void decisive ba tt le t o conserve

t heir fleet s, t he S olom on s w a ter s ch an ged

ha nds every t w elve hours, a nd t hus ea ch



t he Ma rines, H ya kut ake st ill ha d a st rong

for ce a nd a proud confidence t ha t he could

w ipe out t he I ,lmga posit ions in one blow .

.lnd w it h G ua da lca na l sa fely ba ck in

,J apa nese ha nk, Imper ia l t roops t hen

w ould ret a ke Tula gi a nd occupy Rennell

side kept a n import ant t rickle of a id going

t o it s sm a ll com ba t for ce w hich r epr esen ted

t he sin gle poin t. of gr oun d con ta ct bet w een

t he belligerent pow ers. In da ylight w hen

C a ct us could fly cover, t he Allied ships

ca me in from E spirit u S a nt o a nd ot her

. J AI ’AN E S E C OU N TE R OF F E NS I VE 3 23

G ua da lca na l bya bout 1800. Th is wa sju st

inside t h e ra nge of S BD ’S a nd TI I F ’s fromH en der son F ield , but , t he ma neuvering

sh ips ma de poor t arget s, a nd t he la te h our

ga ve t h e America n pla nes t ime for only

one cra ck a t t hem before t urn in g ba ck for

Lungs. i\ ft er t ha t t he lZxpress h a d a n

open line a ll t h e w a y t o S ea la rk.

Wh ile t ra ns por t dest roy er s un loa ded on

eit her side of t he Ma rine perimet er , J a pa -

n ese w arsh ips st ood close in a t Lun gs a ndw ent t o w ork w it h t heir gun s. Louie t he

Louse dropped fla res t o a id t h e na va l gun-

ners, a nd ~ ~ ?:t sllil~ g-hla clli~ le (la rlie

lurked overhea d t o fr it t er out his bombs

during lLdls in surfa ce fir ing. U nder such

a tt a cks t h ere w m lit t le t h e Ma rines could

do but crouch in t h eir foxholes a nd pra y-

er sw ea r. Lun gs defen ders could est ima te

150 new enemy ground soldiers for everydest royer t ra nsport -oft en five or six a

mght -t ha t ma de t he E xpress run , a nd by

ba tt a lions of t he 3 ’8 th D ;w k i on , on e regi-

m en t a n d t hr ee ba t ter ies of h ea vy a rt illery ,a ba t t a lion t t nd a ba t t ery of mount a in

a rt illery, a mort a r ba tt a lion, a t a nk com-

pa ny, a nd t hree ra pid-fire gun ba t t alions.

Special t roops in cluding engineers a nd

m ed ica l per sor mell a n d r em na n ts of ea r lier

a t t a cks brought t he J apa nese force t o

about , 20,000men.

F acin g t his m oun tin g J a pa n ese s tr en gt h

w as a Ma rine force of a bout t h e sa me size.Arr iva l of t he 7t h Ma rines a nd t he t ra ns-

fer of ot h er t roops from Tula gi bolst ered

G en er al Va n degr ift ’s Lu nga pos it ion s, bu t

unt il 7 Oct ober t here w as lit t le hope t ha t

more rein forcement s w ould be for t hcon~ -

ing. Rea r a rea s in t he S out h P acific h a d

ga in ed lit tle st ren gt h sin ce Va ndegr ift h ad

a rgued for cont rol of h is 7t h Ma rines, a nd

t he pla n for t h e occupa tion of Ndeni st illw a s in t he pen ding ba sket . Marine

st ren gt h t h us promised t o clet er iora te

w hile .J a pa nese



ea rly oct ober t h ese t roops bega n t o la nd

insult ingly close, just a cross t he Ma ta ni-

ka u eight t o t en miles from H en derson

F ield. The Allied t urn t o use t he w a ters

ca me a t da yligh t , but U . S . for ces did not

h a ve t he ma n pow er t o ma tch t he ,J a pa nese

w hile .J a pa nese st ren gt h cont inued t o

moun t . More t ha n 800 Ma rine ba tt le ca s-

ua lt ies h a d been eva cua ted by ea rly ~ ct o-

ber , a nd ma la ria cont in ued t o t ake it s t oll}

Th e C a ct us fliers w ere not doin g much

more t h a n holding t heir ow n, eit h er . B y

324 P EARL H AR B OR TO G CAD AL C ANTAL

t heir sh ar e of losses. On t he fir st da y of

Oct ober G enera l G eiger ha d 58 pla nes;t wo da ys la ter t he count st ood a t 49.

I f t he J ~ pa nese h a d fa iled t o w in, pla ce,

or show w it h Ichiki, Ka wa guchi, a nd Na -

ka guma , t he Allies likew ise ha d been un-

a ble t o improve t heir odd s by a ny com fort -

a ble m argin , To G enera l H a rmon t he

sit ua tion looked a bout a s grim a s it ha d on

11 ilt t gust w hen he expressed doubt t ha t

t he Ma rines could hold t heir per imet er ,a nd on 6 Oct ober he w rot e t o Admira l

(lh or mley t ha t t he Nden i oper at ion sh ould

be q ua shed unt il t he sit ua tion improved.

H e q uest ioned t he logic of holding t roops

idle for a new opera tion w hen t hings w ere

going so poor ly in a ba tt le a lrea dy joined.

H e a dmit t ed cert a in fa ct ors fa voring t he

Ndeni occupa tion, but he a dded t ha t, “. . .

in t he fina l a na ly sis t hey a re individua llyor cum ula t ively vit a l t o t he success of m ain

offensive opera tion or . . , ma int a ining

securit y of S out h P a cific ba ses a nd lines of

a nd on 8 OG t ober he ordered Admira l

Turner t o emba rk t he 164t h Infa nt ry oft he America l D ivision, H armon’s choice

for t he job, a n d depa rt Noumea for

G ua da lca na l on 9 (lct ober .

I t w a s t o be a blocka de run in force.

Transports Zei[ in a n d . U c(’a w 7 ey , carry-

ing supplies, 210 n len of t h e 1st Nla r ine

Aircra ft l l~ in~ a n d 85 YLir ine ca sua ls a s

w ell a s t he 2)850 men of t h e ~ rmy r egi-

men t , sa iled un der escor t of t h ree de-st royers a n d t hr ee min e la yers w h ile a

la rger for ce of four cruisers a n d five de-

st royers st ea med off t he con voy% left fla nk.

Th es e cr uis er s, San Fr an ci sco, Sal t L ake

(’i t y, H el en a, a nd B oise a nd dest royers

B u ch an an , W .vn ea n, F w en hol t , L a f ley, a nd

.VcCaUa w e r e comma n ded by Rea r Ad-

mira l Norma n S cot t . Ot her L“. S . Na va l

for ces in t he sur roun din g w a ter s in clud edR ea r Admir al G eorge D . Mur ra y’s H ornet

ca rrier group som e 180 miles sout hw est of

G ua da lca na l, a nd Rea r Admira l Willis



com mu nica t ion s.” s

S pecifica lly , H armon recommended

a ba ndoning t he Ndeni opera tion unt il t he

G ua da lca na l sit ua t ion improved; rein-

forcement s of C act us (G ua da lca na l) by a t

August us L ee>s ba tt leship Washington

gro~ lp a bout 50 miles ea st of Ma lia t a .

S cot t ’s s cr een in g s ta t ion for t he u nloa d in g

w a s nea r Rennell I sla nd.

. TAP AN E S E C O U NTE R OF F E NS I VE 325

.~ctuallj’ S cot t hea ded t o int ercept a

for ce st ron ger t ha n r epor ts h ad ind ica ted.

observers fa iled t o spot t hree hea vy

cruisers, t wo sea pla ne ca rriers, a nd eight

dest royers st ea ming some dist ance a wa y

out side of The Slot . J a pa nese Vice Ad-

mira l G unichi Mika wa , comma nder of t he

E igh th F leet a nd t he (2ut er flea Forces,

a nd Vice Admira l J inichi Kusa ka , EZev-

en th Ah Z Veet comm ander, ha d t ea med up

t o st rike t he st rongest blow yet a ga inst t he

bot hersome (’~ ct us fliers. In t he a ft er-noon of t he llt hj Kusa ka ha d 30 fight ers

md 35 bombers up t o occupy H enderson

fliers w hile Mika wa ’s bomba rdment a nd

r ein for cing g roups st ea med sout h out sid e

the norma l J a pa nese t ra nspor t rout e.

H ea vy cruisers A oh, Kinugaau, a nd

3’u~wtaka wi t h , des t royers Hatswyu& a nd

Fubuki ma de up t he bomba rdment group

w hile t he reinforcing fleet included sea -pl a ne ca r r ie rs (’hitose a n d iV&s hin , a n d d e-

stroyers A k& & -i , .4.sagu m o, N at au gw no,

Y am a gu m o. M u r a ku r n o, a nd f i h i rayuk i .

Fla gship S an Pranczkco, w it h r ud im en -

t a ry ra da r of t ha t ea rly period, ha d no

cont a ct s, a nd S cot t cont inued t o st ea m

t ow a rd S a vo w it h his ships in column.

H e. c oun ted t his t he best a rea for in ter wpt -

ing t he E xpress he hoped t o dera il, a nd a t

a bout 2340 he ha d r eversed course t o hea d

ba ck t ow a rd t he Ca pe w hen t he H elena ,

a t la st confident a bout t he blips from her

bet ter r ad ar eq uipm en t, a nn oun ced her fix

of a t a rget six miles a wa y. Fort una tely,

since t he U . S . fleet w a s ha ving “eye”

t rouble, t he J a pa nese ships w ere com-

plet ely blind, a nd even t hough cert a in

com mu nica t ion s m is un der st a nd in gs 5 fu r-

t her dela yed America n fire, first sa lvos

from t he H elena a t 2346 ca ught t he enemy

by complet e surprise. S cot t 7s ships ha d

usur ped Tokyo’s t ur n in S ea la rk C ha nn el.

The Sal t L ake Ci ty, B oi se, a nd Fccrem

bolt quickly a dded t heir fire t o t ha t of t he

H elena , a nd short ly t herea ft er t he U . S .

fleet crossed t he J a pa nese “T” (sa iled



By a bout 2 2 00, w hile S cot t m a neu ver ed

in t he w a t ers of I ron B ot t om S ound be-

t w een Sa vo Isla nd a nd C a pe E spera nce,

t he ,J a pa nese bomba rdment group ca me

int o The Slot a nd st ea med sout h in a

a hea d of t he J a pa nese column a nd a t r ight—a ngles t o it ) so t ha t a ma jorit y of t he

America n guns could bea r on ea ch J a pa -

nese ship a s it ca me forw a rd. The J a pa -

nese destroyer Fubuki sa nk a lm ost a t on ce,


S cot t coulcl count t ile en ga gem ent a vic-

t ory, but it did not resolve t he seesa wingfor pow er in t he S olomons w at ers or skies.

The ,J a pa nese only st epped LIp their air

a t ta cks on H en der son F ield a nd con tinued

prepa ra tions for t he big push.

PREPAl i .4T 10N FOR BAT TL E

Transports M cCauJey a nd Zeilen a r-

rived a t Kukum w it h t he Army reinforce-

ment s ea rly on 13 Oct ober, but t his w a s

one of t he few bright spot s of t he da y.

B ot h ra da r a nd t he N’ort hern S olomons

coa st w a tchers missed a n a ir a t t a ck t ha t

ca me over a t 1202, a nd t he F 4F >S could n’t

ge t U p ill t ime t o lr,lmper t h e 22 fi~hter-

e.scort ed bombers t ha t ra ined dow n t heir

bombs from 30J )O0 f eet . B ot h H enderson

Field a nd Fight er 1 w ere da ma ged, a nd

fir es fr om t he a t ta ck bur ned 5,000 ga llons

of a via tion fuel.

B et ween 1330 a nd 1400 z second st rike

t erba tt ery ra nge, t hese w ea pons bega n a

slow met hodica l regist ra tion on t he fielda nd t he perimet er . The fire w a s a bra nd

of da ma ge a nd dest ruct ion t he men a t

Imnga lra d t o live w it h, a nd so t o ha ve a

pinpoint t a rget for t heir a nger if not t heir

w ea pons t hey na med t his new ent ra nt in

t heir w ar P ist ol P et e.

P et e, a s w a s most oft en t he ca se w it h

Louie t he Louse a nd Wa shing-Ma chine

(Xha rlie, w as plura l. H ya kut a ke ha dla nded 15 of t hese how it zers. B ut for t he

Ma rines a nd soldiers it w a s difficult t o

ima gine ba tt eries get t ing t ha t persona l,

xnd P et e>s pa rt icula r bra nd of hell w as a

most persona l a nd singula r t hing. S o

P et e beca me one enemy, t he devil him-

self—t he devil a nd one big gun a ct ing a s

Tojo’s per son a l N im rod .

And a ft er he t humped a w a y a t t heperimet er a ll t ha t da y, a n enemy t ask force

built a round ba t t leships H a runa a nd

Kongo ca me int o Sea la rk Cha nnel a ft er



of 15 ,J a pa nese bombers ca ught most of

t he America n pla nes ba ck on t heir fields

refueling. S ome pla nes w ere da ma ged,

a nd t he st r ike undid t he repa ir w ork t ha t

h ad been st a rt ed by t he 6t h S ea bees follow -

ing t he ea rlier ra id. A few C a ct us pla nes

n ig ht fa ll t o la un ch a n 80-m in ut e bom ba r d-

ment .7 This w a s t he J a pa nese Combat

WU isvkn 3, com ma nded by Vice. Adm ir al

Ta keo Kurit a , a nd it a lso included light

cruiser IYUmL a nd t hr ee sh ips of D est roy er

, J AP AX ES E C OU X TE R OF I ’E N S IVE 327

I ncomplet ely knock out t he Ma rine a ir a nd

~ clea r t h e w ay for a coordina ted infa nt ry

a tt a ck. I .o~ lie t h e I .ouse illllmina ted t he

t ielcl, :~ l ~ clt lle b ig g lllls cllt loos e. C ocon ut

t r ees s plin t er ed , b uil(lin gs a n d l~ u t ,sr ip ped

open a n d cra sh ed dow n , fra gment s a nd

w recka ge t ore in t o pla nes a nd men , a nd

m or e ga solin e w en t u p in br igh t fir es w hich

h elped J a pa nese gunnersst ayon t arget for

t heir syst ema t ic covera ge of t he field w it h

m or e t ha n 900 r olln ds of t he h ig h explos ive

shells.

; ~ s~ i {l i~ l i r a lr r :~ l l :~ k : i cl escr ib ed i t l a t er :

The scene w as t opped off by fla re bombs from

our observa tion pliines fly ing o~ -er t he field, t he

w hole spect a cle ma king t he Ryogokn t irew orks

displa y seem like mere child’s pla y. The night ’s

pit ch da rk w a s t ra n sformed by t ire int o t he

brightness of da y. S pont aneous criesmrd shout s

of excit em en t ra n t hr ough out ou r sh ips.8

Then , a s t he ships beca me silent a n d

w it hdrew ea st of S a vo I sla nd, t he pla nes

ca m eba ck. h Tigh tbon lber s con tin ued t heir

st rikes int ermit t ent ly unt il da ybrea k,

2,000”y ar d st ret ch of H en der son t ha t st ill

w as usa ble a nd fly ba ck t o E spir it u S ant e.

Th e ,J a p an ese “P a goda ,” a ir h ea dq ua rt er s

since t h e ea rly da ys, ha d been pa rt ia lly

w recked, a nd G enera l G eiger ha d it bull-

dozed a w a y. I t h a d proved t oo good a

r egis tr :lt ion poin t, for bom ber s, a n yw a y.

For t h e rest of t h e da y t h e ,J apa n ese

sh ips ma in t a ined t heir cont rol of t he

w a ters a round G ua dzlca na l, a nd pla nes

cont in(led t o pr ess t heir a dva nt a ge in t he

a ir. B et w een t he bombin gs a nd t he shell-ings, P ist ol P et e’s effect ive in terdict ion

prevent ed repa ir or use of t he ma in a ir-

st rip, a nd by mida ft ernoon H en derson h ad

t o be cha lked OR a s complet ely un fit for

use. B y la t e a ft ernoon fliers of t h e

Army’s 67t h F igh ter S qua dron a nd 13 dive

bomber pilot s used F igh ter l—a nd n ea rly

a ll of H enderson’s rema ining supply of

fu el—t o st rike ba ck fin ally a t t he J a p an eseby a t t a cking a n ea rly run of t h e Tokyo

E xpress t h en only 70 miles nort h of

G ua da ]ca na l. One ship w a s sun k a nd a n-



a nd by da wn of 14 Oct ober t h e C a ct us Air

F orce could fly only 42 of t he 90 ph mes

t ha t h ad been oper at ion al 24 h our s ea rlier.

F ort y-onernen ha d been killed a nd ma ny

m or e -w oun dedj a n d t he a ir field w a s a com -

plet e s ha m bles . Among t h e dea d w ere

ot h er da ma ged, but t he E xpress did n ot

t u rn b a ck .

Tha t night , (14 Oct ober) t h e J a pa nese

cr u is er s C h .ok oi a n cl Kinu.gasa m ov ed d ow n

t he cha nnel t o bomba rd H en derson F ield

P 13AR L H .4R BOR TO G U AD AL CAh TAL

f ly. 1311tone of t hese pla nes h a d t o be

scr at ched ~ v]lel~ it t um bled i~ lt o w cra ter

on t ile w a y t o t he st r ip, a nd Lieut ena nt ,

Robelt M. P a tt erson lost S 13D num ber t wo

w l~ en t ile pla ne hit ii S hell hole w hile he

ra ced for his t a keoff. P at t erson t ried it

a ga in w it h t he la st dive bomber , a n d t his

t ime be ma de it . H is sin gle-pla ne a t ta ck

(lid not lmmper t he ,J a pa nese much, but

w hile l~ e w a s flying, t he ground crew s

qllickly pa t ched ot her phmes. I t re-s em bled a ll in for nla l n eig hb or h ood b oxkit e

club, w it l~ members ha rdly a ble t o w ait

for w ork t o be complet ed before t hey

t est ed t heir cra ft sma nship. one a t a t ime

t he first folm plw nes w ere t a ken up t o

lm ve a cha nce a t t he cocky J a pa nese t ra ns-

por t s. Tw o minor hit s w ere scored, but

G enera l G eiger st opped t he a ssem bly line

comba t a ct ion unt il he could must er morestrengthos

i~ t 1000 C a ct us w a s rea dy w it h 12

SBD’S, and t hey w ent up t o drop 500- a nd

con fid en t in t l~ is d ar in g da ylight deliver y

of h is r ei nf or ce n~ e n t s.E ven G enera l G eiger ’s ow n pilot , Ma jor

.J :w k C ra n~ , l]a d his t urn d~ lr ing t ha t, cla y

of clespera tioll w hen he ma de a run on t he

t ra nspor ts w it h t w o t or ped oes slun g un der

t he w ings of t he genera l’s B 7ue G oo,se, a

bulbous m~ cl gout y P 13Y-5A. C ra m got

t he t orpedoes off, but t hen he w as cha sed

ba ck t o Fight er 1 b y a clut ch of Zeros, like

spa rrow s a round a ponderolls ha wk, a ndone det ermined enemy fight er ha d t o be

shot , a w a y from t he smoking ~ oose a s

Cra m ca me in for his la nding.

B y da y’s en d t hree bombed t ra nspor t s

of 7,000 t o 8,000 t ons ea ch w ere bea ched

a nd b~ wning off Ta ssa fa ronga t a nd t he

ot her t wo IMC 1led ba ck up S ea la rk C ha n-

nel a nd The S lot . B ut in spit e of t his, t he

J a pa nese h a d ma na ged t o unloa d 3,000 t o4,000 men of t he %Wth a nd 16 th l n fcv n.t r y

Regi?nents a s w ell a s 80 per cent of t he

ships’ ca rgo. These t roops, t he la st t he



1,000-pound bom bs on t he t ra nsport s a nd

t l~ en st ra fe t heir decks. Tha t, a tt ack sa nk

one of t he t ra nspor t s. Next ca me a tt a cks

fr om 1’–39’s a nd t he r elic P 400’s, a nd fir es

broke out , on t w o of t he ships. Aft er t ha t,

.J a pa uese w ere a ble t o la nd pr ior t o t heir

concent ra ted effort a ga inst t he a irfield,

brought G enera l H ya kut ake’s st rengt h on

t he isla nd t o a bout 20,000 men.

G enera l Va ndegr ift now ha d a pproxi-

. J AP AX E SE (’O ~ XTE R OF F E X’S I VE 329

B a tt alion w it h elem ent s of t he 1st S pecinl

We+ lpons B a t t alion, a mphibia n t ra ct or-men, pioneers, a nd engineers w ho held

7,1OO ya rds of bea ch t ha t st ra ddled t he

I mn.ga River. (S ee Ma p23, Ma p S ect ion)

.S ect or Tw o-The 164t h Infa nt ry a nd

elem en ts of specia l w ea pon s u nit s w it h con -

t rol of a 6,600-ya rd line from t he bea ch

inla nd a long t he I lu River a nd t hence w est

t o a point nezr t he ea st slope of B loody

Ridge.S ect or Three-The 7t h Ma rines (less 3d

B at t a lion ), a 2,500-ya rd front of inla nd

jungle from B loody Ridge w est t o t he

I mn ga R iver .

S ect or Four-The 1st Ma rines (less 3d

Battalion), 3,5oo ya rds of jungle from t he

Lungs w est , t o t he inla nd fla nk of t he fina l

sector.

.S ect or F ive—Th e 5t h Ma rin es h old ingt he nort hw est curve of t he m ain perim et er

fron~ t he fla nk of t he 1st Ma rines nort h t o

t he sea a nd t hen ea st a long t he bea ch t o

a ir field. On 15 (lct ober in K okurnbona he

issued his a tt ack or der t o Lieut ena nt C ~ en-er a l Ma sa o Ma r uy a ma >s gd D;?)hion. D a t e

for t he a ssa ult w as set t ent a t ively for 18

oct ober. The %’dDilvkion w ould sw ing fa r

inla nd t o hit t he Ma rines from t he sout h

w it h a night a t t a ck in t w o columns of ba t -

t alions w hile t he ,Yeventeenth Amwy art i l-

lery commander, G enera l S um iyoshi,

w ould shell t he perim et er a nd t hen la unch

a diversiona ry st r ike w it h infa nt ry unit snea r t he mout h of t he Ma t a nika u. F or

t his coa st a l a tt a ck S umiyoshi ha d a force

of some 2,900 men comprising t he ba t -

t a lions of t he J th Z nfcm t~ plus a t a nk

com pa n y, s even ligh t field a r tiller y pieces ,

fift een of t he 150m m how it zers, a nd t hree

100nlm gLILIS.

F or his inla nd a t t a ck, Ma ruya ma ha d

some eight or nine infa nt ry ba t t a lionst ot a ling 5,600 men, plus a rt illery a n d

support ing t roops. G enera l K aw aguchi,

w ho ha d t r ied his ha nd in t he sa me a rea



t he w est fla nk of t he 3d D efense B a tt alion,

S in ce t l~ e ,J a pa nese a t ta ck w a s expect ed

from t he w est a cross t he Ma t a nika u, t he

gr ea t est st ren gt h w a s con cen tr at ed on t ha t

sicle of t he per imet er . F orw ard of t he 5t h

before, w ould comma nd t he right a rm of

t he a ssa ult w it h t wo ba tt a lions of t he %KIth

Znfant ry , one ba t t a lion of t he l 2@h Zn-

fant ry , a nd element s of t he 3’d L ight

Trench Mortar BattaZion9 6t~ a nd 7th lm -

330 1’E .4R L H AR ROR TO G U AD AL CANTAL

hfa ruya rna ’s signa l of vict ory a t t he a ir-

fielcl, mld his a t t a ck from t h e sollt l~ w a sordered t o press unrelent ing clest ruct ion

upon t he en emy ul~ til C xenera l l~ nn cle~ rift

himself ca me for t h t o surren der .

Thus ch a rgecl , G en era l fi~ a ruya ma

st ruck out t h rough t he ju~ lgle w ilderness

on 16 Oct ober .

Tra nsport at ion w -a s pedest ria n, ca rgo

moved on bendeii ba cks, a nd ha nd pow er

drove t he engilieering t ools. ‘1’hus t he

column of enveloping ,J a pa nese inched

sin gle file a cr oss t he t or tu ou s C iua da lca n al

ba ck count ry like a segment ed serpent

cra wling t hrough t ile perpet ua l w et sha d-

ow s of t he t ropica l forest .

The so-ca lled Ma ruya ma Tra il, begunby engineers in S ept ember, scra tched it s

t hin sca r a long t he floor of t he jungle

sout hw ard from Kokumbona , ea st a cross

n~ ort a rs a lso beca me t oo burdensome t o

n~ a na ge. F req llent 1y un sur e of t hei r exa ctloca tion in t he j(ln g]e, t he .J a pa nese by 19

Oct ober st ill ha d not crossed t he ripper

Lungs, a nd ~ Ma ruyma post poned his

a ssa nlt unt il t he 22d. Mea nw hi]e C ~ en-

er a l S um iy osh i’s fift een P ist ol P et es

poun decl t he L unga per im et er , a ir a t ta cks

con tin ued , a n d I mper ia l w a rs hips st ea m ecl

bra zenly int o S ea la rk (Xa nnel nea rly

every night t o shell t be a ir field, bea ches,a n d M a rin e pos it ion s.

Th e t em po of a ct ion obviou sly w a s build -

ing up for t he count eroffensive, a nd

Ma r in es a n d sold ier s w or ked con st a rt t lj~ t o

im pr ove t heir field for tifica tions a nd keep

LIp a n a ggressive pa tr ol sch ed (de. pa tr ok3

clid not go fa r enough a field, how ever, t o

discover Ma ruya ma ’s w ide-sw inging en-

veloping for ce, a nd reconna issa nce t o t heeast fOLU ld no indica t ions of a ,J apilnese

build-up on t ha t fla nk. ThLM G en era l

~ ~ a ndegrift a nd his st a ff w er e a w a re only



t he Ma ta nika u a nd t he Lungs inla nd from

Mount Aust en, a nd t hen nor th t o a n a ssenl-

bly a rea sout h of B loody Ridge. S a fely

beyond ra nge of Ma rine pa t rols a nd

hidden from a eria l view by t he vine-la ced

of S umiyosh i’s t hrea t a ]on g t he coa st from

t he w est .

Th ere t h e first probe ca me on 20 Oct ober .

~ .J a pa n ese comba t , pa t rol , a ugment ed by

t w o t a nks> ven t ured int o view on t h e w est



332 I ’E ARL H ARB OR TO G UAD ALC Ah TAL

ba t t:~ l ioll lla clt nke]~ z few ca su alt ies fr om

a rt illery a nd mort a r fire, but neit her oft hese first t wo a tt mcks h ad posed a ser ious

t h rea t .

At t he Ma ta nika u posit ions on 22 Oct o-

ber S umiyoshi cont inued fir ing his mor-

t a rs a ncl a rt illery but mount ed no new

a ssa ult . I nla nd, G enera l Ma ruya ma

st ruggled w it h t he jungle some dist a nce

from his lines of depa rt ure, a nd he w a s

forced t o post pone his pr oposed a ssa ult t o23 Oct ober. B ut on t ha t da y he st ill w a s

unprepa red t o a tt ack a nd a ga in he set ba ck

h is pla ns a not her 24 h our s.

At a bout 1800 on t he 23d, how ever,

S um iy oshi on ce m or e in ten sified h is a rt il-

lery a nd mort a r fire t o la y dow n a n ort ho-

dox prepa ra t ion pa t t ern on t he Ma r ine

ea st ba nk posit ions a nd a long t he coa st al

rout e from t he Lungs P erimet er . Neart he end of evening na ut ica l t w ilight t he

a rt illery fire cea sed, a nd a column of nine

lt l-t on medium t anks churned a cross t he

The ot her eight hulks rema ined st rew n

a long t he sa nd ba r a cross t he river mout h,:Lnd a rt illery fire knocked out t hree more

t a nks t lmt never got t o a tt ack. H unclreds

of t he enemy soldiers w ho ha d been w ait -

ing t o follow t he t a nks w ere killed. The

a ct ion w a s over by 2200~ a lt hough a t a bout

midnight t he ,J apa nese ma de a ha lf-

hea rt ed a tt empt t o cross t he river fa rt her

upstream. This t hrust w as t urned ba ck

w it h lit t le t rou ble.F rom his st udy of int er roga tions of t he

J a pa nese gen er als in volved, D r. ,J oh n Mil-

ler , J r ., sums up:

S umiyosh i h a d sent on e t a nk compa n y a n d

on e infa n t ry regiment for w a rd t o a t t a ck a pre-

pa red posit ion over a n obvious a pproa ch rout e

w hile t he Am erica ns w ere ot herw ise un en ga ged.

Th e Ma ruya ma force, st ill m o~ -in g in la nd, h ad n ot

r ea ch ed it s l in e of depa rt ure. I n 1946, t h e re-

slxmsible com ma nders ga ve different rea sons for

t he la ck of co-ordin a tion a nd bla med ea ch ot her .

According t o H ya kut a ke, th is piecemea l a tt a ck

h a d been a mist a ke. Th e coa st a l a t t a ck w a s t o



sa ndspit in a n a tt empt t o force a penet ra -

t ion. I n a ssembly a rea s t o t ile rea r in-

fa nt ry t roops st ood by t o a ssa ult in t he

w ake of t he t a nks.

S lim-ba rreled 37’s a ga in bla st ed a t t he

h a ve been delivered a t t h e sa me 1ime a s Ma ru-

ya ma ’s forces st ruck a ga inst t he sout hern per im e-

t er l in e. ~ fa ruya ma , a ccordin g t o H ~a kut a ke,

w a s t o h a ve n ot ified t he btlln fantrg w h en h e

r ea ch ed h is lin e of depa rt ure on 23 Oct ober , a n d

h e so not ified t h e 4t lb I n fant ry . Th e r eg im en t

. J . %P A XE S E C O I ~ XTE R O FF E h TS I W2 333

ill da ylight hours. Tel ep hon e com m un i ca t i on

l t i td been frequent ly disrupted. AS a r es u lt t h e

coa st force hiid been one da y behind in it sknmvledgeof Maruyama ”smovement . ”

Mea n w h ile t he Ma rin e division” h a d

st a r t ed a sh ift of ma n pow er w it hin t h e

perimet er . I n t he fa ce of S umiyosh i’s a t-

t a cks, a nd w it h n o pa trol cont a ct s t o t h e

s ou t]l or ea s tj t he 2d B a t t a lion j 7t h Ma r in es

on 23 (M ober pulled out of it s sout hern

1ines ea st of t h e LLIIIga a nd moved w est

t o relieve t he 3d 13a tt alion, 1st Ma rines a tt h e mout h of t h e Ma ta nika u. This left t h e

1st B a t ta lion, 7t h Ma rines (P uller) w it h a

responsibilit y for t h e defense of a ll of

S ect or F ive, t h e 2,500-ya rd defense lin e

fronl t h e inla nd fla nk of t he 164t h I nfa n-

t ry w est a cross t he sout h ern slopes of

B looc]y Ridge t o t he Lunga River . P ul-

ler”s ext en ded lin es w ere t hin, but t here

a ppea red ver y lit tle da nger fr om t he sou th .H a nneken’s 2/7 did not effect it s in-

t en ded relief, how ever , beca use of t h e

h ea vy ,J a pa n es e a rt iller y fir e t ha t en ga ged

jungle ra vines a bout 1,000 ya rds sout h of

H ill 67 before t hey could be enga ged. I n

t h e fa ce of t h is t h rea t a ppa ren t ly hea ded

for t he 4,000-y a rd ga p bet w een t he Ma t a ni-

ka u out post a nd t he Lunga perimet er , 2/7

w as a ssign ed t o plug t his hole, a nd t h e 3d

B at t alion, 1st Ma rines ret a ined it s posi-

t ion s overlooking t he bench a nd t he Ma -

tanikau.

I .a ter t h e sa me da y ca me ot her indica -

t ion s t h a t t he S umiyoshi a ct ion w ould not

be t h e only J apa n ese effor t a ga inst t heperimeter. La t e in t he a ft ern oon of 24

Oct ober a n observer in t he 1/7 lines sout h

of t he a ir field sa w a J a pa n ese. officer s tu dy -

ing B loody Ridge t h rough field gla sses,

a nd a scout -sn iper pa trol report ed seein g

t he smoke from “ma n y rice fires” in t h e

Lungs va lley a bout t w o miles sout h of

P uller ’s posit ion s on t he Ridge. B y t his

t ime t w iligh t w a s set t lin g over G ua da l-ca na l, a n d t here w a s lit t le t he Ma rines

could do but w ait out development s from

exist ing posit ions. The only t roops not in



3/1 on t he 23d, a nd on t h e follow ing da y a

])ew a ssign ment w as given t o t he 7t h Ma -

rines ba tt a lion. On t he 24t h t he Ma rines

of 3/7 on H ill 67 sout h of t he Ma ta nika u

n lout h h ad spot ted a J a pa nese column , ob-

fron t lines w ere t h ose in reserve in t he

va rious defen sive s ect or s a nd t he 3d B a t ta -

lion , 2d Ma rin es, t he division r eser ve, t hen

bivo{la cked n or th of H en der son F ield.

Th e rice fires a nd t he officer w it h field

334 P EARL H ARB OR TO G ~ TAL)ALC ANAI ,

w it l~ l]ea vy ra in), t he ,J a pa nese genera l

ordered a na rrow a tt a ck over t he ground

Ka wa guchi’s force ha d a ssa ult ed in micl-

September. Tile pla in effor t w a s a ssig ned

t o t he Z9th l nf w nt r y, with t he 16th I nf an -

t r y i n reserve , wh i le .fa r t h er t ot h eea s t t h e

K aw aguchi comma nd-now led by C olonel

‘1’os llin a ri S h oji “ —w as t o ma ke a pa ra l-

lel iWSalllt.

;~t a bout 2130 a ,J a pa nese unit cla shed

briefly w it h z 46-111211 out post P uller ha d

st a tioned forw ard of his t act ica l w ire, but

a ft er a shor t fire fight t he enemy bypa ssed

t he posit ion, a nd t he ba tt lefield w a s q uiet .

P la t oon S ergea nt Ra lph B riggs, J r., in

c]]a rge of t he out post , not ified P uller t ha t

a la rge force of ,J a pa nese w ere moving

a bout t he out post l~ ill t ow a rd t he ba t ta lion

lines, but P uller ordered his men t o ho]cl

t ir e so t ha t B r ig gs coL dcl in filt ra t e t o sa fet y.B ut t he out post a lrea dy w as fla nked by t he

,J a p a nese m ovin g a round t he hill, a nd

B riggs led his men t o t he ea st w hile t he

enemy moved closer t o P uller ’s ba tt alion

t heir a tt ack. Then xt 0030 on 2’5 Oct ober,

S :1s 11’sn len ca m e olt t of t he ju ng le scr ea n -

in g t heir b(mzaisj t hrow ing gr ena des, a nd

f il ’i l~ .gr if les a l ~c ll n:~c ll il le g ll ll s t o s t r ik e t , ]l e

left cent er of 1/7’s line w it h a n a ssa ult

in del)t ll on a na rrow front . P uller ca lled

i 11m or ta r a nd a rt iller y con cen tr at ion s h is

r i fl en len t ook LIp a steady fire, and the ma-

cl]il~e guns ra tt led a lmost endless bt w st s

(I olv n t h eir t in a l pr ot ect iv e lin es .

F ronl P uller ’s left , t roops of t he 2d

Ra tt a ]ion, 1Wt h Infa nt ry a dded t heir fire

t o t ha t of t he Ma rines, but st ill t he J a pw

nese a ssa ~ ~ lt ed, t rying t o rush a cross t he

fie]ds of fire t ow a rd t he Riclge. The a t -

t a ck kept llp for 10 or 15 minut es, but

fina lly grouud it self t o a ha lt a ga inst t he

combined a rms of t he U . S . force. Then

t here w a s a l~ dl w hile t he ,J a pa nese re-

groupe(l a nd ca me ba ck a ga in , t rying t o

clea r a pel~ et ra t ion w it h t heir gr en ades a nd

sma l 1 a rms. The Ma rine co&la nder a s-

sessed correct ly t ha t his men w ere st and-

il~ g off t he ma in a t t a ck of Ra ba ul?s big



a l]d bega n t o cut t he t zct ica l w ire in front

of t he 1/7 posit ion s.14

While P uller ’s m en st ra inecl t o nea r t he

a pproa ching enemy a bove t he sound of

count er offensive: a nd t ha t t he for ce in t ile

jllng]e t o his front obviously w as st rong

enol[gh t o keep S UC 1la tt acks going most

of t he night . H e ca lled for reinforce-

, TAP A XE S E C O ~ X TE R O FF E X TS I VE 335

t ile m or ta r posit ion w on ba ck t he t ube fr om

t ile en em y, a n d in t he m a ch in e-g un sect ion

S ergea nt ,J ohn B a silone t ook rescue ma t-

t ers int o l~ is ow n ha ncls. For t his a ct ion

a ]~ d l a ter h er oism in br aving J a pa nese fir e

t ob ril~ g llp a m mu nit ion , I ?m silon e.b eca m e

t he first enlist ed Ma rine of World Wa r I I

t o w ill t he Meda l of H onor. ‘5

.~ s t hese a tt a cks cont inued, (2010nel

H all’s soldiers bega n t o a rrive in sma ll de-

t a chment s. P nller ma de no a t t empt t o

give t his ba t t a lion a line of it s ow n on his

t hrea tened front , but inst ea d ha cl his men

lea d t hese fresh t roops int o his line w here

t hey w ere most needed a t t he moment . The

fight ing w a s t oo brisk a nd t he night t oo

ra iny for a ny ma jor reshuffling of lines.

B y 0330 t he reinforcem ent w as com plet e,

a nd t he .J a pa nese a tt acks w ere becoming

less int ense. Infa nt ry a nd suppor t ing

fires ha d cut dow n t he Na su force so t ha t

ea ch new a ssa ult w as ma de w it h few er a nd

few er m en .

Fort una t ely, a ll ha d not gone w ell for

combine(l IT. S . infa nt ry ba tt a lions, t he

a rt illery , a nd 37m m~ s fr om t he neighbor -

ing 2d lh~ t t a lion, 164t h infa nt ry. B y

d a w n i IIJW\L ca lled ba ck his men t o re-

group for la t er a t t a cks, a nd P uller a ncl

H all bega n t o reorga nize t l~ eir int ermin-

gled ba tt a lions a nd rea djust t heir lines.

Th e fir st st ron g effor t of t he cou nt er offen -

sive lItLd been t urned ba ck, but t he re-

nla incier of 25 Oct ober, S unda y in t he

S olomons, w as not a rest ful da y.

H ea vy ra ins on t he 23c1 a nd 24t h ha d

t urned Fight er 1 int o a mud bog, a nd a t

(B OO P ist ol P et e opened up a ga in on

H enderson t o fire a t t en-minut e int erva ls

unt il 1100. Wit h C a ct us fliers t hus eff ec-

t ively grounded, enemy pla nes from

Ra ba ul t ook a dva nt a ge of t his, a nd t he

fir st fa ir w ea t her in t hr ee da ys, by a t tem pt -

ing t o give t he J a pa nese count er offen sive

some sembla nce of t he coordina tion t ha t

G enera ls S umiyoshi a nd Ma ruya ma ha d

muffed. Likew ise st rong enemy na va l

forces, t o be enga ged next da y in t he B at -



t he J a pa nese pla ns. NTasu bore t he brunt

of t he effor t w it hout a ssist a nce t o h is r ight

w here t he second a ssa ult ing column w -a s

t o ha ve st ruck. C olonel S hoji, w it h K aw a -

guchi’s former comma nd, ha d st ra yed out

t le of S a nt a C ruz, w ere know n t o be a p-

proa ching, a nd ea rly in t he morning t hree

<J a pa nese dest royers, a s bold a s t he Zeros

overhea d, ca vort ed int o S ea la rk C ha nnel

t o ch a se of ~ t w o Am er ica n d es tr oy er -t r a ns -

336 P EARL H ARB OR TO G LTAD ALC AA’AL

t w ice,” a nd L un gs d efen der s n ot con nect ed

w it h C a ct us oper a tion s p]im bed ou t of t heir

foxholes t o w a tcht he clogfight s w hich be-

ga n a ft er Fight er 1 dr ied enough t o Wp-

pOr t t a keot fs. Th es e . im er ica n planes

w ere a ble t o go up a t 1430 t o meet a 16-

bomber st r ike from Ra ba ul a nd ha mper

t his a tt ack; a nd a nine-pla ne bom bing r aid

a t , 1 500 d um ped it s explosives on (len em l

G eiger ’s boneya r do fdisca rdedw reeks. I t

I va s 1730 befor e C on dit ion R ed ]ift eclj but

a ft er get t ing a irborne t he C a ct us fliers

hld given a good a ccount of t hemselves.

For t he second t ime in t l~ ree da ys (’a p-

t a in F oss sh ot d ow n four J a pa nese fig ht er s,

r rn d a ll ot her m em ber s of t he G ua da lca na l

flying force w orked so w ell t o ma ke up for

t ime lost during t he w et morning t ha t 22

enemy pla nes ha cl been dow ned by la t e

afternoon. Tln-ee Am erica n pla nes, butno fliers, w ere lost in t he a ct ions. .And

w hile t he F4 J VS were Lat t lillg t h e ze ros

S13D’S a nd 1>–39’s w ent off t o t he nort h

t o a tt a ck m lurking J a pa nese na va l force.

ma de visua l cont a ct w it h t he left (ea st )

fla nk of (’olonel H a nn eken ’s 2d B a tt a lion ,

7t h Ma rines w hich ext ended from 3/7’s

da ljgling fla nk nea r t he Ma ta nika u ba ck

t ow ard t he I .unga per imet er . I t w as clea r

t ha t Ma ruya ma w a it ed in t he jungle t o

la unch a not her a tt a ck in t he big count er-

ot ieusive, a nd t he I .unga defenders w ere

det ermined t o ha ve st ronger posit ions

rea dy t o meet him t his t ime.

I n sljit e of his losses t he pr evious night ,

Ma l’lly anla st ill ba d n la npow er sufficien t

t o build it bet t er a t t a ck a @nst t he h f:t -

rines a nd sold ier s, but , h e som eh ow ga in ed

some fa ult -y int elligence w hich kept t he

~ f ’h oji (li’t ~ u w qv ch i) F or Qe id le f or a s econ d

nig]~t. Th e in t ellig en ce ca u sed M a ru ya r na

t o expect a 1“. S . count era tt ack on his right

(ea st ) fla nk, a nd he sent S hoji, w ho ha d

got tel~ lost in t he w et da rkn ess of t he fir st

a ssa ult , t o smeel~ t he fli~ nk w hile Na su’s

J9th I r i fan t~y a nd t he 16t h I n.fml t ry (pre-

viously t he Ma ruya rna reserve) ma de

rea dy t o ca rry t he new a ssa ult .



They sa nk a dest royer a nd put a cr~ liser

ou t of a ct ion .

Mea nw hile, in t he reorga niza t ion of

lines sout h of B loody Ridge, Lieut ena nt

.ift er da rk (on 25 Oct ober), t he ,J a pa -

nese repea ted t he pa tt ern of a t t a ck used

t he previous night . Wit h only ma chine

guns t o :Lugmellt t heir h a ncl-ca r ried w ea p -

OUS grollps of from 20 t o 200 soldiers

.TAPAN’ESE C’OVA’TEROFI’ESSIVE 3:37

ca ll lil~ es t hrough out t he night w hile

fa r t her t o t he w est C olonel oka (w hose

t roops pr oba bly h adbeen t l~ ose spot ted o]~

N 1ol ll lt . ku st ell ’s s lcjl J e sol 1230ct ob er ) s en t

his force + ga inst t h e t hin line of 2/7.

Th is Ma rine bcct ta lion ha d been under m--

t illery fire (from t he Kokumbonz a rea )

t h rou gh ou t t h e cla y , s niper s 21s 0 ha d s cor ed

some America n ca sua lt ies, a nd now from

2130 t o 2,300 i t w a s ja rred by t hree st rong

a t t a cks w hich Oka ma de in ba t t a lion

st ren gt h. The w eigh t of t he a tt a cks fellmost ly hea vily on C ompa ny F on t he left

fla n k of H a nn eken ’s lin e.~ ~ l}t il nlidnight t h ese t h rust s w ere

t hrow n ba ck, but a t 0300 a n a ssa ult sw ept

over t he Ma rine compa n y. E nfila din g

fire from n ea rby foxholes of C ompa ny G

fa iled t o dislodge t he ,J a pa nese, a nd t hey

t ook over C ompa n y F ’s high groun d. I n

t h e h a ze of mornin g some 150 J a pa nesecou ld b e ob ser ved in F /$2/7 f ox holes f ir in g

America n ma ch in e guns a t a dja cent Ma -

r ine emplacements.

America n fight ing ma n. H a d t he envelop-

ing ,J a pa nese successfully n egot ia ted t he

Ma ruya ma Tra il w it h t h eir mort a rs a ncl

a rt illery , a nd ha d t he ,J a pa nese ma na ged

over -a ll coor din a tion , t he ba t tle m ig ht w ell

l~ a ve h ad a different out come. At lea st t h e

,J a pa nese w ould ha ve t a ken a hea vier t oll

of America ns a nd might w ell h ave effect ed

ser ious pen et ra t ion of t he perimet er . B ut

t h ese errors formed t h e foun da t ion of a

gr isly monument of fa ilure: some 3,500

,J a p a nes e s old ier s d ea d , in clu din g C ~ en er a lLNa SLI n d h is regiment al comma nders-

C olonel F urumiya (f29t h In fw nt ry) a nd

C olon el H iroya su (16t h Znfa nt ~ y). I t w as

a bea ten a nd disorga nized J a pa nese force

w hich bega n w it hdra win g inla nd durin g

t h e m or nin g of 26 O ct ob er .’s

B y con t ra st > a lt hough records a re

sket chy or n onexist ent , America n losses

w ere fa r less: proba bly a round 300 dea d

a n d w ou nd ed, in cludin g t hose h it , b y sh ell-

ing a ncl b ombing. The 164t h In fa nt ry sus-

t a ined 26 killed a nd 52 w oun ded (durin g



Ma jor Odell M. (’onoley , 2/7 execut ive

officer , led a jury-r igged coun t era tt ack

force of hea dq ua rt ers t roops a ga inst t hese

,J a pa nesel a nd h e w as join ed by a pla toon

from C ompa ny C , 5t h Ma rines ;md by per-

a ll of Oct ober), it l~ d t he 2d B at t alion, 7t h

Ma rin es lost 30 dea d in it s a ct ion a ga inst

O ka ’s ,J a p a nes e. No figu res a re a va ila ble

on los ses of 1/7, bu t ev id en ce in dica t es t ha t

t hese proba bly dicl n ot much exceed 100



J AP AN ES E C OL TN TE R OF FE NS I VE 339

a n d w hile C olon el Okcc’s br ief pen et ra t ion

of 2/7’s line st ill w as t w o hours a w a y, a n

Am er ica n pa t rol pla ne sout hea st of (}ua cl-

a lca na l repor t ed sight ing element s of a

la rge J a pa nese fleet in t he w at ers nea r t he

S a nt a C ruz Isla nds. These ships com-

prised a not her pa rt of t he “coordina ted”

, J a p a n es e ccjl ll lt el .ot ie ll si ~ ~ e . ~ i d n~ i r a l I t on -

d o of t l~ e i S er on d Fkt a n d Aclr nir a l N a gu -

n looft he 7’1i~ ” d F leet lla clt e:~ m eclllp w it h

four ca rriers a nd four ba tt leships, eight

cr uis er s, 28 d es t roy er s, a n d s uppor t in g v es -

sels; a nd t hey w ere st a nding by t o st ea m

int o ,S ea la rk C ha nnel w hen t hey got t he

“B onza i” signa l t ha t H enderson Field ha d

been reca pt ured. 20 Mea nw hile t hey

g ua r ded a ga in st Am er ica n r ein for cem en ts

or cou nt er mea su res fr om t he sou th .

Refir Admira l Thom as (~ . K inka id, t hen

nort hea st of t he New H ebricles w it h t l)e

E n ter ]mk and H olnef ca r rier g rou ps ,

moved t o i~ t t a ck. .\ t 0650 on 26 October

t w o m or e obser va t ion pla nes spot ted J a pa -

n es e ca r rier s 200 miles nort hea st of t he

, J a p a n es e a i rcr a f t . Ot h er f lig ht s f ollow ed

fr om b ot h f or ces .

Like some of t he previous P acific na va l

ba tt les, it w as a n a ir-a ir a nd a ir-surfa ce

afia ir . The opposing ships dicl not close

for sllr fa ce fight ing. Tw ent y l-. S . pla nes

w ere lost t o enemy a ct ion a nd 54 t o ot her

ca uses. Th e ,J a pa nese lost 100 pla nes.

The fa t e of U S S H wnet i s a n exa m ple

of t he d esper :l t e fight in g w hich t ook pla ce

during t he S a nt a C ruz ba t t le. La med by

a st a rboa rd bomb hit , t he ca rrier next

ca ught a spect a cula r suicide cra sh a s t he

. J a pa n es e s qlm dr on lea d er ’s w ou nd ecl ph me

gla nced ot f her st a ck a nt i burst t hrough

t ile flight deck w here t w o of t he pla ne’s

bombs exp loded . ,J a pa ]lese “K at es” t hen

bore in on t he ca rrier t o la unch t heir t or-

pedoes from low a st ern. TWO exploded in

el~ g in eer in g s pa ces ? a n d t he s hip, clou ded

by t hick smoke a ncl st ea m, lur ched t o st ar-

boa rd. I )ea d in t he w a t er , she t hen t ook

t hree more bomb hit s. One exploded on

t he flight deck, a not her a t t he fourt h deck,



.~ merica n force a t a bout t he sa me t ime

,J a pa nese pla nes w ere sight ing t he IT. S .

ships.

.I ir a ct ion bega n a lmost a t once. ,Ta p:t -

nese ca rrier Zuiho w ccs h it in l~ er st er n by

a nd t he t hird below t he fourt h deck in a

for w ar d m ess in g com pa r tm en t.

As if t ha t w ere not enough, a bla zing“I <a te”’ deliber at ely cr asllecl t hr ough t he

port forw a rd gun ga llery a nd exploded


was so ba dly ma uled t ha t she sfiw no more t hough cont rol of S out h P acific w at ers st ill

a ct ion for n ine m ont hs. ha d not been resolved, t he loss of pla ]les

h’ot defea ted, but hea ring of t he .I rm y”s was a ser ious blow t o .J i ~pi t] :I II d one t l ~ a t ,

f a ilu re ol~ (}~ m d a lc: ma lj t h e ,J a pa n es e n a va l w a s t o a id t he .\ llie{l fleet w it hin a few

force w it hdrew a t t he end of t he da y. Al- w eeks. A bigger na va l ba t tle w a s br ew ing.



CH APTER 8

Critical November

I f Tokyo by now rea lized t h a t one of her

lon g t en ta cles of con qu est h acl been a ll but

per ma nen tly pin ch ec] off un less t he S olo-

mons inva ders w ere a t la st t a ken in I ll

s er iou sn es s, t he cr it ica l G u a da lca m d s it ua -

t ion likew ise w as get t ing more a ct ive a t-

t ent ion in Wa sh ingt on. on 18 oct ober

Admira l G horrnley h a d been relieved of

kS out h P acific Area comma nd by t he a g-

gressive Admira l Willia m F . H alsey , ,J r .,

a nd a lmost immedia t ely t he new com-

ma nder w a s a llot ted more fight ing ml~ scle

t o b a ck h is a g gr es si ve nes s. ’

Ten da ys a ft er H alsey a ssumed his new

comma nd, t he Ma rine C orps est ablisheci

a supra -eche]on st a ff for coordina tion of

a ll Fleet Ma rine Force unit s in t he S out h

P acific. Ma jor G enera l C la yt on B . ~ ~ ogel

l~ ea ded t his n ew ly or ga nized I Mmin e An ~ -

a nd t he llnhea lt hy t ropics. H alsey prom-

ised Va ndegrift a ll t h e support he C OU IC 1

must er in his a rea , a nd t he a chnira l a lso

r eq uest ed a ddit ion al h elp from Nimit z a nd

f rom Wa s h in gt on .

S hort ly a ft er t his con fer en ce t he Ma rin e

C omma nda nt , G enera l H olcomb, w ho h a d

conduct ed his observa tions of t he Ma rine

ln ~ it s in a ct ion on G ua da lca na l, sought t o

clea r L Ip t ]le comma nd cont roversy be-

t w een G enera l Va nciegrift a nd Admira l

Turner. H olcomb prepa red for Admira l

K ing, t he. C hief of N-a va l Opera tions, a

dispa t ch in w hich he set for t h t he prin-

ciple t ha t t he la nding force comma nder

should be on t he sa me connn a ncl level a S

t he n ava l t a sk for ce comm an der a n d sh oL Ild

ha ve unrest rict ed] a ut horit y over opera -

t ion s n sh ore. I Iolcom b t hen used h is .goocl



l)h ibiou s C or l)s w it h hea dq ua r t ers a t

Xoumea . H e exercised no t act ica l con trol

over t he G ua da lca na l opera tion ; his st a ff

w:Ls con cer ned on ly w it h a dm in ist ra t ive

ma t t ers. ~ nd it w ould not be unt il la t er

ot lices t o get Admira l H a lsey t o sign t his

dispa tch. The Ma rine C omnla nda nt t hen

st a rt ed ba rk t o t h e S t a tes, a nd a t Nimit z’

ot lice in P ea rl H arbor he a ga in crossed t he

pa th of t he dispa tch lle ha d prepnred for


sh eph er ded Ma rin e (’or ps t hinkin g on t his

import a nt ma tt er a cross t he P acific t o it s

fir st ser ious con sifler at ion by t he t op n~ ili-t a r y h ier a r ch y .’

Aside from t he genera ] policy t ha t {li-

rect ed America ’s ma jor w ar effort t ow a rd

Na zi G erma ny during t his period, t he

S out h P a cific w a s not intent ional]y

slighted. B ut a s Rea r .idmira l S a muel E .

Morison point s out , Wa shingt on a t t his

t ime ha d it s ha nds full:

Our predica men t in t he S olomons w a s mor e

t ha n ma t ch ed by tha t ca used by t h e G er ma n sub-

ma rines, w hich , dur in g t he mon t h of Oct ober ,

sa nk 88 ships a nd 5S 3,.710 tons in t h e At la nt ic.

Th e Nort h Afr ica n ven t ure w a s a lrea dy a t sea :

B rit ish forces in E gypt st ill h a d t o be supplied by

t he C a l)e of G ood H ope :I ])d S uez rout e. G ua diil-

ca na l ha d t o be fit t ed by t h e J oin t C hiefs of S t a ff

in to a w orldw ide st ra tegic pa nora ma , but G ua da l-

cw na l could be reinforced on ly by dra w in g on

forces or igina lly commit t ed t o t he build-up int he U nit ed K ingflom ( Opera t ion “B olero”) for

a cross-ch:a nn el opera t ion in 1943. Genera l

.I rn oid w ish ed t o concen t ra t e a ir forces in

E urope for t h e st ra t egic bombin g of G er ma n y ;

Admira l K in S a nd G en era l Ma cArt h ur a rgued

tiglitingg.I ke S cleni oper at ion , m uch d og-

ea red fr om per pet ua l sh ufflin g in t he pen d-

i]~ g t ile> t illa lly ’ w a s scr apped by H a lsey,a ]](l t ile 1st B at ta lion, 147t b Infa nt ry, t he

la t est out t it t o ~ ti~ rt t he Ncleni job, w as

ca lled ot f it s collrse t o t he sitIl t~ Ch-uz

isla nds a n(] divert ed t o (lua da lca na l.

ot her ba t t a l ions of t he 147t h regiment

follow-cd.

.11s0 sch ed uled t o r ein for ce t he gen er al

G ua da lca na l effort w ere C olonel Richa rd

H . .J e schke’s 8t li Ma rines fr om Am er ica nS anloa , t wo compa nies ((Y a nd E ) of C olo-

nel E va ns F. C a rlson’s 2d Ra ider B a t -

t a lion: a clet a chment of t he ilt h D efense

B at t a lion, P rovisiona l B at t ery K (w it h

B rit ish 25-pounders) of t he Am erica l D i-

vision’s 246t h Field Art illery B a tt alion,

5(00 Sea bees, t w o ba t ter ies of 155n ~ m g un s,

a (ldit iona l .I rmy a rt illery unit s, a nd de-

t achment s of t he 9t h I)efense B at t alion.The old G ua cia lca na l shoest r ing from

w hich t he opera tion ha cl da ngled for t hree

crit ica l mont hs w -a s being bra ided int o a

s tr on g cor d.



ilga inst risking disa st er in t he S olom ons a nd New

Guinea in order t o prm-ide for t h e e~ ent unlit y of

a fut ure opera tion in E urope. I ’resident Roose-

velt broke t he dei~ (l lf~ k on 24 Ort ober by sendin g

a st rong messa xe t o ea ch member of t he .Toin t

The t wo l&5mm gun ba tt eries-one Ma -

rine a ncl t l~ e ot her .irmy 5—la nded in t he

I ,u ng a per im et er on 2 Novem ber t o pr ovid e

t he first effect i~ e w ea pons for a nsw ering

C RI TI CAL NOVE MB ER 343

t he comma nd of ( ‘olonel n’. 13. Tut t le,

comma nder of t he 147t h I llfa nt ryj t his

force la nded on 4 h’o~ ember a t .401a B aya bout 40 miles ea st of t he Lul~ ~ ii. There,

over t he object ions of Va ndegr ift a nd

ot her s, Tut tle’s com ma nd w a s t o con st ruct

a n ew a i rf ie ld .’)

G eiger ’s C a ct us Air Force a lso grew

w hile Va ndegrift a dded t o his ma n pow er

on t he ground. J a pa nese polmding under

t he Oct ober count eroffensive ha d a ll but

put t he (lua da lca na l fliers out of a ct ion;on X oct ober, a ft er D ugout S unda y, C a c-

t us ha d only 30 pla nes ca pa ble of get ting

int o t he a ir . 7 B ut in t he lull of a ct ion fol-

low ing t he defea t of G enera l H ya kut a ke

a nd t he w it hdra wa l of t he J a pa nese na va l

force from t he B at t le of S a nt a C ruz, C a c-

t us ground crew s ha d a cha nce t o do some

repa ir s, a nd more pla nes bega n t o a rrive a t

H en der son F ield .Lieut ena nt Colonel Willia m O. B rice

brought his MAG -11 t o N’ew C aledonia on

30 Oct ober, a nd in t he next t w o da ys pa rt s

of Ma jor J oseph S a iler , J r .’s . vNIs13-

N ovem ber t her e w er e 1,748 m en in G u ad a l-

ca na l’s a via t ion unit s, 1)557 of t hem

M a r in es .’+ ‘.\ s t hese fresh t roops a nd fliers ca me

a sh or e, t he vet er ans of G ua d:dca na l’s da rk

ea rly da ys w ere ofl on a n expedit ion t o t he

w est . IYit h t he ,J a pa nese reeling ba ck

from t heir defea t of la t e Oct ober, t he

Ma rin es sough t t o dislod ge t he en em y com -

l)let ely from t he K okum bona -P oha River

a rea some five a nd a ha lf miles w est of t he

Ma ta nika u. once clea red from t his a rea ,w here t he isla nd’s nort h cot lst bends

sha rply nort hw est t ow a rd C a pe E sper-

a nce, t he ,J a pa nese P ist ol P et es w ould be

beyond ra nge of H enderson Field, a nd t he

Ma rines a nd soldiers could possibly m eet

,J a pa nese r ein for cem en ts fr om t he Toky o

E xpr ess befor e a n ot her bu ild up could m us -

t er st rengt h for a new ma jor effor t a ga inst

t h e p er i met er . U nder C olonel E dson, t heforce on t his opera t ion included t he

colonel’s 5t h Ma rin es, t he 2d Ma rin es (less

3}2 ), a nd a n ew Wh aling G r oup consist ing

of t he scout -snipers a nd t he 3d B a tt alion,



13 2 a nd Ma jor P a ul Font anz’s vMF-2’11

repor t ed Llpt o C ha da lca na l. (h ~ Novem-

ber B riga dier G enera l Louis E . MToods

a ssum ed comm and a t C act us, a nd G enera l

7t h M a r in es. The llt ll Ma rines a nd Army

a rt i]lery ba tt alions, C a ct us fliers, engi-

neers> a nd bomba rdment ships w ere in

suppor t . (S ee Ma p 24)

344 P EARL H ARB OR TO G UAD ALC AhTAL

r ines ha d come a cross from Tula gi; g a nd shelled bv cruisers S a n Francisco a nd

t he engineers w ere rea dy w it h t h:ir fuel- Helena a id d es tr oy er Sterrett wh i le P –39’s



drum floa ts a nd ot her bridging ma teria l

for t he cr ossing sit es.

C ompa nies A, C , a nd D of t he 1st E n-

gineer B a tt alion const ruct ed t he bridges

during t he night of 31 Oct ober, a nd by

a nd S B D ’S from H enderson F ield a nd

B -17’s from E spir it u S a nt o st ra fed a nd

b o m b e d J apa nese posit ions a round

Kokumbona.

Ma rines of 2/5 a dva nced a ga inst lit tle


a ga p w hich opened bet ween t hese a tt ack-

i ng comp a n ies. Th e opposit ion h eld fir m,

how ever , a n d C ompa ny C , ha rdest hit in

t he first cla sh w it h t he ent renched J a pa -

nese, ha d t o w it hdra w . The C ompa ny B

comma nder, t rying t o fla nk posit ions

w hich ha d pla gued t he w it hdr aw n unit , led

a 10-m a n pa t rol in a n en velopin g m a neuver

w hich skirt ed behind C ompa ny C , but t his

pa t rol a lso suffer ed h ea vy ca sua lt ies a nd it ,

t oo, w as forced t o w it hdra w. E dson t hen

commit t ed his reserve, a nd C ompa nies I

a nd K of 3/5 (Ma jor Robert O. B ow en)

ca me up t o t he ba se of P oint C ruz on a line

bet ween 1/5 a nd t he coa st . This put a Ma -

rine front t o t he ea st a nd sout h of t he

J a pa nese pocket ; but t he enemy held, a nd

t he Ma rines h alt ed for t he nigh t.

Next . morning (2 November) E dson’s

2d B a t t a lion (Ma jor Lew is W. Wa lt )

ca me t o t he a ssist a nce of t he regiment ’s

ot her t w o ba t t a lions, a nd t he enemy w as

t hus ba cked t o t he bea ch just w est of P oint

C ruz a n d enga ged. on t he ea st , w est , a nd

sout h. The Ma rines pounded t he J a pa nese

Fina l reduct ion of t he J a pa nese st rong-

hold bega n a t 0800 on 3 November . C om-

pa nies E a nd G of 2/5 first a ssa ult ed t o

compress t he enemy int o t he. nor t hea st

corner of t he pocket , a nd t his a t t a ck w as

follow ed by a dva nces of C ompa ny F of

2/5 a nd C ompa nies I a nd K of 3/5. J a p-

a nese r esist a nce en ded sh or tly a ft er n oon.

At lea st 300 enemy w ere killed; 12 a nt i-

t an k 37m m’s, a field piece, a nd 34 m ach in e

g un s w er e ca pt u red .

I t seemed t ha t t his success should a t

la st help pa ve t he w a y for pushing on

t o K okumbona , t he const a nt t horn in t he

side of Lunga defenders a nd long a mili-

t a ry object iv e of t he per im et er -r es tr ict ed

Ma rines. F rom t here t he enemy w ould be

driven a cross t he P oha River, H ender son

Field w ould be beyond rea ch of P ist ol

P et e, a nd t he J a pa nese w ould ha ve one

less w ea pon a ble t o bea r on t heir effor t s

t o ground t he C a ct us fliers. B ut t he frus-

t ra t ing Tokyo E xpress a ga in qua shed

Ma r ine a mbit ions. The E xpress ha d



w it h a hea ’vy a rt illery a nd mort ar prepa -

ra tion, a nd la te in t he a ft er noon la unched

a n a tt a ck t o compress t he enemy pocket .

C ompa nies I a nd K st opped short a ~ ~ inst

shift ed it s t ermina l ba ck t o t he ea st of

t he perimet er , a nd a not her buildup w as

t a king pla ce a round Koli P oint .

The 8t h Ma rines w a s not due in S ea la rk

C ha nnel unt il t he next da y (a nd t here w as


im por ta n t d ecis ion , a nd on 26 Oct ober

C a pt ain Toshika zu Ohma e, Chief of S ta ff

of t he Sou theastern F l eet , ca me dow n t oG ua da lca na l from Ra ba ul t o see w ha t

G enera l H ya kut ake proposed t o do a bout

it . And w hile H ya kut a ke ha d been proud

a nd confident . w hen he rea ched G ua da l-

ca na l on 9 Oct ober, Ohma e reflect ed Ra -

ha ul’s current mood w hich ha d been m uch

da mpened during t he mont h. The coLm-

t eroffensive fa iled, Ohma e believed, be-

ca use H ya kut ake bungled by not ca rryingout a tt acks a ccording t o schedule a nd be-

ca use t he Army did not underst and prob-

lems fa cing t he fleet . “The Na vy lost

ships, a irpla nes a ncl pilot s w hile t rying

t o give snpport t o t he la nd a ssa ult w hich

w a s cont inua lly dela yed,” Ohma e sa id

la ter in r espon se t o int er roga tions.l”

On ) Oct ober H ya kut ake’s a ppet it e ha d

been set for P ort Moresby; G ua da lca na lw a s but a bot hersome bit of folia ge t o be

brushed a side a long t he w ay, a nd t he g-en-

era l ha d t he bulk of his 38t h D ivision a nd

ot her r es er ves , plu s q ua nt it ies of su pplies,

to divert his reserves t o a new a ssa ult

a ga inst \ 7a ndegrift a nd t he H enderson

flier s on t he ba nks of t he L un ga .This t ime, t hough, t hings w ould be

conduct ed different ly . Ra ther t ha n lurk-

ing in w a it of successes a shore, t he im-

per i a l PZeet w ould run t he show . Ohma e’s

chief, Admira l Isor oku Ya nnunot o, com-

ma nder of t he Com bi n ed Z V eet , wa n t ed

H ya kut a ke’s uncommit t ed t roops of t he

38th Diu ion 13 t o la nd a t Koli P oint so

t he Am erica ns w ould be w orried a nd splitby forces on bot h sicles of t hem. H igh-

speed a rmy vessels w ould t ra nsport t hese

t J a pa nese t roops dow n The S lot under

escort of t he Tokyo E xpress. Then Ya ma -

mot o’s bomba rdment ships a nd J a pa nese

fliers w ould knock out H enderson Field

once a nd for a ll, a nd H ya kut a ke could

la nd more t roops a nd finish off a ba tt ered

defensive ga rrison w hich w ould ha ve noa i r s upp or t .

I t w a s a bold pla n, but t here w ere some

a pa nese officers w ho t hought t ha t it w as

not pa rt icula rly w ise. .idrnira l Ta na ka ,



in Ra ba ul a nd t he S hor t ha nds rea dy t o

plunge sout h w hen t he a irfield a t Lungs

w as plucked from t he S olomons vine like

a ripe gra pe. B ut now “t he sit ua t ion w a s

t ha t vet era n of ma ny dist ressing hours in

The S lot , w a s one of t hese. H e ha d sug-

gest ed a ft er t he Oct ober defea t t ha t de-

fenses should be pulled ba ck closer t o

C RI TI CAL NOVE MB ER

C olonel S hoji a lrea dy w a s a t Koli P oint

w it h his vet era ns of t he oct ober a ssa ult

a ga inst B loody Ridge, a nd ot her ,J a pa nese

t roops now ma de rea dy t o join him t here.

H ya kut a ke pla nned t o build a n a irfield

t here so ,J a pa nese pla nes could be more

effect ive during t he N“ovember a tt acks.

B ut w hile E dson a n d J Vha ling fought

t heir a ct ion t o t he w est a round P oint C ruz,

a Ma rine ba tt a lion ma rched out t o t he ea st

a nd st epped int o t he middle of H ya ku-

t a ke’s pla n s t h er e.

On 1 November, t he sa me da y E dson

a nd VVha ling crossed t heir foot bridges

w est w ard over t he Ma ta nika u, division

sent Lieut ena nt C olonel H erma n H . H an-

neken’s 2d B at t a lion, 7t h Ma rines out t o

invest iga te report s of J a pa nese a ct ivit ies

t o t he ea st . H a nneken t rucked his men t o

t he Tena ru River t ha t da y, a nd on 2 No-

vember t he ba tt alion ma de a forced ma rch

a cross t he ba se of K oli P oint t o t he Met a -

pona River, a bout 13 miles ea st of t he

perimet er . Int elligence ha d it t ha t t he

347

t hey w ere ca rrying out init ia l pla ns of

t he Imper ia l Army a nd N“a vy for t he

build up t o t he ea st .

Ra in ha d put C olonel H anneken’s ra dio

out of commission, a nd he could not con-

t a ct division w it h informa t ion of t his

la ndin g. Th e Ma rin es held t heir posit ion s

t ha t night but moved t o a tt a ck next . morn-

ing a ft er a n eight -ma n J a pa nese pa t rol

a pproa ched t heir line by t he Met s.pona .

Ma rines killed four members of t his pa -

t rol, a nd t he ba t t a lion t hen moved up t o

fire 81mm mort ars int o t he enemy’s la nd-

ing sit e. This brought no immedia te re-

sponse, but a s H anneken?s infa nt rymen

prepa red t o follow t his mor t a r prepa ra -

t ion a la rge force of Imperia l soldiers

ma neuvered t o fla nk t he Ma rines w ho be-

ga n a lso t o dra w mort a r a nd a rt illery fire.

In t he fa ce of t his coordina t ed a t t a ck by

t he J a pa nese, 2/7 w it hdr ew , figh tin g a r ea r

gua rd a ct ion a s it pulled ba ck t o t a ke up

st ronger posit ions on t he w est ba nk of t he

Na limbiu River, some 5,000 ya rds w est of

t h e M et a p on a .



,J a pa nese ha d not yet been a ble t o build

up much st rengt h here, a nd H a nneken;s

mission w a s t o keep t hings t ha t w a y, On

t he night of 2 November he deployed his

D uring t he w it hdra w a l, H a nneken

ma na ged t o ma ke ra dio cont a ct w it h t he

C P a t Lunga . H e report ed his sit ua tion,


Cruisers S an F r an ci sco a nd H elena a nd

destroyers Sterrett a nd Lan.sdowrw shelled

likely t a rget a rea s ea st of t he Ma rine

ba tt alion, a nd pla nes ra nged overhea d in

va in sea rches for signs of t he enemy.

C om mun ica t ion s st ill w er e non e t oo good,

how ever, a nd element s of 2/7 w ere a cci-

dent a lly st ra fed a nd bombed by some of

t he first pla nes t ha t ca me out from Ca ct us.

Mea nw hile, division ha d m ade t he deci-

sion t o concent ra te m ore force a ga inst t he

evident buildup t o t he ea st . The w est ern

a t t a ck t hen in progress w ould be ca lled

ba ck w hile G enera l Rupert us, due t o come

a cross S ea la rk Cha nnel from Tula gi, w ent

t o Koli P oint w it h C olonel S ims of

t he 7t h Ma rines, a nd S ims’ 1st B at t alion

(P uller). And t o t he effort s of t his regi-

ment (less it s 3d B at t a lion), Va ndegrif t

a dded t he 164t h Infa nt ry (less 1st J 3a t -

t a lion) w hich w ould ma rch overla nd t o

envelop t he Koli P oint enemy from t he

sout h. Art illery ba tt eries of t he 1st B at -

t alion, 10t h Ma rines w ould be in genera l

support.

qua rt ers.” And t o a dd even more t roops

t o t his concent ra tion of effor t t o t he ea st ,

Va ndegrift obt ained relea se of C arlson’s

2d Ra id er B a tt a lion fr om C olonel Tut tle’s

comma nd a t Aola B a y, a nd ordered it t o

ma rch overla nd t ow a rd Koli P oint a nd

cut off a ny J a pa nese w ho might flee ea st

from t he envelopment of t he 7t h Ma rines

a n d t he 164t h I nfa n tr y.

On 4 November t he J a pa nese on t he ea st

ba nk of t he Na limbiu did not seriously

t hrea t en t he Ma rines on t he w est , but

G en er a l R uper tu s h eld d efen sive posit ion s

w hile a w a it ing t he a rriva l of t he 164t h

Infa nt ry. The soldiers, w eight ed dow n

by t heir hea vy pa cks, w ea pons, a nd a mm u-

nit ion, rea ched t heir first a ssembly a rea

on t he w est ba nk of t he Na limbiu inla nd a t

a bout noon. There t he regiment a l C P

bivoua cked for t he night w it h t he 3d B at -t a lion w hile t he 2d B at t a lion pushed on

som e 2,000 y ar ds dow nst rea m t ow a rd K oli

Point.

hText d ay t he 3d B a tt alion, 164t h cr ossed



B y dusk of 3 November t he 2d B a t -

t alion, 7t h Ma rines rea ched t he w est ba nk

of t he Na limbiu River nea r t he bea ch a t

Koli P oint , a nd t here G enera l Rupert us

t he river a bout 3,500 ya rds upst rea m a nd

a dva nced a long t he ea st ba nk t ow ard t he

Japanese. The 2d B a t t a lion likew ise

crossed t he river a nd follow ed it s sist er


Act ion on 6 h’ovember likew ise fa iled

t o fix t he J a pa nese in solid opposit ion, a l-

t hough t he 7t h Ma rin es cr ossed t he Na lim -

biu a nd moved ea st w ard a long t he coa st ,

a nd t he 164t h Infa nt ry found a n a ba n-

doned enemy bivoua c fa rt her inla nd.

Mea nw hile, C ompa ny B of t he 8t h Ma -

rines, just a shore on t he isla nd, moved ea st

t o join t he a t t a cking forces a s did regi-

m ent al hea dq ua rt ers a nd t he Ant it ank a nd

C C ompa nies of t he 164t .h Infa nt ry . The

com bin ed for ce t hen a d va n ced t o posit ion s

a mile w est of t he Met a pona River a nd

t here dug in for t he night , t he Ma r ines

nea r t he bea ch t o gua rd a ga inst . a n ex-

pect ed ,J a pa nese la nding t ha t did not

materialize.

L“nknow n t o Ma r ines a nd Army com-

ma nders, t he sit ua t ion w as shift ing be-

ca use of new cha nges in t he J apa nese

pla ns. D uring t he night of 5–6 November

t he enemy bega n t o ret ire ea st w ard from

posit ions fa cing t he Ma rines a cross t he

Na limbiu, a nd w hen t he U . S . force

st opped w est of t he Met a pona t he J a pa -

of Gavaga C reek, a st rea m some 2,000

ya rds ea st of t he Met a pona River. The 2d

B at t alion, 164t h Infa nt ry w a s a tt ached t ot he 7t h Ma rines a s regiment al r eserve, a nd

t he com bined forces m oved ra pidly t o sur-

round t he J a pa nese. D ur ing t he a dva nce

G enera l Rupert us ret ired from t he a ct ion

w it h a n a tt a ck of dengue fever , a nd Va n-

degr ift pla ced G en er al S ebr ee in com ma nd

of t he ent ire opera tion. The 1st B a tt alion,

7t h Ma rines m et st iff r esist ance, a nd four

Ma rines w ere killed w hile 31, including

L ieut en ant C olon el P uller , w er e w oun ded.

Ma jor J ohn E . T1’eber next da y succeeded

t o com ma nd of t his ba t ta lion.

H anneken’s 2]7 moved a round t he J a p-

a nese t o t ake up posit ions ea st of t he cr eek

w it h it s r ight fla nk on t he bea ch. The

2d B at t a lion of t he 164t h Infa nt ry , com-

mit ted from reserve, t ied in on 2,/7’s left

(inla nd) fla nk, st ra ddled G ava ga C reek

sout h of t he ,J a pa nese, a nd t ied in w it h

t he right fla nk of t he 1st B a t t a lion 7t h

Marines. F rom t his point 1/7 ext ended

nort h t o t he bea ch a long t he w est side of



nese w ere ea st of t he river prepa ring rea r

gua rd defensive posit ions t ha t w ould a id

a genera l w it hdra w a l. G enera l H ya ku-

t a ke a nd Admira l Ya ma mot o on 3 or 4

t he J a pa nese posit ions, a nd t he ring w as

closed on t he enemy. J ~ 7it h t his a ct ion t o

t he ea st t hus st a bilized, division ca lled for

t he ret urn of t he 164t h Infa nt ry (less 2d


a n d F of t h e 164t h I n fa n t ry w ere un a ble

t o ma ke con t a ct a cross t he sw ampy creek.

Th is a ct ion con tin ued t hr ou gh 10 Novem -ber , w it h repea ted orders by G enera l S e-

bree for2/164t o close t he ga p a cr os s t he

creek. This w a s n ot done, how ever , a n d

t he, comma nder of 2/164 w as relieved on

10 November.

D uring t h e nigh t of 11–12 h ’ovember

m ost of t he enemy esca ped a long t he creek

to t he sout h . On 12 November t h e t hree

ba tt a lien s sw ept t h rough t h e a rea w heret h e J a pa nese h a d been t ra pped, met lit t le

opposit ion , a nd w it h drew t ha t a ft ernoon

a cross t ile Met apona River . Ma rin es est i-

ma ted t h a t, t he a ct ion h a d cost t he en emy

approximately 4-50 dead. About 40

America ns w ere killed a nd 120 w oun ded.

Mea n w hile, C olon el C a r lson a n d h is

ra ider s, t ra veling cross-coun t ry t o K oli

P oint , en coun t ered t he rea r elemen t s oft he ret ir ing J a pa n ese. J oined by h is

C ompa nies B a nd F , a s w ell a s elemen t s of

C ompa ny D , C ar lson concen tra ted his ba t-

t a lion inla n d n ea r t h e na t ive villa ge of

men t fleet , a nd Admira l Mika vva of t he

E igh th F leet h a d st epped up his pla ns for

t h e buildup on t he w est side of t he Ma -rin e perimet er . On t he nigh t of 7 No-

vember Ta na ka sen t C a pt a in Tora jiro

S a to a n d h is D e~tr oyer D ivi si on 15 down

The S lot w it h a n a dva n ce un it of some

1,300 troops. Aft er eva ding a L’. S .

bomber a t t a ck in t h e a ft ernoon , t h ese

sh ips la nded t he t roops a t Ta ssa fa ron ga

sl~ or t ly a ft er midn igh t a nd t hen sped ba ck

nort h t o t h e sa fet y of t h e S h or t la n ds.ll~ hile t hese sh ips ca me nort h, t he secon d

shut t le w ent sout h from Ra ba ul t o t h e

S h ort la nds w it h t h e ma in body of t h e 3’8th

Div is ion. Tw o da ys la t er (on 10 h“ovem-

ber) 600 of t hese t roops un der Lieut ena nt

G en era l Ta da yoshi S a n o ma de t he move

from t h e S hort la n ds t o G ua da lca na l. Th e

con voy w a s heckled by U . S . pla n es a nd

P T boa t s, but t he t roops w ere la n ded

sa fely, a nd t h e ships ma de it ba ck t o t he

S hort ha nds on 11 November .”

BRI EF REN E?VAL OF



B inu a nd pa trolled t he surroundin g a rea .

D uring t he. a ft ernoon of 12 November t he

ra iders bea t ot f five a tt a cks by t w o J a pa -

n ese com pa nies. S ca tt ered a ct ion s t ook

WELSTERAT A T T ’A CK

Mea nw hile C olon el Ar th ur ’s 2d Ma rin es

(less 3/2), a ugmen ted by t he 8t h Ma rines


Division) to ma neuver inla nd a nd fla nk

t he Am er ica n a dva nce.

B ut before I to could st rike—a nd befor et he America ns w ere a wa re of his t hrea t—

G enera l Va ndegrift a ga in ha d t o ca ll off

t he w est ern a tt a ck. On 11 3Tovember t he

t roops pulled ba ck a cr oss t he Ma ta nika u,

clest roy ed t heir bridges, a nd resum ed po-

sit ions a round t he Lungs perimet er . In-

t elligence sour ces ha d becom e a w ar e of t he

pla ns of H ya kut a ke a nd Ya ma mot o t o

mount a n ot her s tr on g cou nt er off en sive,a n d lTa ndegrift w a nt ed a ll ha nds a va il-

able.

I t did indeed a ppea r t ha t t he Lungs

per imet er w ould need a ll t he st rengt h it

cou ld m us ter . Ra ba ul w as nea rly rea dy

for a sh ow dow n, w inner t a ke a ll, a nd t het ime w a s now or never . The J a pa nese

w ere losing t heir best pilot s in t his S olo-

m on s a ct ion, a nd sh ippin g ca sua lt ies ]ike-

w ise w ere beginning t o t ell. At t he sa me

t ime Allied st rengt h in t he S out h P acific

ha mmer H enderson Field w hile Ta na ka

la nded t he soldiers. Yet a t hird J a pa nese

flot illa ra nged t he S olornons in genera lsuppor t . Not hing w as t o prevent t he 38th

Division from la nding w it h it s hea vy

eq uipment a nd w ea pons. The t roops

w ould be put a shore bet ween C a pe E sper-

a n ce a n d Ta s sa f a ron ga . 20

On 23 November t he 8t h Ma rines pa ssed

t hrough t he 164t h Infa nt ry t o a t t a ck t he

J a pa nese posit ions st ea dily t hroughout

t he da y . Aga in t here w a s no ga in, a ndt he America n force dug in t o hold t he line

confront ing t he st rong J a pa nese posi-

t ions. There t he a ct ion ha lt ed for t he

t ime w it h t he forces fa cing ea ch ot her a t

close qua rt ers. The 1st Ma rine D ivision

w as due for relief from t h e G ua da lca na l

a rea , a nd more t roops could not be a l-

lot ted for t he w est er n a ct ion.

On 29 November Admira l King a p-proved t he relief of Va ndegrift ’s division

by t he Mt h Infa n t ry D ivision t hen en

r out e from H aw a ii t o Aust ra lia . Th is d i-

vision w a s t o be shor t -st opped a t G ua da l-



w a s slow ly grow ing. I t w a s becoming a n

a wkw ard ba tt le, a nd J a pa n w as spendin g

a lt oget her t oo much t ime a nd ma teria l on

ca na l a nd t he Ma r ines w ould go t o Aus-

t ra l i a .

D uring t he per iod t ha t preceded t he

w it hdra w a l of t he 1st D ivision, t he la st

352 P E.ARL H ARB OR TO G U AD AI .C ANAL

but t he U . S . lost t he cruiser Northampton,

a nd t hree ot hers, t he ~~n.neapol~, NW-C

Orleams, a nd P erw acola , w ere seriously

damaged.

B ut J apa n’s da y of smoot h sa iling in

The S lot w a s over. 11’it h a reinforced

subm arine fleet of 24 boa ts, Admira l H al-

sey~ s comma nd ha d been prow ling t he

rout e of t he Tokyo E xpress t o dest roy or

da ma ge severa l enemy t ra nsport s. The

,J a pa nese edge in fight ing ships a lso w as

becoming less impressive. In a ddit ion t o

t h e ca r rier Enterpm”se, H alsey ha d a va il-

a ble t wo ba tt leships, t hree hea vy a nd one

light cr uiser s, a light a nt ia ir cr aft cr uiser ,

a nd 22 dest royers orga nized in t w o t a sk

forces.

The st rengt h of t he Lunga perimet er

w a s likew ise m uch im pr oved sin ce t he J a p-

a nese a t t a cks of la t e Oct ober. Arriva l

of fresh t roops ena bled a n ext ension of de-

fensive posit ions w est t o t he Ma ta nika u

a nd t he est a blishment of a st ronger line

a long t he sout hern (inla nd ) port ions of

t he infa nt ry ring a round H enderson

F ield. Th ese new posit ion s plus t he sh oot -

a rea w ould cover t he t roop movement . A

da y la t er (9 November) Admira l S cot t

st iiled from E spirit u S ant o w it h a supply

run for G ua da lca na l, a nd a da y a ft er t ha t

Admira l Ca lla gha n follow ed w it h his five

cr uis er s a n d t en d es tr oy er s.

E arly on 11 November (t he da y Va nde-

grift ca lled off his w est ern a dva nce)

S cot t’s t ra nsport s a rrived off Lunga Roa d

t c begin unloa ding. E nemy bombers

t w ice int errupt ed t he opera t ions, a nd

d am aged t he Betelgeuse, L ib ra , a n d Zei li n.

D a ma ge t o t he la tt er ship w as serious, a nd

she w as mot hered ba ck t o E spirit u S a nt o

by a dest roy er . Th e ot her t wo t ra nspor ts

r et ir ed a t 1800 t o I nd ispensa ble S tr ait . be-

t w een G ua da lca na l a nd Ma la it a, a nd la ter

joined Turner’s t ra nsport s. D uring t he

night Admira l C a lla gha n pa t rolled t he

\ .;a t er s o f S ea la r k C ha n nel.

Turner’s t ra nsport s w it h t he 182d In-

fa nt ry a rrived a t da wn on 12 November t o

begin un loa ding t roops a nd ca rgo. D urin g

t he morning t he Betelgewse a nd Libra

drew fire from nea r Kokumbona . The

t w o ships esca ped da ma ge, how ever, a nd



ing by t he 155mm guns kept P ist ol P et e

from ca refree ha mmering a t t he a irfield

a nd bea ch a rea s.

And t he perimet er w a s t o grow even

America n count erba tt ery a nd na va l gun-

fire silenced t he J a pa nese. U nloa ding

cea sed in t he a ft ernoon, a nd t he ships w ere

flushed int o dispersion by a n a t t a ck of

C RI TI CAL NOVE MB E R 353

m iles n or th -n or th west . B y m ida ft er noon

a not her sight ing pla ced t w o ca rriers a nd

a bra ce of dest royers som e 250 miles t o t hewes t .21 Coa st wa tchers in t he upper S olo-

mons logged ot her sight ings. Turner a p-

pra ised t he va rious report s a t t w o ba tt le-

ships, t w o t o four hea vy cruisers, a nd t en

t o t w elve dest royers. C a lla gha n w a s

hea vily out weighed. B ut H alsey’s orders

w ere t o get t he na va l support of G ua da l-

ca na l out of t he da rk ba ck a lleys of t he

S out h P acific; a nd a ft er he shepherded

t he unloa ded t ra nsport s sout h t o open w a-

t er , Ca lla gha n t urned ba ck t o enga ge t he

enemy.

J apanese battleships Hiei a nd Kzki-

shkz, lig ht cr uiser ,Vaga.ra. a nd 15 de-

st roy er s st ea m ed s out h t o d eliver Ad mir a l

Ya ma mot o’s first blow of t he new coun-

teroff ensive. This bomba rdment group

w a s t o ent er S ea la rk Cha nnel a nd ha m-

mer H ender son Field a nd t he fight er st rip

t o uselessness so t ha t C act us a ir could not

bot her G enera l H ya kut a ke’s reinforce-

ment s en rout e. Th is ,J a p a nese m is sion

ga ve Ca lla gha n one slight a dva nt a ge.

a dmira l t herefore dela yed a ct ion unt il he

w a s sure of t he sit ua t ion. B y t ha t t ime

t he ra nge ha d closed t o a bout 2,500 ya rds,a nd t he va n dest royer of t he America n

force w as nea rly w it hin t he J a pa nese for-

mation. When t hey ma neuvered t o

la un ch t or ped oes, t he Am er ica n sh ips d is-

orga nized t heir forma tion, a nd t hey t ook

u p in depen den t f ir in g. S om e sw er ved off

course t o a void collision, a nd in t he melee

bot h Am er ica n a nd ,J a pa nese ships fir ed a t

t heir s ist er cr a ft .

The S an Fra ncisco ca ught 15 solid hit s

from big J a pa nese guns a nd w a s forced

t o w it hdra w w it h Admira l C a lla gha n

killed a nd ot hers, including C apt ain Ca s-

sin Young, her skipper, dea d or fa t a lly

w ounded. A cruiser hit on t he At lan ta

killed Admira l S cot t a nd set fire t o t he

ship. B ut t he sma ll America n force held

in spit e of hea vy losses, a nd by 0300 t he

t J a pa nese gr oup r et ir ed w it hout being a ble

t o a t tem pt it s bom ba rdm en t. m ission. Th e

Imperia l bomba rdment force ha d lost t w o

dest roy er s a nd four ot her s w er e da ma ged.

Th e ba tt leship H iei lim ped a w ay d am ag ed



For shore bomba rdment , t he Imperia l

b at t lesh ips ca r ried h igh explosive pr ojec-

t iles for t heir 14-inch guns, not a rmor-

by more t ha n 80 America n hit s.

For t he America n ships it w a s a cost ly

vict ory. H enderson Field ha d been pro-

354

h eels of t he ret ir ing ,J a pa n ese ships.

Th ey found t h e cr ippled ba tt leship H iei

a fire nea r S a ve, a nd bombed a nd st ra fed

h er t hroughout t h e da y. Th e J a pa n ese

fought a losing ba t t le t o sa lva ge t heir

h a pless sh ip, but t h ey ha d t o scut t le her

n ext da y (14 November ).

D urin g t he n ight ba t t le off G ua da l-

ca na l, Admira l Ta na ka h a d been ordered

t o lea d h is con voy ba ck t o t he S hort la nds.

H e h ea ded sout h a ga in from t here durin g

t h e a ft ern oon of 13 November a t a bout t h e

same t ime t ha t Admira l H a lsey order ed

Kinka id t o w it h dra w t he ca rr ier Enter-

pr~ge sout h w it h t h e remn a n t s of C a lla -

gh an ’s for ce. H a lsey w a nt ed t h is ca r-

r ier —t he S out h P a cific’s sole oper at ion a l

fla tt op-sa fely out of J a pa nese a ircra ft

range. To gua rd H enderson F ield, Ad-

mira l Lee w ould st ea m on n ort h w it h his

battleships Washington a n d Sou th Da-

kota a nd four dest royers from K inka id’s

t a sk force. The dist a n ce w a s t oo grea t

for Lee t o ma ke t h a t night , h ow ever , a nd

only t h e ‘F ula gi P T boa ts w ere a va ila ble

t o prot ect S ea la rk C h a nn el. Shortly

P EARL H ARB OR TO G UAD ALC ANAL

F irst C act us a t t acks st ruck t he ret ir in g

w ar sh ips w h ich h a d sh elled H en derson

durin g t h e night . G roun d crew s on t he

field h a nd -loa d ed t heir pla n es a n d vis it in g

cra ft . from t he l ?n ter pr iw w ith fuel a nd

ordn a nce, a nd t h e pla nes moun t ed from

t he muddy run w a ys in a tt a ck. Th ey da m-

a ged J a pa nese h ea vy cruiser Xhugma

a nd t h e light I sw zw P la nes st ill on t he

Ente~prise, now 200 miles sout hea st of

G ua da lca na l, a lso a tt acked t he J a pa nese

w a rships. Th ey a dded t o t he t roubles of

t he Kinugma a nd I suzu, a n d a lso da m -

a g ed h ea vy cr uis er s L’hokai a n d Ma ya a nd

destroyer Michishio.

Mea nw hile, t h e 11 t roop t ra n spor t s

st ea med on dow n Th e S lot un t il by a bout

1130 t h ey w ere n ort h of t he Russells a nd

n ea r S a ve. A previous light a t t a ck by

f i ;nterprise fliers ha d in flict ed lit tle da m-

a ge t o t his convoy, but a t 1150 seven t or-

pedo bomber s a nd 18 dive bombers from

H ender son w ere refueled, rea rmed, a nd

boring in for a n a t t a ck. Th is st rike

hulled severa l of t he t ra nsport s . .4bout

a n hour la t er 17 fight er-escor t ed dive



a ft er midnight J a pa nese cruisers a nd de-

st royers ent er ed t h e cha nnel a nd shelled

t he C act us a ir field for a bout ha lf a n hour .

There w as no ser ious da ma ge, how ever .

b om ber s d eliv er ed t h e s econ d con cen t ra t ed

America n a t t a ck on t he t r a n sport s a n d

sa n k on e of t h em. Next t urn w en t t o

15 B –17’s t ha t h a d left E spir it u S a nt o a t


a t remen dous volume of a nt ia ircra ft fire. C rew s

w ere n ea r exha ust ion. Th e rema in in g t ra ns-

por t s ha d spen t most of t h e da y in eva sive a c-t ion , zigza ggin g a t h igh speed, a n d w ere n ow

sca tt er ed in a ll dir ect ion s.

I n det a il t h e pict ure is n ow va gue, but t he

gen era l effect is indelible in my mind of bombs

w obbling dow n from h igh -fly in g B –17’s, of ca r-

r ier bombers roa r ing t ow a rd t a rget s a s t hough

t o plun ge full in t o t h e w a t er , relea sing bombs

a nd D ullin g out ba rely in t ime; ea ch miss sending

up t ow er in g column s of mist a nd spra y; every hit

ra isin g clouds of smoke a nd fire a s t ra nspor t s

burst int o fla me a nd t a ke t he sickening list t ha tspells t h eir doom. At ta cks depa r t , smoke

screen s lift a n d revea l t he t ra gic scene of m en

jumpin g overboa rd from burn in g, sinking ships.

S hips regrouped ea ch t ime t he en emy w it h drew ,

but precious t ime w ’a s w a st ed a nd t h e a dva n ce

d ela yed. “

In spit e of t his disa st rous da y, Ta na ka

st ea med on sout h in h is fla gsh ip, doggedly

lea d in g t r a ns por t s K inugawa M ar w , Ya-

m a .t .su k i M a r w , 2 1i r o7ca wa M a r w , a nd Ya -

m aur a M a.r w on t ow ard G ua da lca na l.

These ships a nd t hree dest roy ers from D e-

stroyer D im”si on 15 w hich cont inued t o es-

cort him w ere t he only sound ves-

lig ht cr uis er s Sendai a n d Nagara, a nd a n

ent ire dest royer squa dron. Kondo w a s

t o com plet e t he H en der son F ield kn ockou t

w hich Admira l C a lla gha n’s force ha d

t hw a rt ed t wo night s ea rlier .

Throughout t he da y Admira l Lee like-

w ise sift ed in telligen ce r epor ts w hich fun -

neled int o his fla gship, t he ba t t leship

Washington. Then he m oved a ga inst t his

pow erful Tokyo E xpress w hich w a s

hea ded his w ay.23 Lee ent ered S ea la rk

C ha nnel a t a bout 2100 on 14 November

a nd pa t rolled t he w a t ers a round S a ve.

.4n hour befor e midnight , ra da r indica ted

n J a pa nese ship (t he cruiser Sendai) nine

m iles t o t he nor th . About 12 m inut es la ter

t he t a rget w as visible by ma in ba tt ery di-

r ect or t elescopes a n d L ee or der ed ca pt a in s

of t he Washington a nd t he Sou th D ak ot a

to fire w hen rea dy . Their first sa lvos

pr om pt ed t he Sendai to t urn out of ra nge.

S hort ly before t his Admira l Ta na ka ,

st ill lea ding his four t ra nsport s sout h t o-

w a rd G ua da lca na l, ha d been much re-

lieved t o see Admira l Kondo’s Second



sels Ta na ka ha d a t sundow n t ha t

da y—”. . . a sorry remna nt of t he

force t ha t ha d sort ied from S hor t ha nd.” 23

B ut w ha t w as w orse, Ta na ka t hen got t he

Fleet in front of him in The S lot . B ut

w hen t he cruiser h’endai scur ried ba ck

fr om t his first brief brush w it h t he Ameri-

ca n ships, t he J a pa nese officers found t ha t

356 P EARL H ARB OR TO G IJ AD ALC ANAL

Tora jiro ~ a t o--int o t he fight , a n d t h e a d-

mira l t h en t urned his t ra nspor ts nor t h a nd

shepherded t hem beyon d ra nge of t h e im-

pendin g a ct ion. Ylea n w h jle .~ dmira l

K on do’s fleet closed for t he fight , a n d S OOn

t he America n dest royers lea ding .~ dinira l

Lee’s forma t ion ca me w ith in visua l ra n ge

of some of t hese ships. The l’. S . de-

st r oyers got t he w orst of t h e ba rga in. 13y

2330 a ll four of t h em w er e out of a ct ion:

t he WaZke a fire a nd sin kin g, t h e Benlw?n

limpin g a wa y, t h e Preston gut t ed by fire

t h a t ca used h er a ba ndon men t la ter , a nd

t h e Gu+n da ma ged by a shell in her engine

room. Only on e J a pa nese dest royer , t he

Ayurami , h a d been da ma ged.

Th e t w o U . S . ba t t lesh ips con t in ued

n ort hw est bet w een S avo a nd C a pe E sper-

an t e . The Sou th D ak ot cz, t urning t o

a void t he bu rn in g d es tr oy er Preston? came

w it hin ra nge of t h e J a pa nese ships w hich

h a d just scuffled w it h t h e ~ merica n de-

st royers, a nd t he w ord pa ssed by t hese

,J apa nese ships brought t heir “big brot h-

ers” out from t h e shelt er of S a ve’s n or t h -

w est coa st .

a n d Talcao, revea led by t heir ow n sea rch -

light s, a lso w ere da ma ged, B ut t he orig-

ina l J apa n ese on sla ugh t . ha d ca used

en ough ser ious da ma ge t o t h e A ’ou th D a-

Iota t o force h er t o ret ire, a lso.

Admira l Lee con t inued on a nort h -

w est er ly course t o diver t t h e J a pa nese,

t hen bore a wa y t o t h e sout h w est nea r t he

Russells, a nd fina lly ret ired from t he a rea

w hen he not ed t he J a pa nese likew ise w it h-

dra w in g. Th e enemy ba t t leship lZi~ i-

shima w a s a ba n don ed a s w a s t he de-

stroyer Ayanami . Am er ica n dest roy er

Benharn likew ise ha d t o be a ba n doned

later .

Wit h h is escor tin g d es tr oy er s d isper sed

by t his ba tt le a nd it s a ft erma th, Admira l

Ta na ka n ow w a s a lone in his fla gsh ip

Hayashio w it h t h e four t r a nsport s. H e

ma de full speed for Ta ssa fa ron ga , but it

w as clea r t o him t h a t t he t r a nsport s w ould

n ot be a ble t o un loa d before da ylight .

Aft er t h a t t he U . S . pla nes w ould a t t a ck

t h em like t hey h a d t h ose six t r a nsport s

w hich t r ied t o unloa d durin g da yligh t in

Oct ober . B ut t hese men w ere cr it ica lly



~ ~ dmira l K on do stea med int o t he figh t

w it h d es tr oy er s Asagumo a n d T er u .zu ki i n

t he va n follow ed by hea vy cruisers A t ago

needed on C rua da lca na l, Ta na ka knew .

H e sen t a messa ge t o Admira l Mika w a a t

E igh th F leet hea dq ua rt ers a nd a sked if he

C RITIC AL NOVE MB ER 357

nort h , g~ t hered up his dest royers a ga in

a nd sa iled t hrough t he w at ers ea st of S avo

Is land.”

Th e a dm ir al w rot e la t er :

D ayligh t brough t t he expect ed a er ia l a ssa ult s

on our gron n clecl t ra nspor ts w hich w ere soon in

fla mes from direct bomb h it s. I la t er lea rn ed

t ha t a ll t roops, ligh t a rms. a mmun it ion , a nd pa rt

of t he pr ov is ion s w er e la n ded s ucces sfu lly .”

Tw o guns of t he 2.Mt h C oa st Art illery

B a t t a lion a n d t he 5-inch guns of t he 3d

D efense B a t t alion a lso cont ribut ed t o t he

da ma ge of t he grounded t ra nsport s. This

fire hit t w o of t he ships, a nd t hen t he

Am er ica n d est roy er .Veade ca me over

from Tula gi t o ent er t he fight . P la nes

from H enderson Field a n d E spir it u

S a nt o soon joined t his grisly “B uzza rd

P a t rol,” a nd t he J a pa nese t ra nspor t s w ere

reduced t o useless hulks engulfed in

flames. J a pa nese pla ns for a big Novem-

ber coun ter offen sive h ad m et d isa st er , a nd

I mperia l hea dq ua rt ers now bega n t o t hink

seriously a bout . t he more ca ut ious pla n t o

pL dl t he line ba ck closer t o Ra ba ul. There

t he Imperia l force on t he isla nd bega n t o

dw indle 2’ w hile t he America n comma nd

cont inued t o grow . C rit ica l N ovem ber

ha d t ur ned int o decisive Novem ber, in t he

P acific Wa r a s w ell a s t he G ua da lca na l

B a t t l e . The t J a pa nese never a ga in a d-

va nced a nd t he Allies never st opped.

Admira l Ta na ka , w hose skillful con-

duct of t he convoy a nd a ggressiveness

in t hrow ing his four escort ing dest royers

int o t he ba t t le a ga inst Admira l Lee>s

force nea r S a vo ha d cent ribut ed most t o

w ha t lim it ed success t he <J a pa nese ha d h ad

during t his ha rrow ing mont h, summed it

up t his w ay:

The la st la rge-sca le effor t t o rein for ce G ua da l-

ca na l h a d en ded. My con cern a nd t repida tion

a bout t he en t ire ven t ur e h a d been pr oven w ell

foun ded. As con voy comma n der I felt a h ea vy

r es pon si bi li ty . 27

BACK T O WARD K OK U M BON A

Wit h t his ,J a pa nese a t tem pt t o r ein for ce

G en er al H ya kut ake d ecisively st opped, t he

America n ground a dva nce t o t he w est w as



now w ere some 10,000 new J apa nese

t roops on Cha da lca na l, but t hese recent

sea a nd a ir a ct ions ma de it clea r t o t he

resum ed. G enera l S ebree, w est ern sect or

comma nder, w ould be in comma nd. Wit h

t he t roops of his sect or-t he 164t h I n-



CH APTER 9

Final Period 9 December 1942 to9 February 1943

At t he Noumea con ference w it h Ad-

mira l H alsey in Oct ober , G enera l Va nde-

gr ift st ressed t h e n eed for get t ing t he 1stMa rine D ivision t o a h ea lt h ier clima te.

B ut a t t h a t t ime t h e J a pa n ese coun t er-

offen sive w as underw ay, a nd a not her

enemy effor t a ga inst t he Lungs perimet er

bega n short ly a ft er t h is Oct ober a tt a ck

w a s t urn ed ba ck. Troops could not be

spa red from C h a da lca na l during t h a t

per iod, a nd sea la nes t o t h e a rea w ere t oo

h a za rdous for a ra pid buildup of t h e is-la n d g a rr is on . I t w a s not unt il a ft er t he

import an t na va l a ct ions of November t ha t

s uf ficien t r ein for cem en t s cou ld b e b rou gh t

in t o relieve t he 1st Ma rine D ivision . B y

t h a t t ime it w as clea r t o a ll t h a t t hese vet e-

ua lt .ies t o enemy a ct ion , 8,580 fell prey a t

on e t ime or a not h er t o ma la ria a nd ot her

t r opica l d is ea s es .

Records ma ke it impossible t o sepa ra te

t h ese t w o t ot a ls. Ma ny m en w it h ma la ria

w ere h ospit alized more t ha n once a nd t hus

a dded t o t h e t ot a l a s ca ses’ ra th er t h a n a s

individua ls. S ome of t h ese la t er w ere

killed or w oun ded in a ct ion . B ut on t h e

ot her ha nd ma ny suffered from a milder

form of ma la ria or ot her illness a n d did

n ot t urn in a t t h e h ospit a l a t a ll. I t be-

ca me a rule of t h umb in f rent -line unit s

t ha t unless one ha d a t empera ture of more

t ha n 103 degrees t here w ould be no light

dut y or excuse from a pa trol mission. The

t ropics w ea kened nea rly everyone. F ood

hcid been in sh or t supply during t he ea rly



ra ns n eeded t o be t a ken out of t he jungle.

C om pa r ed t o la t er a ct ion s in t he P a cific,

ca sua lt ies in t he division ha d n ot been ex-

w eeks of t he ca mpa ign, m uch of t h e fa re

h a d been subst a n da r d, a n d most of t he

lon g-t im e vet er an s of t he figh tin g su ffer ed

360 P EARL H ARB OR TO G UAD .4LC AN.4L

w here. This could not be, how ever, a nd

t he Ma rines w ho held out in t he Lungs

perimet er during t he da rk ea rly da ys de-

served a brea k. They ha d t a ken Anler i-

ca ’s first offensive st ep a ga inst long odds,

a nd t hey ha d held out a ga inst st rong ,J a -

pa nese a tt acks w hen G lla da lca na l w as a ll

hut cut off from i llied support . F or t his

t hey w ere a w a rded a P resident ia l U nit

C it a tion a nd —w ha t w a s t o be inm led ia t ely

more sa t isfying t o t ile survivors-a re-

ha bilit a t ion a nd t ra ining period in ~ iu-

st ra lia . The M Ma rines, a lso on ha nd for

t he origina l la nding, w -a s to be sent t o h“ew

Zealand.

On 9 D ecember 1942, comma nd of t he

t roops a sh or e on G ua da lca na l pa ssed fr om

(ienera l Va nclegrift t o ilfa jor G enera l

Xiexa n der M. P a t ch , cou )n lim din g g en er a l

of t he .lmerica l D ivision a nd senior Army

officer present . On t he sa me da y t he 1st

Ma rine D ivision bega n t o emba rk for .\ u-

st ra lia . The 5t h Ma rines sa iled t ha t da y,

follow ecl a t int erva ls of a few da ys by di-

vision h ea dq ua rt er s per son nel, t he 1st Ma -

r iva l t he Ar my clivision n um ber ecl 13,169

men-more t ha n 3,000 shor t of full

st rengt h. The 164t h Infa nt ry , in i~ ct ion

since t he Oct ober fight ing on Illoody

Ridge, w as in lit t le bet t er sha pe t ha n t he

1st Ma rine D ivision regiment s. B ot h t his

regiment a nd t he 182d Infa nt ry w ere ea ch

u nd er st ren .g th by a bol~ t 860 n lel~ .

Ma jor G enera l ,J . La v-t on C oil ins’ 25t h

D ivision, bound from H a w a ii t o New

C aledonia , w -a s divert ed direct ly t o G ua -

d a lca n al w h er e, it s 35t h I nf an tr y R eg im en t

la nded on 17 T)ecem ber , t he 27t h I nfa nt ry

on 1 J a nua ry, a nd t he 161st Infa nt ry on 4

? J a n u a ry , .\ lso on 4 ,J a nua ry , t he 6t h Ma -

r in es (C olon el C ~ ild e.r T. iJ n ckson ) a n d d i -

~ -ision hea dq ua rt ers of t he 2d Ma rine D i-

vision ]a nciecl from X’ew Zea la nd t o join

t heir ot her regiment s, t he 2d a nd 8t h Ma -

rines. B riga dier G enera l Alphonse D e

C’a rre, t he AT)C , a ct ed a s division com-

m ander w hile t his division w a s on G ua da l-

ca na l, a ncl a lso served a s com ma nder of a ll

ot he~ r Ma rine ground unit s. Ma jor G en-



r ines a nd, a ft er a longer int erva l, by t he

7t h Ma rines. The comma nd of G enera l

P a t ch included H enderson F ield, t he

er al ,J olm Ma rst on, com ma nding genera l

of t he 2d Ma rine D ivision, rema ined in

New Zea la nd beca use he w a s senior t o




B y 7 J a nua ry a rriva l of a ddit iona l re-

pla cem en ts h ad pla ced G ua da lca na l’s com -

bined a ir , ground, a n d na va l forces a ta bout 50,000. The 2d Ma rine D ivision

now ha d a st rengt h of 14,733; t he Ameri-

ca l D ivision, 16,000; t he 25t h D ivision,

12,629. This w a s a ma npow er level be-

yond even t he drea ms of t he ea rly Lungs

defenders, a nd, w it h t he S out h P a cific a ir

a nd na va l pow er a lso grow ing, t he Allies

a t la st w ere a ble t o la y pla ns for a t t a cks

t ha t, w ould defea t t he J a pa nese on t he is-la nd a nd keep reinforcement la ndings t o

a m in im um .

Wit h G ua da lca na l clea rly out of t he

shoest r ing ca tegory a t la st , G enera l H ar-

mon on 2 J a nua ry designa ted t he G ua da l-

ca na l-Tula gi comma nd a s XIV C orps.

G enera l P a t ch beca me corps comma nder

a nd G enera l S ebree, former America l

.&D C , a ssumed comma nd of t ha t di-vision.4

A mont h a nd n ha lf ea rlier t ha n t his, on

15 November , inst a lla tions of t he C act us

Air Force a lso ha d ga ined a more digni-

fied t it le. On t ha t da t e Rea r Admira l

Avia tion E ngineer B at ta lion relieved t he

6t h S ea bees, a nd on t he J a nua ry da te Ma -

jor C hest er C la rk’s 2d Ma rine Avia tionE ngineer B at t a lion a rrived. These w ere

t he only unit s of t heir kind w it hin t he Ma -

rine C or ps, a nd, t oget her w it h t he rema in-

ing S ea bees plus t he orga nic engineer ba t-

t alions of t he 1st a nd 2d Ma rine D ivisions,

t hey kept t he a ir fields in sh ape.

P a rt of t his w ork included const ruct ion

of a new st rip, Fight er 2, closer t o t he

bea ch nea r K ukum. Fight er 1, a lw ays un-usua lly slow t o dry a deq ua tely a ft er t ropi-

ca l ra ins, w a s a ba ndoned w hen t his new

st r ip beca m e oper a tion a l, a bou t t he m id dle

of D ecember . B ot h H enderson a nd

Fight er 2 t hen w ere built up w it h cora l

for bet t er dra ina ge, a nd st eel Ma rst on

ma ts, now becoming a va ila ble, a lso w ere

la id on t he runw a ys. Tools st ill w ere

sca rce, how ever, a nd t he old J a pa nese r oa droller s, for exa mple, cont inued t o be used.

B riga dier G enera l Louis E . Woods, w ho

ha d relieved G enera l G eiger a t C a ct us on

7 November so t he w ing comm ander could

ret urn t o his hea dq ua r t ers a t E spirit u



ilubrey W. Fit ch, w ho ha d relieved Ad-

mira l McC a in a s C omAirS oP a c, desig-

nt it ed H enderson F ield a nd Fight er 1 a

S ant e, st ayed on a s C om ma nder Aircra ft ,

C a ct us Air F orce unt il 26 D ecember w hen

he in t urn w as relieved by B riga dier G en-

FI NAL P E RI OD , 9 D E C E MB E R 1942 TO 9 F E B RU ARY 1943 363

B omber G roups (t he llt h a nd t he 5t h) be-

ga n t o opera t e t hrough G ua da lca na l on

lon g-ra nge recon na issa nce mission s. On23 November six 0S 2U ’S ca me in t o run

a nt isubma rine pa trols; on 26 November

t he 3d Reconna issa nce S q ua dron of t he

Roya l Nevv Zea la n d Air F orce a rr ived

w it h it s Lockheed H udson s, a nd during

t he period 15 t o 25 D ecember night pa -

t rolling P BY’s of 17P –12 a rr ived. Also

during D ecember t he Army sent in t he

12t h, 68t h, a nd 70t h Fight er S q ua dron s

a nd t he 69t h B omba rdmen t S q ua dron of

E-26’s.

This a ddit ion al a ir st ren gt h en abled t he

Allies t o ma int a in t he upper h a nd t hey

h a d ga ined over t he Tokyo E xpress a n d

Ra ba ul fliers. J a pa nese commanders

point ed up t heir loss of pilot s a s t he most

s er iou s t rou ble r es ult in g fr om t he fig ht in g

a round G ua da lca na l, a nd severa l J a pa -nese oficers, including C apt ain Ohma e,

list t his loss a s t he t urning point a t G ua -

da lca na l a nd t h erefore t he t urning point

in t he P a cific w ar .5 Oh ma e sa id la t er :

lVe w er e a ble t o la nd a num ber of t roops a n d

GE A7E RA L S IT UAT IO N

T he L 1. S. forces ha d not been idle dur-

ing D ecember . Th e perimet er now ex-t ended w est a long t he bea ch t o P oint

C ruz, sout h t o H ill 66 (n ea rly 2,oOO ya rds

inla nd from t he bea ch a t P oin t C ruz)

vvhere it w as refused ea st t o t he Ma ta ni-

ka u t o join t h e former Lun ga perimet er

out post line ea st of t h a t r iver . There w as

lit t le expa nsion t o t he ea st , but a sepa ra te

America n force held K oli P oint out side

t h e m a in per im et er .

The Aola B a y force, fina lly giving up

a ir field const ruct ion t here beca use of

sw a mpy, unsuit able t erra in, moved ea rly

in D ecember t o K oli P oint w here a field

la ter w as built . This force, st ill un der t he

com ma nd of C olon el Tut tle, n ow in clu ded

t he colonel’s 147t h In fa nt ry, t he 9t h Ma -

rine D efen se B at t a lion, t h e 18t h Na va l

C on st ruct ion B a tt a lion (S ea bees), a n d ele-

men t s of t h e 246t h Field Art illery B at -

tal ion.

The limit ed offensive t ow ard K okum-

bona w a s ha lt ed la t e in November w hen

t he J apa nese t r ied t o moun t a second

s tr on g cou nt er offen siv e a ga in st t he per im -



supplies [on G ua da lea na l], but our a ir losses

w er e t oo gr ea t . Almost a ll of t he Na vy’s first

cla ss pilot s a nd a few of t he Army ’s w er e lost in

et er , a nd a t t h a t t ime a J apa n ese move-

ment t o build up forces in t he Mount Aus-

t en a r ea w a s not ed . Now , ea r ly in D e-


t he sout h a bove H enderson Field ha d t o

be clea red before ma ny t roops w ent w est

a long t he nort h coa st t o drive t he J a pa nesebeyond K okumbona . The enemy line

from P oint (l-w inla nd w a s dug in for a

d et er min ed st a nd , a ncl J a pa nese st ren gt h

w a s a ga in mount ing in t he B isma rcks.

(h~ 2 D ecemberl G enera l H it oshi Inla -

m ura , comm ander of t he J a pa nese -E ight fi

Area . Army, a rrived in Ra ba ul t o a ssume

comma nd of t he enemy’s S out h P acific

fires a nd w ha t w as left of ~TeIled Hyaku-take’s Seventeenth Army. Ima mura ha d

been ordered dow n from ,J a pa n t o ret a ke

G ua da lca na l, a nd for t his job he brought

a long 50,000 men for his .E ight h Area

.lrmy. H ya kut a ke rema ined on G ua da l-

ca na l w here his t roops w ere disposed gen-

era lly from P oint C ruz inla nd t o Mount

Aust en, fa cing t he America n line w est of

t he Ma t a nika u. The rea r a rea s, a nd t hebulk of H ya kut a ke’s suppor t t roops, ex-

t ended from t he P oint C ruz line w est t o

C a p e E s pe ra n ce . This J a pa nese for ce in-

cluded remna nt s of t he 2d D ivi si on ( Gen-

era l Ma ruya ma ), 38t h D i vi si on (Gen er al

At t his t ime t he t ot al J a pa nese st rengt h

on t he isla nd st ood a t a bout 25,000 men.

B ut t hey w ere inca pa ble of concent ra tedoffensive a ct ion, a nd t hey ha d dug in for

a defensive st and w hile a wa it ing G enera l

I ma mur a’s E ight h, Ar ea Am Ly r ein for ce-

ment s. Ra tions w ere low , ma la ria now w as

more preva lent in ,J a pa nese ra nks t ha n

in Am er ic<m , a mmunit ion st ocks w ere

n ea rly exh aust ed , pr event ive a nt { cor rec-

t ive m edica l ca pa bilit ies w er e pr act ica lly

nonexist ent , a nd t he Tokyo E xpress w asha rd pressed t o ma int a in even a st a rva -

t ion-level of supplies. Admira l Ta na ka

st ill w as in cha rge of t his supply opera -

t ion dow n The S lot ., a nd t he mea sures now

being t a ken w ere despera t e ones. D e-

st royers t r ied t o supply t hese Imperia l

t roops by m aking high-speed r uns t o G ua -

da lca na l a nd dropping OH st rings of

la sh ed -t og et her d ru ms in to w h ich su ppliesha d been sea led. B arges from t he isla nd

t hen w ere t o t ow t hese drums a shore.

This procedure w as not t oo successful,

how ever, a nd t he t roops ma na ged t o re-

t rieve only a bout 30 per cent of t hese sup-



S a no ), a nd t he Kawagwchi a nd lchicki

Forces. (See Ma p 26, Ma p S ect ion )

C onfront ing t he America ns on his left

plies t ha t Ta na ka ’s dest royers ca st upon

t he w a ter .

Ta na ka ’s first run w it h t he drums oc-

FI NAL P E RI OI ), 9 I )I K’E M13E R 1942 TO 9 FE B RU .iRY 1943 365

in t o fa ce t he America ns could not even

h old defen sive posit ion s u nless t hey cou ld

be fed a nd ca red for . Ta na ka ’s dest roy-

ers ra ced dow n The S lot . on 3 D ecember

a nd dropped st r in gs of 1,500 drums. B ut

t h e isla nd t roops ma na ged t o ha ul in only

a bout 300 of t hese from t h e w a t ers off

Ta ssa fa ron ga a n d S egila u. “our t rou-

bles,” Ta na ka sa id , “w ere st ill w it h us. ” 6

On 7 D ecember C a pt a in S a to led 10 de-

st royers t o C ~ lmda lca na l for t he t hird J a p-

a nese a t t empt t o supply t he t roops. F our-

t een T_;. S. bomber a nd fight er pla nes lo-

ca t ed t h is force in The S lot a t a bout

n ight fa ll, h ow ever , a nd on e J a pa nese sh ip

w a s h it a nd ha d t o st a rt ba ck n ort h un der

t ow by a n ot her dest royer . Tw o ot her

s hips escor ted t his a ided cr ipple. Adm ir al

Ta na ka w ent sout h t o t he scene in h is new

fla gsh ip, t he n ew ly-built dest royer Terw-

ZZA’ an im pr ov ed 2,500-t on m od el ca p a ble

of 39 kn ot s. Th e ot h er dest royers w hich

h a d been on t h e dr um run w ent , on sout h

t ow a rd G ua da lca na l but ha d t o t urn ba ck

w hen t hey en count ered P T boa t s a nd

U . S . pla nes. ThLI S t h e t hird supply run

fa iled com pl et el y.

w en t t o t he a t t a ck. The J a pa nese sh ip

ch a sed t he P T boa ts a wa y but in t he proc-

ess got hit in it s port side a ft . by a t or-

pedo. Th e sh ip ca ught fire a nd beca me

unna viga ble a lmost a t on ce, a nd t he de-

stroyer iVaqan(~mi hurr ied a longside t o

r escue survivors. Ta na ka , w ho h a d been

w oun ded a nd knocked un con scious, plus

ot hers from t h e officers a n d crew w ere

t ra nsferred t o t h is ot her dest royer , a nd

t he dest royer AmslI i a lso ca me up t o h elp.

B ut t he h ea r t en ed U . S , P T boa t s ch a sed

t h ese soun d sh ips a wa y from t he sinking

Teruauki , a nd t h e ,J a pa nese could only

drop life ra ft s t o crew mem bers w ho w ere

st ill in t he w a t er . S om e of t he drums

w ere recovered by t h e t roops a shore, but

w it h t he loss of such sh ips a s t he T erwm& i ,

t his sor t . of sLlpply opera t ion w a s becom-

in g ver y cost ly . An d n ow t h e moon w a s

en t ering a ph a se w hich ca used ot her such

a tt em pt s t o be t empora rily post pon ed.

J a p an ese defen ses h a d r eceived very lit tle

help for t he a ct ion s w hich n ow sh a ped up

a ga in st t hem .

The 132d I n fa nt ry of t h e America l D i-

vision bega n t he offensive a ga in st Mount



The fourt h of th ese supply runs ca me

on 11 D ecember , a nd Ta na ka h imself led

.kust en on 17 D ecember , a nd by ea rly J a n-

ua ry t roops of t h is regimen t h a d t he ma -

366 P EARL H ARB OR TO G UAD ALC Ah lAL

ing inla nd from P oint C ruz served t o ex-

t end t he America n posit ions fa rt her int o

,J a pa nese t er rit or y w est of Moun t Aust en .

(S ee Ma p 27, Ma p S ect ion)

T H E CORPS OFFE iVSI ~E

Wit h t he J a pa nese in t he Mount Aust en

a rea loca lized in t he ~ ~ ifu, t he drive t o t he

w est could get underw ay. C~ enera l P a tch

pla nned t o ext end his P oint C ruz-H ill 66

line fa rt her inla nd a nd t hen t o push w est ,

dest roying t he J a pa nese or dr iving t hem

from t he isla nd, G ener al C ollins’ 25t h D i-

vision (w it h 3/182, Ma r ines of 1/2 a nd

t he Arner ica l Reconna issa nce S qua dron

a tt a ched) w ould a dva nce w est of Mount

A u st en on t he ext ended fla nk inla nd, a nd

a t t he sa me t im e a ssum e responsibilit y for

t he G ifu P ocket w hich now w ould be be-

hind t he XIV C orps line. (S ee Ma p 2’i,

Ma p S ect ion ).

The 2d Ma rine D ivision (less 1}2)

w ould provide t he corps’ r ight element

from t he 25t h D ivision’s nort h fla nk t o t he

bea ch. The America ] D ivision (m inus t he

182d Infa nt ry, division a rt illery, a nd

C la rence A. Orndorff) w ould be t he di-

v is ion r es er ve .

The ground t hus a ssigned t o t he 27t h

Infa nt ry consist ed of a jumble of hills

(dubbed t he G alloping H orse beca use of

t heir a ppea ra nce on a er ia l ph ot ogr aph s)

w hich lie some 1,500 ya rds sout h of H ill

66. Army unit s bega n t heir a t t a cks

a ga inst t his t erra in on 10 J a nua ry, a nd,

cluring t he fina l a ct ions here t hree da ys

la t er , Ma rines on t he right fla nk of t he

corps line be~ ~ n t heir for wa rd m ovem ent .

La unching it s a t t a ck w it h t he 8t h Ma -

rines on t he right a nd t he 2d on t he left ,

t he 2d D ivision im med ia tely en coun ter ed a

series of cross com pa rt ment s in w hich t he

J a pa nese h ad est a blish ed ver y effect ive d e-

f en si ve pos it i on s. sing a minimum of

men a nd w ea pons, t he enemy fired dow n

t he long a xis of t hese va lleys w hich w ere

perpendicula r t o t he Ma rine a dva nce, a nd

t hus enga ged t he a tt a ckers in a cross fire

in ea ch t er r a in com pa r t men t .

E nemy posit ions of t his t ype held up t he

8t h Ma rines t hroughout t he da y, but t w o

ba t t a lions of t he 2d Ma rines a dva nced

a bout 1,000 ya rds on t he inla nd fla nk.



2/132) w ould h old t he m ain per im et er .

S ince t he 25t h D ivision a ppa rent ly

The 6t h Ma rines t hen moved up t o relieve

t he 2d Ma rines w hich w as long overdue



368 P EARL H AR B OR TO G UAD AI A2ANAL

s ou t h~ l Wit h th is u n it in pla ce,t h eXI V

C orps a tt a ck jumped off w it h t he 25t h D i-

vision on t he left t o envelop t he enemysout h fla nk, a nd t he C AM D ivision ( C om-

posit e .4rmy-Ma rine) t o a dva nce w est

a long t he coa st . The C AM D ivision con-

sist ed of t he 6t h Ma r ines, t he 182d a nd

147t h I nfa nt ry regiment s, a nd a rt illery of

t he America l a nd 2d Ma rine D ivision?2

(S ee Ma p 28, Ma p S ect ion )

The 25t h D ivision bega n it s fla nking

movement on 20 J a nua ry, sw inging in t o-w ard K okumbona a nd t a king H ills 90 a nd

98 by 21 J a nua ry. This high ground, im-

media t ely sout h of Kokumbona , w a s in

front of t he C AM D ivision a nd domi-

na t ed t he coa st a l a rea a round t he J a pa -

n es e b a se. The enemy t roops fa cing t he

C AM D ivision t hus w ere out fla nked a nd

pa rt ia lly surroun ded by t h e t w o forces.

The a tt a ck cont inued on 23 J a nua ry w hent he 27t h Infa nt ry occupied Kokumbona ,

but by t his t ime most of t he enemy a l-

rea dy h a d slipped a wa y a long t he coa st .

Mea nw hile, t he C .4M D ivision on 22

,J a nua ry ha d opened a full-sca le a tt a ck

A ra dio spot t ing freq uency w a s a s-

signed t he four S FC P S serving w it h t he

a ssa ult ba tt a lions of t he 6t h Ma rines a ndt he 182d Infa nt ry, a nd on t his frequency

t he shore spot ters ca lled in fire missions

from t he dest royers. Anot her frequency

w a s est a blish ed bet w -een t he D ivision Na -

va l G unfire Officer ( NG FO ) a nd a ll four

of t he dest royers, a nd forw ard spot t ers

a lso could use t h is net if t he need a rose.

In t h is pha se of t he corps a dva nce, Ma -

r ines in t he C AM D ivision ra n int o t hes tr on gest oppos it ion , a nd t hey w ere

st opped t he first da y by a bout 200 J a pa -

n ese in a ra vine w est of H ill 94. Wit h

t he help of t he close-in na va l gunfire a dd-

ing it s w eight t o a rt illery, a ir , a nd infa n-

t ry w ea pon s, t his opposit ion w a s over-

come by noon of 24 J anua ry w hen t he

C AM D ivision ma de cont a ct w it h t he 25t h

D ivision on t he high ground a bove Ko-kumbona . Alt hough some of t he fight ing

ha d been m ost difficult , t he J a pa nese w ere

pulling ba ck slow ly. I t a ppea red t ha t

t hey w ould proba bly est ablish st rong de-

fen ses fa r th er w es t.



w it h t he 6t h Ma rines on t he right by t he

bea ch, t he 147t h Infa nt ry in t he cen t er ,

Act ua lly t here w ould be m ore st iff fight -

ing on t he isla nd, but no a ll-out st a nd of

FI NAL P E RI OI ), (1 I ) E C I MI B E R 1942 TO 9 F E B RU ARY 1943 369

vember a tt empt t o ret a ke G ua da lca na l,

Now a sma ll force of J apa nese ha d met

w it h disa st er t rying t o reca pt ure P ortMoresby from a cross t he Ow en S t a nley

Mount a in s, a nd t he 50,000 t roops G en er al

Ima mura brought dow n from J a va t o re-

inforce H ya kut a ke w ould ha ve t o be used

in New G uinea . Around 15 D ecember

t he J a pa nese decided t o eva cua te G ua da l-

ca na l a nd build up new defenses fa rt her

nort h in t he S olomon cha in. The st a rv-

ing t roops on t he isla nd w ould fight de-la ying a ct ions t ow ard C a pe E spera nce,

a nd t hey w ould be eva cua ted in det a ch-

m ent s from t ha t point . by fa st dest royers.

C omma nding t hese dest royers w ould be

Rea r Admira l Tomiji Koya na gi, former

chief of st a ff of t he S econ d F l eet . H e

ha d repla ced t he w ounded a nd exha ust ed

Admira l Ta na ka , w ho now w as on his w ay

t o t he home isla nds w here he w ould serveon t he Na va l G enera l S ta fl.

XIV C orps ma int ained t he moment um

of it s w est ern a dva nce by resupplying it s

a tt a cking divisions over t he bea ch a t Ko-

kumbona , w here t he Tokyo E xpress ha d

Allied comma nd concluded t ha t t he en-

emy w a s rea dy for st ill a not her a tt empt

t o ret a ke G ua da lca na l. Admira l H a lseydeployed six t ask forces sout h of G ua da l-

ca na l, a nd G enera l P a tch reca lled t he 25t h

D ivision from t he w est er n a dva nce t o bol-

s t er t h e per im et er . I t w as t he sa me prob-

lem G enera l Va ndegrift ha d fa ced so

ma ny t imes in t he pa st , but now t here

w ere more t roops a nd t he w est ern a tt a ck

did not ha ve t o be complet ely st opped.

P ursuit of t he J a pa nese w a s a ssigned t ot he C AM D ivision .

This est ima te of J a pa nese int ent ions

slow ed pur suit of t he enemy a nd proba bly

a ided t heir esca pe, but t he mist a ke w a s

a n honest one. Act ua lly t he J a pa nese

st rengt h a t Ra ba ul ha d been mount ing,

a nd t he ba sic int elligence w as good. B ut

t his t ime t he a ct ivit y in t he B isma rcks

a nd t he S hor t la nds w as t he result of J a p-a nese pla ns t o complet e t he eva cua tion of

G ua da lca na l a nd t o st a rt new defensive

in st a lla t ion s closer t o R a ba ul.

B y t his t ime t he J a pa nese ha d nea rly

com plet ed t heir w it hd ra w a l t o eva cua t ion



oft en unloa ded, a nd ordering t he a tt a ck

t o push on t ow a rd t he P oha River, a

st rea m some 2,500 ya rds beyond H ya ku -

a rea s a round C a pe E spera nce, a nd w hen

regiment s of t he C AM D ivision la unched

t heir new a tt acks ea rly on 26 J a nua ry t hey

\

J

E

O

NG

12

4

A

78

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FIN-AL P ERI OI ), 9 I ) EC ri;MB E R 1942 TO 9 FE B RU ARY 1 343 371

resumed on 30 J a nua ry, a nd t he soldiers

ra n int o resist a nce nea r t he mout h of t he

B onegi River a bout 2,000 y ar ds nor thw est

of t he P oha . There t he unit s fought unt il

2 Februa ry w hen t he J a pa nese w it hdrew .

The U . S . force a dva nced a ga in next da y,

a nd on 5 F ebrua ry t he 147t h held up 1,000

ya rds short of t he U ma sa rni River , a

s tr ea m s om e 2,500 y a rd s n or th w est , of Ta s-

sa fa ronga P oint .

Mea nw hile, t o form a new t ra p for t he

ret rea ting J a pa nese, G enera l P at ch on 31

J a nua ry dispa tched t he r einfor ced 2d B a t-

t alion, 132d Infa nt ry a round C ape E sper -

a nce t o la nd nea r t he w est ern t ip of t he

isla nd. From t ha t point t he ba tt a lion w as

t o a dva nce t o Ca pe E spera nce a nd cut off

t he J a pa nese line of ret rea t. Aft er la nd-

ing ea rly on 1 Februa ry a t Vera hue, t he

force a dva nced t o t he villa ge of Tit i,

nea rly a t hird of t he w a y t o t he ca pe. B y

7 Februa ry t his force w a s rea dy t o push

on from t ha t villa ge, a nd t he nort h coa st

a t t a ck w a s prepa red t o a dva nce beyond

t he U ma sa rni R iver.

B y t his t ime t he 147t h Infa nt ry ha d

been relieved a t t he U ma sa rni by t he 161st

defea t of J apa nese forces on G ua da l-

ca na l. . . . “ 11 From a ha za rdous ea rly

st ep up t he long isla nd pa th t ow a rd To-

kyo, t he Allies ha d ga ined a solid foot ing

w hich w ould becom e a n a ll-im por ta nt ba se

unt il a ft er t he mount ing of t he fina l offen-

sive a ga inst Okina wa t wo yea rs la ter ,

H a ppy t o hea r t he new s t ha t G ua da l-

ca na l w as a t la st secured—but ha rdly dis-

a ppoin ted t ha t, t hey h ad n ot been t her e for

t he fina l cha se—w ere t he vet era ns of t he

1st Ma rine D ivision in Aust ra lia , t he 2d

a nd 8t h Ma rines in New Zea la nd, a nd t he

1st Ra ider a nd lsi P ara chut e B at ta lions in

New C a ledonia . These old isla nd ha nds

w er e r est in g, fight ing off recur rin g a t ta cks

of ma la ria , get t ing t he jungle out of t heir

blood, a nd a lrea dy t ra ining for t heir next

campaign.

EPILOGUE

G ua da lca na l w a s t he primer of ocea n

a nd jungle w ar. I t w a s everyt hing t he

~ nited states could do at that moment

a ga inst everyt hing t he J a pa nese could

ma na ge a t t ha t pla ce. From t his t he



Infa nt ry of t he 25t h D ivision, a nd on 8

Februa ry t his regiment rea ched D oma

America ns lea rned t ha t t hey could bea t

t he enemy, a nd t hey never st opped doing

3772 P EARL H AR B OR TO G UAD ALC ANAL

a nd unofficia l circula tion of lessons

lea rned t here by t he Arm y, hTa vy, a nd Ma -

r ines w er e m any a nd fa r-rea ching.Vet era ns of a ll ra nks from a ll bra nches

of t he service ca me home t o t ea ch a nd

sprea d t he w ord w hile ma ny more st a yed

on t o t em per t he r epla c~ r nent s com ing out

t o t he w a r. B a rra cks bull sessions a nd

bivoua c ya rns a dded color a nd not a lit t le

w eight t o t he forma l per iods of inst ruc-

t ion. Thus w a s t he myt h t ha t t he ,J a pa -

n ese w er e super men sh at ter ed, a nd t he bit sof comba t lore or t he legenda ry t a ll t a les

a nd t rue w hich begin, “Now , on t he

‘C a na l . . .“ st ill ha ve not ent irely dis-

a ppea r ed fr om t he Ma rin e r eper toir e.

G enera l Va ndegr ift summed it up in a

specia l int roduct ion t o T h e G u ad a.l ca n al

Campaign, t he hist orica l monogra ph

w hich cont a ins t he Ma rine C orps’ first

st ud y of t he oper a tion :We st ruck a t G ua da lca na l t o ha lt t h e a dva nce

of t h e J apa nese. We did n ot kn ow h ow st rong

h e w a s, n or did w e kn ow his pla ns. We knew

only t ha t h e w a s movin g dow n t he isla n d ch a in

a nd t ha t h e h a d t o be st opped.

We w ere a s w ell t ra ined a n d a s w ell a rm ed

a s t ime a nd our pea cet ime exper ien ce a llow ed

increa se t h e per imet er defense line a nd t o ga in

.I posit ion w hich w ould cont rol America n t ra ffic

t o Aust ra lia . E xpa nsion int o t he S olomon s from

R a ba ul w as t hen ca rr ied out . U nfor t un a tely , w e

a lso ca rr ied out t h e expa n sion a t t h e sa me t ime

in st ea d of con solida t in g our h oldings in t ha t

a rea . Aft er y ou ca pt ured G ua da lca n a l , w e st ill

t h ought t ha t w e w ould be a ble t o ret a ke it a n d

use it a s a n out post for t h e defen se of t he

empire. Th is effor t w a s very cost ly , bot h a t t he

t ime a n d in la t er opera t ion s, beca use w e w er e

n ever a ble t o recover fr om t h e ship a n d pilot

losses r eceived in t ha t a rea .”

~Tnfor tUnate ly for t he J apa n ese t h ere

w er e very few lesson s from G ua da lca na l

t ha t t hey could put t o effect ive use. I n a

sense t his w a s ph a se on e of t h eir fina l ex-

a min a t ion, t h e begin n in g of a ser ies of

test s for t h e milit a ry for ce w h ich h a d con -

q uered t h e Orient a l side of t h e P a cific,

a n d t h ey fa iled it . Aft er th is t h ere w a s

n eit h er t ime n or mea ns for a n ot h er semes-

t er of st udy a n d prepa ra t ion. Admira l

‘1’a na ka h a d t his t o sa y a bout t he oper a -

t ion a nd its sign ifica nce:

Opera tion s t o rein force G ua da lca na l ext en ded

over a per iod of mor e t h a n five mont hs. Th ey

a moun t ed t o a losing w a r of a t t r it ion in w h ich

J apa n suffered hea vily in a n d a r ound th a t is-



U S to be. We n eeded comba t t o t ell us h ow effec-

t ive our t ra ining, oa r doct r ines, a nd our w ea p-

la nd . . . Th er e is n o quest ion t ha t J a pa n’s

doom w as sea led w it h t h e closin g of t h e st ruggle

NINAL P E RI OD , 3 D E(3E MB E R 1942 TO 9 FE B RU ARY 1943 373

it t ook on refinement s a nd pra ct ica l modi-

fica t ions, a s doct rines a nd t ech niq ues im-

proved. New models cont inued t o a rr ive

a nd w ere quickly put t o use in t he ha ndsof n ow -skilled figh tin g m en .

F or exa mple, la nding cra ft w hich w ent

int o ma ss product ion a ided t he t act ica l a s-

pect s of a mphibious a ssa ult s a nd a lso les-

sen ed t h e logist ica l pr oblems a t t he

beachhead. I mpr ov ed com mu nica t ion s

eq uipm en t m ade. it poss ible for t he Ma rin e

C orps t o improve a nd ma ke more effect ive

ma ny of t h e specia l orga niza tion s a nd op-er at ion al t ech niq ues w hich pr eviou sly h a d

been lit tle m or e t ha n ca refully -sket ch ed

t heory . Air a nd na va l gun fire lia ison pa r-

t ies experiment ed w it h on G ua da lca na l

la ter beca me t h e efficient t ools of in t e-

gra ted w arfa re t h a t Ma rines h a d been con -fiden t t hey could become. I mproved

eq uipment brough t improved t ech niq ue,

a nd t hus bega n a cont in uous cycle of in -crea sing efficiency w hich ma de t he fin a l

a mphibious a ssa ult s by coopera tin g L“. S .

forces a t Iw o ,J ima a n d Okina w a re-

ma rka ble m odels of m ilit a ry pr ecision .

Th is st ren gt h of n ew eq uipment a n d

a bilit y en a bled t he Allies t o t a ke com-

prove on e t h e .J a pa nese ha d built or w ere

building. This coincided w ell w it h t he

ba sic a mph ibious doct r in e lon g a greed

upon : never hit a defen ded bea ch if t h eobject ive ca n be rea ched over a n un de-

fended one. Toget her t hes e pr in ciples

som et imes ma de it possible for t he Allies

t o la n d on a n enemy isla n d a n d build a n

a ir field some dist a nce from t h e host ile

ga rr ison . This t h e Ma rines did in No-

vember 1943, a t B ouga invi]le. A perim-

et er w as est a blished a round t he a ir field,

a nd t h ere defen ders sa t w a it ing for t heJ a pa nese t o do t h e h a rd w ork of ma rch in g

ov er d ifficu lt t er ra in t o pr es en t t hem selv es

for a ba t t le if t h ey so desired. I t w a s a

premedit a ted repea t of t h e G ua da lca na l

t a ct ic, a nd w hen t he ,J a pa nese obliged by

so a ccept in g it , t hey w er e defea t ed .

All services, unit s a n d men in t h e P a-

cific, or sla ted t o go t h ere, w ere ea ger t o

lea rn t he va lua ble lesson s of ea rly comba ta nd t o put . t h em int o pra ct ice. F or t h e

Ma rin e C orps, a n import a nt fa ct or in t h e

con t inuing success of t he a dva nce a cross

t he P acific w a s t he delinea t ion of com-

ma nd responsibilit ies bet ween t he na va l

t a sk for ce com ma n der a n d t he a mph ibious



ma nd of t h e st ra tegy in a con t est in w hich t r oop com m a n der .

374 P EARL H ARB OR TO G UAD AI J CAN.4L

level a s t he na va l t ask force comma nder .

B ot h of t hem w ould be respon sible t o a

common s u per ior .Wit h t his point clea red, a nd w it h t he

va lua ble lessons of C ka da lca na l comba t a

pa rt of his persona l experience a nd

know ledge, Va ndegrift a s a lieut ena nt

genera l beca me comma nder of t he I Ma -

r ine Amphibious C orps in t he fa ll of 1943

a nd w as a ble t o guide a n ever-expa nding

fight ing force a lrea dy involved in new a c-

t ions in t he S olomons. La t er , on 10 No-vem ber 1943, he left t he P a cific t o becom e

t he eight eent h C omma n da nt of t he Ma -

r in e C or ps .

Tile cost of G ua ckdca na l w a s not a s

grea t a s some la t er opera t ions. Total

Army a nd Ma rine ca sua lt ies w it hin t he

ground forces a mount ed t o 1,598 men a nd

officers killed a n d 4,709 w oun ded. Ma -

rines of t he ground forces killed or dea dfrom w ounds numbered 1,152; a nd 2,799

w ere w ounded a nd 55 list ed a s missing.

I n a ddit ion 55 individua ls from Ma rine

a via t ion unit s w ere killed or died of

w oun ds w hile 127 w ere w ounded a nd 85

missing.13 D efea t for t he J a pa nese w as

more cost ly . Alt hough some 13,000 en-

em y sold ier s w er e eva cua t ed fr om G ua da l-

ca na l for new defensive posit ions fa rt hernort h , more personnel t ha n t his h a d lost

t heir lives on t he isla nd. J a p a n es e

s ou rces list a ppr oxim a tely 14,800 killed or

missing in a ct ion w hile 9,oOO died of

w ounds a nd disea se. S om e 1,000 en em y

t roops w ere t a ken pr isoner. More t ha n

600 enemy pla n es a nd pilot s a lso w ere

lost.

C om ba t sh ippin g losses w er e a bout even

for t he t w o opponent s. The Allies a nd

t he J a pa nese ea ch lost 24 fight ing ships,

w it h t he loss a mount ing t o 126,240 t ons

for t he Allies a nd 134,839 t ons for t he

,J apanese.

There w ould be bigger ba t t les la t er .

There w ould be t iny a t olls for w hich t he

.J a pa nese w ould dema nd higher pr ices onshor t er t erms. An d fa r a w ay t o t he nor t h

a dea d volca no w ait ed t o be t he ba ckdrop

of a phot ogra ph w hich w ould become t he

symbol of t he ent ire isla nd w a r a hea d.

B ut not hing could t ake fr om G ua da lca na l

it s unique spot in hist ory . The first st ep,



“ii t a bula t ion of Ma rin e ca sua lt ies a ppea rs inhow ever shor t a nd fa lt ering, is a lw ays t he

APPENDIX A

Bibliographical Notes

This hist ory is ba sed principa lly on officia l

Ma rine C orps records : t he repor t s, dia ries,

orders, et c., of t h e units or a ct ivit ies involved in

t he specific oper at ion s descr ibed. Records of

t h e ot her a rmed services ha ve been consult ed

w her e per tin en t. On ma t ters pert a ining t o

opera tions a t high st ra t egic level , t he a ut hors

ha ve dra w n on t he records of t he L’, S . J oint

C hiefs of S ta ff ( ,J G S ),

B eca use t his volume spa ns a considera ble

per iod of t ime a nd dea ls w ith a w ide va riet y of

a ct ivit ies, t he sa me records seldom over la p from

one pa r t of t he book t o a not her . These a re

fully cit ed in th e t ext a nd w ill be discussed

sepa ra tely a s a pplica ble to specific pa rt s. E x-

cept a s ot herw ise not ed such records a re on file

a t , or obt a ina ble t hrough, t h e Records a nd Re-

sea rch S ect ion, H ist orica l B ra nch. G –3, H ea d-

qua rt ers, U . S . Ma rine C orps.

Th ere a re, h ow ever , a number of published

w orks of genera l interest more w idely cit ed

t hroughout this volume. The more import a nt

of t hese a re list ed below .

Books

J et er A. I sely a nd P hilip A. C row l, l ’h e U . S .

Marina and Arnphibiou.s War. P rincet on :

Admira l Morison ( ~ S NR, Ret ired ) un der t ook

t he monument a l project on na va l order a nd ha s

ca rried it t hrough w it h a ll possible support of

t he Na vy . The a ut hor ra nks a s one of our lea d-

ing w rit ers a nd hist oria ns, a n d t he w hole ser ies

is highly rea da ble a nd relia ble. A few minor

errors of fa ct t ha t crept int o t he first edit ions

a re bein g cor rect ed in subseq uen t pr in tin gs.

R ober t S her rod, H’i8tory of M u r i%c Corps

Avi at i on i n Wor ld War 11. Wa sh ir rgt on : C om -

ba t Forces P ress, 1952. This is a not her un.

ot ficia l h ist ory un dert rrken a t t he request , r rud

w it h t he support , of t h e Ma rine Corps. The

t it le is self-expla n a t ory , but t he a ut hor gives

some a ccount of t he ea rlier da ys of Ma rine

C orps Avia t ion, I t is by fa r t he most compre-

hensive t rea t ment of t his subject n ow in ex.

istence.

E . B . P ot t er ( Edit or), The [’nited .qtate,s and

World Sea Power. h “ew Yor k : P r en tice-H a ll,

Inc., 1955. This la rge ( 963 pa ges) single-

volrrme hist ory is t h e w ork of t w elve fa cult y

members of t he I )epa rt ment of E nglish, H istory

a nd G overnment , U . S . Na va l Aca demy. I t iS

ext r em el y com pr eh en si ve in scope, covering

na va l hist ory from a ncient opera tions t o t oda y.

As a result compa ra t ively few of it s cha pters



P rincet on Llniversit y P ress, 1951. This dea ls

w ith t he evolut ion of a mphibious doct rin es, t a c-

a re a pplica ble t o Ma rine Corps opera t ion s in

World Wa r I I . I t furnished th e a uthors of t his

376 P EARL H AR B OR TO G UAD ALC ANAL

spon dent in Wa sh ingt on a t t h e t ime of P ea r l

H a rbor , w a s in t ern ed a n d t h en repa t r ia t ed in

t h e civilia n exch a n ge sh ip. H e un der st an ds

t h or ough ly bot h J apa n ese a nd U . S . point s of

view . H is “in side st ory” present s vividly po-

lit ica l, milit a ry, a nd civilia n con dit ion s in J a pa n

a s t h e w a r developed a nd sh eds much light on

w h y t h ey developed a s t h ey did on t he en emy’s

side.

U nit ed S t a t es S t ra tegic B ombin g S urvey , Z’h c

C“ampaign8 of tile Pacific Way. Washington:

U . S . G overn m en t P riut iug Office, 1946. This isa

r epor t of U S S B S (P acific) Na va l An a lysis D i-

vision . I t a ttempt s t o present t h e broa d pict ur e

of t h e w a r t h rough br ief descr ipt ion s of t h e

va rious ca mpa ign s, but unfor t un a t ely w as pr e-

pa red t oo soon a ft er t he even t t o ga in d eep

perspective. Th e t ext cont a ins ma ny fa ct ua l

in a ccura cies. This book is of grea t va lue, hm v-

ever , in present in g t ra nsla tions of ma ny en emy

document s th a t revea l .J a pa nese w ar t ime t hiuk-

ing.

unit ed S ta t es S t ra t egic B ombing S ur vey, I a -

terrogatians of Japanew Oflcials, 2v01s. Wash-

in gt on: U . S . G overn men t P rin t in g Office, 1946.This is a compa nion repor t t o Campnign8

(a bove) a nd simila r ly is of va lue in t ell ing t h e

J a pa nese side of t he st ory .

P ART I

ment B urea u of S hips a n d S ena t e R eport No.

10, P a rt 16, 78t h C ongress, 2d S ession, Ad-

ditio?wt Report of the Special Committee In-

vcstigatinfl the h-ationat Defen.w Program, form

t he ba sis for t h e discussion of t he developm en t

of la ndin g cra ft a n d a mphibious veh icles.

The repor t s of t he unit s a ssign ed t o t h e I ce-

la n d occupa t ion force, supplemen t ed by com -

ma nd corr espon den ce t iles. pro~ ided t he t h rea d

of t h e n a rra t ive. E specia lly va lua ble a re t h e

officia l let t ers w rit t en by G enera l Ma rst on t o

va r ious officer s a t H ea dqua r t ers Ma rine C orps

givin g h is per son al a nd pr ofession al com men ta ry

on t he oper at ion .

[-no ficial A’oarres

Let t ers of commen t on dra ft ma nuscr ipt s, in -

t erview s, a n d in t h e ea se of t h e I cela nd oper a -

t ion , t h e ext ensive not es, correspon den ce, a n d

dra ft n a rra t ives of L ieut en a n t C olonel J oh n

L. Zimmerma n, h a ve supplement ed officia l ma -

ter ia l . E specia lly useful in pr ovidin g ba ck-

gr oun d in forma tion on t h e a mphibious t ra ct or

was a n in terview w it h Lieut ena nt C olon el E rnest

E . Lin ser t , a pa r t icipa nt in most of t h e init ia ls ta ges of it s d ev elopm en t.

I t w a s permissible t o keep a dia ry in a n over -

sea s t hea t re for t h e first few mon t h s of t h e w a r ;

t h ere w as n o prohibit ion , na tura lly , a ga in st t he

keepin g of dia ries in pea cet ime. G en era l Oliver

P . S mit h , w ho served a s ba t t a lion comm a nder

of 1/6 t h roughout t he I cela n d occupa t ion , kept



I NTROD ~ C TI ON TO TH E MAR I NE (’ORP S such a dia ry a n d ma de a C OP Y of it a ra ila ble t o

t he H ist or ica l B ra nch , G –3, H ea dqua rt ers Ma -

B IRLI OG RAI ’H I{”AL NOTE S 3-77

Corps Gazette, .J u n e-Oct ober 1948. Genera l

S mit h proba bly con t r ibut ed more t ha n a ny sin-

gle individua l t o t h e development s w hich h e dis-

cusses in t his a uth or it at ive five-pa rt a rt icle.

J oh n H . Russell, J r., “B ir th of t h e Fleet Ma -

r ine Force, ” U . S . Naval Inm%tute Proceed ing*s,

J a nua ry 1946. As Assista nt C omma nda nt , G en -

era l Russell con ceived t he FMF essent ia lly a s

it exist s t oda y; a s C omma nda nt , he guided it

t hrough its ea rly forma t ive yea rs.

H olla nd M. S mit h a n d P ercy Finch, Coral and

Brass. h “ew I ’ork: C ha rles S cr ibners S ons,

1949, I n t his a ut obiogra phica l volume, G en er a l

S mit h t ouch es a ga in on t h e ea rly st ruggles dea lt

w it h in his Gazettr series a nd ca rr ies t he st ory

t hrough t he P a cific w ar .

Ma jor G enera l J ohn A. Lejeun e, “Th e U nit ed

S ta tes Ma rine C orps,” Mar i ne ~oros Gazet t e,I )ecem ber 1923. I n t his a rt icle, G en er al L ejeu ne,

t hen C omm an da nt of t he Ma rine C orps, expresses

t he preva il ing Ma rine C orps t hough t on a dva nce

b a se op er a t ion s .

Rr iga dier G enera l D ion Willia ms, “B lue Ma -

r ine C orps E xpedit ion a ry Force,” Ma rine C orps

Gazrtte, S ept ember 1925. I n t his a r t icle, G en -

era l Willia ms discusses t he Arm y-Na vy a mphib.ious ma neuver h eld in H a wa iia n w at ers in 1925.

L ien tena nt C olonel Vict or .J . C roiza t , “The

M a ri nes ’ Am ph ib ia n ,” Ifarine Corps Gazette,

.Tun e 1953. Lieut en a nt C olon el C roiza t, in t his

a rt icle, rela tes t he st ory of t he a mphibia n t ra ct or .

S t et son C orm a n d B yron Fa irchild, “The

Fra mew ork of H emisphere D efense,” MS of a

for t hcom in g volume in t he series, United S’tates

ga rrison a ct ivit ies in S a moa a nd t he 14th Na va l

District . All Ma rin e records on G ua m w ere

eit her dest royed or ca pt ured a nd t he recon st ruc-

t ion of t he a ct ion on S -10 D ecember is la rgely

ta ken fr om t he post -ca pt ivit y repor t of t he

i sl an d’s g ov er nor .

Th e prima ry source of informa t ion on t he a c-

t ions of t he U n it ed S t a tes a nd J a pa n in t h e

per iod im media tely h efore, dur ing, a nd just a ft er

t he J a pa nese ra id on P ea rl is S ena t e D ocumen t

N o. 244, ‘79t h C on g res s, Report of the Joint Com-

mittee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor

Attack. I n a ddit ion t o t h e ba sic repor t of t he

findings of t he commit t ee, t here a re 39 volumes

of hea rings, t est imon y, a nd exh ibit s w hich t ouch

on every fa cet of t h e st ory. The r ecord of t he

hea r ings a nd t he a ppen ded documen t s con st i-

t ut e a un iq ue 10,000,000-w ord exa mina tion of a

m ilit a ry d is as ter .

Unoficiai DoctlmeTlt8

U nofficia l repor t s, persona l let t ers, not es a nd

in terview s of n um erous individua ls, a nd on occa -

sion unpublished ma nuscript s, h a ve been dra wn

upon t o supplem ent officia l ma teria l w here per t i-nen t . An especia lly va lua ble source of in forma -

t ion ha s been t he comment s of key pa rt icipa nts

in t he a ct ions descr ibed w h o r eview ed dra ft

ma n uscript s of t his h ist ory a s w ell a s dra ft s of

previous ca mpa ign m onogra phs. U nofficia l com -

ment of this t ype, a s cit ed in t h e t ext , ha s been

especia lly h elpful in developing a fuller st ory of

t he in it ia l a ct ion a t Midw a y.



Army in Jt’orli War II, ha s been most useful in

378 P E.$RL H ARB OR TO G ~ AD AL C ANAI ,

H ea dq ua r t ers Ma rine C orps, 1954. While t his

mon ogra ph is pr ima r ily con cer ned w it h t h e op

era t ions on G ua m in t h e summer of 1944, it does

in clude a na rra t ive of t h e J apa n ese ca pt ure oft he isla nd w h ich is t h e ba sis for t his volume’s

story.

Thoma s Wilds, “Th e J apa n ese S eizure of

Gu a m, ” Ilarinr Corps Gazette, J uly 1955. This

a rt icle by a n a ccomplish ed J a pa nese tra nsla tor

is t h e on ly published na rra tive t a ken from en em y

sources of t h e ca pt ure of t he isla n d a nd is essen-

t ia l t o a clea r pict ure of t h e opera t ion .

P AB T I I I

D E FE NS E OF WAK E

Oficial Documents

Officia l records per t a in in g t o t h e defen se of

Wa ke cea sed t o exist w it h t h e a t oll’s ca pt ure

by t h e J a pa nese, sa ~-e for t h e dispa tches w hich

got t hr ough t o P ea r l H a rbor a n d t he repor t s

P arr ied out by Ma jor B ayler severa l da ys pr ior

t o t h e fin a l st ruggle, a s rela ted in t h e n a rra tive.U pon his ret urn a ft er relea se fr om J apa nese

pr ison ca mp, C olon el D evereux request ed ea ch

of his surviving officer s t o submit t o him a n

informa l repor t concern in g his pa rt in t he opera -

t ion . F rom st udy of t h e ma t er ia l t h us obt a ined

a nd t he prom pt in gs of his ow n m em ory , D evereux

t hen prepa red his officia l r epor t for submission

lit t le ha s been publish ed a bout t he deta ils of t h e

opera t ion it self. S in ce it w a s so n a rrow ly a

Ma rine a ct ion , t he ot h er services h a ve sh ow n

lit t le in t erest in st udyin g it , a n d w it h in t h eC orps few rema in w h o kn ow much a bout it . Th e

follow in g w orks, h ow ever , a re deemed w ort h y

of men t ion :

I ,ieut en a nt C olonel Rober t D . H einl, ,J r ., Z’l~ e

D efcn w of Wa ke. Wa sh ingt on : H ist or ica l S ec-

t ion, D ivision of P ublic I nforma tion, H ea dq ua r-

t ers Ma rine C orps, 1947. This is t h e officia l

Ma rin e C orps h ist or ica l mon ogra ph fr om w hich

t he version in t his book ha s h een a da pt ed.

J ames P . S . D ever eux, Th e Story of Wake

IsZa??d. P hila delphia : J . B . Lippin cot t C om pa ny,

1947. This w ork prepa r ed by t h e comma nder of

t he Wa ke d efen se w it h som e pr ofession al lit er ar y

a ssist a nce does n ot pret en d t o be a h ist ory ,

but it does con t a in a n umber of huma n int erest

sidelight s n ot foun d elsew her e.

I .ieut en a nt C olon el Wa lter L. J . B ay ler , Last

Man ofl Wakr Island. I ndia na polis : B obbs-

Merrill C ompa ny, 1943. This book w a s rush ed t o

publica tion t o sh ed t imely light on a n even t cur-

ren t ly befor e t h e public eye. Memories of t h e

event s dur ing his st a y on Wa ke w ere st ill fresh

in C olon el E Myler ’s min d a t t h e t ime of w rit in g;

but , of course, h e did n ot see t he fin a l ba t t le.

Lieut ena nt C olon el R ober t D . H einl, J r .,

“We’re H ea ded for Wa ke,” Marine Corps Ga-

zette, J une 1946. Lieut ena nt C olon el H einl, t h en

a first lien t ena nt , w as a member of t h e a bor t ive

relief expedit ion a n d h er e gives a full a ccoun t



t o t h e C omma n da n t of t h e Ma rine C orps. C olo-

n el P aul A. P ut na m submit t ed a simila r repor tof t ha t lit t le un derst ood even t from t h e poin t

of view of t hose en ga ged in it .

I3I BL1OG RAP HIC AL NOTE S 379

few preyious a ccoun t s w h ich men t ion Ma rine

a ct ion in t he P hil ippines, t h ere a re a number of

direct cont ra dict ions t o t h e ent r ies in t hese

journa ls. NTon e of t hese errors a re pa rt icula rlyser ious, how ever , a nd w her e it w as possible t h ey

h a ye been correct ed in t his version of t he a ct ion.

A n um ber of t he officia l repor ts cit ed , in clu din g

tha t of t he 4t h Ma rines, w ere dra w n up lon g

a ft er t h e event s t h ey descr ibe by pa r t icipa nt s

w ho sur vived captivity. Th e det a ils of t h ese

repor t s a re somew ha t suspect since t he a ccount s

a re dist illa t ions of memory , ca refully h idden

n ot es, a nd t hose few officia l pa pers of t h e per iod

t ha t w ere a va ila ble w h en t h e repor t s w er e pr e-

pa red. I t is not difficult t o fin d minor errors int h ese repor t s, but on t he w h ole t h ey a re q uit e

valuable.

Th e cit ed na rra t ives compiled by Admira ls

H a rt a n d Rockw ell, t oget h er w it h t heir supple-

men t a ry post w ar commen t s on na va l a ct ivit ies

in Asia t ic w a t ers, ha ve been very helpful in

esta blishing t he ba ckground of t he Na vy a n d

Ma rine C orps cont r ibut ion t o t he defen se of t h e

Phil ippines.

~“noficial Docutafwt.9

A number of unda t ed in forma l repor t s sub-

mit t ed by survivors of t he 4th Ma rines, presum-

a bly w rit t en r igh t a ft er t he w ar , form t he la rgest

body of informa t ion a bout t h e Ma rine pa r t in t he

P hil ippines opera t ion . These repor t s a re fre-

q uent ly cit ed in t h e t ext . Of a lmost eq ua l im-

Jnpanese Sources

F ollow in g t h e close of t he w a r , t he U . S .

Army’s H ist or ica l S ect ion, G -2, G en era l H ea d-

qua r t ers, Fa r E a st C omma n d, spon sored a n d

direct ed t h e prepa ra t ion of a ser ies of mon o-

g ra ph s en t it led Japanese 8tt[die8 in World War

11. Th ese w er e prepa red by J a pa nese comma n-

ders a nd st a ff officers w h o h a d pa r t icipa t ed in

t he va rious P a cific ca mpa igns; a nd t hey w er e

compiled fr om report s, not es, a nd consult at ion

w it h key survivors. These t ra nsla ted st udies

ha ve been checked ca refully a ga inst a ll ot her

a va ila ble sources a nd foun d t o be rema rka bly

a ccura t e, I n t h e ca se of t h e ea r ly P hilippin esca mpa ign severa l of t hese m onogra ph s ha ve been

consult ed a nd t h e t w o-volume st udy of Four-

t een th Ar m y oper at ion s h as been u sed fr eq uen tly

t o give t he en emy view point , This pa r t icula r

monogra ph is ver y un even in qua lit y but it

includes a w ea lt h o f in for ma tion a va ila ble

n ow h er e el se.

Books and Periodicals

L ouis Mor ton , The Fall of the Philippines,Wa sh ingt on: Office of t h e C hief of Milit a ry

H ist ory , D epa r t ment of t h e Army, 1953. D r .

Mort on ’s book, is a not h er of t h e volumes of t h e

Uni ted State8 Army in World War II series.

I t present s w ha t is ea sily t he most compr ehen -

sive a n d t hor ough t rea tment of t his subject yet

t o a ppea r in pr in t.

Wesley F. C ra ven a nd J a mes L. C a t e (E di-



port an ce a re t he let t ers of com men t received from t or s ), Plan8 and Earlg Operations, JanuarV

380

propa ga nda booklet . pr in ted in E nglish , cont ains

a number of second-ha n d a ccount s of en emy

exper iences in t he seizure of C orregidor . The

book h a s been used principa lly t o give person a l.it y t o t he en emy side of t h e a ct ion. A ph ot o-

st a t ic copy of this book is h eld by t h e (Mice of

t h e C h ief of Milit a ry H ist ory .

H a n son W. B a ldw in, “Th e 4th Ma rines a t

Corregidor,” }ffl~-i?tf) ~Orp,S tzc~tc, November

1946–F eb rn a ry 1947, On e of t oda y ’s lea ding

a na lyst s a nd w rit ers on milit a ry subject s ca re-

fully combed t h e 4t h Ma rines’ r epor t , t h e per -

sona l na rra tives of survivors men t ioned a bove,

a nd con sult ed n um er ous in dividua l pa rt icipa nt s

in compilin g his det a iled four-pa r t a r t icle on

t h e st a n d of t h e regimen t on C orr egidor . Th e

priln a ry fa ult of t he st udy is th a t it fa iled t o

ut ilize t h e exist in g 4t h Ma rin e journa ls a nd

t h erefore h a s perpet ua t ed a n umber of minor

er rors rega rdin g t h e comba t orga n iza t ion a nd

st ren gt h of t he r eg im en t.

First L ieut ena n t Willia m F. H oga boom,

‘“.ict ion R epor t-13 a ta a u, ” .lfarinc Corps Gaeettc,

April 1946. Lieut ena nt H oga boom died w hile h e

w as a pr ison er of w ar h ut his n a rra tive, secret ly

compiled dur in g ca pt ivit y , survived h im a nd w as

published un der t his t it le. H oga boom pa rt ici-

pa t ed in bot h of t h e ma jor Ma rine a ct ion s in

t h e P hilippin es, Lon goska w aya n P oint a nd C or-

r eg id or ’s d ef en s e.

L ieu ten an t C olon el Willia m F . P ricket t, “NTa va l

B a tt alion a t Ma riveles,” lf(zritie Corp,S Gazette,

,Tun e 1950. This a rt icle by a survivor of 3/4


Uwoficial Documents

I n course of prepa ra tion of t he hist orica l m on o-

gra ph on w h ich t his a ccoun t is ma in ly ba sed,

Lieut en a nt C olonel Rober t D . H ein l, J r ., ca rr ied

on ext en sive correspon dence w it h individua ls

w h o h eld key posit ion s on Midw a y before a nd

durin g t he a tt ack. Ma nyof t hese r ein ter view ed

person a lly . S ome of this documen t a tion is cit ed

in t h e t ext ; much more, of incident a l in terest ,

is on file in Ma rin e C or ps Ar ch ives.

Books and Periodica.1.s

As w it h precedin g descript ion s of n ava l oper a-

t ion s, t h e previously cit ed sources h a ve been

relied on. I n a ddit ion, t h e follow in g w orks

ha ve been ext en sively consult ed a nd used for

t his pa rt :

L ieut ena nt C olonel Rober t D . H einl, J r., Ma -

r ines d MidwaV. Wa sh ingt on: H ist or ica l S ec-

t ion, D ivision of P ublic I nforma tion, H ea dqua r-

t ers Ma rine C orps, 1948. This is t h e hist or ica l

mon ogra ph w hich, much -edit ed a nd re-w orked,

forms t h e foun da t ion for t he presen t a ccoun t .

M. Fuchida a n d M. Okumiya , Midwug: The

Battle ttLat Doo?ned Japan. Anna polis: U . S .

N’a va l I n st it ut e, 1955. This is a n excellen t

a ccoun t of t he ba t t le from t h e J apa nese side

of t he a ct ion .

Yice Admira l C h uichi Na gumo, I J hT, “Act ion

Report by C -in-C of t h e First Air F leet ,” ONI

R mir w,Ma y1947. Th is a rt icle issim ply at ra ns-

la t ion of w ha t must st a nd a s on e of t h e most



w ho ta lked t o ma ny pa r t icipa n t s in t he L ongos- revea lin g docum en ts obt ain ed fr om t he J a pa nese

381

sponden ce a n d pla nn ing a t t op level. The cor-

respon dence bet ween .4dmiYa l K ing a nd G en era l

Ma rsha ll w a s obt a in ed from t he Na va l H ist ory

D ivision ; ma ter ia l per t a in ing t o t he J oint C hiefsof S t a ff w as furnished by t he Office of t he C h ief

of Milit a ry H ist ory , D epa r t ment of t h e Army.

As in a ll opera tions discussed in t his hist ory,

t hose in P a rt VI a re ba sed on t he repor t s of t h e

unit s con cern ed. Th ese in clude a ct ion repor t s,

w ar dia r ies, etc., of t a ct ica l unit s, a nd t h e jour-

na ls of t he va rious st a ff sect ions. At t his st a ge

of t h e w a r, h ow ever , Ma rines w ere less exper i-

en ced in prepa r ing repor t s t ha n t hey beca me

later. C omma n d a nd st a ff person nel believed

fight ing t o be mor e import a nt t ha n w rit ing.Thus t he document a t ion on ma ny pha ses of

ea rly opera tions is fra gmen ta ry a nd incomplet e.

The 1st Ma rine D ivision’s “17ina l Report on t he

G ua da lca na l Opera tion ’+ w as not compiled unt il

severa l mon t hs a ft er t he ca mpa ign, a l t hough

much of t he ma t er ia l it con ta ins w a s prepa r ed

on t h e scene.

The .4rmy a nd N’a vy w ere lit t le bet t er t ha n

t h e Ma rine C orps in this respect ; t h eir officia l

document a t ion a lso lea ves much t o be desired.

G enera lly spea king, t he records of repor t in gunits a re in t h e cust ody of t he service t o w hich

t hey b elon g.

~:no~cial Documents

I n t he course of prepa r in g t he Ma rine C orps

prelim ina ry “m onogra ph on G ua da lca na l, Ma jor

.J oh n L. .Zimmerma n circula t ed copies of his

H ea dqua r t ers Ma rine C orps, 1949. This is t he

Ma rine C orps’ prelimin a ry st udy w hich serves a s

t h e groundw ork for t h e I mesent , complet ely re-

vised a nd much more complet e, a ccoun t of t hebattle.

J ohn Miller , J r ., Guadalcanal: The First Offen-

sive. Wa sh ingt on: H istorica l D ivision , D epa rt -

men t of t he k-my, 1949. This excellent volume

is one in t he ser ies l~ nitwl Stutc’s Army in World

War II, a nd it ha s been relied on for much of t he

int erpret a tion of ma teria l pert a in ing t o Army

comma nd a nd opera tions of Army unit s.

Wesley F. C ra ren a nd J a mes L. C at e (E dit ors),

The Pacific: GuUdalCU?Lal to 8aipan. . C hica go :

[University of C h ica go P ress, 1950. Volume I V

of t he ser ies Tlt e Artm J Air Forces in World War

11, t his dea ls in grea ter det a il w it h a via tion oper-

a t ions t ha n is pra ct ica l in a genera l hist ory of

t h e ca m pa i gn .

H erber t L. Merilla t , Th e I.slaad. Boston:

H ought on Mifflin C ompa ny, 1944. The a ut h or

pa rt icipa t ed in opera t ion s on G ua da lca na l a nd

w rites a t first ha nd, a nd w it h much huma n int er-

est , of w ha t h e a n d his fellow Ma rines exper-

i en ced t h er e.

E r ic A, Feldt , Tl( e Coast watcl cr8. New I“ork:

Oxford ~ niversit y P ress, 1946. Commander

Feldt , RAN, orga n ized a nd comma n ded t ha t

ha rdy ba nd of rugged individua list s w ho lurked

in t h e jun gle behind t h e J a pa nese lines a nd

ra dioed out in va lua ble in forma tion t o t he Allied

forces. H ere h e t ells for t he first t ime t he st ory

I vh ich w a s t op secret dur ing t h e w a r.



prelimina ry dra ft a mon g ma ny individua ls w ho Ma ny a r t icles in periodica ls w ere likew ise

APPEN DI X B

Chronology

The follow in g list ing of event s is limit ed t o

t h ose comin g w it h in t h e scope of t his book, a n d

t h ose foreca st in g even t s t o be t rea t ed in t h e

v olu mes t o foll ow .

10h ’ovember 1775--- C on t inen t a l C on gress a u-

t h or izes ra ising of t w o

ba tt alion s of Ma rin es.11 J u ly 1798 -------- C on gress rea ct iva tes Ma-

r in e C or ps .

10 J un e 1898 . . . . . . . B at ta lion of Nla rines seizes

G ua nt a na rn o B ay ; pre-

limina ry t hinking on

Ad va nced B a se con cept

begins.

10 D ecember 1898. -. S pa in cedes P hilippines,

G ua m, a n d P uer t o R ico

t o [J. S.

13 J uly 1910 . . . . . . . . Ma rine S chool for Ad-va n ced B a se Tra inin g

established.

25 Apr il 1915 _______ F irst m od er n a mph ibiou s

a ssa ult : B rit ish la n d on

Gall ipoli .

27 April 1917 _______ First Ma rine a via tion unit

formed: ‘‘ h la r in e Aer o-

7 Ma y ------------- P a cific Fleet or der ed by

P residen t t o rema in in -

definit ely in H aw aiia n

waters .

5 J uly ------------- E xport C on t rol Act in -

voked a ga in st J apa n t oproh ibit expor t a tion of

st ra tegic ma ter ia ls a nd

equipment.

19 J uly_ ___________ P resident signs Na va l E x-

pa nsion Act con ta ining

provision s for “Two

Ocea n Na vy .”

29 S ept ember ------- Midw a y D et a chmen t ,

FMF a rr ives a t Mid-

w a y .

8 Oct ober . . . . . . . . . . U . S . a dvises it s cit izens t o

lea ve Fa r E ast .

1941

12 Ma y ------------ Amba ssa dor Nomura of

J a pa n present s S ecre-

t a ry of S t a t e C ordell

H ull w it h J a pa nese pro-



na ut ic C ompa n y, Ad-

va nced B ase Force. ”

posa l for a “just pea ce

in t he P acific. ”

CHRONOLOGY 383

7 J uly . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1st Ma rin e B r iga de la nds

in I cela n d. 1st Ma rin e

Aircra ft Win g forms a t

Qua nt ico, Va .

10 J uly ------------ 2d Ma rine Aircra ft Wing

forms a t S a u D iego,

Cal i f .

15 August ----------- Na va l Air S t a t ion, P a l-

myra I sla nd, a nd Na va l

Air F a cilit y, J oh n st on

I s la n d , e st a b li sh ed .

11 S ept ember -------- P resident orders Na vy t o

a tta ck a ny vessel t hrea t-

en in g U . S . sh ippin g.

14 Novem ber . . . . . . . Ma r in es a re ordered t o

l ea ve S ha n gh a i, P ei pi ng ,

a nd Tient sin , C hina .

20 .Xovember -------- Amba ssa dor Nomura pre-

sen ts J a pa n’s “fin al pr o-

posa l” t o keep pea ce in

t h e P a ci fi c.

26 November ------- S ecr et ary of S ta te submit s

fin a l proposa ls for a d-

just ment of U . S .-J a-

p a n es e r el a t ion s .

27 November _______ Adm S t a rk, C NO, sen ds

w a r w a rn in g t o com -

ma n ders of t h e P acific

a nd Asia tic F leet s.

30 Novem ber ------- J a pa nese F oreign Minist er

Tojo reject s C T. S . pro-

posa ls for set t ling Fa r

10 D ecember __ _ ____ G ua m surrenders t o J a pa -

n es e l an din g f or ce.

11 D ecember- -. ._-. U . S . decla res w a r on G er -

ma n y a nd I t a ly , Wa ke

I sla n d d ef en der s r epu ls e

J a pa n ese la n ding a t -

t empt . J apa n ese ma ke

a ddit iona l la n dings in

Phil ippines.

20 D ecember __ . . ..-_ Adm E . J . K ing becomes

C omma n der in C h ief,

cl . s. F leet .

21 D ecem ber ___ .._-_ hTa va l defen se for ces in

P h il ippin e I sla nds m ov eh ea dq ua r t ers t o C or-

regidor.

22 D ecem ber ___ ____ J a pa nese la nd a t Lin ga yen

G ulf, P . I .

23 D ecember _ __ ---- Wa ke I sla nd surrenders t Q

J apanese .

25 D ecember _ _ . ____ B rit ish surren der Hong

Kong.

26 D ecember _ _ _ ____ Ma n ila , P . I ., decla red a n

open cit y.

31 D ecem ber- ------ Adm C . W. Nimit z a s-

sumes com ma n d of P a -

cifi c F leet a t P ea rl H a r-

bor.

1942

2 J an ua ry ---------- Ma nila a n d C a vit e, P . I .,

fa ll t o J a pa nese.



E a st cr isis .

11 J an ua ry . . . . . . . . . J apa n ese begin in va sion of

384 I ’E ARL H ARB OR TO G UAD ALC ANAL

6 Februa ry . . . . . . . . .

81?ebrua ry . ..--... _

9 Februa ry . . . . . . . . .

1 5 F e br u a r y --------

27 Februa ry .-. . . . . .

1 March -----------

8 Ma rch . . . . .-- . . . .

9Ma rci~ - . . ..-- . . . .

10 Mar ch ----------

11 Ma rch)-----------

12 Ma rch]. . . . . . . . . .

26 Ma rch)----------

29 March ----------

30 Ma rch ____-- . . . .

1 April -------------

[T. S. a nd B rit a in est a b-

lish C ombin ed C hiefs of

S ta ff (C CS ).

J a p a n e s e la nd a t G a s-ma t a , New B rita in.

.J a pa nese la nd a t S inga -

S i ng a por e s ur r en d er s.

B a t t le of J ava S ea .

B at t le of S unda S t ra it .

J apa n ese la nd a t La e a nd

Sa la ma ua , New G uinea .

J ava surrenders t o J apa -

n ese, en din g con quest of

N et ber la ud s E a st I nd ies .J a pa nese in va de F in sch -

h afen , New G uin ea .

G en Ma cArt hur lea ves

P h ilippin es for Au s-

t ra l i a ,

[J. S. forces a rr ive in New

Caledonia.

Adm K in g relieves Adm

S t a rk a s C h ief of Na va l

Operations.

Ma rines a rr ive a t E fa te,N ew H eb ri des .

P acific Ocea n divided int o

P a cific Ocea n Ar ea s

under Adm h’imit z, a nd

S out hw est P acific Area

under G en Ma cArthur.

J a pa nese occupy B uka

I s la n d , S ol om on s .

28 Ma y. ..-. -.... .-

3 J une . . . . . . . . . .._.

4–6 J une -----------

14 J une ------------

19 J une ------------

25 J une ------------

18 J uly --------- --

21 J uly ------------

7 August -----------

U . S . forces a rr ive a t E s-

pir it u S a nt e, New

Hebrides.

t J a pa nese bom b D ut chH a rbor; la n don K iska

n nd At tll, Wes ter n

Aleutians.

B at tle of Midw ay.

First ech elon of 1st Ma r-

D iv a rr ives a t Welling-

t on, New Zea la nd,

VAdm G horm ley a ssumes

comma nd of S out h

P acific Area a nd S out h

P a c if ic F or ce s.P resident Roosevelt a n d

P rim e Min ist er C hur ch -

ill con clu de con fer en ce

in Wa shin@m; decision

r ea ch ed for com bin ed ef-

for t s t o develop a tomic

bomb.

Amph ibious Force, S out h

P acific Area , is esta b-

lished under comma nd

of RAdm Turner .J apa nese la n d a t B una ,

New G uin ea .

1st Ma rD iv la n dson Flor-

ida , Tulagi, Ga v u t u ,

Ta n a mbogo, a nd G ua -

da lca na l in S out h ern

S olomons t o la unch t h e

first U . S . offen sive of



5 April ------------- Ma nuslsla nd, Adm ira l-t he w ar.

CHRONOLOGY

20 August ---------- First figh t er a ircra ft a r-

r ive on H en der son F ield,

Gu a d a l c a n a l .

21 August ---------- Ma rines t urn ba ck first

ma jor J a pa n ese a t ta ck

on G ua da lca na l in B r it -

t le of t he Ten aru,

24–25 August ------- Na va l B a t t le of E a st ern

Solomons.

13 S ept ember _______ Ma rines repulse secon d

ma jor J a pa nese groun d

a t ta ck a t G ua da lca na l

in t he B a t t le of t h e

Ridge.

18 S ept ember ------- 7t h Ma rines a rr ive on

11–12 O ct o be r ____

13 October _______

14 October _______

1 8 O ct o be r -------

20–250ct ober - ___


Na va l B a t t le of C a pe E s-

pera nce. U . S . forces

un der Adm S prua nce

en ga ge J a pa n ese ships

of t h e “Tokyo E xpress. ”

164t h I nfa nt ry Regim en t

of Am erica l D ivision a r-

r ives t o reinforce 1st

MarDiv.

J a pa nese ba t t leships a ndcruisers bomba rd H en -

d er son F iel d.

VAdm H a lsey relieves

VAdm G hor mley a s

C omma n der S out h P a -

cific Area a n d S out h

P a ci fi c F or ce,

Ma rines a nd .4rmy t roops

13 N ov em b er ____

14 N ov em ber ____

15 N ov em ber -----

16 N ov em b er ----

9 D ecember . . . . .

17 D ecember - . . .

385

RAdm C a lla gha n ’s ta sk

group of cruisers a nd de-

st royers enga ges J a pa -

n ese ra idin g group in -

cl ud in g t w o b at tlesh ips,

in second n ight of B a t -

t le of C ,ua da lca na l. U .

S . force h ea vily da m-

a ged, l)ut J a pa n ese r-c-

tire.

J a pa nese cruisers a n d de-

st royers bomba rd H en -

d er son F iel d.

RAdm L ee w it h t w o ba t -

t leships a nd four de-st roy er s t ur ns ba ck la rge

J a pa nese n a va l gr oup t o

en d n a va l B a t t le of


U . S . Army forces la nd

sout h of B un a , New

Gu i n e a .

Ma j G en A. A. Va n de-

gr ift , C G 1st Ma rD iv,

is relieved by Ma j G en

A. M. P at ch, C G Amer -ica l D ivision , a s com-

ma ndin g gener a l of

G ua da lca na l. 1st Ma r-

D iv m a kes pr epa r at ion s

t o ret ire from comba t

zon e t o reh a bilit a te a nd

re t ra in.

U . S . Army forces begin



fight off h ea vy groun d a t ta cks a ga inst . J apa -



APPEN DI X C

Marine Task Organization

and Command List 1

A. WAK E ATOLL (7–23 D ecember 1941) ~

M AR I NE D E TAC H M E NT, WAK E

C O-------------- Ma j J ames P , S . D ever eux

Ist Defense Battalion Detachment

CO-------------- Ma j J ames P . S . D evereux

5-Inch Artillery Group

CO . . . . . . . . . . ---- Ma j G eor ge H . P ot t er

B try A----------- lst Lt C la ren ce A. B arniuger

B tr y B ___________ lst Lt Wood row - W. K essler

B tr y L ___________ 2d Lt J oh n A, McAlist er

3-I nch A nt iai r cr aft G rou p

CO-------------- C a pt B rygh t e D , G odbold

B try D __________ C a pt B rygh t e D . G odbold

B t ry E ----------- lstLt Willia m W. Lew is

13t ry F (P rov) ---- MG C la ren ce B . McK in st ry

&’eparate Batt er ies

B . P HI L IP PI NE I S L AND S (7 D ecember 1941–6

Ma y 1942) 3

4TH M AR I NE S (R E I N FO R CE D )

co

E xO _____________R-l -------------

R-2-------------

R -3-------------

R-4-------------

Hq Co ------------

S ervo---- . . . . . . . .

C ol S amuel L. H ow ard

C ol D on ald C urt isC a pt Rober t B . Moore

lstLt Rober t F . R uge (To

24Dec)

Lt C ol G eorge D . H a milt on

(F rom 25D ec)

Ma j Fra nk P , P yzick

Ma j R egin a ld H . R idgely ,

J r . (To3J a n )

Ma j C a r l W. Meigs (Fr om

4 J a n )

C a pt R ober t C ha mbers, J r.(WI A 6M ay )

M aj Ma x W. S ch a ef fer (WI A

6-May)

l.st B at tal i on , J th M ar in es

coE xO -------------

Lt C ol C ult ist . B eech er

Lt C ol S a muel W. F reen y

(WIA29Apr)



B try G ___________ C a pt Wesley McC , P la tt Bll-l ------------ C a pt G olI a n d L. C la rk, J r.


B OO ------------ C a pt P a ul A. B row n (WI A

4May)

lstLt Alla n S . Ma nn ing

(Act g From 5Ma y)D C O ------------ C a pt Noel O. C a st le (K I A

6May)

B nR esC o --------- lstLt R ober t F . J enkins, J r.

f?nd B at tal ion, i th Marines

coE xO -------------

B n–l ------------

B n –2 ------------

B n -3 ---- --------

B n –4--------- --

Hq Co ------------

E co------------

F Co ------------

H C o-------------

Lt C ol H erma n R. Ander son

Ma j J ohn J . H eil

lst Lt H ugh R. Nut t er (To

28Dec)

C a pt Lloyd E . Wa gn er

(F rom 29D ec)lst Lt H ugh R , Nut t er (To

28Dec)

C a pt Lloyd E , Wa gn er

(29 Dec-6Ja n)

lst Lt S idney F. J enkin s

(F rom 7J a n)

Ma j J oh n J . H eil

C a pt Aust in C . S hofn er

lstLt Aust in C . S h ofn er

(t o 4J a n)

C a pt L loyd E . Wa gner

(From 5J a n)

Ma j J ames V. B ra dley , J r.

C a pt Lloyd E . Wa gn er (To

28Dec) s co-------

C a pt C lyde R. H uddleson

(F rom 29D ec)

C a pt B en ja min L, McMa kin

(WI A 26Ma r)TCo ------

I C O------------- Ma j Ma x C la rk (WI A

24Apr,29Apr)

K C O------------ C a pt J oh n W. C la rk (To

31Dec)Ma j G eorge R. Weeks (From

1 J a n )

L C O------------ 2dLt Willa rd D . H oldredge

(To23Dec)

lst Lt H ow a rd L. D a vis

(24-31Dec)

C a pt Willis T. G eisma n

(F rom lJ a n , WI A20Apr )

M C o ------------ C a pt Ted E . P ulos

B n ResC o -------- lstLt C la ren ce E . Va n Ra y

ith B at tal i on (Pr ovi si on al ), i th M ar i nes

CO-------------- M aj Fra n cis H . Willia ms

(WI A29Apr, 6Ma y)

B n–l ------------ C a pt C a lvin E . C h unn , U S A

(~ IA 6Ma y)

B n–2____________ C a pt C a lvin E . C h unn , U SA

(WI A 6Ma y)

B n –3------------ lstLt Ot is E . S a a lma n , U S A

B n -4------------ E ns J ohn McC lure, U S iYR

(WI A 6Ma y)Q C O------------ C a pt P a ul E . Moore, U S A

R C O ------------ C a pt H a rold E . D a lness,---U S A

Lt E dw a rd N. Lit t le, U S N

(WI A 6Ma y)

lstLt Ot is E . S a a lma n, U S A

(F rom 6Ma y)

-,1.t B et h el B . Ot t er , U S N



BnRes Co________ C apt Aust in C . S h ofn er (K IA 6Ma y)

MARI ATE TAS K ORG .4NI ZATI ON AND C OMMAND LI S T 389

22d P rov Ma rC o ---

2 3d P r o v Ma r C o _. .

6-Inch

co_H & S B t r y --------

Bt ry A-----------

Bt ry B-----------

Bt ry C-----------

7“ Bury ----------

7 “ B t r y ----------

3“/50Btry -------

3“ /50 B t r y -------

lst Lt G eorge E . Met zent hin

C a pt B oyd O. Whit ney

A rt i ll er y G rou p

Lt C ol Lew is A. H oh n

Lt C olLew isA. H oh n

Ma j L oren S . Fra ser

C a pt R odn ey M. H a ndley

C a pt D ona ld N. Ot is

C a pt Ra lph A. C oll ins, J r.

C a pt H a rold R. Wa rner , J r.

C a pt J a y H . August in

C a pt Willia mR. D orr , J r.

S-I n ch . A nt ia ir cr af t G rou p

CO_-- . . . . . . . . ---- M aj C ha rles T. Tin gle

H &S B ury -------- MG Ma urice C . P ullia m

B t ry D ---------- C a pt J ea n H , B uckner

B t ry E ----------- Ma j H oyt McMilla n

B t ry F----------- C a pt D a vid }1’. S ilvey

B t ry G (S /L) ----- C a pt Alfred L. B oot h

.l I ach i ne-G un G rou p

coH&S Bury --------

. 50 C a l B t r y--_. ..

.30 C a l B t ry ------

3-Znch Antiairc@

co_H &S B t r y --------

Ma j R ober t E . H ommel

2dLt G eorge K . Acker

Ma j Willia m E . B oles

C a pt E dw in A. La w

Group, $d Defense Bat ta l ion

Ma j C h a ndler W. J ohn son

Ma j C h a ndler W. J oh nson

VMS B -241------- Ma j L oft on R. H en derson

(MI A 4J un )

Ma j B en ja min W. Norr is

(MI A 4J un )C a pt Ma rsha ll A. Tyler

(From 4J u n)

D . G U AD ALC Ah’AL (7 August 1942-t 3 F ebrua ry

1943) 4

F I RS T M AR I NE D I VI S I ON (R E I NF OR C ED )

Division Headquarters

(7Aug42-8Dec42)

C G -------------- Ma j G en .klexa nder A. Va n-

degrift

AD C ------------ B riG en Willia m H . Rupert us

C obs . . . . . . . . . . . . . C ol Willia m C . J a mes (To

21Sep)

C ol G er a ld C . Thoma s

(F rom 21S ep )

D –l. . . . . . . . . . . . . C ol Rober t C . K ilma r t in , J r .

(To 2 1S ep )

Ma j J a mes C . Murra y , J r .

(F rom 22 S ep)

D –2------------- Lt C ol F ra nk B . G oet t ge

(MI A 12Au g)

Lt C ol E dmund J . B uckley

(F rom 14Au g)

D –3. . . . . . . . . . . . . Lt C ol G era ld C . Th oma s

(To 2 0S ep )

Lt C ol Merrill B . Tw in ing

(F rom 21S ep)

D –4------------- Lt C ol Ra n dolph McC . P a te

(To 2 10 ct )

Lt C ol Ra ymon d P . C offma n



Bt ry D---------- Ma j Willia m S . McC orm ick

390

1s1 E n gi n eer B at t al i on

(7Aug42-22Dec42)

CO -------------- Ma j J a mes G . Fra zer (TrI

240ct)

Ma j H en ry H . C rocket t

(F rom 250ct )

I st M edical Bat ta l ion

(7 Aug42-22Dec42)

C O . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C dr D on S . K n ow lt on , MC

(To 1 4D e c)

LC dr E veret t B . K eck, MC

(F rom 15D ec)

1st P ar a ch u te B at t al i on

(7 Aug42-18Sep42)

C O . . . ..-. ._ . . . .- Ma i Rober t H . Willia ms

co

(WIA 7~ug)

Ma j C ha rles A. Miller

(8Aug-5Sep)

C apt H arry L. Torger son

(6-8Sep)

Ma j C ha rles A. Miller

(9-17Sep)

C a pt H a rry L, Torger son(F rom 18S ep)

Ist Pioneer Bat ta l ion

(7Aug42-22Dec42)

C ol G eorge R. R ow a n (To

19Sep)

Ma j Rober t G . B alla nce

(F rom 20S ep)


Forward E ch el on , I st Tank Bat ta l ion

(7 Aug42-22Dec42)

C O-------------- Ma j H a rvey S , Wa lset h

Ist Marines

(7Aug4Z22Dec42)

C O -------------- C ol C lift on B . C a t es

1st B n ___________ Lt Col Len ard B . C ressw ell

2d B n____________ Lt Col E dw in .4. P ollock (To

22Sep)

Lt C ol Willia m W, S t ickney

(F r om 24S ep)

3d B n------------ Lt C ol Willia m N. iMcK elvey ,

J r.

5th Mar ines

(7Aug4Z9Dec42)

co

lst Bn -----------

C ol L eroy P . H unt (To

19Sep)

C ol Merrit t A. E dson (From

21Sep)

Lt C ol Willia m E . Ma xw ell

(To 2 8Au g )

Ma j D ona ld W. F uller (30

Au g-ll Oct )

Ma j Willia m P . Thyson, J r.

(120ct)

Ma j Willia m K . E nrigh t

(13-230ct)

Ma j Willia m P . Thyson, J r.

(24-3ooct)

Ma j Willia m K . E nrigh t



MAR INE TAS K OR GANI ZATI ON

7th Mar ines

(18Sep42-5J an 43)

C O . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C ol J a mes C .

19Sep)C ol Amor LeR.

20Sep)

AND C OMMAXD LI S T 391

5t h B n ----------- Lt C ol E ugen e H . P r ice (To

3ooct)

Webb (ToMa j Noa h P . Wood, J r .

(F rom 1 Nov)

S im s (F rom ,l?d R ai d er B at t al i on

1st B II - ---------- Lt C ol L ew is B . P uller (WI A

8NOV)

hfa j J ohn E . Weber (9–

17Nov)

Lt C ol Lew is B . P uller (F rom

18NOV)

2d B n------------ Lt C ol H erma n H . H a n n eken

(To 1 7N ov )

Ma j Odell M. C on oley (18-28Nov)

Lt C ol H erma n H . H an n eken

(F rom 29N ov )

3d B n ------------ Lt C ol E dw in J . Fa rrell (To

21Sep)

Lt C ol Willia m R. Willia ms

(F r om 24S ep )

(4 Nov42-17Dec42)

C O -------------- Lt C ol E va ns F. C a r lson

.9d B a r r a g e B a l loon S qu ad r on

(8Sep42-8Feb43)

C O-------------- C a pt Rober t C . McD ermon d

3d D ef en se B at t al i on

(7 Aug42-8Feb43)

C O-------------- C ol Rober t H . P epper (To

28Nov)

Lt C ol H a rold C . Rober t s

(29 Nov-l l Ja n)

Lt C ol S a muel G , Ta xis

(F rom 12J a n )

D et ach m en t A , 6t h D ef en se B at ta li on11 th M a r i nes

(7Aug42-22Dec42)R ed esi gn at ed 14 th D ef en se”B at ta l i on , 1 5J a n&

(8S e~ 42-8Feb43)

colst B n . . . . . . . . . . .

C O-------------- Lt C ol Willia m F. P arks (To

5Dec)

C ol G alen M. S t urgis (F rom

5Dec)

B r iG eu P edro A. del Va n e

Lt C ol J oseph R. K n ow la n

(To 18 0ct )

Lt Col Ma nly 1,. C urry (18

Ott–27hTov)

Lt C ol D on ova n D . S uit

(28 Nov-20Dec)

ila j Lew is J . F ields (F rom

21Dec)

9th D ef en se B a t ta l i on

(30 Nov42-8Feb43)

C O_ . . . . . . . . . . . . . C ol D a vid R. Nimmer (To

2Feb)



2d B l~ ____________ Lt C ol E dw a rd J , H a gen

392

Zd Special Weapons Bat ta l ion

(7Aug 42-8Feb43)

C O-------------- Lt C ol P a ul D .S herm an (To co..

8 J a n )

Ma j G uy E . Ta n nyhill

(9-12J an )

Lt C ol P a ul D . S h erma n

(F rom 13J a n )

2d M a ri n es

(7Aug42-31J an 43)

C O -------------- C ol J oh n M. Art hur co--

I st B n ----------- L tC ol Rober t E . H ill (WI A11Nov)

Ma j Wood B . K yle (From

P EARL H AR B OR TO G UAD .4LC ANAL

3d B at ta li on , 10t h Marines

(7 Aug42-8Feb43)

Lt C ol Ma nly L. C ur ry (To

170ct)

Lt C ol D on ova n D . S uit

(180ct-27Nov)

Lt C ol Ma nly L. Curry

(F rom 28N ov )

2d A vi at ion E ngi n eer B at tal i on

(30J an 43-8Feb43)

Ma j C ha rles O. C la rk

1 l th D ef en se B at ta li on

(17 J an43–8Feb43)

11Nov)–,

2d B n ------------ L tC ol Orin K . P ressley (To C O-------------- C ol C ha rles N. Muldrow

14Dec)

Ma j E w a r t S . La ue (Fr om M AR IN E AI R U NI TS

14Dec)

3d B n ------------ L tC ol Rober t G . H unt H ea dqu ar ter s D et ach men t, l st M ar i ne A i rcr af t W in g

6t h Marines

(4Ja n43-8Feb43)

C O-------------- C ol G ilder D . J ackson, J r.

1st B n ----------- Lt C ol Russell Lloyd

2d B n ------------ Ma j R a ymon d L. Murra y

3d B n ------------ Ma j Willia m A. K en gla

8th Mar ines

(2 Nov42-8Feb43)

(3Sep42-8Feb43)

C G --------------Cof s -------------

w-l -------------

w -2_____________

W-3. .-. . . . . . . . . .

Ma j G en Roy S . G eigerB riG en Louis B . Woods

Lt C ol P erry O. P a rmelee

(To 2 0N ov )

C a pt J a mes G . H opper

(21 N ov -20 D ee)

Lt C ol Thoma s G , E nnis

(F rom 21D ec)

L t C ol J oh n C . Munn

C ol La w son H . M. S a n der-



393ARI NE TAS K ORG ANI ZATI ON AND COMMAND LI ST

W–3------------- Lt Col J oe A. S moa k Marine Fighter Squadron 1.21

(To 29J a n ) (20ct42-28Ja n43)

Lt Col Willia m C . Lemly

(From 30J a n) C O-------------- Ma j Leona rd K . D a visW–4_____________ L tC ol F ra nklin G . C ow ie (WI A ll~ ov, To 16D ec)H qS q –2---------- Ma j Willia m K . S nyder

Marine Aircraft Group 14

(160ct42-8Feb43)

C O-____ . . . . . . . . . LtC ol Alber t D . C ooley

(To 17 D ec)

C ol Willia m O. B rice

(F rom 19D ec)

H qS q–14_________ C apt C la ude J . C arlson ,(To 1 7N ov )

Ca pt S t a n ley M. Ada ms

(F rom 18N ov )

S MS -14__________ Ma j Ar th ur R. S ta cey

Marine Ai rcr aj t Gr ou p 23

(20Aug42-4Nov42)

CO_. -.-. . . . . . . . . C ol Willia m J . Wa lla ce

H qS q-23_-. ..__ . . MG H a rla nd W. B ond

(To 2 40 ct )Lt C ol C ha rles L. Fike

(F r om 250 ct )

S MS -23---------- 2dLt J oseph A. P aw loski

MG Willia m F. Wilson (17:

31Dec)

Ma j D on a ld K . Yost (From

1 J a n )

Marine F igh ter S qu ad ron 122

(12Nov42-8Feb43)

C O-------------- C a pt Na t ha n T. P ost , J r ,

J r. (To 21 ~ OV)C a pt J a mes R. Anderson

(22 Nov-10Dec)

2dLt J oh n F. Tenvole (1 l–

23Dec)

Ma j E lmer E . B ra cket t , J r.

(24-29Dec)

C a pt Na t ha n T. P ost , J r .

(30 Dec-l l Ja n)

Ma j E lmer E , B ra cket t , J r.

(F rom 12J a n)

F li gh t E ch el on , M ar in e F igh ter Squ ad ron 1%3

(3 Feb43-8Feb43)

A dvan ce D et ach men ts, M ar i ne A ir cr aft G roup %5C O-------------- Ma j E dw a rd W. J ohn st on

(3Sep42-8Feb43) F li gh t E ch el on , M ar in e F igh ter Squ ad ron 124

coH qS q-25---------

LtC ol P erry K . S mit h (3 Feb43-8Feb43)

Ma j Leona rd W. Ash w ell




M ar in e Scou t-l ?om ber Squ ad ron 141

(23 Sep42-17Ja n43)

C O-------------- Ma j G ordon A. B ell (K I A140ct)

lst Lt Wort h a m S . Ash croft

(F rom 140ct , K IA8N ov)

lst Lt Rober t M. P at t erson

(%lNov)

2dLt J 1’a lter R. B art osh (12-

17XOV)

F l i g ht E ch el on , Marine Scout-Bomber

S qu ad r on 2 31

(30Aug42-14Nov42)

C O . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ma j L eo R. S mit h (To

18Sep)

C a pt R uben I den (From

19S ep, K IA 20S ep)

C a pt E lmer G . G lidden, J r.

(F r om 20S ep)

Ma j G eor ge A. S a r les Marine Scout -B om ber Squ ad ron 232

(18 Nov-16Dec)

C a pt C la ude A. C a r lson , J r.(20Aug42-2Nov42)

(F rom 17D ec) C O-------------- Lt C ol Richa rd C . Ma n grum

Marine Scout-Bomber S qua dr on 142 Marine Scou t-B om ber Squ ad ron ,233

(12 Nov42-8Feb43)(25Dec428Feb43)

C O-------------- Ma j Rober t H . ’Richa rdC O . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ma j C lyde T. Ma t t ison (To

F l igh t E ch el on , M a ri n e Scou t-B om ber Squ ad r on 14419Jan)

(5F eb43-8Feb43)Capt E lmer L. G ilber t

(F rom 20J a n )

C O-------------- C a pt Roscoe h’. N“elson

Flight Echelon, Marine Scout-Bomber

Flight Echelon, Marine Utility Squadron 162 Squadron 234(210ct42-8Feb43)

(28J an 43-8Feb43)

C O-------------- Ma j E lmore W. S eedsC O . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ma j Willia m D . R oberson

F li gh t E ch el on, M ar ine Ph otogr aph ic

Squadron 154

(10iYov42-8Feb43)

.V ar i ne O bser c* at i on S qu ad ron 2’51

(19Aug42-8Feb43)

C O-------------- Lt C ol E lliot E . B a rdC O . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I .t C ol J ohn N. H a r t (To

290ct)



APPEN DI X D

Marine Casualties’

L o c a t i o n a n d d a t e

— ——_ —.-- M a r i ne s

—————_

G ua m ------------------(7-10 D ec 41)

Wake Atoll _____________(7-23 D ec 41)

K I A

: ‘ I T

D OW WI A

offi- E n l is t ed of fi - E r d is t ed O ff i. E n l is t efcer cer cer

—— — . - ——

. —. .= —— ____

4 ____ 1 -... 1;

. —. — ___ 4

— — — — . — — .P hilippines -------------- 43 267 ---- 5 33 324

(7 D ec 41-6 Ma y 42)— . — — . _ _

M id w a y I s la n d s _________ 2 8 1 ------ 14 25(7 D ec41-6J un 42)

.— ——l—-l———— l—-l— I—l—_

Ma kin . . . . . ..--- . . . . . . . 1 17 ____ . . . . . . 2 14

(1 7-1 8 Au g 42 )——— — —— — —

Guadalcanal ----------

(7 Aug42-8F eb 43)——.=

Na va l Med ica l P er son nelOrga nic t o Ma rineU n i t s

——_—

P hilippines --------------(7 D ec 41-6 Ma y 42)

~———_——.--..1

. ——— .

MI AP D I K D P OW

offi- E n l is t ed of fi - E n li st eccer cer

. — —— —

. .—— —— __——.

5

— ——— . .

6 . . . . 13

—— — ——

16 14 225

—— ———

23 14 ---- . . . . .

. —— —

12 ---- ______

—— — —— __

52 246 . . . . . . . . . .

. ——— . ————

.— .— __ __— __

3 25

— ——

TOTAL

offl- Errlistedcer

. -

. ——23

— —

10 103

—— —

90 837

. —

40 47

. —

3 43

. —.

{57 4,063

_ —__

— ——.

5 25

— —



APPEN DI X E

First Marine Division

Operation Order—Guadalcanal

F I RS T M AR I NE D I VI S I ON

F L E E T M AR I NE F OR C E

Wellingt on, N. Z.

[2 0 J u ls ’ 19 42] ‘

OPERATION ORDER

No. 7-42

Maps: H . O. C H ART 2896 ( S olomon I sla nds) r eproduced by D –2 S ect ion.

D –2 S eet ion Ma p ATort h Coa st G ua da lca na l I sla nd—L ungs P oint t o Aola , 9 S ect ions, 15

J u l y, 1942, R F 1/24, 000.

D –2 S ect ion Ma p Tula gi a nd a dja cen t isla nds, 7/14/42, (4 sheet s) c RF 1/12,000.

D -2 S ect ion —S pecia l m ap Tula gi—1/ 2,000, 15 J u ly , 1942.

TASK ORGANIZATIO&”

a) COMBAT GROUP A [5t h Ma r, Reinf ]

(less C omba t Tea m 2 (less B t ry E llt h Ma rin es) )

(b) COMBAT GROUP B [lst Ma r, R ein f]

(c) TULAGI GROUP

1st Ra ider B n

C omba t Tea m 2 (less B t ry E llt h Ma rines)

(d) GAVUTU GROUP

First P a ra chut e B at ta lion

(e) SUPPORT GROUP

1st E ng B n (less C os A, B , & C)

C ol. L eRoy P . H unt , U SMC .

C ol. C lift on B . C a tes, U SMC .

LtC ol. Merr it t A. E dson , U SMC .

Itfaj.Robert H . Willia ms, U SMC.

C ol. P edro A. del Va ne, U S MC .



FI RS T M.4R1NE D IVI SI Oh ’ OR DE R—G U AD AL CANAL 397

2. Th is D iv is ion w ill a t t a ck a n d d es tr oy t he h os tile g a rr is on s of TU L AG I , G U AD AL CAN AL ,G AVU TU , a n d M AK A~ I B O b y s im u lt a n e ou s l a n di ng s on D d a y . I t w ill t h en or ga n iz e a n d d ef en d

t h ose i sl an d s .F or Tr a n spor t Ar ea , L in e of D epa r t ur e, b ea ch es , ob ject iv es , B o un da r ies s ee O per a t ion Ov er la y

An n ex D .

3. (a) La nd on B ea ch RE D a t Zero H our w it h 2 CTS in a ssa ult on a front of 1600 ya rds seize bea ch-

hea d (see opera tion over la y ). When pa ssed t h rough by C omba t G roup B , C omba t G roup A (less

CTS 2 & 3) a t ta ck t ow a rd LU NG A w it h it s r igh t rest in g on t h e shore line. S eize t he line of t he

TE NARU RI VE R. C omba t Tea m 3 a t t a ck a nd seize line of w oods runn ing sout hea st from

TE NAVATU [ea st ern fla nk of R ed B ea ch] (see opera t ion over la y). H old t ha t line unt il relieved

by S upport G roup. Then opera te a s direct ed by Ta sk Orga niza t ion C omma nder .

(b) L an d on B ea ch R ED a t Zer o H our plu s 50 m in ut es (s ee oper at ion over la y) pa ss t hr oughr ig ht of C om ba t G r ou p A a n d a t t a ck on m a gn et ic a z im ut h 2 60” . S e ize g r assy k n ol l 4 m il es sou t h of

L U ~ G A P O I NT. B e pr ep a red f or f ur t her a d va n ce.F or m at i on —C olu m n of b a t t a l i on s e ch e lon e d t o t h e l ef t r e ar . M a in t a in con t a ct w i t h C om ba t G r o upA on r ig h t.

(c) La nd on ~ ron t of 500 ya rds on B ea ch B LU E a t H h our , a n d seize t ha t por t ion of TU LAG I

I S LAND lying nor th w est of lin e A ( see D –2 S ect ion S pecia l Ma p TU LAG I 1/12,000, 15 J uly 1942).

Fire G RE E N S T.4R C LU S TE R t o ca ll for five minutes a ir a n d na va l bomba rdment of TU LAG I

sout hea st of line A, a ft er H plus 1 hour . U pon complet ion of bombing a nd lift ing of na va l gun fire,

a tt a ck a nd seize t h e rema inder of TU LAG I I S LAND . U pon complet ion seizure of TU LAG I IS LANTD

Ist Ra ider B n reemba rk a t B ea ch B lue a n d repor t complet ion of reemba rka t ion t o D ivision H ea d-

q ua rt ers, prepa red for fur t her la ndings. upon seizure of TU LAG I, cont rol pa sses t o C omma nder

Comba t Tea m 2. C omba t Tea m 2 t hen reemba rk sufficient t roops a n d seize MAK AMB O

IS L.4ND , t hen orga nize a nd defend t h ose isla nds, Follow in g seizure of TIJ LAG I a nd .MAK AMB O,

a nd of G AVU TU a nd TANAMB OG O by 1st pa ra ch ut e B a t ta lion, relieve 1st pa ra ch ut e B a t ta lion

w it h on e r ifle com pa ny plus on e ma chine gun pla toon.

(d) La nd on ea st coa st of G AVU TU I S LAND a t H plus 4 hours, a nd seize t ha t isla nd, t hen seize

TANAMB OG O. Fire G RE E N STAR C LU S TE R t o ca ll for five minut es na va l gunfire on TANAM-

B OG O I S LAA’D . Reemba rk upon relief prepa red for employmen t elsew here.

(e) La nd on B ea ch RE D on order , a ssume cont rol of 2d a nd 3d B a t t a lions llth Ma rines, pr ovide



398 P EARL H .4RB OR TO G UAD ALC ANAL

(x) (1) L a nd ta nks w it h comba t gr oups a n d move t o cover n ea r ea st boun da ry of bea ch hea d.

Ta nks n ot t o be com mit ted except on division order .

(2) La n d 1st a n d 3d pla t oons B a t t ery A S pecia l Wea pon s B a t t a lion on fla nks of bea ch a n d

furnish AA defense bea ch a rea , 1st P la t oon t o r ight 3d pla t oon t o left . These rever t t o ba t t a lion

con t rol upon la nding of H ea dqua rt ers 1st S pecia l Wea pons B at t a lion.

(3) S cout ca rs w illn ot l a n d.

(4) All a rt illery of comba t t roops w ill be la nded w it h t hose groups a ndpa ss t ocont rolllt h

Ma rines upon la ndin g llt h Ma rines H ea dqua rt ers.

(5) Assistant D iv is ion C om ma n der w il l com ma n d oper a tion s in TU L AG I -G AVU TU -F LOR ID A

Area.

4. See Administrative Order.

5. (a ) S ee An nex E , S igna l C om munica tion .

(b) C omma nd P osts a floa t:

1st Ma r D iv

C omba t G roup A

C omba t G r oup B

TU LAG I G roup

G AVU TU G roup

S uppor t G r ou pD iv is ion R es er ve

FLORI D A G roup

3d D efen se B n

MC CAWLE Y (AP 1O)

AME RI C AN LE GI ON (AP 35)

B .4R NE TT (AP 1l)

AP D

H E YWOOD ( AP 12 )

H U NTE R L IG GE TT (AP 27)C RE S C E NT CI TY (AP 40)

P RE S I D E NT J AC K S ON ( AP 37 )

ZE ILI N (AP 9)

(c) Axis of S igna l C ommun ica tion a ll unit s:

C P a floa t-loca tions a shore t o be repor t ed.

(d) U se loca l t ime, zon e minus eleven ( zon e suffix let t er Love), in a ll communica t ion s w it h

Division.



APPEN l)I X F

Military Map Symbols

SIZE SYMBOLS UNIT SYMBOLS

Squadn P Pioneer

0 Sectionm Rdr Raider

* PlatoonD

Tank

1 Company or Battery MISCELLANEOUS SYMBOLS

II Bottolion or Squodron Commond Post

Ill Regiment or Air Group

AObservation Post

x Brigode

~/xx Division or Wing

/

Boundory ( battolion)

UNIT SYMBOLS + Aid Station (bottalion)

0 Bosic Unit

B

EXAMPLESAir

nLVT Amphibion Troctorc1

L “.O ID E Ist S ee, LBtry, Ist OefEn

Antioircroft



APPEN DI X G

Guide to Abbreviations

AA ------------ An tia ir cr aft

ALA . . . . . . . . . . . An t ia ircra ft Art il lery

OAF----------- Army Air Force

ABC ___________ American-Br i t i sh-Cana dian

AD A . . . . . . . . . Am erica n-B rit ish -D ut ch -Aus-

t ra l i an

Acct . - . . . . . ---- Accoun t in g

Ac t ____________ Ac t io n

AD C. - . _______ Assista nt D ivision C om ma nderAd m___________ Ad mi r a l

Adv ----------- Adva nce

AF ------------ Asia tic Fleet

Air ------------ Aircra ft

ALA __________ At ta ck C ar go S hip

Am er ---------- Am erica n

Amt ra ck-- . . . . . Amphibia n Tra ct or

An ------------ An nua l

An za c __________ Au st ra lia -N ew Zea la n d Ar ea

AP ____________ N a vy Tr a ns por t

AP A___________ At t a ck Tr a ns por tAP E ----------- S ma ll C oa st a l Tra nspor t

AP D ---------- D est royer Tra nsport

AR ____________ . 4ct i on R ep or t

Arca dia ________ U . S .-B rit ish C on feren ce (D e-

cem ber 1941–J a nua ry 1942)

As Fl t __________ . &s ia t i c F l ee t

ATI S __________ Allied Tr an sla tor a nd I nt er ro-

g a tor S ect ion

C . . . . . . . . ----- Combat

CA._. . . . . . . . . . Coast Artillery

Cactus --------- C ode Na me for G ua da lca na l

C al------------ C a liber

C AM---------- C ombin ed Army & Ma rine

C a pt ----------- C a pta in

“C a t a lina ’’ ----- P B Y pa t rol bomber ma de by

Consolidated-Vultee

C C S ----------- C ombin ed C hiefs of S t a ffC ar-. --_.. ._. _.. C om ma nder

C G ------------ C omma nding G en era l

C h ------------ C h ief

C h a p ---------- C ha pt er

C h in ---------- C ha irma n

C in C ---------- C omma nder in C h ief

C h ic ---------- C omma n da n t of t he Ma rine

Corps

C OO ---------- C h ief of Na va l Opera t ions

C O_- . . . ..-_... C omma nding Officer

C o---- . . . . . . . . C ompa n yC ofS ----------- C h ief of S t a ff

C ofS A-- . . . . . . . C h ief of S t a ff, U . S . Army

C ol------------ C olon el

C en t ----------- C on tin uin g

C om----------- C omma nder ; C omma nda nt

C om b ---------- C om bined

C oma -._ . . . ._. C ommunica tion

CP ------------ C omma n d P ost



G U ID E TO AB B RE VI ATI ONS

D ef ____________

D ept . . . . . . . . . .

D es ___________

D ev ___________

“Devastator’’___

D ir ____________

I)is p -----------

D iv ____________

D oc . . . . . . . . . . .

D OW----------

DUK W --------

E ncl . . . . . . . . . . .

Egg - ----------

E n l____________E ns . . . . .. . . . . . . .

E G O-----------

E xt . . . . . . . . . . . .

F4F - ________

FAdm _________

FEAF ---------

F ED . . . . -------

Fl ex ___________

F la t . __-. . __. .. _

Flt ------------F MF ----------

FO-----------

For ____________

F ou r te en . . .--_.

G -2-----------

G a r------------

G en -----------

G H Q----------

Defense

Depar tment

Destroyer

DevelopmentTB D– , t orpedo-bom ber ma de

b y D ou gla s

Director

Dispatch

Division

Document

D ied of Woun ds

Am ph ib iou s Tr uck

Enclosure

Engineer

EnlistedEnsign

E xecu t iv e O fl icer

Extension

“Wildcat” fight er ma de by

f . l rumman

F leet Ad mi ra l

Fa r E a st Air F orce

Fa r E ast C omma nd

F leet L an din g E xer cise

Flotilla

FleetF leet Ma rin e F or ce

F or wa r d Ob ser ver

Force

14t h Na va l D ist rict

I nt elli gen ce Of fi ce(r ), D iv is ion

or a bov e

Garr i son

Genera l

G e ner a l H ea d qu a rt er s

J -------------

J AG -. . . . . . . . . .

J ASCO --------

J C S -----------

J I C ------------

J G ------------

J n l------------

“Ka te’’ --------

.KDPOW _______

Lr rn ____________

La nd ___________

LC dr __________

L C M----------

LCVP ---------

LS T___________

L t _____________

L t r____________

LE T . . . . . . . . . . .

LVT(A)--------

MAG ----------

Ma j -----------

Ma r. -_. . ______

MarCor --------MAW---------

Mb r ___________

MC ___________

MCEC ________

MOO__________

MC S ----------

MD -----------

Me d___________

Joint

J udge Advoca te G enera l

J oin t Assa ult S igna l C om pa ny

J oin t C hiefs of S t a ff

J oin t I nt elligen ce C en ter

J un ior G ra de

J o u r n a l

J a p a n es e t o rp ed o-b omb er

K illed or D ied While a P ris-

on er of Wa r

Landing

At la n ti c (F leet )

L ieu ten a nt C om ma n der

Mecha nized La nding C ra ft

Veh icle a nd P er son nel L an din gCra f t

Ta nk L a nding S hip

Lieutenant

Letter

L a nd in g Veh icle Tr acked

La ndin g Vehicle Tra cked (Ar-

mored)

Ma rine Aircra ft G roup

Major

Marine(s)

Ma rin e C or psMa rin e Aircr aft Win g

Member

Ma rine C orps; Medica l C orps

(Navy)

M ar in eC or ps E d uca t ion a l C en t er

Ma rine C orps Or der

Ma rin e C or ps S ch ools

M ar in e D et a ch m en t

Medical




S AC ___________ N -a v a l Ai r S t a ti on

h’a v ----------- N’a vy ; I ia va l

N D ____________ N a vy D ep ar t men t

N -H A__________ N av al H is tor y D iv is ionN7G F . . -------- N’a va l G un fire

N OB __________ N’a va l Oper at in g B a se

NR IJ I C ________ Na va l R ecords Xfa na gem ellt

C en ter (Alexa ndr ia , Vs. )

NOD . . . . . . . . . . l ia va l S upply D epot

OC MH -------- Office of t h e C hief of Milit a ry

H ist ory, L1. S . Arm y

Off ------------ officer (s)

Ofl ------------ Officia l

ONI ----------- Office of Na va l I n t elligence

OP ------------ Observa tion P ostOP la n --------- Opera tion P la n

OpOrd --------- Oper a tion Or der

Ops------------ Oper at ion s

P &P ----------- P la ns a n d P olicies D ivision ,

H ea dq ua rt ers Ma rine C orps

P AA___________ P a n Am er ica n Air wa ys

P a c . . . . . . . . . . . . P acific (F leet )

P ara __.. . ----- P ara chut e

P a t ------------ P at rol

P A ------------ P at rol B oa t

P a l------------ ‘(C a t a lin a ” pa t rol bomber

m a d e b y C on s ol id a t ed -V ul t ee

P C ------------ P at rol C ra ft

P a rs ----------- P erson nel

P h i b ___________ Amp h ib i ou s

P hil ----------- P hilippin e

P ion ----------- P ion eer

P i------------- P la toon

P roj . . . -------- P roject

R ho . . . . . . . . . . . Roya l Ma rine(s)

RM....-- R oya l Ma rine Art il lery

R N------------ Roya l Na vy

S B D– --------- “D a un t less’’scou Gbom berma de by D ougla s

S B 2U – _ . . . . . . . “Vin dica t or” scout -bomber

m a d e b y Vou gh t -S ik or sk y

S C AP ---------- S upreme C omma n der Allied

Powers

S ch . . . . . . . . . . . . S chool

S ec . . . . . . . . . . . . S ect ion

S ea . ----------- S en ior

S a p_ . . . . . . ----- S epa ra t e

S er ------------ S er vice

S FC P . . . . . . . . . . S hor e F ire C ont rol P a r t yS gt . . . . . . . . . . . . S ergea n t

S ixt een . . . . . . . . . 16t h Na va l D ist r ict

S /L ------------ S ea rch ligh t

S M. ----------- S pecia l Ma nua l

S MS -- . . . . . . .-. Ma r ine S ervice S q ua dron

S NLF --------- J apa nese S pecia l Na va l La n d-

in g F or ce

so--- . . . . . . . . . . sout h

S ol------------ S pecia l

S in ------------ S qua dron

S S------------- S pecia l S t a ff

S S gt -- . . . . . . . . . S t a ff S ergea n t

S WP A --------- S out hw est P acific Area

TAC O . . . . ----- Th e Adjut a n t G en era l’s Office

TB D– -------- “D eva st a tor” t or pedo-bomber

ma de by D ougla s

TB F– --------- “Aven ger” t orpedo-bom ber

ma de by G rum ma n

TF ------------ Ta sk For ce



G U I D E TO ABBREVIATIONS 403

U SN I . ..___ . .._ U nit ed S t a tes h “a va l I nst i tute

U S E R . . . ..-. _. L~ nit ed S t a t es Na va l Reserve

U P S . . . . . . . . . . . LTnit ed S t a tes S hip

U SS B S --------- U nit ed S t a tes S t ra tegic B omb-

in g S ur vey

VAdm. . . . . . . . . Vice Admira l

I F-__ . . . . . . . . . Na vy Fight er S qua dron

“Vin dica tor” --- S B 2U – , scout -bomber ma de

b y V ou g h t -S i k or s ky

VMF . . . . . . . . . . Ma r ine Fight er S q ua dron

VMJ . --------- Ma rine U tilit y S qua dron

VMS B --------- Ma rine S cout -B omber S q ua d-

ro n

VP ------------ Na vy P at rol S q ua dron

VS . . . . . . . . . . . . Na vy S cout ing S q ua dron

W-l ----------- Win g P erson nel Office(r)

W–2----------- Win g I nt elligen ce Office (r)

W–3----------- Wing Opera tions Office(r)

W-4- _--__ . . . . . Wing Logist ics Office(r)

Wa t ch t ow er . . . . C ode na me for t he G ua da l-

ca n a l-Tu la g i O per a t ion

WD ----------- Wa r D epa r t ment

WD C---------- Wa r D ocumen t s C ent er

Wa s ----------- West

“Wildca t’’ ______ F4F– , figh ter ma de by G rum -

ma n

WE ----------- Wa rra nt Officer

WP L ---------- Wa r P la n

Wins . . . . . . . . . . Wea pon s

Wt l~ ----------- World Wa r

YP __. . . . . . . . . . S ma ll P a t rol C ra ft,(~rol? --------- J a p an ese fig ht er



APPEN DI X H

Unit Commendations

TH E WH ITE H OU SE

WASHINGTON

C it a tion by

TH E P RE S ID E NT OF TH E U NI TE D S TATE S

of

Th e Wa ke det a ch ment of t h e 1st D efen se B a t ta lion, C . S . Ma rine C orps, un der comma nd of

Ma jor J a mes P . S , D evereux, U . S . Ma rines

a n d

Ma rine Fight ing S qua dron 211 of Ma rine Aircra ft G roup 21, un der comma nd of

Ma jor P aul A. P ut na m, U . S . Ma rines

a n d

Army a nd Na vy per sonn el presen t

“Th e coura geous conduct of t h e officers a n d m en w ho d efen ded Wa ke I sla nd a ga inst

a n overw h elmin g super ior it y of en emy a ir , sea , a n d la nd a t t a cks from D ecember 8 t o 22,

1941, h a s been not ed w it h a dmira tion by t heir fellow coun t r ymen a n d t h e civil ized w orld,

a nd w ill not be for got t en so long a s ga lla nt ry a nd heroism a r e respect ed a nd h on ored. They

a re commen ded for t heir devot ion t o dut y a n d splen did con duct a t t heir ba t t le st a t ions

un der m ost a dverse con dit ion s. Wit h limit ed defensive mea ns a ga inst a t t a cks in grea t

force, t h ey ma nned t h eir sh ore insta lla t ions a nd flew t h eir a ircra ft so w ell t ha t five en emy

w a rships w er e eit her sunk or severely da ma ged, ma ny h ost ile P I a nes shot dow n , a n d a n






GEIVEItALORDERS

}

WAR D E P AR TME NT

No. 22 WASH ING TON, Apr i l .90 ,19 .j2

C it a t ion of u ni ts of b ot h m ilit a r y a n d n a va l f or ces of t h e U n it ed S t a t es a n d P h ilippin e G ov er n-m en t s. —As a u t hor iz ed b y E xecu tiv e O rd er 9075 (s ec. I I , B u ll. 11, W. D ., 1942), a cit a t ion in t h en a m e o f t h e P r es id en t of t h e U n it ed S t a t es a s pu blic ev id en ce of d es er ve d h on or a n d d is ti nct ion ,is a w a r d ed t o a ll u nit s of b ot h m ilit a r y a n d n a va l f or ce s of t h e U n i t ed S t a t es a n d P h ilippin e Govern-

ment s en ga ged in t h e defen se of t h e P hilippines sin ce D ecember 7, 1941 t o 10 Ma y 1942.

A. G . 210. 54 (4-12-42). (C losin g da t e a ut h. by W. D . G .O. 460f 1948)

B Y OR D ER OF TH E S E CB E TAR Y OF WAR :

OFFICIAL:

J . A. U L I O

Ma jor G en era l

The Adjutant General

G . C . MARS H ALL

Chie f of Naff



U N I T C OM ME N DATI ON S 407

TH E S E C I t E TAS YOF THE NAVY

Washington.

Th e P resident of t he U n it ed S ta t es ta kes plea sure in presen t ing t he P RE S I D E NTI AL U NI T

C I TATI ON t o

MAR I NE AI RC RAFT G ROU P TWE NTY-TWO

for service a s set for t h in t he follow in g

C I TATI ON :

“For con spicuous coura ge a nd heroism in comba t a t Midw ay I sla nd during J un e, 1942.

Out n umbered five t o on e, MARI NE AI RC RAFT G ROU P TWE NTY-TWO boldly int er cept ed

a h ea vily escor t ed en em y bombing force, disrupt in g t heir a t t a ck a nd preven t in g ser ious

da ma ge t o isla nd inst a lla tions. Opera ting w it h ha lf of t heir dive-bombers obsolet e a nd inpoor mech a nica l condit ion w hich n ecessit a ted vulnera ble glide bombin g t a ct ics, t hey suc-

ceeded in inflict in g h ea vy da ma ge on J apa n ese sur fa ce un its of a la rge en emy ta sk force.

Th e skill a nd ga lla nt persevera nce of flight a nd gr oun d person n el of MARI NE AI RC RAFT

G ROU P TWE NTY-TWO, fight ing un der t remen dously a dverse a nd da ngerous condit ion s,

w er e essent ia l fa ct ors in t he un yieldin g defen se of Midw ay .”

For t he P resident .

F R AN K K N OX ,



408 P EARL H AR B OR TO G UAD ALC .4NAL

THE SECRETARYOF THE NAVY

Washington,

Th e S ecret ary of t he Na vy t akes plea sure in com men din gt he

S I XTH D E FE NS E B ATTALI ON, FLE E T MARI NE FORC E , RE I NFORC E D ,

for service a s follow s :

“For out st a n din g h eroism in support of milit a ry opera t ions pr ior t o a n d durin g t he

B at t le of Midw ay, J un e 1942. Assuming a tremen dous opera tion a l a nd service loa d inpre-

pa rin g defenses of Midw ay a ga inst a nt icipa t ed J a pa n ese a tt a ck, t he officers a n d men of t h e

SI XTH D efen se B at ta lion ca rr ied on in tensive nigh t ba tt le t ra in ing, complet ed a nd inst alled

underw at er obst a cles, un loa ded a nd dist r ibuted supplies, empla ced gun s a nd const ruct ed

fa cilit ies forst ow ing a nl~ nunit ion a nd for prot ect in g per son n el. Aler t a ndr ea dy for comba t

w hen en emy pla nes ca me in t o la un ch high a nd dive-bombin g a tta cks a nd low ..level st ra fin g

a t t a cks on J une 4, t h ey prompt ly open ed a n d ma in t a in ed fire a ga inst t h e host i le t a rget s,

dow ning 10 pla nes dur in g t h e fur ious 17-min ut e a ct ion w hich result ed in t h e dest ruct ion of

t hella rin e ga lley a nd mess-ha ll, eq uipmen t , supplies a ndcommun ica tion fa cilit ies. Work-

in g a s a n effect ive t ea m for lon g per iods w it hout relief, this B a t t a lion clea red t h e debr is

fr om t he bom b-w recked ga lley , r eest ablish ed disr upt ed com mu nica tion s, a nd ser viced pla nes,

t h ereby cont r ibut ing grea t ly t o t h e success of opera t ions conduct ed fr om t his ba se. Th e

h igh sta nda rds of coura ge a nd service ma int a in ed by t h e S IXTH D efen se B at t a lion reflect

t heh igh est cr ed it u pon t he L Tn it ed S ta tes Na va l S er vice.”

All person nel a t t a ched t o a nd serving w it h t he S IXTH D efen se B a t t a lion, Fleet Ma rin e Force,

Rein forced, consist ing of t he S IXTH D efen se B at t a lion , a tt a ch ed person nel of t h e Third D efen se



U N IT C OM ME N D ATI ON S 409

THE SECRETARYOF THE NAVY

Washington.

4 F E B RU AR Y 1943.

C it ed in t he Na me of

Th e P resident of t he U nit ed S t a t es

TH E FI RS T MARI NE D I VI S 1ON, RE I NFORC E D

U nder comma nd of

Ma jor G enera l Alexa n der A. Va n degr ift , U . S . M. C .

C I TATI ON :

“The officers a nd en list ed m en of t he First Ma rine D ivision, R ein forced, on August 7 t o 9, 1942,

demon st ra ted out st a ndin g ga lla nt ry a nd det ermin a tion in successfully execut in g for ced la ndin g

a ssa ults a ga inst a n umber of st ron gly defen ded J a pa nese posit ions on Tula gi, G avut u, Ta na mbogo,

Flor ida a nd G ua da lca na l, B r it ish S olomon I sla n ds, complet ely rout ing a ll t h e en em y forces a n d

seizing a most va lua ble ba se a n d a ir field w it h in t h e en emy zon e of opera t ion s in t h e S out h P acific

Ocean. F rom t h e a bove per iod unt il 9 D ecem ber , 1942, t his R ein for ced D ivision n ot on ly held t h eir

import a nt st ra tegic posit ions despit e det ermin ed a nd repea ted J a pa nese na va l, a ir a nd la nd a tt a cks,

but by a ser ies of ofl%n sive opera tion s a ga inst st rong en em y resist a nce droire t h e J a pa nese from t h e

proximit y of t h e a ir field a n d inflict ed grea t losses cm t h em by la nd a nd a ir a t t a cks. Th e cour a ge

a nd det erm in at ion displa yed in t hese opera tion s w ere of a n in spir ing order .”

FRANK KNOX




THE SECRETARYo ? THE h’AvY

Wa811iwgton.

The S ecret a ry of t he Na vy ta kes plea sure in commen ding t he

NINTH MARI NE D E FE NS E B ATTALI ONfor service a s follow s :

“For out st a nding heroism in a ct ion a ga inst en emy ,Ta pa nese forces a t G ua da lca na l,

November 30, 1942, t o h fa y 20, 1943; Ren dova -Xew G eorgia Area , J un e 30 t o November 7,

1943; a nd a t G ua m, Ma ria na s, J uly 21 t o August 20. 1944. On e of t he first units of it s

kin d t o opera te in t h e S out h P acific Area , t h e NI NTH D efen se B at t a lion est a blished st rong

sea coa st a nd bea ch posit ions w hich dest royed 12 host ile pla nes a tt empt ing t o bomb G ua da l-

ca na l, a nd fur th er en ga ged in ext en sive pa tr oll in g a ct ivit ies. I n a 21-d ay -a nd -n ig ht t ra in in g

per iod pr ior t o t he Ren dova -New G eorgia a ssa ult , this group ca libra t ed a n d lea rned t o

ha n dle n ew w ea pons a nd rea dily effect ed t he con version from a sea coa st unit t o a unitca pa ble of execut in g field a rt iller y m ission s. J oinin g Army Art il lery unit s, specia l groups

of t his ba t ta lion a ided in la unchin g a n a t t a ck w hich drove t he en emy from t he bea ches,

dow ned 130f a 16-bomber pla ne forma tion during t he first nigh t a sh ore a nd den ied t he use

of t h e Munda a irfield t o t he J a pa nese. The NI NTH D efen se B at t a lion a ided in spea rhea d-

ing t h e a t t a ck of t he Army Corps opera t ing on New G eorgia a nd, despit e h ea vy losses,

rema in ed in a ct ion unt il t he en emy w a s rout ed from t he isla nd. E lement s of t he B at ta lion

la nded a t G ua m under in tense fire, esta blished bea ch defen ses, inst a lled a nt ia ircra ft gun s

a nd la ter cont r ibut ed t o t h e rescue of civilia ns a nd t o t h e ca pt ure or dest ruct ion of t hou-

sa nds of J a pa nese. B y t heir skill, coura ge a nd a ggressive figh t ing spir it , t he officers a nd

men of t h e NI NTH D efense B a t t a lion uph eld t he high est t ra dit ions of t he U n it ed S ta t es

Na va l S er vice. ”

All personn el a t t a ched t o a nd servin g w it h t he NI NTH D efense B a t t a lion during t h e a bove

ment ioned per iods a re a ut hor ized t o w ea r t he .NAVY U NI T C OMME ND ATI ON Ribbon.

J OH N L. S UL LI VAN,

Secretary of the IVavy.



U N I T C O MM E ND ATI ON S 411

TH E S E C E E TAR YO F TH E N AVY ,

Washington.

The S ecret a ry of t he A’a vy t a kes plea sure in commen ding t h e

FI RS T S E P ARATE E NG INE E R B ATTALI ON

for service a s follow s:

“For except ion ally m er it oriou s ser vice in suppor t of m ilit ar y oper at ion s on G ua da lca na l,

D ecember I O, 1942, t o Febrna ry 27, 1943; Tinia n from August 20, 1944, t o Ma rch 24, 1945;

a nd Okina w a from April 14t o S ept ember , 1945. F aced w it h n ur ner ou s an d d ift icu lt pr ob-

lems in engineer in g t hrough out t wo m ajor ca mpa igns, t he First S epa ra te E ngineer B at t alion

init ia ted new t echn iques a nd proceduresin const ruct ion, repa ir a nd ma in ten ance, execnt in g

it s missions un der a dverse condit ions of w ea t her a n d t erra in a nd in spit e of J apa neseshellings, a rt illery fire, bombing ra ids, sickness a nd t ropica l st orms. Tech nica lly skilled,

a ggressive a n d un mindful of grea t persona l da n ger , t he officers a n d men of this ga lla nt

B at ta lion const ruct ed, developed a nd ma in t a ined vit a l rout es of communica tion, a irfields

a nd ca mp fa cilit ies; t hey served a s comba t engineer unit s in per forming demolit ion s, min e

det ect ion a nd disposa l a n d bomb disposa l t a sks in support of va r ious nnit s of t h e Fleet

Ma rine Force; a n d t h ey built br idges a nd repa ired a ir-bombed a ir st r ips t ow ard t h e unin-

t errupt ed opera tions of Allied gron nd a nd a eria l forces. U ndet erred by bot h mecha nica l

a nd na tnra l limit a tions, t he First S epa ra te E ngineer B at t a lion complet ed w ith dispa tch a nd

effect iven ess a ssigned a n d una nt icipa ted dut ies w hich con t r ibut ed immea sura bly t o t h e

ult ima t e defea t of J apa n a nd upheld t h e highest t ra dit ions of t h e U nit ed S ta t es Na va l

Service.”

All personn el a t t a ched t o t he First S epa ra t e E ngineer B at t a lion durin g a ny of t he a bove ment ioned

per iods a re hereby a ut h or ized t o w ea r t he NAVY U NI T C OMME ND ATI ON Ribbon.

J A M E S F O RR E S TAL ,

~ecretar t i of the~a~.



IndexA ar on W ar d , 35 3

Abbot t , C a pt R. A., 327

Abe, RAdm H ., 227

Abe, R Ad m K ., 129-130

AB C–1, 85

AB DA ( America n-B rit ish-D ut ch -Aust ra lia n )

C omma nd, 86

Ad ak, 215

Ada ms, Lt C ol J . P ., 162, 164, 168, 171

Adva nced. ba se a ct ivit ies, 8-10, 64

Afr ica , 59, 85

Aga na , 76, 78

Air a tt acks. S ee Aircra ft .

.kircraft

Allied

a erodyna mics sa fet y, 18

a ir-groun d coordina tion , 18. S ee also Com-

munications.

a ir-gr oun d “a rmored pa cket s,” 1Sa eria l ph ot ogra ph s; 126, 147, 243, 245

a er ia l sea rches, 79

cl os e s uppor t, 297, 299, 319

fir e pow er , 17

lia ison , 18

n aviga tion , 18

ob ser va t ion , 19, 254, 298, 320

oxy gen sy st em , 280

Aircraft—Continued

Allied—Continued

types-Continued

fi gh ter s, 81, 87, 163, 217, 219,226, 259, 263,

294, 354,365

F 2A-3s, 216, 225

F 4F s, 66, 101–102, 107–108, 110, 120, 128,

2 07, 21 9, 2 23, 2 25 --22 6, 2 41, 27 9, 291 –292 ,

296295, 302-303, 326, 336, 343m , 362

l ia is on , 254, 373

L ockh eed H udson s, 363

ob ser va t ion , 254, 325, 339

0S 2U S, 363

P -38s, 362

P – 39s , 328, 336, 343n , 344, 362

P 40S , 180

P 400s, 280, 297, 299, 308, 323, 328, 343n,

362

pa trol , 36, 66, 70–71, 81–83, 98, 211, 292,204, 352

P B Ys, 78, 80-81, 89, 102, 104, 123, 126-127,

161, 163, 165, 216, 221, 277, 328, 363

ph ot ogr aph ic pla nes, 241

R 4D s, 280, 328n

S B D S, 207, 219, 224-229, 267,269, 279, 292,

29*295, 305, 311, 316-317, 323, 327+ 2 8,

336, 339, 343n , 344, 362



414 P EARL H ARB OR TO G LMD ALC ANAL

Aircraft—Continued

J apanese—Cont inued

types—Continued

ca rr ier pla n es , 119, 128, 230

dive bombers, 7k71, 73, 128, 143, 147,1 52 , 1 63 , 1 70 ,2 21 , 2 23 ,2 27 ,2 58

figh t er pla nes, 7*71, 73, 127–128, 151,

163, 165, 170, 218, 227–228, 292, 294,

326

f l oa t p l a n es , 2 27 ,2 60 ,2 91

f ly in g b oa t s, 121, 123–124, 221

K a t es , 22 1, 2 2 8 , %39

K a wa nish i 97s, 115, 121, 123, 218, 224,

228

ob ser va t ion pla n es , 275, 327

s ea pl an es , 263

t orpedo bombers, 71, 221, 228, 259, 352

V a ls , 2 21 ,2 23

Zer os, 128, 221, 223–225, 227–228, 292,

29 4, 29 7, 302, 328 , 3 35 -336

Air support . S ee Aircra ft .

Airfields

Allied, 36, 64, 68, 99, 102, 106, 10%109, 115-

116, 123, 130, 133–134, 136-137, 139, 141,

148–149, 162, 210, 212, 238-239, 241, 255-256,

274-277, 280, 283, 294, 299, 327–328, 336,

3 46 , 3 52 –3 54 , 3 60

J apanese , 163-165,238,258,347

Air unit s, Allied. iS ’ee a lso Ma rine unit s, Air.

C hinese Air F orce, 60

P hilippin e Army Air C orps, 180, 188, 191

Roya l New Zea la nd Air Force, 241

Roya l .kust ra lia n Air Force, 237

U . S . Army Air C orps, 100, 156, 163n, 191, 241,

Ai r u n it s , Al li ed -C on t i nu ed

Fl ight 300,292,323

3d P ursuit S qua dron, 177

3d R econ na issa nce S q ua dron (R NZAF ), 363

VP – 12, 363VP – 21, 7S 79, 81, 216

VS -1 –D 1 4, 80 -00

VS + 3 , 305

VT-8, 3 05

Ah?agi, 215,223,227

.4kebono, 79-80

. 4k iz uk i, 325

Al am ed a, 50n

Al am o, 155

Ala ska , 214

Alchiba, 253

Aleu tia n s, 214215, 218

Alhena, 250, 253

Am er ica n-B rit ish st aff con ver sa tion s, 36, 63

American Legion, 253

America n S a moa . Nee S a moa .

Am munit ion . B ee a lso Wea pons.

Allied, 21, 68, 71, 79, 104, 107, 112, 144, 157,

163-164, 167-168, 172, 188, 217, 257, 260, 270,

27*277, 295, 31*311, 316, 321, 348

d u mps , 1 64 ,2 97

m aga zines, 66, 99, 112, 217

types

a r mor -pier ci ng , 16

bom ba rdm en t, 16

bombs, 108, 120, 122, 126, 181, 183, 209,

212, 269, 276, 293, 297, 328, 355

. 50 ca l ib er , 120, 133

5 -i n ch , 11 2, 11 4, 119 , 26 8



I N D E X 415

Ammunition-Continued

J apanes&Cont inued

types—Continued

8-i nch , 32 7

m or ta r , 141, 330

6 -i n ch , 1 17

t or ped oes, 71, 212, 221, 224, 227, 311, 339,

353

240m m , 160

Am ph ib ia n v eh icl es

a mphibia n t ra ct or , 32–33, 2.56, 270, 276, 320,

329

C hr is tie a m ph ibi an , 23,32

D U KW, 34

L VT, 3 2-3 4

L VT (A), 33-34

Amph ibious doct r in e a n d t echn iq ues, 7–8, 11,

14-15, 23, 51, 254, 372~ 373. 6’ee also Logistics;

P l a n n i n g .

Amph iNlous eq uipment , 23-24, 30. S ee a lso Am-

ph ibia n veh icles; S hips.

Am ph ib iou s exer ci ses , 22, 52

An ch or a nd ch rysa nt hem um d evice, 285

Anderson , Lt Col H . R., 171

An oph el es m os qu it o, 239

An tia ircra ft fire, 42, 68, 71, 73, 95, 140, 162, 241,25%259, 352,357

An ti-Axis pow er s, 155

An tib oa t obs ta cles, 113, 190

An tig ua , 54

An t il les , 54

An t is ub ma r in e m is si on s, 89, 363

An za c a r ea , 84, 84n , 205, 209,235, 238

.40ba , 129,325

Arm y gr oun d units (Allied ) —C ont in ued

P h ilippin e Ar my, 155-157, 164-167, 172, 190n ,

191,200

P h ilippin e C on st a bu la ry , 156, 172, 160n , 191

P hilippin e S cout s, 156, 156n, 179–180, 190n,

191, 194

U nit ed S t a t es Army, 5, 7, 11, 14, 21, 30, 31, 33,

34, 37, 39, 43-46, 42, 54-55, 63, 71, 74, 8W38,

156, 166, 187–188, 190a , 236, 242n , 295, 297,

321, 323, 326, 329, 336+ 337, 349, 358, 360,

369, 372

U nit ed S t a t es Ar my F orces in t he Fa r E a st

( US AF FE ) , 156-157, 161–164, 165n , 16&

167, 173, 17i%176, 178-179, 182

U nit ed S ta tes Forces in t h e P h ilippines( US FI P) , 182, 184, 189-160, 19%200

H ea dq ua rt ers S a moa n Area D efense F orce, 90

I cela nd B ase C omma nd, 44

L uzon F or ce, 182

S ervice C omma nd ( Ba ta an ), 175, 177

I P h il ippin e C or ps , 172, 176, 179-180

I I P h ilippi ne C or ps , 172, 176,180

XI V C or ps , 362, 362n , 366-369

Nort h Luzon F orce, 167

S ou th L uz on F or ce, 166-167

1st I n fa nt ry D ivision , 52, 542d C onst abula ry D ivision , 175

25t h I nfa nt ry D ivision, 342, 351, 360, 362, 366-

369, 371

31st P h il ippin e D ivision , 167

71st P hil ippin e D ivision , 175, 177

Ar nerica l D ivision , 238, 324, 328, 342, 348, 362,

362n, 365-368

C AM ( Composit e Army-Ma rin e) Division,



416 J ? ~ ~ R L H AR B OR TO G U AD MM AN AL

Arm y groun d units (Allied )—C on tinued

10lst Qua rt erm ast er R egim en t, 360n

Am erica l D ivision Reconn aissa nce S qua dron ,

360n, 36<>366

244t h C oa st Art illery B at ta lion , 342n, 35757th E ngin eer C omba t B at t a lion , 360n

F ield Ar tiller y B a tt a lion s

221s t , 36 0n

24 5t h , 36 0n

246t h, 347, 363

2 47 th , 360 , 3 60 n.

I nfa nt ry B a tt alion s

1 /1 32 , 3 60

l y147, 342

1/164, 33+ 3 45, 348, 358

11182, 358

2/132, 366, 371

2/164, 334–336, 34%350

2)1 82, 3 58

3/1 64 , 336 ,34 $, 35 8

3 /1 82 , 3 66

B rit ish S olom on I sla nds D efen se F orce, 285

G ua ma n ia n I nsula r F orce G ua rd, 76, 76n

G ua ma nia n I nsula r P a t rol, 76

301st C hem ica l C om pa ny, 177

3st h R econ na issa nce Tr oop, 366

26t h S ign al C om pa ny , 360r I

Army Air C orps D et achmen t , Wa ke, 103n, 104,

106

Arndt , S gt C . C ., 281

Arn old, Lt Gen H . H ., 85,342

.kr t hur , C ol J . M. 250, 261, 26% 345, 350

Art h ur , S Sgt R. O., 10ln, 108

Artillery

. i t l an ta, 353

At la n t ic, 5, 24, 37, 40, 53-54, 63, 342

At la nt ic C on feren ce, 42

At la n t ic F leet . S ee Na va l un it s (Allied ).

A t og a , 35&K i6At tu, 215

Au ckla nd, 242

Aust ra lia , 61, 84, 8&-8+ 3 , 155, 205, 209, 230, 235-

23 9, 243 ,247 ,35 1, 360, 372

Aust ra lia n a n d New Zea la nd .4rmy C orps, 8%

Aust ra lia n Ma nda ted Terr it ory of New G uin ea ,

243

Axis P ow er s, 47, 53, 59, 61, 63, 85

Ayararni, 356

Azor es, 3*31, 38, 5S 56

B a ga c, 173, 17&177, 180

B a gga ge, 250

llagley, 260

B a ha ma s, 3, 54

B ah m, LC dr G . H ., 27n

B ailey , Ma j K . W., 263, 315

B aker I sla nd, 115

B aldin us, Lt L., 293

B aldw in, H . W., 191n

B ales, Lt C ol W. L., 89, 89n

B alesun a R iver , 245

Ballard, 316

B a na na w a rs. 199

Banzai ch a rg es , 329, 334. 339

B arbed w ire &TeeD efen ses.

B arber ’s P oint , 73

B arn es, B Mlst C l J . E ,, 132n, 137

Barnett, 253

B a r ninger , Lt C . A., 117–118, 128, 148; C a pt ,



I N D E X 417

B ea ches. S ee a lso D efenses; S h ore P art y .

B ea ch B lu e 266, 269–270

B ea chm ast er , 20

B ea ch pa rt y, 20-21

B ea ch R ed, 254, 258, 269

du mps, 260, 276

m arking, 20

B ea rn , 54

B ea ufor t B ay , 367

B eecher , Lt C ol C . T,, 171, 189, 194: B riG en, 18%

B ell, Ma j G . A., 327

1 3e ll a t ri x, 253

Benham, 356

B en son , Ma j W. I f’. , 223

B er i-b er i, 187

B ermuda , 54

B erry , C a pt G . J ., 189n

Betelgeuse, 252–253, 352

B iebush , L tC ol F . C ., 256

B in u, 350

B is ma rck Ar ch ipel ag o, 62, 78n , 205, 237–238, 275,

302,310,369

B ivoua c a rea s, 20

B l ack sm it h s hop , 111, 125

Blitzkrieg, 47

B loch , RAdm C . C ., 75, 79; Adm, 65n

B locka de r un , 276

B lock F ou r R iver , 29k291

B loody R idge, 305+ 06, 3(N+ 31O, 313, 315-316,

3 29 -3 30 ,3 33 ,3 36 -3 37 , 3 47 ,3 60

Blue, 260

Blue Goose, 328

B oa t Rig A, 29

B oa tsw a in s’ pipes, 71

Boi8e, 324-325

B r id get , C dr F . J . , 175, 175n ., 177–180

B riggs, P IS gt R., J r ., 334

B r is ba n e, 258

B rit ish C hiefs of S ta ff, 86

B rit ish C om mon wea lt h, 61, 84n

B rit ish E mpire, 5

B rit ish G uia na , 54

B rit ish S olomon I sla n ds P rot ect ora te, 237, 243

B rook, C a pt C . B ., C S N, 185n

B row n, Ma j L . .4.,160

B row n, C apt P . A., 190, 192

B rush , C a pt C , H ., J r., 285, 288; Ma j, 285n

B ry an , B ., 134n

B rya n, LC dr J ., I I I , 371n

B ubblin g Well-Na nkin g R oa ds, 159

Buchanan, 263, 26/+269, 324,352

B uckley, Lt Col E . J ., 281n

B uckn er ,C apt J . H ., 80,217

B ugles. 71, 73

B uka , 243

B un s, 238

B unkers. S ee D efenses.

B uoys, 19

B urea u of C onst ruct ion a n d Repa ir , 24, 26-27,

29, 32

B urea u of E ngin eer in g, 24B urea u of Or dn an ce, 68

B ur ea u of S hips, 28,31, 33–34

B urm a, 62, 86

Burrou~8, 82

B urt on, C a pt C ., J r., 216 ; Lt C ol, 216n

Bushido s pi r it , 3 22 ,3 35

B ut ler , J . R. M., 35n

B uzza rd P a trol, 357




C a pe C od, 10

C a pe E sper an ce, 253–254. 260, 325, 343, 351, 353,

356, 365, 367, 369, 371

C a pe Ma y, 24

C ape of G ood H ope, 342

C ape York, 327

C ara ba o I sla nd, 169, 181

C ar der ock, 50

C a rey , lstLt J . F., 217: Ca pt , 223

C a rgo net s, 19

C a ribbea n, 5, 8-9, 14, 38, 52–54

C a rl, Ca pt M., 292

C a r lson, LtC ol E . F.. 262, 285, 342, 348, 350

C arolin e I sla nds, 10, 63, 96

C ar pen ter’s Wh ar f, 26+ G 265

C arr, MessS gt G ., 137

Carriers. S ee S hips .

C a$t or , 100

Ca st le, C apt N. O., 192, 197

Casualties

Allied , 73–74, 78, 80, 88, 109, 111, 122, 125, 152,

164-16 5, 171, 180, 189-190 , 194, 197, 200>207,

230, 267, 26%270, 279, 283, 285, 291–292, 299,

308, 310-311, 31= 316, 32*322, 327, 337, 339,

349-350, 353, 359, 374

J a pa nese, 74, 120, 137, 146, 149, 152, 180, 196,

200, 247, 266, 26%270, 283, 285, 29(L 291, 299,

308, 317, 320-321, 332, 337, 345-346, 350, 374

C at e, J . L ., 163n, 235n

C ates, C ol C . B ., 248, 25S 257, 290

C ausew a ys, 267

C a va lr y P oin ~ , 185, 192–193, 198

C a vi te, 157, 162–164, 168-170, 181, 184, 189

C eb u, 301

C en tra l P acific, 64, 75, 83-84, 96, 214, 253. &’ee

a180 Pacific.

C hin wa ngt ao, 158, 160

Chito.se, 291-292 , 325

C hois eu l, 243, 259

Chokai, 327, 354

C hrist ma s I sla nd, 87

C hun n, Ca pt C . E ., 188?4 198

C hurchill , P rime Minist er W. S., 35, 35n, 36-37,

40, 4243, 86

Civilia n const ruct ion con tra ct ors, .52, 65+ 6, 81–

82, 95, 9&99, 104, 122

Civil Wa r , 16

C la rk, Ma j C., 362

Cla rk, C apt G . L., J r ., 195, 199

C la rk F ield, 100

C la ss ii3ed d ocu men t s, 124

C lea rw a ter , 32+ 3

C lemens, U apt W. F. M., 285, 285n

C lem en t, L tC ol W. T., 160n , 161; C ol, 179

Clothing , 38-39,170,277

C oa st defen se. S ee D efen ses; Wea pon s.

Coa st G ua rd. see Na va l unit s (Allied).

C oa s t w a t c h er s , 3 20 ,3 26 ,3 53

C ocon ut p la n ta t ion s, 243, 297

C ollin s, Ma jG en J . L ., 360,366

C ol or s, n a ti on a l, 149, 199

Comba t loa ding, 19-20, 38, 248-249. 8ee a 180

Logistics.C ombin ed Ch iefs of S ta ff ( CC S ), 85-87

Comma n da n t of t he Ma rine C orps, 10-11, 13,

29-30, 32–33, 44, 262

C omma nder in C hief, Asia t ic Fleet ( C inC AF ),

158-161, 165n

C omma nder in C hief, P acific Fleet ( C inCP ac ),

84,114,131,143,218,236

C omma n der in C h ief, P a cific Ocea n Area



I N D E X 419

Communications—Continued

Allied—Continued

w ire, 68, 103, 105, 108, 110, 132, 137, 152,

189–190, 192,256,290,306,334

J a p a n e sefla res , 76, 8 2, 136, 1%3, 195, 198, 305–306, 3%

r a di o, 258, 264, 286, 332

s h ip -t o-s h or e, 285

t el ep ho ne , 33 3

C om ma nd post s, 18,66, 79

C om mun ist C om in for m, 59

C on cret e ba tt lesh ip, 169. S ee a lso Fort D rum.

C on derm an , 2dLt R. J ., 100, 100n, 102, 108

C on dit , K . W’., 92n

C on dit ion R ed, 335

C on gr es s, 52–52, 75

C or m, S ,, 35n

C on oley , Ma j O. M., 337

C on st it ut ion , 3-4

Construction. S ee E n gi neer op er a ti on s,

C on tin en ta l C on gr ess, 3

C on tin en ta l Ma rin es, 3

C on voy s, 39-40,43, 46. S ee a lso S hips.

C ooley , C ol A. D ., 362

C op ra , 243

C or al for ma tion s. S ee Ter ra in .

C ora l S ea , 205, 20$210, 212, 21+ 215, 218, 227,

2 30 , 2 35 , 2 37 –2 38 , 2 86

C or pu s C hr is ti, 50n

C orregidor , 84, 87, 155, 1~ 7, 167–171, 173, 175,

179, 181, lW-185, 1S 8-190, 192-193, 196, 198,

20&202

C orregidor Ma rin es, 202, S ee a lso llfa rin e unit s.

C ory , Lt R., 281

C uba , 38

C ulebr a, gl O, 14, 18n , 23,26, 2%30

C unn in gha m, C dr W. S ., 99, 102–103, 106, 106n,

107, l 17n , 124-126, 134, 14W141, 143–148; C a pt ,

9 9n , 1 26 nC un nin gh am F ield , 52

Cnracao , 54n

C urry , Lt Col M. L,, 271n

C ur tis, Ma jG en I -I . O ., 42

G u sh in g, 353

C ust er , lstS gt S . A., 281

D agget t, LC dr R. B ., 27, 27n

D aln ess, C apt H . E ., 197–198; Ma j, 185n

D am age con trol t ea ms, 71

D an ish K ing, 35D avidson , 2dLt C . R., 10W, 107n, 121, 128

D avid Ta ylor Model B asin, 50

D avis, Lt Col H . L., 162n

D avis, Ma j L. K ., 326

D a vi ts , 24, 28

D e C a rre, B riG en A., 360

Defenses

Allied

a nt it an k obst acles, 290

a rm or pla te, 279

ba rbed w ire, 114, 181, 190, 193, 220, 313, 334

b ea ch d efen ses , 17, 68, 121, 126-127, 167, 171,

179–181, 185,188,190,201,313

b un ker , 110

coa st a nd h arbor, 67, 157, 168

d um my gu ns , 112–113, 127

em pla cem en ts , 99, 103, 110, 112, 12&127, 181,

1%5, 190,192,310,337

f iel d f or t if ica t ion s, 288, 290, 330




D en gu e fev er , 245

D en ver B a t ter y, 193-199

D essez, C a pt J , H . S ., U SN, 175

D essez, Lt Col L. A., 88

D est royers. S ee S hips.

D et on at or m aga zin es, 99

D ev er eu x, M aj J . P . S ., 99– 1O O, 102, 104–106, 108,

112–113, 117, l17n , 118, 121, 126, 132, 134, 136,

136a , 137–138, 138n , 139, 139n , 140-144, 147–

149, 151 ; C ol, 96n , 107n , 130n

D ew ey, Adm G . F., 7

D ia mon d, G ., 92n

D ierdor ff, C a pt R. D ., U SN, 95n

D iesel fuel . S ee F uel,

D il l, G en S ir J ., 42

D ixon , LC dr R. E .,211n

D ocks, 243

D ockside eq uipm en t, 249

D oma C ove, 371

D oolit t le, I ,t C ol J . H ., 207, 209, 218

D ow ning, S Sgt C . E .,197n

D ryd ocks, 74

D rysda le, Ma j D , B .,36n

D ugout S un da y, 335, 343

D uh am el, F at her A. C ., 283, 285n

D uke of York & Alba ny’s Ma rit ime Regimen t

of Foot , .% S ee a lso Roya l Ma rin es.D umps. S ee S upply .

D urwan, 324–325

D unedin , 33, 50

D un gca s B ea ch , 76, 78

D ut ch G uia na , 54n

D ut ch H a rbor , 214

D yn a mit e, 109-110, 112, 125, 220

D ysen ter y, 182

E llis, Ma j E . H ., 8-9, 9n, 10

E lrod, C apt H . T,, 10W, 107n, 109–110, 112, 119-

1 20, 141

E mper or ’s birt hda y, 189

E n gi neer op er a t ion s

build in g eq uipm en t, 277

con st ru ct ion , 45, 64, 66, 112

d ir t-m ovin g eq uipm en t, 250

h a nd t ool s, 66,89, 114, 27(L 277, 279

h ea vy eq uipmen t, 74, 88, 99, 104, 109, 125, 311

J a p an es e eq ui pm en t, 258, 274, 330

J a p a ne se u n it s , 3 86, 3 01– 302 , 323 ,329 ,354

pneum at ic t ampers, 294

pow er sh ovels, 274

sa fet y, 18,

un it s, 8, 20, 38, 48, 74, 274, 276-277, 279, 290,

294–295, 303, 311, 313, 343–344. S ee a tso

.Ya va ~ unit s ; Ma rine units.

E mpla cem en ts. flee D efen ses.

E ngla nd, 35, 42

E nright , Ma j W. K ., 344

Enterprise,5–66, 74, 101–102, 114, 205, 207, 209,

214, 218, 221, 226228, 242, 247}L , 252, 263n ,, 280,

2 92 -2 93 ,3 11 ,3 39 ,3 42 , 3 52 ,3 54

E quipm ent . flee S upply .

~ricsson, 249n

E rskine, Ma j J . C ., 2641E spir it u S an te, 239, 241–242, 261, 280, 293–294,

302, 305, 31*311, 322, 327–328, 343–344, 354,

3 57 , 3 &2 , 3 76

E t?p ri t d e cor ps, 46

Eur eka. See L a nd in g cr a ft .

E urope, 18. 38, 47, 53, 55–56, 59, 61, 63, 85, 342

E ver gla des, 32

E wa Mooring Ma st Field, 48, 68, 71, 73, 101, 279



I N D E X 421

F ields of fir e, 305

F igh ter 1, 295,326-328, 33&336, 362. N ee a180

Airfields.

F igh ter 2, 362. S e e a 1 80 Ai r fi el d s.

Fiji I sla nds, 84, 87–88, 230, 237–238, 242, 247,25 0, 2 52– 253, 259, 279

Fike, Lt C ol C . L., 279

Fink, E ns C ., 293

F in seh ha fen , 237

Fire-cont rol eq uipment , 82, 103, 107, 110, 112-

114, 118, 127, 138, 148, 152, 190, 325, 355. S ee

also R ad ar ; Wea pon s.

Fit ch , RAdm A. W., 362

Fla g. S ee C olors, n a tiona l.

F leet la nding exercises ( Flex), 14-15, 2*21, 26

F lex 4.26

F lex 5, 27, 2%30

Flex 6, 27, 30

F leet Tr ain in g P ublica tion 167, 14, 17

F lem in g, C apt R . E ., 2 29, 229n

F let ch er , 353

Flet ch er , R .4dm F. J ., 115, 13@131, 143, 205,

207, 21@211, 218, 218n , 221,224, 226, 229, 22%

230, 237–238, 240 ;VAdm , 242, 250n , 252, 258-

259, 291–292

F lor ida , 32

F lor ida I sla nd , 237-238, 243, 247–248, 253–254,

2 60, 263 ,268, 27 0

Fomalhaut, 253

Font a na , Ma j P . J ., 343

F ood. flee S upply.

F ood Ma ch in er y C or por at ion , 33–34

Ford I sla nd, 71, 73, 101

F or mos a , 160, 162– 163, 165, 172

F rueler , C a pt H . C ., 10W., 104?v, 109, 119-120,

1 22 –1 23 , 1 28

fi’Ubuki, 325

F uch id a, M., 205n , 215n , 230, 238?2

F uel , 157, 250,259, 277, 327a via t ion , 108, 225, 277, 311, 326

bu lk , 107

d ies el , 117, 125, 277

drum s, 108

d um ps, 268

g as oli ne, 21, 99, 164, 277, 280

J a p an es e, 277, 286

t a nks , 82, 117, 223

F uel-dr um floa ts, 344

F uller , 253

Fuller , Ma jG en J . F . C ., 7

Funa fut i, 239

F un gus in fect ion s, 245

Fun da ment a ls of t ea mw ork, 92

F ur ur ni ya , C ol, 337

Farwtaka, 1 29 , 3 25

G aler , C a pt R. E ., 279; Ma j, 295

G a lley , 223

G a llipoli, 16

G a llopin g H orse, 36*367

G a om i, 269

G a ra ge, 111, 125

G as ma sks, 107

G asolin e. S ee F uel.

G ava ga C reek, 349

G a v ut u , 238, 243, 247–248, 263, 267–271

G ay , E ns G . H ., 227u

G ay , P ., 134n




G lea son, S . E ., 35n

G lidden, C a pt E . G ., 224n

G odbold, C a pt B . D ., 138, 141–142, 142n , 151;

L tC ol, 121r 4 127n

G oet t ge, Lt C ol F . B ., 243, 247, 281, 281nG ot o, RAdm A., 210

G over nm en tR a vin e, 171, 188, 195

G overn men t Tra ck, 276

G ra gg, S gt R., 140

G ra ssy K noll, 25&257

G r aves, lst Lt G . A., 100w , 108-109

G ra ves, (2P 1 L., 13*139, 141

G rea t B rit a in, 35–37, 47.53, 61+ 3, 85

G rea t E a st Asia Wa r, 155

G reeley ,2dL t R . W., 142

G r een la nd , 36n

G reen port B asin a nd C onst ruct ion C ompa ny, 24

G reensla de, R Adm J . W., 55

G reey , L C dr E . B ., 99, 9% 127

G r egor y, 253

Gridlev, 270

G riffin , C ol R., 90

G riffit h, Lt Col S . B ., I I, 315, 315)1

G u ad a lca n al, 15–16, 19, 22, 237–239, 241–243, 245,

247– 248, 253– 254, 257–259, 261–271, 275– 277,

279–280, 283, 285–286, 288, 291–292, 294, 297–

298, 301-302, 310-311, 317, 322–324, 327, 330,

333, 336. 339, 341–343, 346, 35W357, 359–360,

36 0n , 36 2-3 67 , 36 9, 37 1– 374

G ua da lou pe, 5%

G ua m, 7. 7n , 9, 64, 75-76, 78, 78?/ 84, 95, 106,

115 , 286

G ua ma nia ns 76, 78

G ua nt a na mo B ay, 5, 8, 10, 16.38

H an d pum ps, 102

H a nn a , 2dLt R. M., 134, 13*137, 139–141, 148,

152 ; lst Lt , 134n

H ann eken, Lt C ol H . H ., 320-321, 333, 336-337,

3 47 , 3 47 t L, 3 48 + 4 9Hara-kiri , 293,308

H a rm on , Ma jG en M. F ., 240, 275–276, 280, 324, 362

H ar ris, lst Lt W. F ., 192, 194-195

H art , L t C ol J . N., 241

H art , Adm T. C ., 155w , 157, 157r4 158, 158n , 159,

1 61 , 1 61 n , 1 64 -1 65 , 1 65 n , 1 6&1 67

Haruna, 225,326

H askin, QMS gt J . E ., 196

H ast ie, C a pt D . H ., 219

Hatst[@ii, 325

H auck, C a pt H . H ., 198

H ava nna h H arbor , 239

H a w a iia n I sla n ds, 5, 7, 7r~ , 9, 11, 62, 6*66, 68,

78, 83-84, 87–88, 95–96, 101, 123, 143, 215,

218–219, 238, 249, 253, 351, 360

Hava.shio, 3 51 , 3 56

H ay at e, 118, 120

H ayes, Ma j C . H ., 276

H ayes, C dr T. H ., 170n

H ayn es, C a pt R. M., 218

H azelw ood, C pl H . R., 79H eel P oin t, 98, 141, 147

H ein l, lst Lt R. D ., J r., 115; Lt C ol, 4n , 5n, 04n,

l13t?,, 130)~, 216?1.,265n, 342n

Helena, 324–325, 344,348,353

Helm, 260

H elm et s, 107

Henderson, 158

H en der son F ield , 27%280, 292–295, 298, 302–303,






J a p a n es e U n i t s-C on t in u ed

Army-Continued

S even t eent h Army, 286, 301, 322, 329, 332,

3 37 , 3 ’4 9, 3 64

2d D ivision , 314, 323, 327, 333, 338, 364

4t h D ivis ion , I &J , l&1857t h D ivision, 286

16th D ivision, 165–166, 172, 176, 182, 184

18t h D ivision , 301

21st D ivision , 182

38t h D ivision, 323, 329, 346, 347n, 35W351,

358 , 36 4

48t h D iv is ion , 164, 166,172

55t h D ivision , 78n

5t h Air G roup, 163, 170, 172

35t h B riga de, 286, 288, 301

65t h B r iga d e, 172–173, 176, 182K a wa guehi Force, 299, 301, 308, 310-311,

314, 317, 322

S out h S ea s D et ach ed Force, 78

2d Formosa Regimen t, 164

4t h I nfa n t ry Regiment , 301, 308, 314, 319.

321 -3 22, 3 29, 332, 3 64

16th I n fa nt ry Regimen t , 32S 329, 334, 336-

337, 364

20t h I nfa nt ry R egim en t, 176-177

28th I nfa nt ry Regimen t, 286, 301

29t h I nfa nt ry Regiment , 329, 334337, 364

61st I nfa nt ry Regim en t, 185, 193–194, 196

124t h I n fa nt ry Regimen t , 301, 323, 329, 364

144t h I nfa n tr y R eg im en t, 78n

228t h I nfa nt ry R egim en t, 350, 364

229t h I nfa nt ry R egim en t, 354.364

230t h I nfa nt ry Regim ent , 328-329, 347, 354,

364

I chiki Force, 286, 288n, 290, 291, 294, 299,

J a p a n es e U n i ts -C on t in u ed

Navy

Na va l G enera l S ta ff, 62, 369

C om bined Fleet , 62, 96, 1 29, 228n, 230, 235,

346

S econ d F leet , 228, 339, 355-356, 369Th ir d F leet , 339

F ou rt h F leet , 75, 96,11~ &l16, 129

E ight h Fleet , 238, 260, 286, 291, 301, 325,

350, 356

E leven t h Air Fleet , 162, 165, 170, 325

S ou th ea st er n F leet , 346

Adva nce E xpedit ion ary Force, 215

Aleut ia n S cr een in g F or ce, 215

C a rr ier S t r iking F orce, 210, 215, 221, 226-

227

Mid wa y C over in g F or ce, 21(F 211Midw ay I nva sion Force, 228

Midw ay Ma in B ody , 215, 229

Midw ay h’eut ra liza tion U nit , 78

Midw a y Occupa t ion Force, 215, 221

Out er S ea s Forces, 325

S econ d Mob ile F or ce, 214–215

S ubm ar in e F or ce, 228

Aleut ia n S cr een in g G r oup, 228

P ort Moresby I nva sion G roup, 210-212

C arr ier D ivision 2, 127, 129

C ruiser D ivision 6, 114-115, 129–130, 142

C ruiser D ivision 7, 228

C ru iser D iv is ion 8, 129-130

C ru iser D ivision 18, 129

C omba t D ivision 3, 326

D est royer D ivision 15, 326, 350, 355

D est roy er D ivision 24, 301

D est royer D ivision 29, 118

D est roy erD ivision 30, 119



I N D E X

J a p a n e se U n i t s-C on t i nu ed

Navy—Continued

S pecia l na va l la n ding force t roops, 96, 116,

133, 136, 143, 149, 293

Jai+s, 259

J a va , 62, 86, 167, 172, 369

J e llicoe, E a rl, 238w

J enkins, lstLt R. F., J r., 187, 192: Lt C ol, 170n,

192n

J eschke, C ol R. H .,342

J et ties, 243

Jint.su, 291, 293, 299

J ohn son, Ma j C . W., 219

J oh nst on I sla nd, 64-66, 68, 75,81–84, 114

Joint Action of the Armgand Navg, 11J oint B oa rd of t he&m y a nd~ a vy, ll,14, 55J o in t C hiefs of S t a ff, 85, 85n , 86, 86n , 87–8$,

23%236, 342

J oi n t P l a n n i ng C ommi t t ee ,5 4J on a s s on ,P r i me ~ i in i st er H . , 3 9n .J on es, l st Lt L . A. , 216J ol o Is la n ds ,1 72J o ss ely n, L t H . E . , 264nJuneau, 353

Junyo, 339

J une, MS gt R. M., 138n

Kaga, 215,223,227

Kagero, 293

K a hn , Lt ( jg) G . M.. 109n , 112

K ajioka , RAdm , 11*117, l18n, 119, 129-132

Ka.ko,129

K a lbf us, R Adm E . C ., 32

K a luf, Ma j J ., 32

425

K ing, Ma jG en E . P ., J r ., 182, 182n , 183

K in g, Ma j S . W., 171, 171n, 180

K inka id, RAdm T. C ., 339, 354

K in ney , 2dLt J . F ., 10ln, 10%110, 121–122, 122n,

123–124, 128 ; ls tL t, 102w , 107n , 121n

Kinryu Maru, 291, 293

Kinugawa itfaru, 355

Kinugasa , 129,299,325,327,354

Kiriskima, 225, 353, 355–356

K im, L C dr L. J ., 305

Kisaragi, 120

Kiska , 215

Kitty hawk, 219

Kiyokawa, 129, 133

K liew er , 2dLt ., D . D ., 10ln, 109, 111, 122, 124,136, 141, 142n ., 148; lst Lt , 149n

K obe, 209

K odia k, 50n

K okomt um bu I sla nd, 270

K okumbon a , 280, 283, 288, 298, 301, 308, 314-

315, 317-318, 326, 32%330, 333, 337, 344-345,

34%350 , 3 57, 36 3-36 4, 3 67 -369

K okumbon a River , 343

K oli P oin t, 285, 308, 345–350, 363

K on do, RAdm N., 215,356

Kon.go, 326

K on go Ma ru, 119–120

K on oy e C a binet , 60

K on oye, P rin ce, 60

Konr~u Maru, 119

K orea n Wa r, 4

228-229, 339; VAd m, 355–





I N D E X 427

M ach in e s hop, 111, 123

Ma ginot L ine, 18

Ma ha n, RAdm A. T., 1.31

Ma ju ro, 115

Ma ka mbo I sla nd, 270Ma kin At oll, 115, 205,207, 285

Ma hiit a, 2+ 3 , 352

Ma la now ski, I ?lS gt A. P ., J r ., 317

Ma la r ia , 182, 184, 239, 245, 310, 323, 328, 332,

339 , 3 ’71

Ma la ya , 62, 84, 86, 155, 157, 162

Ma leol ap, 207

Ma lint a H ill, 169, 171, 183, 187, 192–l X, 199, 201

M alin ta Tu nn el, 19*193, 197–198

Ma lleck, S gt D ., 148

M aln ut rit ion , 173, 182,328, 356Ma nch uria , 59, 201

Ma neu ver s, 8-10, 52

Ma n grum, L t C ol R . C ., 279, 294, 323, 32%

Ma n ila , 7, 84, 159, 161-167, 172

Ma nila B ay , 7, 157, 159, 16..-164, 166, 168, 172,

184, 201

.Wanleg, 296

Ma nn ing, lst Lt A. S ., 192, 199

Ma a ua l for IVucal Ocrv-. was Operation, 14

Maps

Allied , 18, 243, 247

J a p an es e, 147, 185, 265

Ma rcus I sla nd, 207

Ma ria na s, 64, 95

Ma rine C orps E quipr iw ut B oa rd, 24, 28, 32-33

Ma rin e emblem, 4

Ma rin e un it s

Air

M a r in e u n it s —C on t in u ed

Air—Continued

VMP ’-221, 81, l14n, 121, 126, 130, 21*217,

223, 225

V 31 k1 -2 23 , 2 79 , 2 91 –2 92 , 3 23VMF -224, 279, 295

VMF -252, 68

VMO-151, 90

VM&231, 241, 276

VMS -3, 47

VM SB -132, 343

VMS B-141, 327

VMS B-231, 73–75, 79, $1, 100, 216, 279, 2%

VMS B-232, 68, 10W, 279, 292, 3T3

VM S B -241 , 2 17, 223 , 2 23 n, 224 –22 5

GroundMa rin e C orps H ea dq ua rt ers, 22, 28

Ma rin e C orps S chools, 14

Fleet Ma rine F orce, 11, 13, 14, 32, 4748,

51-52, 54

Fleet B ase D efen se Force, 13

I C orps (P rovisiona l), 38

I Ma rin e Amph ibious C orps, 341, 374

1st Ma rine D ivision, 38, 48, 52, 52n , 56, 90,

2 36, 239 –24 0, 243 , 24 7– 249, 252n, 261 , 2 93,

341, 351, 359–360, 362, 367?~ , 3712d Ma rin e D ivision, 38, 46, 48, 52, 56, 69, 88,

248, 360, 362, 366, 368, 368n

1st Ma rine B riga de, 18, 47

1st Ma rine B riga de ( P rovisiona l), 3940, 44,

54, 54n , 55

2d M a ri ne B r ig a de, 47, 88-90, 92, 205

3d Ma rin e B riga de, 30, 90n



428

M a ri ne u n it s —C on t in u ed

Ground—Continued

llth Ma rines, 248, 261, 27.5, 281n, 283, 303,

306,313,329,332,343

Wh a li ng ’s G r ou p, 319-321, 343. \m l}h ibia n Tr act or B a tt a lion s

I st , 261, 275, 3(M , 313

2d, 261,270

Ar t il le ry B a t t a li on s

1 /1 0, M n , 3 42 ,3 48

1/11, 90, 261,310,313,319

2/10, 39, 88-89

2/11, 275, 283, 298,.319

3/10, 261

3/11, 275,283,290,319

4/11, 2615/11, 275, 283, 298. 305– 306, 308, 319

Av ia t ion E ng in eer B a tt alion s

lst , 362

2 d, 362

D ef en se B a t ta li on s

l st , 65–67, 73, 75, 79–80, 82, %3, 06, 98-100,

103–104, 10% 110, 113, 125–126, 128,

134,137,147,150

2 d, 56, 88– 89, 205

3d, 65–67, 73, 75, 113, 219, 230, 249, 252,

261, 294, 298, 313, 329, 333, 357, 359n

4t h, 66-67, 75. 81. 113–114, 126, 130, 21G

217,238-239

;t h, 3= 39, 41–42, 46, 298, 31(L311, 342,

342n

6t h , 63–67, 7%80, 21 R 217, 221, 223, 230

7 th , 6 7-6 8, 8 8-9 0

8t h, 90

P EARL H ARB OR TO G UAD ALC AI YAL

M a r in e u n it s —C on t i n ue d

Ground—Continued

I n fa n t r y B a t t a l ion s—C on t in u ed

2/5, 248, 256, 261, 266, 271, 298, 302, 305-

3 06, 31>317, 320, 344+ ?452 /6 , 4 5

2 /7 , 3 20 ,3 33 ,3 36 -3 37 ,3 39 , 3 47 –3 49

3/1, 256, 306, 308, 319, 329-330, 333

3/2, 268–269, 271, 311, 313, 318-319, 329,

333,343, 344?1,345,350

3/4, 170-171,175,199,201

3 /5 , 2 56 ,2 81 ,2 83 , 3 20 , 3 4* 34 5

3 /6 , 4 5

3/7, 90,329,333,336,343,348

4/4, 187, 187w, 188,191,197

Reserve B n, 4t h Ma rines, 171, 180, 191,195–196

M ed ica l B a t ta lion s

I st , &4n , 261

2d, 39, 361

1st P ara chut e B at ta lion, 248, 261, 267, 269,

27@271, 29~ 299, 311, 359n , 371

P i on eer B a t ta li on s

lst , 257, 261, 275, 303, 313, 329

2d , 261

R a id er B a t ta lion s

lst , 247–249, 252, 261, 264, 298, 315, 317,

320-321, 35 9n , 371

2d, 219, 262, 266, 285, 342, 348, 350

2d P rovisiona l, 262

R aid er -pa ra ch ut e ba tt alion , 303, 305–306

1st S amoa n B at ta lion, 67–68, 88

1st S epa ra t e Ma rine B a t t a lion, 161n, 162–

164, 164n , 16*169, 175

S er vi ce B a t ta li on s



I N D E X 429

lvlarineunits—ContinuedGround—Continued

1st Scout Company,39,261Si gn a l Go mpa n i es

l st , 39, 261

2d,261J .4SC 0 , 367

Securi ty guard detachments ,WShips’detachments,13,50

~ lariveles, 157, 162, 167–168,170. 173, 175–180,182

h la r s ha l l, G e n G . C ., 43, 85, 87, 235– 236, 275~ larsha ll Island s, 10, 62, 81, 9.%96,110,129, 131,

207i ll a rst on , B r i Gen J . , 39, 4 1n , 42 42n, 43-44, 44n.

45-46; Ma jG en , 360, 360n

Ma rst on m at tin g, 276, 295, 362

Ma rt in iq ue, 38, 54, 54% 55

Ma rushige, R.kdm K., 129

Ma rnya ma , Lt G en M.. 327, 329–330, 332–333,

33 4n , 335– 337 , 33 7n , 364

Ma ru ya ma Tra il, 330, 333, 337

Ma son, P ilot Officer C . J ., 25%259

Ma t a nika u, 281, 298, 314, 316, 318, 320, 336,

363-364

Ma t an ika u R iv er , 245, 28@281, 308, 314-317, 319-

320, 323, 329–330, 333, 343, 347, 351–352, 358,

365

Ma tloff, M. E ,, 37n

Ma gu, 354

Ma xw ell, L tC ol W. E ., 256,298

Mba nga i I sla nd, 270

iMc.41ist er, lstLt J . A., 117, 132w 144, 146-147

McAn ally , C P 1 W. J . , 140-141

McB ra yer , C a @J . D ., J r ., 161}1

Mea d, Lt G . H ., J r., 283

. lfeade, 3.57

Xeda l of H on or , 80, 335

Medica l a ct ivit ies. S et ’ also H ospit als; C asua l-

ties.

a id sta tions, 66, 74, 112, 148

d is pen sa r ies , 223

eva cu at ion . 20, 270

m edicin es a nd eq uipm en t, 104, 111, 170, 172

medica l unit s, 20, 48, 239

na va l, 66, 75, 104, 161

Med it er ra nea n, 53

Mela nesia , 237

Mercur io, MG unS gt J ,, 192

Mer izo, 78

Merr illa t, C apt H . L., 23.5n

Mes sh a ll s, 12. 5-126, 223

Met apon a River , 347, 349

Met ca lf, L tC ol C . H .,9n

Met ze, C apt .4. F ,, 160n

Mexica n Wa r , 4, 16

Mexico, 9

Mia mi, 50n

Mic?Li8dio,354

Middle E a st , 85, 87

Midw ay, 48, 62, 64–66, 68, 73–75, 7%81, 84, 92,

95, 130, 143, 151, 214-219, 221, 223-231, 235-238, 27 9, 286, 291 -2 62

M id dle S ect or , 171, 194

M id dl es id e, 168, 171, 181, 190, 199

Midd leS ide B a rra cks, 170

Mika w a , VAdm G ., 238, 260, 291, 299, 301, 325,

350, 356

.Mikama, 229

Mili, 207



430 P EARL H ARB OR TO G UAD ALG ANAL

Jfogami, 229-230

Monroe D oct rine, 5, 36

Monssen,263, 26S, 353

Moon, Lt A. L., 265n

110 O per a ti on , 210

M oor e, M ajG e n G . F ., 156/ ., 169–170, 198Moor e, C ol E ., 326

Moore, C a pt P . C., 197

Mor ison , C apt S . E ,, 114w , 126n ; R Ad m, 40n,62n,

2 05+ 1 , 214n , 215n , 225n, 227?1, 23. 5n , 337n , 342

Morr ison H ill, 171

Morr ison P oint , 185

M or t on , L ., 156n ,200n

Moser, Col R. D ., 1811

Moses, B riG en E . P ., 28, 28n., 33

Mt . Aust en , 245, 248, 256-258, 308, 314-315, 330,

333, 337, 358, 363, 366

M t. B a t a an ,173

Mt . N-a t ib, 173, 176

Mt . P u cot , 177–179

Mt . S ila nga na n, 173

.llugford, 258

Mulca hy , B r iG en F. P ,, 362

Munn, LtC ol J . C.,297

Munro, S MlstCl D . A., 317

Mura ka mi, Ca pt Y., 301

.Vurah-umo, 325, 32,3n

Murra y, RAdm G . D ., 324

.I l a .st suk i , 293

Xat8u ki , 118, 143

Xaganawbi, 365

A’a ga no, Adm O., 62

A’agara, 227, 353,355

A“agoya, 209

X av a l G u n fi re -C on t in u ed

J a pa nese, 129, 297, 318, 351, 353

~ ’a ~ -a l U nit s, Allied. S ee also S hips ; Ta sk

Organizations.

B rit ish H ome Fleet , 40n

U . S . C oa st G ua rd, 21, 24

C . S. Navy, 3–5, 7, 10, 11, 14, 17, 18, 21, 23,

24, 26-30, 32, 33, 40, 4* 46, 50, .33, 55, 64,

69n , 71, 74, 76, 76n , 86-87, 90, 99, 157, 175,

190n , 2W, 236, 241–242, 260, 295, 297, 303,

311, 372

As ia t ic F leet , 69, 76, 157, 164

At la nt ic F leet , 10, 21–22, 28, 85

P acific Fleet , 62–64, 69-71, 74, 81, 84, 87, 95-

96, 98, 113, 157, 205, 209, 214–215, 228

L T. S , F leet , 5, 10, 13, 32, 84, 214

Am ph ibiou s F or ce, S outh P acific, 252n, 2tH

S out h P acific Forces, 236

L1. S . Na va l Forces in E urope, 236

14th Na va l D ist rict , 64, 66, 70n, 75, 124

16th Na va l D ist rict , 157

At la nt ic S qu ad ron , 2730

C ub –1, 276

G ua ma nia n na va l milit ia 76, 76n

Na va l ba tt alion , Ma riveles, 175-176, 178-180

P hilippine I nsh ore P at rol, 180

6t h Na va l Const ruct ion B at t a lion, 295, 326,

362

18t h Na va l Const ruct ion B at t a lion, 363

NAD , B urns Cit y, 5W

N AD , C a v it e, 175, 178, 180

A-AD , L ua lu alei, 69, 74

XAS, C a pe Ma y, 50n

XAS, Ford I sla nd, 69, 71

N-AS, J acksonvi l le , W?



I N D E X 431

Savy D epa rt men t, 13, 27, 31, 54, 89, 137–158, 166

Na vy D epa r t ment C on t in uing B oa rd for t h e D e-

~ relopmen t of L a nding B oa ts, 2s, 30

Na zis, 35, 47

A-d en i, 262, 261, :31H 11, ~ z ~ , 3z4, 342

Nea r E a st , 61

N cr hcs , 114, 131

X (w s h o, 21 (P 2 11

Net her la nd s. 54, 61–W, 84

iYet her la nd s E ast I ndies, 78, 155, 157

I Xeu se R iv er , 52

A’eut ra lit y P a tr ol, 37

Neu tr alit y Zon e, 63

A’e vi ll p, 253

h “ew B rit ain, 236

New C a ler lon ia , 86, 88, 209, 230, 237–238, 324,3 43 , 3 60 , 3 60 } , 3 71

N “ew f ou nd la r rd ; 54r r

An ew G eor gia G r ou p, 243, 301

New G uin ea , 86, 207, 209. 23&238, 301, 322, 342,

346, 368–369

sew H ebrides, 86, 88, 23*239, 241, 259, 262,

279-280, 293. 293, 311, 339, 353

S ew I rela nd, 236

An ew L on don , 8

New Orlea ns, 24, 28, 31

N t’I n O rleu rw, 352Xew port , 8

New Rirer, 14.21, 31, 38, 52, 60

New World, 54

N ew York, 45–46, 54

h ’ew Zea la nd, 36, 61, 84, 8+ 87, 89–90, 155, 205,~ 30, ~ 36, ~ ~ ~ , ~ 43, ~ 4~ 250, ~ ~ ~ , 360, 366, 37]

Nggela G roup, 243, 270

h’ia ga ra P enin sula , 16

Nort h P a cific, 214. S eeulso P a cific.

Xor th P oin t, 192–193

A’or wa y, 53

Xon mea , 240-242, 272, 260, 324, 341, 359

X“ oy es, R .k dm L ., 242, 259

Oa hu, 48, 66, 68-69, 69n, 70-71, 74-75, 81, 106,

1 13, 13W13 1, 2 79, 285

O’Bannon, 353

Oboro, 129

O’B rien , 311

observa tion post , 105

Ocea n I sla nd, 115

O’C on nell, Ma j M. V., 298

Odilia , S ist er, 285n

Oh rn ae, C apt T., I J N, 120n, 346, 346n, 3b7n, 363,

372

Oil. S ee Fuel.

oit c, 118, 120

Oka , C ol A., 301, 333?1, 337,336, 367

Okin aw a , 371, 373

O li in w h ir rm , 237

O km n iy a , M ., 205?1, 215n , 230

O lon ga p o, 157, 159, 161, 165, 167

Open D oor policy , .59

Oper at ion B oler o, 342

Oper a tion S hoes tr in g, 237, 257, 260Orga niza tiona l loa ding, 249. S ’cc a rso I .ogist irs.

Or ien t, 59, 65, 75

Or ion , 173, 176, 180

O rk ney I sl a nd s, 40n

Orn dorff, C ol C . A., 366

Or ot e P en in sula , 76

Osa ka . 209

ot ter, I .t B . B ., 197–198




P ana ma Ca na l, 38,53

P an Am erica n World Airw ays, 65, 75, 80,106, 109

P arker , Ma jG en G , M., J r., 167, 172–173, 176

P a rker, L Cdr T. C ., 183w

P arks, Ma j F. B ., 223

P a rris I sla nd , 38, 46,51, 51n , 52

P a tch Ma jG en A. M., 23S 239, 360, 360n , 362,366-

3 67 , 3 69 ,3 71 , 3 71 n

P at e, Lt Col R. McC. 249

Pa trot Craft 5’2, 129, 130, 133–134, 136, 142

P at rOt C ra ft 33, 129, 130, 133-134, 136

P a t rols , 180, 275, 280-281, 283, 283, 288, 308, 315,

318, 328, 330, 333, 345, ?. 47, 349-350

Pattf’rson, 260

P at terson, Lt R. M., 328

P ea cock P oint , 98, 102-103, 108, 110-113, 117-118, 124, 130, 134, 13 6-137, 139-14 0, 143

P ea le I sla nd, 98–99, 103, 105, 111–112, 115, 119,

121, 123–124, 127–128, 132, 134, 138, 141_144,

147,131

P ea rl H a rbor , 5, 33, 43, 45, 48, 50, 56, 62, 64-70,

73–76, 78-79, 81–84, 86–89, 101, 107, I 13_I 14,

125, 127, 13@131, 143, 155, 157, 16*161, 205,

207, 209, 212, 214-216, 219, 236, 241, 252, 253,

~ 6 ~ , 286

P efley, Ma j A. R., 67; B riG en, 6511

P e ip in g , 15 7, 159– 160P en guin , 76

~c)t.sncola, 352

I ’eI J p er , C ol R . H ., 252,313

P esh ek, 2dL t M, E ., 176a

P ew , Lt (jg ) L. A., 177

I ?h ase L in e A, 264

P h ila delph ia , 8,51

P ]/i li pp in e C l iop er , 106-107, 109 , 127

P o ha R iv er , 343, 34 5, 357, 369, 371

P o in d ex t er , 2d Lt A. A. , 132, 134, 136-137, 141 ,147,

149, 151–152 ; L t Col , 126?q 132n

P oin t C ruz, 281, 316–320, 344-345, 347, 350, 354,

357%58, 363,366-367

P ola nd, 47

P ollock, Lt Col E , A., 28% 290

P ond, Lt Z. A., 292

P on ies , 41

P or ter , 339

P or t la nd , 353

P ort Moresby, 209, 237-238, 322, 346, 369

P ort Roya l, 51

P or t of emba rka tion , 20

P or tu ga l, X-56

P os t exch a n ge, 51, 223P ot t er, E . B ., %

P ot ter , Ma j G . H ., 134, 139, 141–142, 142?2, 143 ;

C ol , 132n

P ot ter ’s I .ine, 142, 148

P ound, Adm of t h e Flt S ir D ., 42

P ow er hou se, 7 3, 82, 223

P ra tt , LC dr M. L., 281

P r el im in a ry b om ba r dm en t

Al l ied, 150,192

J a p a nes e, 150, 1&5, 200, 202

P resident ia l U nit C it a tion, 360Pr e.Wen t A dam g, 250, 253, 268, 270

Prcs iden t Harrison, 158-160

President Haye8, 250, 253, 268

Pre~ident Jack80n, 250, 253

P residen t L in e’s dock, 159

President Madison, 158-159

P ressley, Ma j O. K., 270

Prrston, 356



I N D E X 433

Qua rt erma st er st ocks. S ee S upplies.

Qu in ar mn P oin t, 177, 180

Q a in c~ , 2 54, 260

Q ui ni ne, 184, 239

Quon set P oin t, 50n

Rabaul , 78n, 205, 210, 212, 235-238, 241, 253, 257,

259, 264, 274, 280, 286, ~ 3–294, 301–302, 305,

308, 310, 316, 320, 322, 3MI -329, 334-336, 346,

3S 0+ 31, 355, 357, 363–364, 368+ 69, 372

R ada r, 70, 79, 98, 103, 105, 109, 114, 150, 152, 162–

163, 170, 217, 221, 275, 325-326, 353, 355–336

R ad io. S cc C om mu nica tion s.

Raiders. S cc Ma rine unit s.

R ailh ea d, 160

Ra inbow r–5, W-64, 75. S ee a lso P la nn ing.

RalplIalbot, 260

R a msey B at t ery, lW

Ra msey Ra vine, 169, 171

Ra pe of S a nking, Xl

Ra tions. S (’C supply.

R uysbrook, S gt R. D ., 316

R econn a issa nce, 17, 48, 63, 89, 241. S ee a lso

Aircraft .

Recruit deuot s, 51, W

R eefs, 133, 137

ROC/?(la/A9S

R eh ea rs als , 12 ). 1S 4, 242, 252

R eifsnider , C a pt L. F ., CS X, 253

R ei nf or cem en t s. 310. 339

Relia ta B ay, 260

R en dez~ on s a rea , 19

R en ne]l I sla nd, 3?2, 324

R epla cemen t s. W W Tbr. -,.-

R eser ves. Ma rin e. 4s. 53

R oosevelt , E ., 37n

Roosevelt , P resident F . D .. 23, 31, 37–39, 39n,

42, 47, 53, 55, 60, 85–86, 86rr , 113, 155, 342

R oper P oll, 47n .

R oscoe, T., 190n

Rose, Lt Col M,, 4n

Rosecra ns, Lt Col H . E ., 248, 266, 315

Rosenm an, S . I ., 40n

Row an , C ol G . R., 257

Roya l Ma rin es, 3, 4, 36

Roya l Na vy , 210

Rupertus, B r iG en W. H ., 247, 265, 268, 26W,

298, 333n., 348, 348tt, 349

R ussell I sla nd s, 243, 354, 356

Russell, B riG en J . H ., 13

Russell, W. H ., W

R ussia , 38, 40, 53, 56, 60

Rust , MG E . S .. 283

Rut ledge, R. R., 137

Ryl(jo, 292

Ryukyu I sla nds, 160, 166

Saalman, lstLt O. E., 185n, 198, 200n; l Iaj, 187n

Sackett, Capt E. L., LTSN, 175n

S’acramen to, 83

S’ad o M aw , 299, 301

S a iler , Ma j J ., J r ., 343

S t. G eor ge’s C ha nn el, 259

S ’$. L O f (i 8, 2 07 , 2 19

S a int Lucia , 54

S a int P ierre, 54n

S aipa n, 76, 129, 133

S ala ma ua , 207, 237

S’al t L ak e U i tv, 324–WS

S a lt t a blet s, 257



434----- -- .-—-— —---- .— .-— -----

S a nta C ruz I sla nds, 236, 252, 310, 335, 339, 342-

243

S anta I sa bel, 243, 260

S a nt o D omin go, 9, 17

Saratoga, 81, 114–115, 130, 143, 216, 242, 252,

2 63 n, 29 2, 30 2– 303, 3 11, 3 23 nS a sa pi ,, 264

S at e, C ol G ., 185, 192–193, 196

S at e, C apt T., I J N, 350, 356, 365

S a va ii, 8%90

S a vo I sla nd, 238, 243, 253, 260, 298, 325, 327,

353–357

S ch a effer , C a pt M. W., 171n ; Ma j, 188, 1%198

S ch oon er pilot s, 257

S cot la nd , 40n

S cot t, R Ad m N., 324-326, 353

S cot t , G en W., 16

S ea bees , 276-277, 279, 295, 342, 362–363. S ’ee a 180

Na va l u nit s, Allied.

S ea d rom es , 64-65

S ea H orse com plex, 367

S ea la rk C h a nn el, 243, 247, 253, 25%260, 276-

277, 294-295, 303, 305, 311, 322%)23, 32= 326,

328, 330, 335, 339, 345, 347-348, 353-356

S ea pla ne ha nga rs, 80, 223

S ea pla ne ra mps, 73, 78, 99, 267

S ea rch ligh t s, 8, 65, 80, 103-104, 113, 144, 146,

169, 190, 193, 356

S ebree, B riG en E . B ., 348, 348n, 34%350, 357, 362

S ecret ary of S ta te, 36

S ecr et ar y of t he Na vy , 30-31

S ecret a ry of Wa r, 44

S eg il a u, 365

S el ect iv e S er vi ce, 37. 53

Sendai, 355

l’H AltL H AI WU K ‘lw G U Al) ALG AI N AL

Ships—Continued

Allied—Continued

ca rr iers, 54, 74, 87, 114, 13(L131, 209-212,

214-215, 218, 224, 228, 235, 240, 242, 250,

259, 291–292, 311, 339, 352, 354

C oa st G ua rd cr it ter s, 54ncom mer ci al, 24,26, 88, 164

con tr ol vess els , 19

cruisers, 24, 39, 74, 157, 207, 209, 218, 228,

241-242, 260, 263, 267, 291, 311, 322, 324,

339, 344, 348, 351–353, 357

dest royers, 36, 39, 53, 70, 74, 131, 157, 207,

20%210, 218, 228, 241–242, 250, 258-260,

263, 291, 311, 316, 322, 324, 339, 344, 348,

351 -35 4, 35 6-35 7, 367 , 36 8

dest royer t ra nspor ts, 38, 242, 252–253, 276,

2 99 , 3 35

d r ed ge s, 83 ,99

es cor t ca rr ier s, 27 3

g un b oa t s , 157– 158

L STS , 34

m in e la yer s, 74, 324

m in e s w eep er s, 76, 81, 164, 179, 242, 311

m ot or t orpedo boa ts, 116, 164, 167, 177, 181,

350,354,365

o il er s , 1 14 , 1 31 , 2 09 -2 10

pa d dl e-w h eel s tea m sh ips, 32p ick et b oa t s, 19, 31

s ea pla n e t en der , 81, 100, 114, 219

subma rines, 65, 131, 157, 164, 166, 168, 181,

189, 189n , 207, 217– 218, 227, 229, 285-286,

352

s ub ma rin e t en der s, 164, 175

SUPPIY, 66 , 82 , 27 7

t ar get , 74



I N D E X 435

Ship+C ont inued

J apa nese-Continued

dest roy er s, 78-80, 82, 96, 116-120, 12%130,

143, 143n , 147, 149, 179, 214, 226, 22.+ 2 29,

275, 283, 288, 291-293, 301, 303, 305, 324-

325, 335-336, 339, 3.51-357, 3%364, 369

d es tr oy er -t ra ns por ts , 116-117, 120, 129, 133-

134, 136,291, 293,301,323

f loa t p la n e t en d er , 129, 133

gu nboa t s, 196, 211

mine la yers, 129, 207, 237

pa trol cra ft , 134

subma rin es, 16, 70, 74, 81–83, 96, 116, 122,

130, 205, 214, 25 2, 275, 294

t a nk er s, 78-79

t ra nspor ts, 116, 118-120, 221, 291–293, 299,

327%328, 352, 354358

t3hirayuki, 325

Sh ir i ga , 79

S hock, C a pt T. M., U SN, 207

S h oh o , 2 1W2 11

S hoji, C ol T., 334-335, 347, 347n , 349

Shokah%, 210, 212, 339

S hore fire cont rol. f3ee Na va l gun fire.

S hore pa rt y a ct ivit ies, 20-22, 240, 257–258. i3’ee

a ls o s upp ly .

S hort la nd Isla nds, 259, 301, 322, 346, 350-351,3 54-355, 369

S ign a ls . S ee C om mu nica t ion s.

S ima rd, C dr C . T., 79-80, 219; G a pt , 221, 224,

229

S impler , LC dr L. C., 302

Nims,210-211

S ims, C ol, 348

S ol om on I sla nd s, 92, 208--210, 236-239, 243, 252–

253, 257–259, 275, 280, 286, 29S 291, 294, 31@

311, 322-324, 326, 335, 341-342, 346, 348, 351,

353, 363, 368-369, 372

S olom on S ea , 235

S on gon an gon a I sla nd, 270

S or yu , 127–131, 143, 215, 227

S ound-fla sh eq uipmen t, 275, 317. S ee also Fire

con t rol eq ui pm en t .

S ou th Am er ica , 54n , 55-56

South Dakota, 339, 354-356

S out hea st Asia , 61, 86

S out h P acit ic, 83-84, 90, 155, 205, 218, 23*237,

240, 249, 275, 277, 279, 302, 311, 324, 340-342,

351, 353-354, 362, 364. S ee a lso P acific.

S ou th er n R es ou rces Ar ea , 61-62S out h S ea s I sla nds, 96

S out hw est P acific, 67, 83, 86-87, 236, 241–243.

S ee a 180 P a ci fi c.

S oviet in terven tion , 60

S pa in , 56

S pa nish America n Wa r, 5, 7, 7n

S pa ulding, C pl J ., 281

Spearf18h, 189-190

S pecia l na va l la n din g force. S ee J apa nese

u nit s, N av al.

S pen cer , Flt Lt , 268S perling, C apt W. E ., 264; Ma j, 264n

S prua nce, RAdm R. A., 207, 218, 218n, 221, 224,

226-230

S t a ging a rea , 92

S ta nding Opera ting P rocedure, 22

S t a rk, Adm H . R., 37, 39, 44, 85, 85n

S ta te D epa rt ment , 54




S upply. S ee a lso S hore pa rt y a ct ivit ies.

a r tiller y, 217

a via t ion , 104, 217

con st ru ct ion , 125

d um ps a nd st ora ge, 20,45, 111,257, 27&277eq u ip men t , 23, 81, 276-277

food , 277, 357

.J a pa nese em er gen cy m ea sur es, 364

J a p a n es e s tock s, 276, 310, 327, 354

m ovem en t of supplies, 257

m un it ion s. S ee Am mu nit ion .

q ua rt er ma st er st ocks, 88

r a t ion s , 21, 104, 167, 1 70, 172– 173 , 1 82, 249, 261,

311, 313, 330, 364

spa re pa rt s, 276

st ow age, 11

S upreme C omma n der of t he S WP A ( C in C S W-

P A), 87

S ur f, 24, 26, 276

S urren der of C or regidor , 199

S urren der of Wa ke, 147

S uva , 279

%veen ey , Lt E . J ., 269

%veen ey , Ma j J . B ., 264n

S ween ey , S gt Ma j J . H ., 196

S ween ey , Lt Col W. C ., 225S yl via , S ist er , 285n

Ta ivu P oin t , 288

Ta ka gi, VAd m T., 21W212

Tahxzo, 355-356

Ta la fofo B ay, 78

Tambor, 229

Ta n a mb og o, 243, 247–248, 263, 267–271

Ta s k O r ga n i z a t i on s —C o n t in u ed

TF 61.1, 242

TF 61.2, 242

TF 62, 250, 253, 261

TF 63, 242, 276TF 65, 311

TG 62.2, 253

TG Yoke, 247, 253–254, 263

TG X -R a y, 247, 25%254

Ta s sa f a r on g a , 327– 328 , 35 0-3 51, 3 56, 364-3 65

Ta ssa fa ronga P oint , 371

l’at.suta, 117–120, 129

Ten a ru , 371

Tena ru River , 245, 256, 288, 292, 308, 313, 347

Tena va tu R iver , 256

Te nr g m, 11 7– 12 0, 129

Tentat iveLanding0~erat ion8Manual ,14-15,17,

19-20, 23Tenffo M a r u , 129

Te rr a in . S e e a i %oR ee fs ; R oa d s ; Ve ge ta t i on .caves , 179cli f fs , 177cora l formations, 9&99, 264,286hills, 176,193,305interior lagoon, 98

jungle, 170,177,181,243, 245,25~257, 275,298,302,308, 330,336mountains,41,173,243mu d, 27 6ridges, 173, 177,192,243, 302,305, 313,330rivers and streams,243s a n d du n es ,6 6, 2 90swamps,239,245tableland,283



I N D E X 437

Toky o E xpr ess, 288, 322-325, 327-328, 343, 34%

346, 35 2, 355 , 363-364, 366

Tokyo ra id, 207

Tom on aga , Lt J ., 224

Tone, 129, 1 43n , 224, 227

Tonga Isla nds, 88Ton ga t abu , 88, 238, 241

Tongue P oint , 50n

Topside, 168,171,181,190,194

Tor ped oes , S ee Am mu nit ion .

Tr ad er s, 243

Tra ils. S ee Roa ds.

Training

Al li ed , 17, 45, 51–52, 156, 188, 218

J a p an es e, 184

Tr an spor t q ua rt er ma st er , 20,250

Tr en ton -P rin cet on ca mpa ign , 3

Tr ia ng ula t ion , 245

Trinida d, 54

Tripa rt it e Trea ty, 59

Triton, 104

Truk, ll&-116, 286, 288, 293, 299, 301-303, 322

Trun dle, 2dLt W. B ., 2%

T8u ga r u, 129

Tsu ji, N ., 108n

Tu la g i, 210, 235-238, 242–243, 245, 247–248, 253–

254, 261, 263, 266, 268-271, 277, 292, 295, 298,

302, 31@-311, 322, 323, 344, 348, 354, 357, 360,

362

Tula gi B ay, 248

Tumon B a y , 78

Tunn el st ern, 24

Turnbla dh , E . T,, 92n

Turn er , RAdm R. K ., 240, 242, 248n, 250, 250n,

253–254, 257, 25%262, 268, 274, 285, 310, 31OW,

U nloa ding, 20, 22, 100, 257. flee a ko S h ore pa rt y

activit ies.

U n o, K ., 191n

UPOIU,86-60

Uf-aka3e, 143n

U8hio, 79-80, 8Qn~’ZUki,293

Va ndergrift , B r iG en A. A., 44n; Ma jG en , 239-2 40 , 2 40 % 2 41 –2 43 , 2 45 ti , 2 47 _2 48 , 2 50 , 2 52 , 2 52 n,

254, 257–260, 262, 267–268, 274-275, 280, 288,

29W291, 294, 297–299, 303, 310, 310n , 311, 313,

315, 319-321, 323-324, 330, 333n , 341–343, 343n ,

34$351, 35%360, 360n , 363n , 369, 372-373

Va n Ness, C ol C . P ., 271n

Veg et a tion , 29, 41, 66, 140, 149, 173, 178, 187, 243,

245, 256-257, 266, 277, 260, 295, 297, 305, 313,

327,330

Vehicles

Allied. S ee a t 80 Amphibia n vehicles; Wea p-

ons.

b om b-h a nd lin g t ru cks , 279

b ul ld oz er s, 66, 99, 274, 295

ca rt s, 279

d um p t ru ck s, 274, 294

f la t bed l or ri es , 250

g a sol in e t ru ck s, 279–295

g ra der s, 66

m ot or cy cl es , 167

pr im e m ov er s, 256

r adio va ns, 106

scout ca rs, 38

s ea rch li gh t t ru cks, 146

t ra ct or s, 23

t rucks, 66, 71, 107, 112, 125, 151, 167, 250,



438 P EAR L HAR BOR TO GUADALCAN.4 L

Virginia,51 1Vogel ,~la jGenC.B, ,341Vouza, Sgt J ~ aj,2t15n,288n

Wa de, LC dr E . M., 194nWa de, G un S gt T. Q., 137

Wa inw righ t , Ma jG en J . M., 167, 172-173, 176,

179–MO, 182, 189, 19%200; G en , 155n , 157n

l%”a it , C apt L. W., 264, 266; Ma j, 345

Wa ke At oll , 62, 64-66, 68, 75, 78-82, 84, 9%96,

98– 99 , 101 –10 4, 1 0~ 1 07, 109 –1 17 , 1 2W1 21, 123 -

127, 129, 131, 134, 139, 143, 147, 150, 207, .253

Wa ke I sla nd, 48, 98-99, 103, 105, 111, 116, 127,

13(L 131, 133-134, 136, 138, 14W144, 147–148,

1 51 –1 52 , 2 16

Wa U c e, 3 56Wa lker, Lt C ol T. J ., J r ., 90

Wa lla ce, L tC ol W. J . , 217, 217rL ; C ol, 295

Wa llis (U ea ) I sla nd,90

Ward, 70

Wa r D epa rt men t, 156,182

Wa r of 1812, 16

Wa r eh ou ses , 249

Wa sh in g-ma ch in e C h a rley , 305, 317, 323, 326.

S e e U Z .S OAi rcr a ft , J a p a n e se .

Washington, 324, 354-356

Wa shin gt on , D . C ., 35-36, 38, 60, 76, 85, 87, 89,

2 37 ,2 40 , 3 41 –3 42

Wa shin gt on , G en G ., 3

Wa sh in gt on Na va l D isa rma men t Trea t y , 59, 75

Wusp, 242, 250, 263, 263n, 267–268, 292, 303, 311

WATCHTOWER 237 23 9-240

Wa ter supply , 104

Wa t er t a nk , 105,297

Veapons—Continued

Allied-Continued

5-i nch g un s, 66-67, 79-80, 82X33, 98, 103–104,

114, 117-118, 121, 131, 134, 138, 140, 147-

148, 152, 217, 275, 294, 355, 357fla me t hrow ers, 367

1 4-i n ch g un s , 1 68 -16 9

gren a des , 114, 137, 141, 144, 148, 178, 195,

29 7, 33 2

m achin e gun s, 33, 42, 71, 73–74, 78, 83, 136-

137, 144, 146, 151, 16@161, 165, 171, 178-

179, 1 3 1-193, 195–196, 217, 291, 306, 320,

334, 337

m in es, 8, 114, 136, 157, 168, 220

m ol ot ov cock ta ils , %20

m or t a r s, 17 1, 1 79, 1 92 –19 3, 1 98, 266 ,30 6, 316,32 0-3 22, 334 ,33 6, 3 45

m oun ta in h ow it zers, 179

na va l gun s, 16, 180

155m m g un s, 23, 169, 342, 349, 352

155m m h ow it zer s, 275

1 05m m h ow i t ze rs , 256 ,27 5, 305

pis tols , 71

r ifles, 73, 78, 148, 178, 188, 196, 306, 320

7-i nch g un s, 67, 81, 21G 217

75m m g un s, 169,179, 191, 193

75m m h a lf -t r a ck s, 275, 332, 345

75mm pa ck how it zers, 256, 275, 290, 342,

349

6-in ch g un s, 68,169, 267

60m m m or t a rs , 264-265

subm ach in e gun s, 141, 160

ta nks, 29–31, 34, 38, 83, 151, 183, 219-220,

258, 269, 291, 308, 367



I N D E X 439

Weapons-Continued

J apa nese-Continued

a nt it a nk gun s, 308

ba yon et s, 141, 291

fiel d pieces, 329, 345

5-in ch gun s, 129

fla me t hrow ers, 291

14-i nch g un s, 353

in fa nt ry ca nn on, 116

grenades , 141,144,291,320,334

g ren a de la un ch er s, 116,291

h ow it zer s, 178

ma ch in e guns, 116, 139–141, 146, 177–179,

193-195, 198, 268, 283, 291, 330, 334-336

mort a rs, 140, 178-179, 198, 290, 306, 315-

3 16 , 3 30 , 3 32 -3 33 , 3 37 -3 38

m oun ta in how it zers, 198

obser va tion ba lloon s, 187

150m m h ow it zer s, 317, 326, 329, 342

105m m gun s, 181

100m m gun s, 329

pist ols, 291

r if les , 177–178, 198, 268, 291, 334

75m m mount ain gun s, 184

70m m g un s, 290-291

6-in ch gu ns, 118

sma ll a rm s, 139, 141, 303, 316, 322, 334, 348

s w or d s, 14 7, 291

t a nks , 172, 199, 32%330, 332

37m m gun s, 330, 332, 345

240m m h ow i tz er s, 184, 189

Wea th er , 41,89,245, 249,252, 320,276,295, 330,

334335, 347

Webb, 2dLt H . (3., 10ln, 108

Weber , Ma j J . E ., 349

Whit e, 2dLt P . R., 217

WMlt eh ill, C dr W. M.,84n

Wilds, T., 75n

Wilkes I sla nd, 98, 103, 105, 110, 113, 115–116,

118, 121, 124-125, 127, 130, 133–134, 137, 139,

142 -144 , 147 -149 , 151

Willia ms, B riG en D ., lln

Willia ms, C a pt F . H ., 168; Ma j, 187–188, 194.

197–199,. 200n

Willia ms , Ma j R . H .,248,267

William Ward Burrow,8,295

Wi lson, 260

Wilson, C apt H . S ., 103n , 106

Wilson, P residen t W., 44

Wir e. f lee C om mu nica t ion s.

Woods, C ol L. E ., 297; B r iG en, 343, 362

Wor ki ng d et a ils, 20, 42,45

World Wa r I , 4, *9, 44, 50, 51, 54n, 59, 107,

137, 168, 199

World Wa r I I , 4, 9-10, 17, 19, 32, 46, 63, 80

Wort on, Ma j G en W. A., 44n

Wot je, 123, 207

Wright, 9 9-10 0, 1 02, 21 6

Wrigh t , RAdm C . H ., 351

Wrigh t , P IS gt J . E ., 127

Ya ma guchi, RAdm T., 227

Ya m ag um o, 325-

Ya ma mot o, Adm I ., 62, 214, 214n, 215-216, 228,

230, 235, 237, 346, 349, 351, 353

Ya ma mot o, C dr T., 346n

Yamai%uki Maru, 355

Yamaura .lfaru, 355

Ya ngt ze P a t rol, 158

Ya ngt ze River , 157

























