History of Second World War Vol 7 No 11

Barrie PittThis week's contents:

2969 The TanksKenneth Macksey2978 The Gunslan Hogg2989 The MenKenneth Macksey

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Nothing is more essential in the writing of military history than an awarenessof the impulses thai motivate fighting men. Somerset Maugham once wrote thatin order to describe the taste of mutton, it was as well at least to have eatena lamb chop-and it is certainly a valid contention that for a man to writeabout battle, he must have some little experience of what it is like to be underfire; only then can he appreciate what makes a man stand up and risk his life.

But the historian must also have a clear appreciation of the technologicalfactors that shape battles, and although that first requirement has beenbasic and consistent since man first wrOte on war, the second one has becomeinfinitely more complex as industrialisation has perfected the techniques ofwarfare. During the Second World War this technological complicationnecessitated the revision of many old and well-tried concepts of how armiesand men should be trained. The burden of Kenneth Macksey's article 'The Men'is the selection of the right men for the right job and the clash whichoccurs when the demand for cold technical ability run up against the needto turn citizens into soldiers with discipline stronger than that of machines.By combining this article with descriptions of the development of armour andartillery, we present in this issue the essential contrasts of three majorfactors affecting land battle.

Yet the vital issue all the time is whether or not the soldier will use hisweapons. lt is always easier for a man behind armour or from the remotenessof some concealed position, to fire against a foe who cannot see histormentor or cannot immediately hit back-and it is the infantryman whonearly always is in the 'target' category. When he has to get to his feet andmove forward, he does so unprotected by anything but his own courage andunsustained by anything but his regimental training-and the distinguishedAmerican military historian, S. L. A. Marshall, made a revealing discovery as

the result of his interrogations of men who had just been under fire.'We found that on average not more than 15% of the men had actually fired

at the enemy positions or personnel . . . during the course of an engagement.'Later he added 'l have yet to see a Sherman tank or Browning gun that

added anything to the national defence until it came into the hands of menwho willingly risked their own lives.' Despite industrialisation, then, in theend it all comes down to 'the man behind the gun'. Armies that believe thatmaterial will solve every problem do so at their own peril. THE EDIToR

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The British found themselves to have been less well servedwhen it was discovered that their prewar tanks were hard pressedto accept heavier guns or armour. The Matilda was quite incapableof being up-gunned and had to go out of production when thegun/armour race got too hot: the Valentine needed a completelyredesigned turret, as did the Centaur/Cromwell series later in thewar. The French, of course, fell out of the race in 1940 thoughall their front-line tanks had by then reached the ultimate pointof development. The ltalians, using their M-13s (an improvedVickers design), never approached comparison with friend or foe,and the Japanese (who were also developing basic Vickers designs)had only a secondary need for armoured vehicles because of theterrain over which they fought.

Thus the Matilda gave the Germans a surprise in 1940 and theimpulse to press urgently ahead with a more powerful 50-mm gunin Pz Kw lll (a long established intention), as well as speeding upwork on bigger versions of the 50-mm and 75-mm guns on fieldmountings. Nevertheless, the rate of the gun/armour race onlymarginally quickened. For although the 37-mm anti-tank guns

the time at the front. The short campaigns before 1941 had notfully tested this system, but Afrika Korps in the desert, and thenthe rest of the Panzer divisions in Russia, found their strengthsseverely reduced once the campaign had gone on longer thanHitler's prescribed six weeks' maximum. Breakdowns and heavylosses that could only slowly be replaced slashed tank strengthsbelow the level of safety.

Then there were the inescapable restrictions imposed by logis-tics. Each campaign and each major advance started close to well-stocked depots that could usually maintain the invaders up to adistance of about 400 miles, so long as a reasonable road network,one that could carry the wheeled supply vehicles, existed. Despitethe hideous state of Russian roads which collapsed whenever itrained, the Germans rode forward over 400 miles in four weeks-but then stopped dead, their axes of advance littered with broken-down vehicles, the Panzer spearheads grounded from shortage offuel and ammunition.

As the war progressed every other mechanised army was tomeet, and be defeated by, this same problem to some extent.

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The Tiger ll, or'King Tiger'. lts 8B-mm gun had great range and accuracy. lts turret armour was 7 inches thick

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had frequently failed against Anglo/French armour, field artilleryhad then filled the tank-killing gap while the 88-mm anti-aircraltgun had emerged as a most potent anti-tank weapon capable ofSettling with even the Matilda at ranges beyond 1,000 yards.

The gun/armour race did not really get into top gear until theGermans met the Russian T-34/76 and KV-1 tanks in July 1941.These were tanks whose 76-mm gun outmatched every Germantank gun, and whose frontal armour generally resisted every field-mounted anti-tank gun except the new long 50-mm and the 88-mmanti-aircraft gun. lt was combined action of the German battle-groups-when they skilfully outfought the poorly co-ordinatedRussian forces-that led to the striking initial German victory,but the very magnitude of that victory then exposed the vulner-abilities of armoured forces in yet another way.

Something like a 25"k unreliability rate in tanks had always beenallowed for by the Germans, but this rose sharply-and dan-gerously-during protracted operations because the vehiclesdepended upon centralised maintenance and servicing based inGermany to put machines right, after a campaign, rather than at

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Even though the supreme aim of all mechanised operations wasperpetual motion, logistics, in the end, inevitably imposed a haltin order to give the supply services time to stock new, advancedbases ready to support the next main leap forward. And this usuallygave the enemy time to recover his strength and composure.

ln 1941 the Germans had to rethink their armoured technologywhile the Russians reconsidered their tactical methods and triedto improve the training of commanders and crews whose abilitieshad been found sadly def icient. Busy on the periphery of the majorconflict, the British, aided by the Americans, sought to build moreand better vehicles and reach the standard of professional per-fection displayed by the well-trained German formations beforeengaging them in Europe.

ruow tne time and money spent on prewar study and researchpaid o{f-those with a real lead usually retained it. lndeed, theRussian lead in production facilities was never overtaken: in thequickest time imaginable they could reassemble masses of vehiclesto outnumber the Germans on every front. The Germans, how-ever, were the equal of the Russians in technological quality and

were able, with the knowledge at their disposal, to up-gun thePz Kw lV to match thef 44/76 and, by producing even bigger gunsand fitting them to their second generation of heavier tanks (Pan-iher and Tiger), to defeat the T-34l85 and the KV's successors,ihe heavy JS (Josef Stalin) tanks. But the creation of these two newGerman machines named Panther and Tiger (both of which hadbeen first thought of before the war) demanded a vast increase inindustrial outlay, linked with the introduction of new manufacturingtechniques that were close to the frontiers of knowledge whenthe German economy was coming under extreme pressure.

On the battlefield tactical methods were constantly under re-view. The German concept of all-arms battlegroups originated inthe First World War when infantry groups acquired increasinglyclose support from organic artillery and machine-gun elementsand withstood the tests of combat. ln the Panzer divisions, whichwere fundamentally offensive in employment, even when engagedin strategically defensive operations, tanks predominated, andthe Panzer divisions themselves acted independently, though inconjunction with infantry divisions. This did not leave the infantry

other armies-the Semovente in the ltalian army, the M-3 in theAmerican, the Archer in the British, and the SUs of the Russians.However, the Americans and British were most strict in def ining therole of tanks when in support of infantry: both earmarked par-ticular armoured formations to act primarily in this role (at onetime the British actually substituted a tank brigade for an infantrybrigade within the infantry division but gave up the experiment in1943 after it failed in Tunisia). Critics of the British infantry tanksystem say it was wasteful, forgetting that the German use of SPguns was even more wasteful, since SPs were only defensive in-oncept whereas tanks could be used for offensive as well as

defensive operations.ln any case, the underlying reason for the Russians and Ger-

mans operating SP guns was one of quantity linked with quality.It was quicker and cheaper to produce a new, more powerfulgun on an existing chassis, giving it only a limited traverse, thanto produce a chassis to carry a fully rotating turret.

By 1943 the evolving trends of manufacturing techniques wereplaih for all to see. Where nations with vast industrial resources

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The British Comet retained the lay-out and engine of the Cromwell, but had better armour and a 77-mm gun

divisions devoid of armour, however, for besides the indirectsupport given by Panzer divisions when they wove mobile patternsaround infantry positions, the infantry divisions possessed theirown direct armoured support from the self-propelled assault gunknown as the Sfurmpanzer.

fhe Sturmpanzer tirsl came into being in 1940. The earliest pro-Cuction model was a 47-mm gun mounted high on a Pz Kw I

chassis, followed by versions with bigger guns built mostly onobsolete German, French, and Czech chassis that came into useDy stages throughout the war. At the same time the need to give:ne infantry formations a more mobile anti-tank defence than:rat provided by towed guns (the gigantic field-mounted 88-mmPak 43 guns were far too large and clumsy) led to the introductionci SP (self-propelled) anti-tank guns-Jagdpanzers-which,:^cugh organised as army or corps troops, could readily be allo-:a:ed to close support of both Panzer and infantry formations.

3;t the dividing line between 'Sturm' and'Jagd' vehicles was:-:'cughly blurred when it came to battle. Both could, and did,-="r'out the function of the other, just as did similar variants in

could lay down new plant at speed, major armoured components,such as turrets and parts of the hull, were made of cast steel-a technique used in the T-34, with its three-man, 85-mm-gunnedturret, and in the three-man turret of the American Sherman withits 75-mm gun. ln Germany and Britain, where industrial capacityhad less means with which to expand, the technique of weldingarmour plate (which had been developed for AFVs only shortlybefore the war) gradually took over from bolting or rivetting.

Protection was further increased by sloping armour: in 1939most German, British, and American tanks carried vertical plates,but the example set by the Russian T-34 persuaded the Germansto adopt sloping plate, and they were closely followed by theAmericans and, last of all, by the British who endured with thetheory that, since no shot ever arrived at 90 degrees to the verticalplate, that sort of plate gave the better protection. At the sametime few tanks anywhere entered service with frontal armour ofless than 80 mm-and some carried more than twice that thickness.

Automotive powerplants increased their output in proportionto the increasing size and welght of vehicles and the kind of

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Christie's system: independent suspension; enhancing speed andallowing a tracked vehicle to run exclusively on its road wheels

The Russian BT medium tank series incorporated Christie's system,but it was somewhat under-armoured and under-gunned

A later development, the T-34 featured a Christie-style suspension, apowerful76.2-mm overhanging gun, and well-sloped armour

engines that happened to be available. Most tank powerplantsderived {rom aircraft engines. The light Russian diesels, the BritishLiberty engines, and the American Wright radial engines-all camefrom this source, though there were some, like the 12-cylinderBedford engine in the British Churchill, and the 30-cylinder Chry-sler engine in some makes of Sherman, that grew with the needsof the occasion from improvised commercial vehicle engines.

Few engines were specifically designed for tank use. Range andperformance were then conditioned by national fuel policies: theAmericans, British, and Germans mostly insisted on their tanksbeing f uelled by petrol (though many US and British diesel-enginedtanks were built), while the Russians settled for diesel, charac-terised by greater range, reliability, safety-and by the plumes ofwhite smoke that betrayed vehicles when engines were started orput under high power. lt is to be noted, however, that nationalpolicy was decided by the availability of fuel-not operationaldesirability.

Each inbrease in vehicle weight was accompanied by a corres-ponding increase in the size and weight of suspension. The cross-country mobility of a tracked vehicle is mostly dependent upon itspower/weight ratio and the track-to-ground pressure. Widertracksgive a lower ground pressure and a lower rate of sink-a tacticaladvantage over soft ground that was to be decisive in Russia, atone time, when Soviet tanks with a lower ground pressure wereable to manoeuvre while their German opponents were boggeddown.

Tracks also were fundamentally important, for not only did theygive grip (the American rubber tracks were actually of low grippingefficiency on wet ground), but they also wore out very easily. Atone time low track life was the bane of British cruiser tanks, butthe introduction of manganese steel tracks, or, in other nations,rubber-bushed pins, did much to improve track life. Changing atrack may be laborious, but to demand excessive life in one com-ponent of a fighting vehicle whose life is almost bound to be ofshort battlefield duration is often economically wrong-a fact thatwas well recognised in tank design circles. Finally, let it be notedthat wheeled vehicles continued to be made- mostly for reconnais-sance purposes-but it was generally felt that their simplicity,silence, and speed did not compensate for shortcomings in cross-country ability.

No other aspect of armoured development was more importantthan that of hitting power, although protection ran it a closesecond, and the needs of quality control to achieve improvedreliability nagged every phase of design. lt could be argued thatarmour was bound to be penetrated eventually at some rangeor another, and this was acceptable providing it was always possibleto penetrate the enemy at an equivalent range. The idea of whatdistance actually constituted the 'normal battle range' at whichpenetration would occur was fundamental to decisions about theratio of gun size to armour strength. ln the early stages of the warfew effective engagements against armour took place much beyond500 yards, but in the desert and on the steppes this range increasedto nearly 2,000 yards. However poor visibility and the problems ofidentifying friend from foe brought the average range of engage-ments, even in the latter stages of the war when a Russian JS lllcould kill a Tiger I at 2,000 yards, down to as little as 1,000 yards.

lncreases in the size and effectiveness of guns represented themost striking advances in fighting vehicle technology during theSecond World War, and affected most profoundly tactics and crewtraining. Longer barrels and the greatly increased pressuresexerted by thefiring of much more powerful ammunition imposedimmense strains on turret mountings, leading to increases in theirsize, diameter and, consequently, in overall vehicle weight. Biggerammunition demanded more room for stowage and inevitably re-sulted in fewer rounds being carried, with a corresponding rise indemands upon supply echelons stretching back to the sources ofproduction and supply. Bigger ammunition also multiplied thephysical problems of a tank gunloader working in a cramped sp.ace,bausing lower rates of fire that got still lower when the sheerweight of an individual round had to be divided by separating pro:jectile f rom charge. The 88-mm gun carried by the Tiger ll had fixedammunition: the 128-mm gun in the Jagdtiger was separated'

As more hard armoured targets began to appear on the battle-f ield, related to a sharp increase in the number of tank-versus-tankactions, it became essential to hit and penetrate the enemy at aslong a range as possible. Guns became far more accurate becausedesign and manufacture grew more precise and gave rise tohighbr muzzle velocities; the velocity of 1,265 feet per second givenOy tfre shorlL/24 75-mm German gun in 1940 is to be comparedwitfr g,gSO feet per second reached by the armour-piereing (withdiscarding sabot) round fired from the British 17-pounder in 1944.The need to judge distance was simplified at the shorter ranges

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Germany's Pzkw-V Panther was designed to outclass the T-34, andindeed ii proved itself to be one of the war's best tanks

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because the shot's trajectory was so flat that an accurate lay by thetank gunner might en'sure a first round hit. But observation of thefall oi shot at longer ranges (with higher trajectories), to enablecorrections to be hade to the lay, was still mandatory-and theflash and dust thrown up by the discharge of bigger guns couldeasily obscure the fall of shot, as it arrived at its target beforethe flash and dust subsided. Yet even at the short ranges a misswas possible, either because sights were not fully integratedrruithguns, the gunner had made a poor lay, or because the gun itself losticcuracy from excessive wear. lmproved optical devices could anddid helI reduce inaccuracies but in the final analysis straightshooting was the result of true weapons and well-trained crews.

lnto tlie design of shot and shell went enormous research' Simplearmour-piercing shot (and even larger calibre high-explosiveshells) r,ias able to penetrate or disrupt light armour, but thickerarmour with specially hardened faces could only be defeated bysophisticated shot moving at very high velocities' For instance,early British shot was found to break up against German face-hardened armour, a process that could be prevented if the shotwere made stronger, fitted with a protective cap, or given a highervelocity-usually a combination of all three. Rises in velocity werethe mdst common solution as we have seen, brought about eitherby increasing the size of charge relative to projectile (costly .inslace) or squeezing the round. One type of squeeze could.bea'pplied by firing a tungsten round through a tapered barrel, butGerman 6xperiments in this field were curtailed by shortage oftungsten: another, British, method involved adding an attachmentto the end of a 40-mm 2-pounder-but this'Littlejohn'device im-posed almost unacceptable restrictions on firing anything otherihan armour-piercing shot- high explosive and smoke wereexcluded.

Usually the gun designers chose to squeeze the shot 'within it-self ', either (as with the Germans and Russians) by using compositerigid (APCR) shot that placed a hard core within a soft outer sheafthlt iaused the core to accelerate on striking the target, or (as

with the British and Americans) by casing the round with a'sabot'wrapped round the hard core, acceleration being imparted to thecore as it was squeezed by the sabot during their passage down thegun barrel. This round was called an armour-piercing discardingsabot (APDS).

But'a quitb different approach to armour penetration from thatpractised'by the brute force of high-velocity, kinetic-energy roundscame with-chemical-energy ammunitions-the hollow charge orhigh-explosive anti-tank (HEAT) round' These low-velocity pro-

lectites (which inevitably imposed a range assessment problem onine crewsl exploded on the hostile armour and then directed a jet

of molten debris to cut a thin hole at something like 27,000 feet persecond. Not only could they be fired from ordinary guns,-but alsofrom the hand-lield infantry weapons such as Bazooka, Piat, andPanzerfaust; and though they had a somewhat lower chance ofkilling a tank than shot, they could cut through the thickest armour'and,

"being cheap and easy to make, proliferated the number of

anti-tank fueapons infesting the battlefield. They would also have

been the warhead fitted to the first anti-tank guided missile everproduced -the experimental German X-7.

It can be seen that most innovations brought added complexitiesin their train-throwing an additional load on manufacturingcapacity when increased numbers of tanks were being demandedat the fiont. Every nation wanted more tanks, but each had to over-come different problems, besides those of research and develop-ment, to get them. America, blessed with limitless labour andmaterials, and quite undisturbed by enemy action, produced themost tanks once her industry got into gear-as it did by 1942.

Russia made vast strides in production despite losses and theinterruptions caused by removing factories beyond the reach .ofthe Geiman advances. Britain made great numbers of tanks despitehostile activities and labour shortage. But Germany's case waseasily the most interesting, for she redoubled and almost com-pletely reshaped her tank factories during the war, although ham-pered- by material shortages, destruction by air raids, disruptionof transport, and the vagaries of foreign labour.

Quality and reliability varied between and within each nation'sproduct6. None, except the Russians, achieved a very high level atihe outset and the Russians shunned sophistication in their searchfor basic simplicity. Some German designs started unreliably andwere improved, and the same could be said of the British' whiletheAmericans started well and kept it that way, in no small part be-cause they stuck to thoroughly proven components.

ln the last years of the war armoured vehicles were still predomi-nant on the 6attlefield, but could no longer operate with impunity.The increased power and number of anti-tank weapons dqte-r19!ianks from charging defended localities in mass, lorbadeV2977

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British Cruiser Mk I (A-9) was designed as a fast tank forarmoured divisions; its suspension was inferior to the Christie

The Mk lll (A-13), developed by Nuff ield, used Christie's suspensionand had a 2-pounder gun as main armament

Cruiser Mk V, the 'Covenanter', dogged by mechanical faults, wasnever used in action but was useful as a training vehicle

The Cromwelltype entered service in 1944' two years late-tofind itself outclassed by the Panther

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ln the Battle of France on May 21, 1940Matilda tanks struck the flank of Rommel'smotorised infantry regiments, where theycreated havoc. ln Rommel's own words: 'Theanti-tank guns which we quickly deployedshowed themselves far too light to be effectiveagainst the heavily armoured British tanks.'The strength of the 'Matilda's' armour was arevelation to the Germans and opened theireyes to serious deficiencies in their ownarmour strength that had not been rectifiedwhen Afrika Korps met them again in thedesert

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throughout the war, lorming the backbone olthe German armoured corps ljrntilby the Pzkw-V Panther

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The British Crusader tank (the Cruiser Mk Vl)first saw action in the Western Desert inJune 1941. lts performance was marred bymechanical unreliability and the low powerof its 2-pounder gun. This picture shows theMark lll version firing the bigger 6-pounderwhich came into service in 1942

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Gun:2-pounderMaximum armour: 80-mmMuzzle velocity: 2,650 feet per secondWeight of shot: 2 lbGun: 75-mmMaximum armour: 30-mmMuzzle velocity: 1,263 feet per secondWeight of shot: 15 lb

Gun: 75-mmMaximum armour: 81-mmMuzzle velocity: 2,050 feet per secondWeight of shot: 14.9 lbGun: 75-mmMaximum armour: 80-mmMuzzle velocity: 2,461 leel per secondWeight of shot: 15 lb

Gun: 85-mmMaximum armour:75-mmMuzzle velocity: 2,600 feet per secondWeight of shot: 21.5 lbGun: 75-mmMaximum armour: 120-mmMuzzle velocity: 3,068 feet per secondWeight of shot: 15 lb

Gun: 17-pounderMaximum armour: 81-mmMuzzle velocity: 2,950/3,950 feet per secondWeight of shot: 17 lbGun: 88-mmMaximum armour: 110-mmMuzzle of velocity: 2,657 leel per secondWeight of shot: 22.25|b

Gun: 122-mmMaximum armour: .160-mm

Muzzle velocity: 2,900 feet per secondWeight of shot: 40 lbGun: 128-mmMaximum armour: 250-mmMuzzle velocity: 3,020 feet per secondWeight of shot: 58 lb

Type:r34/85

Type:Sherman FireflY

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them entering close country or towns, and demanded that theyshould be stiI more closely Supported by infantry and artillery and,if possible, directed away f rom heavily entrenched positions-infait, striking with even more care than the tank practitioners of1940 had demanded.

Armoured operations were hampered still further by air attacksand mines. The former, as they multiplied in number and improvedin technique, were less successful as tank killers (it was imperativeto hit a tank to kill it and most difficult to achieve by rocket or bomb)than as disrupters of vital supplies. Mines were laid in belts and incountless numbers as the Germans reverted ever more to the de-fensive. Linked with natural obstacles such as rivers, they couldaccount for up to 20 or 30"/" of all tank casualties; they could imposecritical delays; and they channelled tanks into killing zones ofinterlocki ng anti-tank f i re.

Tank tactics had to be modified with each new technical inno-vation. By 1943 armour could no longer race ahead unsupported byother arms. lt had to move with care, searching hard to avoid oppo-sition, using high-explosive shells and machine-guns to neutraliseand destroy anti-tank weapons, supporting each shift of posi-tion by fire and hiding in well-concealed ambushes in order tosurprise careless enemy moves. lnfantry on foot or in armouredcarriers had to give close support to tanks to knock out opposinginfantry anti-tank weapons, which by the end of the war wereaccounting for increasing numbers of tanks. Tanks, in their turn,had to support the infantry's every step, shooting up machine-gunpositions that might wipe out unarmoured men in a trice. Massedartittery fired immense volumes of ammunition in support of everyoperation, while air power took part with stlfficient success tocbmpel armoured forces to introduce special anti-aircraft tanks.

Though armoured forces could and did take part in every engage-ment where they could be thrust into the front line (even in themountains and valleys of ltaly and, as the result of immense featsof engineering, through the jungles of Burma or across the beachesof Pacif ic islands) their principal purpose remained the quest for astrategic stroke to the enemy brain. No better example of this cameduring the invasion oJ France in 1940; thereafter the great armoureddrives into the Balkans, through the desert, deep into Russia and,reciprocally, back into Germany from east and west, lost their out-right stunning nature because the novelty had worn off and armiesand nations had learned how to weather these storms. Armour'sbattle-winning capability, however, was in no way reduced.

Each operation of war had need of men surrounded by armourfor the same reasons as it had always been required to give protec-tion against the effects of an omnipotent firepower that could notitself 6e entirely destroyed by counter-f irepower. So in the attack,following reconnaissance by armour, infantry (many in armouredcarriers)-and tanks led the assault, each picking the routes andtasks best suited to their characteristics, f ully supported by artillerydrawn by wheeled or tracked vehicles, some of them armoured andmany in the assault gun class and moving in the second wave ofattack. ln defence or withdrawal, however, it was the assault gunsthat found their place in the front rank along with infantry, backingaway out of trouble, their battleworthiness no longer seriouslycircumscribed by lack of all-round traverse, while, in this phase' thetanks were to bqfound as part of a counterblow force, held in depthready to pounce on the enemy's f lank or rear when he had becomeentwined with and over-extended by the main infantry defensivepositions.

Finally, there appeared an increasing proportion of specialisedarmour, developed to overcome the obstacles imposed by natureor raised by man. Bridge-laying tanks to cross streams and ob-stacles; flaii, roller, or plough tanks to destroy mines; flame-throw-ing and bomb-throwing tanksto smash fortifications; and swimmingtanks to land on an enemy shore or cross wide rivers-each a

relatively costly device since its application was specialised andnot universal, but each one tactically essential since, like armouritself, nothing else could ensure man's continued survival on a

battlefield smothered by weapons of widespread eifect.By the last months of the war there was evidence to suggest that

theiuture of the tank might be limited by the dominance of anti-tank weapons. At the same time every nation was making plans toinvent tanks that would exploit the lessons of six years of armouredwarfare-a demand for relatively cheap, universal machines com-peting with the beliefs of those who considered a degree of special-isation unavoidable for both tactical and technological reasons.Compromise being the essence of armoured vehicle design, it hasshaped the plans for the future as it did in the war. Only the pace

has been reduced to match the needs of a peacetime economy,when a fighting vehicle can be expected to last 20 years instead of20 weeks.lFor K.J. Macksey'sbiography,seeVol 1,p. 181 .)

TYPe:Jagdtiger

2977

Technology and Land Warfare, 1939/45

the

unAs with the tanks, so with the guns: the artillery designers of the

Second World War found themselves caught up in a ceaseless racec outmatch the ever-improving enemy defences lan Hogg shows how

this affected the gunners' w-ar, and how it resulted in the artilleryrevolution o1 greater ranges, mobility and fire control'

A thorough discussion of the history and development of everyartillery weapon used in the Second World War would need severalvolumes, for the sheer size of the subjects is incredible; the Germanforces alone disposed over 200 land service weapons in 51 differentcalibres, without considering experimental models' Britain andAmerica between them fielded about 100 artillery weapons, againnot counting experimental models but only those which foundtheir way into the hands of troops. lnstead of trying to catalogueevery weapon used, therefore, this article merely outlines theprin6ipal features of the research which developed during the war'and aiso brings to light one or two of the more unusual and lesswell-known weapons which were produced.

There are three main subjects to be explored:o The routine improvement of weapons, in order to bring them intoline with changing tactics and concepts of employment or tocounter improvements in enemy defences;o The improvements in ammunition introduced to step up theperformance of existing weaPons;o The application of hitherto untried scientific principles.

In many cases these topics tend to overlap, but rather than tryto develolr a chronological story with these three aspects jumbledtogether, it is best to consider them as separate f ields.

First, routine improvement. A good example of this in action is

the history of the celebrated German 88-mm Flak Gun. This wasoriginally conceived in the late 1920s by Krupp designers attachedto [he gbtors Company in Sweden. When in 1931 they returned toEssen with the design, the political climate seemed right. A proto-type was built in 1932; and due to thorough paperwork it was an

immediate success and was issued in 1933 as the 8'8-cm FlakModel 18. lt should be stressed, in view of the exaggerated taleswhich became current in later years, that there was nothing unor-thodox about this weapon at all-it was simply a good, sound,conventional anti-aircraft gun. lt was taken to Spain by the KondorLegion during the Civil War and tested in action; its potentialitiesas an anti-tank gun were also seen, though not advertised. Thisexperience showed that there were a few weak points in the designand as a result, minor modifications were made in the mountingto improve stability and facilitate mass-production. This modifiedversion became known as the Flak 36. ln the following year animproved sighting and fire-control system was fitted, and the gunbecame the Flak Model 37. The 36 and 37 remained in servicethroughout the Second World War, being used in their primaryrole as an anti-aircraft gun; as an anti-tank gun, when fitted withshields and direct-fire sights; fitted to coastal craft and U-boats;used as a coast defence gun; and even mounted on a 12Vz-lonhalf-track as a self-propelled gun (though this was not one of itsmost successf ul applications).

By early 1939 tirough, in spite of its excellence, it became obviousthai bombers were gbing to f ly faster and higher than before, andthe gun's performance would have to be improved. And so in 1939Rhei-nmettal-Borsig were given a contract for an improved model,to be known as the Flak 41. Prototype trials began in 1941 and it wasfound that the gun, although a most efficient design, had a lotof teething troubles which were going to take time to eliminate.Since no one else had a contract for the gun, the Luftwaffe (whichwas responsible for Germany's anti-aircraft defences) was forcedto use it or else do without. Consequently the next year saw a greatdeal of effort thrown in and by March 1943 the first issues weremade.

The Flak 41, as f inally produced, was a considerable improvementover the 18,36, and 37. By using a turntable to carrythe gun, in-stead of the more usual pedestal mounting, a much lower sil-houette was achieved. The muzzle velocity and ceiling were bothimproved by adopting a more powerful cartridge, and the stabilityin bction was excellent. The only f ly in the ointment was the difficultextraction of the fired cartridge case, which is a flaw of majorproportions in a quick-firing anli-aircraft gun. Different designs ofbariel were produced in an effort to overcome the trouble, and aspecial brass cartridge case was developed; but none of thesepalliatives made muCh impression and the gun was never thesuccess it might have been.

Some time after Rheinmettal had received their contract, a similarspecification had been given to Krupp. Their development' some-times referred to as the Flak 42,became more and more entangledwith their concurrent development of 88-mm tank and anti-tankguns in the hopes of producing a family of weapons which wouldise interchangeable parts and common ammunition. Before theKrupp version-had got off the drawing board, the Luftwaffe wasdemanding more performance than the design could produce'and in February 1943, not without a certain amount of relief' onefeels, Krupp drbpped the Flak 42 to concentrate on the tank andanti-tank weapons.

iin#*S$iii s.

di

#ffi

2978

While the 88 shows an example of improvement of a particularcalibre, the more common approach was to improve a particularclass of weapon by raising the calibre; most anti-tank weaponsdisplay this iechnique. The British army began the war with a 2-pounder; followed it by a 6-pounder and then a 17-pounder; andiinally had a 32-pounder in preparation when the war ended, havingtoyed briefly with a possible 55-pounder. America began_with a

37lmm, took over the British 6-pounder and called it the 57-mm;then moved to a 3-inch based on a redundant anti-aircraft gun; thena 90-mm, also based on an AA gun, and was working on a 105-mmwhen the war ended. Germany also began with a 37-mm and pro-gressed through 28, 42, 50, 75 and 88-mm to arrive at a 128-mmas the war closed.

All these series show steady progression in conventional guns, allintended to beat the forthcoming increases in enemy armour. How-ever, the flaw in this system becomes apparent on looking at theBritish 32-pounder or the German 12.8-cm Pak 44- bigger calibresmay mean a bigger punch, but they invariably mean bigger guns asweil, and this means more weight to move about. This is a con-siderable drawback for an anti-tank gun which usually has to beemplaced by manpower, and certainly the 32-pounder was toobig'for its talk; even had the war continued, it is doubtful whetherit would have been accepted into service.

Anti-aircraft guns tend to show a similar pattern among allnations, always striving to extract more ceiling and greater velocity;the increased ceiling meant that higher-flying aircraft could beengaged, while higher velocity meant a shorter time between firingthe gun and the shell arriving at the target, and hence less roomfor elror in the prediction of the target's position at the time of theshell's arrival. The two groups o{ anti-aircraft weapons in commonuse were the light guns, such as the German 37-mm and the Britishand US-employed Bofors 40-mm, and the heavy guns, such as theGerman 88, 105, and '128-mm guns, the British 3'7-inch, 4.5-inch'and 5.25-inch guns, and the American 90-mm, 105-mm, and 120-mm types. The-light guns relied on throwing up a heavy volume.offire ai a high rate, to counter the low-flying attacker. The heaviesfired at slower rates, threw heavier shells, and had higher ceilingsto deal with the high-level bomber. But strangely enough, all thecombatants had a gap in their defences, which lay between themaximum ceiling ol the light guns-about 6,000 feet-and theminimum effective ceiling of the heavies-about 10,000 feet.Below this figure the heavy gun could not swing fast enough tofollow a fast lbw flyer. ln an endeavour to f ill this gap, developmenttook place in both Britain and Germany to provide a medium AA gun.As far as Britain was concerned, a paramount feature of anyweaponproposed in 1940 was to avoid usurping production already hardat worf with the more basic weapons needed for simple survival.ln view of this, the first question the designers asked themselveswas: 'What existing gun can be worked over to fill the bill?'Aftera few false starts the design coalesced around the existing coastartillery 6-pounder gun, the same calibre as the anti-tank gun butusing i hdavier cartridge and capable of greater rqnge. This wasadap-ted to a twin-barrel mounting on a three-wheeled trailer, andwork then began on pesigning a suitable automatic feed systemto get the rate of fire thought necessary, and a fire-control systemto -put the shells where they were needed. Since the guns wereoriginally designed for hand loading, the adaptation to. autofeedturied out to -be more difficult than had at first been imagined;then Allied air superiority gave the project less priority; ryd' !nthe event, the twin 6-pounder never entered service and Britainnever had a medium AA gun.

The German developrient was not restricted to an existingweapon, since the 'gap' had been appreciated before the war, andin 1936 Rheinmettal was given a contract to develop a 50-mm gun.This was eventually introduced in 1940 in limited numbers for an

extended troop trial to assess whether such a weapon was desirableand whether ifre ftaX 41, as it was known, would fill the require-ment. For a variety of reasons the gun was not a success, but theexperience showed that the medium AA gun was needed, and a

great deal of thought went into the design of a completely inte-grated Weapon system, probably the first such system to be con-ceived as a complete entity. lt was to comprise a 55-mm automaticgun, with matched radar, predictor, displacement corrector, andfull electro-hydraulic remote control of a six-gun battery. By thetime all these theories and designs had been put together it wasmid-1943, and the production of such a far-reaching concept wasso difficult that the war ended before the weapon was completed.To act as a stop-gap, the now-obsolescent 50-mm anti-tank gunwas fitted with an automatic loading system, but this idea fellby the wayside, and it is doubtful if any were ever made. All in all'tiie mediuh AA gun story is remarkable in the similarity of Britishand German experience.

1W;ffi,ffiwffiw:,affi{

and

Elof

=c,-o.E

The much-feared German 'BB'. Disliked equally by Allied armourinfantry the Pak 43 was both versatile and hard-hitting '

could be fired by remote control as well as manually

The British 4.5-inch static AA gun is seen here being loaded by its crew'its 55-pound shells readY to hand

2979

ln the field artillery world practically all development wassimply a matter of improvement on existing designs' No nationin iis'right mind would attempt a major re-equipment of its stan-dard we"apons in.the middle of a war' The British 25-pounderservedvaliantly, and modiJications to meet special demands included theself-propelled 'Bishop' (on a Valentine chassis) and 'Se-rton' (o-n

a Rim'chassis); the Australian-developed 'Short' or 'Baby' 25-pounder with a truncated barrel, no shield, short trail and castorwheel for easy manoeuvring in the jungle; it was tried as a self-propelled gun 1Se; in many vehicles including the Lloyd.carrier,wni'cn *as"asking ioo muchof such a light vehicle; it was strappedto the cargo bed-of a DUKW for supporting amphibious landings;and it was-even considered for the armament of submarines Simi-iarly, the American 105-mm howitzer was tried in a variety of SP

mol'ntings, starting with a half-track, until the Sherman-basedM-7 beclme standardized as the 'Priest'; it was shortened andplaced on a light carriage for use by airborne units; it was mountedin tank turreti as a close support gun; and, like the 25-pounder,mounted on the long-suffering DUKW.

The German 1E FH 18, more or less the equivalent of the 25-pounder and '105 howitzer, suffered similar, though more drastic,bhanges. First it was given a muzzle brake and a heavier chargewith i long-range shell; then in an attempt to reduce the weight'like the 'BaOy 2S-pounder', the barrel and recoil system weremounted on the carriage of the 75-mm Pak 40 anti-tank gun; thewheels were removeo ano it was dropped bodily into a tank hull toprovide an assault gun; it was grafted on to a variety of trackedmountings. But eventually a complete re-design was..called Jor

and Rhe'inmettal was giv6n a contract. Before their offering was|."uoy, tn" experiences-of the Russian Front had shown that certainfeatires were mandatory in the next generation of field guns'g;"iiv,1rt"t" were that the- gun must have a good anti-tank per-

tor*in"" for self-protection; at the same time it had to be capableof hiding in forests and firing out at high angles; the range lll tq

oe at teist g miles without demanding special ammunition; it had

to have all-round traverse, since Soviet partisans could attack f romany direction; and it had to weigh less than 2,200 pounds' Now even

today a designer would have a hard time meeting that specification,but i;r 1943 both Krupp and Skoda rose to the challenge'

The Skoda version, the .,l0.5-cm 1E FH 43, was most ingenious:the carriage had virtually a normal split trail at the rear, plus anothersplit trail'at tne front, beneath the barrel, and a firing pedestal

b'eneath the axle. ln action, the equipment rested on the two reartrails and the pedestal, and the front trails were laid on the groundto form a cruciform stable platform above which the gun couldrotate through 360 degrees, the four legs giving stability al anY

angle o{ the-barrel. The novelty of this carriage lay in the fact thatthi two front legs were not rigidly attached to the carriage; tocompensate for 6neven ground they were permitted to lie at anyconvenient angle. A hydiaulic system was arranged so that slowmovement ot ifre legd-as during folding and unfolding to andfrom the travelling position-was freely permitted, but fast move-ment-as the firirig shock-would cause the legs to lock rigidlyto the carriage and give the desired stability'

Krupp, un6er the same nomenclature, produced two models; onewas very similar in general design to Skoda's' though withoutt|re rryor'autic system, white tne other was based on a more or less

conventional cruciform platform of the type familiar in AA guns'

However, none of the designs, Krupp or Skoda, were ready forproduction before the war's end, and only prototypes existed'

The German super-gunsThe heaviest f ield equipments seen during the war were the Germanself-propelled howitzers generically klgyn as 'Karl Morsers''These ltiere of two calibres, 540-mm and 600-mm, mounted on thesame type of carriage, Six carriages. were made and the exactdisposiiibn of barrelJbetween them is in some doubt; the carriageswere numbered I to Vl; Vehicle V was captured by the US lstArmyand found to have a 540-mm barrel, yet photographs captured latershowed this same carriage to have a 600-mm barrel. lt is probablyiut" to assume that thre-e oJ each calibre were made' The date ofintroduction is also a little vague, but it seems fairly certain Jhat t!'t9

600-mm version was introduced in 1942 and the 540-mm in 1944'

The carriage of 'Karl'was a simple rectangular box, divided intothree compaitments. The first held the Mercedes-Benz engine andtransmission; the second carried the gun; and the third held the

carriage raising and lowering gear. After.driving into position.onit, tr"""t . the ingine was usld to drive the lowering gear, which,otateo the anchirages of the suspension torsion bars so as toaitow tfre chassis to 6e lowered to the ground until the suspensionano tract were relieved of the weight. For long-distance.moves.thes;; ;"d recoil system were removed f rom the carriage, dismanled,

2980

and loaded on to special trailers; the carriage was then winched onto a special tank-transporter. For very long distances the completegun and carriage ass6mbly could be slung between two railwayilat wagons by means of special trusses.

ln th-e use 6f railway artillery Germany virtually had the field toherself. This ciass of weapon is really the prerogative of the Con-tinental nation with a weil-developed rail system by which it c-an

readily deploy them to any front. ln contrast, Britain and the USA'

while'possessing railway guns, used them solely as mobile coastdefenie units, since the problem of transporting two or three hun-dred tons of railway mounting across the channel was not a trick tobe undertaken lightly. lndeed, the British and American weapons

were almost entirely relics of the First World War which had been

in mothballs. 1940 saw a few more mountings hastily cobbledtogether from available spares and hurried to cover the channel,irir "r in similar fashion American guns were mobilised andiieptoyeO in 1941. ln 1944 reports from France indicated that heavy

Ai*;i artillery might be of use in demolishing strongpoints to.b.e

eipecieo in tha fin;l assault in Germany, and desig.ns were hastilypr6pared by the Americans for a number of 16-inch guns, buti"itf,in u few weeks it was seen that heavy artillery of this class had

been rendered superfluous by the quality and quantity of air sup-port available, and the demand was cancelled.' The German army had a vast range of railway guns f rom 150-mm

upwards, but two were really outstand-tng and deserve closereiaminaiion. The first was the 28-cm K5(E) -Kanone, Model 5'

Eisenbahnlafette-which became their standard super-heavyLit*uy gun and was probably the finest Qesigl of its kind in theworld.'Tie basic arithhetic and paperwork had been done in theLate 1920s and early 1930s, and work began on the gun in 1934'

1it is worth noting tfrat every German railway gun was designed andbuilt by Krupp-hheinmettal did design two, but they were neverraO".1'f irst, h tSO-mm barrel was produced for tests; it had been

deciddd thai to obtain the great range demanded, a conventionallyrif led barrel was out oJ the question. A design was prepared with12 deep grooves and having a shell carrying 12 ribs, or splines, tomatch. T"he theory behind this was that the engraving of a con-ventional copper driving band on the shell gave rise to very highpressure in th6 gun chamber; by using the spline and groove methodio spin the shel-i, this resistance was removed, and the shell wouldii"ii"tt more smartly, allowirlg a brgoer. propelling charge to be

usdO witfrout over-straining the gun. The 150-mm test barrel provgdtfrat tfre theory was right, aiO a tutt-calibre 280-mm barrel was built.

The mounting was a simple box-girder assembly carried on twosix-axle bogies] with the iront bogie slung so as to allow thefront of thJbox-girder to be swung across it for aiming the gun'For large angles tFe whole weapon was mounted on a special port-able tu"rntabie built at the end of a short spur of track laid at theOesireO firing point. Each gun was supplied with a special trainwhich incluEed wagons for carrying the turntable, light-anti-aircraft guns f or Iocal defence, air-conditioned ammunition wagons,living quarters and kitchen for the gunners, and flat wagons tocarry their entitlement of motor transport.

ey f S+O eight of these complete equipments were in service, andproiluction cbntinued throughout the war, 25 being built.in all'.Theb"rrun gunners called them 'Slim Bertha', but to the Allies in ltaly

one at lealt became famous as 'Anzio Annie'.- Witf' the 561-pound pre-rifled shell the gun could reach .to

6g,000 yards. A r6cket-adsisted shell was later developed-which in-

ii"ase<j this range, with a certain loss of accuracy, to 94,000 yards'

Finatty, the Pe6nemiinde Research Establishment designed a

300-pound dart-like projectile which was fired from a special31O-inm smooth-bore barrel and which ranged to 170,000 yards'Attfrough coming too late for general issue, these 'Peenemrinde

Arrow 5hells' weie issued for troop trials in the f ield, and some werefired against the US 3rd Army at ranges of about 70 miles'

The iecond railway gun, Gustav , was the biggest 9!n the worldhas ever seen-the Krupp-designed 800-mm Kanone' The idea wasconceived in 1937 of a pair of super-guns; they were of quite con-ventional design, except for their immense size. Too large to be

moved in one piece, they were transported piecemea.l in specialtrains and assembled at the selected sites by travelling cranes.Whenassembled,themountingstraddledtwosetsofstandard-gauge rails, with 80 wheels tqklS the .l

,350-ton weigh.t An armour6i-c"oncrete-piercing shell of 7 tons was propelle6.bY ? l.ltl-t21

"n"ig" to J r'ange oi 23 miles, or a s-ton high-explosive shell to,29

rii"si. rr,e f irst jquipment, 'Gustav', was proved at the Rugenwalderinge in March 194S, in Hitler's presence. The only reco-rd of its use

wiiat the siege of Sebastopot; tne gun was sited at Bakhchisaryand fired som"e go to 40 rounds. on-e shot is recorded as havingpeneirateO through 100 feet of earth to destroy a Soviet ammunitjo-nbump at Severniya Bay. The subsquent history of the gun is un-

6n:*i,;#

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The short 25-pounder Mark I was developed by the Australians. lts lighter construction allowed its use in jungle terrain

#r . '::

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The German 12.8-cm K44 anti-tank gun Luckily for Allied armour this powerful and sophisticated gun saw no service

-,,f*$lt. ; !w*ffiw*"':{"This version, mounted on a Lloyd carrier, was not adopted

1*';,;$r

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wFw.w5fffi1$;rffiSeveral versions of a self-propelled 25-pounder were produced

2987

The 60-cm Miirser'Katl'. Weight: 132 tons.Length:35 feet 9 inches. Engine:580-hp diesel.Max speed:3 mph (on good ground only). Crew:1O9. Angte of fire: max elevation 60'. Maxdepression 50' . Ammunition: a 4,850-lbshell able to penetrate 98% inches of concreteor 173l+ inches of armour

The 80-cm Kanone(E) Dora L40.6. Range:51,040 yards (29 miles). Crew: 250 (forassembly and firing), 4,120 in all. Ammunition:one 10,500-lb shell, 25 feet long (plus case).Rate of fire: 2 rounds-per-hour

John Bachelor

2982

The gunsofGermany

The 28-cm Ks(E). Weight: 479,600 lb. Length:96 feet. Range: 66,880 yards (38 miles). Crew;10 (for firing)

The 10.5-cm Leichte Feldhaubitze 18m L128.Weight:4,488 lb. Range: 13,377 yards. Crew:6. Rate of fire: 6-8 rounds-per-minute

The 10.S-cm Leichte Feldhaubitze 43 L128.Weight: 5,060 lb. Crew: 6. Range: 17,875 yardsRate of fire; 6 rounds-per-minute

Sight port toenable PeriscoPeto be used

Range Anti-tankscale telescoPe

Dial (orpanoramic)sight forindirect f ire

Rangesettingwheel

Sightcase

Breechopeninglever

Hand-brakelever

Firingmechanism

Sightcross-level Traverse(to keep sights handwheelverticai on (4" right anduneven ground) left of centre

line)

Elevation Firing Casehandwheel lever containing

fuse settingkeys

Firing Platformplatform travelling

clamp

Spade box used whenplatform is in use. Whenfired without platform, thebox is removed and the spadedigs into the ground

Towingeye

Traversinghandle

The 25-pounder gun-howitzer. Manoeuvrable, hard-hitting-it was one of the most reliable artillery pieces of the war

Breachreleasehandle

Sear Cartridgecase

Hollow Highcharge temperatureshell explosive

Cavity in headof hollow chargeshell

Pressurechamber

oo

occo

Venturi Firing Aerodynamic Firingtube pin firing Pin Prn

sPring suPport

When an artillery target was identified onlyone gun of the battery would 'range in' on it.When this gun's fire registered, the batterycommand post would make the calculation tobring all the other guns onto the target. Thisprinciple could be extended to include anyhumbbr of guns, the key to success being goodcommunicationsThe working parts of a recoilless rifle. Part of the blast travels backwards out of the venturi, thus

eliminating-recoil. The hollow-charge shell could blast a hole through thick armour

2984

known (it was presumably captured by the Red Army).The second equipment, 'Dora', so far as is known, never left the

proving ground, though what happened to it at the end of the waris a minor mystery (some ammunition and a spare barrel were foundat Krupp's proof establishment at Meppen near the Dutch border).

The detachment necessary to man, maintain, and give local pro-tection to Gustav was 4,120 men strong, commanded by a major-general. The actual f ire-control and operation of the gun demandeda colonel and 500 men, and the construction or dismantling of theweapon took between four and six weeks. A long-range 'Peene-mrinde Arrow Shell' was developed for Gustav, but, so far as isknown, was never f ired. This was to weigh 2,200 pounds and rangeto 100 miles. There was also a proposition to mount a 520-mm gunon the same carriage to fire rocket-assisted shells and 'Peene-mtinde Arrow Shells'to a range of 118 miles for cross-channelbombardment, but this never got past the drawing-board.

lf it is accepted that it is not a good idea to tamper with a goodgun design in the middle of a war, then the only way to render thegun more effective is to improve the ammunition, and this techniquewas f requently adopted during the war. And in no f ield is this seento greater effect than in the battle against the tank. The reason forthis is fairly self-evident: personnel targets remain more or less thesame-once the anti-personnel projectile is perfected it can stayas it is. On the other hand, once a new anti-tank projectile appears,it is only a matter of time before the enemy put thicker armour onhis tanks.

At the outbreak of war there were two types of anti-tank projectile:the armour-piercing (AP) shot, and the AP shell. The difference isbasic. Shot are solid, with no explosive filling, and rely purely ontheir speed to smash through the armour and do damage inside thetank by their impact, the fragments of plate they knock off duringpenetration, and their own effect when they penetrate the plate andbounce around inside the tank. AP shells, on the other hand, have asmall cavity filled with high explosive and are fitted with a fuse inthe base. The shell penetrates, similarly to shot, by brute force, butthe fuse is activated by the impact and, after a short delay to allowthe shell to pass through the plate and enter the tank, the explosiveis detonated, shattering the shell into fragments and adding to theshot-like damage already caused. On paper the shell is the betterproposition, since there is the bonus of the explosive filling. Butpaper figures tend to be deceptive, and in fact the shot is probablythe more practical projectile, because the high-explosive (HE)cavity weakens the shell, and the fuse is precariously supportedagainst the hammer-blow of impact. Britain held firmly to the shottheory for anti-tank work, though many years of experience in pro-ducing AP shells for naval use was available. Several other nationspreferred AP shell, bewitched by the HE bonus.

Most of the belligerents entered the war with a plain shot or shelland relied on throwing it hard enough to penetrate the opposingtanks. So long as the target was relatively lightly armoured this wassuccessful; but, naturally, each side began to increase armourthickness on each succeeding generation of tank. The quick answerto this was to increase the gun charge or even the calibre, and thusthrow the projectile harder, but there comes a time when the impactis too much for the projectile, and instead of piercing, it merelyshatters on the outside of the target without doing any damage.

The answer to this was to protect the tip of the shot or shell witha softer cap, which tended to spread the impact stresses over theshoulders of the projectile, instead of concentrating them into thetip. This preserved the piercing action to higher velocities, and thegun was again winning the battle. The next move belonged to thetank designers who made their armour thicker, and so it went onuntil the projectile was once more shattering, cap or no cap. Atthispoint the projectile designers were faced with a new problem: if itwas futile to throw the projectile harder, might it not be possible tothrow a harder projectile? And what was harder than an armour-piercing projectile? Tungsten carbide, a diamond-hard alloy, pro-vided an answer, but it was about one-and-a-half times as heavyas steel, so that it could not easily be made into a projectile. Further-more, it was expensive and in short supply.

The f irst application of tungsten to an anti-tank projectile was bythe German army in their 28-mm Schwere Panzerbuchse 41 , aweapon with a unique tapered barrel. The shot consisted of a smallcore of tungsten carbide held in a light alloy casing of 28-mmcalibre. As the shot was fired down the gun barrel, so the calibrediminished and the light alloy casing was ground down, until itemerged as a 21-mm shot. This squeezing enhanced the velocityand changed the ratio of shot diameter to weight. The velocityreached was 4,000 feet per second, and, on impact with the target,the hardness of the core was impervious to impact shock andpenetrated successf u I ly.

About the same time-late 1940-a similar idea had been put

forward by a Mr JanScek, a Czechoslovakian weapon designerworking in England. While his idea was still under consideration,a specimen of the German weapon was captured in North Af rica andflown home for trials: the idea was seen to be feasible. The Britishversion was in the form of a taper-bore adapter to be fitted to theexisting 2-pounder gun, together with a special tungsten-coredshot, known under the code name of 'Littlejohn', an Anglicisedversion of Jan6cek. The advantage here was that the adapter couldbe removed to permit firing normal explosive shells, but could berefitted quickly for the special shot, whereas the German designrequired a special pattern of high-explosive shell to be developed,a difficult feat in such a small calibre. The 'Littlejohn' attachmentand its shot were not used in towed artillery, since by the time theywere ready for service the anti-tank units were armed with 6-pounders, but it was used on 2-pounder and American 37-mm gunsmounted in armoured cars.

To use tungsten in a conventional gun, a different approach wasneeded. The first attempt, for the 6-pounder, was the 'AP CompositeRigid' (APCR) shot, a tungsten core mounted in an alloy sheath ofapproximately the same dimensions as the conventional steel shotfor the gun. By virtue of its light alloy content the APCR shot wassomewhat lighter and thus had a higher velocity when fired.Unfortunately the ratio of weight-to-diameter was unfavourable,giving a poor ballistic coefficient or 'carrying power', and while theshort-range performance was impressive, the velocity soon drop-ped, and at ranges over 1,000 yards, steel shot was just as good,sometimes better. Some German weapons were also providedwith the same type of projectile, and one was designed for use inthe Soviet 76.2-mm field gun which the Germans captured in largenumbers and converted into an anti-tank gun. Unfortunately forthem, by early 1942 the shortage of tungsten in Germany began tobe felt, and in the middle of that year a ban was placed on the useof tungsten in ammunition; what scarce supplies there were hadbeen earmarked for machine tool production, not for throwingabout the Russian steppes. After strong remonstrations, the 5-cmPak 38 anti-tank gun was specifically exempted from this ban,since at that time it was the only weapon capable of stopping aRussian T-34 tank, provided it was supplied with lungsten-coredshot.

Although the 6-pounder APCR shot seemed reasonably success-ful, it was notthe ideal answer. The ideal, in fact, sounded ridicu-lous: what was wanted was a shot which in the barrel was large-calibre and light, so as to pick up speed quickly and leave the gunat high velocity, but which outside the barrel should be small indiameter and heavy, so as to have good 'carrying power'and keepup its high velocity for a long range. These two conflicting require-ments were fused into one projectile by two British designers,Permutter and Coppock, of the Armaments Research Department.Even belore the 6-pounder had received its APCR shot they lvereat work, and in March 1944 their'AP Discarding Sabot'shot wasprovided for the 6-pounder. ln this design, the tungsten core iscontained in a streamlined steel shgath or sub-projectile; this inturn is carried in a light-alloy framework or 'sabot'of the full guncalibre. On firing, this sabot holds the sub-projectile centralised inthe bore and gives the whole thing the combination of light weightand large area which is wanted for velocity. But firing actually'unlocks'the sabot, and as the shot leaves the gun muzzle, so thesabot is thrown clear, allowing the sub-projectile to race to thetarget at velocities of the order of 3,000 feet per second. Now, sincethe sub-projectile's sheath is virtually a skin round the tungstencore, it follows that the weight is high in relation to the cross-sec-tion-the ideal condition for good carrying power and thus long-range performance. A similar projectile for the 17-pounder followedin September 1944, and one was under development for the 20-pounder tank gun when the war ended.

More punch from the hollow chargeRunning parallel with this unfolding story of piercing projectileswas the development of the hollow-charge principle into a viableweapon. This illustrates the adaptation of a well-documentedscientific phenomenon to a weapon of war: almost 200 years agoa Norweglan engineer had observed that hollowing out the face ofan explosive charge made it cut deeper into rock when blasting. lnthe 1880s an American experimenter, Monroe, found that whenfiring guncotton slabs against armour plate, the initials 'USNengraved in the guncotton reproduced themselves in mirror-likeform in the face of the armour plate. From his observations andreports the phenomenon became known as the 'Monroe Effect' andwas a scientific curiosity for many years. Just before the First WorldWar one or two inventors toyed with the idea of employing thiseffect in mines and torpedoes, but since no one really understoodwhy it did what it did, it was difficult to engineer the idea into a

2985

Two sorts of armour-piercing shot. Left and centre: the British Armour-Piercing Discarding Sabot whieh shed its lightweight casing and (right)the Armour-Piercing Composite Rigid' which kept it until impact

The German airborne 28'mmPzB-41 gun had a barrel which tapered from2B-mm to 20-mm, giving its tungsten steel shot a muzzle velocity of 4'600feet per second

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2986

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practical form.Just before the Second World War broke out, a Swiss consortium

approached the British government to offer a 'new and powerfulexplosive' for anti-tank use-at a high price. The inventors refusedto divulge any information until cash was forthcoming, but wereprepared to demonstrate their projectile being fired. An astuteobserver f rom the Research Department of Woolwich Arsenal wentto Switzerland to watch the firing; being a well-read expert onammunition development and history, he realised that what he waswatching was not a new and powerful explosive so much as apractical application of the Monroe Effect. Upon his return toWoolwich he duly reported this, and, since it appeared that theMonroe Efiect could be made to work, research immediately beganinto applying it to a light anti-tank grenade which the infantrysoldier could fire from his rifle. Before the outbreak of war, this'68 Grenade' had been perfected and was in production, andcarries the distinction of being the first weapon ever to reach thehands of troops which relied on the Monroe Effect, or as it cameto be known, the Hollow-Charge Principle.

What is this Hollow-Charge Principle? Put simply, it consists offorming the forward surface of the shell's explosive charge into acone or hemisphere and then lining this with a thin metal liner. Theshell is then fitted with a suitably shaped nose, for ballistic effectand also to give the vital 'stand-off' distance. This is the distancefrom the target-a matter of a few inches-at which the explosivemust be detonated in order for the hollow charge to work effect-ively. On detonating the explosive at its rear end, the detonationwave exerts an immense pressure on the metal of the liner; the coneshape virtually'focusses'the explosive energy and causes the metalof the liner to be shaped into a jet of finely-divided metal andexplosive gas, shooting toward the target at speeds of up to 20,000feet per second. The stand-off distance is necessary in order toallow this jet to form and accelerate. When the jet strikes thetarget plate, the pressure exerted is so great as to blast a holethrough the armour, blowing splinters of metal f rom the inside andpermitting the white-hot jet to pass into the tank where it will setfire to fuel or ammunition, and, of course, kill or injure the crew.

The great virtue of the hollow-charge shell is that its performanceis always the same, irrespective of the velocity at which it strikes.Even if the shellwere standing still when detonated, the penetrationwould be the same. Because of this, it could be f ired from guns toosmall to fire the large cartridges needed to give the necessaryvelocity to normal piercing projectiles. As soon as the 68 Grenadewas seen to be successful, design began on other hollow-chargeprojectiles. A great deal of work went into producing one for the25-pounder, though in the end it was never issued, since the APshot issued for that gun was quite satisfactory and there was no realneed for a hollow-charge shell. Then came a request from lndia toproduce an anti-tank projectile for the 3.7-inch Pack Howitzer, themodern version of Kipling's immortal 'screw-gun'. This gun, a smalland portable weapon, could not be made to fire a piercing pro-jectile at anything like the velocity needed to defeat even Japanesetanks, and a hollow-charge shell was designed and placed in pro-duction. The same shell was used in the 95-mm howitzer, anabortive infantry support gun which never saw service as a towedweapon, though it was employed as a self-propelled supportweapon by the Royal Marines in Normandy and by the ArmouredCorps.

By 1944, though, sufficient basic research had been done into thisprinciple for it to be seen that a spinning shell was not the idealmethod of employing hollow charges, since the spin tended tospread the jet out and give poor penetration. Finned projectileswere more effective, and consequently no more artillery shells weredesigned around the hollow charge; it was extensively employed,instead, for infantry weapons such as the PIAT, the Bazooka, and avariety of rifle grenades.

The Germans, and later the Russians, embraced the hollow-charge shell wholeheartedly. The Germans began issuing shell inlate 1940 and eventually almost every German field and tankweapon had a hollow-charge shell, thus giving every gun or how-itzer an anti-tank capability. lndeed, so short were the Germans ofanti-tank guns after the Russian invasion got under way, that theyhastily collected up all the French army's 75-mm guns and assem-bled hundreds of them on to redundant anti-tank gun carriages ofGerman design. A hollow-charge shell was produced and thesemakeshift weapons were deployed in Russia to stem the advancingSoviet tanks until 75-mm and 88-mm anti-tank guns were in suffi-cient supply. Judging from appearances, the Soviet hollow-chargeshells were developed as virtual copies of German designs whichhad been captured.

ln addition to artillery shell Germany also used the principle forinfantry weapons such as lhe Panzerfaust, rif le grenades, and even

a small shell which could be Jired from a signal pistol. They alsoemployed the principle in an ingenious attempt to prolong the lifeof the prewar 37-mm anti-tank gun, whose piercing projectile was,by 1942, no longer effective against current tanks. A large hollow-charge bomb was fitted with a hollow tail carrying fins; within thistail was a stick which fitted snugly into the barrel of the 37-mm gun,allowing the tail and fins to slide over the barrel. A blank cartridgecompleted the outfit, and this was used to fire the stick bomb toranges of 300 to 400 yards. The bomb's warhead was about 6 inchesin diameter and carried about 8 pounds of explosive, giving adevastating effect at the target. ln all fairness, it must be pointedout that Lieutenant-Colonel Blacker, inventor of the PIAT and the'Black Bombard' of Home Guard fame, had proposed a similar60-pound stick bomb in 1940, to be f ired f rom the 25-pounder, butthe idea was turned down on the grounds that it might lead to mis-employment of the gun as a purely anti-tank weapon. (This mis-employment theme was not confined to the British side: manyGerman Flak commanders bewailed the loss of their valuable88-mm Flak guns as they were whittled away to provide anti-tankdefences.)

The third subject is the application of new principles to gundesign. The first of these to be unveiled was the taper-bore anti-tank gun, which has already been touched upon. This was the childof a German engineer called Gerlich, who, advocating his principleof attaining high velocity without attracting any buyers, had beenstumping the world for several years. He was briefly employed byboth the US War Department and the British War Office at varioustimes, but his ideas on improving shoulder arms were felt to beimpractical. He eventually settled in Germany and saw his ideaaccepted as an anti-tank weapon. The 28/21-mm came f irst, then a42/30-mm and finally a 75l50-mm. Unfortunately, the lack of tung-sten carbide for the special projectiles spelled the demise of theseweapons, but experiments continued with coned bores and conedmuzzle-adapters for guns of various calibres up to as large as280-mm, in order to boost velocity and range. These were intendedto use high-explosive shells, which were more practical in the largercalibres, though the development of a shell which would stand upto being squeezed down the gun barrel was no easy task.

The second, and more widespread, new line of thought was therecoilless gun. Like most weapon ideas, there was nothing reallynew about it: Commander Davis of the US Navy had produced arecoilless (RCL for short) gun during the First World War which wasadopted by Britain as an anti-Zeppelin aircraft weapon. The virtueof an RCL gun is that by having no recoil one needs no complicatedhydraulic buffer system to absorb the firing shock: one need onlymake the gun-carriage strong enough to take the weight of the gun,instead of being strong enough to withstand being fired from-anideal state of affairs for an aircraft weapon, particularly in thestick-and-string era. Davis's idea is worth looking at, althoughoutside our time scale, since it is the classic recoilless weapon. Hesimply provided the gun with two barrels, one pointing forwardwhich fired a normal shell, and one.pointing rearward which firedan identical weight of grease and buckshot. When the centralcartridge was fired the shell and countershot departed at equalspeed in opposite directions and cancelled each other's recoil.From this it can be seen that if you make the countershot (say)one-fifth of the weight of the shell and fire it out at five times thespeed, then the gun will still be in balance. Taking this idea to itslogical conclusion one finishes up firing out of the back of the gun afast, light stream of gas, still balancing the recoil since the weighttimes speed of the gas is the same as the (greater) weight times(slower) speed of the shell.

Cutting down the recoilThis was the principle which the Germans revealed in Crete whentheir troops appeared armed with a 75-mm RCL gun. The shell wasthe standard 75-mm shell, but the cartridge case had a frangibleplastic base which held for long enough to allow pressure to buildup and start the shell moving, then blew out through a hole in thebreech-block, releasing the balancing stream of gas. The all-upweight of the gun, on its ex-machine gun tripod, was only 320pounds, whereas the weight of the standard 75-mm field gun wasaboul 11/z tons-no mean saving for airborne carriage. A 105-mmversion soon followed, weighing 855 pounds as opposed to the105-mm 1E FH18's 4,312 pounds, and many more developmentsbegan in this field to provide light weapons for mountain troops andinfantry, particularly for anti-tank use. (lt ought perhaps to bepointed out that lhe Panzerfausf was in fact a recoilless gun, andnot, as generally supposed, a rocket launcher). Eventually RCLguns of up to 380-mm calibre were under development, includingmany for slinging beneath aircraft to carry artillery aloft for thebattle against the Allied bombers, but none of these came to f ruitlon.

2987

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ln Britain the RCL gun ddvelopment during the war is a scarcely-known story of one man's persistence. Sir Denis Burney, airshipO"iign"r and prolific inventor-engineer, began to be interested in

ine iecoittess principle early in the war' ln order to prove histheories he converted a four-bore gun into a recoilless weapon andoroceeded to f ire it from the shoulder with ease; it must have been

ine wortO's most comfortable duck gun. Having proved his point he

proceeded to design a series of RCL guns ranging from 20-.mm.to

b-in"n calibre. ln alddition to designing the guns, he expanded histfreories and designed special ammuniiion to take advantage of the

ballistic peculiarit'ies of ihe weapon. He argued that since the rear-warO Otait was taking place, the pressure within the gun would be

less than with a conventional type, and the shell would be subjectedto-i more steady thrust, in whi-ch case it would be possible to makeshells with thiriner walls, which would carry greater charges ofeiptosive than previously possible. He then went further, and

reasoned that, since tfre 6frett walls were thin, if the shell were tobe filled with the then new plastic explosive, it would spread on toihe surface of the target likb butter; a fuse fitted in the base of the

shell would then detdnate this plaster and blast in the target- His

envisaged target was either the concrete emplacements of .theEuropdan coa6t, or the palm-reinforced Japanese bunker, and he

called his shell the 'Wallbuster'.ln 1944 his designs were accepted and a 3.45-inch (the same

calibre as the 25-pounder) shoulder-fired gun, a 3'7-inch towedgun, a 95-mm towed howitzer, and a7.Z-inch towed howitzer were

firepareO lor production. The 95-mm was also jeep-mounteg-lhgiirii appticatibn of what has since become a standard method ofcarrying these guns. The 7.2-inch soon fell by the wayside, sinceit friO 5een int6nded solely as a means of defeating the Atl.antic

Wafi empfacements, but other weapons were found to do all thatwai neebeO. The 3.45-inch was intended as an infantiy weapon in

the jungle, enabling one man to carry what was virtually a 25-pounOei punch on liis shoulder. The 3.7-inch was proposed as theiuture inthntry anti-tank weapon, and the 95-mm was contemplatedai ifre airOorrie field gun to r'eplace the US 75-mm howitzer and theiS-pounOer. Howevei, before the guns were.produce^d in sufficientqudntity for issue, the war came to an end; some 3'45-in9h gngS./-inch guns were issued to selected infantry units to^o5tain theirreaction

*to RCL guns as a general thing, and the 95-mm was

abandoned altogether.The principai- difference between the Burney guns and the

Germari type was that the Burneys had much longel barrels, andused cartiidge cases which, instead of the plastic blow-out.base,used many ferforations in the sidewall to release the gas into a

surrounding chamber, from whence it was passed back to a num-ber of vents around the breech.

concurrently with Burney's work in Britain, American designersOegin on similar weapons.-A 105-mm howitzer T-9 was developedon"similar lines to the German 105-mm, having a blow-out base to

2988

the cartridge. Another team developed 57-mm and 75-mm weaponswhich used perforated cases similar to the Burney pattern buthaving more and smaller holes, and also had the shell driving bandpre-eigraved in order to reduce the pressure inside the SYn F-o.tIthese l-atter weapons were accepted for service early in 1945'saw service with ihe US Army in the Pacific theatre, and remainedin service for many years. A third team, this time under the auspicesof the National R6dearch and Development Council, developed a

4.2-inch RCL mortar, an unlikely-sounding weapon which' so as tobe able to fire direct at the target at low angles, carried a smallrocket on the nose of the shell io push it down the barrel and firethe propelling cartridge in the usual mortar fashion' Due to theblast of'the iearward Jet, it could only be f ired at low elevations;there was a certain amount of enthusiasm for this weapon but itnever entered service.

Perhaps the best summing up of all wartime development onRCL webpons was made in a wartime report: 'Undoubtedly a num-ber of efiective recoilless weapons have been developed, but theyare being accepted with reserve, and will only be cons.idered as

supplem5ntary io older and more orthodox weapons which haveproved their accuracy and reliability in service.''

There is, unfortunately, no space here to delve into more recon-dite stories of research and development:the British 13'5-inch gunlinered-down to 8-inch calibre which, fired from Dover, reacheda range of over 100,000 yards; the British and American develop-ment"of flying artillery, which culminated in the mounting of a

32-poundei'aiti-tank iun in a Mosquito; the German V-3 multiple-chamber gun which was intended to shell London; the American36-inch mbrtar 'Little David', designed to batter Japanese strong-points; the German rocket-assisted and ramjet-assisted heavyhrtitlery shells which promised vast increases in range; or-theAnglo-hmerican development of the ele.ctronic proximity .fusewhich proved the answer to both 'Doodlebugs' and kamikazeoilots. These and similar stories may only interest the specialist, butihey, together with what has been written here, serve to illustratetfre'inc6OiOle range of inventions brought into play in the warwaged between th! designers and inventors of each side, eachendlavouring to get one step ahead of the other, if only temp-orarily.

IAN HOGG was born in 1926 in Durham City' enlisted in

the Regular Army during the war, and is now a MasterGunner'in the R6yal Artillery. After serving in Europe and

the Far East, including duty with a Field Regiment duffigthe Korean War, he becam6 a member of the lnstructionalStaff of the School of Artillery, Larkhill. He is at presentemoloved in the Ammunition Branch of the Royal Military

with particular emphasis on ammunition.

Often enough it has been said that a nationsets the aimv it deserves and that, con-iersely, the iomposition and capability ofthat army is the reflection of the nation towhich it 6elongs. In days gone by, before theleuie en masse introduced the nation inarms and converted war-making from alimited to a wholesale operation, the wide-spread employment of foreign mercenariesouite often blirred the ethnic resemblanceof un ""*y to its country of origin. Duringthe War of Spanish Succession, for instance,Irishmen foright in both the French andoooosins British armies and particularly,on'one"celebrated occasion, came face toface during the Battle of Malplaquet-givingrise to the request, 'Gentlemen of France-fire firstl'

Once the nation in arms became estab-lished, the building of armies had to be-

come,'by definition, more fully integratedwith the policies, aims, and economres ottheir parent nation. More often than not,the geographic location ofa country ordainedthe

"alignment of national po-licy,-cgllingeither f6r a maritime- or land-based GrandStrategy - deciding, in fact, wheth-er priorityshould-Le given to the creation of a navy or;; at-y.* I.t consequence, -continentalnations, Luch as Russia, tended to commitsreater'thoueht and more resources to theEuildine of land forces, while sea-boundnationJsuch as Great Britain and Japanconcentrated mote on their navies-thoughneither type of nation, quite obviously,could affoid to ignore the needs of the less-favoured service. Governed by prioritiessuch as these, the traditional impulses thatshape armies from their primary days, on-

*u.d gto* in response to the demands ofvarying political situations.

ff gols- without saying that the thoughtsguiding an army's civil and military mastersir"

"oiditio.ted by the pressures generated

bv internal and external political and.lottornic events. When the population ofGermany exhibited a sense of grievance afterthe Firsi World War, their military leadersfelt iustified, in salving what they couldfromihe wreck and rebuilding an army witha cadre comprised of a stronger than normalofrcer and nbn-commissioned officer elementand an outlook that searched for means tothe offensive. At the same time in France,the nation and its generals, replete invictory, adopted a strictly defensive^ men-talitv"in the belief that a strong defensivenostire would be sufficient deterrence toattack from outside. Britain, on the otherhand, had perforce to revert to a syst-em

which put first priority on policing- !t-"7

Empire, allowing a return to the pre-1914outlbok established within the class struc-ture that had served quite adequately be-

fore. And America, isolated by distance andthe Monroe Doctrine, simply took refuge incommerce and a democratic humanitarian-ism that rejected war and consigned theirarmv and officer corPs to atroPhY.

Eventually a hosf of inclinations, inhibi-tions, and itestut"s, in addition to thosementioned ibone, interact upon each otherto formulate the philosophy and constitutionof the kind of aimy a nation will come toown in peacetime. Frequently the process

is one of material and intellectual attritionin the face of retrenchment, yet no armyworthy of its salt dare exist in pe-a-ce with-out laying varied plans to re-build in pre-paration for the foreseeable circumstances-that c.tt be envisaged as arising in war'Before or during a war the resulting expan-

2990

sion, leadership, training, and behavio-ura"" iikely to be idjusted to national attitudessuch as belief in a cause' aggressrve orpassive motives, industrial or peasant occu-oations. democratic or totalitarian govern-mental systems, flexible or rigid organisa-tions-th-e final product probably emergingas a compromise br integration of fundamen-tal national characteristics.

It follows that when a nation's leaders em-bark on the reconstruction of an army(assuming that they have some kind ofarmed boly already in existence) they willfirst take account of national aspirations'They will then formulate an-army whosesize and composition satisfies nationaloolicv. that in turn fits a well-consideredsrani'strateev which is suited to geographicind climatiJ conditions and related to theavailability of vital resources such as man-oower and materials. When the GermansLegan the reconstruction oftheir army after19i9, they had to restore the confidence ofa body already seriously uldermined- bydefeat, revolution, and an arbitrary reduc-tion in number to 100,000 deprived ofoffensive weapons under the rules of theVersailles Treaty. Working on the assump-tion that this could only be a cadre for anarmy that need never fight outside Europe,thev tackled their problem within reason-ablv and helpfullv narrow limits' Thegrillsh. on the-other hand, had to re-adaptan army that, for the first time in its exist-ence, hid become conscript and continentalin orsanisation and reduce it to the size

of a Jmall volunteer force capable of opera-ting under the conditions imposed byvanyingteriains and climates ranging from Shang-hai, through India, Palestine, and Egypt-white maiitaining an army of occupation inGermany and combatting insurrectron rnIreland.- Preparations for another -gene-ralEuropean war went to the bottom of the listof courses of action.

Unlike the Germans' whose motives cou-ld

only be acquisitive in the long run,, theBriilsh wer-e strictly preservative' More-over, while the Germans could train onlyon territory of the sort they were bound tofight over,-the British h"4 tg spread theirtlirited resources to provide for almost anykind of combat in colonial circumstancesfrom desert to jungle and mountain to plain

-always wittrthe chance that amphibiousoperatibns might be required and-a longshot-movement bY air.

The choice of grand strategYA nation's grand strategy takes- shape with-in the confi-nes of what is possible, imposedbv the realities of treaties and economicr6strictions. Expansion takes place whenthe government says so-Germany's from193f onwards at the behest of aggressiveintent under the encouragement of renewedand illegal conscription, fixedto a Europeanerand ftrateqv; Russia's with defensive/Sffensive sent"i-ments linked to the stronglyheld beliefs that the struggle againstcaoitalism must eventually take place byfoice of arms; France's in pious hope behindconcrete fortifications; Britain's fromapproxi-mately 1935 onwards, with the intentionof bolitering the French from behind whoselines they elected to mount a decisiveoffensive founded on air power. MeanwhilePresident Roosevelt, after Munich, began todevelop a strategy of deterrence basedprimafily upon industrial power in the hopeittat the-sigit of such material might couldcause the Germans and Japanese-in that

)Top: German machine-gunners learn thehandling of their weapons'Bottomi A parade of horses, half-tracks, andguns at the German school of artillery

order of priority-to reconsider their de-

signs. At the sime time Roosevelt had toca"rry public opinion with him and secretlydivert-civil development funds to lhe pyr-poses of revival in lhe armament industries'

When a nation decides to expand its armyit must harness its human and materialresources to military schemes. Peasantcountries can draw on massed manpower ot

low output and staunch loyalty and armtheir pe-ople with whatever equipment itsimmature industry can manufacture, suq-

"iume"ted bv purchases from abroad' Such

was the ouilo6k of Russia before her in-dustrial output could place- sufficientweaDons in the hands of an almost inex-huoitilt" number of men. More highlya"uufop"a industrial countries that stillpossesied a sizeable- peasant. populationisuch as Germany and France between thewars) are usually persuaded to supplementtheir massed infantry forces with as manyelite formations as the economy can support'To keep a nation's economyin balance, long-term pianning and repeated reviews have to-

u.tuUfitft sym"pathy between the demands ofthe civil sector foi consumer goods and themilitarv sector for weapons. An acceptablestandaid of living has to be maintained inorder to placate the people-always remem-bering that the rearmament programmes. oIthe 1530s probably had as much to do y!!hreversing lhe trends of the 'economic bliz-zard' and reducing unemployment as any-thing else-and this trend remains evidentto this day.

The supply and selection of manpower- tothe armed- iervices and industry thus be-comes critical, particularly when, as in theearly 1930s, employment was adjusted tothe whims of traditional economic practiceswhich demanded that a nation should bal-ance its budget and never run into deficit.Paradoxicalli several nations, Britain andAmerica especially, reduced their armedservices to lheir nadir when national un-employment was rising to a peak. To put itanother way, however much an army wantsto expand, it must have the wherewithal toarm itself. The more technical an army be-comes, the greater demand there is fortechnologists first in the industrial areas,second,.l*ottg the cadres of the arrny, andonlv finallv in-quantitv throughout the ranksof the army as- a whole. Before the SecondWorld War the mobilisation of armies(whether by the call-up of reservists or bypermitting an influx of enthusiastic volun-teersl hal frequently hampered civil ad-ministration and industry by deprtvtngthose bodies of the very men they mostneeded to arm and support the emergentforces. In France, among other nations atthe beginning of the Firsl World War, good

administratois, industrialists, farmers, andcoal miners and others found themselvesserving without distinction in the rankswhen iheir special skills were urgently re-quired to re-energise a dying economy.-

By the Second World War most nationshad learned profitable lessons from theirrecent experiences. Manpower was morecarefully ionserved, aided by governmentstatistics that had never before been col-lected and disseminated. In Britain theCentral Economic Information Service wasnot set up until the summer of 1940, and the

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selection of technologists was, basically,decided at Labour exchanges on the con-sideration of whether a man did or did nothave a trade. Even so, the call-up of men inBritain went forward in step with the avail-ability of accommodation and weapons, andin Germany the army was mobilised bydegrees over a period of months before theoutbreak of war, first to give the nation agradual introduction to its war footing, andsecond to help achieve a high standard oftraining throughout the service before thefirst shots were fired.

The brain and skeleton of an army is itscadre of regular officers, instructors, andtechnologists around which the flesh ofreservists, conscripts, and war-time volun-teers is moulded and hardened. The latterare called up to a carefully phased mobilisa-tion scheme that is geared to the time andplace of war and is, by its implication, apotent weapon in the hands of the politi-cians engaged in negotiations during theperiod of tension preceding hostilities. Itfollows that the period in which mobilisa-tion takes place is critical: it coincides withthe outbreak of war, when the nation'seconomy is in a state of flux and its dailyroutine is disrupted. The nation is open tothe depredations of internal forces of dis-content and the external interruptions ofpre-emptive raids or full-scale invasion bythe enemy. Simultaneously, the mobilisa-tion of naval and air forces (which may havea priority over the army) throws competingdemands upon the pure expansionist needsof the army. For the other two services maywell demand protection for vital points byanti-aircraft defences or simply by armedguards -just when the soldiers would ratherbe getting on with important re-formationand training for their principal role inthe field.

The mobilisation machineBased upon the experiences of 1974, al-most every government had set up unusuallyelaborate mobilisation machinery before1939 to gear their industries to a wartimeeffort. Key personnei could be prevented ordeferred from entering the services by group-ing them in'reserved occupations', and theindustries themselves recruited labourneeded to manufacture the large quantitiesof equipment that would be needed by thearmed services. These were deeply laidfoundations, for the technological lead timeswon in peacetime became the keystones ofsuccess in war. The fact that Russia andGermany rearmed with a new generation ofweapons from the mid-1930s onwards in-stead of trying to adapt an older generationin the manner of the French (who in any casestarted adapting two years after the Ger-mans started rebuilding) gave them signi-ficant advantages. With the Americans, whodid not really get into production until 1941,the discrepancy was even more marked,particularly when it is recalled that almostany new major weapon system neededseveral years' development from conceptionto being in service. A tank might need twoyears, an airplane twice that if, for thosedays, it was fairly sophisticated.

Naturally no amount of industrial plan-

ning to equip armies could be of use ifsufficient raw materials were not stockpiledor indigenous within each nation's bound-aries. The acquisition of raw materials thusmerged with warlike preparations, the sizeand nature of stocks being gauged in rela-tion to the type of warfare envisaged, thetime it was forecasted as lasting, and thelikelihood of fresh supplies being main-tained as the war proceeded. The Germans,planning for a short war, had perpetuallyto maintain petrol stocks from tenuousnatural and synthetic sources without whichtheir mechanised forces could no longerfunction-and on more than one occasiondeflected their strategy to acquire freshstocks, often when their forces were alreadyinhibited by critical shortages. Britainopened the war with the declared intentionof engaging in a three-year war and triedto assemble materials in sufficient quantityto support expenditure at the rates thatprewar assumptions seemed to estimate.America, enjoying self-sufficiency in almostevery kind of raw material, neverthelesssuffered minor restrictions, just when herVictory Programme of Rearmament wasgathering energy, as the main sources ofrubber were cut off by Japan overrunningthe plantations in South-East Asia.

Compared with the vast complexity of thelong-term probiems involved in the assemblyof civil and industrial backing for a growingarmy, the arrangement of an army's internalframework is relatively simple, since itusually serves to extend an existing andwell-tried system. In Britain just before theoutbreak of war, the Regular Army had astrength of 22L,813 and could call upon afurther 661,797 semi-trained reservists andauxiliaries (such as time-expired regularsand Territorial soldiers) immediately. Fornormal 'peacetime' operations the Britisharmy reckoned upon subsisting on a volun-teer intake, but after Munich pointed tothe virtual inevitability of war, felt boundto introduce conscription under a MilitaryTraining Act in May 1939. France andRussia simply extended the conscriptionthat had long been a feature oftheir defence.Germany reintroduced conscription againstthe terms of the Versailles Treaty in 1935and the Americans, under the pressure ofevents, brought in the draft in 1941.

The organisation of armies is roughlystandard throughout the world, comprisingarmies, corps, divisions, brigades (some-times referred to as regiments), battalions(sometimes referred to as regiments), com-panies (or squadrons or batteries), platoons(or troops), and sections. Divisions areusually the highest formation with a fixedestablishment of lower formations and units,but vary by type such as armoured, infantry,and airborne, each of which can also varystill further depending upon the part ofthe world in which it is destined to fight.The manner in which these formations andunits are grafted upon each nation's regionalcivil organisation fluctuates, nation bynation. Before the war Britain was sub-divided into commands, districts, and sub-areas related to county boundaries-eachcorresponding respectively to corps, divi-sions, and brigades. Within their bound-aries each regional organisation adminis-tered and helped train the fighting elementsthat were to make up the ExpeditionaryForces. They also commanded the local de-fence of key points.

The regular formations were fattened outafter mobilisation by the recalled reservists

-not all of whom necessarily relished put-ting on uniform again (though their termsof engagement prescribed that this couldhappen) but some of whom were only toopleased to escape from the routine of homelife and even their wives. More closely re-Iated to the peacetime, regional organisa-tion were the Territorial formations com-prising several divisions, each run by aminute cadre of regulars whose task it wasto train a great concourse of volunteers inthe evenings, at weekends, and during a fort-night's camp each year. With the best wiltin the world (and the spirit of these menwas hard to beat) the Territorial formationscould not be rated fit for war upon mobilisa-tion, and had to undergo intensive trainingfrom the start with what little (mostlyobsolescent) equipment could be found.

America employed a similar system to theBritish, their National Guard correspondingto the British Territorial Army-but theentire organisation suffered from an acuteshortage of regulars, many of whom hadIeft their most active days behind. In 1931its totai strength had sunk to only 134,000of all ranks-and its officer corps was soattenuated that sometimes only one officercould be raised for a whole battalion. By1939 numbers had risen to 184,000, but thiswas still a narrow base upon which to buildthe proiected 8,000,000 men.

Germany, learning from the failures ofthe ill-trained Landwehr (territorial) divi-sions in 1914, built up her regular forma-tions and diluted them with well-trainedreservists throughout 1939. But she too em-ployed the regional system as the basis ofinternal military organisation, each Wehr-kreise reptesenting a corps with specifieddivisions. For instance, Wehrkreise Sachsenproduced the IV Corps, made up of IV, XIV,and XXIV Divisions. The motorised, light,and panzer divisions, however, belongedto corps without a territorial affiliation, sincetheir specialised training also demandedthat they should be located close to particu-Iar areas, while men of the required stand-ard of mechanical knowledge could best berecruited from the centres of industrialpopulation.

Of course, military commands and dis-tricts are mainly intended to provide anadministrative base to find and take care ofaccommodation, feeding, and medical care,along with such training facilities as recruittraining depots, central schools, and trainingareas. A recruit entering an army mighttherefore expect to experience a routinesuch as follows. Having volunteered or beennotified of impending call-up, he can expecta medical examination as the first stage ofhis induction. If he passes that (and itmay be noted that in Britain during theSecond World War 8.V7o of those examinedfailed to reach the required standard) thenext test concerns an assessment of edu-cational and trade qualifications (in Britain25Vo were below normal elementary schoolstandards-in some other nations the per-centage was a good deal higher) in order tofit the man to the task in which best usecan be made of his talents or physique. In-variably, almost on a worldwide basis, thescientific and technological grades wereshortest in supply in the 1930s-and thisshortage fell particularly heavily uponarmies who received a smaller slice of thebetter intelligences in proportion to thenavies and air forces. Waste such as hadoccurred in the First World War was quitesignificantly reduced. Nothing so wasteful

2993

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as 'Pals' Battalions' (which had included aludicrously high proportion of leadershipmaterial in its ranks) was allowed to recur.

Once selection has been decided, the em-bryo soldier can expect to find his way to aprimary training centre, there to receivehis uniform and learn the outward motionsof military order and discipline lvhich setthe fighting man apart from others. In otherwords he is taughi how to dress, drill, andcarry out the simplest of military duties.

Teaching a tradeThereafter the volume of training that aman receives depends upon how much hecan profitably absorb in the time availableand ihe enthusiasm of his officers can teach.Frequently a man's training used to be cgr-tailed by operational contingencies' Undersevere pressure from 1941 onwards, theRussians reduced a1l forms of training to abare minimum: some of their infantry hardlyknew how to aim and shoot a rifle. On theother hand there are almost no limits tothe number of different subjects that asoldier can be taught. In the Second WorldWar a recruit in the British army mightspend five weeks on basic training and. ifhe were a tank man. learn two clew trades(say driver/gunner or signaller/gunner) eachof which might take eight weeks-the pointis thus made that, as in any other organisa-tion, an army must aim to train its menwithin a reasonable division of labour alongwith a degree of specialisation.

As the technological aspects of warfarebecame more diversifled, the individual sol-dier had to learn an enormous number ofdifferent, basic skills without which he

2994

An assault course for fitness and stamina

could not survive. He needed to knorv how toshoot a rifle. how to conceal himself fromview and stalk the enemy, how to protecthimself against gas attack, how to cook andlive in the roughest conditions, and so on.To these basic skills might be added special-ised training as a heavy machine-gunner, a

radio operatbr', a driver (a considerable pro-portion of the British recruits had to betaught how to drive when they joine9-.thearmy: in the American army most soldiersot".r-ed and drove cars as a matter of course)or perhaps as a radar operator. A good dealof ihis instruction can take place withinthe man's unit, though those learning themore highly skilled trades (such as radaroperator) have to attend long courses at acentral school deaiing with that subject. Andof course the instructors themselves have tolearn their subject from somewhere, inaddition to the most effective way to imparttheir knowledge, and usually this is-.aisotaught at a central school or, possibly, directfrom an industrial establishment.

Pre-eminent in the field of selection andinstruction rvent the creation of officers' Inmost nations they were volunteers but thesources of their recruitment were divergent,for the technological upsurge of the Firstand Second World Wars imparted sweepingchanges in the functions of the officer. Nolonge.-r could they mainly be drawn lrom.thetraiitional aristocratic- classes who hadhabitualiy impressed their methodg uponarmies in the past. The need for leadership,ingenuity, and organising ability were stillpr-esent io the same degree, but the demandsbf technology called also for officers whosebackground was aliied to a world the aris-

tocracies and middle classes did not fre-quently enter. In all European armies(particularly in Germany's) the base of theofficer class was broadened to include thetechnocracy. In America the severe run-down of the officer corps in peacetime amonga nation that did not possess a traditionalofficer-producing class, raised more complex

- though not insoluble - problems. TheAmerican allegiance to equal opportunitywithin a demoCratic society clearly imposedbarriers that could only be broken down bya display of individual merit which couldnot be fully evaluated until the selectionsystem had been tempered by battle experi-ence.

Running at odds through most armies wereto be fouid serious misgivings concerningthe undermining effects of intellectual andtechnological disciplines when they cameinto conflict with the older, better under-stood automatic motivations associatedwith the over-emphasised code of 'Do as Isay, not as I do'. Only the truly ignorantemployed this method without restraint,buL its mention suggested blind obedienceand this could be the very opposite of intel-ligent leadership and compliance. (As Imarched offthe Ofrcer Training Unit squareas part of a well-drilled squad on the wayto its first day on the tank park, I rememberhearing my Guards instructor-a soldierof great merit-warn in an agoni,qed voic-e

from afar: 'Don't become oil-minded,gentlemen.' Il was a cry lrom ihe heart, {orsomehow the new leadership had to betaught by the old to apply their technicalknowledge with equal guile and fortitudeon an unlidy battleheld where machines, in

German infantry practise patrolling

Training for German artillery spottersRealistic battle simulation in North Wales

British infantrymen practise landing drill

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the end, obeyed their human masters.)These winds of sociological change im-

pinged unerringly upon morale. Instructiondesigned to induce a frightened man toperform his duties to perfection for the com-mon benefit, regardless of fear, could nevercompletely make up for practical experienceunder fire - though it could go a long waytowards that ideal. Given the time, mencould be trained up to and then, sadly,beyond the point of staleness. High moralegrows with confidence in personal prowessand then within the team to which theindividual belongs. But there comes a pointwhen that morale may slip into decline ifthe skills can not be applied in earnestbefore boredom sets in.

Much time spent at war is time spentin monotony when the mind is insufficientlyexercised and turns to other things. Like ahouse, once an army has been built it hasto be maintained. Its internal structure-morale-demands a proliferation of minorprivilege! and services such as regularIeave, adequate pay, reliable medical atten-tion, reasonable accommodation, enter-tainment, and the taste, every now andagain, of home delights away from thebarracks environment. Pay, as an example,could cause the most harrowing anomalies.For a conscript whose standaid of livingcorresponded to a high wage and long-termfinancial commitments, reduction to thelowest rate of other rank pay overnightcould be disastrous for his family and him-self. In wartime Britain a firm was obligedto maintain the pay of men called up forservice, but not every soldier's originaljob entitled him to this privilege. As the

war went on many concessions had to bemade in the pay rates of armies, not onlybecause shortage of consumer goods inducedinflationary tendencies, but also because tooinvidious a comparison between the higherwages of civilians and the lower ones ofsoldiers could not be compatible with highsoldierly morale.

Unit and formation exercises became thefirst stage in helping to apply the practicesof individuai training. By stages a recruitwill find himself made part of a crew, asection, or a team within the lowest echeionof some unit whose title (which may aspireto glorious past achievements) means lessto him than the calibre of the officers (aboveall the commanding officer) set over him. Onexercises all would learn their trade and thejunior ranks would have the chance to workout whether their superiors might have thewit to steer them through danger to successand survival. During these lower levelexercises the soldiers have most to do andlearn: as they rise by military stages toreach corps or even army level only the moresenior officers profit to a significant extent,though it is equally vital that, even at thesacrifices of the soidier's patience, this sortof exercise should be practised-very occa-sionally.

The need for spaceInevitably, most exercises require the com-paratively free use of large tracts ofland. Incountries possessing vast land masses, suchas Russia and America, there was very littledifficulty in finding space-though eventhere it was not always possible exactly toduplicate every kind of terrain in which the

men would operate. But in Britain, and to aIesser extent in the other principal Euro-pean nations, the provision of sufficient land,above all of the right kind, posed innumer-abie painful and domestic problems. It wasimpossible to train formations for desertwarfare with realism in either Germany orBritain, and in both countries, where a highpopulation density made consistent calls onevery square mile and where blockaderaised the value of farmland to a premium,territory taken exclusively for militarypurposes could ill be spared. Yet manyvaluable acres of arable land had to beturned over to teach men how to fight throughhedgerows (the sort of ground they werelikely to meet in France) rather than, forinstance, grouse moors, which are exclusiveto Britain.

In very few other aspects did the buildingof armies encroach more aggravatingly andprovocatively upon civil rights and good-will. Although there is a noticeably passiveresignation to the military presence anddepredations throughout Europe, tendenciessuch as these are traditionally resisted inBritain. Here the application of defenceregulations cut right across the rights ofproperty owners when land for training wasrequisitioned and, in extreme cases, depop-ulated. In wartime this was just acceptable,but the fear of its extension into peacetimewas never far from peoples'minds along witha threat of bureaucratic dominance thatcould not be sufficiently curbed. Neverthe-less, army building in time of nationalemergency cannot wait the due process ofIaws that, in peacetime, prevented theconstruction of anti-aircraft gunsites by

How to cross wire

2995

LettersAn absolute racket?

Dear Sir,With regard to your letter which I received theother day stating that you had decided toextend the History of the Second World Warfor another two volumes 'owing to publicdemand'. This is an absolute racket! When thiswas first published it was stated there wouldbe six volumes. Then on the last week of thelast issue you have the audacity to write andsay you are extending it and on subjects whichhappened after peace was declared. That wasthe end of the war, so the next two volumesare under the wrong title. I do not want theseand would like proof of this 'public demand' ofwhich you speak, but even if I wanted to sellthem they would be incomplete without the lasttwo volumes.

What is there to guarantee that after thesetwo volumes you won't decide to publish anothertwo and so on.

As I said before it is a racket and needsexposing. Never will I ever buy any more ofyour publications and I am sure there arethousands of your unfortunate supporters ofthis series who feel exactly the same as I do-CHEATED. And I challenge you to publishthis.Yours etc,V. M. Chatwin (Mrs)Hull

Editor's reply:I cannot understand why you are using theword 'cheating', Mrs Chatwin. ln Volumes 1 to 6you have a complete history of the Second WorldWar-as you were promised when lssue I

appeared. As the history developed-as I havemade clear several times before in my Editorialletters-our editorial staff found themselves notinfrequently snowed under by requests for ex-pansion of material-on the pattern of the onepublished below. During the first half of theperiod of publication, we were forced regret-fully to inform our readers that there was noroom for the extra material which they wererequesting-with the result that very shortlywe accumulated a large file of letters suggestingthat we made more room by extending theseries. With this prospect in mind, wepublished a letter by Mr Evison-Taylor in Vol 4,No 16-and the resulting flood of correspond-ence made it perfectly clear that a large bodyof opinion supported the idea of appendixvolumes. May I take this opportunity to repeatthat the original six volumes will be completein themselves. An index, bibliography, anderrata list, at present rapidly nearingcompletion, will soon be available to allreaders who are content with the six-volumeedition of the history. Amplified versions ofthese three amenities will be available toreaders who opt for the eight-volume edition.And you can rest assured that the historywill not be extended beyond eight volumes.

More information, please

Dear Sir,I am writing to thank you for a very good, ifnot excellent, History ot the Second World War.I would also like to suggest a few items whichyou may, or may not, like to put into theHistory. They are:1. Economic effects on various major Allied orAxis countries after the war ended.2. Major items from the Nuremberg War Trials.3. More history on supreme peraons in the war,eg Chiang Kai-shek.'4. More articles about civilians at war-spies,nurses, Home Guard: and what about Chinese

civilians whom you seem to have left out?5. Articles covering the occupation andf raternisation of Allied troops in variousAxis countries after the war.6. Axis countries' war on churches, and most ofall the leader of Christianity in the world,the Pope.7. Could a pull-out wall chart be made of allor some of the insignia, flags, and badges ofthe different fighting nations of World War Two?

My last question is to whether you will bepublishing a History of the First World War.Yours etc,Paul FairbairnNorth Shields, Northumberland

Editor's reply:Many of these topics have in fact already beencovered in the published issues of Volume 7,and other key subjects will appear in futureissues. The work of the Red Cross, for example,is analysed in an issue devoted to concentration,POW, and internment camps (Vol 7, No 15), andthe Nuremberg Trials are the subject ofVolume 8, No 7. Mr Fairbairn is not alone inraising the guestion ot a History of the FirstWorld War, which is under serious consideration.We have always deeply respected the highstandard of constructive criticism shown by ourreaders, and will be grateful for all suggestionson how our present standard could beimproved in a First World War history.

Please lay some ghosts for me

Dear Sir,So the History ol the Second World War iscoming to an end; it seemed like a secondway of life these past 95 weeks. I would liketo say how much l've enjoyed it and especiallythe editor's replies (and retorts) to readers'letters.

lf the letter page is continuing over thenext 32 issues I wonder if you could lay someghosts for me. I am too young to rememberanything of the war. My mother has been aprimary source of information for me. Onething she recalls was the extreme feeling ofanxiety she had living in Kent during 1940.Sentries, posted on the Romney Marshes, weredisappearing without trace. Posting them inpairs was lamentably unsuccessful and thesoldiers' morale was greatly affected.Apparently no cause was ever discovered forthis.

A young chap I was talking to had been amerchant seaman on a ship working f rom Nor-way, Stavanger I believe, had heard strangetales of a forest in which was a large numberof dead German troops. The Norwegian Govern-ment emphatically forbade entry to this placewhere skeletons, guns and ammunition andother small items of equipment apparently layin profusion. Occasionally small parties wereallowed in, but were searched on leaving.Apparently a Lidice was committed in Norway;if the strange tales are true, are those deadmen victims of Resistance retribution? Leavingthem where they fell hardly fits in with whatI imagine the Norwegians to be like.

It was interesting to compare the twoaccounts of the Russo-Japanese conflict in1945. There is a remarkable difference, but I

suppose the censorship makes the Russianhistorian, in a sense, an official spokesmanand the Russian Government cannot admit tothe motives ascribed to it by the author ofthe Allied view.Yours faithfully,Mr E. A. StaggHove

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ItledalsNext week's full colour issue is devotedto the military glamour of the war, andthe opening teature consists of fivepages on medals and awards. lncludedare the top awards for valour and aselection ol Axis and Allied campaignbadges and shields-with a collection ofnot-so-famous medals.

Uniforln$The development of the lighting man istraced in a pictorial leature whichextends lrom the Roman legionary tothe postwar Gl. Full-colour picturesinclude the uniforms of the armies olFrederick the Great, Wellington, and ofboth Federals and Confederates in theAmerican Civil War.

ileadgoarWhile separate full-colour leatures andillustrations show the evolution ofmilitary headgear from the time of theNorman Conquest to 1918, and aselection of British regimental capbadges, the central leature ol next week'sissue shows the main hats and helmetsworn in the Second World War.

Bad$sSleeve and shoulder badges and flashesfor all units, commands, and headquar-ters-these provide more pages of lullcolour, showing how tradition and adhoc decisions both produced a welterof bewildering colour for the otherwisedrab unilorms of the Second World War,making the wearer feel part of a team.

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