Historical Legacy & One Party Dominance

The Role of Historical Legacy in the

Emergence of One-party Dominance The Case of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary

Democratic Front (EPRDF)

Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Development and Governance

University of DuisburgUniversity of DuisburgUniversity of DuisburgUniversity of Duisburg----EssenEssenEssenEssen

Institute of Political Science

By Alemayehu Eyasu Tedla

Supervisor: Professor Dr. Christof Hartmann

August 2011

ii

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the German Academic

Exchange Service (DAAD) which sponsored my study through its generous

scholarship offer.

My special thanks also goes to my thesis supervisor, Professor Dr. Christof

Hartmann, for his invaluable comments and overall support in the entire

study period.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge Mr. Dennis Binder and his colleagues at

the DAAD for making my competition in the scholarship possible, and

extending their assistance throughout my stay in Germany.

iii

Acronyms

AC Audit Commission

ADLI Agricultural Development-Led Industrialization

ANDM Amhara National Democratic Front

CC Central Committee

CoR Council of Representatives

EDU Ethiopian Democratic Union

EPDM Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement

EPRDF Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front

EPRP Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party

ESM Ethiopian Student Movement

ICG International Crisis Group

MEISON All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement

M-L Marxist-Leninist

MLLT Marxist Leninist League Tigray

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

NQ National Question

OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

OLF Oromo Liberation Front

OPDO Oromo People’s Democratic Organization

PDO People’s Democratic Organization

RST Relief Society of Tigray

SEPDF South Ethiopian People’s Democratic Front

SMC Single Member Constituencies

TGE Transitional Government of Ethiopia

TNC Transitional National Council

TPLF Tigray People’s Liberation Front

iv

List of Tables

Table 1. Definitions of Dominant Parties

Table 2. Election Results of EPRDF and the Opposition from 1995-2010

List of Figures

Figure 5.1. Organizational Chart of TPLF, 1979

Figure 5.2. Local Administration, Mass Association and Cadre Structures, and their links

with TPLF

v

Table of Contents Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………………………........ii Acronyms………………………………………………………………………………………………......iii List of Tables………………………………………………………………………………………………iv List of Figures……………………………………………………………………………………...iv CHAPTER ONE............................................................................................................................1

1. Introduction ..................................... ............................................................................. 1

1.1. Statement of the Problem..................................................................................................................1

1.2. Research Questions...........................................................................................................................4

1.3. Methodology.....................................................................................................................................4

1.4. Hypothesis.........................................................................................................................................5

1.5. Organisation of the Study........................................................................................................6

CHAPTER TWO............................................................................................................................7

2. Explaining One Party Dominance in Africa ......... ....................................................... 6

2.1. Dominant Party Systems and Single Party Dominance……………………………………………7

2.2. Roots of One-Party Dominance…………………………………………………………….11

2.2.1. Institutional Factors…………………………………………………………………………………...12

2.2.2. Ethno-political Cleavages…………………………………………………………………………….14

2.2.3. Historical Legacy………………………………………………………………………………15

CHAPTER THREE……………………………………………………………………………………...17

3. EPRDF as a Dominant Party……………………………………………………………….. .17

3.1. Electoral Dominance……………………………………………………………………………...18

3.2. Bargaining Position……………………………………………………………………………….19

3.3. Governmental Dominance………………………………………………………………………..20

CHAPTER FOUR……………………………………………………………………………………….21

4. From TPLF to EPRDF: The Political Legacy of the Rul ing Party……………………..22

4.1. TPLF as a reformist Guerilla Movement (1975-1989)…………………………………………...22

4.2. EPRDF and the Emergence of One Party Dominance (1991-1994)……………………………...26

CHAPTER FIVE…………………………………………………………………………………………29

5. The Historical Legacy of TPLF/EPRDF and its Post Li beration Political Dominance: Is there a Link?................................... ...........................................................................30

5.1. Ideology…………………………………………………………………………………………..30

5.2. Organization and Operation………………………………………………………………………35

5.3. The Legacy of Governance in ‘Liberated’ Areas…………………………………………………41

Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………………………47 References……………………………………………………………………………………………………50

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CHAPTER ONE

1. Introduction

1.1.Statement of the Problem

After 20 years since the fall of the former communist military-backed regime (popularly known

as ‘Derg’) in 1991, political power in Ethiopia has remained a prerogative of a single party—the

Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Although the TPLF/EPRDF1-led

regime has introduced a number of liberalization measures from the outset including multiparty

elections, regime change has proved to be elusive in the country in the face of an incumbency

which continued to maintain its electoral dominance for long. According to Chege (2007:36),

“Ethiopia is most accurately described as a one dominant-coalition party state.” Like many other

African cases of stalled transitions, the four national multiparty elections conducted in Ethiopia

since 1995 did little to change the ruling party’s dominance. EPRDF’s share of parliamentary

seats has never dropped below 80 % while the largest opposition could only manage to claim

0.2 %, 1.5%, 20%, and 0.2% of the seats in the national elections held in 1995, 2000, 2005 and

2010 respectively (Hagmann, 2010:4).

The EPRDF took control of the Ethiopian state after wagging a protracted albeit successful

armed struggle for 17 years. The party is an alliance of four ethnic-based groups, including the

Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO), the Amhara National Democratic Movement

(ANDM), the South Ethiopian People’s Democratic Front (SEPDF) and the Tigray People’s

Liberation Front (TPLF). All four regional-ethnic parties were created by TPLF which represents

the Tigrayan ethnic minority but had the military upper hand in overthrowing the Derg regime.

TPLF remains a formidable force within the EPRDF coalition.

1 TPLF/EPRDF is used in this study to emphasize the firm control of TPLF over the EPRDF coalition in which TPLF is a

member. Nonetheless, the reference is still EPRDF.

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Studies indicate that TPLF/EPRDF has created a hegemonic authoritarian state over its two

decades rule in Ethiopia with an ideological dispensation and political behavior contradictory to

liberal democratic principles (Vaughan, 2003; Asnake, 2010). These contradictions have mainly

to do with its political philosophies of democratic centralism and revolutionary democracy that

have become the bulwarks of the regime’s hegemonic control and survival. According to a recent

study by the International Crisis Group, the regime has instituted a mode of governance forged

out of an ‘unholy alliance’ between political decentralization and democratic centralization

which is symptomatic of “a dual dynamics...: a more visible, formally decentralized state

structure and a more discreet but effective capture of the state by the EPRDF and its affiliated

regional parties” (ICG, 2009:27).

The regime’s hegemonic status is further documented by Asnake (2010:12) who argues, “the

Ethiopian state, despite reforms towards ethnic federalism, has remained centralist authoritarian

in a manner reminiscent of previous regimes”. Similarly, Fantini (2007:8) utilizes the label

“authoritarian ethnic federalism” to depict the tight control exercised by central authorities over

the lower orders of governance. The EPRDF relies on total control of the state bureaucracy, not

only because it wants to cling to power, but because public resources are the main patronage it

can provide to its followers (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003). A well-organized party network

extends from the federal to the regional, from the regional to the ‘woreda’ (district), and from the

woreda to the ‘kebelle’ (smallest administrative unit) levels.

The apparent ideological contradiction is also reflected in the regime’s policies that uphold the

merits of a ‘strong’ and highly interventionist state contrary to the expressed commitments to

free market principles. Asnake (2010), for example, states that the ruling party is in an

“irreconcilable ideological contradiction” as it “advocates capitalism, yet retains a strong state

role in the economy, including government land holding, and limits to individual liberties.”

Vaughan (2003:83), on her part, points to EPRDF’s use of “Revolutionary democracy” as an

“attempt to reconcile the TPLF socialist legacy with global capitalism and market liberalism”. In

her views, the party employed this ideological variant to simply justify the need for the

leadership of a strong party with economic and political muscle as evidenced from the extensive

involvement of EPRDF-affiliated firms in the Ethiopian economy.

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A number of research findings indicate single party dominance in Africa could be explained by

specific historical, contextual and institutional factors in which concerned political parties have

evolved and operated. Mozaffar and Scarritt (2005:406) explain the strange cohabitation of ‘low

fragmentation’ and ‘high volatility’ in the African world of party systems with the continent’s

historical legacies, social as well as institutional contexts. Doorenspleet and Nijzink (2011) on

their part relate party dominance with enduring historical legacies of party systems and ruling

parties in African states. Basedau (2005) has studied the causes of single party dominance in 38

party systems involving dominant and non-dominant parties. His finding identifies ‘coercive’

party origin and prior authoritarian political environment as major causative factors accounting

for party dominance in 30 (more than two thirds) of the cases investigated. Similarly, Salih (2007)

invokes the liberation movement history of political parties, their revolutionary/Marxist ideology

and their autocratic tendencies as explanatory factors for authoritarian one-party dominance in

many Africa countries.

However, the link between the historical legacy of EPRDF and its current political dominance

has not so far been studied in a systematic and detailed manner although such an approach would

have helped to reveal important insights in to the party’s nature, motivations and instruments of

dominance. Most recent research work in the area mainly focused on issues of federalism, albeit

a limited number of studies have been conducted linking authoritarianism, ethnicity, federalism,

political culture and ideology in Ethiopia. Prominent among the latter include a study by Lovise

Aalen (2002) on “Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State,” Sara Vaughan’s (2003) work on

ethnicity and power, and Jon Abbink’s (2006) article linking elections (the 2005 Ethiopian

election), democracy and political culture. Yet, their perspectives were too broad and their

findings were barely relevant for explaining the roots of party dominance in Ethiopia.

Given this background, the observed empirical gap necessitates a study which could objectively

explore the causal relationship between TPLF/EPRDF’s legacy as an armed insurgency and its

current political dominance so as to come up with further insights about political actors and

democratic transitions. This study therefore seeks to explore the stated link.

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1.2.Research Questions

Overall, the thesis sets out to answer the following question:

� How did the historical legacy of EPRDF contribute to its current political dominance?

With a view to address the general question indicated above, the study probes in to the specific

questions presented below.

o Could its origin as a liberation/guerilla movement influenced its desire and tactics

for establishing and maintaining one-party dominance?

o Is the political ideology of the party relevant to explain its success in ensuring

dominance?

o Has the party’s origin (in relation to the coalition’s strong and senior partner,

TPLF) as an insurgency from the minority ethnic Tigrean constituency influenced

its action to ensure and maintain its political dominance?

o Did its past leadership and governance styles and mechanisms affect its current

practices to vie for absolute dominance in Ethiopian politics?

o Have the reform measures it carried out after taking power helped it to establish

and maintain its dominance?

o How has it overall approached and executed the reform and transition process

after coming to power?

1.3.Methodology

As an exploratory study, a qualitative research technique would be utilized to collect, interpret

and analyze data. Two methods of investigation, namely secondary data and case study would be

specifically employed for the research using a hybrid empirical-analytical approach common in

political sciences. Secondary data from such sources as books, scientific journals, magazines,

files and records (from open and/or closed sources) would be utilized.

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As the focus of the thesis is on studying the causal link between historical origin and one-party

dominance relating to the Ethiopian case (EPRDF), a thorough investigation in to the historical

legacies of the EPRDF from its early days as a rebel movement until its post liberation

dominance would be made. This requires an in-depth study in to the political development of the

party, its organization and leadership as well as its management, strategies and interaction with

various political and community actors using a case study approach. This is supported by

Newman (2000:32) who points out that in case study research, researchers examine in depth

many features of a case or cases over a duration of time.

1.4.Hypothesis

The study seeks to test the following two related hypothesis in the case of the Ethiopian People’s

Revolutionary Democratic Front:

a) A reformist rebel movement is more likely to create one-party dominance post-liberation if it

succeeds in its armed struggle because the key objective of the group is state building.

b) The narrower support base/ethnic representation a reformist insurgency has, the more it

endeavors for political dominance post-liberation.

Justification:

It is indicated in the works of political scientists that a party’s historical background as a rebel

movement affects its post liberation political behavior, especially the higher probability of it

transforming in to a dominant party. According to Metelits (2007), rebel movements pursue a

strategy of political domination and control over communities in order to mobilize sufficient

human, material and financial resources for their war efforts. This legacy in turn influences the

political behavior of these groups post liberation (Ibid). As such, the theory of political party

dominance emphasizes the significance of a political party’s historical roots to explain its

subsequent political behavior. According to Peters (1998:150), one of the purposes of conducting

a case study relates to its possible use as a “Plausibility Probe” which helps to explore the

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relevance/plausibility of a concept by employing a particular case. Therefore, the study seeks to

assess the applicability of the above hypothesis using the case of the EPRDF.

1.5.Organization of the Study

The rest of the paper is organized under five chapters. Chapter two discusses the theoretical and

empirical issues relating to the nature and roots of one-party dominance in Africa. Chapter three

defines the standards with which EPRDF’s dominance could be established. The political history

of TPLF and later EPRDF is discussed in chapter four. The section on EPRDF mainly deals with

the instruments employed by the party to establish its early political dominance. Chapter five

assesses the link between TPLF’s historical legacy as a guerilla movement and its post-liberation

dominance as a ruling party. The chapter analyses the front’s ideological and organizational

legacies as well as its approaches to local governance to determine the impact of TPLF’s

background on the domineering political behavior and practices of the ruling TPLF/EPRDF.

Finally, the concluding section summarizes the findings, and determines the link between

historical legacy and political dominance in the case of TPLF/EPRDF.

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CHAPTER TWO

2. Theoretical Discussion: Explaining One-Party Dominance in Africa

A large majority of ruling parties in Africa seem to have effectively shielded themselves from

the “democratic anomaly” commonly experienced by party systems in consolidated democracies.

Based on his study in to African party systems, Basedau (2005:22) concludes “one-party

dominance is the central feature of party systems in Africa” unlike cases elsewhere. His finding,

up on analyzing 38 country cases in a 15 year period beginning 1990, shows more than half of

the party systems investigated belong to the ‘dominant’ category. Similarly, Carbone (2007)

describes one-party dominance in Africa as a political puzzle characterizing the continent’s third

wave reform processes. Contrary to expectations of fragmented party systems to prevail in Africa,

the reality rather reveals a trend “towards dominant and predominant party systems” (Erdmann

and Basedau, 2007).

One-Party dominance in Africa therefore remains an enduring dilemma in party system research

as political scientists continue to grapple with the explanatory variables as well as the specific

features and nature of single party dominance at the various categories and stages of the evolving

party system in different regimes. Having largely drawn from the European/ Western discourse,

a number of studies have endeavored to explain dominance and determine the significance of key

variables put forth by the mainstream party system theory in an African context.

The section below first presents the theoretical and empirical determinants of dominance. It then

moves on to discussing the relevance of key explanatory variables of party dominance in the

broader literature on Africa. Finally, it captures the link between dominance and historical legacy

as the latter causes the former, from both a theoretical and empirical perspective.

2.1.Dominant Party Systems and Single-Party-Dominance

Friedman and Wong (2008:4) attach particular importance to dominant party systems not only as

a “sub-set of political systems cross-cutting the authoritarian-democracy divide,” but also as a

subject of comparative politics that made “a re-conceptualization of political systems and their

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transitions” possible. In a political environment in which a relation of dominance and

competition coexist, it is often a challenge to determine the nature of competition and the

trajectories of a democratic transition. As such, dominant party systems are often emphasized

from the point of view of their effects on the degree of democratic quality and democratic

consolidation in both authoritarian and democratic political systems besides their potential

impacts on on-going democratization processes.

Having borrowed from Sartori’s definition, Bogaards (2004:177) conceptualizes a dominant

party system as one in which “a dominant party effectively determines ‘the system of

interactions resulting from inter-party competition’.” The work of Sartori (1976) on African

Party Systems is especially notable as he provides a separate typology on African party systems

which is critical not only to understand party system development in Africa but also to capture

the authoritarian-democratic divide in the political system. He identifies between two stages of

party system development, namely initial (fluid) and structured (crystallized) stages based on the

degree of the system’s embeddedness (existence of well entrenched mass party) in society which

many African party systems are indicated to be wanting.

Single party dominance is not a political feature exclusive to undemocratic contexts but also a

political reality in democracies; and hence Sartori’s (1976) ‘dominant authoritarian’ and

‘dominant non-authoritarian’ typology applies. Carbone (2007:14), for example, discusses the

confusion surrounding the use of the term ‘dominance’ in African politics as such: “some may be

properly referred to as “dominant parties”, but others are in reality full-fledged ‘hegemonic

parties’ (that is, ‘authoritarian dominant parties’). While the former notion relates to a situation

that is fundamentally competitive, the latter is about non-competitive systems”.

Erdmann and Basedau (2008) operationalize the concept of institutionalization using indicators

to determine whether the party system have reached the structured stage. These include a

minimum of three consecutive election episodes, uninterrupted democratic rule without violent

conflict, etc., a value of volatility not exceeding 40, and a minimum party age of 15 (Erdmann

and Basedau, 2008:245). Accordingly, their findings underscore highly fragmented systems in

Africa to be largely a myth as “dominant and predominant party systems are prevalent, even in

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institutionalized party systems in a democratic environment.” The reality appear to be

symptomatic of Spiess’s (2009:14-15) views which asserts that as long as party system

development goes hand in hand with democratization and reform processes in transitional

periods, the party system may assume increasing political roles but likely remain fragile and

liable to manipulation by political elites.

Similarly, Sartory’s typology underlines the largely fluid nature of African party systems, and

categorizes these polities in to dominant authoritarian, dominant non-authoritarian, non-

dominant non-authoritarian and pulverized party systems. An essential category for our purpose

is the dominant authoritarian system where single party dominance is sustained through different

forms of suppression and manipulation in an effort of circumscribing effective contestation while

the semblance of electoral democracy is maintained. Further, Sartori distinguishes between a

number of party systems from hegemonic authoritarian through to variants of fragmented,

polarized and atomized types in his structured category.

In the context of an in-depth qualitative case study research, Spiess’s (2009) recommends the

adoption of an analytical purview that goes beyond the discussion of ‘fragmentation’ and

‘polarization’ thesis in the context of transition societies including those in Africa. Her premise

relates to the need to explore the “distinct qualities of the party system that represent its

mobilizational, organizational and process-related aspects” to come to grips with its unique traits

and mode of operation (Spiess’s, 2009:14). She specifically details the necessity to probe in to

the following key aspects of the party system’s:

a. Linkage strategies including clientelist versus programmatic, patronage-based versus

transformative;

b. Intraparty organization such as functional accommodative versus centralist;

c. Style of politics, viz. consensual versus confrontational, delegitmative versus cooperative,

and;

d. Rhetorical strategy and policy options including ideological versus pragmatic.

(Spiess, 2009:14)

Party dominance has been established differently by different scholars using varied criteria.

Bogaards (2004:174-175), for instance, establishes party dominance based on four yardsticks:

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dominance threshold, system inclusiveness (to the opposition), ‘divided government’ (in

presidential systems), and duration of incumbency. Similarly, Basedau (2005:2) describes

Pempel’s (1990) defining criteria as composed of four elements of political dominance: the

party’s numerical dominance, its bargaining power, dominance of tenure, and dominant position

in controlling state power. Boggards (2004) summarizes the specific standards used by scholars

to operationalize their definitions of party dominance in a tabular form as follows.

Table 1. Definitions of dominant parties

Column1 Column2 Column3 Column4 Column5 Column6 Column7 Column8

Author(s) Coleman

Van de

Valle &

Butler

Ware

Predomin

ant

Sartori

(pre)

dominant

Ware

dominantBlondel Pempel

Threshold

of

Dominance

70% (seats) 60% (seats) 50% (seats) 50% (seats)40-50%

(seats)

40-50%

(votes)

Plurality

(votes &

seats)

Opposition Dispersed Divided

Several

Smaller

parties

Multiple

Opposition

helpful

Inferior

bargaining

position

President

No divided

governmen

t

Duration

Analysis

limitted to

single

selection

Analysis

limitted to

single

selection

Permanent

Three

consequitiv

e elections

Dominant

Party

should win

usually

Analysis

over

twenty

year period

Substantial

period

Source: Boggards (2004:176)

As could be seen from the table, the definitions assign different values to the four variables of

dominance based on differing contextual and conceptual grounds. Boggards (2004) singles out

Van de Valle and Buttler’s (1999), Coleman’s (1960) as well as Sartori’s (1976) classical

definition as suitable for use in an African context. Leaving the argument on the merits of

employing specific values aside, many researchers support combined approaches involving

Sartorie’s 50% “natural” thresholds and ‘three consecutive terms’ criteria, Boggards criteria of

governmental dominance (monopoly), as well as Coleman’s and Ware’s principles of

dispersed/fragmented opposition (Carbone, 2007; Boggards, 2004; Basedau, 2005).

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As indicated above, political scientists recommend the use of qualitative criteria besides

quantitative variables such as electoral dominance to understand single party dominance in the

context of specific case study research. A number of qualitative standards could then be used that

emphasize on the distribution of power within the party system (not just number of parties),

horizontal and vertical aspects of interaction (viz. within the system, to society, state structure,

political and social system) as well as the inherent drive of the dominant party to create an image

of grandeur (Spiess, 2009). The conceptual discussion conducted here would be later employed

in the next chapter to explain the case of EPRDF as may be appropriate.

2.2.Roots of One-Party Dominance

Scholars concede that single party dominance constitutes one of the least investigated subjects in

African politics, especially in relation to its causative factors (Erdmann & Basedau, 2007;

Carbone, 2007; Doorenspleet and Nijzink, 2011). According to Basedau (2005) recent studies

focus rather on methodological questions such as the definition and the operationalization of

one-party dominance.

In the specific African context, it is Nicolas van de Walle (2002) who has attempted to provide

the most comprehensive set of, albeit tentative explanations for one-party dominance. He names

as “incentives for one-party dominance” the illiberal nature of most of the countries, the

characteristic centralization of power around the presidency and the pervasive clientelism that

structures the relationship between the state and its citizenry. Mozaffar and Scarritt’s (2005)

study has indicated that the high prevalence of dominant party systems (and low fragmentation)

might be explained by the institutional legacies of authoritarian regimes in the formation and

development of political parties.

Dominant parties and hegemonic parties (or “authoritarian dominant parties”) normally emerge

following different causal paths. As Basedau (2005:26) puts it: “authoritarian dominant parties

play foul and are typically characterized by a coercive historical origin [armed conflicts, military

coup or single partism], a strongly presidential system of government and poor socio-economic

and political governance.” On the other hand, non authoritarian dominant parties show less

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violent and coercive historical origins and tend to benefit from a favourable performance and/or

a combination of socio-political cleavages and electoral institutions. A number of factors are

generally attributed to the emergence and sustenance of single-party dominance, yet quite a few

of them have been found to have a significant impact in the African context. A brief review is

made below to look in to the merits of some of the key variables to explaining party dominance

in Africa.

2.2.1. Institutional Factors

The classical institutional discourse regards the choice of specific electoral systems and systems

of government (systems governing legislative-executive power relations) to have significant

contribution to the emergence of one-party dominance/dominant party systems. A number of

empirical research findings in the field, however, question the relevance of the institutional

hypothesis to explaining one-party-dominance in Africa (Basedau, 2005; Lindberg, 2005). The

following review on the two oft-cited institutional factors serves to provide a bird’s eye view of

the issue involved.

a) Electoral System

The mainstream thinking about the impact of the electoral system on the party system is

informed by the level of proportionality or disproportionality the different electoral principles

might produce while translating votes in to seats. Consequently, the specific legislative electoral

system may have reductive influences on the number of legislative parties on the one hand, and

may create asymmetries in the balance of the party system on the other (Golder, 2004).

Majoritarian systems are generally associated with disproportionate outcomes, and hence

premised on the logic of creating stable legislative majorities (governance capacity) while PR

systems are believed to maintain proportional representation in the system, and as such assumed

to be ideal for ensuring representative justice (Basedau, 2005; Golder, 2004; Lindberg, 2005).

Thus what generally follows is that disproportional electoral systems such as first-past-the-post

principles provide fertile grounds for the emergence of single-party dominance whereas

proportional ones result in fragmentation.

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Nevertheless, Basedau (2005:7) has found no significant correlation between electoral systems

and party dominance in Africa as “one party system occurs in all kinds of electoral systems,” and

that “artificial majorities are rare in African party systems.” Similarly, Golder (2004) has reached

the same conclusion after his study finds limited causality between the number of effective

parties and the degree of district magnitude in African electoral systems. His overall assessment

was that “electoral institutions do not (yet) have the same impact on the number of parties in

Africa as they do in other regions of the world.” (Ibid: 13) The limited explanatory value of

electoral systems to understand one-party dominance in Africa has also led Doorenspleet and Lia

Nijzink (2011) to suggest the use of a combination of electoral variables such as incentive

structures, funding and registration of parties instead of adopting a minimalist perspective on

electoral systems.

b) System of Governance

Owing to specific adherence to minimalist or maximalist definitions, scholars diverge as to the

nature and institutional features of government prevailing in Africa. Many indicate the prevailing

form of government in African to be presidential with a relatively small number of countries

adopting semi-presidential and parliamentary systems. An important criterion employed here

relates to the power of the president “to select and determine the survival of government”

regardless of whether the president being directly or indirectly elected (Golder, 2004:7). On the

other hand, others argue, “most African political systems represent a ‘hybrid’ type, in the sense

that they combine elements of presidential and parliamentary systems of government.” (van

Cranenburgh, 2011:4). At issue is lack of separation of power between the legislative and

executive branches expected of presidential systems as, for instance, the president controls the

cabinet as well as the executive.

Despite perspectives on the prevailing institutional anomaly, however, both underline the

disproportionate balance of power vested on the presidency in African systems leading van

Cranenburgh’s characterization of ‘hyperpresidential systems’ (Ibid: 4). As the concentration of

power in the hands of the president provides excessive decree/agenda power, and facilitates

increased access to state resources, scholars point to the need to inquire after whether the strong

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presidential systems may have contributed for the prevalence of dominant parties in Africa

(Basedau, 2005; Doorenspleet and Nijzink, 2011). Basedau discusses possible claims associated

with the attributes of strong presidency including (concentration) effects on patterns of voter

behavior, access to state resources, and influence in setting electoral arrangements, especially

relating to design of electoral systems and election schedules (Ex. Concurrence).

Nevertheless, Basedau’s finding indicates no significant evidence to justify that strong

presidentialism, and even parliamentarism contributed to the entrenchment of dominant parties in

Africa. Similarly, Doorenspleet and Nijzink (2011:9) conclude “these variations of the

institutional arrangements of parliamentary versus presidential or semi-presidential

systems…have little influence on the patterns of one-party dominance”.

2.2.2. Ethno-political Cleavages

Despite the growing importance of cleavages relating to class, profession, ideology and way of

life, etc. in modern African societies, ethnicity, especially politicized ethnicity has been regarded

as key to shaping evolving party structures in Africa. A reliance on the generic thesis would thus

lead to an assumption that the prevailing ethnic fragmentation in Africa may result in the

development of fragmented party systems in the continent owing to its effect on voting behavior

(Lindberg, 2005). Yet, as extensively discussed in earlier sections, this is hardly the case in

contemporary party system constellations in Africa.

Recent scholarship has it that the nature of ethnic identity and its effect on African party systems

are much more elusive than suggested by the conventional discourse. The issue becomes the

more complicated while considered against the practical difficulty of ethnic identification in

Africa; the cross cutting nature of ethnic allegiances; and issues pertaining to the fluid nature of

ethnic identities. Norris and Mattes (2003) find that ethnicity does play key role in determining

support for ruling parties, but that ethnicity is not always the primary cleavage in African polities.

Bannon, Miguel, and Posner (2004) demonstrate that there is no simple relationship between

ethnic fractionalization and the likelihood that individuals will identify themselves first and

foremost in ethnic terms. While notwithstanding its potential explanatory value in combination

- 15 -

with other variables, Basedau (2005) is also quite explicit in stating the inadequacy of ethnicity

to understand party dominance in Africa.

Despite quite contrary to the conventional thesis, Mazaffar, Scarritt and Galaich (2003), however,

demonstrate that both ethno-political fragmentation and the geographical concentration of ethnic

groups are important factors in explaining the number of political parties. Their finding states

that fragmentation alone produces a reductive effect on the number of parties despite its

incremental effect when interacts with concentration (Ibid: 1). Further, they explain the role of

ethno-political cleavages in leveraging the effect of highly disproportional as well as

proportional electoral systems on party structures. Yet, per Basedau’s (2005) study to test their

claim, the link between the variables appears worthwhile but lacks quantitative significance.

2.2.3. Historical Legacy

According to Basedau (2005:20), historical background provides “the best explanatory value” to

understand the emergence of one-party dominance in Sub Saharan Africa. Similarly

Doorenspleet and Nijzink (2011) confirm that the endurance of one-party dominant systems is

highly related to the historical background of the party systems in Africa’s modern democracies

and the history of the current ruling parties. Yet, the level of violence characterizing the struggle,

or the mode of transition varies for the various movement regimes, and the nature of transition

differs accordingly.

Dorman (2006) identifies between those post-movement regimes that came to power through a

negotiated settlement after an armed resistance, and those that controlled state power at the barrel

of the gun. Despite later reversal of gains in the case of Zimbabwe, the combined effect of ‘bush

war’ and international pressure led to multiracial elections and the negotiated removal of settler

rule in Zimbabwe in 1980, Namibia in 1990 and South Africa in 1994. In contrast, second-phase

liberation movements that seized power in Uganda in 1986, Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1991, and

Rwanda in 1994 were relatively free to singlehandedly implement their reformist agenda and

shape their respective states in their own images (Saleh, 2007). As Dorman (2006:1097)

- 16 -

elaborates “The goal of liberation movements was not just to seize power, but also to reshape the

state.”

As Leys and Saul (1994:146) remark, there is a distinct possibility that “the very process of

struggling for liberation, especially by resort to force of arms, may generate political practices

that prefigure undemocratic outcomes in the wake of revolutionary success”. Many liberation

movements have a clear and well articulated ideology that has been honed in the bush to attract

recruits and civilian supporters, as well as for presentation to the media and academics (Ibid.).

Particular forms, norms and practices of rule are developed in ‘liberated zones’.

As Dorman (2006) relates prolonged warfare leads to the development of hierarchies, hardship

and brutality have been experienced, and links with external supporters and arms dealers have

been strengthened. These factors continue to influence the style of governance, institutional

forms and relations with civilian populations ‘post-liberation’. But other factors also matter—the

nature of the transition, the character of the state against which the revolution has occurred, the

reaction of the former incumbents and the international array of forces (Ibid.).

Overall, most post liberation movements including EPRDF are indicated to have exhibited leftist,

populist ideologies; bear tensions arising out of conflicts between liberation and democracy,

harbor a feeling of ownership of the state and the nation (legitimacy to rule), a tendency to

centralize and dominate power, and related political behaviors which are distinct from other

political actors and formations (Dorman, 2006, Basedau, 2005; Saleh, 2007; Doorenspleet and

Nijzink, 2011).

While notwithstanding research efforts including those reviewed here, it wouldn’t be

inappropriate to share Basedau’s (2005) reasoning that research in this topic is at its “stage of

infancy,” and that “in depth country case studies will contribute to a better understanding of

exact mechanisms and dynamics of emergence and maintenance of one-party dominance.” It is

thus against this circumstances that the thesis is conceived. The concepts reviewed here would

help to analyze factors related to EPRDF’s historical legacy that contributed to the party’s

dominance in post-liberation Ethiopian politics.

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CHAPTER THREE

3. EPRDF as a Dominant Party

Despite a long history of statehood, multiparty politics is a recent experience in Ethiopia that

only came in to existence following EPRDF’s ascent to power in 1991. Previous elections under

the imperial regime constituted no-party competitions among ruling elites while subsequent

elections under the socialist regime were carried out in a context of a one party state. Up on

assuming power, the EPRDF allowed party formation and multiparty completion, albeit in a

much circumscribed political environment. As noted by Arriola (2008:118), there is little

disagreement as regards the intention of EPRDF to entrench itself in power by expanding its

influence to every ethno regional cleavage with an ethnic congress, “even if meant competing

with, and even supplanting, its erstwhile allies in the fight against Mengistu Haile Mariam’s

military backed regime.” That remains the norm to this day, and constitutes the subject of this

study.

On the basis of discussions in preceding sections, and drawing from Green’s (2006:4) and Spiess

(2009:12) definitions of one-party-dominance, the study assigns the following definition to

operationalise the concept of a dominant party in the Ethiopian political context:

“A dominant party is a political party that maintains executive and legislative dominance

for at least three consecutive elections winning an absolute majority of popular seats in

minimally competitive elections wherein the party dominates government, policy making,

public opinion, political competition and discourse.”

Therefore, it is essential to critically assess EPRDF’s position in the party system using criteria

stated in the above definition. The most important aspects of the definition are electoral

dominance, bargaining position, and governmental dominance. The analysis uses these three

variables to establish the party’s dominant position in the system.

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3.1.Electoral Dominance

As stated in earlier sections, electoral dominance could be explained using share of total votes

and seats in consecutive elections. Yet, given the lack of data on vote shares in Ethiopian

elections, legislative seat shares are only factored in to our definition. Accordingly, threshold for

seats is set at above 50 % (50+1 %), and the minimum tenure is fixed at three consecutive

elections, which in the Ethiopian case is equivalent to 15 years and above.

Ethiopia has conducted four national elections following its transition period and the adoption of

its new constitution in 1995. The Ethiopian constitution provides for a parliamentary system with

an elected legislature and a premier appointed by the legislature (lower house) (Ethiopian

Constitution, 1995). Thus, legislative elections are held every five years in 547 ethnically-

determined districts using the plurality formula in Single Member Constituencies (SMCs)

(Ishiyama, 2009). Table 2 summarizes the results of the four consecutive elections held in

Ethiopia since 1995.

Table 2: Election results of EPRDF and the Opposition from 1995-2010

Source: Compiled based on data from Arriola (2008) and Hagmann (2010)

PartyElection

YearSeat Share

Voter

Turn Out

(%)

1995 528 82.9

2000 534 90

2005 373 90

2010 545 90

1995 19 82.9

2000 13 90

2005 174 90

2010 2 90

EPRDF & its

affiliates

Opposition

and

Independen

ts

- 19 -

As displayed in the table, EPRDF has managed to claim more than three quarters of the seats

with 95 per cent of the corresponding votes in three of the four consecutive elections excepting

the 2005 election. The 2005 election episode saw a relatively reduced seat share for the ruling

EPRDF although it still maintained its absolute dominance. In such a highly asymmetrical

scenario that lasted more than 20 years, some researchers even prefer to talk of hegemony than

dominance. According to Roessler and Howard (2006: 110), for instance, “If the winning party

or candidate received more than 70% of the popular vote or 70% of the seats in parliament in the

previous election, we code the regime as hegemonic”. Donno (2011) further adds a more benign

criteria relating to tenure than adopted by this study which categorizes authoritarian regimes

staying in power for more than ten years as ‘hegemonic authoritarian’. However, it is suffice for

our case to establish EPRDF’s dominance based on the first criteria employed herein, namely

electoral dominance.

3.2.Bargaining Position

In order to explain the bargaining position of EPRDF to maintain its dominance, our earlier

conceptual discussion guides us to direct the analytical emphasis in to the party’s horizontal

interaction with the opposition, and its vertical links with state, society and relevant political

forces. What comes up first in the nature of EPRDF’s interaction with opposition parties in

Ethiopia is that the party continues to impose an exceedingly hierarchical interactive framework,

and exploit the prevailing mutual distrust and antipathy to marginalize the opposition (Merera,

2007). As it controls not only all branches of government at the national level but also the entire

constituent regions and local and grassroots administrative units of government, the party has

succeeded in establishing a highly centralized and hegemonic rule in the country. In line with its

Marxist conformity-seeking orientation, it appears to regard the opposition as a threat to its

continued power and reformist vision. As maintained by Chege (2007:35) , “to the extent that the

formation of political parties in Ethiopia has been permitted, their freedom to operate has been so

circumscribed that none of them has had even a remote chance of competing with the EPRDF.”

It therefore tends to largely employ suppressive and delegitimizing strategies rather than

inclusionary and reconciliatory ones to retain its unchallenged status. The opposition itself

- 20 -

contributes to the maintenance of the status quo as it largely remained divided over ideology and

strategy and failed as a credible force with policy alternatives to mount an organized campaign,

communicate its agenda and mobilize support (Harbeson, 2005). Owing to its sole command

over military, political and economic apparatus and resources of the state, the ruling party resorts

to establish new, like minded party affiliates and/or form countervailing ‘phony parties’ to

augment its position and discredit relatively strong contenders (Abbink, 2006).

As noted by Merera (2011:8), the strategy of forming People’s Democratic Organizations (PDOs)

helped the party “to speak through the mouths of other ethnic groups as well as win elections and

rule the country in the name of ‘all the peoples of Ethiopia’”. The establishment of ANDM,

OPDO and SEPDF as members of the EPRDF congress-coalition at different times by TPLF

could serve as a case in point. As such, the party has been able to ensure its absolute dominance

through suppression, divide and rule tactics, delegitimization, expansion and entrenching the

ethnic congress through new ethno-regional party formations and affiliates.

As regards its broader relations to society and societal forces, the party has been active in

membership recruitments, and the creation and maintenance of loyalty through political

mobilization and patronage. The party maintains an extended cadre network connected to each

locality, and continues to operate mass organizations like women and youth associations (ICG,

2009). It strategically ties major national policies such as land policy, and public interventions

activities including input supplies and relief programs to continued political support and loyalty

at local level (Human Rights Watch, 2010). Broader societal support and political allegiance has

also been promoted through a successful fusion of the state and the party. The party’s drive for

dominance as well informs its elite cooptation strategy through the maintenance of political

patronage.

3.3.Governmental Dominance

Some scholars rebuke EPRDF of degenerating Ethiopian politics in to a de facto one party state

system. The highly centralized party structure of the EPRDF is being blamed for permeating the

federal structure, and distorting its decentralized features as well as the very essence of

- 21 -

autonomy and self-administration (Tronvoll, 2010). The party dominates the public policy

agenda and monopolizes developmental discourse and initiatives (Merera, 2011). Civil society

and media are largely forced to refrain from the articulation and promotion of societal interests.

Criticism against the party and its grand vision amounts to an antisocial and anti-

transformational conspiration directed at the state (Hagman, 2010).

Hagman convincingly demonstrates how EPRDF’s dominance has evolved during the last 20

years from commanding a monopoly over political power to include a monopoly over shaping

developmental discourse. He notes EPRDF’s continuous framing and reframing of its

legitimatizing discourse from its initial ‘No development without democracy” rhetoric through to

the subsequent “No democracy without development” claim and finally to “No development

without stability” thesis (Ibid: 6-7). By controlling public agenda, thus, the party’s dominance

has been justified through an evolving discourse depending on changing political reality.

Therefore, legitimacy does not reside with people but continually molded by the party on behalf

of its subjects.

Therefore, by all conservative measures, be it quantitative or qualitative parameters, or both,

EPRDF constitutes a ‘dominant party’. If we are to take Donno’s (2011) criteria stated in 3.1

above seriously, it could further be possible to characterize EPRDF as ‘hegemonic authoritarian’.

- 22 -

CHAPTER FOUR

4. From TPLF to EPRDF: The Political Legacy of the Ruling Party

Following its successive military victories against the Derg/Ethiopian army in the late 1980s and

its control of more areas beyond Tigray, analysts note, the TPLF saw the necessity to create a

multiethnic coalition with EPDM (now ANDM) to lead the struggle at the broader national stage

(Young, 1994). The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) was therefore

established in 1989 as a joint front between TPLF and the then Ethiopian People’s Democratic

Movement (EPDM), now ANDM, which itself was formed in 1979 with TPLF’s sponsorship.

The Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO) followed suit in joining the coalition

after its formation in 1990 by ethnic Oromo prisoners of war under TPLF’s custody. The last

coalition partner to join the ranks of the EPRDF was the Southern Ethiopia People’s Democratic

Front (SEPDF) which was established by the EPRDF in 1994 to create an ethno-regional party

representing diverse ethnic groups in Southern Ethiopia.

As a senior partner to the coalition and a major sponsor of the parties constituting it, it is the

TPLF whose case would then be of interest to our study. Indeed, its long history as an armed

guerilla movement and its majestic role in post-liberation Ethiopian politics adds to the

significance of its legacy to explaining the roots of EPRDF’s enduring dominance. Accordingly,

the first part of the chapter would dwell in the history of TPLF and assesses the organizational,

operational and programmatic aspects of the front’s history. An analytical approach would be

utilized to review the history of the front in favor of a descriptive-chronological one. The

assessment attempts to mainly look in to: “why and how the armed struggle started?” and “How

the organization evolved and operated?” in relation to the front’s record on political dominance.

4.1.TPLF as a Guerilla Movement (1975-1989)

The TPLF’s saga appears the more adventurous considering the organization’s humble origins.

When TPLF was founded at Dedebit, a remote Western Tigray locality at a distance of 900 km

from the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa, in 1975, it was largely a club of a dozen youthful

university students and school teachers who had neither skills in guerilla warfare nor experience

- 23 -

in political leadership. As noted by Young (1994:168), “the small group of students who first

made up the TPLF were at the bottom of a learning curve on the practicalities of fighting a

revolutionary war.” Young further recounts how the early TPLF turned in to ‘wandering bandits’

trying to create the semblance of a huge military presence across Tigray; and how they employed

a number of kidnappings and hit-and-run tactics to draw local as well as international attention.

However, the founders were of the view that the depth of the problem in Tigray was sufficient to

justify armed struggle and bring more following to the cause of liberating the province from the

grips of the “Amhara-dominated”2 centralist regime. According to the former chairman of the

front, Aregawi Berhe, the reason behind initiating the struggle has to do with the collective

grievances of Tigrayans as a result of domination and discrimination in the hands of the ruling

Amhara; lack of cultural and political autonomy for the region as well as the widespread poverty

and underdevelopment in Tigray (Aregawi, 2004).

Besides heeding to the above triggers, Vaughan (2003) and Young (1994) further make

references to the perceived cultural supremacy among Tigrayans and their resentment over the

loss of their past glory as an Abyssinian center of power during the Axumite period. It would

therefore be cogent to deduce part of the problem emanates from an age old, historical rivalry

between the Amharas and Tigreans for the control of the Ethiopian state. This clearly resulted in

hatred and resentment on the part of Tigreans for having been denied access to the benefits and

privileges of the state for centuries by their arch rivals, the Amharas.

It is instructive to quote the reflections of Walter Plowden made in the 19th century to shade

some light on the nature of the historical rivalry between the two competing ethnic groups:

“Teegray is now almost universally acquainted with the Amharic language, and their customs,

food and dress have become so assimilated to those of the Amharas as not to require separate

description, though their hatred of that people is undiminished (Plowden, 1868 in Vaughan,

2003:157). The historical precedent, among others, could have contributed to the current drive by

TPLF’s elite to rely on the “politics of hate” and maintain dominance in Ethiopian politics.

2 A traditionally dominant (politically) dominant ethnic group inhabiting the central highlands of Ethiopia

accounting for 26% (19.8 million) of Ethiopia’s population according to the 2007 census. (see the online ‘WIKIPEDIA

Free Encyclopedia’ for more at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amhara_people)

- 24 -

Concerning TPLF’s early development, a number of factors are attributed to its transformation

from a severely weak ‘hit-and-run’ group in to an effective fighting force after the late 1970s.

Chief among them include the front’s use of Tigrayan ethno-nationalism to mobilize the masses

(Aregawi, 2008); its strategic decision to establish a strategic alliance with Eritrean People’s

Liberation Front (EPLF); its pursuit of a struggle centered on the peasantry and rural areas

(Young, 1994) as well as the role of its ‘pragmatic’ leadership that led the struggle by combining

ethnic mobilization with Marxist Leninist ideology (Vaughan, 2003).

The TPLF did not take time to approach the EPLF, a force then fighting for the independence of

Eritrea from Ethiopia, in the interest of forging strategic alliance and technical cooperation

(Aregawi, 2008). As a result, it was able to maintain ties with the more established EPLF as far

back as 1975, and obtain its technical support in the training of fighters and the supply of

weapons. More importantly, the alliance facilitated an opportunity for both fronts to coordinate

their military and political activities (Young, 1994).

As one of the major ethno-national groups that advocate the resolution of the ‘National Question’

in Ethiopia through self-determination up to and including secession, TPLF’s mobilisational

strategy was centered on the promotion of Tigrayan nationalism. Owing to its emphasis on the

national question, TPLF initially operated as a separatist-cum-reform movement aiming at both

the cessation of Tigray from Ethiopia and the establishment of the Tigrayan nation on the basis

of ethnicity. When it shaded its separatist stance by mid-1980s, the movement transformed itself

in to a purely reformist insurgency intent on reorganizing the Ethiopian state on ethnic criteria.

Given Tigray’s arguably ‘near ethnic homogeneity’ and the political resentment in some circles,

the organization succeeded in constructing a re-imagined Tigrayan identity (Vaughan, 2003).

The front used various forms of cultural expression including the Tigrayan language, which was

then officially replaced by Amharic as a language of instruction in Tigray schools as well as

local oral traditions, songs and poems to promote a unique identity. Historical symbols,

memories and socioeconomic and political grievances had also been employed to create and

recreate ethnic consciousness (Ibid).

- 25 -

According to Young (1994), the leadership of the TPLF did not only use ethno-nationalism to

attract the peasantry to the struggle. The organization had to convince the peasantry that it was

the only force to rely on, and that it was capable of meeting the needs and demands of farmers.

TPLF proved its military supremacy by defeating its arch multi-nationalist rivals, namely the

Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) and Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP) in 1978,

and endeavored to provide basic public goods especially security and agricultural extension

(Ibid). The TPLF had never allowed another party to operate in Tigray and/or represent the

people of Tigray. Beginning its early days, it endeavored to portray itself as a vanguard party

representing the entire Tigray and its society.

TPLF had been criticized as a movement which is highly secretive and conformity/consensus-

oriented. First, as a political entity operating under strict Marxist-Leninist principles, plurality of

ideas and differences were not tolerable (ICG, 2009). In the occasion of contradicting an

important political principle perceived to be crucial to the organization such as ethno-nationalism,

the action amounts to betrayal against the party. Second, factionalism was not only denounced

but also punished, and often employed as an effective tool by powerful internal actors to drive

their rivals away from the party (McCracken, 2004). Therefore, TPLF leaders, some argue,

would only endure differences and competitions until they achieve their goal but would avenge

any perceived act of confrontation and/or challenge at an opportune moment (Ibid). Therefore,

dominance was to a certain extent maintained through coercion while contractarian (per Metelits,

2007) approaches involving local governance and service delivery were also emphasized.

Consequently, the organization continued to grow in strength throughout the 1980s except the

period of 1984-85 famine which heavily affected the Tigray region. In 1987, Young (1994) notes,

the TPLF reached a conclusion that a balance of power maintained against the Derg, and a

condition of stalemate prevailed after which time the front worked to reverse the balance in its

favor beginning 1988 and 1989. In the end, the long battle drew to its end after the entire Derg

army left Tigray in 1989, and TPLF and its partners finally controlled Addis Ababa in May 1991.

- 26 -

4.2.EPRDF and the Emergence of One-Party-Dominance (1991-1994)

After President Mengistu Hailemariam, the then Ethiopian dictator, fled to Zimbabwe and the

TPLF/EPRDF army moved closer to Addis Ababa, the care taker military administration led by

General Tesfaye Gebrekidan ordered the military to lay down arms and surrender (Paulos, 2003).

The victorious EPRDF army subsequently controlled Addis Ababa in May 1991 in a swift and

largely bloodless offensive. The challenges as well as benefits of state power in the maintenance

of security, rebuilding of the state and effecting political transformation had fallen in the hands

of the EPRDF.

Following its assumption of power, TPLF/EPRDF quickly turned its focus on promoting

political processes and building institutions critical to legitimize and strengthen the party. It

moved to redefine and transform the state in a manner supportive of establishing and entrenching

the party’s political dominance (Aalen, 2002). The party had initially endeavored to reposition

itself through renouncing Marxism-Leninism and adopting free market orthodoxy while making

a quick institutional revision on its party structure. The latter move resulted in the pruning or

liquidation of TPLF’s powerful political wing, the Marxist Leninist League of Tigray (MLLT)

and its replica from EPDM, the Ethiopian Marxist Leninist Force (EMLF). Many TPLF

members are still in the dark as to how the MLLT structure has been mysteriously dissolved

(Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003). With this act of reimaging, the organization endeavored to make

a clear contrast to the previous communist regime while reassuring the international community,

especially the US that it is a (rechristened) democratic force committed to change.

Among the early reform processes carried out by the EPRDF leadership, the June 1991

transitional national conference constitutes an important milestone to both shaping the trajectory

of the democratization process as well as establishing EPRDF’s dominance in the political

system. In no more than a few weeks in to power, EPRDF leaders summoned ethnic parties to a

national conference which would lay the institutional foundation for the envisaged political

system in the country. The conference was attended by close to 30 ethnic parties, and resulted in

the adoption of a Transitional National Charter (TNC), the formation of an 87-member Council

of Representatives (CoR), and the establishment of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia

(TGE) (ICG, 2009).

- 27 -

According to Aalen (2002), the conference had been especially significant to EPRDF for it

served as a major vehicle to legitimize the party as well as institutionalize and implement its

doctrines, programs and visions in the broader political system. Yet, as much as the Charter’s

democratic, human rights and other liberal features have been commended, it was as well

criticized for having institutionalized EPRDF’s doctrine of ethnic federalism at the expense of

other alternatives. For Merera (2011), the outcome amounted to a full endorsement of EPRDF’s

reformist agenda in redefining and governing the Ethiopian state.

The conference’s political outcome was further criticized for the disproportionate allocation of

seats in the unelected CoR in favor of EPRDF. In the views of Vestal (1996), the arrangement

rendered legitimacy to a legislative-cum-executive dominance of TPLF/EPRDF in the TGE. Per

the agreed seat share, 32 were assigned to EPRDF out of a total of 87 seats while only one other

party, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), obtained 12 seats with the rest able to claim for a

meager share ranging from 1 to 3 seats each (Aalen, 2002). EPRDF’s power was further

strengthened with its control of most cabinet positions in the executive including the position of

the chief-executive (the interim president) as well as key cabinet posts such as defense and

foreign affairs, facilitating the early emergence of one-party dominance.

Many thus blame the ruling party for maneuvering the design of the process to suit its political

ends. Vaughan (2003) notes that the process was exclusionary as pan-Ethiopianist parties had

been denied participation in favor of weaker and sometimes ‘phony’ ethnic parties. Similarly,

Aalen (2002) criticizes the undemocratic nature of inter-party dialogues during the conference,

implicating the EPRDF for purposefully discouraging meaningful discussion on critical issues

such as ethnicity. As stated by Aalen (2002:41), “the outcome of the transitional conference, the

transitional charter, is therefore more a result of an agenda predetermined by the EPRDF…

rather than a pact between all the organizations that participated in the conference.”

After the establishment of the TGE following the conference, a two pronged-strategy was

employed by the party to entrench its dominance. While a strategy to expand party dominance to

new areas had been employed on the one hand, a pre-emptive tactic was used to suppress parties

growing to constitute a threat on the other (Wondwessen, 2009). As such, the party mobilized to

expand its support base in the South as well as other key areas and the peripheral regions of

- 28 -

Ethiopia. The recruitment and cooptation of members of Ethnic groups in Southern Ethiopia, for

instance, culminated in the establishment of SEPDF consisting of several ethnic parties in that

part of the country. In addition, EPRDF satellite parties, that have been closely affiliated and

monitored by it, were formed in all the four peripheral regions of Ethiopia, namely Somali, Afar,

Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz Regional States (Ibid: 9). According to Merera (2011: 7-8),

EPRDF’s approach “…reflects a strategy of manufacturing a political support base by creating

controlled ethnic-based organizations for the various ethnic groups of the country.”

On the contrary, ethnic-based parties, such as the OLF, which had been part of the TGE and

which enjoyed extensive popular support, were ultimately forced to leave the government due

allegedly to unlevel playing field and election rigging during the 1992 sub-national elections

(Ibid). Several pan-Ethiopian parties as well boycotted elections during the time, and reported a

curtailment to their political activities citing intimidation, detention and torturing of their

members by EPRDF (Aalen, 2002).

Finally, a critical foundation to Ethiopia’s transition process and political future has been laid at

the end of the transitional period with the adoption of the Ethiopian Constitution in 1995. The

constitution has been hailed as the most democratic the country has ever owing to its standard

provisions on democratic governance, human rights and rule of law. It was welcomed as a

radical and innovative approach to ethnic management in multiethnic countries (Tronvoll, 2010).

Yet, it is at the same time criticized as a document largely reflective of EPRDF’s interests and

political philosophy, besides being a product of a flawed process under a less participatory and

EPRDF-dominated environment. Vestal (1996), for example, makes a strong critique of the

Ethiopian constitutional order from the analytical viewpoints of process as well as content. Based

on his observation of the constitution’s provisions, he concludes the Ethiopian constitution to be

“nominal and fictive” (Vestal, 1996: 30). He characterizes the constitution as being descriptive

and lacking provisions to enforce limits on government behavior. He therefore criticizes the

document for its lack of “commitment to constitutionalism”, and its failure to reflect “the pre-

constitutional principles of the mass of the people” which he claims to have been replaced by

EPRDF’s ethnic ethic (Ibid: 31). With regard to the process of drafting, debating and ratifying

- 29 -

the constitution, both Vestal (1996) and Aalen (2002) are of the view that the process has largely

been exclusionary.

The significance of the foregoing analysis from the point of view of this study has to do with its

value to explain how EPRDF’s dominant position has been established and entrenched. Two

important references could be made to justify the contribution of the constitution in creating

asymmetric power relationships. The first concerns the unrestrained power of the executive

which has been referred to in our analysis of the TNC earlier and whose practice further

sanctioned in the constitution. Under the constitution, the executive has become a

disproportionately powerful branch of the state with a prime minister enjoying extensive powers

as head of the cabinet, head of the government and commander-in-chief of the army. Quite

contrary to both logic and empirics, the EPRDF-dominated House of Peoples Representatives

further passed a legislation in 2008 to transfer its power to the executive. The bill which was

enacted to define the Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs of the Federal Democratic

Republic of Ethiopia” (Proclamation No. 471/2005) willingly handed over the power of the

legislative to form, restructure or dissolve government entities to the executive, making the

executive even more powerful (Abbink, 2009:16). Secondly, the constitution provides for

politically autonomous regional states but with meager revenue generating powers, and hence

financially dependent on the center. This paradoxical arrangement puts regional governments at

the mercy of the federal government, and facilitates a de facto centralization of power with the

attendant political dominance of the ruling party.

- 30 -

CHAPTER FIVE

5. The Historical Legacy of TPLF/EPRDF and its Post Liberation Political

Dominance: Is there a Link?

In the course of their protracted armed struggle against incumbents, rebel movements develop

and/or adopt different ideological, organizational and operational instruments and practices

depending on their specific environment and the nature of their struggle. Spiess (2009) makes a

reference to the distinct political development trajectories and the ‘political capital’ accumulated

by ‘liberation’ movements while explaining the significance of their legacies post-liberation.

Similarly, Doorman (2006) points to the effect of pre-liberation ideologies, rules of governance,

institutional forms and relations with society on the behavior of rebel movement-turned regimes

post-liberation. As indicated in earlier sections, it has been an insurmountable challenge for most

to break from the past attesting to Friedman and Wong’ (2008:9) claim a “…party’s past leaves

an imprint on its future development.” Accordingly, this chapter analyzes the ideological,

organizational and governance legacies of TPLF to determine whether its legacy has relevance to

understanding its current political dominance.

5.1.Ideology

TPLF/EPRDF has its roots in the Ethiopian Student Movement (ESM) of the 1960s and early

1970s that raged throughout the country with a strong Marxist-Leninist fervor. Due to its strict

following to certain variants of the Marxist school and its ethno-national orientation, TPLF is

said to have founded its ‘liberation’ struggle on three major ideological pillars, viz. the “National

Question,” “Democratic Centralism” and “Revolutionary Democracy” (Vaughan, 2003; Aalen,

2002; Merera, 2011). The front has adapted and/or adopted principles premised on these

conceptual pillars for use in the design of mobilization strategies, organizational structures,

operational modalities and related functions during the course of the armed struggle. This section

discusses the link between TPLF’s legacy as a revolutionary Guerilla movement, and its current

status and practices as a dominant party based on the three ideological pillars stated above.

a) The ‘National Question’

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Studies indicate that ethnic conscious university students within ESM used to accord more

emphasis on the “National Question” as a key political agenda whose resolution could only be

envisaged through addressing the right of ‘self determination’ to the ‘oppressed’ Ethiopian

nations and nationalities (Merera, 2011; Abbink, 2006). TPLF grew out of such M-L student

groups, mainly the Tigray Student Association which had been keen on the National Question

(Aregawi, 2004). The front has therefore adopted the Stalinist and Maoist approaches to the

National Question premised on ethnic identity and ethno-national mobilization. According to

Vaughan and Tronvoll (2003:117), TPLF employed ethnicity as a unit of political participation

and representation to mobilize the Tigrayan peasantry whom it “regarded as a ‘homogenous

mass’ with common needs, interests and political outlook.”

The Stalinst approach, which was largely adhered to by TPLF, however, makes basic conceptual

contradictions while addressing the national question as it employs both bottom-up and top-down

perspectives in identifying and determining ethnicity (Ibid). Therefore, the Stalinist theorem not

only served to advance TPLF/EPRDF’s argument that ethnicity can be constructed by members

of an ethnic group from within but also utilized to support the contradicting view that ethnicity

could as well be determined by forces from without the concerned ethnic/social group, like itself.

As a result, voluntary integration and unity has become the bulwark of EPRDF’s principle of

ethnic federalism based on the premise: “Marxist-Leninist advocacy for nationality self

determination is intended to neutralize, not foster ethno-sub-national sentiment” (Vaughan and

Tronvoll, 2003:118). This viewpoint is especially significant owing to its use by the vanguard

party, the EPRDF, to advance the claim that the party could bestow the right of self

determination up on the different nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia. TPLF’s favored

Stalinist solution to the ‘National Question,’- ‘self determination, up to and including secession’

has thus become a guiding principle to reorganize the Ethiopian state (Asnake, 2010).

As such, ethnic federalism has provided a preferred strategy for the hegemonic aspirations of a

vanguard party from a minority ethnic group. This is why Aalen (2002:48) considers the current

federal arrangement as “not only a way of maintaining unity, but also a means to overcome the

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Amhara hegemony and provide a structure in which the EPRDF could govern.” According to her,

the party’s motive to create ethnic-based regional governments as well as ethnically-determined

satellite parties emanates from its political weakness as a representative of a minority accounting

for less than ten percent of the Ethiopian population.

In all, the aforementioned Stalinist ethno-nationalist ideology of the party has served two

purposes. First, it guided the party’s political ideology in defining and constructing Tigrayan

ethno-nationalism (Aregawi, 2008). The ideology largely shaped the nature and scope of the

struggle as an ethnic based and sub-nationally oriented movement on behalf of the Tigrayan

nation. In the process, it gave rise to the early development of a vanguardist tradition within the

TPLF, and its self-proclaimed status as a sole representative of the Tigrayan people (Vaughan

and Tronvoll, 2003). It informed the party’s early drive for political dominance in Tigray and its

hostility and violent action against any competing political force in the province (Aregawi, 2008).

Secondly, the ideology has greatly shaped TPLF’s strategy on class and mass political

mobilization. TPLF’s pragmatism on class and class relations in the then Tigray was partly a

product of its ethno-national precepts. TPLF realized that the likelihood of success in the armed

struggle hinged on its ability to mobilize a greater section of the Tigrayan society which was

represented by the peasantry (accounting for roughly 90 per cent of the total population) (Young,

1994). For one thing, social stratification among the peasantry based on ownership of the means

of production, and/or income level had been less prominent in the then Tigray (Aregawi, 2004).

For another, an ideology based on class relations would have reduced the support base of the

front by marginalizing specific groups. TPLF had therefore taken the peasantry as a homogenous

mass and a foundation for its armed struggle based on the dictates of Maoism.

TPLF/EPRDF has continued to vigorously follow these same ideological principles in the post-

liberation era in order to ensure the continued support and loyalty of the peasantry to the party.

Soon after holding the reigns of state power, it instituted national strategies and structures

focused on the peasantry and the rural sector. Agricultural Development-Led Industrialization

(ADLI) was introduced as the regime’s core development Strategy based on the claim that it is

the agricultural sector which has the potential to propel growth in other sectors, mainly industry

- 33 -

(Zerihun, 2009). A recent report (2009:6) by the International Crisis Group (ICG) confirms the

enduring claims of both TPLF and EPRDF as “legitimate representatives of rural citizens who

make up 84 per cent of the population.” TPLF/EPRDF once again targeted the Ethiopian

peasantry as its political support base. The organizational and programmatic aspects of

peasant/rural mobilization will be discussed in the appropriate sections to come.

b) Democratic Centralism

Besides the national question discussed above, the principle of democratic centralism constitutes

an important ideological mainstay of the party critical to shaping TPLF/EPRDF’s behavior and

mode of operation for long. Studies indicate that TPLF/EPRDF has been excessively centralized,

highly secretive, disciplinarian, and intolerant of differences and factionalism from its early days

as a guerilla group (Aregawi, 2008; ICG, 2009, Aalen, 2002). Under a regime of democratic

centralism, disagreements are a source of competition, not avenues for dialogue (Vaughan and

Trenvoll, 2003:117-118). While pluralism is a means to an end, debate only constitutes an

instrument for consensus. But criticism of decisions after consensus amounts to factionalism

(ibid). According to ICG (2009:6), all major decisions in the party had been prerogatives of the

executive and central committee members, whose practice it criticizes for “forging a small,

highly centralized, and secretive leadership that occasionally bordered on paranoid.”

Studies indicate that this legacy has continued to dominate the party’s practice to this date.

Young (1997:211), for instance, points to the apparent lack of transparency at every echelon of

the government structure “in spite of the ready reference of the EPRDF leadership to democratic

jargon.” Vaughan (2003:157) on her part cites how EPRDF utilizes service delivery and local

resource distribution to consolidate its grass roots support base through monopolizing collective

goods provision while discouraging the participation of alternative providers such as civil society

organizations as competitors.

Further, democratic centralism still appears to inform the management philosophy and

organizational principles of the party. In conformity to the tradition of TPLF, EPRDF partner

parties currently maintain similar structures, both horizontally and vertically, in which decisions

- 34 -

are mainly taken at the center and flow down the hierarchy while information at lower echelons

are relayed upwards for monitoring and intelligence purposes. As noted by Aalen (2002:54), the

centralized EPRDF structure “…promotes upward accountability to the party organs above

rather than downward accountability to the people of the region, Woreda (districts) and Kebele

(grassroots administrations)…” Consequently, the party and the state appear fused to the extent

that one’s interest is taken to represent the other’s. It is highly revealing to refer to a statement

made by a Kebele EPRDF official warning opposition supporters during the 2000 elections: “Are

you voting for the opposition? All right, ask your party to give you land. The constitution says

the state owns rural land. We don’t give land to those who are not loyal to us” (Human Rights

Watch Report, 2010).

c) Revolutionary Democracy

Finally, the principle of ‘revolutionary democracy’ constitutes another important ideological

philosophy which is rooted in TPLF/EPRDF’s legacy as a M-L Guerilla movement, and is being

advocated by it to maintain dominance. Abbink (2006) and Vaughan (2003) regard

‘revolutionary democracy’ as an attempt by the EPRDF to justify its political dominance based

on a Leninist ideology of socialist democracy which in significant ways diverges from that

espoused by the liberal school. The approach purports that the mobilization potential and strong

leadership of a vanguard party are critical for any successful development endeavor (ICG, 2009)

while upholding the principles of popular democracy based on consensual representation and

collective rights (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003:117). Per Abbink’s (2006:23) view,

TPLF/EPRDF as a vanguard party thus does not have an interest for a “compromise with

opposition forces because it is convinced that it has the solution for everything.”

What follows from the M-L ideological variants of democratic centralism and revolutionary

democracy is an organizational structure suited to a centralized command and control hierarchy

which is largely suited for grass roots mobilization, control and hence one-party dominance. It is

therefore vital to look in to the structural legacy of TPLF and its implication to the organizational

philosophy, behavior, and domineering practices of the ruling TPLF/EPRDF in some detail in

the following section.

- 35 -

5.2.Organization and Operation

In keeping with the principle of democratic centralism and precepts of a vanguard party, TPLF’s

pre-Derg organization reveals a highly centralized, vertically structured Marxist-Leninist party

that regarded itself as destined not only to mobilize and lead the struggle of the Tigrayan people

against Degr but also shape the social, economic and political life of people along M-L lines. As

such, the party was structured to combine functions of mass political mobilization and control,

armed struggle and the delivery of collective public goods (see Figure 1 below). A brief

discussion on the structural and operational features of TPLF would help to understand how the

party’s organizational legacy influenced its current organizational framework and its drive for

political dominance.

Figure 5.1. Organizational Chart of TPLF, 1979

Source: Aregawi (2008)

CongressCongressCongressCongress

Central CommitteeCentral CommitteeCentral CommitteeCentral Committee

Polit BureauPolit BureauPolit BureauPolit Bureau

Political Committee

Cultural D

Propoganda

D

Security D

PR D

Mass Org D

Foreign Aff.

D

Millitary

Committee

Intelligence

D

Training D

Logistics D

Agit. Prop D

Militia

Regular

Forces

Socioeconomic

Comittee

Health

Supply

Agriculture

Technique

Education

- 36 -

As could be seen from the figure, the structure depicts a 4-tier hierarchy with the supreme

decision making organ being the congress. The Congress is composed of elected members from

fighters and representatives of TPLF-affiliated mass associations (youth, peasants, merchants,

women and workers) and convenes every two years. The Central Committee (CC) and Audit

Committee (AC) members (although not indicated in the 1979 structure) were elected by the

congress. The CC which consisted of 31 members enjoyed considerable powers as a central

decision making organ between congresses while the nine-member Polit Bureau mainly engaged

in the day-to-day management of the party’s affairs (Aregawi, 2008). The three committees

down the hierarchy involved CC members as staff, and each were led by member of a Polit

Bureau. Departments constituted functional units in charge of implementing and coordinating

activities, and largely tied with local cadre-dominated and supervised local administration

structures.

Based on Young’s (1994) and Aregawi’s (2008) studies on the history of TPLF, it could be

witnessed that the party’s organizational structure was intended to maintain the political

dominance and strong grip of the party on society. Firstly, as noted by Young (1994), TPLF was

able to utilize a comprehensive organizational approach/design to include relief, governance and

local socioeconomic functions which were critical to win grass roots support besides structures

focused on the war effort. In this case, Aregawi (2008) is of the view that the efficacy of the

movement’s mobilizational endeavors could be partly explained by the utilization of patronage

strategies made possible by the provision of collective public goods for rural communities in

TPLF controlled territories.

TPLF’s socioeconomic committee had been engaged in supplying relief and providing

agricultural extension services to farmers with its agricultural development programs ultimately

leading to the creation of the Relief Society of Tigray (RST), the party’s development and relief

NGO-wing, in 1979 (Segers et. al., 2008). This vanguardist approach helped to imbue a

perception that the party was not only the legitimate force to lead the struggle but also govern

Tigray. The organizational and operational portfolio of TPLF embodied the comprehensive

missions of a movement with roles as a legitimate liberator, a de facto government and

representative of the Tigrayan nation state. Societal control and hence dominance was partly

- 37 -

achieved through contractarian strategies to ensure grass roots support. TPLF was almost able to

create a state with in a state in accordance with its reformist agenda.

Secondly, TPLF’s structural features as well as operational methods were firmly grounded on a

strong cadre network stretching down to the grassroots level (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003). As

observed by Aregawi (2008), the party had cultivated and extensively utilized a large army of

cadres to achieve the twin objectives of mobilization and control in Tigray during the time of the

struggle. Most departments under the three branches except those charged with pure combat

roles, were designed to serve considerable mobilisational functions through the guidance and

supervision of cadres at different levels of the party as well as public administration structures.

Four of the six departments under the powerful political wing of the party especially constituted

the nucleus of the effort through their roles in shaping the organizational, political and cultural

aspects of mobilization and control. The acclaimed cadre school of the movement, which was

established under the Propaganda Department and once led by the current Prime Minister of

Ethiopia, had been instrumental in beefing up the cadre base, and hence augmenting the

mobilisational capacity of the party (Young, 1994). The other significant unit, the Mass

Organization department had served as a crucial operational arm and an interface between the

party and its affiliated mass organizations as well as local administrations. It was responsible for

organizing and directing both mass associations and local administrative units (Aregawi, 2008).

The Cultural and Public Relations departments were also highly instrumental in shaping and

promoting TPLF’s ethno-nationalistic rhetoric and its image as a liberator. The Political Affairs

Committee in general and the above units in particular played a key role in the development and

management of the cadre network, and its operation within the local public administration

hierarchy.

As such, the party structure was able to pervade society throughout Tigray by embedding itself

deep in to the village level through local cells which Vaughan (2003:27) regards as highly

critical for the party on two grounds: “the cadre-network facilitates a firm representation by the

party and presentation of its ideology at the grassroots, on the one hand, and on the other, it

supplies the party with grassroots information and (less positive observers claim) ‘intelligence’.”

- 38 -

Internal democracy within the organization had been severely curtailed due to the highly

centralized structure and secretive nature of the organization. This resulted in the concentration

of power in the hands of a few elite at the center, especially few notables in the Central

Committee and Polit Bureau. Aregawi (2008:218), for example, recounts an organizational

practice in which a CC member had been entitled to preside over and pass any verdict against a

perceived wrong doer. According to him, if an individual was reported to have harbored an

opposition against the TPLF in the then Tigray, the individual’s case had to be ultimately

adjudicated by a CC member who “had the power to pass any verdict against him/her.” He

further provides an evidence-based account of how the Stalinist tendencies of the top TPLF

leadership revealed through their repeated use of purgatory and execution tactics to punish

dissent (Ibid: 235). As a result, organizational practices of leadership alternation and the

cultivation of new leaders constituted the exception while the monopolization of power remained

to be the norm.

The TPLF is known for its institutionalization of a management technique called Gimgema in

Amharic (self/evaluation) from its early days as a guerilla movement. Gimgema was initially

used for evaluating the effectiveness of combat strategies and operations of the TPLF, and has

been adopted to evaluate politicians/cadres and administrators since then (Aalen, 2002). Aalen

makes note of diverging views on the merits of gimgema. She makes a reference to both

favorable and unfavorable views towards the practice as an essential instrument of promoting

transparency and democracy on the one hand while being criticized as a tool to remove people

from their jobs on the other. Based on her findings, however, she regards ‘gimgema’ to be an

instrument in the hands of the party elite “…to discipline the lower party cadres and bureaucrats

and make them loyal to the central party line” (Ibid: 88). Similarly, an ICG report (2009:18)

observes that “…party loyalty and interests weigh stronger than a popular endorsement” in party

evaluation sessions. Aregawi (2008) details, among others, how the current PM of Ethiopia,

Meles Zenawi used ‘gimgema’ manipulatively to remove himself (Aregawi) as the then

commander of the TPLF army, and Gidey ZereaTsion as a chairperson of the TPLF in 1985, to

bring himself to power.

- 39 -

It is especially befitting to note that TPLF’s management practice is strictly in line with the

principles of the Maoist party discipline. According to the Maoist school, party discipline is

dictated by a hierarchy of four subordination-based precepts (Mao, 1965:203). The first two

principles require the subordination of the individual to the organization, and that of the minority

to the will of the majority respectively. The third dictates the unquestioned submission of the

lower level to the whims of the higher while the fourth requires the subordination of the entire

membership to the central committee. As these principles are meant to be strictly adhered to by

the party members, “whoever violates these articles of discipline disrupts party unity” (Ibid: 203).

On the basis of TPLF’s practices, namely the monopoly of power by the elite central committee;

the party’s top-down management practices; the primacy of the organization over any individual

purposes, as well as the majoritarian-consensual decision making styles, it is possible to

conclude TPLF’s organizational and management philosophy had been largely shaped by the

dictates of the Maoist school. The party elites generally assign themselves double responsibilities

as the vanguard of the party as well as of the Tigrayan masses (ICG, 2009). After the formation

of MLLT in 1985, the party’s domineering, secretive and authoritarian tendency has further been

strengthened (Young, 1994). In the name of party discipline and cohesion, a ‘culture of

extremism’ and a ‘cult of personality’ had been promoted (ICG, 2009). In all, it would not be

difficult to observe the legacy of a vanguard party with inbuilt organizational and operational

mechanisms to control, shape and direct the political, economic and social aspects of public life.

Despite holding the reins of power for the last 20 years, however, TPLF has not only retained its

earlier organizational features but also utilized its experience to design EPRDF and its

constituent PDOs. A relatively similar organizational framework, principle and practice to that of

pre-liberation TPLF has currently been adopted by EPRDF and its member parties. Analysts

largely invoke the path-dependency thesis to explain the lack of progress in TPLF/EPRDF’s

transformation from a guerilla movement to a political party. Some point to the inability and/or

unwillingness of the party to shake itself off the M-L philosophy that largely defined its decision

making, organizational principles and discourse (ICG, 2009). Others argue it could well be in the

interest of the party to maintain its structural features if it had to continue to dominate state

power and deny ground for its competitors (Vaughuan and Torell, 2003; Aalen, 2002).

- 40 -

In view of the persistence of TPLF’s pre-liberation organizational imperatives within the current

TPLF as well as EPRDF structures, it is possible to make three related observations. Like the

TPLF before it, the ruling TPLF/EPRDF has adopted a centralized organizational framework

based on a cadre network to ensure its political dominance. For instance, the ruling coalition has

a sixty-member central committee with extensive decision making powers; a 20 member

executive council for managing the party’s day-to-day activities; and a party congress as the

highest authority convening every other year (Aalen, 2002). The four EPRDF parties have

councils equivalent to central committees and executives at each level of administration, at the

regional level, in the woreda and the kebele. These party organs are responsible and accountable

to the party bodies in the hierarchy above them. Orders are dispatched from the top to the lower

levels, and information about activities on the lower levels are forwarded upwards through the

hierarchy to the top (Ibid). Except differences in size, it is possible to conclude the coalition and

its members could be regarded as structural replicas of the TPLF. Decision making power is

concentrated at the center, i.e. central committee and executive committee levels, and the

remaining tiers down the hierarchy are expected to execute plans and programs. This is why the

centralized party structure of EPRDF is being criticized as an obstacle to the institutionalization

of a genuine decentralized federal framework (Merera, 2007).

Second, EPRDF has emulated TPLF’s pre-liberation structural imperatives which had been

adopted by the party for purposes of mobilization and control. As indicated in earlier sections,

the ruling party has been very active in co-opting ethnic entrepreneurs in all major ethno-national

regions, and in politicizing ethnicity to form representative PDOs as members of EPRDF

(Merera, 2011). As such, it was able to expand its support base, and ensure political control at

the grass roots level.

The structures to operationalize its mobilisational activities are grounded in a hierarchy of cadre

networks that work within and in parallel with all administrative tiers. As indicated by Aalen

(2002), the same party executives or cadres occupy both administrative/technocratic positions

and political ones. Extra constitutional, parallel arrangements such as regional affairs bureaus at

regional levels have been created by the ruling party for monitoring and controlling purposes

- 41 -

(Ibid). At the same time, cadre-based local party structures, affiliated-mass organizations as well

as grass roots and neighborhood party cells belonging to the ruling EPRDF has pervaded society.

According to Poluha (1997:46), residents of every peasant association and every kebele (the

lowest administrative units in rural and urban localities respectively) in Ethiopia elect and

sponsor the training of 12 EPRDF cadres each to form a local “political vanguard group whose

duty is to guide and lead the population.” The TPLF’s experience on cadre policy and its reliance

on an extended cadre network have continued to inform the approaches of the ruling

TPLF/EPRDF.

Third, TPLF’s pre-liberation adherence to the promotion and establishment of ethnically defined

(regional) parties has continued to inform the ruling TPLF/EPRDF’s organizational logic in the

post-liberation era. From the very outset, TPLF/EPRDF has followed a policy of marginalizing

and weakening multi-national parties as could be evidenced from its early decision to prohibit

pan-Ethiopia parties such as EPRP and the All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement (MEISON) from

participating in the 1991 transitional national conference. The party has since promoted ethno

political formations while suppressing pan-Ethiopian groups as anti-establishment and

reactionary with an alleged purpose of weakening competitors and maintaining its dominance

(Merera, 2011).

5.3.The Legacy of Governance in ‘Liberated’ Areas

As noted earlier in the theoretical discussion, dominance is an attribute mainly defined within the

context of interaction. The vertical interaction of a political party to a society thus constitutes an

important dimension to determine the nature of its relationships with constituencies whom it

administers, or ethnic groups/social classes whose interests it stands to advance. Based on this

perspective, this section attempts to assess TPLF’s approaches and mechanisms of local

governance, and its interaction with local structures and societies in Tigray in the pre-liberation

period. This is done by looking in to the institutional, operational and interactive aspects of

TPLF’s engagement with local administrative structures and communities.

- 42 -

In broader conceptual terms, governance comprises of “all relations between state and society-

from the means of articulating and reconciling needs and expectations, to mechanisms of service

delivery-or the entire social contract” (OECD, 2008:36). As such, effective social contract

implies mechanisms, processes and institutions of governance created “through processes of

contestation and deal making between state and society” (Ibid: 36). Given this conceptual

background, it appears vital to assess the structures and functions of newly formed local

governance institutions; the mechanisms and processes employed in building these institutions as

well as the relationship that existed between these structures, TPLF, and society at large in pre-

1991 Tigray.

The TPLF had a legacy of forming parallel local administrative, political and civil society

organizations vertically linked to it in areas under its control (See Fig. 2 below). These local

institutions include people’s councils (Baitos), mass associations and cadre networks at different

levels. Whereas the people’s councils mainly served administrative and governance functions,

the mass associations and cadre structures were largely utilized for mass mobilization and

control purposes (Young, 1994). As noted by Aregawi (2008), however, all were conceived,

structured and operated to achieve TPLF’s principal purposes of “agitating, organizing and

arming the people” to win the struggle against the then government. Given the prevailing poverty

and conflict situation, these structures had been understandably weak with loosely differentiated

or blurred boundaries characterized by formal and informal horizontal interactions with one

another as well as vertical linkages with TPLF.

- 43 -

Figure 5.2. Local Administration, Mass Association and Cadre Structures, and their links with TPLF

Source: Adaptated from Aregawi (2008)

a) Mass Associations

Let us first look at mass associations from the trio of structures portrayed in the above figure. In

the then TPLF-controlled territories of Tigray, membership in one and/or multiple mass

associations such as peasant, women and youth was compulsory (Gebru, 1991). Thus, every

member of the local community except those that fall below the minimum age bracket were

organized under one or more category, the largest being peasant associations. These entities were

organized at Tabia (village) and Woreda (district) levels. Each association had a constitution

prepared by TPLF, and led by a central committee selected from among its members (Ibid). As

these entities were organized and supervised by TPLF, they were dominated and led by local

cadres and cadre cells that were linked to the hierarchy of cadre structures above them (Aregawi,

2008). They were thus subject to supervision by a senior cadre at the district level, and may also

Mass Organisation Department (TPLF)

Zonal

Councils

District

Councils

Tabia

Councils

Public Works Committee Mass

Associations

Mass

Associations

Administration Comittee

Social Affairs Committee

Chairman

Tribunal

Militia

District Cadre

- 44 -

report and receive orders from TPLF’s mass organization department directly depending on the

prominence and urgency of tasks.

According to Gebru (1991), mass associations constituted not only the foundation of TPLF’s

objectives of mass mobilization but also instruments of political domination and control. First,

the associations created a suitable forum for TPLF’s ethno-nationalist propaganda, and the

recruitment of an active grass roots army of cadres that ensured increased dissemination of its

political teachings besides raising its capacity of intelligence gathering. Second, they helped to

broaden the pool of politically agitated youth volunteering to join TPLF’s army. This is

especially critical for TPLF had been confronted with a critical shortage of army enlistees by the

end of 1970s and early 1980s (Young, 1994).

Thirdly, the front was, among others, able to undermine the prominence of other competing

social forces and indigenous structures using mass organizations. Aregawi (2008) notes how

TPLF utilized peasant associations to undermine the role of elders in society (in conflict

resolution, provision of moral and practical guidance, imposing societal sanctions etc.) which it

perceived to go against its objectives of control and supremacy at the grassroots level. Most

importantly, these associations were vehicles to ensure TPLF’s domination and control in local

administrative structures. A very illustrative case in point here is the formation of Woreda

(district) administrations. Woreda councils were formed from council members elected by an

assembly of representatives drawn from members of all Tabia (village level) mass associations

under the concerned district, in which case many of the elected representatives were active TPLF

cadres (Gebru, 1991).

b) Local Councils

Local administrative councils, on the other hand, constituted three tier structures at Tabia

(village), Woreda (district) and Zone levels. Village and Woreda administrations had councils

selected from villagers and association representatives respectively based on constitutions

provided to each by TPLF, and were active in the delivery of collective public goods such as

security, justice and other economic and social services besides their big roles in political

- 45 -

mobilization (Young, 1994). Zonal councils took varied structures and formations as they were

mainly used to coordinate and supervise functions by lower level units, and were directly

supervised by the Mass Associations department of the TPLF.

c) Cadre Network

The other structure which was less visible but more powerful and dominant was the cadre

network which had pervaded the entire local structure and assumed active leadership role in

every unit. Besides an active cell embedded in each unit across the hierarchy, the Kifle Hizbi

(senior cadre) enjoyed a power ranging from supervision through to overriding decisions by the

councils (Vaughan, 2003). She/he represented TPLF’s chief field officer and formal

representative linking the various local administrative, political and social structures to the party.

She/he was the one to organize, mange and supervise the local cadre cell, and entrusted to weld

an effective cadre network for mobilization and control purposes. As such, the Kifle Hizbi

ensured cadre cells controlled community; and intelligence was delivered to the upper strata.

In all, the structural features of local governance institutions were not results of contestation and

negotiation between TPLF and local communities. They were imposed from the above by TPLF,

and guided by its Maoist principles and its central objective of winning the war. Although local

people involved in elections and participated in decision making process, it was often

manipulated and hijacked by embedded cadres and loyalists (Aregawi, 2004). A decision taken

by TPLF to raise the minimum school age from 6 to 12 could be a good case in point. Although

farmers in Tigray wanted to send their younger children to schools at the time as they needed

their older children for support in agricultural activities, TPLF insisted on only admitting older

ones from age 12 to schools for it wanted to use schools as breeding ground for youth army

enlistees (Young, 1994; Aregawi, 2008). In the end, schools only admitted older boys for

education. Per Mao’s dictum, every individual had to submit to the party and its causes.

Over all, the party had mainly employed approaches involving organization and indoctrination,

(de) incentivization, neutralization and subordination in its engagement with society. Local

administrative and political structures were utilized to indoctrinate and mobilize people besides

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their function on control. Incentive structures such as policy reforms, service provisions and

measures of empowerment served to either entice or dissuade society vis-à-vis decisions favored

by TPLF. Steps were taken to neutralize the influence of powerful societal forces/institutions

such as churches for the only force that was entitled to dominate and control society was TPLF

and only TPLF (Aregawi, 2008). Therefore, the mechanisms, processes and institutions of local

governance put in place by the party as well as its relations with society had been utilized to

ensure the subordination of all societal forces to the party. TPLF was almost able to create a state

with in a state in accordance with its reformist vision.

These same reformist and hegemonic political practices of TPLF characterize the current

governance approaches of the ruling TPLF/EPRDF and its interaction with society.

TPLF/EPRDF’s centralized party rule continues to antagonize and jeopardize the decentralized

federal framework in Ethiopia. All regions are governed by EPRDF and its affiliated parties

which operate per directives received from the center, making their autonomy nominal (Aalen,

2002). TPLF/EPRDF’s cadre network and party structure pervade and dominate state structures

at all levels. Studies have made repeated observations on the blurring of boundaries between

party and state in Ethiopia, and control of the masses through grass roots state structures and

party cells. The practice of using mass organizations as political tools of mobilization and control

has continued unabated in the two decades of TPLF/EPRDF rule. A number of policy measures

and accountability mechanisms have been tied to objectives of party dominance and monopoly

of political power. Some critics link the ruling party’s refusal to revise key policies such as

Agricultural Development Led Industrialization (ADLI), and its regulation on the state

ownership of land with TPLF/EPRDF’s reliance on these policies to subjugating the Ethiopian

peasantry to the party (Zerihun, 2009; Merera, 2007).

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Conclusion

The ruling TPLF/EPRDF has dominated Ethiopian politics for more than two decades since 1991.

The party’s grip on power has been absolute by all measures and at all times. Electorally, it

continues to enjoy absolute legislative majorities and full control over the executive.

Governmentally, it has had monopoly over policy making, reform and change processes as well

as public discourse. As to its bargaining position, both its vertical and horizontal interactions

with societal, state and political actors have been characterized by highly asymmetrical

relationships skewed in favor of the party.

Following its takeover of power through Guerilla warfare, it effectively utilized its incumbency

advantage as well as its military and political prowess to institutionalize its political dominance

and pursue its reformist vision. The party has been able to impose its programs and visions

through such institutional mechanisms as the ‘Transitional National Charter’ and the 1995

‘Ethiopian Constitution’ beginning the early stages of the transition process. It failed to effect a

‘pacted’ transition. In all, the paper has provided sufficient ground to conclude the current

political system in Ethiopia epitomizes an enduring one-party dominance. Up on conservative

standards, the system could further be categorized as one bordering on the hegemonic

authoritarian category; or still as one symptomatic of a de facto one-party state.

TPLF’s history as a Marxist-Leninist Guerilla movement reveals a vanguard ethno-nationalist

front with ideological, organizational and governance legacies that are quintessential to the

practices and behaviors of a dominant political group. Over the course of the protracted Guerilla

warfare, the front utilized a number of ideological, structural and operational tools to mobilize

society for a war effort whose means as well as end had been solely determined by itself. It

worked to silence and/or punish alternative ideologies/views, as well as neutralize and/or defeat

any political/social force perceived to compete with it. It maintained a centralized and

hierarchical internal institutional structure in which the excessive concentration of power at the

top created an internal power monopoly while the entire membership was subordinated to the

dictates of the elite central committee. In areas under its control, TPLF created hierarchically

organized local governance and civic structures which were subordinated and affiliated to it.

Whereas the design of these local structures as well as their supervision was carried out by the

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front, their ranks were heavily dominated by TPLF members. Further, it penetrated local

community structures and embedded itself in grass roots constituencies through neighborhood

cadre cells and networks besides its societal control through the compulsory membership of

residents in diverse mass associations. It overall utilized both coercive and contractual strategies

to ensure its political dominance.

The study indicates much has not changed during the past two decades despite TPLF’s change of

status from a revolutionary rebel movement to a ruling coalition (EPRDF). The ideological

precepts of the party on the ‘National Question,’ ‘democratic centralism’ and ‘revolutionary

democracy’ remain critical now as much as they were then. They continue to shape both the

organizational philosophy and the interaction of the party with society and other forces. Whereas

the national question mainly served to inform TPLF’s ethno-national ethic, its function this time

has broadened to encompass the basic conceptual referents of ethnic federalism. As such, the

ideology has provided for an easy identification and definition of ethnicity by TPLF/EPRDF, and

its current ethnic federalist venture.

More importantly, it constitutes a mile stone for TPLF/EPRDF’s strategy of ethnic congress, and

its absolute dominance via the formation of coalition-member as well as affiliate parties across

ethnically-defined regions. Similarly, TPLF/EPRDF’s current use of the principles of

‘democratic centralism’ has resulted in a de facto centralized state in the context of a de jury

federal framework in which the ruling party dominates all political spaces, structures, processes

and functions. The ideological tool of ‘revolutionary democracy’ has long been invoked by

TPLF/EPRDF to justify the need for state-led growth and a strong (vanguard) party which it

claims to be critical for its developmental and transformational missions. Variants of the M-L

philosophy have thus been instruments of TPLF/EPRDF’s dominance now as much as they

constituted ideological tools of TPLF then.

Similarly, the war time TPLF and the ruling TPLF/EPRDF exhibit almost similar organizational,

operational and governance practices which have been instrumental for the party’s dominance. In

keeping with its M-L organizational imperatives, TPLF/EPRDF emulated the vertical structures,

centralized decision making practices and cadre based frameworks of the war-time TPLF. The

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culture of intolerance to factionalism and the demand for unwavering loyalty to the party and its

top leadership still constitute key organizational traits of the ruling TPLF/EPRDF as they were to

the per-liberation era TPLF. TPLF then utilized the strategy of mobilization and control for

rallying the Tigrayan masses behind its war effort. The incumbent TPLF/EPRDF currently

pursues the same strategy through partner and affiliate party cadre structures throughout the

country to mobilize grassroots support and ensure loyalty to it. The practice of TPLF to

monopolize power; subordinate society and local governance accountability mechanisms and

structures to party interests continues to this day by the ruling TPLF/EPRDF ‘post liberation’.

In all, the thesis’s revelation is that the ruling TPLF/EPRDF has remained a victim of its own

legacy. Two key causal links could be identified here. One has to do with the behavior of TPLF

as a reform movement whose central objective has remained state building. Such political forces

allege their enduring derive for dominance not only on their mission to rebuild the state but also

their indispensability to maintain the new political order. For TPLF/EPRDF, political dominance

is not only a means to achieve its ends but also an end in itself in the interest of ensuring party

continuity and survival. More importantly, war is a worthy investment for reformist movements

like TPLF, and vested interests in their ranks. It could be the case that TPLF/EPRDF has been in

pursuit of political dominance to realize its reform projects, and reap a good return from its

investment on the war project which are in turn critical to its claim and practice for dominance.

The second relates to the political weakness of TPLF as a representative of a minority ethnic

group in Ethiopia. Contrary to its M-L philosophy, TPLF, from the outset, pursued a class-blind

strategy focused on the mass mobilization of the Tigrayan people owing mainly to the minority

status of its constituency. After taking state power, TPLF/EPRDF utilized this ethnic-based

formula to weaken multinational parties while making the cooptation of ethnic parties to its

congress coalition easier. As such, TPLF’s derive for political dominance has also been informed

by the minority status of its Tigrayan constituency.

Consequently, the study’s two hypothesis that link both TPLF’s reform-orientation and its

narrow support base/minority representation with the current political dominance of the ruling

TPLF/EPRDF are found to be valid, significant!

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