high court of madhya pradesh

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HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH

BENCH AT GWALIOR

DIVISION BENCH

BEFORE: G.S.AHLUWALIA

AND

RAJEEV KUMAR SHRIVASTAVA, JJ.

Criminal Appeal No. 446/2008

Ramveer @ Veera S/o Dileep DhobiVersus

State of Madhya Pradesh

A N D

Criminal Appeal No. 612/2008

Mahendra @ Lalla S/o Bhadai AadiwasiVersus

State of Madhya Pradesh

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------Shri D.R.Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant in CriminalAppeal No.446/2008.Shri D.S.Rajawat and Shri Vinay Kumar, learned counsel for theappellant in Criminal Appeal No.612/2008.Shri C.P.Singh, learned Panel Lawyer, for the respondent/ State.--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

J U D G E M E N T (06/08/2021)

Per Rajeev Kumar Shrivastava, J.:

This judgment shall govern the disposal of Criminal

Appeal No. 446/2008 (Ramveer @ Veera Vs. State of MP) and

Criminal Appeal No. 612/2008 (Mahendra @ Lalla vs. State of

MP), as both the appeals arise out of Sessions Trial No.51/2006.

2. Both the aforesaid appeals have been preferred under

Section 374 of CrPC, challenging the conviction and sentence

dated 8.4.2008 passed by Special Judge (MPDVPK Act) Shivpuri

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(MP) in Special Sessions Trial No. 51/2006, whereby Ramveer @

Veera (appellant in Cri.Appeal No.446/2008) and Mahendra @

Lalla (appellant in Cri.Appeal No.612/2008) have been convicted

under Section 364(A) of IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment

with fine of Rs.5000/- each, in default of payment of fine, to

undergo additional rigorous imprisonment of three years each.

Both the appellants have also been convicted under Section 365 of

IPC and sentenced to five years RI with fine of Rs.2000/- each, in

default of payment of fine, to undergo additional rigorous

imprisonment of one year each. All the sentences were directed to

run concurrently.

2(A). It is pertinent to mention here that in Criminal Appeal

No. 446/2008 learned counsel for the appellant has filed

application under Section 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

praying therein for a direction to run all the sentences

concurrently, imposed against the appellant in different sessions

trial. The application has been considered and disposed of by

passing orders on separate order sheet.

3. The prosecution story in nutshell is that on

15.11.2005 at about 10 am when Railway Engineer Gyanendra

Pratap Singh Parmar along with trolley-man Bandilal Yadav and

Kripal Singh Bundela were inspecting railway track between the

village Padarkheda and Jamunia, suddenly 6-7 armed persons

bearing police uniform reached there, abducted Gyanendra Pratap

Singh Parmar, Bandilal Yadav and Kripal Singh Bundela and they

also confined Bala Prasad Kolhi, Bansilal Ahirwar and Gulabdas.

Thereafter, the accused persons released Bala Prasad Kolhi,

Bansilal Ahirwar and Gulabdas but took Gyanendra Pratap Singh

Parmar, Bandilal Yadav and Kripal Singh Bundela to the forest.

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The FIR (Ex.P/1) was lodged. After several months, the accused

persons released the abductees. After completion of investigation,

charge sheet was filed against the appellants/accused persons.

4. Appellants Ramveer @ Veera and Mahendra @ Lalla

were charged for the offences punishable under Sections 364(A)

and 365 of IPC read with Section 11/13 of MPDVPK Act.

Appellants abjured their guilt. After marshalling the evidence

available on record, the trial Court has convicted and sentenced

both the appellants as under :-

Name ofaccused

Section Punishment Fine In default,punishment

Ramveer@ Veera

364 (A) IPC Life Imprison-ment

5000/- Three yearsRI

365 IPC Five Years RI 2000/- One yearRI

Mahendra@ Lalla

364 (A) IPC Life Imprison-ment

5000/- Three yearsRI

365 IPC Five Years RI 2000/- One yearRI

5. The grounds raised are that the prosecution has not

proved all the essential ingredients of Section 364(A) and 365 of

IPC, hence conviction under Sections 364(A) and 365 of IPC and

Section 11/13 of MPDVPK Act is not sustainable. It is further

submitted that despite there was no evidence, the trial Court has

given a finding that threat was extended to the abductees, which

was of the degree to give rise to the abductees a reasonable

apprehension to put them to death or to cause hurt. The demand

was not communicated. Hence, prayed for setting aside the

impugned judgement of conviction and sentence.

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6. Per Contra, learned State Counsel has vehemently

opposed the submissions and submitted that there is ample

evidence against the appellants and all the essential ingredients are

available on record. Therefore, considering the aforesaid the trial

Court has rightly convicted the appellants/accused persons. Hence,

no case is made out for interference.

7. Heard the learned counsel for the rival parties and

perused the record.

8. In the present case, the following questions emerge

for consideration :

“(i) Whether appellants Ramveer @ Veera and

Mahendra @ Lalla had abducted

Gyanendra Pratap Singh Parmar, Bandilal

Yadav and Kripal Singh Bundela for

getting ransom on 15.11.2005 at around

10.00 am from the area between village

Padarkheda and Jamunia, District

Shivpuri ?

(ii) Whether appellants Ramveer @ Veera and

Mahendra @ Lalla along with other co-

accused persons had wrongfully confined

the abductees ?”

9. Section 364(A) of Indian Penal Code runs as under :-

“364A.-- Kidnapping for ransom, etc.-- Whoeverkidnaps or abducts any person or keeps a personin detention after such kidnapping or abductionand threatens to cause death or hurt to suchperson, or by his conduct gives rise to areasonable apprehension that such person may beput to death or hurt, or causes hurt or death tosuch person in order to compel the Governmentor any foreign State or international inter-

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governmental organisation or any other person todo or abstain from doing any act or to pay aransom, shall be punishable with death, orimprisonment for life, and shall also be liable tofine.”

10. Section 365 of Indian Penal Code runs as under :-

“365. Kidnapping or abducting with intentsecretly and wrongfully to confine person.--Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person withintent to cause that person to be secretly andwrongfully confined, shall be punished withimprisonment of either description for a termwhich may extend to seven years, and shall alsobe liable to fine.”

11. It is relevant to point out that Section 364A of IPC had been

introduced in the Indian Penal Code by virtue of Amendment Act

42 of 1993. The Statement of Objects and Reasons are as

follows :-

“Statement of Objects and Reasons.-- Kidnappingby terrorists for ransom, for creating panicamongst the people and for securing release ofarrested associates and cadres have assumedserious dimensions. The existing provisions oflaw have proved to be inadequate as deterrence.The Law Commission in its 42nd Report has alsorecommended a specific provision to deal withthis menace. It was necessary to amend the IndianPenal Code to provide for deterrent punishment topersons committing such acts and to makeconsequential amendments to the Code ofCriminal Procedure, 1973.”

12. While considering the facts of the present case, it would be

appropriate to deal with the relevant provisions along with the

dictum of various Courts.

13. Section 364(A) of IPC is attracted and a person/accused is

convicted only if the prosecution proves following ingredients :-

(i) the accused must have kidnapped,

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abducted or detained any person;

(ii) he must have kept such person in custody

or detention; and,

(iii) kidnapping, abduction or detention must

have been for ransom. To pay a ransom, in

the ordinary sense means to pay the price

or demand for ransom. This would show

that the demand has to be communicated.

14. In Omprakash Shrivastava vs. State [2007 CrLJ 696

(Del), it is observed that to establish a charge of kidnapping for

ransom a demand for ransom has to be made and it should be

properly communicated not only to the third person but also to the

victim himself. It was held that this plea will not be entertained

that ransom demand was made to the complainant/victim himself

and not to any other person.

15. Hon'ble Apex Court in Shaik Ahmed vs. State of

Telangana (Criminal Appeal No. 533 of 2021, decided on 28 th

June, 2021), has observed as under :-

“7. From the submissions made by the learnedcounsel for the parties and materials on record,following questions arise for consideration in thisappeal:-

I. What are the essential ingredients ofSection 346A to be proved beyondreasonable doubt by the prosecution forsecuring the conviction of an accusedunder Section 364A IPC?

II. Whether each and every ingredient asmentioned under Section 364A needs tobe proved for securing conviction underSection 364A and non-establishment ofany of the conditions may vitiate theconviction under Section 364A IPC?

III. Whether the learned Sessions Judge as

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well as the High Court recorded anyfinding that all ingredients of Section364A were proved by the prosecution?

IV. Whether there was any evidence orfindings by the Courts below that theaccused had threatened to cause death orhurt to the victim or by his conduct gaverise to a reasonable apprehension thatvictim may be put to death or hurt?

8. The appeal having arisen out of order ofconviction under Section 364A, we need to noticethe provisions of Section 364A IPC beforeproceeding further to consider the points forconsideration.

9. Sections 359 to 374 of the Indian Penal Codeare contained in the heading “of Kidnapping,Abduction, Slavery and Forced Labour”. Offence ofKidnapping for lawful guardianship is defined underSection 361 and Section 363 provides forpunishment for kidnapping. Section 364 deals withkidnapping or abduction in order to murder. 10. The Law Commission of India took up therevision of Indian Penal Code and submitted itsreport, i.e., 42nd Report (June, 1971). In Chapter 16,offences affecting the human body was dealt with.The chapter on kidnapping and abduction was dealtby the Commission in paragraphs 16.91 to 16.112.Section 364 and 364A was dealt by the Commissionin paragraphs 16.99 to 16.100 which are as follows:-

“16.99. Section 364 punishes the offenceof kidnapping or abduction of a person in orderto murder him, the maximum punishmentbeing imprisonment for life or for ten years. Inview of our general recommendation as toimprisonment for life, we propose that lifeimprisonment should be omitted and termimprisonment increased to 14 years.

The illustrations to the section do notelucidate any particular ingredient of theoffence and should be omitted.

16.100. We consider it desirable to have

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a specific section to punish severelykidnapping or abduction for ransom, as suchcases are increasing. At present, suchkidnapping or abduction is punishable undersection 365 since the kidnapped or abductedperson will be secretly and wrongfullyconfined.

We also considered the question whethera provision for reduced punishment in case ofrelease of the person kidnapped without harmshould be inserted, but we have come to theconclusion that there is no need for it. Wepropose the following section:-

“364A. Kidnapping or abduction forransom .—Whoever kidnaps orabducts any person with intent tohold that person for ransom shall bepunished with rigorous imprison-ment for a term which may extendto 14 years, and shall also be liableto fine.”

11. Although the Law Commission has inparagraph 16.100 proposed Section 364A, whichonly stated that whoever kidnaps or abducts anyperson with intent to hold that person for ransom bepunished for a term which may extend to 14 years.Parliament while inserting Section 364A by ActNo.42 of 1993 enacted the provision in a broadermanner also to include kidnapping and abduction tocompel the Government to do or abstain from doingany act or to pay a ransom which was furtheramended and amplified by Act No.24 of 1995.Section 364A as it exists after amendment is asfollows:-

“364A. Kidnapping for ransom, etc.—Whoever kidnaps or abducts anyperson or keeps a person in detentionafter such kidnapping or abductionand threatens to cause death or hurtto such person, or by his conductgives rise to a reasonableapprehension that such person may

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be put to death or hurt, or causes hurtor death to such person in order tocompel the Government or anyforeign State or international inter-governmental organisation or anyother person to do or abstain fromdoing any act or to pay a ransom,shall be 12 punishable with death, orimprisonment for life, and shall alsobe liable to fine.”

12. We may now look into section 364A to findout as to what ingredients the Section itselfcontemplate for the offence. When we paraphraseSection 364A following is deciphered:-

(i) “Whoever kidnaps or abducts anyperson or keeps a person in detentionafter such kidnapping or abduction”

(ii) “and threatens to cause death or hurt tosuch person, or by his conduct gives riseto a reasonable apprehension that suchperson may be put to death or hurt,

(iii) or causes hurt or death to such person inorder to compel the Government or anyforeign State or international inter-governmental organisation or any otherperson to do or abstain from doing anyact or to pay a ransom”

(iv) “shall be punishable with death, orimprisonment for life, and shall also beliable to fine.”

13. The first essential condition as incorporatedin Section 364A is “whoever kidnaps or abducts anyperson or keeps a person in detention after suchkidnapping or abduction”. The second conditionbegins with conjunction “and”. The secondcondition has also two parts, i.e., (a) threatens tocause death or hurt to such person or (b) by hisconduct gives rise to a reasonable apprehension thatsuch person may be put to death or hurt. Either partof above condition, if fulfilled, shall fulfill thesecond condition for offence. The third condition

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begins with the word “or”, i.e., or causes hurt ordeath to such person in order to compel theGovernment or any foreign State or internationalinter-governmental organisation or any other personto do or abstain from doing any act or to pay aransom. Third condition begins with the word “orcauses hurt or death to such person in order tocompel the Government or any foreign state to do orabstain from doing any act or to pay a ransom”.Section 364A contains a heading “kidnapping forransom, etc.” The kidnapping by a person todemand ransom is fully covered by Section 364A. 14. We have noticed that after the first conditionthe second condition is joined by conjunction “and”,thus, whoever kidnaps or abducts any person orkeeps a person in detention after such kidnapping orabduction and threatens to cause death or hurt tosuch person.

15. The use of conjunction “and” has its purposeand object. Section 364A uses the word “or” ninetimes and the whole section contains only oneconjunction “and”, which joins the first and secondcondition. Thus, for covering an offence underSection 364A, apart from fulfillment of firstcondition, the second condition, i.e., “and threatensto cause death or hurt to such person” also needs tobe proved in case the case is not covered bysubsequent clauses joined by “or”.

16. The word “and” is used as conjunction. Theuse of word “or” is clearly distinctive. Both thewords have been used for different purpose andobject. Crawford on Interpretation of Law whiledealing with the subject “disjunctive” and“conjunctive” words with regard to criminal statutemade following statement:-

“……………………..The Courtshould be extremely reluctant in acriminal statute to substitutedisjunctive words for cojunctivewords, and vice versa, if such action

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adversely affects the accused.”

17. We may also notice certain judgments of thiscourt where conjunction “and” has been used. InPunjab Produce and Trading Co. Ltd. Vs. The CIT,West Bengal, Calcutta (1971) 2 SCC 540, this Courthad occasion to consider Section 23-A Explanationb(iii) of Income Tax Act, 1922 which provision hasbeen extracted in paragraph 5 of the judgmentwhich is to the following effect:-

“Explanation. — For the purposes of thissection a company shall be deemed to be acompany in which the public aresubstantially interested— (a) If it is a company owned by theGovernment or in which not less than fortyper cent of the shares are held by theGovernment. (b) If it is not a privatecompany as defined in the IndianCompanies Act, 1913 (7 of 1913) and—

(i) its shares (not being sharesentitled to a fixed rate of dividend,whether with or without a furtherright to participate in profits)carrying not less than fifty per centof the voting power have beenallotted unconditionally to, oracquired unconditionally by, andwere throughout the previous yearbeneficially held by the public (notincluding a company to which theprovisions of this section apply):Provided that in the case of anysuch company as is referred to insub-section (4), this sub-clauseshall apply as if for the words ‘notless than fifty per cent’ the words‘not less than forty per cent’, hadbeen substituted; (ii) the said shares were at anytime during the previous year thesubject of dealing in anyrecognised stock exchange in

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India or were freely transferableby the holder to other members ofthe public; and (iii) the affairs of the company orthe shares carrying more than fiftyper cent of the total voting powerwere at no time during theprevious year controlled or held byless than six persons (persons whoare related to one another ashusband, wife, lineal ascendant ordescendant or brother or sister, asthe case may be, being treated as asingle person and persons who arenominees of another persontogether with that other personbeing likewise treated as a singleperson: Provided that in the case of anysuch company as is referred to insub-section (4), this clause shallapply as if for the words ‘morethan fifty per cent’, the words‘more than sixty per cent’, hadbeen substituted.”

18. This Court held following in paragraph 8:-

“8. …………………...The clear import ofthe opening part of clause (b) with the word“and” appearing there read with thenegative or disqualifying conditions in sub-clause (b)(iii) is that the assessee was boundto satisfy apart from the conditionscontained in the other subclauses that itsaffairs were at no time during the previousyear controlled by less than six persons andshares carrying more than 50 per cent of thetotal voting power were during the sameperiod not held by less than sixpersons……………………….”

19. In another judgment, Hyderabad Asbestos

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Cement Products and Anr. Vs. Union of India,(2000) 1 SCC 426, this Court had occasion toconsider Rule 56-A of Central Excise Act, 1944. TheCourt dealt with interpretation of conjunctive anddisjunctive “and”, “or”. Proviso to Rule 56-A alsouses the conjunctive word “and”. The Provision ofthe Rule as quoted in paragraph 4 is as below:-

“56-A. Special procedure for movement ofduty-paid materials or component parts for18 use in the manufacture of finishedexcisable goods.—(1) Notwithstandinganything contained in these rules, theCentral Government may, by notification inthe Official Gazette, specify the excisablegoods in respect of which the procedure laiddown in sub-rule (2) shall apply. (2) The Collector may, on application madein this behalf and subject to the conditionsmentioned in sub-rule (3) and such otherconditions as may, from time to time, beprescribed by the Central Government,permit a manufacturer of any excisablegoods specified under sub-rule (1) toreceive material or component parts orfinished products (like asbestos cement), onwhich the duty of excise or the additionalduty under Section 2-A of the Indian TariffAct, 1934 (32 of 1934), (hereinafter referredto as the countervailing duty), has beenpaid, in his factory for the manufacture ofthese goods or for the more convenientdistribution of finished product and allow acredit of the duty already paid on suchmaterial or component parts or finishedproduct, as the case may be:

Provided that no credit of duty shallbe allowed in respect of any material orcomponent parts used in the manufacture offinished excisable goods—

(i) if such finished excisable goodsproduced by the manufacturer areexempt from the whole of the duty ofexcise leviable thereon or are

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chargeable to nil rate of duty, and (ii) unless— (a) duty has been paid for such materialor component parts under the sameitem or sub-item as the finishedexcisable goods; or (b) remission or adjustment of dutypaid for such material or componentparts has been specifically sanctionedby the Central Government: Provided further that if the duty paidon such material or component parts(of which credit has been allowedunder this sub-rule) be variedsubsequently due to any reason,resulting in payment of refund to, orrecovery of more duty from, themanufacturer or importer, as the casemay be, of such material or componentparts, the credit allowed shall be variedaccordingly by adjustment in the creditaccount maintained under sub-rule (3)or in the accountcurrent maintainedunder sub-rule (3) or Rule 9 or Rule178(1) or, if such adjustment be notpossible for any reason, by cashrecovery from or, as the case may be,refund to the manufacturer availing ofthe procedure contained in this rule.”

20. This court held that when the provisos 1 & 2are separated by conjunctive word “and”, they haveto be read conjointly. The requirement of both theproviso has to be satisfied to avail the benefit.Paragraph 8 is as follows:-

“8. The language of the rule is plain andsimple. It does not admit of any doubt ininterpretation. Provisos (i) and (ii) areseparated by the use of the conjunction“and”. They have to be read conjointly. Therequirement of both the provisos has to besatisfied to avail the benefit. Clauses (a) and(b) of proviso (ii) are separated by the use of

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an “or” and there the availability of one ofthe two alternatives would suffice. Inasmuchas cement and asbestos fibre used by theappellants in the manufacture of theirfinished excisable goods are liable to dutyunder different tariff items, the benefit of proforma credit extended by Rule 56-A cannotbe availed of by the appellants and has beenrightly denied by the authorities of theDepartment.”

21. Thus, applying the above principle ofinterpretation on condition Nos. 1 & 2 of Section364A which is added with conjunction “and”, we areof the view that condition No.2 has also to befulfilled before ingredients of Section 364A arefound to be established. Section 364A also indicatesthat in case the condition “and threatens to causedeath or hurt to such person” is not proved, there areother classes which begins with word “or”, thoseconditions, if proved, the offence will beestablished. The second condition, thus, as notedabove is divided in two parts- (a) and threatens tocause death or hurt to such person or (b) by hisconduct gives rise to a reasonable apprehension thatsuch person may be put to death or hurt.

22. Now, we may look into few cases of thisCourt where different ingredients of Section 364Acame for consideration. We may first notice thejudgment of this Court in Malleshi Vs. State ofKarnataka, (2004) 8 SCC 95. The above was a casewhere kidnapping of a major boy was made by theaccused for ransom and before this Court argumentwas raised that demand of ransom has not beenestablished. In the above case, the Court referred toSection 364A and in paragraph 12 following wasobserved:-

“12. To attract the provisions of Section364-A what is required to be proved is: (1)that the accused kidnapped or abducted theperson; (2) kept him under detention aftersuch kidnapping and abduction; and (3) that

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the kidnapping or abduction was forransom. Strong reliance was placed on adecision of the Delhi High Court in NetraPal v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2001 Cri LJ1669 (Del)] to contend that since theransom demand was not conveyed to thefather of PW 2, the intention to demand wasnot fulfilled.”

23. This court in paragraphs 13 to 15 dealt withdemand for ransom and held that demand originallywas made to person abducted and the mere fact thatafter making the demand the same could not beconveyed to some other person as the accused wasarrested in meantime does not take away the effectof conditions of Section 364A. In the above case,this Court was merely concerned with ransom,hence, other conditions of Section 364A were notnoticed.

24. The next judgment is Anil alias Raju NamdevPatil Vs. Administration of Daman & Diu, Damanand Another, (2006) 13 SCC 36. In the above case,this Court noticed the ingredients for commission ofoffence under Section 364 and 364A. Following waslaid down in paragraph 55:-

“55. ………………………for obtaining aconviction for commission of an offenceunder Section 364-A thereof it is necessaryto prove that not only such kidnapping orabetment has taken place but thereafter theaccused threatened to cause death or hurt tosuch person or by his conduct gives rise toa reasonable apprehension that such personmay be put to death or hurt or causes hurtor death to such person in order to compelthe Government or any foreign State orinternational intergovernmental organi-sation or any other person to do or abstainfrom doing any act or to pay a ransom.”

25. At this stage, we may also notice thejudgment of this Court in Suman Sood alias

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Kamaljeet Kaur Vs. State of Rajasthan (2007) 5SCC 634. In the above case, Suman Sood and herhusband Daya Singh Lahoria were accused in thecase of abduction. They were tried for offence underSection 364A, 365, 343 read with Section 120-Band 346 read with Section 120-B. The trial courtconvicted the appellant for offence under Sections365 read with 120-B, 343 read with 120-B and 346read with 120-B. She was, however, acquitted foroffence punishable under Section 364-A. Herchallenge against conviction and sentence foroffences punishable under Sections 365 read with120- B, 343 read with 120-B and 346 read with 120-B IPC was negatived by the High Court. But heracquittal for offences punishable under Sections364-A read with 120-B was set aside by the HighCourt in an appeal and she was also convicted forthe offence under Section 364A and was sentencedto life imprisonment. In the appeal filed by herchallenging her conviction under Section 364A, thisCourt dealt with acquittal of Suman Sood underSection 364A by trial Court. In Paragraph 64 thiscourt noticed as follows:-

“64. According to the trial court, theprosecution had failed to prove chargesagainst Suman Sood for an offencepunishable under Sections 364-A or 364-Aread with 120-B IPC “beyond reasonabledoubt” inasmuch as no reliable evidencehad been placed on record from which itcould be said to have been established thatSuman Sood was also a part of “pressurisetactics” or had terrorised the victim or hisfamily members to get Devendra Pal SinghBhullar released in lieu of RajendraMirdha. The trial court, therefore, held thatshe was entitled to benefit of doubt.”

26. The findings of trial court that no reliableevidence had been placed on record from which itcould be said to have been established that SumanSood was also a part of pressurise tactics or hasterrorized the victim or his family. This court

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approved the acquittal of Suman Sood by trial courtand set aside the order of the High Court convictingSuman Sood. In paragraph 71 following was held bythis Court:-

“71. On the facts and in the circumstancesin its entirety and considering the evidenceas a whole, it cannot be said that byacquitting Suman Sood for offencespunishable under Sections 364-A read with120-B IPC, the trial court had actedillegally or unlawfully. The High Court,therefore, ought not to have set aside thefinding of acquittal of accused SumanSood for an offence under Sections 364-Aread with 120-B IPC. To that extent,therefore, the order of conviction andsentence recorded by the High Courtdeserves to be set aside.”

27. Thus, the trial court’s findings that there wasno evidence that Suman Sood was part of pressurizetactics or terrorized the victim or his familymembers, hence, due to non-fulfillment of thecondition as enumerated in Section 364A, the trialcourt recorded the acquittal, which has beenconfirmed by this Court. The above case clearlyestablishes that unless all conditions as enumeratedin Section 364A are fulfilled, no conviction can berecorded.

28. Now, we come to next judgment, i.e.,Vishwanath Gupta Vs. State of Uttaranchal (2007)11 SCC 633. In the above case, the victims wereabducted from district of Lucknow, State of U.P.demands for ransom and threat was extended fromanother district, i.e., Nainital and the victim wasdone to death in another district, i.e., Unnao in theState of U.P. This Court had occasion to consider theingredients of Section 364A and in paragraphs 8 and9, the following was laid down:-

“8. According to Section 364-A,whoever kidnaps or abducts any personand keeps him in detention and threatens

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to cause death or hurt to such person andby his conduct gives rise to a reasonableapprehension that such person may beput to death or hurt, and claims a ransomand if death is caused then in that casethe accused can be punished with deathor imprisonment for life and also liableto pay fine. 9. The important ingredient of Section364-A is the abduction or kidnapping, asthe case may be. Thereafter, a threat tothe kidnapped/abducted that if thedemand for ransom is not met then thevictim is likely to be put to death and inthe event death is caused, the offence ofSection 364-A is complete. There arethree stages in this section, one is thekidnapping or abduction, second is threatof death coupled with the demand ofmoney and lastly when the demand is notmet, then causing death. If the threeingredients are available, that willconstitute the offence under Section 364-A of the Penal Code. Any of the threeingredients can take place at one place orat different places. In the present case thedemand of the money with the threatperception had been made at (Haldwani)Nainital. The deceased were kidnappedat Lucknow and they were put to death atUnnao. Therefore, the first offence wascommitted by the accused when theyabducted Ravi Varshney and AnoopSamant at Lucknow. Therefore,Lucknow court could have territorialjurisdiction to try the case.”

29. This Court in the above case, laid down thatthere are three stages in the Section, one iskidnapping or abduction, second is threat of deathcoupled with demand of money and third when thedemand is not met, then causing death. The Courtheld that if the three ingredients are available that

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will constitute the offence under Section 364 of theIPC. Dealing with Section 364A in context of abovecase, following was laid down in paragraph 17:-

“17. ……………But here, in the case ofSection 364-A something more is there,that is, that a person was abducted fromLucknow and demand has been raised atHaldwani, Nainital with threat. If theamount is not paid to the abductor thenthe victim is likely to be put to death. Inorder to constitute an offence underSection 364-A, all the ingredients havenot taken place at Lucknow or Unnao.The two incidents took place in the Stateof Uttar Pradesh, that is, abduction anddeath of the victims but one of theingredient took place, that is, threat wasgiven at the house of the victims atHaldwani, Nainital demanding theransom money otherwise the victim willbe put to death. Therefore, one of theingredients has taken place within theterritorial jurisdiction of Haldwani,Nainital. Therefore, it is a case whereinthe offence has taken place at threeplaces i.e. at Haldwani, Nainital, wherethe threat to the life of the victim wasgiven and demand of money was raised,the victim was abducted from Lucknowand he was ultimately put to death atUnnao. ………………….”

30. Next case which needs to be noticed is aThree Judge Bench Judgment of this Court inVikram Singh alias Vicky and Anr. Vs. Union ofIndia and Ors., (2015) 9 SCC 502. In the above case,this Court elaborately considered the scope andpurport of Section 364A including the historicalbackground. After noticing the earlier cases, thisCourt laid down that section 364A has three distinctcomponents. In Paragraph 25, following was laiddown with regard to distinct components of Section364A:-

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“25. …………….Section 364-A IPC hasthree distinct components viz. (i) theperson concerned kidnaps or abducts orkeeps the victim in detention afterkidnapping or abduction; (ii) threatens tocause death or hurt or causesapprehension of death or hurt or actuallyhurts or causes death; and (iii) thekidnapping, abduction or detention andthe threats of death or hurt, apprehensionfor such death or hurt or actual death orhurt is caused to coerce the personconcerned or someone else to dosomething or to forbear from doingsomething or to pay ransom…………………...”

31. We may also notice one more Three JudgeBench Judgment of this Court in Arvind Singh Vs.State of Maharashtra, (2020) SCC Online SC 400. Inthe above case, an eight year old son of DoctorMukesh Ramanlal Chandak (PW1) was kidnappedby the accused A1 and A2. Accused A1 was anemployee of Dr. Chandak. It was held that A1 hadgrievance against Dr. Chandak. A2 whoaccompanied A1 when the boy was kidnapped andafter the kidnapping of the boy it was found that boywas murdered and at the instance of A1, the deadbody was recovered from a bridge constructed overa Rivulet. Trial court had sentenced both A1 and A2to death for the offences punishable under Sections364A read with 34 and 302 read with 34. The HighCourt had dismissed the appeal affirming the deathsentence. On behalf of A2, one of the argumentsraised before this Court was that although child waskidnapped for ransom but there was no intention totake the life of the child, therefore, offence underSection 364A is not made out. This Court noticedthe ingredients of Section 364A, one of which was“threatening to cause death or hurt” in paragraphs90, 91 and 92, the following was observed:-

“90. An argument was raised that thechild was kidnapped for ransom but there

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was no intention to take life of the child,therefore, an offence under Section 364Ais not made out. To appreciate thearguments, Section 364A of the IPC isreproduced as under:

“364A. Kidnapping for ransom, etc.— Whoever kidnaps or abducts anyperson or keeps a person indetention after such kidnapping orabduction and threatens to causedeath or hurt to such person, or byhis conduct gives rise to areasonable apprehension that suchperson may be put to death or hurt,or causes hurt or death to suchperson in order to compel theGovernment or any foreign State orinternational intergovernmentalorganisation or any other person todo or abstain from doing any act orto pay a ransom, shall be punishablewith death, or imprisonment for life,and shall also be liable to fine.”

91. Section 364A IPC has threeingredients relevant to the presentappeals, one, the fact of kidnapping orabduction, second, threatening to causedeath or hurt, and last, the conduct givingrise to reasonable apprehension that suchperson may be put to death or hurt. 92. The kidnapping of an 8-year-old childwas unequivocally for ransom. Thekidnapping of a victim of such a tenderage for ransom has inherent threat tocause death as that alone will force therelatives of such victim to pay ransom.Since the act of kidnapping of a child forransom has inherent threat to cause death,therefore, the accused have been rightlybeen convicted for an offence underSection 364A read with Section 34 IPC.The threat will remain a mere threat, ifthe victim returns unhurt. In the present

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case, the victim has been done to death.The threat had become a reality. There isno reason to take different view that theview taken by learned Sessions Judge aswell by the High Court.”

32. We need to refer to observations made byThree Judge Bench in paragraph 92 where thisCourt observed that kidnapping of an eight year oldvictim for ransom has inherent threat to cause deathas it alone will force the relatives of victim to payransom. The Court further held that since the act ofkidnapping of a child has inherent threat to causedeath, therefore, the accused have been rightlyconvicted for an offence under Section 364A readwith Section 34 IPC. In the next sentence, the Courtheld that the threat will remain a mere threat, if thevictim returns unhurt, “the victim has been done todeath the threat has become a reality”. The aboveobservation made by Three Judge Bench has to beread in context of the facts of the case which was forconsideration before this Court. No ratio has beenlaid down in paragraph 92 that when an eight yearold child (or a child of a tender age) iskidnapped/abducted for ransom there is inherentthreat to cause death and the second condition asnoted above, i.e., threatens to cause death or hurt tosuch person, is not to be proved. The observationscannot be read to mean that in a case of kidnappingor abduction of an eight year old child (or child of atender age), presumption in law shall arise thatkidnapping or abduction has been done to cause hurtor death. Each case has to be decided on its ownfacts. In the foregoing paragraphs, we have noticedthat all the three distinct conditions enumerated inSection 364A have to be fulfilled before an accusedis convicted of offence under Section 364A. Thus,the observations in paragraph 92 may not be read toobviate the establishment of second condition asnoticed above for bringing home the offence underSection 364A.”

16. In the light of above annunciation of law laid down by

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Hon'ble Apex Court, the evidence available on record in the

present case is required to be considered.

17. Gyanendra Singh Parmar (PW-4) has deposed in his

statement that at the time of incident he was posted as Railway

Track Inspector. He was on duty and was inspecting the railway

track on the date of incident. When he arrived at Padarkheda

along with Gangman Banshi, Trolley-man Bandilal, Balaprasad

and Kripal Singh, near village Imaliya, suddenly appellant Veera

Dhobi armed with a gun reached there, abducted and took them

inside the forest. After sometime, appellant released Bansilal,

Balaprasad and Gulabchand and took him along with trolley-man

Bansilal and Kripal Singh. Balaprasad (PW-1), Bandilal (PW-3),

Bansilal (PW-5) and Kripal Singh (PW-9) have also supported the

statement given by Gyanendra Singh Parmar (PW-4).

18. Balaprasad (PW-1) has proved the letter written by

the appellant. The letter is Ex.P/5. This fact has also been admitted

by witnesses Gyanendra Singh (PW-4), Bansilal (PW-5) and

Kripal Singh (PW-9). It is also stated by the witness that

Rambabu-Dayaram Gadariya gang had abducted them. It is further

stated that Gulab and Bansi were released by the appellant and

Gyanendra Singh Parmar, Kripal Singh and Bandilal were

abducted and taken to inside the forest where they were kept for

around 50 days and only after receipt of ransom amount they

released the abductees.

19. The aforesaid witnesses have identified the appellants

in their court statements. Babulal Suman (PW-2), Sub-Inspector

has stated that as per notification (Ex.P/7), Shivpuri District was

declared as dacoity affected area and reward of Rs.50000/- was

declared against each appellant. The witnesses have also stated

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that during their abduction period the appellants and other co-

accused persons were discussing that if ransom amount shall be

received, they will not kill them. Gyanendra Singh, Kripal Singh

and Bandilal were abducted for getting ransom and they were

wrongfully confined for a period of 50 days. The fact of handing

over of ransom is also proved by the prosecution as only after

receipt of ransom amount the abductees were released. The

evidence of aforesaid witnesses remained unrebutted in their

cross-examination.

20. On the basis of above, it is proved beyond doubt that

appellants Ramveer @ Veera and Mahendra @ Lalla had abducted

Gyanendra Pratap Singh Parmar, Bandilal Yadav and Kripal Singh

Bundela and kept them detained for around 50 days and also

threatened them to cause death or hurt to them and thus the

appellants/accused persons, by their conduct, gave rise to a

reasonable apprehension to the abductees that they may be put to

death or cause hurt in order to compel their family members to pay

ransom amount, which was communicated to the family members

of the abductees.

21. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we are of the

considered opinion that the trial Court has properly and legally

analyzed and appreciated the entire evidence available on record

and did not err in convicting and sentencing the present appellants.

The appeals filed by the appellants appear to be devoid of any

substance.

22. Consequently, Criminal Appeal No. 446/2008 filed by

appellant Ramveer @ Veera and Criminal Appeal No.612/2008

filed by appellant Mahendra @ Lalla are hereby dismissed and

their conviction and sentence are affirmed. Both the appellants are

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in jail. They be intimated with the result of this appeal through

relating Jail Superintendent.

With a copy of this judgment record of the trial Court

be sent back immediately.

(G.S.Ahluwalia) (Rajeev Kumar Shrivastava)(Yog) Judge Judge