HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SARTRE'S EXISTENTIALISMshodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/16839/8/08... · 2018. 7. 9. · Existentialism in general is an irrational school of philosophy,

CHAPTER - I

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SARTRE'S EXISTENTIALISM

In our present study we propose to deal with the important concepts of man,

society and freedom in earlier and later Sartre. In earlier Sartre we mean his

exposition of Being and Nothingness and later the exposition of his work Critique of

Dialectical Reason. These two great works can best represent his philosophy. Though

we concentrate on these two basic philosophical writings, but we will also discuss

about some of his early writings prior to these two works in the later part of this

chapter. Sartre's early philosophical writings appeared in a tri-lingual university

review bearing the title The Theory of the State in the Modem French Thought in

1927. Nizam published his three-part essay 'The Legend of Truth' in 1931, which he

has written in 1929. In this Sartre has denied the role of universals as categories in

science and has aligned it with 'concrete categories'. For Sartre Truth is the by­

product of commerce, and commerce is associated with democracy. Sartre in his early

essay has argued the "inadequacy of both 'science' and 'ideology' as intellectual

consensus as a 'collective belief • as 'universality' and defended the necessity of

individual judgment on the part of 'Solitary men· - as artists and philosophers." 1 Our

1 . Beauvoir. Simone. de .• The Prime of Life. Penguin Books. England. 1981. p.45.

19

approach here is based on "a distinction between what a philosopher claims to be

doing and what he is actually doing."2

While expounding his concept of 'man', 'society' and 'freedom', we'll

take a historical approach here tracing back Sartre's concept from Descartes, Locke,

Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Husseral, Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Marx.

Descartes is a duelist. He divides reality into mental and material, i.e. into

consciousness and matter. This leads to the development of two schools of thought, -

idealism and materialism. Both give an abstract picture of reality. The modem idealist

claim that the whole reality is mental. The mechanical materialists interpret reality in

terms of mechanical causal connections. We will attempt to show that "from Locke

onwards the British empiricists accepted the idealist premises of Descartes and

interpreted reality in terms of 'ideas', 'impressions' and 'sense-data' or 'sense-

content. ,.3 Our procedure of bringing out the ontological and epistemological

implication of any philosophical system is based upon the methodological

assumptions. These are as follows:

"(i). We draw a distinction between what a philosopher claims to be doing and

what he is actually doing.

2 Gupta, Suman., The Origin and Theories of Linguistic Philosophy, lntellectual Publishing house, New Delhi, 1983. p. ix.

3 . Ibid., p.xi

20

(ii). We regard ontology and epistemology as logically inseparable m a

consistent philosophical system. /)1-

(iii). And lastly, in order to uncover what a philosopher is actually doing we

have to historically trace the ontological and epistemological assumption of his

theory.''4 In short we may call our approach an "Historico- Analytic Approach."

Thus in the light of the above three methodological procedures, we will

discuss the ontological and the epistemological assumptions of Sartre.

Some philosophers see man in abstraction. Man is seen in abstract form, that is

to say pure consciousness is taken as the subject of knowledge, and consciousness is

separated from the body. This passive subject of knowledge, by his very nature, is

only a silent recipient of knowledge. He can not transcend his own self to become a

socially active individual. He cannot change the world through his practical activity.

In his ontology and epistemology Prof Suman Gupta states referring to his

reasons why Descartes separates mind and body and interprets the whole reality in

materialist term, she holds that "Descartes was not the ideologue of the working class

but of the bourgeoisie, who could not accept materialism in totality. Acceptance of

materialism implies not only seeking an explanation of natural phenomena in material

Po' 4

• Gupta, Suman., Metaphysics and the ~ erification Principle of Afeaning~ an Appraisal: The Visva­Bharti Journal of Philosophy, Volume- xxxi. Number I. Aug. 1994. p. 43.

THESIS 142.78 Si645 Ma

1111111111111111111111111 TH8493

21

terms but of social phenomena as well. Since the leisured class can never afford to

expose itself, it tries to hide the real causes and project itself to be superior by

advocating the primacy of mind, ideas or consciousness over matter. And Descartes as

an ideologue of the new emerging bourgeoisie, tried to accommodate materialism on

the one hand, and superiority ofthe mind on the other."5

While assigned distinct independent existence of matter, he gives primacy

to mind. The confusion created by his dualism of two independent parallel worlds

remains unresolved in the philosophy ofSartre. Sartre's Existentialism can be traced

from the three assumptions of Cartesian dualism:

"(i). Mind and Matter are two basic realities which can exist completely

independent of one another.

(ii). And furthermore being separate they cannot have even causal

interconnections, the second assumption, we find, does not follow from the first one,

in the sense that, even though two realities may be independent of each other yet they

may causally interact with each other. Descartes on the other hand assumed that,

logically, there cannot be any causal connections between two independent realities.

5 .Gupta, Suman., The Origin and Theories of Linguistic Philosophy, IPH, 1983, p. 23.

22

(iii). Descartes also assumes that though Mind and Matter are two independent

substances yet mind is logically prior to matter."6

On the basis of the above three assumptions, Descartes advocates that

mind can know only its own ideas. But being a rationalist Descartes attempts to

justify the knowledge of the external world through "clear and distinct" ideas. Jean

Paul Sartre (1905-1980), a French philosopher and writer, and a leading proponent of

atheistic existentialism has been one of the most important philosopher in modem

time. His philosophical views were contradictory. He has proclaimed the freedom of

man to be absolute and wants to establish this in man's life - 'existence precedes

essence.' Like Hegel, he believes in a dialectic between man and the society, but it is

a never-ending dialectic.

Sartre was appointed as professor of philosophy at Le Havre in 193 1. The year

1931-33 were important in Sartre's life as the course of his 'philosophical

development' was drastically affected by his discovery of 'phenomenology.' As he

was teaching at Le Havre he began to work on Nausea as a 'pamphlet on

contingency'. Sartre like Raymond Aron, studied 'phenomenology' at the French

Institute in Berlin in 1933-34. Simone de Beauvoir in her book The Prime of Life

reported that Raymond Aron initiated in Sartre an interest in phenomenology. Once

6.Gupta, Suman .. 'Metaphysics And ... of Meaning'. The Visva Bharati Journal of Philosophy. Aug.

1994, p. 43.

23

having a cocktail in a restaurant pointing to a glass Aron told Sartre "you see my dear

fellow, if you are a phenomenologist, you can talk about this cocktail and make

philosophy out ofit."7

Sartre's interest in phenomenology "coincided with his earlier pre-occupations

about the ways of by-passing the anti-thesis of idealism and realism, offering

simultaneously both the supremacy of reason and the reality of the visible world as it

appears to senses."8 For the first time Sartre read Husser] and Heidegger during his

stay in Berlin.

He adoptes the Husseralian phenomenological method to analyze the different

layers of human existence. He discovered, following Heideggar that man has to

realize an ultimate goal. His philosophy deals with the important aspect of human life,

with an inquiry into the Ontology of man's being, man's ethical reality, social and

political life to determine the authentic nature of human existence. Is it so?

Regarding this and his important concepts we will discuss in second and third

chapter. Sartre's both the work represent two distinct dimensions of his thought.

Being and Nothingness is the ontological study of man, giving emphasis on human

freedom, finitude, authenticity, bad faith etc., and Critique of Dialectical Reason

deals with man's role in society as a maker of his own history and consequently maker

7• Beauvoir. Simone. de .• The Prime of Life, Penguin Books. England. 1981. p. 135.

8. Ibid .. p. 135.

24

of the history of man kind. Here it seems he is more interested in the social nature of

man.

Sartre holds that the essence of a thing'is; existence refers rather to the fact that

it 'is'. In saying 'I am a man' the 'I am' denotes the kind of attribute I have. "Plato

called essence 'Ideas' and the Ideas were for him 'really real'. They were more real

that the particular things that derived their individual being by participating in ideas. "9

Ideas in Plato's philosophy constitute a realm of absolute reality beyond time, change

and existence. 'Existence in this sense becomes a pale shadow of essence. An idea

coming into existence is like a fall from some higher realm of Being. The history of

western philosophy till the nineteenth century has been dominated by essentialism,

though in certain cases there have been doctrines which wanted to uphold the priority

of existence over essence'. On the question of existence in relation to essence St.

Thomas Aquinas gave existence more important place. He holds that existence is

prior to essence in the sense that "what primarily constituted the being of anything is

its act of existing." In all created things except God there is a real difference between

the existence of a thing and its essence. It is only in God that essence and existence

coincide. "I am not my essence, since if my essence was identical with my existence,

then it would be my essence to exist. In such a case I would be immortal. Thus for all

contingent beings that come into existence and die, existence can never coincide with

9. Sartre, Jean. Paul., Being and Nothingness, Trans. by Hazel. E. Barnes. New York. 1956. p. 89.

25

-

essence. This theory of separation of essence and existence led to the view in some

other Philosophers that essence has primacy over existence. The philosophers were

influenced by this rationalist idea of supremacy of essence in relation to existence.

Descartes was one ofthem."10

We will trace Sartre's philosophy right from Descartes onward. If we trace the

past we will see that his philosophy was virtually immanent in the French educational

system. It's true that Sartre found his intellectual starting point in his formal studies- it

was Descartes. "Any study of human reality must begin with the cogito"11, he

declared in Being and Nothingness. To be sure Sartre reformulates "I think therefore

I am," to reveal two distinct states of consciousness, but even as he corrected

Descartes and built on his legacy, he accepts the inner sense of self-certainty as his

absolute intellectual starting point. He begins with consciousness aware of itself,

consulting itself, questioning itself, proving its own existence to itself Indeed his

argument for freedom, a crucial theme in his work, based itself on the Cartesian

discussion of doubt.

Descartes was only a starting point. Sartre develops his characteristic themes

with the cogito as his point of departure, but in a direction sharply opposed to his

predecessors who drew their inspiration from Descartes. If he began from the cogito,

10• Bhadra, Mrinal. Kanti., A Critical Survey of Phenomenology and Existentialism, I CPR in association

with Allied Publishers, New Delhi, 1990, p. 126-127. 11

. Sartre, Jean. Paul., Being and Nothingness, Trans.by Hazel. E. Barnes. New York. 19. p. 89.

26

he refused, nevertheless, to dissolve all reality into consciOusness, as he judged

idealist to have done. Existentialism in general is an irrational school of philosophy,

which rejects all scientific and logical thinking "it is opposed to what it called

speculative system of Kantianism and Hegelianism." 12 John Macquarrie in defining

Existentialism states "what then are the basic characteristics belonging to this style of

philosophizing? The first and the most obvious one is that this style of philosophizing

begin from man rather than from nature. It is philosophy of the subject rather than of

the object. But one might say that idealism too took its starting point in the subject.

Thus one must further qualify the existentialist position by saying that for the

existentialist the subject is the existent in the whole range of his existing. He is not

only a thinking subject but also an initiator of action and center of feeling. It is this

whole spectrum of existence, known directly and concretely in the act of existing, that

Existentialism tries to press."13

What does this mean? He further clarifies thus, "We have said that his kind of

Philosophy begins from man, but from man as an existent rather than man as a

thinking subject. In stressing existence, it is also implied, that one cannot posit a

'nature'or an 'essence' of man, and than go on to make deduction about him."14

This is the core of Existentialist philosophy and Sartre says, 'Existence precedes his

12. Gupta, Suman., Twentieth Century Philosophy p. 99.

13• Macquarrie, John., Existentialism, Penguin Book Ltd .. England. 1985, p. 14-15.

14. Ibid, p.l5.

27

Essence.' Sartre holds, "We mean that man first of all exists, encounters himself,

surges up in the world-and defines himself afterwards. If man, as the existentialist

sees him, is not definable, it is because to begin with he is nothing. He will not be any

thing until later~ and then he will be what he makes of himself later."15 Thus Sartre

separated existence from essence.

John Macquarrie in defining 'existence' and 'essence' in the context of

Existentialism states, "To say that anything 'exists' is simply to point to the fact 'that

it is' ... If existence of anything has to do with the fact, 'that it is' its 'essence'

consists in 'what it is'. The essence of an object is constituted by those basic

characteristics that make it one kind of object rather than another. The essence of the

silver dollar would be described in terms of its colour, metallic luster, composition,

weight, specific gravity, shape, inscription, and so on. One would have to mention all

the characteristics that are necessary to define this as a dollar rather than any thing

else. It follows then that essence is characterized by abstractness and universality.

Furthermore, essences lend themselves to the operations of rational thought, to

analysis, comparison and synthesis which the sheer contingency 'Thatness' of

existence resists."16

1 s . Sartre, J. P., Existentialism is Humanism, in Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre. edited Walter Kaufarnann, Cleveland. 1956, p. 289.

16• Macquarrie, John., Existentialism. Penguin Book Ltd .. England. 1985. p. 61.

28

According to Sartre man is pure existence. It is pure consciOusness and

subjectivity having no determination. And, since for Sartre, pure consciousness has no

determinants, it is equivalent to nothing. Pure subjectivity as consciousness Sartre

defines as 'being-for-itself' and the inanimate world as 'being-in-itself'

In this we see that Sartre retains Descartes Dualism of Mind and Body or

Consciousness and Matter. Hazel. E. Barnes holds that consciousness of Sartre is

different from Descartes cogito because Sartre conceives consciousness as pre­

reflective whereas Descartes holds Cogito to be reflective. Sartre is opposed to

Descartes and here Hazel E. Barnes states. "Most important is Sartre's rejection of the

primacy of Cartesian cogito. He objects that in Descartes formula 'I think~ therefore I

am' the consciousness which says 'I am' is not actually the consciousness which

thinks. Instead we are dealing with a secondary activity. Similarly, says Sartre,

Descartes has confused spontaneous doubt, which is an act, when we catch a

glimpse of an object, there may be a doubting consciousness of the object as

uncertain, but Descartes cogito has posited this consciousness itself as an object~ the

Cartesian cogito is not one with the doubting consciousness but has reflected upon it.

In other words this cogito is not Descartes doubting: it is Descartes reflecting upon

doubting ... the Cartesian cogito is reflective, and its object is not itself but the

original consciousness of doubting. The consciousness, which doubted is now

reflected on by the cogito but was never itself reflective; its only object is the object ,

29

which it is conscious of as doubtful. These conclusions lead Sartre to establish the

pre-reflective cogito as the primary consciousness, and in all of his later work he

makes this his original point of departure. " 17

Thus we see that Sartre completely separates the subject and object,

consciousness and matter. He holds that the subject if it becomes the object will

negate itself This is so because, to be an object of knowledge it should have some

qualities. In the same way for Descartes cogito alerts such qualities as thinking,

believing, knowing and willing. Sartre says that he though rejects the Cartesian

dualism of Mind and Body separation, but he still holds the dualism of subject-object

separation. In the words of Prof Swnan Gupta "Characterization, Sartre maintained,

means that it is determined, and if consciousness is determined it cannot be free.

Sartre held that consciousness-the 'being-for-itself -is always directed towards the

object- 'the-being-in-itself'- but it cannot be an object."18 So for Sartre in the act of

knowing the object the subject is also revealed.

Here one may ask why Sartre takes so much pain to establish the separate

mode of knowing the subject? Finally the basic question in all philosophical

endeavors is four- fold i.e.

"(i) What is the nature ofmari?

17 . Gupta, Suman., Twentieth Century Philosophy. p. 103.

18 . Ibid. p. 103.

30

(ii) What is the nature ofthe world?

(iii) What is the relation of man and the world?

(iv) What is the relation of man and man." 19

The behaviorist conceives the nature of man as biological. They are Vulgar

Materialist; they reduce mind to matter. Man, for them is a part of material world. The

Idealist on the other hand reduces matter to consciousness. We may mention here that

though in his book Critique of Dialectical Reason, Sartre criticizes both Idealist and

Vulgar Materialist and himself advocates Cartesian Dualism. It may be mentioned

here that "though Sartre referred to Dialectical materialism's, he interpreted it in

terms of Vulgar Materialism's and thus failed to grasp the development of

consciousness through social labour. "20

Sartre adopts ideas and concepts from other writers without working in their

tradition and he gives them a highly individual meaning. This is true in his treatment

of Descartes. One result of this isolation from an established tradition is that

influences such as personal history and class position, that in other writers remain m

the background, can be fairly easily discovered in his work.

Locke's philosophy is greatly influenced by his predecessors Descartes and in

19. Ibid., p. 104.

20 . Ibid., p. 105.

3 1

tum it influences its successors including Sartre. We, here will, now begin by giving a

short account of Locke's philosophy. Though Descartes is an rationalist and Locke is

an empericist, yet Locke accepts Cartesian dualism, with all its implications and

regards it (Dualism) as the unquestionable premises of his philosophy.

Let us now discuss in brief the three British Empiricist philosophers.

Epistemologically speaking John Locke (1632-1704) considers sense experience as

the only source of knowledge. "As opposed to the philosophy of the feudal era this

philosophy had to be such that it could generate a greater interest in the material

world. Thus Locke felt the necessity of accommodating materialism in his Ontological

framework. "21

Though Locke rejects the rationalism of Descartes, he accepts Cartesian

dualism. In his epistemology he advocates empiricism. He says, for instance "Let us

then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without

any ideas: how comes it to be furnished hence comes it by that vast stone, which the

busy and the boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety?

Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer in one

21 • Ibid., p. 38.

32

word, from expenence: m that all our knowledge ts founded, and from: that it

ultimately derives itself"22

By expenence Locke meant only something abstract and discrete 'simple

ideas', of heat, sweetness etc. He does not mean by it the practical activity of social

man. "Scientific knowledge does not deal with externally related isolated discrete

ideas as Locke assumed but it embodies internally related causal laws of development

ofnatural and social reality."23

Locke says 'Mind is tabula Rasa', its a blank sheet of paper. Initially it is

without any qualities, and this is the Nothingness of Sartre. Sartre assumes the self-

but since; there is no attribute, so it is nothing. The dominant theme of his earlier

work is freedom and contingency.

Man is seen as contingent, as having no reason for being in the world, and as a

'nothingness'in relation to the solidarity of the world around him. This nothingness is

the source ofman's 'total freedom.'

Now coming to Berkeley (1685-1783) we see that this thread was taken by

him, who showed that if we begin from 'simple ideas', as the only entities given

in sense experience we can never draw a distinction between the ideas of primary and

22 • Locke, John., An Essay Concerning !Iuman Understanding. edited by A.D.Woozlcly. the tontana Library, Philosophy 1973. p. 89.

23 . Gupta, Suman., The origin and Theories of !.inguistic Philosophy, I.P.H. 1983, p. 42.

33

secondary qualities. Berkeley rejects Locke's position that, though we are confined to

our simple ideas, we can know material substance and its primary qualities as their

causes. Thus Berkeley instead of accepting the dualism of Descartes as is done by

Locke rejects completely the material substance and its primary qualities as

knowledge. He criticizes Locke's distinction between his existence of primary and

secondary qualities and argues against this Locke's position that objects exist only if

they are perceived. Esse est percipi - 'To exist is to be perceived' he points out

" ....... The various sensations, or ideas imprinted on the sense, however, blended or

combined together (that is, whatever objects they compose), can not exist otherwise

than in a mind perceiving them. "24

Berkeley in order to show that the things still continue existing, when no body

is perceiving and here he introduces the concept of God. He holds that when we do

not perceive, God perceives them and consequently things continue to exist. And

here we may also mention that since common sense views is that there are objective

causal connections in the world that is, existence of object in other word do not

depends upon the perception of man. Berkeley further posits the objective causal

connections in God. Things are causally connected not because the subject or the

perceiver connects each other, but in Berkeley's view, it is God who causes

connection between various objects. But what do Berkeley introduces? one may ask.

24 • Berkeley, George., The Principles of !Iuman Knowledge. edited by M. Warnock G.J. 1955. Page. 72.

34

That is to say a view of the world which is so different, both from common sense and

from scientific world view, the answer to this question rests upon Berkeley's objective

in Philosophizing it. Berkeley is a bishop who aims at refuting atheism and it bases

materialism through his philosophy.

Berkeley advocates subjective Idealism by holding that the ultimate reality is

mental and that ideas depend on perceiving subject for their existence. It is in this

way, Berkeley differs from Descartes position that mind can know it's own ideas. His

aim is basically "a refutation of materialism and a defense of idealistic empiricism. "25

It is in this way we find that Berkeley, from Descartes proposition that, 'mind

can know its own ideas' draws the conclusion that from this premises mind can not

step out of the ideas through experience and can know a reality existing independently

of experience. Berkeley from Cartesian dualism and from its implications means that

mind can know its own ideas and mind is prior to matter. On the basis of empiricism

he draws his philosophy of Subjective Idealism. One may ask why does Berkeley

introduces the concept of God.

Here one may argue that to hold that things exist because they are perceived

by God is so contradictory to common sense position that it looks strange for any one

to uphold such a position. It seems to us that the motive which lie behind Berkeley's

Gupta, Suman., The OriKin and Theories of LinKZJislic Philosophy [A Marxist point of view[. Intellectual Publishing House. New Delhi 1983, p. 49.

35

position of subjective idealism can be attributed to his theological commitment rather

than its logical validity. This theological commitment in our view, which arises out of

it is the desire to refute atheism. Atheism according to him rests upon materialism and

thus for refuting atheism Berkeley considers it necessary to refute materialism.

Sartre argues that Berkeley deduces the object to the subject. Ideas for their

existence are dependent upon the perceiving subject. Sartre argues against Berkeley's

subjective idealism because "It seems that the famous formula of Berkeley cannot

satisfy us for two essential reasons, one concerning the nature of the percipi, the other

that ofthe percipere. The nature ofpercipere: If every metaphysics in fact presupposes

a theory of knowledge, every theory of knowledge in true presupposes a metaphysics.

This means among other things that an idealism's intent on reducing being to the

knowledge, which we have of it ought first to give some kind of guarantee for the

being of knowledge. If one begins, on the other hand, by taking the knowledge as a

given, without being concerned to establish a basis for its being, and if one then

affirms that esse est percipi, the totality 'perceived-perception' lacks the support of a

solid being and so falls away in nothingness. Thus the being of knowledge cannot be

measured by knowledge; it is not subject to percipi. Therefore the foundation of being

for the percipere and percipi cannot itself be subject to the percipi; it must be

transphenomenal. Let us return now to our point of departure. We can always agree

that the percipi refers to a being not subject to the laws ofthe appearance, but we still

36

maintain that this transphenomenal being is the being of the subject. Thus the percipi

would refer to the percipient - the known to knowledge and knowledge to the being

who knows (in his capacity as being, not as being known)~ that is, knowledge refers

. ,26 to consciOusness.

Thus for Sartre, Berkeley is not right in first assuming knowledge as given

and then deducing the existence of the subject from it. The subject or the cogito,

which he calls (being-in-itself) in Sartre's view, cannot be identified with the

knowing subject. Pure consciousness, for Sartre, is neither identical with the known

object nor is it identical with feelings and emotions. Knowledge according to Sartre

refers to consciousness in exactly the same way as feelings or emotions or an action

refers to consciousness. For Sartre subject reveals it self He said, " ... every positional

consciousness of an object is at the same time a non-positional consciousness of

itself"27

Now after a brief account of the empiricist tradition in the philosophy of

Locke and Berkeley we take up in our analysis David Hume' s position. The classical

empiricism started since Locke. Hume by taking the mental side of Cartesian dualism

i.e. mind can know only its own ideas not only accepts the Barkelean position that the

material substance, which can never be given in sense experience cannot exist. But

26. Sartre, Jean. Paul., Being and Nothingness (op.cit.), p. 10.

27 . Ibid .• p. 13.

37

further argues that mind as the subject of knowledge equally is inaccessible to sense

experience and consequently, in Hume's, view, does not exist. Thus empiricism

started by Locke logically culminates in the philosophy of Hume in terms of the

denial of both mental and material substance. Hume separates the empirical

knowledge from logical knowledge. Empirical knowledge or knowledge derived from

sense experience, Hume calls~ matter of fact and logical knowledge he designates as

relation of ideas. Taking up the thread from Berkeley, Hume ( 1711-1776) has

reduced the whole reality to mental, discrete 'impression'. Hume has divided all

kinds, i.e. states to relations of ideas and matter of fact. He states that "All the

objects of human reason or inquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds of wit,

'relation of ideas' and 'matter of fact'. Ofthe first kind are the sciences of Geometry,

Algebra and Arithmetic and in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or

demonstratively certain ... that three times five is equal to the half of thirty, expresses a

relation between these numbers. Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the

mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is any where existent in the

universe... Matters of fact, which are the second, objects of human reason are not

ascertained in the same manner, nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a

life mature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible~

because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the

same facility and distinctness as if ever so comfortable to reality. That is the sun will

not rise tomorrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more

38

contradictions than the affirmation, that it will arise. We should in vain, therefore,

attempt to demonstrate its false hood. Were it demonstrated false, it would imply a

contradiction and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind. "28

For Hume knowledge derived from the sense i.e. matter of fact is only

probable where as certainty and universality can be attributed only to relation of ideas,

which do not assert any existence, and consequently is not open to the senses. The

second category of knowledge for him is only tautology i.e. it does not give any new

information. The only difference between the impressions and ideas according to

him, is that of degree in the sense that where as the ideas are more vivid then the

impressions. In other wards it is a matter of degree and not of kind. For Hume there

is only the appearances and no essences, which might have caused these

appearances. Ontologically speaking the impressions and ideas are the same. Thus

for Hwne all impressions are derived from experience. Every impression i.e. ideas is

an impermanent discreet unit. For him both self and material objects are nothing but

bundles of 'impressions. '

Hwne denies essences and accepts only the appearances. He states that all

knowledge must be found upon experience. But facts are not necessarily facts of

nature only. Essences are also another kind of fact, which may not be revealed to

empirical seeing. Both inHume's philosophy as well as in the philosophy of Berkeley,

:s. Hume, David., A Treaties of Human nature, Book I. edited D.G.C.Macnable 1962, p. 234.

39

there has been a radical attempt to shake off the foundation of dogmatic objectivism-a

tendency, which wanted to accept the objective validity of everything transcendent

without a critical inquiry.

Thus Hume denies causally interconnected, changing, objective reality and its

cognition through man's practical activity. We may sum up Hume by saying that all

that exists are only the 'impressions', which are given in 'sense experience'.

Ontologically speaking Hume's 'impressions' are nothing but particular appearances,

without having any essence. This Ontological aspect i.e. the acceptance of appearance

and rejection of essence is also the starting point of Sartrean Ontology in his work

Being and Nothingness. To trace the influence of Hume's Philosophy in Sartre we

find that, he rejects the distinction between the appearance and essence, the possibility

and the actuality. He says: 'We can equally reject the dualism of appearance and the

essence'. The appearance, in his view, does not hide the essence, it reveals it; it is the

essence.

We find that an analysis of scientific knowledge, reveals, as opposed to

Sartrean position that there is an interdependence of appearance and essence.

Scientific knowledge is the discovery of essences from appearances. Sartre conceives

that there is no distinction between appearance and essence. That is for him "all

appearance have equal status."29 And Consequently appearances in Sartre's view do

29• Sartre, Jean. Paul., Being and NothinKness. op.cit.. p. 5

40

not lead to any thing else that is essence. But in general there is a unity between

essence and appearance. There can not be an essence without its appearance and

vice versa. We find that though essence and appearance are inseparably linked, they

are not identical. The discovery of essence constitutes the scientific explanation of the

appearance. Marx in this context states "All science would be superfluous if the

outward appearance and the essence of things directly coincided. ''30 And it is only on

the basis of the knowledge of the law of transformation of the objective reality that

man can actually transform it. It is in this sense that man interacts with nature. We

find that the whole development of man, his production, his civilization and culture

are dialectically interlinked with man's cognition of the laws of objective reality.

For Sartre his denial of essence logically implies the denial of the category

of possibility. For Sartre reality consists in its appearing. He says "The appearance

which manifest the existent are neither interior nor exterior; they are equal, they all

refer to other appearances, and none of them are privileged."31 So Sartre conceives

the categories of essence and appearance, as dualistic and he accepts the former ones

and rejects the latter. Here we see that Sartre accepts the ontological status of only the

appearances.

We in our thesis will attempt to show that appearances and essences can not

30 . Marx., Karl., Capital- Vol. III. op.cit. p. 10.

31 . Sartre, Jean. Paul .• Being and Nothingness. op. cit. p. 3

41

be separated. In other words appearances must have an essence and the essence must

be manifested in appearances. The word 'must' here is used in the sense that

scientific knowledge logically assumes in our view an interdependence of

appearances and essence. In the context of essence, Sartre was also right in rejecting

both Kants unknown and unknowable 'Things-in-itself and God as the essence

behind the appearances. In accepting only the appearance and denying the essence,

we find that Sartre's position comes very close to that ofHume.

Hume in the form of 'impression' accepts only the appearances and denies the

essences. As Sartre rejects essences and accepts only the appearances he, in

conformity with his thesis also rejects Kants 'thing-in-itself. Sartre's argument for

rejecting Kant's thing - in - itself is that, since thing-in-itself can never be given in

sense experience and consequently is unknown and unknowable, so it can not exist.

In this respect Sm:tre's position is identical with that with ofHume. As Sartre accepts

Cartesian Dualism, for him "body belongs to the out side world, being subject to the

laws of the material world and consciousness to the inner world revealing itself

through intuition. "32

Coming back to the positions in which he accepts the body as a component of

the external world Sartre states, "my body and consciousness are two distinct

realities and my bodily organs are known to me in exactly the same way as other

32. Ibid, p. 402 .

42

objects in the material world."33 Sartre in conformity with Cartesian dualism accepts

the objective material reality. This seems to be the case when he separates within the

individual his mind from his body. Mind for him is pure consciousness and body is

posited in the objective material world. But in this regard his position seems to be

contradictory because as stated earlier when he denies the essence and accepts only

the appearances then the denial of essence also implies the denial of existing objective

reality. Thus Sartre like Descartes regards mind and body as two separate realms of

reality. Regarding the separation of mind and body Sartre states, "In fact they are

radically distinct, and they exist on two incommunicable levels. "34

Here we have shown Sartre, s Ontology as identical with Cartesian Dualism.

Sartre himself claims that he is not in agreement with Descartes dualism.

Sartre's difference with Descartes rests on the ground that whereas mind or

consciousness of Descartes is a substance having content, Sartre, s concept of

consciousness is nothing. Even though Sartre claims that there is a difference between

Descartes cogito and his own being-for-itself as nothing, but when we analyze the

characteristics of Descartes cogito we find that it can only be conceived as vacuous.

This is so because the cogito of Descartes is nothing but pure consciousness, and all

the characteristics of man, Descartes posits in the body. In this respect the two

positions namely that of Descartes and Sartre are exactly the same. In this context

33. Ibid., p. 402 .

34 • Ibid., p. 403 .

43

ontologically speaking, there is no difference between Descartes 'spiritual substance

or cogito' and Sartre's 'being-for-itself as 'nothing'. Similarly so Descartes defines

substance as follows: "By substance we can understand nothing else than a thing

which, so exists that we need no other things in order for it to exist."35

It is the

spiritual substance or cigito, of Descartes, which is exactly the same as Sartre's

'being-for-itself or consciousness.

According to Prof Suman Gupta "we call his position eclectic because Sartre,

in our view, confused between Materialism and Kantianism."36 The problem of the

possibility, of knowledge was posed to Kant by the philosophy of David Hume. It

was Hume's agnostic position, which posed a problem to Kant. According to Kant

one does have universal and necessary knowledge. Yet Kant accepts Hume's position

that 'impressions' or appearance or what Kant calls representations are the only

objects which can be given in sense-experience. Kant also like the Empiricist

Philosophers Locke, Berkeley and Hume assumes mind to be pure consciousness or

cogito of Descartes. Kant regards categories of understanding as a priori. For Kant,

knowledge is the unity of both categories of understanding and sensory experience,

and knowledge is the knowledge of only the phenomena. But for Kant, beyond

phenomena there is neumena which, since it is never given in experience is unknown

and unknowable. In the region of neumena Kant includes existence of God,

35. Descartes, Rene' .,Meditation, p. 89.

36 .Gupta, Suman., Twentieth Century Philosophy. (Global Philosophy for Every one) p. 114.

44

immortality of should and Freedom of will. What is given in sensory expenence,

according to Kant, is caused by something which transcends experience which Kant

calls 'the-thing-in-itself.' Kant in his book Critique of Pure Reason used the concepts

of neumena and 'the thing-in-itself' identically and at other places he made distinction

between these two concepts. But it seems to us that we can not draw the distinction

between neumena and thing-in-itself because both of them are unknown and

unknowable. For Kant the subject of knowledge is the prerequisite of all knowledge

because the discrete, unconnected data of knowledge is organized through the

'categories of understanding', by the subject. Kant calls the phenomenal subject as

'unity of apperception'. This Kant's phenomenal subject which is unity of

apperception is Sartre's pre-reflective consciousness. There is a distinction between

Hume and Sartre on one hand and Kant on the other. For both Hume and Sartre mind

is bereft of all the qualities. Where as in the case of Kant the categories of

understanding is posited in mind which has the capacity of performing the function of

schematizing the discreet 'representations' given in experience. But there is a further

difference between Hume and Sartre on the question of the nature of the subjects

which is given in the experience to the subject. Hume's position is very clear that this

object can not be any thing else but mental. This is so because Hume denies the

existence of the material substance.

45

In case of Sartre some times it appears that the object is mental like that of

Hume while at other times it appears to be material. When Sartre denies the essence

and asserts the existence of appearance as the only entity given, is experience to the

subject then it seems that the appearance of Sartre and impressions of Hume are

identical. But at other time when Sartre in the context of body or being-in-itself

attributes all the material qualities to them, it seems that the object is material. It is in

this sense that Sartre's position seems to be contradictory. In Kant's view the subject

of knowledge is prior to all knowledge. Sartre rejects Kant's 'thing-in-itself as the

cause of the appearances or the given data of sensory experience. Sartre' s appearances

are different from Kant's world of Phenomena. This is because 'whereas Kant's mind

imposes 'forms of intuition' and 'categories of understanding' on the given data to

constitute a synthetic whole as the object of knowledge, Sartre mind or consciousness

as 'nothing' is completely divorced from the object. And if from Kant's world of

Phenomena 'Forms of Intuition' and 'Categories ofunderstanding' are excluded then

only the 'Impressions' ofHume are left. Now we may ask, are Sartre's 'appearances'

or 'being-in-itself identical with Hume's 'Impressions'? Sartre's position in this

context is eclectic. "37 Here we can say that Sartre tries to identify his 'appearances' or

'being-in-itself' with Hume's 'Impressions' but still stating being-in-itself, he takes

somewhat Mechanical Materialist approach. Thus m this way "Sartre accepts

3, . Gupta, Suman., Twentieth Century Philosophy. p. 116.

46

Husserl's concept of the Phenomena and Husserl, m his turn, accepts Hume's

'I . ' th . ,Js mpress10ns as e gtven appearances.

Sartre states "Thus we arrive at the idea of the Phenomena such as we can find

for example in the 'Phenomenology' of Husserl ". 39 But for Sartre consciousness as

'Nothing' has no essence, for Husserl, on the contrary, the purpose of his descriptive

phenomenology is to arrive at the essence of the structure of consciousness. And

because of Husser I' s acceptance of consciousness Sartre regards him as close to Kant.

Sartre says: "His (Husserl's) phenomenalism at every moment border on Kantian

idealism. "40

Sartre adopts the Husserlian phenomenological method to analyze the different

layers of human existence. We also find that he calls his major philosophical work

Being and Nothingness 'Phenomenological Ontology'. But it is an Ontology of

human existence, not of some ultimate being. He wants to analyze human life or

reality in all its aspects, such as man's experience, perception, emotion and the

varieties of mental life. Sartre while stating the ontology of human existence discusses

only the conscious aspect of existence of Being. We in our next chapter with

the conformity with this interpretation try to bring out the biologico-social nature of

38 . Ibid, p. 117.

39. Sartre, Jean. Paul., Being and Nothingness. p. 4.

40. Ibid., p. 119.

47

being.

The earlier work of Sartre show a search of various aspects of human

experience and existence and they have prepared Sartre to reach his fundamental

ontological conclusions. Sartre is aware of the fact that ontological theories have to

be established on the basis of a philosophical method. Sartre shares with Husserl and

Heideggar the basic idea of phenomenology.

The Phenomenological studies are more detailed in his earlier work on

Imagination and Emotion. Sartre published Imagination in 1936. This book was a

part of Sartre's diploma in advanced studies. This book bore the subtitle of

'A Psychological Critique '. He in this book reviewed article on the different theories

of the imagination developed since Descartes. Sartre defined phenomenology as a

"description of transcendental consciousness based on intuition of essence of these

structures. lbis description takes place, of course, on the level of reflection~ but

reflection must not be confused with introspection, which is a special mode of

reflection aimed at grasping and establishing empirical facts.'.-41 Sartre's basic thrust

in this work was to see the consequences of phenomenology over any theory of

consciousness or imagination as inevitably error free, "Sartre maintained that all

41 . Sartre, Jean. Paul., A Psychological Critique, Translated with introduction by Forrest Williams. Anna Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1962. p. 128.

48

history of study of imagination is a tale of monumental error-the error being the

assumption that images are things between imagining and perceiving."42

In Being and Nothingness, both ontological theorizing and phenomenological

investigation go together. There are brilliant examples of the phenomenological

analysis in Being and Nothingness, such as 'bad faith', 'relations with the others',

which we will discuss in the second chapter. In this book-written earlier to Being and

Nothingness, entitled The Transcendence of the Ego, ontology is concealed under

Phenomenological studies. In his Phenomenological study of emotion or imagination

it seems that he is more interested in what the investigations lead to about the nature

of consciousness or freedom or man's relation within the world. Sartre published this

book in a yearly periodical Les Research Philosophiques in 1937. Sartre has written

this long essay subtitled An Existentialist Theory of Consciousness during his stay in

the French Institute of Berlin, in 1934. In his work Sartre "on it lined-in Husserlian

perspective, but contrary to some of Husserle's most recent theories-the relationship

between the conscious mind and also established a distinction which Sartre was to

maintain permanently, between the conscious mind and psyche."43

Sartre claims to derive the nature of consciousness in The Transcendence of

the Ego from the phenomenologicaly given. He says that the transcendental 'I' is not

42. Ibid., p. v.

43. Bcauvoir, Simone. de., The Prime of Life, Penguin Books. England, 1981. p. 185.

49

given m our pre-reflective expenence. If we have to be true to what is given

immediately to our experience, then we have to reject the transcendental ego. It is, in

other words called the 'phenomenological reduction'. Husser] accepts the principle of

epoch with the idea of thoroughgoing phenomenological reduction, but unlike

Sartre, he does not carry the demand of the epoch to its logical conclusion. Here we

can compare Sartre with Hume who carries out logical implication to empiricism by

denying a substantial ego. Husser] understands by the phenomenological epoch the

bracketing of the presuppositions including our belief in the reality of the world. But

Sartre also wants to accept only what is given in 'immediate experience'. If Sartre

wants to accept only the immediately given, then Husserlian notions like the

transcendental ego cannot be accepted and belief in the existence of the world cannot

be suspended.

In Emotions [1939] Sartre makes use of Heideggers philosophy to come to

terms with that of Husserl's. Sartre agreed with Heidegger's view that the notion of

the world and the human reality Dasein are inseparable. Sartre argues that one must

differentiate between all research into man from other type of strict investigation

because human reality is ourselves. Sartre quotes from Heidegger' s Being and Time:

"the existent that we have to analyze is ourselves. The being is this existent is my

50

own."44 Sartre defined phenomenology in the light of his agreement with Heidegger,

that phenomenology is the study of phenomena and not fact.

By phenomena Sartre meant that which 'announces' its reality in appearance.

Sartre elaborated that 'announcement of itself' as being ofthe 'existent' as not a thing

'behind which' there was something which does not yet appear. For Heidegger to

exist, according to Sartre, was to assume its own being in an existential mode of

understanding. Different from this was Husserelian stance of which Sartre rejected,

'to exist is to consciousness to appear to itself' Sartre took appearance to be absolute

and theorized that 'only this appearance has to be described and inquired.' Sartre

defines Emotion: "what is this we know from the very beginning~ an emotion signifies

in its own manner the whole of the consciousness, or, if we take our stand on the

existential plane, ofthe human reality."4s

Sartre asserts that it is neither contingent that human reality expresses itself as

a particular synthesis of facts nor is it an effect of human reality itself that becomes

the reality of emotion. Emotion, Sartre clarified "It is the human reality itself realizing

in the form of emotion. Hence it is impossible to regard emotion as a psycho-

physiological disorder. It has essence, it's meaning. It cannot possibly come from

44 • Sartre, Jean. Paul., Sketch for the Theory of Emotion. Trans by Phillips Marret with a Preface by Mary Warnock, Matheue & Co Ltd London 1962. p. 23.

45 . Ibid., p. 27-28.

51

outside human reality. It is man on the contrary who assumes his emotion, and

emotion is therefore an organized form ofhuman existence."46

Husserl's phenomenological method is mainly concerned with the analysis of

the structures of consciousness that constitute the world. But he does not show how

consciousness is connected with the main purpose of life. Sartre points out that it is

the nature of consciousness to be intentional, to point to other thing that are not

conscious, but ofwhich it is conscious. For Sartre consciousness is 'nothing' and has

no essence but for Husserl as we have earlier stated, that his descriptive

phenomenology is meant to arrive at the essence of the structure of consciousness. In

a symposium on Phenomenology and Linguistic Analysis A. J. Ayer said

'phenomenologist, have a very important presupposition. It is the assumption that the

being of things is identical with there being for consciousness. This principle may be

interpreted realistically and will then imply things that are unaffected by our

consciousness of them. It can also have an idealistic interpretation that they are the

products of consciousness. Descartes doubted in the reality of the external world.

Descartes accepts without any hesitation the reality of self, which is nothing but an

existent in the external. But if the world is already presupposed, then it is absurd to

ask how the reality of the world can be proved.

46 . Ibid, P.28.

52

Here Husser I introduces the principal of bracketing. In the above statement we

find that A. J. Ayer interprets consciousness in two ways i.e. Idealistically and

Subjective Idealistically. But it seems to us that there is only one way in which we can

accept consciousness. This is so because consciousness we think is the consciousness

of some thing. If it is the consciousness of something then it depends on the person

whose consciousness it is. So the distinction which Ayer draws between

consciousness and what is being 'product of consciousness' can not be logically and

empirically upheld. The existentialist philosophers have often used the

phenomenological method, but their main center of interest is the individual. Hence

the aspects of individual existence has to be analyzed in its participation in the world

of everyday life. Mereleau-Ponty has pointed out that this idea cannot be successfully

carried out, for man is a Being in the world. This is also accepted by Heideggar and

Sartre, though their interpretation of human existence substantially differs from each

other. In fact we find that the relation of man with the world is very intimate. For

Sartre "consciousness of an object is consciousness of being, consciousness of an

object. Thus by nature all consciousness is self consciousness. "47

Sartre in his early book The Psychology of Imagination had already linked

the idea of Nothingness and freedom, "In order to imagine, consciousness must be

free from all specific reality and this freedom must be able to define itself by a being­

in-the-world which is at once the constitution and the negation of the world. This

47 • Ibid., p. XI

53

means that consciousness must be able to effect the emergence of the unreal. The

unreal is produced out side of the world by a consciousness which stays in the world,

and it is because he is transcendentally free that man can imagine. "48

Sartre also designed The Psychology of Imagination as an essay in

phenomenology. He initiated the study of imagination from the hypothesis derived

from phenomenology that imagination is part of consciousness and this imaginative

consciousness is directed upon some object. Sartre argues in this text about the

emergence of space between 'thinking subject' and that which is the object of its

thought, between 'perceiving subject' and that which is perceived only to prove

Being-for-itself 's distance from the world of Being-in-themselves. Comparing a

photograph, a caricature and a Image under the head 'Image Family Sartre states: "In

the last two cases the material can be perceived for-itself~ it is not intended to function

as the material of an image. This photograph taken by itself, is a thing~ I can try to

ascertain the duration of its exposure by its colour, the product used to tone it and fix

it. etc., the caricature is a thing: I can take pleasure in studying its colours without

thinking that they were intended to represent something. The material of the mental

image is more difficult to determine. Can it exist outside the intention? ..... Mental

48. Sartre. Jean. Paul., The Psychology of Imagination, New York: Philosophical Library 19-J8. p. 271.

54

image must also have a material which derives its meaning solely from the intention

which animates it. "49

Sartre theorizes that it is a matter of little theoretical importance whether we

use a physical analogue photographs or whether we use analogue whose material is

derived from the mental world. Sartre maintains that 'mental image is parasitic whose

description cannot be made with reference to that of which it is an image'. What

Sartre tries to study in this that was image having its existence, as an analogue of its

object and made it comparable with any of the physical represeBtation.

Sartre in this text for the first time expounds the concept of Nothingness,

Annihilation etc. Sartre in a Cartesian Husserelian way argues consciousness is quite

unlike anything else and this in respect of is object. Sartre realized the consequences

of such assumption when he took a position that intentional consciousness 'disappear

into nothingness' as awareness of its object at a very moment it realizes it in existence

to be nothing in itself Sartre defines consciousness as grasping and positing of 'what

it is not'. Sartre described image as a carrier of the non-existence of the object of

which it is an image. Sartre has derived his concept of freedom from this thesis of

non-being or nothingness. Sartre insists that 'mans' freedom to act in the world is a

function of his ability to perceive things not only as they are, but also as they are not.

49 .Ibid., p. 17-18.

55

This concept of freedom and concept of imagination became Sartre' s main concern in

his philosophical work which were to follow The Psychology of Imagination.

Sartre's famous slogan: "Man is condemned to be free", carries the core of his

philosophy. Through the above statement he shows his anti-Hegalian view on the

nature of man. Unlike Hegel who puts man merely as a part of a systematic of this

universe, for Sartre any system that is build is not possible without man. Man plays

the pivotal role in any systematic order. He says that, it is the man who makes history.

Man is not a passive actor in the continuous stream of history~ rather he is the maker

ofhis own history. If man has any essence, it is his freedom. 'To be free' is 'to be free

to choose'. Further 'to choose' is 'to choose to act'. So Sartre in this respect may

argue that his freedom is not merely an abstract ontological freedom. In the Critique

of Dialectical Reason he has shown his concern for the concrete man amidst others in

the heart of a society: in series, group, institution, etc. In the philosophy of Sartre the

concept of Consciousness, Nothingness, Alienation, Freedom and Responsibility are

inseparable. This is so because man cannot be free if he is determined either by the

objective or the subjective conditions.

Thus Sartre's conscious man having no determination is nothing. In other

words man is completely divorced from the entire objective and subjective condition.

By objective condition we mean the matter of social world surrounding him and by

subjective condition, it's man's own psychological history. It is in this sense that

56

Sartre's man with his consciousness and nothingness is also alienated from both the

material worlds as well as from other human beings. Thus for Sartre man ts

completely free and thus responsible for all his action. According to him man ts

afraid of his Responsibility and thus lands himself into 'Bad faith'. Bad faith

according to Sartre is lying to one self. This whole-interconnected conceptual network

of Sartre is so interwoven that taking out from it any single brick can lead to the

collapse of whole structure. Thus we find that it's his concept of freedom around

which the whole'-interconnected structure is build. Man being completely free, Sartre

holds, is thus responsible for all his actions. In this way Sartre attempts to resolve the

age-old problem of morality regarding the question of freedom, determinism and

responsibility. It has been argued that if man is completely determined that is to say,

he has no freedom then he can not be held responsible for his action. The

reformative theory in morality holds, not the individual man but the society for all his

actions.

Now if we compare Sartre with Hegel we find that his position is diametrically

opposed to that of Hegel. For Hegel man is the part of the universal system and he is

historically determined, where as for Sartre it is man who forms the history. It's true

that both for Hegel and Sartre man is pure consciousness. It is a fact that Hegel

preceded Husser!, Sartre discusses his position second because he thinks it makes

important advances over Husser I' s approach. Hegel supersedes the Cartesian picture.

57

He makes no effort to prove that other exists or to justify the knowledge one has of

them. Sartre begins with pre-reflective consciousness, contrast his position with that

of realism and idealism, reject any idea of noumenal world behind the phenomenon

and explains his own idea to the transphenomenality of Being. He got evidently the

concept of 'Being-in-itself i.e. 'unconscious Being' and 'Being-for-itself i.e.

'conscious Being' from Hegel's concept of an-sich andfor-sich. I think that in his

own way Sartre recapitulated the development from Hegel to Marx. The point of

departure for Sartre's analysis of human relations in Being and Nothingness is Hegels

dialectics of the Master and Slave. Hegels in The Phenomenology of Mind describes

the development of self consciousness as follows : "consciousness begins in the

attitude of sense certainty, by seeing the things of the world as alien and independent

and opposed to it, and then, after destroying there false objectivity, comes to recognize

itself as lying behind the finished form of things. Self-consciousness is thus the height

of knowledge: mind sees it's categories, its laws, and its activity as constituting the

underlying meaning and nature of the world. At a certain stage in the process of self­

awareness, consciousness needs to be recognized by other consciousness in order to

be sure of itself; 'that is to say, it is only by being acknowledged or recognized'; only

if objectified, that I am sure that I am, and of what I am."so He further states "the

Master is pure consciousness, existing for itself, free before all things and seeing all

things as existing for it. The Slave on the other hand, is not purely for him self. but

50. Hegel, G. W. F .• The PhenomenologyofMind. Trans. J. B. Baaillie. London. 1931. p. 229.

58

for another, i.e., as an existent consciousness, consciousness in the form and shape of

thing hood."51 For Sartre who devotes one third of Being and Nothingness to the

problem of human conflict, Hegel's analysis is far too optimistic. Hegel attempts to

present a dialectic-an upward moving process of development in which the original

conflict would evidently be transcended in a harmonious relationship of equals.

Kierkegaard revolts against the speculative system of Hegel, for he thinks that

in speculative philosophy the individual man vanishes. He points out further that a

logical system is possible, but an existential system is not possible. Kierkegaard was a

true Christian. For him a perfect Christians is one who has faith in his own self He

must transcend the aesthetic and ethical stages and reach the religious stage where he

can transcend the moral and ethical norms of societies and lead a life ·where he

becomes one with his internal voice. He gives the classical example of Abraham who

was ready to sacrifice Issac, his own dear son, for his inner voice[which he

considers to be the voice of God] commands him. He is ready to discard the most

sacred ethical principle of human living i.e., respect for life. The principle of morality

falls short of his faith in the inner self This is where one reaches the stage of

authenticity.

Kierkegaard was also critical of churches and there functioning's in Denmark.

He observed that the prevailing form of Christianity in Denmark was against the very

51 • Ibid., p. 234.

59

spirit of Christianity itself It has reached the institutional form and started exerting its

authority on the people, thus losing the basic spirit of Christianity. What Kierkegaard

dreamt of was the image of a pious Christian and he was afraid that

institutionalization would lead to spiritual bankruptcy. To be Christian is to seek and

realize the hwnility of Christ in one's own life. For Kierkegaard it is on the basis of

self-knowledge that one can understand one's fundamental commitment. The

phenomenological method as devised by Husser! is adopted by Heidegger and Sartre.

Kirekegaard, the founder of existentialism can not be said to adopt this method

because Husser} was active in philosophy in the early decade of the century whereas

Kirekegaard died in 1885. He thinks that Hegel's dialectic is quantitative and

opposed to him, his dialectic is qualitative. Kirekegaard derives his theistic

existentialism from point of view of a Supernatural Being. God is being, and man's

being is his Soul. Whatever is objective and natural has no being of its own. The

being ofnature[including man's body] is derived from the transcendental being that is

God. Now man after falling from the grace of God is thrown into nature.

He criticizes Hegel for his abstraction and idealism. He further criticizes

Hegel for emphasizing the universal and the essence which implies man's social

nature and equality which he (Kierkegaard) stands for the particular and existence, for

the theory of individual as preceding the universal (social) and for the individuals

existence, without any essential determinism. [Hegel poses an abstract universal

60

(spirit) and conceives mans essence idealistically]. Kierkegaard insists existence over

essence. The particulars precedes the universals. He opposes Science and Reason and

identifies human existence with passion (on component of subjectivity). Man to his

mind, is fundamentally individual, and absolutely independent ofhis social fabric. He

states "existence constitutes the highest interest of the existing individual, and his

interest in his existence constitutes his reality. Man is made of two contradicting

elements: mind and body (infinite and finite) though essential qualities of his being

tal · ·tual , S2 are men or spm .

It seems to us that in this respect Kierkegaard takes for granted the Cartesian

Dualism of mind and body. Sartre as an atheist, discards the religious aspect of

Kierkegaards philosophy of existence but retains his theory of the primacy of subject

over object and individual over society. Philosophy in his opinion is primarily

concerned with the individual and his way of life, not with concepts and conceptual

knowledge. To exist, is not to be a knowing subject but to be a moral agent.

Existence, is the significance which one provides for one's own life, through

realization of ones personal freedom and autonomy. He says that the full account of

the individual's existence is obtained in his practical life. He thinks that the life of

action expresses the true nature of human existence.

5~. Kierkegaard. S., Fean and Trembling and the Siekness Unto Death., Prinston, 1975. p. 147-48.

61

Now commg to another important philosopher who influenced Sartre's

thought was non other than Heidegger. It's true that next to Husserl, Heidegger is

the most important thinker for Sartre's early philosophy. In the post war

existentialism, the name Sartre and Heidegger were often linked, evoking two aspects

of a single doctrine, but today they are radically opposed in every respect. The

statement existence precedes essence in Existentialism is a Humanism seems to align

Sartre with a fundamental tenant of Being and Time. But this apparent agreement is

misleading for the two philosophers are diametrically opposed on several basic

themes-consciousness, nothingness, anxiety, others and death.

In Heidegger's opinion existence is realized through different activities while

as Sartre gives emphasis on the individual and his decisions. Heidegger's whole

endeavour was the search for Being. His focus on the distinction among being,

Being and Dasien shows his search for Being. Both Being and being are essences.

Essence of objects is termed as 'being,. His search was for Being which is the

essence of being-human. Dasein has been literally translated as being there I being in

the world. It is man who-is-in-the-world. Man as an authentic existential is Dasein for

Heidegger. Dasein and Being cannot be separated, for Being is posited in Dasein.

Being as an essence is a potentiality, which can not be conceived without the prior

existence of Dasein. Dasein becomes Dasein only because it has 'Being' concealed

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in it. The moment man realizes his potential (Being) he becomes an authentic human

being.

In the philosophy of Kieregaard and Heideggar the existence of individual is

more associated with despair or anxiety. In the philosophy of Heideggar, the

individual has to separate himself from the life the community and the world. He

divides existence into three levels-man, the world, and the things of use. Man does

not realize his existence in the every day life. He has to take over the responsibility of

all his action alone by separating himself completely from everyday activity. There is

no end of anxiety in such an existence, but man has to proceed towards the realization

of his own possibilities through anxiety. In Sartre's philosophy there is an accord

between the feeling of International anxiety and freedom. For Sartre "anxiety is the

reflective apprehension of freedom by itself"s3 As in Being and Time Heidegger calls

into question the very essence of man through the notion of Dasein and being-in-the-

world, and he undertakes a 'destruction' of metaphysics in order to recover the

forgotten meaning ofbeing. In the face of the audacity, Sartre appears conciliatory and

conservative: he seeks to safeguard the great principle of Cartesian and Hegelian

metaphysic i.e. The cogito appears to him to be "the sole secure point of departure"s4,

and Hegelian negatively scaled down to the dimension of individual consciousness

53. Sartre. Jean. Paul., Being and Nothingness .. p. 39.

54 • Ibid .• p. 244 .

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offers him the key to the mind. "Hegel rather than Heidegger IS right when he

states that mind is the negative."55 Always reacting

defensively against Heidegger, Sartre goes so far as to reproach him far a method too

offhand, willingly revolutionary, and speak of "his abrupt, rather barbaric fashion of

cutting Cordian Knots rather than trying to unite them. "56 It seems that Heidegger has

served Sartre not as a source of inspiration but as a foil.

Sartre's earlier work Being and Nothingness and his later work Critique of

Dialectical Reason is influenced by two different trend or schools of Philosophical

thought. His Being and Nothingness ontologically and epistemologically speaking is

mainly influenced by Cartesian dualism and his later work Critique of Dialectical

Reason is influenced by Marxism. Coming to the influence of Descartes on Sartre's

Being and Nothingness we find, it was mainly the mental side of Cartesian dualism

along with British empiricism and Husserlian objective Idealism, which have

influenced it's thought. His Being and Nothingness Vacillates between Cartesian

dualism in which Descartes accepts the existence and knowledge of material realities

and the Empiricist subjective Idealistic position of Berkeley and Hurne.

In Being and Nothingness he was also influenced as we have already seen by

the objective Idealism of Husser) whose methodology, Sartre claims to adopt in his

ss. Ibid., p. 18-19. 56

. Ibid., p. 244 .

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earlier writings. But in his later work that is Critique of Dialectical Reason Sartre

claims to reconcile between Marxism and Existentialism. We find that Sartre often

projects a gloomy picture of man. Sartre along with Camus projects the nature of

absurdity in great detail. He holds that life is absurd for them. Roquintine of Nausea

with constant search for his own self in order to give meaning to existence finally

realizes that human existence itself is contingent, gratuitous and unjustifiable. In his

view it is absurd in the sense that there is no reason for it and further asserts that there

is no out side purpose to give it meaning and direction.

For Sartre human being is not only an object but also a consciousness. It is

true that man is thrown into the world along with inert objects. But he has

distinguished and differentiated himself from these inert objects. Though for Sartre

the for-itself is nothingness, he views it as the source of both absurdity and

meaningfulness. It might sound contradictory. The paradox is: For-itself finds itself as

absurd, yet strives for 'Being' and gives meaning to its own existence.

Sartre's earlier philosophy revolves around the freewheeling nature of

consciOusness. Consciousness is always 'positing' itself in a character. However,

consciOusness does not have a being. It is an operational notion. Through

consciousness man makes projects and visualizes possibilities, further leading to the

performance of action. Sartre is concerned with intentional action, for intentional

action involves responsibility, thus giving room to exercise freedom. If we explain

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Sartre's philosophy in the simplest possible way, it stands as-'the philosophy of

freedom'. But he also realizes at the same time that people living in a de-humanized

condition cannot perhaps visualize the possibility of freedom. Freedom is the goal of

his desire. His activities are not determined by the rules of the external world. Man

exists in the society and though there is an enmity between man and society, man

cannot exist independently of the society.

In his later work Sartre brings freedom as the central theme of his philosophy.

In the Critique of Dialectical Reason he shifts the emphasis of the concept of

freedom from the context of the individual to that of a group. He is interested in the

social nature of man. Sartre studies the nature of ensembles in the form of Series,

Group and Institution. Series and Institutions are perverted forms for they are marked

by Seriality. Fused group on the other hand is genuine and authentic form of an

ensemble. People assemble to form groups out of reciprocity (genuine feeling for

some cause). A revolutionary group, for instance, is a fused group for the members of

group assembled with a certain sense of responsibility and it involves the exercise of

their individual freedom in the form of group or axis (constituted praxis).

Sartre was deeply impressed by Marxism and he claims Marxism as the

philosophy of our time and Existentialism as the sub-ideology of Marxism. He tries to

blend Existentialism with Marxism. He claims to be a liberal Marxist and shows

strong reservation over Stalinism through out his writings in Existentialism and

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Humanism and The Prohlem of Method. He borrowed several Marxist terms but at

the same time coined new concepts like 'practico-inerfand 'lack', which we will

discuss in the third chapter. But there are new versions of the Marxist terms- 'product

of human labour' and 'scarcity' respectively. Practico- inert however has a wider

denotion not merely confining to the product of human labour but also consisting of

abstract human constructs like society, institution etc. Sartre further distinguishes

between individual praxis (constitutive praxis) and group praxis (constituted praxis).

Group praxis is not opposed to individual praxis. Individual form group through

common goals and projects, which each member of the group finds as an individual

goal, too. This does not however imply that individual and group praxis is

synonymous. There are possibilities of clashes of values. In this thesis attempts have

been made to elucidate some of the important issues keeping in view the central

theme ofSartre's philosophy.

It is also important to note that his two important works with which we are

dealing, were written under two extreme different historical situations. He wrote

Being and Nothingness during the Second World War. He him self in an interview to

Leo Fretz on Nov. 25,1976 admits that,

" Do not forget that I wrote Being and Nothingness during the occupation.

We were occupied here. I did some work in the resistance like every one else

and Being and Nothingness was also a book against the Germans It has an

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anti German aspect and there is more certainly some violence in it and more

generally some antipathy."

His analyses were strongly influenced by the war. He further states that .....

Personally I see my life as the life of an anarchist individual until 1939, and

in 1939 certain short of communication with the people whom I loved during

the war and there after in capacity~ then from 1940, under the monstrous

condition that characterized the occupation, the societal comes into my field of

vision. I see how people associate with each other and I see that as something

that must be changed by the disappearance of the occupation force~ and thus

since1945, I began to take part in politics and to think about the Social, which

terminated as you know, with the Critique of Dialectical Reason.

He further asserts that ...... .

my life is certainly consists of three parts. An anarchistic individualistic

part, a transition period, wherein one may speak of a development, of a coming

into contact with the Societal in many ways. The war taught me the societal, as

did the prison camp, and there after the return home and the struggle of the

French against the Germans, the resistance and the liberation-and from that

moment their is a new attitude, that of the Individual in the society, of the

person in society.

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Here is selection from Simone de Beaivoirs well known description of the

psychological conditions under which Sartre wrote the Critique.

Sartre managed [in the midst of extreme emotional tension due in part to

events during the Algerian war] by writing furiously his Critique of Dialectical

Reason. He did not work as he usually did, with pauses, erasing, tearing up

pages, begning them again. For hours at a stretch, he sped from pages to pages

without re reading them, as if waylaid by ideas that his pen, even at full tilt,

could not keep up with. To keep up this pace, I could here him crunching

corydrame capsule, of which he swallowed a tube a day. By the end of the

afternoon, his gestures would become uncertain, and often he get his words

mixed up. We spent our evening at my apartment. As soon as he drank a glass

ofwiskey, the alcohol would go straight to his head. 'That's enough I'd say

to him. But for him it was not enough, against my will I would hand him a

second glass, then he'd ask for a third; two years before he'd have needed a

great deal more, now he lost control of his movements and his speech very

quickly, and I would say again: 'that's enough two or three times I became

violently angry and sent a glass crashing against the tiled floor of the kitchen.

But it exhausted me to quarrel with him and I know that he needed to let

himself go, that is to say, to destroy himself a little .... what had happened

during these horrible days is that Sartre had barely escaped an attack. .. .To

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think against oneself is fine, but in the long run it takes its toll. By breaking

bones in his head he had damaged his nerves. "57

As we have stated that his two major works Being and Nothingness and

Critique of Dialectical Reason were written under different circumstances. Being and

Nothingness was written during the war and Critique of Dialectical Reason after the

war. In his later part "Sartre became first committed to political activism, to socialism,

to developing an integration of thought, writing and political activity, to close relation

with the communist party and the Soviet Union, to using Marxism as a tool of analysis

and then in Search for a Method and the Critique, to Marxism as a philosophy. Before

the war Sartre had been yearning to encounter the real world. During the occupation

and after the war the sheer organized power of the Marxist movement of the working

class- the French Communist party - continued to draw him towards it and define his

capacity to act. By the post war period Sartre had accepted certain Marxist themes

i.e. the class struggle, the goal of a classless society, the leading role ofthe proletariat

in attaining it, and the emphasis on action as central. But his own action, the

engagement of a writer ; still put little weight in the social and economic forces

emphasized to Marxism. ,ss

In 1946 Sartre wrote Materialism and Revolution which he thought as an

57. Beaivoirs. Simone. de., La Force Dec Chases., Paris-Gallimard, 1963, p. 407.474

58 . Ibid .• p. 481.

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alternative to Marxism. He claims that it offered existentialism to the left, including

the communists, as a philosophy of freedom befitting a movement of liberation. Here

he attempts to show how human freedom became alienated under Capitalism, and

could be fully realized under socialism. He admits that Marxism is the only

humanistic philosophy committed to realizing itself in the world. Its agent, the

proletariat, has not achieved power anywhere in the world; but still threatens to

make its voice heard again. This is enough for us to regard the Marxist attitude as

still attractive, not only as moral criticism but also as an historical hypothesis. Sartre

claimed that the essay published in Book form in 1947 as Humanism and Terror,

caused him to be 'converted' from his old individualism to politics. "This small dens

book reveled to me the method and object. It gave me the push I had needed to

release me from my immobility. Marxism offers the only adequate moral critique of

capitalism and the only meaning full philosophy of history."59 In the intensifying

cold war Sartre chose to side with PCF and the Soviet Union against the west, citing

the Govt. 's apparent to suppers the communist party in the wake of the anti NATO

riots against the American General in 1952. "In the name of those principles which

it had inculcated into me, in the name of liberty, equality, fraternity, I swore to the

bourgeoisie a hatred which would only die with me. When I returned precipitately

from Paris, I had to write or suffocate, Day and night wrote the first part of the

•• . Ponty. Merleau., La Prose du monde, edited by Claude Lefort (Paris, 1969); Sartre. · L 'ecrivain et sa langue, Situations ix, p.82.

71

'Communist and Peace '(1961 ). Communism represented the only positive future of

the great mass of human Kind. ,,6o

In Being and Nothingness his emphasis was strictly on Individual freedom. He

had to reflect on this early notion to his growing Marxist intellectual and political

orientation. Sartre's appropriation to Marxism in experience as well as theory and to

establish it philosophically led him in framing the Critique. The general lines of

Sartre's itemerary led quite naturally to the full-scale theoretical encounter with the

basic principle of historical materialism. One way or other it can be said that

Sartre's thought through out his philosophy is of a model of repetition. In his later

work though, he claims his kinship with Marxism, he decenters man and regains

freedom as more radical. Freedom tends to dominate, and it is increasingly seen in

terms of a totalized dialectical. It is also seen that Being and Nothingness is the

beginning and Critique of Dialectical Reason is the end of a philosophical system. In

the Critique of Dialectical Reason Sartre wrote against himself The problem which

Sartre attempts to solve in Critique of Dialectical Reason is "how can we understand

that History, the product of the free praxis of man, turns against its agent and is

changed into an inhuman necessity that makes man the object of the historical

process. The essential psychological perspective of Being and Nothingness is thus

enlarged in the Critique of Dialectical Reason into a historical and sociological

perspective that should allow one to account for the existence of alienated freedom. It

60 . Ibid, p. 86.

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can be said that Critique of Dialectical Reason comes to complete Being and

Nothingness in certain basic areas where it remained abstract or insufficiently

developed; and that this act of completion, lifting all the problems onto a higher

dialectical plane, ends by utterly transforming the very appearance of the earlier

system."61

As we proceed further we will see that the changes from one work to the other

are often substitution of terms within a similar framework practico- inert for things-in­

itself and praxis for things-for-itself He claims that it is a shift from

phenomenological ontology and morality to a concern with history, politics and

society. In Sartre's later work, the moral problem is related to the problem of politics

and social action then the question arises; Is Existential Marxism an answer to the

question that Being and N_othingness or indeed, is it a dialectical transformation of

both questions and answers, which reformulates them on a higher plan of theory and

practice? Does Sartre remain the same while becoming different? As we know that

Being and Nothingness was written during the Second World War. After the war he

passed through another individualistic myth-that of heroism-but nonetheless came

finally 'true experience, that of society'.

A stronger historical sense of the situation was related diminution of the range

61 • Fredric, Janeson .. Afarxism and Forms. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1971. p. 208-209.

73

of freedom. It now became 'the little movement that makes of a totality of what he or

she has received from conditioning or this little displacement In an operation

whereby an interiorization and re-exteriorizes itself in an act'. There was no idea in

Being and Nothingness of the mediating relation of interiorzation and exteriorization

between the individual and society. Being and Nothingness can be termed on account

of purely interior and individual experience as an innerself of the Isolated Individual

and his later work, because of his kinship with Marxism is concerned with political,

historical and social issues. He himself accepted that his earlier work lacked necessary

socio-historical dimensions, which he now tries to draw from Marxism. He want's to

reconquer man within Marxism.

We in our second and third chapter we will discuss about the various concepts

in both his earlier and later work and at the end will also attempt to show that the

two basic schools of thought namely Existentialism and Marxism are so diverse that

reconciliation seems logically to be unattainable.

This is so because where as the basic prermses of existential position IS

consciousness in terms of his purity, Marxism takes not only 'man' as a social being

but also assumes a dialectical interaction between the objective material reality and

human beings. We have attempted in the other chapters of our thesis to analyze,

compare and bring out the implications of Sartre's earlier and later work in the

context of his concept of 'Man', 'Society' and 'Freedom'.

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