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Francesco Patrizi da Cherso's concept ofspace and its later
influenceJohn Henry aa Faculty of Arts, The Open University, Milton
Keynes, MK7 6AA,EnglandPublished online: 22 Aug 2006.
To cite this article: John Henry (1979) Francesco Patrizi da
Cherso's concept of space and its laterinfluence, Annals of
Science, 36:6, 549-573
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ANNALS OF SCIENCE, 36 (1979), 549--575
Francesco Patrizi da Cherso's Concept of Space and its Later
Influence
JOHN HENRY
Facu l ty of Arts, The Open Univers i ty, Milton Keynes, MK7
6AA, Eng land
Received 19 March 1979
Summary
This study considers the contribution of Francesco Patrizi da
Cherso (1529-1597) to the development of the concepts of void space
and an infinite universe. Patrizi plays a greater role in the
development of these concepts than any other single figure in the
sixteenth century, and yet his work has been almost totally
overlooked. I have outlined his views on space in terms of two
major aspects of his philosophical attitude: on the one hand, he
was a devoted Platonist and sought always to establish Platonism,
albeit his own version of it, as the only eurreet philosophy; and
on the other hand; he was more determinedly anti-Aristotelian than
any other philosopher at that time. Patrizi's concept of space has
its beginnings in Platonic notions, but is extended and refined in
the light of a vigorous critique of Aristotle's position. Finally,
I consider the influence of Patrizi's ideas in the seventeenth
century, when various thinkers are seeking to overthrow the
Aristotelian concept of place and the equivalence of dimension-
ality with corporeality. Pierre Gassendi (1592=1652), for example,
needed a coherent concept of void space in which his atoms could
move, while Henry More ( 1614-1687) sought to demonstrate the
reality of incorporeal entities by reference to an incorporeal
space. Both men could find the arguments they needed in Patrizi's
comprehensive treatment of the subject.
Contents
1. Introduction
........................................................................................
549 2. Patrizi's Platonism and his ideas on space
........................................... 552 3, Patrizi's
anti-Aristotelianism and his concept of space
........................ 559 4. The influence of Patrizi's ideas
about space ......................................... 566 5.
Conclusion
............................................................................................
571
1. Introduct ion Francesco Patr iz i da Cherso's role in the
history of science has not been
adequate ly evaluated, and yet thanks to the mult i far ious
facets of his work historians have tbund it difficult to ignore him
completely. He holds a permanent
place among the ranks of those humanist scholars who made Greek
works avai lable in Latin. He translated works by Proclus,1 John
Phi lophonus z and Aristotle, 3 and made a new translat ion of the
Hermet ic Corpus and the Chaldean Oracles of
1 Proelus, Elementa theologica et physiea fecit Iatine Y.
Patricius (1583, Ferrara), 2 John Philoponus, Expositiones in omnes
X l l 1 A ristoteleos libros, eos q'ui vocantur metaphysiei, quas
F.
Patricius de graeeis latinas fecerat (1583, Ferrara). 3
Aristotle, De iis quae sub auditum cadunt interprete F. Patricio.
This was included in the Discus'siones
peripateticae (1581, Basle), vol. 1,90-94, and has since
reappeared in A ristotle's works edited by I. Bekker (1831,
Berlin), vol. 4,388-391. Patrizi also published, as an appendix to
his Nova philosophia, a neo- Platonic work based on Plotinus's
Enneads IV-VI known as the Theology of Aristotle. Patrizi gives it
the title: Mystiea Ae~jyptiorum a Platone dictata, ab Aristotele
excel)ta, et perseripta philosophia.
2L2 00(}3 3790/793606 0549 S02'O0 9 1979 Taylor & Francis
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550 John Henry
Zoroaster. 4 He wrote poetry himself and became embroiled with
no less a poet than Torquato Tasso in a dispute about poetic
theory. 5 He wrote works on rhetoric and military history, and a
treatise on love. 6 One of his earliest works was a series of
dialogues on historiography and the philosophy of history which has
been described by a modern scholar as 'the first manifesto' of a
'truly Copernican revolution . . . in the field of historical
theory'.7 His two most substantial works, however, are
philosophical and they neatly illustrate two distinct but closely
related features of Patrizi's philosophical outlook. The
Discussiones peripateticae is a monumental work in which he sets
out to undermine if not dismantle the vast super-structure of
Aristotelianism which had been erected over the centuries before
his time; s while the Nova de univemis philosophia is Patrizi's own
would-be replacement system which is clearly heavily influenced by
Platonic thinking. 9 It is this combination of Platonism and
vehement anti-Aristotelianism which led to his most original
contribution to philosophy.
Since it offered itself as a new system of philosophy, many
historians of science have dipped into the Nova philosophia in
order to glean some of Patrizi's thinking on particular topics; but
there has been no detailed examination of his natural philosophy.
10 Patrizi is the least studied of the four late Italian
Renaissance nature philosophers with whom he is consistently
grouped. 11 Giordano Bruno and Tommaso Campanella have been very
well served by historians, and even Bernardino Telesio has had
three new editions of his major work published since 1910.12 The
latest edition of Patrizi's Nova philosophia appeared in 1640, and
even this did not bear his name on the title page. 13 It would, no
doubt, take many pages to
4 Francesco Patrizi, Magia philosophia .. . Zoroaster et eius
CCCXX oracula chaldaica. Asclepii dial@us et philosophia magna.
Hermetis Trismegisti Poemander. Sermo sacer. Clavis. Sermo ad
fdium. Sermo ad Asclepium. Minerva mundi et alia miscellanea (
1593, Hamburg); also published as appendices to the Nova
pholosophia.
5 L'Eridano in nuovo verso heroico (1587, Ferrara) was an
attempt, by poetic flattery, to gain the patronage of the Este
family. The polemic with Tasso began with Patrizi's Parere in
difesa dell' Ariosto (1585, Ferrara) and Tasso's Discorso sopra il
Parere fatta dal Sit , F. Patricio (1585, Ferrara); it continued in
Patrizi's I1 Trimerone .. . in risposta alle oppositioni fatte dal
Siq. T. Tasso . . . (1586, Ferrara). See Bernard Weinberg, A
history of literary criticism in the Italian Renaissance (1961,
Chicago), 600~603.
6 Della retorica dieci dialoghi (1562. Ferrara); La militia
romana di Polibio, di Tito Livio e di Dionigi Alirar~asseo (1583,
Ferrara): and Paralleli militari (1594, Rome). The
L'amorosafilosofia was unpublished in Patl'izi's lifetime but has
no~ bee~l edited by Jolm ('. Nel~(m (1963. Florence). See also J.
C. Nelson, 'L'amoro~a ,filosofta di Francesco Patrizi',
Rina,scime~do. 2 (1962). S9 106.
Della historia dieci dialoghi (1560, Venice). See Giorgio
Spi,fi, 'ttistoriography, the art of history in the Italian
Counter-Ref'ormation'. in E. (Iocln'ane (ed.), The late ltaliatt
Remti,~sam'e (1525-1630) (1970. London), 91-133.
s The first volume was printed in 1571 at Venice but the
complete work appeared as Discussionttm peripateticart~m tomi IV
(1581, Basle).
9 First published at Ferrara in 1591 and then, after
condemnation by the Congregation of the Index, in a second edition
from Venice in 1593. See L. Firpo, 'Filosofia italiana e
eontroriforma', Rivista difdosofia, 41(1950), 150-173.
lo For a very full bibliography of works which often only
mention Patrizi in passing, see Vladimir Premec, Franciskus
l>atricijus (1968, Beograd). The fullest treatment of Patrizi's
Nova philosophia concentrates on his metaphysics rather than his
physics: Benjamin Brickman, An introduction to Francesco Patrizi's
'Nova de universis philosophia' (1941, New York).
11 See, for example, P. O. Kristeller, Eight philosophers of the
Italian Renaissance (1964, Stanford); B. Brickman, 'Francesco
patrizi on physical space', Journal of the history of ideas, 4
(1943), 224-245; and J. O. Riedl (ed.), A catalogue of Renais~sance
philosphers (1940, Milwaukee).
12 Bernardino Telesio, De rerum natura iuxta propria principia
(ed. V. Spampanato), (3 vols., 1910- 1923, Modena); with an Italian
translatinn by Luigi de Franco (3 vols., 1969, Cosenza); and: a
facsimile of the 1581 edition (1971, Hildesheim).
13 This'edition is carefully described by Paola Zambelli,
'Aneddoti Patriziani', Rinascimento, 7 (1967), 309-318.
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Patrizi'~" Concept of Space and its Later Influence 551
account for this imbalance, but we cannot pursue the whims of
historians here. Bruno and Campanella, for example, have come to be
seen as symbols of intel lectual integr i ty in the struggle
against oppression, yet it should not be forgotten that many of
their works were written in I ta l ian and so could enjoy only a l
imited influence. Certainly the amount of a t tent ion paid to them
by historians is out of all proport ion to their influence among
their contemporaries. 14 Similarly, Telesio's influence was no
greater than Patrizi 's, yet, thanks to his influence on Campanelta
and the fact that Francis Bacon dubbed him 'first of the moderns'
and wrote an extended critique of his De rerum natura,15 historians
have been quick to examine Telesio while Patrizi remains
ignored.
Patr iz i 's difficult and prolix Lat in and his rambl ing
over-scholarly approach- -he often considers all earlier theories
on a part icular matter before giving his own- - must also bear
some of the blame for the lack of enthusiasm shown by modern
historians. However, as I hope to show in this paper, this lack of
interest is total ly undeserved, for his concept of space, in
particular, is a highly significant new development in philosophy
which was to become very influential.
Before turn ing to our main theme it would be as well to outl
ine briefly Patr iz i 's new system so that we can see how his
ideas on space fit into the whole. His new philosophy is expounded
in four parts with the unfami l iar titles of Panaugia, Panarchia,
Pampsychia, and Paneosmia. These headings are in fact inspired by
the neo-Platonist Philo Judaeus, who used the word 'Panaugia ' in
his De opificio mundi. 17 Panaugia is a term referring to the
divine source of l ight and the light or brightness emanat ing from
it. This places Patrizi f irmly in the tradit ion of neo- P latonic
light metaphysics in which light is seen as the closest analogy to
God in the physical world. 18 Using Phi lo's term as his model,
then, Patrizi coins the other words to signify equivalent concepts.
Panarchia is a study of all first principles which, like light,
stem from God. Pampsychia is a study of all souls, from the
irrational souls of plants and animals to the world soul and the
human soul. Pancosmia is a study of the whole physical world and as
such contains Patr iz i 's natura l philosophy. 19
Patrizi seeks to replace the four Aristotel ian principles of
hot, cold, moist and dry with his own natura l principles, which he
believes can equal ly well account for all
14For an indication of the range of material on Bruno see V.
Salvestrini (revised by L. Firpo), Bibliografia Bruniana (1958,
Florence). For Campanella see L. Firpo, 'Cinquant'anni di studi sut
Uampanella, 1901-1950', Rinasrimento, 6 (1965), 209-348.
15 De principiis atque originibus secundam fabulas Cupidinis et
Coeli: sive Parmenidis et Telesii el praecipue
Democritiphilosophia, tractata infabuli de Cupidine. This can be
consulted in J. Spedding, R. L. Ellis and D. D. Heath (eds.), The
works of Francis Bacon (14 vols., 1877 1887, London), vol.
5,461-500.
16 Kepler found this aspect of Patrizi's work useful when t1~dng
to establish his mechanism for planetary motions. He examined all
earlier theories on the causes of the tides which were set out by
Patrizi in book 29 of the Pancosmia (see Johannes Kepler Gesammelte
Werke (ed. Max Caspar: 1951, Munich) vol. 15,387 ) Bruno, on the
other hand, found Patrizi's work rather exasperating, in fact he
described Patrizi as 'a truer excrement of pedantry who has soiled
many pages with his "Discussiones peripateticae" ' (Sidney
Greenberg, The infinite in Giordano Bruno (1950, New" York),
127).
17 The word appears in section 31. See Works, translated by F.
H. Colson and G. H. Whitaker (1929, London), vol. l, 24~5.
18 See in particular book l0 of Panaugia: De fonte ac patre
luminum, 22 23. Here Patrizi quotes a number of authorities for
this view including Zoroaster, Proclus and, of course, the
Bible.
19 For a fuller account see Brickman's Introduction (footnote
10). There is a very useful examination of Patrizi's light
metaphysics in E. E. Maechling, 'Light metaphysics in the natural
philosophy of Francesco Patrizi da Cherso' (1977, University of
London: M. Phil. thesis).
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552 John Henry
physical phenomena. The new principles are space, l ight, heat
and a mat ter principle which is ca l ledf luor . Heat is a special
sort of l ight, and these two act onf luor to form the different k
inds of physical bodies, including of course the Ar istote l ian
elements (earth, water, air and fire) which Patr iz i retains.
Space p lays no act ive role but its impor tance for Patr iz i
cannot be overstated. I t is prior to everyth ing else metaphys ica
l ly and temporal ly . :~ The opening three books of the Pancosra
ia are devoted to a detai led discussion of space, and so it is
given a fuller considerat ion than any of the other natura l
principles, which are deal t with in one book each. Fur thermore ,
all three of these books had been publ ished in substant ia l ly
the same form in 1587, four years before the appearance of the
complete system. 21 I t would seem, therefore, that Patr iz i 's
concept of space real ly was prior to the rest of his natura l phi
losophy. Certainly, it was the most original and the most inf
luential par t of his phi losophical system.
2. Pat r i z i ' s P la ton ism and h is ideas on space In an
autob iographica l let ter wr i t ten to Baccio Valori in 1587 Patr
iz i recorded
how he first set out on his phi losophical career: ' . . . on
hearing a Franc iscan fr iar support ing the P latonic conclusions
he was enamoured of it, and so he made fr iends with him and asked
him whei~ he should look for the "l i fe" of P lato. The fr iar
proposed F ic ino 's Theology as the best way, to which he turned
with great eagerness; and such was the beginning of that s tudy
which he has taken ever since'. 2z
According to his own test imony, then, Patr iz i was a P
latonist ; indeed, he was to become a very dist inguished Platonist
. For while F ic ino must be credited with the revival of P la ton
ism in Renaissance I ta ly (his P laton ic Academy in F lorence was
founded in 1462), he never held a Univers i ty pqst, and judged
from an inst i tut ional po int of view P la ton ism is v i r tua l
ly non-existent unt i l 1577 when Patr iz i became the first
Professor of P latonic phi losophy at the Un ivers i ty of Ferrara.
23 Fur thermore , in 1592, just after the publ icat ion of his Nova
ph i losoph ia , he was invi ted to Rome as the first Professor of
P latonic Phi losophy at the Sapienza itself. In the Ded icatory
Epist le at the beginning of his New ph i losophy he urged Pope
Gregory X IV to replace Ar is tote l ian ism with P la ton ism in
the schools as an impor tant feature of tRe Church's counter-
reformat ion struggles. The Germans and other schismatics could be
brought back to the fold by reason rather than by force, he
claimed, and went on to suggest that the Jesuits should be used in
this educat ional reform. 24
The point is that , for Patr iz i , the P laton ic phi losophy
is much more concordant with Chr is t ian i ty than the prevai l
ing Ar istote l ian phi losophy. I f phi losophy is the
20 This can be seen in the opening words of Patrizi's
discussion, which are quoted below in section 4. 21 Books 1 and 2
appeared as De rerum natura libri I I priores, alter de spacio
physica, alter de spaeio
nmthemntico ( ! 587, Ferrara); book 3 is a latin version of
Della nuova geometria libri X V ( 1587, Ferrara). For a complete
translation of De spacio physico see: B. Brickman, 'Francesco
Patrizi on physical space,' Journal of the history of ideas, 4
(1943), 224-245. I have used this translation here, making changes
occasionally if it seemed necessary.
22 'Autobiografia di Francesco Patricio (1529-1597)', edited by
A. Solerti in Arehivio storieo per Trieste, l'Istria ed il
Trentino, 3 (1884-86), 275~280: Francesco Patrizi, Lettere ed
opuscoli inediti ed. D. Aguzzi-Barbagli: 1975, Florence),
45--51.
23 For a useful account of the development of Platonism in
Universities, see P. O. Kristeller, 'Francesco da Diacceto and
Florentine Platonism in the sixteenth century', in his Studies in
Renaissance thought and letters (1956, Rome), 287-327; and C. B.
Schmitt, 'L'Introduction de la philosophie platonicienne dans
l'enseignement des universit@s ~ la Renaissance', in Platon et
Aristote d la Renaissance. X Vie Colloque International de Tours
(1973) (1976, Paris), 93-104.
2r Dedicatory Epistle, recto of second sheet.
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Pat r i z i ' s Concept of Space and its Later In f luence
553
handmaiden of religion, then surely P latonism is the more
suitably pious: 'Why is it that only those parts of Aristotle's
philosophy which are most harmful to God and his Church are taught
in the schools? Arc there no pious handmaidens? Surely Hermes' l
ittle book on piety and philosophy contains more philosophy than
all of Aristotle's work'. 25
So, when he was invited to Rome, Patrizi went 'with great hopes
and grand designs '26 that perhaps such an educational reform would
be brought about. His hopes were soon dashed. Jus t six months
after his arrival in Rome he was summoned to appear before the
Congregation of the Index. In spite of apologies and hurried init
ial emendat ions his work was put on the Index 'unless corrected by
the author ' (nis i fuer i t ab auctore correcta), z7 Moreover,
after Patr iz i 's death in 1597, Roberto Bel larmino, newly
appointed counsellor for the Holy Office, recommended the
suppression of his chair on the grounds that P latonism was more
dangerous than Aristotel ianism because of, rather than in spite
of, its similarities with Christ ianity. I t was more insidious in
the same way that heresy was more insidious than paganism, zs The
Pope did not go so far as to suppress the chair completely but
appointed Jacopo Mazzoni, who was well known for his attempts, as
Professor at
Pisa and in his writings, to reconcile the differences between p
lato and Aristotle. 29 I t should be realised that for Patrizi and
his contemporaries P latonism was a
much more Syncretic, even eclectic philosophy than it is for
modern scholars. Many of the similarities between Platonic thought
and Christ ianity, which Renaissance P latonists felt could only
testify to the t ruth and wisdom of the Church, and which the
Church itself felt were too dangerous, arose more from the
selective emphasis on various post-Christian neo-Platonic writ ings
than from the works of P lato himself. For Renaissance philosophers
there was no dist inct ion between P latonist and neo- Platonist;
indeed, men like Ficino and Patrizi saw themselves as the latest
figures in the longest unbroken chain of philosophers stretching
back to the t ime of Moses or even, as Patrizi claimed, to Noah.
3~
2s Ibid. Patrizi is referring here to the first book in his own
collection of the Corpus hermetieum. Patrizi arranged the different
parts of the Corpus into what he considered to be their correct
order. In so doing he placed one of the Hermetic fragments recorded
by Stobaeus (I.41.[) before the Poe~xtnder and gave it the title De
pietate et philosophia. See W. Scott (ed.), Hermetica, The ancient
Greek and Latin writings which contain religious or philosophic
teachings ase,~ibed to Hermes Trismegistus (4 vols., 1924, Oxford),
vol. I, 40, and vol. 3,321.
26 So said Pier Francesco di Nores of Patrizi in a letter of May
1592 (see Tullio GregoiTr 'L'Apologia e la Declarationes di
Francesco Patrizi', in Medioevo e rinascimento." studi in onore di
Bruno Nardi (1955. Florence), 387-424 (p. 388)).
z7 The history of Patrizi's fight against the Congregation of
the Index has been very well documented in Gregory ibid., and L.
Firpo, 'Filosofia italiana e controriforma' (footnote 9). See also
Francesco Patrizi (ed. P. O. Kristeller), 'Emendatio in libros suos
novae philosophiae', Rinascimento, 10 (1970), 215-218.
28 L. Firpo ibid., 165-166. 29 As can be clearly seen in the
title of one of his major works: In universam Platonis et
Aristotelis
philosophiam praeludia, sive de comparatione Platonis et
Aristotelis (1597, Venice). There is an excellent study of Mazzoni
and the 'Comparatio' tradition in F. Purnell Jnr., 'Jaeopo Mazzoni
and his comparison of Plato and Aristotle' (1971, Columbia
University: Ph.D. thesis).
3o See the Diseussiones Peripateticae (footnote 8), vol.
3,292-293, where Patrizi traces the origin of the sciences b~'k to
Noah, and Zoroaster is said to be a grandson of Noah. For further
discussions of Patrizi's contributions to the prisca .sapientia
tradition, see K. H. DannenfMdt's articles: 'Hermet.iea
philosophiea' and 'Oraeula chaldaica', Catalogus translationum et
commentariorum, 1 (1960), 137-164; and F. Purnell Jnr., 'Francesco
Patrizi and the critics of Hermes Trismegistus', Journal of
medieval and Renaissance studies, 6 (1976), 155 178. More general
treatments of the tradition are: E N. Tigerstedt, The decline and
fall of the neo-Platonic interpretation of Plato (1971, Helsinki);
and D. P. Walker, The ancient theology, Studies in Christian
Platonism from the 15th. to the 17th. Century (1972, London).
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F ic ino 's genealogy of theology is wel l-known: beginning with
Hermes Tr ismegistus or Zoroaster the myster ies were passed on to
Orpheus, Aglaophemus, Pythagoras , Phi lo laus and then to Plato.
31 Simi lar ly, Patr iz i argues that 'all the Greek phi losophies,
the Pythagorean, the P laton ic on divine things, and also the Ar
is tote l ian on the dogmas of morals, and the Stoics on physics
and even the first pr inciples of medicine, these phi losophies
were taken from their [Hermes's and Aselepius's] books and from
others which are lost'. 32 On a more specific point we are told
that 'P la to was not the first teacher of " Ideas" . For before
him Parmenides and his Eleat ic school, the Pythagoreans and
Pythagoras , who perhaps [learnt] it from Aglaophemus, an Orphic
phi losopher, held this doctr ine. For in many places Proclus and
Damaseius interpret certain Orphic songs spoken by him as being
about " Ideas" . . . Certa in ly the whole doctr ine comes from the
Chaldeans and Zoroaster ' . 3a
Patr iz i ' s thought , therefore, is steeped in the wr i t ings
not only of P la to but also of the later neo-Platonists: Plot
inus, Proelus, Iambl ichus and Porphyry as well as the Hermet ic
and Zoroastr ian texts. In these writ ings we can often see the
origins of Patr iz i ' s view of space even if they are never taken
as far as Patr iz i was to do. P la to 's own account in the
Timaeus, for example, is very close to Patr iz i 's notion. Space
is recognised as one of the pr imary factors required for a full
descr ipt ion and classif ication of the World. Ideas, Forms and
Space are the first recognisable features in the Chaos. a4 Space is
descr ibed as being 'ever last ing, not admit t ing destruct ion;
provid ing a s i tuat ion for all things that come into being', a5
So space is ' the receptable, as it were the nurse, of all
becoming' , a6 In other words, space is recognised as being prior
to all things, a necessity in order for anyth ing else to exist.
Patr iz i puts it this way: 'this must be prior to all else; when
it is present all other things can be placed in it, when absent all
others are destroyed. 'av
Fur thermore , i fa physical ent i ty is not in space then it is
considered not to exist. As P la to says, 'This, indeed, is that
which we look upon as in a dream and say that anyth ing that is
must needs be in some place [r6=o~] and occupy some room
[){&p~], and that what is not somewhere in earth or heaven is
nothing. 'as Or, as Patr iz i would say, ' if they exist they
cannot exist nowhere. Hence they exist somewhere and so in some
place, and so in space', a9
31 See his Opera omnia (1576, Basle; repr. 1962, Turin) vol. 1,
1736 (in the preface to his translation of the Corpus Hermeticum),
and 386 (in his Platonic Theology).
32 This is taken from the historical preface to Patrizi's
edition of the Hermetic works, 3r. 33 Book 12 of Panarehia: De
divinis unitatibus, 25r. 34 The most convenient translation of the
Timaens is probably F. M. Cornford, Plato's cosmology ( 1937,
London). 35 Timaeus, 52B; ed. tit., 192. 36 49A; 177. ~v
Pancosmia, 61a. From now on I will designate all citations from
Patrizi's Nova philosophia as N.p.'.
The sheets are printed in double columns, which I will label as
'a' and 'b' on the recto side and 'c' and 'd' on the vet, so.
3s l'imaeus, 52C; 192. 39 N.p. 61a.
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Having said this it has to be admitted that the differences
between Patrizi 's ideas and those of his 'divine P lato' are quite
fundamental; but these differences are largely due to obscurities
and inconsistencies in Plato's account. For example, on the one
hand he describes space as unchangeable, and so is fully in accord
with Patrizi, while on the other hand he seems to suggest that
space is a characterless base which takes on the properties of
whatever is occupying it at any time. He makes an analogy here with
scents or perfumes which are mixed into a base liquor which is as
odourless as possible so as not to affect the perfume. 4~
The difficulty here is of a general kind in ancient phi losophy
and not just confined to Plato. The failure to distinguish clearly
between corporeal and incorporeal entities seems to lie at the
heart of many of the problems in ancient natural philosophy. 41 The
same failure arises in Aristotle's own thinking, as we shall see,
as well as in his perhaps overhasty inference that Plato's view of
space is roughly equivalent to his own view of prime matter before
it is endowed with form. 42 The main problem arising from this is
that, as one corporeal ent i ty cannot be in the same place at the
same time as another, space cannot be an extended thing in which
another body is conta ined- - the missing inference being that
extension implies corporeality. The beginnings of a solution to
this problem appeared in the works of the Epicureans, who declared
that space could be extended but incorporeal, and the Stoics, who
met the problem head on by accepting, even insisting, that material
objects can and do interpenetrate. According to the Stoics pneuma
was a material substance composed of fire and air which pervaded
the whole universe, continuously, even within the depths of solid
bodies. 4a For the Stoics the incorporeal is only a subtle and
rarefied form of the corporeal. The neo-Platonists were clearly
influenced by both opinions though both were considered to be too
materialist. Syrianus, for example, rejects the Stoic view in his
commentary on the Metaphysics:
9 we should not look to the Stoics and pay attention to what
they say, for they do not even reject [the concept that] material
masses can subsist within one another; we should rather turn to
those who suppose that space ranges throughout the whole cosmos,
and receives all the nature of corporeality into itself; they
declare that it does not divide [things] nor is it divided, as it
is shared by the air and other bodies, but unbending and firm and
immovable and forced from every change stretches throughout the
whole cosmos. 44
On the other hand, the neo-Platonic author of Libellus I I of
the Hermetic Corpus rejects the Epicurean concept of void while at
the same time ai~irming that space [Z6TCo~] is incorporeal. When
Asclepius asks Hermes: 'What, then, is that incorporeal thing?',
Hermes is made to reply that 'it is Mind, entire and wholly self-
encompassing . . . imperturbable, intangible, standing firm-fixed
in i tsel f . . . ' . Similarly, in the dialogue known as the
Asclepius void is denied on the grounds that
40 Compare Timaeus 50B-C, 182, with 50D-E, 186. For a fuller
account of Plato's concept of space Cornford's commentaIs~ should
be consulted.
41 See for example G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, The pre-Socratic
philosophers (1971, Cambridge), 247 and 249.
a2See Physics, IV, 2 (209b ll) and IV, 7 (214a l0 15). 43 On the
Stoic natural philosophy see S. Sambursky, Physics of the Stoics
(1971, London); Emile
Brehier, La th~orie des incorporels dans l'aneien stoieisme
(1963, Paris)i and Josiah B. Gould, The philosophy of Chrysippus
(1970, Leyden).
44 Syrianus In metaphysicam commentaria (ed. Guilelmus Kroll:
1902, Berlin), 84-86.
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all space is always full of 'things apprehensible by thought
alone'; in other words, by some spiritial, incorporeal entity. In
this way the Stoic concept ofpneuma became transformed into a
genuinely incorporeal yet extended entity, as The so-called
intelligible world, the higher spiritual world, became the true
reality tbr the neo- Platonists while the physical world was but a
poor reflection. So three dimensional and yet insubstantial or
immaterial entities like space and light become important as
analogues of the spiritual world. Space and light became
border-line entities between the realms of matter and spirit.
Plotinus (205-270), for example, il lustrates the relationship
between the One and Nous (roughly equivalent to the world of Forms
and Ideas in the Platonic sense) by analogy with the relationship
between the Sun and light. Nous is an emanation from the one in the
same way that light is an emanation from the Sun. 1,ight is said
t
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Patrizi 's Concept of Space and its Later Influence 557
Patrizi was personally famil iar with the work of all these men.
He cites each of them in the Nova philosophia s3 and we know that
he once owned works by Proclus and Plot inus as well as other
neo-Platonists, s4 He translated Phi loponus's com- mentary on the
Metaphysics into Latin, and it is inconceiyable that he did not
read his commentary on the Physics which was pr inted in Lat in
eight t imes between 1539 and 1581.5s Patr iz i could use these
thinkers as an inspirat ion and an author i tat ive backing for his
own views on space and its relationship to metaphysics and physics.
His t reatment of space, however, was not confined in his own mind
to these two sciences. As a P latonist he felt bound to treat of
another impor tant science which was closely related to the concept
of space: mathematics.
After all, one of the maj or differences between Aristotle and
Plato was considered to he their disparate att i tudes to
mathematics. Mazzoni in his Comparison of Plato and Aristotle, for
example, declared ' that Plato believed that mathemat ics was part
icular ly suited to physical investigations. On account of which he
often applied it to revealing the mysteries of physics. But
Aristotle seems to have felt entirely different, and he ascribed
Plato's errors to his love of mathemat ics ' , s6
I t is not surprising, therefore, that Patrizi devotes two of
his three books on space to 'mathemat ica l ' and 'geometrical '
considerations. 57 The major influence here is the shadowy figure
of Pythagoras rather than Plato himself, though, of course, Patrizi
cannot forbear from reminding us that 'r ightly was it set on the
doors of the divine Plato's school: "let no one enter who is
ignorant of Geometry" ,.ss Believing, as he does, in an ' intell
igible' world which is more real than the physical world and which
is populated with Ideal Forms, it is easy for him to accept the
reality of numbers as self- existent entities which, like
geometrical figures, in some sense underl ie physical entities. So,
whereas an Aristotel ian will tend to reject the usefulness of
mathematics because it only deals with abstract ions and not with
real objects, a' P latonist will see mathemat ica l operations as
proof of the existence of the Ideal Forms.
Renaissance P latonism has been cited by some notable modern
historians as an important feature in the mathemat izat ion of
science and the development of the quant i tat ive approach. 59
While there are certainly elements of t ruth in this, it must
always be borne in mind that there are two dist inct tradit ions:
one of mathemat ica l
53 Although there is no index to the Nova philosophia there is a
'Catalogus autorum qui hoc novae philosophiae opere citantur'.
54 We know this because there are seventy-five Greek manuscripts
in the library of the Escorial which used to belong to Patrizi. He
had to sell them during a period of insolvency. The list includes a
number of Platonic works. See B. E. C. Miller, Catalogue des
manuscrits grecs de la Bibliothbque de l'Escurial (1848, Paris:
repr. 1966, Amsterdam); and E. Jacobs, 'Francesco Patrizi und seine
Sammlung griechischer Handschriften in der Bibliothek des
Escorial', Zentralblatt Fir Bibliothekswesen, 25 (1908), 19-47.
55 See footnote 2 for reference to Patrizi's translation. There'
were two translations of Philoponus's commentary on the Physics;
one by G. Dorotheus printed in 1539, 1546, 1550 and 1554, and the
other by J. B. Rasarius printed in 1558, 1559, 1569 and 1581, all
at Venice. For full references see CI B. Schmitt, 'A fresh look at
mechanics in 16th century Italy', Studies in history and philosophy
of science, 1 (1970), 161- 175.
56 Jacopo Mazzoni (footnote 29), 187. s7 See footnote 18. 5s
N.p. 68b. 59 The two most well-known proponents of this view are E.
A. Burtt, The metaphysical foundations of
modern science (1924, London); and Alexander Koyr4, 'Galileo and
Plato', Journal of the history of ideas, 4 (1943), 400428. But see
also E. Cassirer, 'Galileo's Platonism', in M. A. Montague (ed.),
Studies and essay~ in the history of science (1946, New York), 277
297.
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science and one of mathematical mysticism or 'metamathematics '
. There is a world of difference between the 'mathematical '
ramblings of Patrizi and the work of men like Galileo and Kepler
(though Kepler has a foot in both traditions). Admittedly, Patrizi
recognises the importance of mathemat ics- -he even tells us that
'Aristotle's assertion that mathematics has neither aim nor use was
false'6~ he has no clear grasp of the use of mathematics in
developing his own universal philosophy. Indeed, the word
'mathematics' has, for modern minds, an almost unrecognisable mean-
ing. 61 I t is worth quoting a long passage from the De spacio
mathematico to get something of the flavour of Patrizi's version of
mathematics:
And the Pythagoreans, most learned of the older thinkers were
correct in saying that Two, which was the first number,
corresponded to a line; Three, the second, corresponded to the
surface; Four, the third, to the body, with the nature of things
persuading and compelling, though silently. This nature did not
allow continuous quantity to proceed beyond the number four (from
which Ten the ultimate of numbers is made), nor beyond body, which
is itself within four. For just as the part of space which is held
between two points is a line, and that between three points is the
first surface: a triangle, so the part of space which is contained
within four points, form the first body, a pyramid. Subsequently,
if a space be contained within five points, or six, or any larger
number, they will not form any thing other than body, that is the
threefold dimension, long, broad, and deep, by which we measure the
parts of infinite space (for, the whole being infinite we do not
measure). And with great wonder it must be realised that two points
enclose a line, three a surface, and four a body, the three parts
of space . . . . Within the same four consists Ten, the most
perfect number beyond which there is repetition of the same things
... and no less deserving our admiration is it that ten is produced
in yet another way: from the continuous quantities constituting the
first body, namely six lines and four surfaces- the three sides and
base of a pyramid. Yet between such points and lines and surfaces,
even if many more be taken for forming figures of bodies, there can
be enclosed only three spaces, long, broad, and deep, which make
one and every body. And so it was rightly said by the Pythagoreans
that the three embrace all, and so are perfect. And so as nature
leads us through the degrees of things in order, we have been led
to points, to lines, to surfaces, to bodies, to unity, to numbers.
But among the sciences these things constitute the whole of that
which the ancients called mathematics. 62
60 It is not clear what Patrizi has in mind here. He may be
confusing Aristotle with Aristippus (see Metaphysics B, 2,996a,
32-36, and M,3, 1078a, 32-b, 5: I am grateiul to Dr. A. G. Molland
for making this suggestion). Or it may be that Patrizi has been so
enraged by Aristotle's serious criticisms of Plato's number theory
in the last two books of the Metaphysic:s that he leaps to the
conclusion that Aristotle is opposed to any theo~T of nurr~ber and
so to mathematics. For a recent assessment of Aristotle's critique
of Plato's number theory see the introduction to Julia Annas,
Aristotle's 'Metaphysics' Books M and N (1976, Oxford).
61 This is not unique to Patrizi: there is a general problem
arising from the fact that mathematics was seen as a science
relying on abstraction and so dealt only with imaginary things.
Plato's ideal mathematical forms, for example, are found in the
intelligible world of the neo-Platonists and not in the physical
world. So, Telesio, in his l)e rerum natura (1586, Naples), 40
rejects the notion of space as a 'mathematical body, in our
imagination only . . . ' . ,John Buridan, in his Questions on the
physics, even refers to simple ' thought experiments' as
'experiences of' a mathematical kind' simply because they are
imaginary and not because there is any quantitative analysis of
results (see E. Grant, So~l'ce bo~k on )ttedieeal .vcience (1974,
Cambridge, Mass.), 326). I hope to deal more fully with Patrizi's
ideas on 'mathematical space' in another paper.
62 N.p. 66c~l.
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Patrizi's Concept of Space and its Later Influence 559
We can conclude, therefore, that Patrizi is wholeheartedly
Platonist, adopting, as he does, the emanative light metaphysics
already propagated by Plotinus, Proclus and others (even, nearer
Patrizi 's own time, Ficino and Palingenius), 63 and the
number-mysticism of the Pythagoreans. Often, however, the treatment
of space given by his Platonic predecessors is only cursory and
could only serve as a starting point for Patrizi. The primacy of
space in his new system meant that the concept had to be developed
in detail, and thanks largely to the other dominating facet of his
philosophical outlook, to which we now turn, he was able to
propound his ideas in an often strikingly original way.
3. Pat r i z i ' s ant i -Ar i s to te l ian ism and h is
concept of space As Patrizi well knew, it was not sufficient to
promote a Platonic notion of space
when everyone else was firmly entrenched in Aristotelian place.
He had to show that Aristotle's position was untenable, in the hope
that his own version could supersede it. Besides, Patrizi needed
very little excuse to attack Aristotle. He was arguably the most
vehement and unrelenting critic of Aristotle even at a t ime when
anti Aristotelians were making themselves heard all over Europe.
Indeed, had he not been given a chair in Platonic philosophy it
seems doubtful that he could have worked within the University
system. He would surely never have been content to hold a position
like that of his contemporaries Franeeseo de'Vieri 64 and Jaeopo
Mazzoni, who ran courses on Plato at Pisa, but only as a small part
of their teaehing duties which, of course, concentrated on the
philosophy of Aristotle.
His antipathy to Aristotle is, no doubt, partly due to jealousy
on behalf of his divine Plato. As he tells us himself, he 'fell
greatly in love with Plato and all his followers, and dedicated
himself wholly to them. And so it was that he always preferred them
to Aristotle'. 65 Often, when expounding his fondly held notion of
replacing Aristotle by Plato in the schools, he emphasises the
irreligious aspects of the Stagirite's philosophy: 'it would be far
more advantageous, more well considered for Christian men and far
more useful if the Hermetic teachings were more powerful than the
Aristotelian which spout out great impieties everywhere.. / .66
As far as Patrizi was concerned, if the Platonist philosophy
agreed suprisingly well with Christian theology, Aristotle's was
almost entirely detrimental to the faith. At one point he asks 'who
would not pursue with great hatred an impious man and enemy of
(~od~' . 67 Patrizi rarely minces his words when discussing
Aristotle:
Common men laugh indiscriminately at Philosophers with this
saying, which is now a eommonplaee: this man is a philosopher, he
does not believe in
63 For an example of light metaphysics in Ficino see his Liber
de sole in vol. 1 of his Opera omnia (footnote 31). Palingenius
wrote a philosophical poem called Zodiaeus vitae which has appeared
in many editions. A convenient reprint is: Marcellus Palingenius,
The zodiake of life . . . translated by Barnabe Googe (t947, New
York). See also F. W. Watson, The 'Zodiacus vitae' of Marcellus
Palingenius Stellatus: an old school book (1908, London).
64 Compare Francesco de'Vieri, Vere conelusioni di Platone,
eonformi alla dottrina christiana eta quella d'Aristotile (1590,
Florence).
65 This appears on the first page (un-numbered) of the last
appendix to the Nova philosophia ealled Veritatis studiosis. This
is an apologia for Patrizi's anti-Aristotelianism and is partly a
reproduction of the opening chapter of tome 3 of the Discussiones
peripateticae.
66 Hermes Trismegist~s, 3r-v. 6 ~ Veritatis studiosis.
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God. And not without cause. For they see in every school in
Europe, in every gather ing of monks, only the phi losophy of Ar
istot le is taught , for great rewards, and with great fame. Yet
they know and learn that only this phi losophy deprives God of his
omnipotence and providence. 6s
As, well as being an enemy of God, Ar istot le shows other
unsavoury charac- teristics. He was impl icated in the plot to kill
A lexander the Great; he was an ungrateful disciple who turned
against his teacher P la to and 'tore him to pieces for poster i ty
' ; and perhaps most serious of all, ' I t is handed down that for
the most par t he burnt the books of his predecessors to steal
their ideas from them, so that they would seem to be his own
discoveries'. 69 And when he does not plagiarise from his
predecessors he often does 'not report their th ink ing fa i thful
ly but destroys them by jeering and soph is t ry - - th i s is
typical of him'. 7~ In short, Ar istot le was ' tota l ly concerned
that no-one should seem wiser than himself ' . 71
I t is the combinat ion of this virulent ant i -Ar is tote l ian
ism with the metaphys ica l impor tance of space in Patr iz i ' s
thought that leads him to pay careful a t tent ion to the prevai l
ing views on Ar istotel ian place and systemat ica l ly to reject v
i r tua l ly every one of Ar istot le 's conclusions. And it is
here rather than in his more overt ly P laton ic not ions that Part
iz i ' s work takes on its great significance. The gradual
overthrow of Ar istote l ianism cont inued for many years after
Patr iz i ' s death, 72 and many th inkers made use of his erudit
ion and scholarship in a number of fields; 73 but most impor tant
ly a new concept of space was needed for the proper estab l i
shmeot of the mechanical phi losophy, and Patr iz i ' s arguments
provided by far the ful lest t reatment up to that t ime.
Now, the not ion of space as we th ink of it, hard ly appears at
all in Aristot le; instead he confines himself to a discussion of
place [~6uo~] which he quickly establ ishes in the Phys ics as, so
to speak, a ' techn ica l term'.74 This technical term is so
careful ly defined that many of the features of Pat r i z ian space
seem self- cont rad ic tory when viewed from an Ar istotel ian
posit ion. For Aristot le, all ent it ies can be analysed in terms
of substance and accident, and where a body is at any given moment
is nothing to do with its essence but is merely accidental to it.
So it is the concept of 'place' or locat ion which he sets out to
define. After careful considerat ion he asserts that the place of a
body is the l imit ing surface of the surrounding or contain ing
body. 75 Patr iz i , however, is unimpressed; ' For what is his
locus', he
68 Dedicatory Epistle, verso of first sheet. In fact there is
actually a recorded instance of this saying used specifically--if
unfairly--against Patrizi. in Giordano Bruno's trial proceedings
Zuan Mocenigo reported that Bruno had said: 'I know that Patrizi is
a philosopher and believes nothing' (see F. A. Yates, Giordano
Bruno and the Hermetic tradition (1964, London), 345),
69 Veritatis studiosis, recto of first sheet. 70 N.p. 67b.
71N.p. 66d. 72 That is was a gradual overthrow must now he
recognised. See, for example, C. B. Scbmitt, 'Towards
a reassessment of Renaissance Aristotelianism', History of
science, 11 (1973), 159 193; or, taken from another point of view,
Edward Grant, 'Aristotelianism and the longevity of the medieval
world view'. History of science, 16 (1978), 93-106.
73I briefly mention just a few of these below in section 4. 74
Aristotle's concept of place and rejection of the notion of space
can be found in the Physics, 4,
chapters 1 9,208a, 27-217b, 28; and in De caelo, 1, chapters
5-9, 271b 279b, 3. 7s Physics, 4, 4,212a, 5-10. I have used the
Loeb edition translated by P. H. Wicksteed and F, M.
Cornford (1970, London), 313. In future I will give the page
reference in brackets.
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demands, 'other than space, with length and breadth, even if in
locus he himself foolishly overlooked depth, which is more properly
locus'. 76 Patrizi has made two points here. Firstly, Aristotle's
place is only a particular sort of space. He expands the argument
for us: 'When the same space contains a body it is called locus;
but if it contains no body it is called a vact~.~m. But really
these things are the same thing: vacuum, spacium, plenum, and
locus... And on this account vacuum like locus, must consist of the
three dimensions, length, breadth, and depth. And this very vacuum
is nothing other than three dimensional space'. ~
His second point is that the Aristotelian definition is
inadequate because a three- dimensional object is said to be
contained in only two dimensions. Aristotle is even accused of
inconsistency here first attributing three dimensions to place and
then denying it: 'For he does deny it when he says: "locus must be
the boundary of the enclosing body, with which it touches the body
enclosed". On this account he defines locus as the surface of the
surrounding body'. 7s
Within the terms of his own paradigm Patrizi is making a good
point when he asks how the depths of a body can be meaningfully
said to occupy a surface rather than a space. But it is hardly a
fair criticism of Aristotle, whose concept of place is primarily
concerned to locate a body, describing where it is in relation to
other objects; in which case consideration of a closed surface is
entirely adequate. However, it will not do to characterise these
arguments in terms of the incompat- ability of paradigms, because
Aristotle actually considers what is very much like the Patrizian
concept and rejects it:
What makes 'place' appear so mysterious and hard to grasp is its
illusive suggestion now of matter and now of form, and the fact
that while the continent is at rest the transferable content may
change, for this suggests that there may be a dimensional something
that stays there other than the entering and vacating objects--air
too contributing to this last illusion since it looks as if it were
incorporeal--so that the 'place' instead of being recognised as
being constituted solely by the adjacent surface of the vessel, is
held to be the dimensional interval within the surface, conceived
as 'vacancy'. 79
The problem here is that proposed by the perennial confusion
between corporeal and incorporeal. This is clearly shown when
Aristotle argues that because a void is non-material an encroaching
object like a cube of wood cannot displace it, as it could displace
water and so has to interpenetrate with the void. This is held to
be impossible, for it means two objects are occupying the same
place at the same time. The fact that the void is incorporeal ought
to make a difference to the argument, but Aristotle fails to see
this. He seems to be objecting that the void is not material enough
to be displaced by the wood but too material to exist in the same
place at the same time as the wood. s~ Any 'dimensional entity' for
Aristotle is corporeal: he cannot accept the incorporeal
three-dimensional space of the atomists, sl
v6 N.p. 61a. v~ N.p. 62d. Aristotle had anticipated this point:
'Thus "place" and the "filled" and the "vacant"
would all be one identical entity under varying aspects or
conditions of existence' (Physics, 213a, 15-20 (p. 329)).
7s N.p. 62a. ~9 Physics, IV; 4, 212a, 7-15 (p. 313). s~ IV,
8,216a, 35-216b, 4 (p. 359). slPhysics, IV, 6, 213a, 30 sq. (p.
331).
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Consider by way of contrast Patr iz i ' s version of d
isplacement: 'Therefore, in order that the locat ing body may now
receive the located body, it is necessary for it to w i thdraw
complete ly from this place leaving the space, which is immobi le
there, empty so that it may be fil led with the encroaching body.
And when this [body] in turn wi thdraws completely, that same space
which is there immobile, may receive another enter ing body' , s2
Hav ing said this, Patr iz i now reveals, in complete contrad ict
ion to Aristot le, that he believes this is the only way to avoid
interpenet- rat ion of bodies: 'Space always the same, and a lways
immobi le must remain long, wide, and deep in order to release all
leaving bodies and to receive all enter ing bodies. Or else
penetrat ion of bodies occurs and this is impossible' . 83
I t is thanks to his P latonic concept of an incorporeal
corporeal, then, that Patr iz i avoids gett ing into confusion
about what is a mater ia l ent i ty and what is not. However, as an
extended ent i ty can be either mater ia l or immater ia l , Patr
iz i has to eharacter ise a corporeal body by reference to
something other than its extension. Patr iz i ' s answer is the
obvious one for the modern mind: ' I t is antitypia which they also
call anteresis which is proper to a body, in so far as it is a
natura l body. This is resistance. This resistance needs that three
d imensional space for its existence', s4 Patr iz i ' s opinion was
to be re-emphasised in the seventeenth century in arguments against
the Cartesian definit ion of mat ter as res extensa. Descartes, l
ike Ar istot le, could not conceive of d imensional i ty wi thout
corporeal i ty , s5
A fur ther problem arising from this phi losophical confusion
was the possibi l i ty of void space. Aristot le, as is well known,
was forced into denying the existence of void space even in
principle. After all, place is an a t t r ibute of body.
Nevertheless, even scholastic phi losophers used to argue against
Ar istot le on this one, though only secundum imaginat ionem,
almost as a menta l exercise, s6 U l t imate ly they would usual ly
return to the Ar istotel ian fo ld - - they were not dr iven to
overthrow Ar istot le because of a love for P lato, like Patr iz i
, or because of a need to account for the universe in mechanical
terms, l ike Gassendi, Boyle and Newton.
u2 N.p. 62c. s3 Ibid. s4 N.p. 62e-d. s5 Indee~t, one could
almost say Descartes was more Aristotelian than Aristotle on this
point. See
Principles 4-22 in Descartes's Principles of philosophy, which
is conveniently presented in E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross
(eds.), The philosophical works of Descartes (2 vols., 1967,
Cambridge), vol. l, 255-265.
s6 There is an excellent series of articles by Edward Grant on
the concept of void space in the Middle Ages. It comprises: 'Motion
in the void and the principle of inertia in the middle ages', Isis,
55 (1964), 265- 292; 'Medieval and seventeenth century conceptions
of an infinite void space beyond the cosmos', Isis, 60 (1969),
39-60; 'Medieval explanations and interpretations of the dictum
that "Nature abhors a Vacuum" ', Traditio, 29 (1973), 327-355;
'Place and space in medieval physical thought', in P. K. Machamer
and R. G. Turnbull (eds.), Motion and time, space and matter:
interrelations in the history of philosophy and science (1976.
Columbus, Ohio), 137-167; and 'The principle of the impenetrability
of bodies in the histol)" of concepts of separate space from the
middle ages to the seventeenth centu .ry', 1sis, 69 (1978),
551-57l. See also A. Koyr~, 'Le vide et l'espace infini au XIVe
smele', Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire dn mbyen-af]e,
24 (1949), 45-91.
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Patrizi's Concept of Space and its Later Inflnence 563
In his own discussion Aristotle distinguished three species of
void: the intra- mundane void, the inter-particulate void, and the
extra-cosmic void. Following suit, Patrizi considers each of these
in turn. The intra-mundane void refers to large-scale vacua that
might be formed inside blocked bellows, clepsydrae or water clocks,
sealed bludders or other containers, and even much larger voids
which could be left behind if God destroyed everything beneath the
sphere of the moon but kept that sphere supported, s7 Now, even
Patrizi admits that this sort of void is not found natur~lly, but
he believes that such could be produced artificiMly. Unfortunately,
albeit interestingly, Patrizi lets the whole burden of his argument
rest on certain 'experiments' (experientiae) which he describes,
with no consideration of the theoretical objections proposed by
Aristotle. This is particularly disappointing because Aristotle's
most strenuous objections rely on his assumption that motion would
be impossible in a vacuum, and it would have been interesting to
see how Patrizi surmounted these obstacles. However it was left to
other thinkers to argue for a new dynamic theory and this is one of
the major failings of his otherwise comprehensive critique, ss
The possibility of motion in a void only becomes an issue for
Patrizi when he is arguing for the second sort of void: the
interparticulate or interstitial void said to exist between the
particles of matter. Following the arguments of Lucretius in De
return natura s9 Patrizi insists that only on this assumption can
motion and condensation and rarefaction take place:
The air, likewise, yields to my body when I change my position
in it. As it gives way it is either destroyed or else withdrawn
into its other neighbouring particles and thus, either one part
penetrates into another, or else it withdraws into the empty spaces
interspersed within it. But we must not say that it was destroyed
without any previous transformation. Nor is the inter-penetration
of one part of the air with another ~dmissable. Therefore, we must
admit that it betook itself into the empty spaces of the nearby
air. And it is in this sense that certain of the wisest of the
ancients, well informed on the nature of things found in the vacuum
the reason for density and rarity; and also maintained that the
motion of bodies took place through the void, the object met giving
way and withdrawing into the nearest empty little spaces. 9~
Of course, all this had been vigorously denied by Aristotle, but
as far as Patrizi was concerned his carefully thought out arguments
were merely a 'dross of sophisms'. Meanwhile, he is so carried away
by his own speculations that he asks: 'Why can we not maintain that
there is as much vacuum in the world as there is
87 Patrizi does not discuss the last example, but it does appear
in the scholastic literature and even in Walter Charleton's
Physiologia Epicuro Gassendo-Charletoniana (1654, London), 63. For
a medieval example see E. Grant (tbotnote 61), 325, where Albert of
Saxony's Questions or~ the Physics of Aristotle is considered.
8s For an excellent discussion of these experiments see C. B.
Schmitt. 'Experimental evidence for and against a void: the
sixteenth century arguments', isis, 58 (1968), 352 366. For
Patrizi's discussion see N.p. 63b-c. On the relationship between
dynamical theories and the concept of void, see E. Grant., 'Motion
in the void (fnotnote 86). See also M. ('.lagett, The s~:ienee of
mechanics in the Middle Ages (1959, Madison, Wis.), 509-512.
Philoponus also deserves recognition on this score: so far his work
has to be properly ~ssessed, but see C. B. Schmitt (fontnote
55).
s9 Lucretius, On the "~mture of the univer.se (1951,
Harmondsworth), Book I, l l . 32,%417. 9~ N.p. 63a.
9 ~ .s. 2 M
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564 John Henry
plenum ~'.91 In ther words, 'These interspersed empty spaces are
real ly as extensive and as nmnerous as the filled spaces [of the
world]. For it is a plenum to the senses and in popular parlance,
but according tt'the world is empty . . . ' .02 Once again Patr iz
i has hit upon a notion that will be taken up again in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, part icu lar ly after the
inspirat ion of Isaac Newton's speculat ions in the Quer ies
appended to his Opt icks . 9 3
The final type of void is the extra-cosmic void beyond the
outermost sphere of the heavens. Arguments had been put forward on
its behal f v i r tua l ly cont inuously from the pre-Socrat ics to
the Renaissance in spite of Ar is tot le 's best efforts. The
famous, and t ru ly ubiquitous, a rgument runs something l ike
this:
9 let it be assumed that someone standing motionless at the ext
remi ty [of the world] extends his hand upward 9 Now if his hand
does extend they take it that there is something there beyond the
sky to which the hand extends 9 But if the arm could not be
extended then something will exist outside that prevents the
extension of the hand; but if he then stands at the ext remi ty of
this and extends his hand the same question as before [is asked]
since nothing could be shown to exist beyond that being: 94
Patr iz i 's own version is somewhat more sophist icated but the
same point is made, namely that the world must have an outer
surface which must present itself to an external surrounding space.
His st ratagem is to consider one of the signs of the zodiac (he
takes Aries) which covers an area del ineated by arcs of 30 ~ and
12 ~ on the innermost surface of the heaven. Now, these bounding
lines can be extended through to the outside surface, which must
exist, otherwise the heaven would be a body with no surface or not
a body at all. I f we consider all the signs of the zodiac in s
imilar fashion, then we have to conceive a band 12 ~ wide running r
ight around the world. Fur ther , we can extend the lines div iding
one sign from the next upward and downward to each pole, so that
the world is d iv ided into twelve equal parts like a melon. Patr
iz i is t ry ing to give the reader a menta l p icture of what the
world must look like if it could be seen from outside the sphere of
the fixed stars. The outer surface must be contiguous with an
ambient space and the world as a whole must exist, l ike everyth
ing else ( including melons), in an encompassing space. 9s
Fur thermore , this space must be infinite in extent . Patr iz i
is quite insistent about th i s - - the void is not merely
indefinite but infinite, and infinite in actua l i ty not s imply i
n potent ia . After all, space cannot be bounded by itself nor by
any other corporeal incorporeal , which would be indist inguishable
from space, so it must be bounded by an incorporeal or a body. An
incorporeal , however, would have to have a surface in order to
bound space and so could not be incorporeal and a body has to exist
i n space and so could not bound space. So, space is infinite. 96
And it cannot be
9 91 N.p. 63b. 92 N.p. 64c. 93 See A. Thackray, '"Matter in a
nut-shell': Newton's Opti
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Patrizi's Concept of Space and its Later Influence 565
said to be infinite only in potential while actually finite, for
that would mean it is r
actually bounded, which is impossible by the same reasoning we
have just been through, so space is actually infinite. 97 Patrizi
is now in a position to summarily dispose of one awkward scholastic
problem: can the world as a whole be moved? Certainly it can, and
it does indeed leave a void behind it as it moves into another part
of the infinite space. 9s
A related Aristotelian problem concerns the place of the world
as a whole. Aristotle led himself into a tight corner on this issue
when he said that 'if a body is encompassed by another body
external to it, it is "in a place", but if not, it is not ' . 99
The outermost sphere or the world as a whole could not be said to
be surrounded by an external containing body, so the commentators
had to make a special case and define this place in terms o f the
surrounded limit. 1~176 The place of the outermost sphere was,
therefore, the external surface of the penultimate sphere. Strictly
speaking, Patrizi is once again perfectly free to dispose of this
argument; but his Platonism leads him to agree with Aristotle for
once, and he feels it incumbent upon himself to establish that the
earth, which is the centre of the world (he was no Copernican1~ is
in the centre of the universum spacium. Of course, as an infinite
extension, the universum spacium should have no definable centre,
and Patrizi begs the question completely by saying that if we draw
imaginary lines out in all directions from the centre of the earth
as far as the boundary of the world, they will be equal but finite
in length. I f we extend them further they remain equal even to
infinity and so the world is in the centre of the universal space.
1~
From one point of view this is a weakness which prevents Patrizi
from being hailed as a truly modern thinker, 1~ but as a Ptatonist
he was bound to believe in a hierarchy, the great chain of being
from matter to spirit and up to God. The rational soul of man was
another corporeal incorporeal for Patrizi, a mid-point between the
world of nature and the world of spirit, and so it seemed fitting
that man's place on earth should be central, with the base matter
of earth below him and the heavens above him. 104 So everything is
ordered: 'the principal bodies of the world have the power of being
fixed each in its own place and rank and of not being dislodged
97 Ibid. 9s N.p. 63d. This argument about the world moving was
raised by the Aristotelian Alexander
Aphrodisiensis as an objection to the Stoic concept of an
ambientvoid. His objection was simply that this sort of motion is
meaningless and yet is allowed for by the Stoic concept, therefore
their concept is in error. The Aristotelian, however, has
overlooked the principle of sufiqcient reason which can be invoked
by the Stoics to account for the immovabil ity of the world: for
why should it move one way rather than another? See S. Sambursky
(footnote 43), 113. This argmnent was still going strong in the
seventeenth century between Leibniz and the Newtonian Samuel
Clarke. This debate may be conveniently followed in H. G. Alexander
(ed.), The Leibniz-('larke correspondence (1956. Manchester): see
Leibniz's 3rd paper and Clarke's 3rd reply, for example.
99physic~s, IV, 5, 212a, 32- 5 (p. 321). too For a brief
discussion of this problem see, H. A. Wolfson, Crescas' critique of
Aristotle (1929,
Cambridge, Mass.), 45-46 and Note 54 on Proposition 1, part. 2,
432441. ~0~ Although he did, like so many others, accept the
rotation of the earth about its own axis (compare
N.p. 104d). 102 N.p. 64c. 103 E. E. Maechling (footnote 19)
considers this to be the reason why A. Koyr6 omitted Patrizi from
his
From the closed world to the infinite universe (1957,
Baltimore). For Patrizi believed in a closed world in an infinite
universe. Koyr~'s omission is, nevertheless, unfortunate in view of
Patrizi 's great importance.
lo4 For hierarchies in Patrizi's Nova philosophia see B.
Briekman (footnote 10), 32-39.
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566 ,John Henry
therefrom. And so it happens that the centre of the world is a
lways in the centre of space, the earth remains immovable in the
same space around the centre, and l ikewise water, air, and the
entire heaven'. 1~
In the closing lines of his book on physical space, then, Patr
iz i i ronical ly comes close to an acceptance of Ar istotel ian
natura l places and the non- isotropie space that it implies. He
continues: 'But if this is so, the bodies of the world, the heaven
and the elements, occupied from the beginning the parts of space
appropr ia te to each, in which they might remain forever. Jus t as
these bodies differ in nature from one another so can the parts of
space that underl ie each of them seem to differ from each other' .
106
Patr iz i has a l ready said that the differences in parts of
space arising from different located bodies are merely accidental
to it and not par t of its proper at t r ibutes , and yet now he
admits that space could be given speeiM propert ies l ike those
impl ied by the Ar istotel ian doctr ine of natura l plaees. Thus,
instead of arguing against. Ar istot le he declares that if ' it
should be proved that those parts of space were so ar ranged from
the beginning that the one holding the earth is incapable of
holding the air, and the one holding the water is unable to hold
the heaven, air or earth, and that each part received bodies peeul
iar to itself ' , then it follows that 'this p roper ty must have
been given each one of the parts of space by some other superior
power. But whose power that is, and what sort of power it is, will
be looked into thoroughly in its own place' . l~
Even if Pat r i z i ' s t reatment of physical space ends on
this quasi -Ar istote l ian note, the major i ty of his arguments
have a l ready been sutEeient to underl ine the inadequacy of the
Ar istotel ian account. 1~ Dr iven by his love of the P laton ic
phi losophy and his adherence to its metaphys ica l principles, he
has set out to show that Ar istot le 's reject ion of the popular
opinion that there is a 'k ind of d imensional ent i ty ' which is
'd ist inct from body' is misconceived, 1~ and at the same t ime to
establ ish this popular opinion as the correet one by careful phi
losophieal analysis. The str ict ly re lat ional concept which for
Ar istot le was merely one of the ten categories of the objects of
thought 1 lO became for Patr iz i a real self-existent ent i ty
.
4. The inf luence of Pat r i z i ' s ideas about space In the
late s ixteenth and ear ly seventeenth centur ies Patr iz i was
general ly
regarded as one of the world's leading phi losophers. There are
numerous passing references to him, as well as a number of longer
discussions by writers all over Europe. One of his early works was
even abr idged and adapted in an English work of
10s N.p. 65d. t06 Ibid. ~o~ Ibid. lo8 Besides. Patrizi goes
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Pat r i z i ' s Concept of Space and its Later In f luence
567
1574. i l l G i lbert , 112 Bacon, 113 Kep ler l l4 and F ludd i
i s knew his work; Mersenne
took pa ins to re ject his l ight metaphys ics in Quaest iones
in Genes im, i16 and John Comenius put Pat r i z i ' among the
greates t ph i losophers of his t ime ' a longs ide Bacon and
Descartes . i 1~ Thomas Hobbes includes a number of Pat r i z i ' s
works in a l ist of books which he bel ieves shou ld compr ise an
ideal l ibrary. 1 is Kene lm D igby actua l ly had a copy of the
Nova ph i losoph ia in his l ibrary and when his co l lect ion was
sold at auct ion in 1680 Pat r i z i ' s book ach ieved one of the
h ighest prices at s 6s. 6d1119 Var ious C~mbr idge P la ton is ts
were fami l ia r w i th his work, as we might expect : Herber t of
Cherbury 12~ and Joseph G lanv i lP 21 f requent ly cite h im.
Glanvi l l even
paraphrases Pat r i z i in his Letter to a f r iend Concern ing
Ar istot le , which is very closely mode l led on a shor t piece by
Pat r i z i cal led Veri tat is studios is . 122 Henry More also
knew Pat r i z i ' s work 12a and, as we shall see, was heav i ly
in f luenced by it.
The most impor tant inf luence, however , and one of the most fu
l ly documented , was undoubted ly on P ier re Gassendi . The great
F rench ph i losopher even abandoned work on one of his own works
because, so we are to ld by a note at the end of the manuscr ip t ,
he learned that 'exact ly the same argument is found in F rancesco
Pat r i z i ' s Per ipatet ic D isqu is i t ions ' . ~ ~ I t may
well be that the d i scovery of such a k indred spir i t led
Gassendi to examine more of Pat r i z i ' s works and so brought h
im eventua l ly to ponder over Pat r i z i ' s concept of space.
Needless to say, as the rev iver
of the Greek a tomis t theory of Democr i tus and Ep icurus ,
Gassendi was commit ted to a vacu is t concept ion of space and so
had to re ject the Ar i s to te l ian posit ion.
l l2He mentions Patrizi once or twice in his De mundo nostro
sublunari philosophia nova (1651, Amsterdam), 127-128 and 139.
~13 In a letter to an Italian priest, Re
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568 John Henry
Gassendi therefore devotes the second book of his monumenta l
Syntagma ph i losoph icum to a discussion of space and time. 115 St
ra ightaway similar it ies of approach become apparent . L ike Patr
iz i , Gassendi wants to assert that 'P lace and t ime are not
included in the division of things or beings into substance and
accident'.126 After all, he suggests, place and t ime ' t ranscend
the universe in some fashion and encompass it ' . 127 They are not
s imply accidental qual it ies of body which d isappear if the
bodies do: 'Since it appears to us that even if there were no
bodies, there would stil l remain both an unchanging place and an
evolving t ime, it is therefore apparent that place and t ime do
not depend on bodies and are not corporeal accidents. And they are
not therefore incorporeal acc idents . . , but they are certain
incorporeal natures of a different k ind from those ord inar i
ly called substances and accidents' . 128
Patr iz i puts it this way:
. . . if i t [space] is something, it is e ither substance or
accident. And if it is substance it is e ither something
incorporeal or a body. But if i t is an accidens it is e ither a
quant i ty , a qual i ty , or some such thing. But we say that
space itself per se, since it precedes the world and is outs ide
the world, is not one of the things in the wor ld , i. For the
world is a body, but space is not in the least a body, therefore
space is not embraced by any of the categories, it is before them
all, and outs ide them all. i29
Later he adds that space 'is accidental to no wor ld ly thing,
be it e i ther body or non-body, substance or accident, it is pr
ior to all these'. 13~ SPace is a substance, he admits , but a
'different sort of substance outs ide the categor ies ' . l 3 i And
everyth ing is acc idental to space: 'As all things come to be in
it, so they are accidental to it; so that not only those things
called accidents in the Categories, but even those which are
substances there, are accidental to it [space]'.132
Patr iz i ' s space is, therefore, substant ia l extension.
Gassendi follows on: 'And we must admi t that space is a quant i ty
, or some sort of extension, namely the space or interval made up
of the three dimensions, length, breadth, and depth, in which it is
possible to hold a body, or through which a body may travel . But
at the same t ime it must be said that its dimensions are
in60rporeal, so that place is an interval , or incorporeal space,
or incorporeal quant i ty ' . 133
We need not pursue Gassendi 's arguments any further, but it
should be remarked that the s imi lar i ty of ideas cannot be a t t
r ibuted to coincidence. After his discussion Gassendi gives a br
ief account of earl ier ideas and when he gets to Patr iz i he says
that 'about this space or place, whose three dimensions length,
breadth, and depth coincide, be propounds nothing other than that
what we ourselves have argued about it above' . 134 Certa in ly he
was well acqua inted with Patr iz i ' s Nova ph i losophia .
125 Pierre Gassendi, Syntag~t~ztis philosophicum pars seeunda,
quae est Physiea, liber I1, 17~228, in Opera omnia (1658, Lyon:
repr. 1964, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt) voh 1.
126 Ibid., 179. 1271 have taken the translations, where
possible, from Craig B. Brush (ed.), The selected works of
Pierre
Gassendi (1972, New York); this line is from page 383. Hereafter
this will be cited as Selected works. 12s Selected works, 384. 129
N.p. 65a. 13~ N.p. 65b. 131 Ibid. 132 Ibid. 133 Selected works,
385. 134 Syntagma philosophicl~m, 246a.
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Pat r i z i s ( 'oncept o f Space and it,~' Later h~f luenee
569
At one point in his outl ine of Patr iz i 's ideas he slips into
paraphrase: 'Vult enim id
pr imum, quod Opifex summus extra se produxit esse spatium, ut
sine quo esse caetera non possint, et possit ipsum tamen esse sine
caeteris'. 13s This can be
compared with Patr iz i 's 'Quid autem illud fuit, quod summus
Opifex pr imum
omnium extra se produxit? Quid aut debuit, ant expedi it prius
produci, quam id qno omnia alia. ut essent eguerunt, et sine quo
esse non poterunt, ipsum autem sine aliis esse poterat ' . 136
Patr iz i 's influence on Gassendi is an important detail in the
history of science. In a recent paper J . E. McGuire has stressed
the influence of Gassendi on Isaac Newton, whose views on space
became firmly established as the scientific or thodoxy unti l
replaced by Einstein's concept in our own century. 137 According to
Voltaire,
Newton, notor iously re luctant to acknowledge debts, actual ly
declared that: 'He , regarded Gassendi as a very accurate and very
wise mind, and he used to pride himself that he was entirely of his
opinion in all the things of which we have just spoken: space,
time, and atoms' . 13s
Hi therto the more general consensus among historians has been
that Newton's ideas on space were influenced by the Cambridge
Platonist, Henry More. 139 So once again, by a separate route, we
can infer the indirect influence of Patr iz i on Newton, for Henry
More's views on space clearly show the influence of his
Platonising
predecessor. Like any typical neo-P latonist More wanted to
prove that the world of the
spiritual is more real than the physical. I t is precisely this
which leads him so strenously to oppose Cartesian dualism. I t
seemed to be all too easy for the Cartesians and other mechanists
to ignore the res eog i tans , and God himself, as being unrelated
to the physical world. Yet More did not reject the Cartesian res
extensa as the correct criterion for existence in the physical
world, but instead widened it to include even incorporeal entities:
'For to take away all extension is to reduce a thing only to a
mathemat ica l point which is nothing else but pure negat ion or
non-ent i ty
and there is no medium between extended and non-extended no more
than there is betwixt ent i ty and non-ent i ty. I t is plain that
if a thing be at all it must be extended' . 140
135 Ibid.: For he maintains that the first thing which the
supreme Artificer produced apart from Himself was space, as other
things could not exist without it, yet it could itself exist
without other things'.
136 N.p. 61a. : 'What, then. was it that the supreme Artificer"
produced first of all, apart from Himself? What ought to be
produced or what is more fitting to be produced first than that
which all things needed that they might exist? and without which
they could not exist, yet it could itself exist without other
things?'.
137j. E. McGuire, 'Existence. actuality and necessity: Newt
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570 John Henry
More has gone further than Patr iz i here because he has, in
effect, re jected the not ion of pure incorporeal i ty. Using Patr
iz i ' s terminology, for More there are only corporeals and
corporeal incorporeals, or extended mater ia l entit ies and
extended immater ia l entit ies. In seeking to prove the real
existence of God, More embraces the concept of space, rather than l
ight, 'as the closest ana logy with God in the physical world. He
must, therefore, reject the Cartesian scheme and show that mat ter
differs from spir i t by some factor other than extension. The dist
inct ion he requires has a l ready been made by Patr iz i ; it is,
of course, resistance which dist inguishes the two sorts of
existence. Thus, in The immortal i ty of the soul More suggests
that 'we div ide Substance in general in to these first Kindes,
viz. Body and Spir i t and then define Body: a substance impenetrab
le and discerpible. Whence the contrary K ind to this is apt ly
defined, a substance penetrable and indiscerpible'.141
Hav ing given a more restr icted definition of Descartes 's res
extensa, More could now expand the terms of reference of the
original Cartes ian d ic tum to include souls, spirits, and God as
extended immater ia ls or, as Patr iz i would have said, corporeal
incorporeals. He had a l ready said as much:
Likewise Life, and that soul which is called 'sensit ive' , if
it is d is t r ibuted among the organs of the body will extend
through spaee. And if Reason and the Mind of the soul inform the
body then, l ike other forms they too are extended throughout
bodies. If, however, the soul is in the body not as form but as
form-giver, then sinee the body is in space the soul too will be in
space. But if the body is in the soul, then the soul, if divis ible
will exist in divis ible space: if indivisible, in indivisible
spaee. 142
Simi lar ly, both men, bel ieving as they did that to exist
meant to exist somewhere and that what is nowhere does not exist,
insisted that even God is extended in space. The Cartesians, in
fact, were d isparaged by More as nul l ibists who branded
themselves as atheists by denying God a place in which to exist.
So, for More it was 'clear that God is extended in His manner just
because He is omnipresent and occupies in t imate ly the Whole
machine of the world as well as its s ingular par t i c les . . .
God, therefore, extends and expands in this manner; and is,
therefore, an extended thing'.143
Patr iz i , as we might expect, is more c i rcumspect but his
meaning is clear: ' I f the universal de i ty is indivisible, as it
is, it will be in indivis ible space. Similar ly, if it is nowhere
it cannot be conceived wi thout space [8i nuUibi item sit, sine
spacio non cogitatur], 1,,a if it is anywhere, either in the
topmost heaven or above, it will certa in ly be in space. Indeed,
if it is everywhere it cannot be said not to be in space'. 145
141 ibid., 21. 142 N.p. 6lb. The odd notion that body may be in
the soul is an acknowledgement of a concept
proposed by Plotinus (Enneads, 4,3). Compare R. T. Wallis,
Neo-Platonism (1972, London), 51. 143 Henry More, Collection of
several philosophical writings ( 1662, London). This is taken from
the first
of the Letters to Descartes, 62. 144 It is not clear what
Patrizi means at this point. It may be he is simply saying that
incorporeal
beings which do not occupy space cannot be conceived by the
imagination. Even Aristotle in the De caelo seems to have spoken
about a space beyond the world in spite of his best efforts.
Consider this quotation from 279a, 15-25: 'It is obvious, then,
that there is neither place nor void nor time outside the heaven,
since it has been demonstrated that there neither is nor could be
body there. Wherefore neither are the things there born in place,
nor does time cause them to age, nor does change work in any way
upon any of the beings whose allotted place is beyond the outermost
motion...', Similarly, Henry More in his Divine dialog~les (1668.
London). 104. insists that Space cannot be 'dis-imagined'. Mom's
argument here has been likened to Kant's in the Tral~,~cemle~dal
a~..~tlletic (see ,l. T. Baker (footnote 139), 10).
145 N.p. 61b-c.
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Patrizi'~" Concept of Space and its Later Influence 571
As is welt known, More goes on from here virtually to identify
space and God. 146 Patrizi, living in counter-reformation Italy,
could never have gone so far even if he so wished. It should be
remembered, however, that God was an incorporeal in Patrizi's
hierarchy and so could not be identified with a corporeal
incorporeal. This difficulty does not arise for More, who has done
away with the concept of the purely incorporeal, as far as Patrizi
would have understood the term. Nevertheless, Patrizi does say that
'in the universe empty space is the physical entity closest to
God'. 147 Furthermore, when More gives a checklist of divine
attributes which he believes are also proper to space, most of them
are exactly consonant with Patrizi's ideas. The attributes are
these: 'One, Simple, Immobile, Eternal, Complete, Independent,
Self- existent, Self-subsisting, Incorruptible, Necessary, Immense,
Uncreated. Uneircumseribed, Incomprehensible, Omnipresent,
Incorporeal, Permeating and Surrounding all Things, Ens per
Essentiam, Ens actu, Purus Actus') 4s
So, in spite of differences in philosophical vocabulary 'and in
prevailing theological ideas, More's attitudes arc, in general,
strikingly reminiscent of Patrizi's. Just as Patrizi insists that
God must create space first, so More says: 'we must either
acknowledge that there is a certain extended entity besides matter,
or that God could not create finite matter'. 149 Patrizi quotes
Hermes as saying that 'a body that is moved is moved through an
immovable medium', 15~ and More in his Divine dialogues declares
that space forms an immovable medium for the motion of matter. TM
Finally, it is perhaps worth noting that while both men formed
their initial conceptions of space in Platonist terms as an
emanation from God, the details were worked out in a critical
response to the prevailing philosophical notions: Aristotelian for
Patrizi, and Cartesian for More.
5. Conclusion The Ari