Hellenophilia vs History of Science

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1/11

The History of Science Society

Hellenophilia versus the History of ScienceAuthor(s): David PingreeSource: Isis, Vol. 83, No. 4 (Dec., 1992), pp. 554-563Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of The History of Science SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/234257

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2/11

ellenophilia

r s u s

t h

i s tory

o

Sc ience

By

David

Pingreet

THE GENESIS

OF

THIS PAPER

lies

in a conversation that I

had with A. I.

Sabra of Harvard on

the

perennial problem

of

the

definition of

science

appropriate

o

a

historian of

science;

its

corruption

(including

the

deliberately

extreme mode of

its

expression)

is

entirely

a result

of

my

own

labors. For the

piece representsthe attitudestowardthe subjectthatI havedevelopedover some

three and

a

half decades of

studying

the

history

of the

exact sciences

(as

I

will

persist

in

calling

them

despite

the lack

of exactitude

in

some of

them),

as

prac-

ticed

in

ancient

Mesopotamia,

in

ancient and

medieval

Greece,

India,

and

the

Latin-speaking

West,

and

in

medieval Islam. It

is

this

experience,

then,

and the

desire

to reconstruct a

complex

history

as

accurately

as

possible,

that motivates

me-these

two,

and the wish to

provide

an

apologia

or

my

claim to be a

historian

of

science

rather than

of

quackery.

For the sciences

I

study

are those related

to

the

stars,

and

they

include

not

only

various astronomies and the

differentmath-

ematicaltheories

they

employ,

but also astral

omens,

astrology, magic,

medicine,

and law (dharmasastra).All of these subjects, I would argue, were or are sci-

ences

within the contexts of

the

cultures

n

which

they

once flourished

or

now

are

practiced.

As such

they

deserve to

be

studied

by

historians of

science

with

as

serious

and

thorough

a

purpose

as are the

topics

that

we

usually

find

discussed in

history

of

science

classrooms or

in the

pages

of

Isis.

This

means

that

their intel-

lectual content

must be

probed deeply,

and not

simply

dismissed as

rubbish

or

interpreted

n the

light

of modern historical

mythology;

and that

the

intellectual

content

must

be related to

the

culture

that

produced

and

nourished

each,

and

to

the

social

context

within which each arose

and

developed.

In

stating

these

opinions

I

may appear

to

have set

myself

up

as

a

relativist,

but

I woulddeny the applicabilityof thatepithetto my positionsince my interest lies

not

in

judging

the truth or falsehood

of these or

any

other

sciences,

nor

in

dis-

covering

in

them some

part

that

might

be

useful

or relevant

to

the

present

world,

but

simply

in

understanding

how,

why,

where,

and

when

they

worked

as func-

tioning systems

of

thought

and

interactedwith each other and with other

systems

of

thought.

It

is

with these considerations

n

mind, then,

that

I

have embraced the word

employed

in the title

of

this

article,

Hellenophilia,

as it

is

a

most

convenient

description

of

a set of attitudes

that I

perceive

to be of

increasing

prevalence

t Box 1900,BrownUniversity,Providence,Rhode Island 02912.

This

paper

was

originally

deliveredas a lecture

at the

Department

f

History

of

Science,

Harvard

University,

14

November 1990.

ISIS,

1992,

83:

554-563 554


3/11

CULTURES

OF ANCIENT SCIENCE

within the

profession

of the

history

of

science,

and

which

I

believe to

be

thor-

oughly pernicious.

I like

Hellenophilia

as

a

word because it

brings

to

mind

such other

terms

as

necrophilia,

barbaric xcess that

erupts

as

a

disease from

the passionate rather than from the rationalsoul; whereas the true love of the

Greeks, Philhellenism,

hough

also

an

attribute

of

barbarians

uch as

are

we-the

epithet

Philhellene

was

proudly

borne

by

ancient

Parthians,

Semites,

and Ro-

mans-arises

preeminently

rom

well-deserved admiration.

A

Philhellene s one

who

shares

in what used to

be,

when children in the West

still were

taught

the

classics,

a

virtually

universal awe

of

Greek

literature, art,

philosophy,

and

sci-

ence;

a

Hellenophile

suffers from a form of madness

that blinds him

or

her

to

historical

truth and creates

in

the

imagination

he

idea

that one

of several false

propositions

is true. The first

of

these is that the Greeks invented

science;

the

second is

that

they

discovered

a

way

to

truth,

the scientific

method,

that

we

are

now successfully following;the third is that the only real sciences are those that

began

in

Greece;

and

the fourth

(and

last?)

is that

the

true definitionof

science is

just

that

which

scientists

happen

to be

doing

now,

following

a

method

or

methods

adumbrated

by

the

Greeks,

but never

fully

understoodor utilized

by

them.

Hellenophiles,

it

might

be

observed,

are

overwhelmingly

Westerners,

display-

ing

the cultural

myopia

common

in all

cultures

of the world

but,

as

well,

the

arrogance

hat characterized he medieval

Christian's

recognition

of his own

in-

fallibility

and that has now been inherited

by

our modern

priests

of

science.

Intellectually

hese Western

Hellenophiles

are still

living

in

the miasmathat

per-

meated

Europe

until

the nineteenth

century,

before the

discovery

of Sanskrit

and

the crackingof cuneiformdestroyed such ethnocentricrubbish;such persons

have

simply

not been

exposed

to the

knowledgethey

would need to

arrive

at a

more balanced

judgment.

But,

sadly,

I

must

report

that

many

non-Westerners

have

caught

a form of the disease

Hellenophilia;

hey

are

deluded

into

believing

that the

greatestglory

an

Indian,

a

Chinese,

an

Arab,

or

an

African

scientist

can

have

acquired

is that

gainedby having anticipated

either a Greek

or

a

modern

Westerner.

So

some

Indians,

for

instance,

busily reinterpret

heir

divinely

in-

spired

R?gveda

o that it teaches such modern

hypothetical

theories

as that

of

relativity

or

the latest

attempt

to

explain

black

holes,

as if these

transitory

deas

were eternal

complete

truths. In

doing

this

they

are

behaving

as did those

Chris-

tians who once believed it importantto demonstratethat Genesis agrees with

Greek science. These

attempts

do not enhance the brillianceof the

authorsor

the

reinterpreters

of their sacred

or

scientific

texts,

but rather reveal a

severe

sense

of cultural

nferiority.

Parallel o

this

form of cultural

denigration,practiced

by

the

culture

tself

or

by

historians of

science,

is,

say,

the false claim that medieval

Islam

only

preserved

Greekscience and transmitted

t as

Muslimshad received

it

to the

eager

West. In

fact Arab

scientists,

using

Indian, Iranian,

and

Syrian

sources

as well

as

their

own

genius,

revised

the Greek

sciences,

transforming

hem into the

Islamic

sci-

ences

that,

historically,

served as the main basis

for

what little

science

there

was

in Western Europe in the twelfth and followingcenturies and for the amazing

developments

that

happened

three

and four centuries later in

Italy

and

Central

Europe.

Another form that this Western

arrogance

takes is the naive

assumption

that

other

peoples

in the

world not

only

should

be like

us,

but

actually

are

or

were-

555


4/11

PINGREE: HELLENOPHILIA

V. HISTORY OF

SCIENCE

were

because

this

particular

allacy usually

affects those who

study

Stone

Age

and other

preliterate

cultures

that have been left defenseless

in

the

face

of

mod-

ern

reconstructions

of their

thoughts

by

their

inability

to record

them

in

perma-

nent

form.

In the

history

of the exact sciences the scholars who

perpetrate

wild

theories of

prehistoric

science

call themselves archaeoastronomers.

The

basic

premise

of

some archaeoastronomers

s that

megalithic

and

other

cultures in

which

writing

was not

known built stone

monuments,

some

quite

massive,

in

order to record

their

insights

into

the

periodicity

of celestial

motions.

This seems

to

me a trivial

purpose

to motivate such monumental

communal

efforts as the

building

of

Stonehenge

or the

pyramids.

There are

many strong arguments

o be

raised

against

many

of

these

interpretations.

At this

point,

however,

I wish

only

to

point

out

that

they go

against

the

strong

evidence from

early

literate societies

that

early

man

had little interest

in

the stars before

the end of the

third

millen-

nium

B.C.;

the

cataloguing

of stars and the

recording

of stellar and

planetary

phenomena

are not

a

natural,

but a learned

activity

that

needs a motivation such

as that

which

inspired

the

Babylonians,

who

believed that the

gods

send

mes-

sages

to mankind

hrough

he celestial bodies.

The

realization hat some of these

ominous

phenomena

are

periodic

can

be dated

securely

in

Mesopotamia

o a time

no earlier

than the late second millennium

B.C.;

mathematicalcontrol of

the

re-

lation

between

solar and

lunarmotion

came

only

in about 500 B.C.

The

Egyptians

also

first

began using

selected stars

as a sort of crude clock

only

in

about 2000

B.C. and

progressed

no

further

in

mathematical

astronomy

till

they

came

under

Babylonian

nfluence. The

earliest

traces

of a

knowledge

of

astronomy

n

Greece

and India seem also to be derived, in the early first millennium

B.C.,

from Mes-

opotamia.

I cannot

speak

of the

astronomy

of

the

early

Chinese with

authority

because

I am

ignorant

of their

language,

but I

gather

from what

I

have read that

not

even

the

beginnings

of the

system

of

the hsiu

or lunar

lodges

can be dated

before the

late

second

millennium

B.C. From the

written

evidence, then,

it

ap-

pears

that

an interest

in the stars

as omens arose

in

Mesopotamia

after 2000

B.C.

and started to

develop

toward

mathematical

astronomy

in

about

1200

B.C.,

but

that

the

Babyloniansbegan

to

invent mathematical

models useful

for

the

predic-

tion

of

celestial

phenomena

with

some

degree

of

accuracyonly

in about 500

B.C.

From

Mesopotamia

these astronomical

deas

rapidly

radiated

to

Egypt,

later

to

Greece and India, and finally,perhaps,to China;in each of these culturesthey

were

molded

by

the

recipient

scientists into

something

new,

though

still

having

recognizable Mesopotamian

origins.

The astral

sciences

spread

from

one

civili-

zation to another

like a

highly

infectious disease.

It is within the

context

of

this

documented

history

that

I find

implausible

the

suggestion

that less

advanced

civilizations,

without

any

known

systems

of

writing

or accurate record

keeping,

independently

discovered

complex

lunar

theories,

or

precession,

or even an

ac-

curate intercalation

cycle.

The

example

of

the

Babylonians,

with their need for a

specific

motive for

observing

stars

and the fact that

it took them a millenniumand

a

half to

arrive

at

a workable

mathematical

astronomy,

and the

examples

of

the

Egyptians,Greeks, and Indians,if not the Chinese,who initiallyborrowed their

astronomies from

the

Babylonians

before each

developed

its science

in

its own

way,

seem

to me to

invalidate the

theoretical basis

for much of

archaeoastron-

omy.

I

return

now

to

the four variants

of

Hellenophilia

that I

mentioned earlier.

556


5/11

CULTURES

OF ANCIENT

SCIENCE

Each,

I would

claim,

distorts

the

history

of science

in two

ways: passively,

it

limits

the

phenomena

that the historian s

willing

or able to

examine;

actively,

it

perverts

understanding

both of Western

sciences,

from the Greeks till

now,

and

of non-Westernsciences. Thus those who still believe that the Greeks invented

science

either are

altogether

ignorant

of,

say,

Babylonian

mathematics

and

as-

tronomy

or

else,

though

aware

of

them,

fall

into

my

second

category

and refuse

to

recognize

them as

sciences.

The

ignorance

of the first

group,

of

course,

can

and

should

be remedied

through

education;

the

obstinacy

of the second

in

not

acknowledging

hat

Old

Babylonian

nvestigations

of

irrationalnumbers

ike

\/2,

of arithmetical

and

geometrical

series,

or of

Pythagorean

riplets

are

science

even

though

they

are

mathematically

correct,

or

in

asserting

that the

arithmetical

schemes

that

they

successfully

used to

control

the

many

variables nvolved in the

prediction

of

the time of the

first

visibility

of the lunarcrescent cannot bear the

august

name of scientia even

though

the

predictions

were

essentially

correct-

this

obstinacy

is hard

to

deal

with. It leaves the

obstinate, however,

in

the awk-

ward

position

of

denying

the status of science

to one

of

the main

contributors o

the Greek

astronomy

that

is

the forebear of our

positional

astronomy.

Such a

person,

of

course,

can

name an

arbitrary

date at which

positional

astronomy

comes

to fit into

his

or

her definitionof

science;

but this

cannot

be

accepted

by

a

historian,

as it is the

historian's

ask to seek

out the

origins

of the ideas that he

or

she is

dealing

with,

and these

manifestly

lie,

for

astronomy,

in

the

wedges

im-

pressed

on

clay

tablets

as well as

in

the observed

motions

of

the

celestial

bodies.

It is

certainly

possible

to be

a

modern scientist

without

knowing

history,

or even

with a firm belief in historicalmythology;but can a historianof science function

effectively

under

such

disabilities?

While

ignorance

of

Babylonianastronomy

destroys

the historian's

ability

to

understand

he

origins

and

development

of Greek

and other

astronomies

ogether

with their

more modern

descendants,

it also

tempts

him

or

her

to

imagine

that

there

is

no other

way

to

do

astronomy

han

through

he

Greek and

modern

way

of

making

observations

and

buildinggeometric

models.

But

Babylonian

astronomy

reveals how few observations

are

needed and how

imprecise

they

may

be

if

the

astronomers

are clever

enough;

and

it

also demonstrates

hat

simple

arithmetical

models suffice

for

predicting

the

times and

longitudes

of

periodic

celestial

phe-

nomena. The Babylonian solutions are brilliant applicationsof mathematical

structures

o rather

crude

data,

made

purely

to

provide

the

possibility

of

predic-

tion

without

any

concern for theories of

cosmological

structure

or

celestial me-

chanics.

The Greeks added

the concern

both

for the

geometrical

structureof

the

universe and

for the cinematics

of the

heavens,

with

a

strong

prejudice

n

favor

of

circles or

spheres

rotating

with uniform

motion;

but

they

also,

to

a

large

extent,

simply

expressed

the

Babylonian period

relations

and arithmetical

zigzag

and

step

functions

in a

geometricallanguage, using

observations

to

modify Babylo-

nian

parameters

and to fine-tune

heir

own

geometrical

models.

A third

variety

of

astronomy emerged

from

the

synthesis

of

Babylonian

arithmetical

models,

Hel-

lenistic geometricalmodels, and local mathematical raditions that occurred in

India in

the fifth

century

A.D.

In

this

astronomyquestions

of celestial

cinematics

receded into

trivial

mechanisms

while

computational

inesse harnessed a broad

range

of

mathematical

echniques

to

the solution of astronomical

problems,

with

the

role

of

observations

being

limited to the

confirmation,

f

possible,

of

accepted

557


6/11

PINGREE:

HELLENOPHILIAV. HISTORYOF SCIENCE

theory.

There were

historically

many

more

astronomies,

manifesting

a

variety

of

ways

in

which the

same

phenomena

might

be made

predictable

by

mathematical

means.

These different

astronomies reflect

the

different

ntellectual

traditionsof

the variouscultures as well as the

specific problems

that each

society

wished its

astronomers

o

address-for

example,

the

Babylonians

were

interested

in

certain

horizon

phenomena

that

they regarded

as

omens;

the Greeks

brought

philosoph-

ical

and

physical

problems

nto a science

that had been

purely

mathematical,

and

as

well introduced

the more social

aim of

casting

horoscopes;

and

the

Indians

devoted

their

efforts

to

the

purely pragmatic

goals

of

casting

horoscopes,

of

pre-

dicting

eclipses

because of

their

significance

as

omens,

and

of

evolving

and

reg-

ulating

an

extraordinarily omplex

calendar.

I

believe

that

those historians who

limit

themselves to the

study

of

only

one of these

approaches

to mathematical

astronomy

will

blunder,

as

indeed

many

have,

by

not

fully

understanding

he

range

of

possibilities

or the

shaping

orce of

purely

cultural actors on the course

that

any

science

takes.

If it is evident

that

for

a historian

the

proposition

that

the Greeks invented

science

must

be

rejected,

it

necessarily

follows

that

they

did not discover a

unique

scientific method.

Indeed,

they-and

we-have not

one,

but

many

scien-

tific

methods;

biologists, physicists,

and

astronomers

went,

and

go,

their

separate

methodological

ways.

I

choose, therefore,

to focus

on the

pride

of Greek science:

Euclidean

geometry-which,

of

course,

is

purely logical

and

nonexperimental.

This is

often and

justly praised

for the

rigor

and

power

of

its

axiomatic

system

and for its

ability

to

offer

ogical

deductive

proofs.

Indeed,

Babylonian

and Indian

mathematicsarefrequentlycriticizedfor relyingnot on proofsbut on demonstra-

tions.

But

without

axioms

and without

proofs

Indian

mathematicians olved

in-

determinate

equations

of

the second

degree

and discovered

the infinite

power

series for

trigonometrical

unctions centuries

before

European

mathematicians

independently

reached

similarresults.

These

achievements

amply

demonstrate,

I

believe,

that

the

Euclidean

approach

s not

necessary

for

discovery

in mathemat-

ics. Those who

deny

the

validity

of alternative

scientific methods

must

somehow

explain

how

equivalent

scientific

truths can be

arrivedat

without

Greek meth-

ods.

And in their denial

they

clearly

deprive

themselves

of

an

opportunity

to

understandscience

more

deeply.

To departbrieflyfrom the exact sciences, I wouldlike to draw attentionto the

fascinating

work

of Francis

Zimmermann

on

ayurveda,

the Indian

science

of

longevity,

as

it was and is

currentlypracticed

in Kerala. While

he

stronglysup-

ports

the idea

of

the

historical

dependence

of

ayurveda

on

the

Galenic

theory

of

humors,

Zimmermann s also

keenly

aware

of

the

many

ways

in

which Indian

vaidyas

have

altered

foreign

notions

while

incorporating

hem into their own

cultural

traditions to

create

a

theory

of

harmony

and mutual

influence between

the

humans,

animals,

and

plants

inhabitingany region

and that

region's

terrain

and climate.

In

Kerala

these

ecological

deas

produced

a local

interpretation

f

ayurvedic

doctrine

that,

it would

appear,

maintaineda

generally

healthy

human

population,at least to that population'ssatisfaction,as long as the people were

not

subjected

to

wars, famines,

or

epidemics.

The

ayurvedic approach

to medi-

cine does not

inspire

its

practitioners

o make discoveries

in molecular

biology,

but

it

is

the correct medical

science

for

the culturalcontext

within which it

op-

erates.

And it

attempts

to address

psychological,

social,

and

environmental

as-

558


7/11

CULTURES OF ANCIENT SCIENCE

pects

of health that our mechanistic medicine tends

to

ignore.

Western

doctors

have

something

to learn about medical care

from

dyurveda,

and

so do Western

historiansof medicine.

The third fallacious

opinion

that

I

have

associated

with

the

Hellenophiles

is

that the

only

sciences

are

those that accredited Greeks

recognized

as such.

This

opinion generally

takes the

form of

allowing

Aristotle to define

science

for

us,

so

that it

excludes

even the

genuinely

Greek

sciences of

astrology,

divination,

magic,

and other so-called

superstitions.

This

brings

us

squarely

to the funda-

mental

question

of this

paper:

What is the

proper

definition

of science for a

historianof science?

I

would offerthis as

the

simplest,

broadest,

and

most useful:

science is a

systematic

explanation

of

perceived

or

imaginary

phenomena,

or else

is

based on such

an

explanation.

Mathematics

inds a

place

in

science

only

as one

of the symbolicallanguagesin which scientificexplanations may be expressed.

This definition

deliberately

ails

to

distinguish

between

true and

false

science,

for

explanations

of

phenomena

are never

complete

and

can

never

be

proved

to be

true.

Obviously,

this

shortfall

s as true of modern

scientific

hypotheses

as of

ancient

ones. It

is, therefore,

inappropriate

o

apply

a standardof

truthfulness o

the

sciences,

at

least viewed

as historical

phenomena,

for the

best

that

modern

scientists can

claim-I

cannot

udge

whether

ustly

or not-is that

they

are closer

to some truth

than were

their

predecessors;

nor,

for the reasons I

have

already

stated,

can the

methodologies

of science be limited to

just

those

employed

by

present-day

scientists.

If my definitionof science as it must be viewed by a historian s accepted, it is

easy

to show that

astrology

and

certain learned

orms of

divination,

magic,

alchemy,

and so on

are

sciences. Some

may

regard

his

procedure

or

elevating

superstition

o the rank of scientific

theory

as

arbitrary

nd

unfair,

but

remember

that modern science

is the initial

culprit

in that it

arbitrarily

sets

up

its

own

criteria

by

which it

judges

itself and all

others.

If

I

am a

relativist,

then,

it

is

precisely

at this

point

where,

as

a

historian,

I

refuse to allow modern

scientists

who

know little

of

history

to define

for

me the bounds of what in

the

past-or

in

the

present-I

am

allowed

to consider

to be

science.

It

pains

me

to

hear

some

scientists,

who have not

seriously

considered

the

subject,

denounce

astrology

as

unscientific

when all

that

they

mean

is

that it

does not

agree

with

their

ideas

about the

way

the universe functionsand

does not

adhere

to their

concept

of a

correct

methodology.

It

pains

me not because I

believe that

astrology

is

true;

on

the

contrary,

I believe it

to

be

totally

false. But the anathemas

hurled

at it

by

some scientists remind

me more of the anathemas leveled

by

the

medieval

Church

against

those

who

disagreed

with its

dogmas

thanof

rational

argument.

n

its

persecution

of hereticsas in its

missionary

zeal and its

tendency

to

sermonize

and to

pontificate,

our

scientific establishment

displays

marked

similarities o

the

Church,

whose

place

in

our

society

it

has

largely

usurped.

That

Church,

like modern

science,

condemned

divination,

astrology,

and

magic, though

on the

grounds

that

they

limitGod's

power

and

human

free will

rather than that

they

fail to conformto our current laws of nature. Both

of

these

arguments,

to

my

way

of

thinking,

are

arbitrary

and

irrelevant

to

a

histo-

rian,

who should remain

free of either

the

Church's

or

modern

science's

theol-

ogy.

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PINGREE: HELLENOPHILIA V. HISTORY OF SCIENCE

within its cultural

context,

but to

attempt

to discover

within

the

science elements

similar

to elements of modern

Western

science. One

example

I can

give

you

relates

to

the

IndianMadhava's

demonstration,

n about

1400

A.D.,

of the

infinite

power

series of

trigonometrical

unctions

using geometrical

and

algebraic

argu-

ments.

When this was

first

described

in

English by

Charles

Whish,

in

the

1830s,

it

was

heraldedas

the Indians'

discovery

of the calculus. This

claim

and

Madha-

va's achievements

were

ignored by

Western

historians,

presumably

at first

be-

cause

they

could not admit

that an Indian discovered the

calculus,

but later

because

no one read

anymore

the

Transactions

of

the

Royal

Asiatic

Society,

in

which

Whish's article

was

published.

The matter resurfaced in the

1950s,

and

now

we have the

Sanskrit

texts

properly

edited,

and

we

understand

he

clever

way

that

Madhava derived the series without

the

calculus;

but

many

historians

still find it

impossible

to

conceive of the

problem

and

its solution

in

terms of

anythingotherthan the calculusandproclaim hat the calculus is whatMadhava

found.

In this case the

elegance

and

brilliance

of

Madhava's mathematics are

being

distorted

as

they

are buried under the

current mathematical olution to a

problem

to which he

discovered

an

alternateand

powerful

solution.

Other

examples

of this

dangerous

tendency

abound. For

instance,

since the

1850s

historians

ignorant

of

Madhava's

work have

argued

about

whether

Indian

astronomers

had the

concept

of the infinitesimal alculus on the basis

of

their

use

of the

equivalent

of the

cosine

function

in

a formula or

finding

he

instantaneous

velocity

of the

moon,

a

formula

that occurs

already

in a

sixth-century

Sanskrit

text,

the

Pancasiddhantika.

I cannot

tell

you

how

that

formula

was

derived,

since

its author, Varahamihira,has not told me; but I find it totally implausiblethat

some Indian discovered

the calculus-a

discovery

for which

previous

develop-

ments

in Indian

mathematics

would not

at all have

preparedhim-applied

his

discovery only

to the

problem

of

the

instantaneous

velocity

of

the

moon,

and

then threw

it

away.

The

idea that he

might

have discovered the calculus arises

only

from the

Hellenophilic

attitude that what

is

valuable

in

the past is what we

have

in

the

present;

this

attitudemakes historiansbecome treasurehunters seek-

ing pearls

in the

dung heap

without

any

concern

for where the

oysters

live

and

how

they

manufacture

gems.

One

particularlydangerous

orm of this

aspect

of

Hellenophilia

s

the

positivist

positionthatis confidentthatmathematicalogic providesthe correct answers to

questions

in

the

history

of

the exact sciences.

I,

of

course,

am not

denying

the

power

of

mathematics to

provide

insights

into

the

character and structure

of

scientific

theories;

obviously,

Otto

Neugebauer's

brilliant

analysis

of the

astro-

nomical tables

written in

cuneiform

during

the

Seleucid

period gives

us a

pro-

found

understanding

of how

this

astronomy

worked

mathematically,

and it tells

us

something

about some

stages

in

the

development

of the science as recordedon

the hundredsof tablets

that he

investigated.

But it

does not

and

cannot,

as Neu-

gebauer

well

knew,

answer

a

whole

range

of

historical

questions.

We

do not

know

by

whom,

when,

or

where

any Babylonian

unar or

planetary

theory

was

invented;we do not knowwhatobservationswere used, or where andwhy they

were

recorded;

we

do not

know much about the

stages by

which

Babylonian

astronomers

went

from the crude

planetary

periods,

derived

from

omen

texts,

found

in

MUL.APIN

to the

full-scale

ephemerides

of the last few centuries

B.C.

Historians

need to be

very

careful

in

assessing

the nature

of

the

questions

the

562


11/11

CULTURESOF ANCIENT SCIENCE

material at

hand

will

allow them to answer

with a

reasonable

expectation

of

probability;

and

they

must

hope

for and search out new evidence.

But the

posi-

tivists

jump

in

to claim that mathematicalmodels

(and

they

usually

use

quite

simple

ones) sufficeto describe the

idiosyncratic

behaviorof

people

and to ac-

count for

the

perverse

quirks

in their

personalities.

I

will

not

here

name

names,

but

the

number

of

historians

of

the

exact sciences who suffer rom

this

malady

is

appallingly

arge; they

can be

easily

recognized

by

the

characteristic rait

that,

in

general,

the

remoter the time and the

scantier

the

evidence,

the

more

precise

their

computations.

Millenniaof

history

are made to

depend

on the

measurement

of an arc of

a

few minutes

or

degrees

when it

has not even been

convincingly

demonstrated

hat

any

arc

was

being

measuredat

all.

So far

I have been

attempting

o discredit

Hellenophilia

on

the

grounds

that it

renders those affected

by

it unable to

imagine many significantquestions

that

legitimatelyshould be addressedby historiansof science and thatit pervertstheir

judgment.

Much

of

my argument

has

been based on

the

anthropological

percep-

tion

that science is not

the

apprehension

of

an external set

of truths that

mankind

is

progressively

acquiring

a

greater

knowledge

of,

but

that

rather he

sciences

are

the

products

of humanculture.

But

this

viewpoint

must

be

modified

by

a

further

consideration,

to which

I

have from time to time alluded since it

strengthens

he

arguments

n

favor of

the

definition

of

science

that

I

proposed.

This

consideration

is

that,

as

a

simple

historical

fact,

scientific ideas

have been

transmitted or mil-

lennia from culture to

culture,

and

transformed

by

each

recipient

culture into

something

new. This

is

particularly

noticeable

n the astral

sciences that

I

study-

astronomy, astral omens, astrology, and astral magic-but can be readily dis-

cerned

in

many

others. The

taproot

and trunkof the tree of

the astral

sciences are

buried

in

the

Mesopotamian

desert,

with

subsidiary

roots

in

Egypt

and

China

(I

have

lopped

the

Mayas

off this arboreal

image,

as

they

are

self-rooted).

From

Babylonia

the tree branchedout to

Egypt,

to

Greece,

to

Syria,

to

Iran,

to

India,

and to

China;

grafted

onto differentculturalstocks

in

each

of

these

civilizations,

it

developed

variant

eaves, shoots,

and

flowers.

The

process

of

the

intertwining

of these diverse

varieties of astronomies

throughout

Eurasia and

North

Africa

was

amazingly

complex,

as

ideas,

mathematical

models,

parameters,

and instru-

ments

circulated

rapidly

over the

vast

expanse

of

divergent

raditions.Out

of this

process modern Westernastronomysprangfrom a rather ate branchthat grew

from

and was fed

by

an

incredibly

complicated

undergrowth.

For

very

complex

reasons this modern Western

astronomy

has

choked off all of its

rivals and de-

stroyed

the intellectual

diversity

that mankind

enjoyed

before

it

moved from

simple

communication

to Western domination. We

cannot

know

what the Is-

lamic, Indian,

or

Chinese astral sciences

might

have

become had this

not

hap-

pened, except

that

they

would not have become

what our

culture

has

produced.

But

unraveling

the intertwined

webbing

of these sciences is a

fascinating

and

a

rewarding

task for a

historian,

and

one

in

which much

remains to be done. I

strongly

recommend to those of

you

who

have

the

opportunity

hus to broaden

yourperspectivesto graspit.

563

Hellenophilia vs History of Science

Documents