Hegel on legal history and legal philosophy v 2 · DRAFT 1 Hegel on Legal Philosophy and Legal History N.W. Sage The initial sections of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right contain a sustained

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HegelonLegalPhilosophyandLegalHistoryN.W.SageTheinitialsectionsofHegel’sPhilosophyofRightcontainasustainedinvectiveagainstthosewho“obscur[e]thedifferencebetweenthehistoricalandthephilosophicalstudyoflaw.”1“Toconsiderparticularlawsastheyappearanddevelopintimeisapurelyhistoricaltask…appreciatedandrewardedinitsownsphere[buthaving]norelationwhatsoevertothephilosophicalstudyofthesubject.”2AccordingtoHegel,legalphilosophyandlegalhistorymust“preserveanattitudeofmutualindifference.”3Therecanbenodialoguebetweenthem—neitherfieldshouldpurporttoimprove,ortochallenge,theother.

WhydoesHegelinsistuponthisquarantineoflegalphilosophyfromlegalhistory?Answeringthatquestionmayhelptoilluminatecurrentcontroversiesincommonlawscholarship,inwhichphilosophically‐andhistorically‐mindedscholarsaccuseeachotherofmethodologicalerrorsthat,theycontend,resultfrommistakingtheproperboundariesbetweendistinctspheresoflegalthought.4

UnderstandingHegel’sargumentrequiresusfirsttoascertainwhathemeansbylegal“philosophy”andbylegal“history,”inordertoseehowhedrawstheboundariesbetweenthosefields,andthereforewhyheinsistsuponkeepingthemdistinct.5

ForHegel,legalphilosophyendeavorstoshowthelegalconceptsthatjudgesandlawyersapply,togetherwiththeresultsoftheapplicationofthoseconcepts,toberational.Opposedtolegalphilosophyisthepositive

*S.J.D.Candidate,UniversityofToronto,[email protected],andIwouldgreatlyappreciateanycomments.1G.W.F.HEGEL,PHILOSOPHYOFRIGHT§3R(T.M.Knoxtrans.,1952)(1821).2Id.3Id.4See,forexample,thecontroversylastdecadeoverapproachestoprivatelawamongStephenWaddams,DIMENSIONSOFPRIVATELAW:CATEGORIESANDCONCEPTSINANGLO‐AMERICANLEGALREASONING(2003);StephenA.Smith,AMapoftheCommonLaw?40CAN.BUS.L.J.364(2004);StephenWaddams,Response,40CAN.BUS.L.J.396(2004);AllanBeever&CharlesRickett,InterpretiveLegalTheoryandtheAcademicLawyer,68MOD.L.REV.320(2005);SteveHedley,TheShockoftheOld:InterpretivisminObligations,inSTRUCTUREANDJUSTIFICATIONINPRIVATELAW(CharlesRickett&RossGranthameds.,2008).5Hegelgenerallydiscussesthephilosophyof“right,”whichforhimextendsbeyondlawtoinclude,forexample,thenormsoffamilyrelationsandcivilsociety.However,thispaperconsidersHegel’sremarksonlyinsofarastheyapplytolaw.

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studyoflaw:thestudyoflegalresultsorconceptswithoutregardfortheirrationalbasis.Oneformofpositivism,accordingtoHegel,islegalhistory.

Becauselegalphilosophyisconcernedwithlaw’srationality,andlegalhistorywiththelaw’shistoricalcausesirrespectiveoftheirrationality,thetwofieldsare“mutuallyindifferent.”Difficultiesarisewhenoneofthefieldsoverreaches:whenalegalhistorianpurportstoimproveortochallengethephilosophicalunderstandingofthelaw,orviceversa.ForHegelsuchoverreachingamountstoasortofcategorialerror,whichyieldsonlyobscurity.

Yet,despitehisadmonitionsagainstmixinglegalphilosophyandhistory,Hegelalsoenvisageswhatwemaycalla“philosophicalhistory”ofthelaw.Thisisastoryofthelaw’sdevelopmentthatendeavorstoshowthatprocesstoberational.(Thesortof“teleology”forwhichHegelisnotorious.)Arguably,anexemplarofthissortofrationalreconstructionistraditionalcommonlawreasoning:themarshalingofprecedentsthatjudgesandlawyersundertakeinordertoestablishwhatthelawis.Hegel’sworksuggestsnotonlythatthepursuitofaphilosophicalhistoryoflawislegitimate,butthatitmaybeobligatoryforthosewhoseekafullunderstandingofthelaw’srationality.

A.WhatisthePhilosophyofLaw?

InhisEncyclopediaofthePhilosophicalSciences,Hegeldefines“philosophy”asthe“thinkingstudyofobjects.”6Ithasbeensaidthat“Hegel’sbriefdefinitionsofphilosophy”alongtheselines“are,asheadmits,usuallyunilluminating.”7However,inthePrefaceandfirsttwoparagraphsofhisPhilosophyofRight,Hegelelaborateswhathemeansbythe“thinkingstudyofobjects,”discussinginsomedetailbothwhatthe“objects”oflegalphilosophyare,andwhatitmeansto“think”philosophicallyaboutthem.

i.TheObjectsofLegalPhilosophy:RealizedLegalConcepts

TheobjectsofHegel’sphilosophyoflawaretheconceptsthatarerealizedinthepracticeoflaw:theconceptsendorsedandacteduponbyjudgesandlawyersintheirofficialcapacities,andwhicharethereforeaccessibletousbecauseoftheir“publicrecognitionandformulationin

6G.W.F.HEGEL,ENCYCLOPEDIAOFTHEPHILOSOPHICALSCIENCESI§2.7MICHAELINWOOD,AHEGELDICTIONARY220(1992).

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thelawoftheland.”8Wemightthinkhereofthevariousdoctrines,rules,principles,maxims,tests,andsoonspecifiedinthecommonlaw.

Hegel’sfocusonrealizedlegalconceptsmeansthatheisnotconcernedtounderstandconceptsmerelyinabstraction,butinconjunctionwiththeconcreteresultsoftheirapplication.Indeed,forHegel,legalconceptandresultareinseparable:thereisa“completeinterpenetration”betweenthem.9Wecantrulyunderstandagivenlegalconceptonlybyconsideringthelegalresultsthatityields.10Conversely,alegalresultiscomprehensibleonlywhenviewedthroughthelensofsomelegalconcept.11Wemightsay,intoday’sjargon,that“all(legal)dataistheory‐laden”:eventheinitialisolationandcharacterizationofagivenlegalresultisinfluencedbyourbackgroundconceptualassumptions.Or,toputitanotherway,thedescriptionsofalegalresultandoftheconceptthatyieldsthatresultarereallyjustthesamedescriptionstatedatdifferentlevelsofabstraction.

Whyisitonlytherealizedlegalconcept—theunionofconceptandresult—thatinterestsHegel?Thiscanbebrokenintotwoquestions.First,whynotstudylegalresults,independentlyofthelegalconceptswhoseapplicationjudgesandlawyersclaimyieldsthoseresults?Whynottakethesetoflegalresultsandthenanalyzethemusingother,non‐legalconcepts?Somethinglikethisapproachisinfactadoptedby,forexample,manyoftoday’seconomicanalystsoflaw.Theytakeastheirdataasetoflegaloutcomes,andthenseektoevaluatetheefficiencyofthoseoutcomesusingsophisticatedeconomicconceptsthatareforeigntolegalanalysis.

OneanswertothisquestionconnectswithHegel’sthoughtthatthereisa“completeinterpenetration”betweenlegalconceptandresult,theoryanddata.Thedatasetof“legalresults”—say,forargument’ssake,thesetofdecisionsdescribedinlawreporters—isinitiallysalienttousbecauseitisasetofresultspickedoutbylegalconcepts.Theboundariesand8G.W.F.HEGEL,PHILOSOPHYOFRIGHT§1(S.W.Dydetrans.1896)(“ThephilosophicscienceofrighthasasitsobjecttheIdeaofright,i.e.,theconceptionofrightandtherealizationofthatconception.”)Hegel,notoriously,isamonist,assumingthereisultimatelyasingle“Idea,”thoughitmaytakeavarietyofdifferent“shapes.”SeePreface;§1R.Howeverthislanguageissoobscuretoourearsthatitispreferabletospeakof“concepts”intheplural,whilebearinginmindthatHegelthinkstheseareultimatelyinsomesenseunitary.Seefurtherinfranote34.9§1A(Dyde,Knox).10§1R(Knox)(“Theshapeswhichtheconceptassumesinthecourseofitsactualizationareindispensablefortheknowledgeoftheconceptitself.”)11Id.(“Allelse,apartfromthisactualityestablishedthroughtheworkingoftheconceptitself,isephemeral....”)

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natureofthesetitself(nottomentionthecharacterizationofeachresultwithintheset)arespecifiedbyconceptsoflegalauthority(suchasstaredecisis,ratiodecidendi,jurisdiction,andsoon)andsubstantivelegaldoctrine(forexample,thereporterwilldescribeonlycasesthatareimportanttoagivendoctrinalfield).Now,wecanofcourseapplynon‐legalconcepts,suchastheconceptsofeconomicanalysis,toevaluatethesetoflegalresults.Butifwedo,wewillquicklyfindthatthesetofresultsthatthelegalconceptspickoutisbothnarrowerandbroaderthanthesetofresultsthatournon‐legalconcernswouldnaturallyreach.12Forexample,theconceptsofclassicaleconomicanalysisrelatetoallinstancesofself‐interestedmaximizinghumanconduct,andnottootherformsofhumanconduct,irrespectiveofwhethertheconductisdescribedinlawreporters.Theconjunctionofonesetofconceptswiththesetofresultspickedoutbyanothersetofconceptsisthereforeintellectuallyarbitrary.AndforHegel,anygenuinefieldofintellectualinquirymustavoidsucharbitrarylimitationsonitsscope.Eachfieldmustpursueitssubject‐mattersystematically.13

Furthermore,ifouraimistoexplainouractuallegalpracticesandinstitutions,thenstudyinglegalresultsusingnon‐legalconceptswillinevitablyproduceafailureofexplanation.Thisisbecause,totheextentoneseekstoexplainthelegalresultsusingconceptsotherthanthosethatjudgesandlawyersthemselvesusetoproducethoseresults,thenonefailstoexplainwhatthoselegalactorsareactuallydoing,oratleastwhattheypurporttobedoing.Legalactorsthemselvesinvokelegalconceptstoexplainthelegalresultsatwhichtheyarrive.Ifweuseother,non‐legalconceptstoexplainthelegalresults,thentheroleofthelegalconceptsthatjudgesandlawyersthemselvesusebecomesutterlymysterious.

(Perhapsthelegalconceptsthatjudgesandlawyersthemselvesusecanbeexplainedawayasadelusion,orafraud—adeceptionthattheytellthemselves,orothers,inordertoconcealthetruemotivationsforwhattheyaredoing.14However,evenifitisacceptabletoexplainawaylegalactors’conductasdelusionalorfraudulent,thisapproachneverthelessfailstoexplaintheconceptualcontentofthedelusionorfrauditself.Whythisdelusion,thisfraud—asopposedtoothersthat

12Cf.MICHAELOAKESHOTT,ONHUMANCONDUCT9‐10(1975).13See,e.g.,INWOOD,supranote7,at265‐68(“ScienceandSystem”).HegelnotesinthePhilosophyofRightthatthatworkpresupposesanacquaintancewithgenuinely“scientific”procedure,assetoutinhisScienceofLogic.SeePreface,§2R.14CompareJodyKraus,TransparencyandDeterminacyinCommonLawAdjudication:APhilosophicalDefenseofExplanatoryEconomicAnalysis,93VA.L.REV.287(2007).

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mighthavebeenjustaseffective?15Thelegalconcepts—theconceptsthatare“publicallyrecognizedandformulatedinthelawoftheland”—hereremainunexplained.)

Second,thequestionofwhyitisonlyrealizedlegalconceptsthatinterestHegelcanbeposedintheoppositeway:whynotinvestigateabstractconcepts,irrespectiveofwhethertheyarerealized,i.e.,haveyieldedconcreteresults?ForHegel,legalphilosophyisunconcernedwithconceptsthataremerefanciesorimaginings,whichareas‐yetunrealizedintheactualpracticeandinstitutionsofthelaw—suchasthewishesofutopiansorpotentialmoralentrepreneurs,forexample.Butwhyshouldonenotphilosophizeabouttheproposalsofutopiansandwould‐bereformers?

Therearetwoanswerstothisquestion,eachasideofthesamecoin.Foronething,theneedtounderstandwhatsomepersonorgrouphappenstowishaboutthelawislesspressingthantheneedtounderstandthelawitself.Wearenotsubjecttootherpersons’whimsaboutwhatthelawoughttobe.Weare,however,subjecttothelaw.Thus,thereisademandtounderstandrealizedlegalconceptsthatdoesnotexistwithrespecttomerelegalwishes.

Relatedly,thereisnoreasontoexpectpersons’merewishesaboutthelawtobesusceptibleofunderstanding,becausethereisnoreasontoexpectmerewishestobecoherent.Ajudge,forexample,canwishfortheadoptionofwhateverlegalconceptshewants,regardlessofwhetherthatwishiscompatiblewithherotherlegalcommitments—withtheensembleofrealizedlegalconceptsthatsheiswillingtoactupon.16Forexample,ajudgemaykeenlywishthatthatshedidnothavetoawarddamagesforabreachofcontractagainstanimpecuniousdefendant.However,thedisciplineofrealizingofalegalconceptinaconcreteresultforcesthejudge’shand,requiringhertoreconciletheconceptorresultforwhichshewisheswithotherlegalconceptstowhichsheiscommitted,modifyingorabandoninganyconceptstotheextenttheyaremutuallyincompatible.Forexample,thejudgewillnotrealizeherwishthattheimpecuniouscontractualdefendantbeleftunharmed,totheextentthatthatwishisincompatiblewiththeneedtocompensatetheplaintiffforhisloss.Becausetherealizationofaconcreteresultforcesone’shandinthisway,theensembleofone’srealizedconceptsmustbe15Cf.MichaelOakeshott,OnMisunderstandingHumanConduct,4POL.THEORY353,361(1976)(Nietzsche’ssyphiliscouldnotexplainZarathustra).16Cf.ARTHURRIPSTEIN,FORCEANDFREEDOM:KANT’SLEGALANDPOLITICALPHILOSOPHY109(2009).

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mutuallycoherent,inawaythatone’sunrealizedconceptsneednotbe.(Hencelegalscholarsoftencontrasttheirintellectualenterprisetothatofmoralphilosophers,whoareblissfullyunconstrainedbyanyrequirementthattheyarticulateprinciplescapableofauthoritativelyresolvingconcretedisputes.)17

ThatweshoulddemandandexpecttrueunderstandingonlyofrealizedlegalconceptsexplainsHegel’sobsession,evidentatthebeginningofthePhilosophyofRightasinmuchofhisotherwork,withdistinguishinggenuinephilosophyfromtheRomantictendencyto“philosophize”byarticulatingone’sownpersonalsentimentsorwishes.18Suchwishesarenotproperobjectsofphilosophy.Hegel’spointherewouldseemtoapplyequallytomuchcontemporarylegalscholarship.Consider,forexample,theinnovationsofcontemporaryeconomicanalystsofcontractlawwhosuggestthatthelawoughttoadopthithertounknownconceptionsofcontractualdamages,19orshouldimposecontractswithouttheparties’consent,20andsoon.

Finally,itisworthnotingthatHegelalsocontraststhestudyofrealizedconceptswithanother“unphilosophic”method,thatofproceedingbydefinition.21(Herewemightperhapsthinkoftheariddogmatismor“formalism”associatedbyAmericanLegalRealistswiththeirpredecessorsinthelegalacademy.)22DefiningthelegalconceptsatissueattheoutsetoftheinquiryisproblematicforHegel.Forastart,thisapproachislikelytoleadtoadivergencebetweenone’sdefinitionalconcepts,ontheonehand,andthelegalconceptsactuallyrealizedintheworld,ontheother.Inthisrespect,definitionalformalismwouldsufferfromthesamedefectasRomanticism.Hegel,however,ismoreconcernedwithanotherdangerofproceedingbydefinition:thatitwillyieldanunderstandingthatcomportswithreceivedopinionorcommonsenseaboutourconcepts,butwhichisnottrulyrational.23ThisconcernleadsustoHegel’sideasabouttheconnectionbetweenphilosophyandrationality.

17E.g.RICKBIGWOOD,EXPLOITATIVECONTRACTS7‐8(2003).18Preface,§2R. 19RichardCraswell,AgainstFullerandPerdue,U.CHI.L.REV.99(2000).20OmriBen‐Shahar,ContractsWithoutConsent:ExploringaNewBasisForContractualLiability,152U.PA.L.REV.1829(2004).21§2R.22HegelprobablyhasinmindSpinozaandtheGermanrationalists.SeeINWOOD,supranote7,at74‐77.23§2R,§215n.68(Knox).

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ii.ThinkinginLegalPhilosophy:RevealingaRationalBasis

Aswehaveseen,tophilosophizeaboutlawistothinkaboutcertainobjects:realizedlegalconcepts.Butwhatis“thinking”here—whatistheactivityoflegalphilosophy?AnanswerappearsinthePhilosophyofRight’sPreface,whereHegeldescribesthetaskoflegalphilosophyastomakeourrealizedlegalconcepts“appearwell‐foundedtountrammeledthinking.”24This,heexplains,meanstobringouttheimplicitrationalityofthoseconcepts.25Thatis,tomaketheimplicitrationalityofourrealizedlegalconceptsexplicit.26

What,then,isitforsomethingtobe,initially,“implicitly”rational,andforthisrationalitythentobemade“explicit”?HereHegelanalogizesourrealizedlegalconceptstothenaturalworld.27Weassumethatthenaturalworldisgovernedbyvariouslaws—physical,biological,chemical,andsoon—thatareintelligibletous.Inthiswaythenaturalworldcanbethoughtofas“implicitly”rational.Itawaitsthethinkerorscientistwhowillmakethatrationality“explicit,”bydiscoveringandarticulatingtheexplanationorlawthatmakesthenaturalphenomenonintelligible.Likewise,theHegelianlegalphilosophermustproceedonthebasisthattheconceptsrealizedinthelawareimplicitlyintelligible—thattheyaresusceptibleofunderstanding.Thephilosopher’staskistomakethisintelligibility“explicit”byarticulatingtherationalbasisofthelegalconcepts.28(Inthisrespect,itisnotablethatHegelregardsphilosophyassiblingtotwootherhumanenterprises,religionandart,whichalsoseektorendertheworldintelligibletous,butinalessarticulateorexplicitmanner.)29

Thereisasense,then,inwhichwecanregardHegelasasupremerationalist.30Hetakesnotonlythenaturalworld,butalsohumanconduct,includinglaw,tobeinherentlysusceptibleofunderstanding.Thisobviouslyrunscountertoourcontemporarytendencytoassumethat,whilenaturemayberationallyapprehended(ornot,dependingon

24Preface(Knox)at3.25Preface(Dyde)atxii.26ThisisafavoritethemeofRobertBrandom’s.E.g.MAKINGITEXPLICIT(1998).27Preface(Dyde)atxiii,(Knox)at4.28We“mustdeveloptheidea,whichisthereasonofanobject,outoftheconception.”§2(Dyde).29AscontendedinthePhenomenologyofSpiritVII.30Cf.LeoStrauss,LecturesonHegel’sPhilosophyofHistory,Lecture1at1:27(Jan.5,1965),http://leostrausscenter.uchicago.edu/course/hegel‐philosophy‐history‐winter‐quarter‐1965(“Hegelissurelythemostradicalrationalistthateverwas.”)

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whatonethinksofquantumphysics),humanpracticessuchaslawneednotbedeeplyintelligibleinthesameway.

Ifphilosophizingismakingourrealizedconcepts’implicitrationalityexplicit,whatexactlyisrationality?Itistemptingtoavoidthistopicaltogether,sinceanythingsaidaboutitwillnecessarilybecrudeandinadequate.Butsomethingmustbesaid,giventhatthecentralityoftheideaofrationalitytoHegel’sarguments,andinordertoavoidassociatingHegelwithviewsaboutrationalitytowhichhewouldobject.(Inparticular,anyformofmetaphysicalrealism.)

Wecansaythat,forHegel,agivenlegalresultisrationalifitisyieldedbyalegalconceptthatisrational.Andagivenlegalconceptisrationalifitismutuallysupportedbyourotherlegalconcepts.Thatis,iftheconceptisrequiredby(isinferablefrom),andinturnrequires(yieldsbyinference)theotherlegalconceptsthatweendorse.31

First,then,foragivenlegalresulttoberational,itmustflowfromtheapplicationofalegalconcept.Aconceptmustbethereasonfortheresult.32Totakeafacileexample,acourtmightholdathree‐year‐olddefendantnotliablefornegligencebecauseoftheconceptthatpersonsshouldnotbelegallyliableuntiltheyhavereachedatleasttheageofseven.Aresultsuchasthisthatflowsfromtheapplicationofalegalconceptcancontrastedwithanon‐rationalresult:onethatisnotexplicableinconceptualtermsbecauseithasanonconceptualcause.Thiswouldbethecase,forexample,ifthejudgedecidedtherewasnoliabilityjustbecauseof“whatshehadforbreakfast.”

Second,foragivenlegalconcepttoberational,itmustbeonethatstandsinarelationofmutualinferabilitywiththeotherlegalconceptsthatweendorse.Agivenconceptisobviouslyirrationalifitisincompatiblewithotherlegalconceptsthatweendorse:theseven‐years‐old‐before‐liabilityrulecouldnotrationallystandtogetherwiththenotionthateveryoneisfullyresponsiblefortheirconductnomattertheirage.Incontrast,alegalconceptisrationalifitstandsinarelationofmutualsupportwiththeotherlegalconceptsthatweendorse:ifitisinferablefrom,andcanitselfbeusedtoinfer,thoseotherconceptualcommitments.Theseven‐years‐old‐before‐liabilityrulemightstandina

31See,e.g.,ROBERTB.BRANDOM,REASONINPHILOSOPHY:ANIMATINGIDEASch.4§4(2009).32Ofcourse,itmaybeobjectedthatlegalconceptsaretooindeterminatetoyieldconcreteresults.Thatobjectioncannotbeadequatelyaddressedhere,butseeBrandom,infranote71.

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rationalrelationofthissorttotheconceptthatlegalresponsibilityrequiresacertainlevelofintellectualmaturity,andtheconceptthatthatstageofmaturityisreachedatageseven.

Itmightbethoughtthatalegalconceptmayberational,evenifitdoesnotstandinanyrelationofmutualsupportwithourotherconcepts,solongasitisnotincompatiblewiththem.However,whilesuchaconceptwouldnotberationallynegated,itwouldberationallyinexplicable.Sinceitwouldbeunconnectedwithanyotherconceptthatweendorse,wewouldsimplyhavenobasisuponwhichtosaythatitisrational.Sucha“concept”(ifitcouldbecalledaconcept)wouldhavenorationalsignificancewhatsoever.33

BecauseHegelianrationalityinvolvesrevealinghoweachofourconceptsstandsinarelationofmutualsupportwithourotherconcepts,wearequicklypropelledtowardsasortofradicalconceptualholism.34Anencompassing,amorphousholismisavicewithwhichHegelisoftenassociated.However,ourexpectationsinthisrespectarelikelytobeupsettosomeextentbythePhilosophyofRight,becausethereHegelcautionsattheoutsetagainstatoo‐quickpursuitofholisticexplanation.InthesecondparagraphofthePhilosophyofRight,Hegelsaysthat“theorigin[s]”oftheconceptsoflawfall“outsideof”thephilosophyoflaw,andthatlegalphilosophymustpresupposeratherthanseektoprovethoseorigins.35

Wemightunderstandthisremarkinthefollowingway.Eventually,giventheHegelianphilosopher’staskofpursuingtherationalconnectionsbetweenallofourconcepts,itwillbenecessarytoconsidertherelationsbetweenourlegalconceptsandnon‐legalconceptsemployedinotherfieldsofknowledge—suchastheconceptsofethicsandmoralitygenerally,forexample.Butphilosophizingmuststartsomewhere:itmustbeginbyinvestigatingcertainconcepts,whileleavingotherspresupposed.Forexample,wemustbeabletobeginthephilosophyofreligionwithoutunderstandingthewholeoflogicorlinguistics.36

33Seeid.34SeeRobertBrandom,HolismandIdealisminHegel’sPhenomenology,inASPIRITOFTRUST(draft,forthcoming).Seealsosupranote8.35§2(Dyde).36“Philosophyformsacircle.Ithas,sinceitmustsomehowmakeabeginning,aprimary,directlygivenmatter,whichisnotprovedandisnotaresult.”§2A(Dyde).

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Thephilosopheroflaw’sstartingpointisourlegalconcepts.And,havingbegunatthatstartingpoint,thelegalphilosophercannotthenproceedbyrelatingthelegalconceptstootherconceptsthatshearbitrarilychoosesfromdifferentdomainsofhumanexperience.Thatwouldbejustlikethearbitraryconjunctionoflegalresultswithnon‐legalconceptsthatwasrejectedabove.Genuineknowledgemust,forHegel,bepursuedsystematically.Ithastorespectandaccountfortherelationsbetweenconceptsthatourconceptsthemselvessuggest.Thus,itmustrespectandaccountforthewayinwhichdifferentkindsofconceptsaregrouped—thewayinwhichtheyarerelatedtootherconceptsofthesamekindanddistinguishedfromdifferentkindsofconcepts.Thereforethephilosopherwhobeginswithlawmustfirstunderstandhowtheconceptsoflawrelatetoeachother,beforerelatingthemtoothernon‐legalconcepts.

Ofcoursethisispossibleonlyiflegalconceptsaretosomeextentdistinguishablefromnon‐legalconcepts.Todaylegaltheoristsoftendenythis.Butawholesaledenialseemsimplausible.Wecanobservethatlegalreasoningatleastpurportstobe,tosomeextent,distinctfromotherformsofreasoning.Theconceptsthatlawyersdeploytoexplainlegalresultscomefromthe“limiteddomainofthelaw”:37theyare,forexample,conceptssuchasmensreaorstrictscrutinyorfairuse,andnotconceptssuchasentropyordialecticalmaterialismorNashequilibrium.

B.ThePositiveAspectsofLaw

Afterdescribingthenatureoflegal“philosophy”inthefirsttwoparagraphsofthePhilosophyofRight,Hegelseemstochangetackabruptly.Inthethirdparagraph,hebeginstodiscussthewaysinwhichlawmaybepositive.Asweshallsee,itisintheRemarktothisthirdparagraphthatHegeldrawsthedistinctionwithwhichweareprimarilyconcerned,betweenlegalphilosophyandlegalhistory.

Hegeltellsusthatlawmaybe“positive”both“(a)initsform”and“(b)[in]content.”38Thepositiveformoflawissomethingwithwhichwearetodayfamiliar,thankstocontemporarylegalpositivism.Hegeltellsusthatlawispositiveinformwhenithas“theformofbeingvalidinaparticularstate.”39Thus,whatHegelcallsformallegalpositivitycallstomindthecontemporarylegalpositivist’sso‐called“sourcesthesis”:the37FrederickSchauer,TheLimitedDomainoftheLaw,90VA.L.REV.1909(2004).38§3(Knox).39§3.

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thesisthattheexistenceorvalidityofalawcanbedeterminedmerelybyreferencetothesourceofitspromulgation(suchasaparliamentaryenactmentorjudicialopinion,forexample).40

However,Hegel’sothervarietiesofpositivism,whichconcernthecontentofthelaw,arelikelylessfamiliartous.Hegelliststhreewaysinwhichlawacquiresapositivecontent:

(α)throughtheparticularnationalcharacterofapeople,itsstageofhistoricaldevelopment,andthewholecomplexofrelationsconnectedwiththenecessitiesofnature;(β)becauseasystemofpositivelawmustnecessarilyinvolvetheapplicationoftheuniversalconcepttotheparticular,externallygiven,characteristicsofobjectsandcases…;(γ)throughthefinallydetailedprovisionsrequisiteforactuallypronouncingjudgmentincourt.41

Whatdoalloftheseversionsoflegalpositivityhaveincommon?

ForHegel,thepositiveisanythingthatexists,irrespectiveofwhetheritisrational—thatis,irrespectiveofwhetheritistheproductofsomeconceptthatweendorse.InHegel’smetaphoricallanguage,themerelypositiveisthat“fromwhichthespirithasflown.”42Thus,forexample,inhisearlyessay,OnthePositivityoftheChristianReligion,HegeldescribeshowtheoriginalteachingsofJesus,whichHegeltakestoberationalmoralprinciples,becameoverthecourseoftheensuingcenturieslargelypositiveastheywerecodifiedandglossedbytheCatholicChurch.

Thus,wecanseewhatlegalpositivityisforHegel:legalconceptsandresultsthatarise,orareunderstood,independentlyofanyrationalbasis.Apositiveaccountoflawexplainsalegalresultorconceptashavingsomebasisotherthanitsinferencefromalegalconceptthatweendorse.OrasHegelputsit,suchanaccountexplainsthelawbasedonfactorsorcausesthatare“external”tothelaw’srationality.

NowwecanseewhatitisthatthedifferentvarietiesofHegelianpositivismhaveincommon.Regarding(a)law’spositive“form”orsource,thisis,ascontemporarylegalpositivistsinsist,independentofor“externalto”thelaw’ssubstantiverationality.Hencetheothermajortenetofcontemporarylegalpositivism,theso‐called“separability

40JOSEPHRAZ,THEAUTHORITYOFLAW47‐50(1979).41§3(Knox).42OntheRecentDomesticAffairsofWürtemberg,inHEGEL’SPOLITICALWRITINGS244(T.M.Knoxtrans.1964).

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thesis”:thethesisthatarulemaybelawevenifitisimmoralorunjustified.43

Asto(b)thecontentofthelaw,thismayalsobepositive,or“externalto”therationalityofthelegalconceptsthatunderliethelaw.ToadaptananalogyofHegel’s,wemightsaythatrealizedlegalconceptsacquirepositivecontentinthesamewaythatone’sindividualactions,astheyarerealizedintheworld,incorporateelementsthatwerenotfullyintended.Youmayintend,forexample,toburndownyourenemy’shouse,butyoudonothaveanyintentionsabouttheparticularfibersofwoodthattheflameofyourmatchinitiallytouches,noraboutexactlyhowmuchofthehouseturnstoashes.Thosedetailsareinawaypartofyouraction,buttheyareexternaltoyourintention—theconceptyouhaveofyouraction,oryouraction’srationalbasis.44

HenceHegel’svarietiesofpositivelegalcontent.Takingtheseinreverseorder:(γ)thedetailedprovisionsinthejudgmentofacourtaretosomeextentarbitraryvis‐à‐visthelegalconceptthatthecourtisapplying.Forexample,asHegelpointsoutinalaterpassage:

Reasoncannotdetermine,norcanthe[legal]conceptprovideanyprinciplewhoseapplicationcoulddecidewhetherjusticerequiresforanoffence(i)acorporalpunishmentoffortylashesorthirty‐nine,or(ii)afineoffivedollarsorfourdollarsandninety‐three,four,etc.,cents,or(iii)imprisonmentofayearorthreehundredandsixty‐four,three,etc.,days,orayearandone,two,orthreedays.45

Suchmatters,sincetheyarebeyondrationaldetermination,arenottheprovenanceoflegalphilosophy.(InhisPreface,HegelmockshiscontemporaryFichtefordevelopinghispurportedlyphilosophicalanalysisof“passportregulationstosuchapitchofperfectionastorequiresuspectsnotmerelytosigntheirpassportsbuttohavetheirlikenessespaintedonthem.”)46

Likewise,(β)judgesarerequiredtoapplythegeneralconceptsoflawtotheparticularitiesofgivencases—particularitieswhosesourceisthenatureofthenonlegalworld,andwhicharethereforeexternaltothelaw’srationality.Thejudgemustsubsumetheparticularsofagivencaseundersomelegalconceptorother.Butwhetherornotanyparticular

43H.L.A.HART,THECONCEPTOFLAW185‐86(1994).44E.g.§132R;G.W.F.HEGEL,IntroductiontoTHEPHILOSOPHYOFHISTORYIII(2)(b).45§214R(Knox).Eventhefactthatajudgecanorderonlyaroundnumber(andnot,say,39.5lashes)isexternaltothelegalconcept.Id.46Prefaceat11(Knox).

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casefallsunderoneconcept,orunderanother,isnotalwaysdictatedbytheconceptsthemselves.Thus,forexample,Hegelnotesthatacourtmayhavetosettlewhetherornotaliteraryplagiarismshouldberegardedasa“theft.”47Analogizing(somewhatmisleadingly)thedistinctionbetweentheRomanDigestandPandects,Hegelimagineslegalconceptsasstatementsofgeneralprinciples,whoseparticularsubdivisionsandapplicationsmustbeworkedoutindetailbypositivelawyers.Again,thisissomethingwithwhichphilosophersshouldnotconcernthemselves.48

Thelawalsoacquirespositivecontent(α)fromthreeotherrelatedfactors.Twoofthesearethe“nationalcharacter”ofthepeopletowhom[thelaw]applies”andthevarious“relationsconnectedwiththenecessitiesofnature.”Herewecanthinkoffactorssuchastheculturaltraditionsofapeople,andacountry’sclimateandthefertilityofitssoil,whichHegel,followingMontesquieu,believedmayinfluenceitslaws.49Andfinally,anation’slawacquirespositivecontentbecauseitisinformedbythenation’s“stageofhistoricaldevelopment.”Thisbringsustolegalhistory.

C.WhatisLegalHistory?

Havingsetoutthevariouskindsoflegalpositivity,Hegelembarksuponwhatcanonlybedescribedasadiatribe,againstthosewho“obscuretheboundary”betweenlegalhistoryandlegalphilosophy.50ItisherethatHegeldevelopshisclaimthatthesetwofieldsare“mutuallyindifferent”—andmustremainso,ratherthanpurportingtoinformeachother.

Thenatureoflegalhistoryisbynowclear.Anhistoricallegalexplanation—whichisonekindof“positive”explanation—explainsagivenlegalresultorconceptindependentlyofanyrationalbasisitmayhave.Thus,anhistoricalexplanationmayshowagivenlegalresultorconcepttohavebeeninferredfromsomeotherconceptthatwedonottodayendorse.Oritmayshowthelegalresultorconcepttobetheproductofanhistoricalcausethatisnonconceptualinnature—for

47CompareKnoxn.10,citingHegel’shandwrittenmarginalnotes.48§3R&n.12(Knox).49Knoxn.9,citingHEGEL,PHILOSOPHYOFHISTORY,supranote44.Seealso§3R&n.13(Knox),citingMONTESQUIEU,THESPIRITOFTHELAWSI.3(1748).50§3R.Hegelhasinmindcertainacademiccolleagueswhosubscribedtothe“historicalschool”ofjurisprudenceassociatedwithSavigny.Knox§3Rn.17.

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example,whatacertainjudgehappenedtohaveforbreakfastsometimeinthepast.

Iflegalphilosophyisconcernedwithlaw’srationality,andlegalhistory”withitshistoricalcausesregardlessofwhethertheyarerational,thetwofieldsmustbe“mutuallyindifferent”toeachother.Andwheneitherlegalphilosophyorlegalhistoryoverreaches—attemptingtochallengeorimprovetheotherfield—obscurityensues.

Legalphilosophycanneitherchallengenorimprovelegalhistory.Cannotchallenge,becauseevenifwetodayregardalawashavingarationalbasis,flowingfromconceptsthatwenowendorse,legalhistorycanshowthatasanhistoricalmatterthatsamelawcametobeonthebooksduetonon‐rationalcauses—suchaspurehappenstanceorlegalactors’self‐interest,forexample.Legalphilosophycannotimprovelegalhistory,because,astoday’sacademichistoriansareacutelyaware,towriteourpresent‐dayrationalinsightsintothehistoricalrecordistocommitthesinof“presentism,”obscuringthetruehistoricalcausesandmotivationsofactionsandevents.

Hegel,ofcourse,ismoreconcernedtomaketheoppositepoint:thatlegalhistorycannotchallengeorimprovelegalphilosophy.Cannotchallenge,becauselegalphilosophycanshowthelawtoberational—toberequiredbyourpresentconceptualcommitments—regardlessofwhether,historically,itwastheproductofothernon‐rationalcauses.Ifwehavearationalbasisnowforagivenlegalruleorinstitution,itisirrelevantthatitalsohasnon‐rationalcausesthatledtoitsadoption.

Forexample,virtuallyeverymodernnationstatewasfoundedatleastinpartasaresultofactionsandprinciplesthatwetodayregardasevil.Indeed,thehistoryofalmostanystateisoneofsuccessiveepisodesofhypocrisy,perfidy,andbrutalitybythepersonsandgroupswhomadethatstatewhatitistoday.Nevertheless,wemayrationallyendorsethestateweliveintoday,ifwebelievethatitrealizesconcepts(oratleastendeavorstorealizeconcepts)towhichwearenowcommitted.51

Indeed,anargumentthatseekstochallengetherationalityofaconceptbasedonthewayinwhichthatconcepthistoricallycametobeadoptedcommitswhatlogicianscallthe“geneticfallacy.”Thefactthatsomeonehasarrivedatabeliefastheresultofafaultyreasoningprocessdoesnotentailthattheirbeliefisfalse.(Forexample,justbecauseJohn

51Cf.IMMANUELKANT,THEMETAPHYSICSOFMORALS[6:318](MaryJ.Gregored.&trans.,1996)(1797‐98).

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StuartMillmighthavearrivedatabeliefintheequalityofallhumanbeingsbecausehisfatherpressuredhimintoit,doesnotmeanthatthebeliefisfalse.)52

Norcanlegalhistoryimprovelegalphilosophy.Ifwedemonstratealawtoberational,thenportraying“themannerof[its]appearanceinhistory,alongwiththecircumstances,cases,wantsandevents”thatledtoitaddsnothingtotheassessmentofitsrationality.53Andthisistrueevenifthelawappearedastheproductofaconceptthateveryoneinthepastendorsed.Becausetotheextentthatconceptismerelyhistorical,ratherthanendorsedinthepresent,itsrationalityhasnowexpired.(“Thespirithasflown.”)

So,forexample,HegelsuggeststhatmanyaspectsofRomanprivatelawfollowinferentiallyfromtheconceptsofpatriapotestasandtraditionalRomanmatrimony.However,sincethoseconceptsarerepugnanttoustoday,wecannotendorseanyaspectsofprivatelawthatpurporttoderivetheirrationalbasisfromthem.54Likewise,monasteriesorcloistersmayoncehavebeenjustifiedonthebasisthattheypromotelearning.Hegelbelievedthatbyhistime,thatjustificationwasobsolete.(Presumablytheuniversityhadcometoperformthisfunction.)Therefore,Hegelpointsout,“sincecircumstanceshavenowentirelyaltered,themonasteriesareinthisrespectatleastsuperfluousandinappropriate.”55

Indeed,Hegelnotesthatwhenhistorianspurporttoimprovelegalphilosophyusinghistoricalexplanations,they“unconsciouslyachievetheveryoppositeofwhattheyintend.”56Byshiftingbetweentwofieldsthathavenothingtocontributetoeachother,thehistoriancommitsacategorialerror,andasaresultonlyobscuresthelaw’srationality,ratherthanelucidatingit.FollowingMichaelOakeshott,wecancomparethiskindofcategorialerrortoanothertraditionallogicalfallacy,“ignoratioelenchi”or“ignoringtheissue.”57Thisoccurswhen,forexample,someonemisunderstandsanargument,andthenemploysthatmisunderstandinginrespondingtotheargument.(Asin,“Themanwho

52JAMESDCARNEY&RICHARDKSCHEER,FUNDAMENTALSOFLOGICch.2(1964).53§3R(Dyde).54§3R.Infact,Hegelsuggests,manyaspectsofRomanprivatelawwerenotrationalinRomantimeseither.55§3R(Knox).56Id.57MICHAELOAKESHOTT,EXPERIENCEANDITSMODES(1933).

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said‘Miraclesdon’thappen’isblind.Whataboutpenicillin?”).58Becausethetwoargumentsareirrelevanttoeachother,theirconjunctioncanyieldonlyconfusion.Thisisexactlywhathappens,accordingtoHegel,whenonetriestoconjoinargumentsfromthedistinctfieldsoflegalhistoryandlegalphilosophy.

ThereareofcourseanumberofpossibleobjectionsthatmightberaisedagainstHegel’sdemandforthisstrictseparationoflegalhistoryfromlegalphilosophy.Letusconsiderthreeprominentones.

First,couldaconservativeapproachtolawnotrenderlegalhistoryrelevanttolegalphilosophy?Aconservativemightcontendthatweshouldapproachthelawtodaybycontinuingtoendorsethelegalconceptsandresultsthatourforebearsarrivedat—nomattertheirreasonsorcauses.

Suchanapproachwouldindeedmakelegalhistoryrelevanttolegalphilosophy.However,itwoulddosoonlybyadoptingapresent‐dayconcept,theguidingprincipleofconservatism(orsomesimilarprincipleofepistemologicalorpracticalcaution),whichhastheeffectofincorporatingthelaw’shistoryintothedomainofpresent‐dayrationality.Itisonlythispresent‐dayprinciplethatsuppliesthelaw’srationality—withoutit,thereisnoreasonwhatsoevertothinkthat,merelybecauseourforebearsarrivedatagivenlegalconceptorresult,weshouldendorsethatconceptorresultasrational.

Second,mightlegalphilosophersnotlearnfromthehistoryoflaw,andviceversa?Thesuggestionhereisthatscholarsineachfieldmightusetheotherfieldinstrumentally,asameanstothediscoveryoftruthsintheirownfield.Andthereissurelysomethingtobesaidfortheideathathistoryandphilosophycanspurnewlinesofthinkingineachother.

Forexample,understandingwhylawyersinthepasttookcertainlegalconceptstobejustifiedmaysuggestreasonswhylegalphilosopherstodayshoulddothesame.Ourenthusiasmforthismethodshould,however,bediminishedsomewhatwhenweconsiderotherpossiblesourcesofgoodideasforlegalphilosophy:forexample,bookspickeduprandomlywhilewalkingthroughalibrary,dreams,ortheravingsoflunatics.Thosesourcesmaylikewisebeusedinstrumentally,toinspirephilosophicalideas,thoughtherationalityofthoseideasisfarfromguaranteed.Itisthesamewithlegalhistory.Ofcoursehistoryisprobablyamorereliablesourceofgoodideasforunderstandingthe58CARNEY&SCHEER,supranote52.

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rationalityofourconceptsthan,say,dreams.Buthistory’sreliabilityinthisrespectshouldnotbeoverstated.Hegelhimselfclaimedthattheonlythingwelearnfromhistoryisthatpeopleneverlearnfromhistory:becauseourpresentcircumstancesareneverthesameasthehistoricalones,wecannotderivelessonsofrealvalue.59Likewise,today’shistoriansstresshowdangerousitistousehistorytoattemptunderstandthepresent,asitwillleadtoa“presentist”readingofthepast,whichitselfobscuresanyvaluabletruthsthathistorymightotherwisehavecontained.60Andthesameisofcoursetrueofattemptstousenewlymintedphilosophicalinsightsinordertounderstandwhatactuallyhappenedasanhistoricalmatter.

Insum,then,itisconceivablethatlegalphilosophyandlegalhistorymaylearnfromeachother,butonlyifeachfieldishighlycautiousandselective.Eachmusttreattheinsightsoftheotherfieldinmuchthesamewayaswewouldtreataninsightyieldedbyadream—nevertakingitatfacevalue,butrathersubjectingittothefullrigorsoftheapplicablediscipline.

Third,whataboutthecurrentlyfashionablemethodof“genealogy”?ThetermcomesfromNietzsche’sGenealogyofMorals,whichsoughttounderminetheconventionalviewthatourmoralityisagoodthingbysketchingahistoryinwhichmoralconceptsdevelopedoutofrivalsocialfactions’attemptstodominateeachother.(TheancientGreekrulingclassdefineditselfas“good,”aJudeo‐Christianunderclasswrestedpowerbyre‐defining“good”intermsofitsown“slavemorality,”andsoon.)61FoucaultcommendedthisapproachinhisNietzsche,Genealogy,History.Helikewisesoughttodisruptreceivedwisdomaboutoursocialinstitutions,byshowingthemtobetheproductofhistoricalaccidentsarisingoutofacontinualstruggleforpower.62

Thus,thebasicmethodofanhistorical“genealogy”istodiscreditexistingconceptsbyshowingthemtohaveignobleorigins.Moretechnically,wecansaythatagenealogyshowsagivenconceptorresultφthatwenowendorsetobetheproductofsomeconcept,orother

59HEGEL,PHILOSOPHYOFHISTORY,supranote44,atII§8(on“PragmaticHistory”).60SeeHERBERTBUTTERFIELD,THEWHIGINTERPRETATIONOFHISTORYIII,VI(1931).61FRIEDRICHNIETZSCHE,THEGENEALOGYOFMORALS(HoraceB.Samueltrans.,1913).62MichelFoucault,Nietzsche,Genealogy,History,inTHEFOUCAULTREADER(PaulRabinowed.,1984).

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cause,thatisnotinferentiallyrelatabletoφ—i.e.,thatcannotprovideareasonforustoendorseφ.63

ForHegel,agenealogicalattempttounderminetherationalityofthelawwouldbemisguided.Itdoesnotmatterifsomelawnowonthebookswas,historically,entirelycausedby,forexample,theself‐interestedpowerplaysofvarioushistoricalactorsorgroups.Ifthereisapresentrationalbasisforthelaw,thatcannotbeimpugnedbylegalhistory.

BrianLeiter,inhispaperTheHermeneuticsofSuspicion,presentsapossiblechallengetothiswayofthinkingaboutgenealogy.64Hearguesthatagenealogymaygeneratereasontosuspectthetruthofagivenpersonorgroup’sbelief,byshowingthatbelieftohavea“causaletiology”thatisunrelatedtothetruthofthebelief.Leitercontends:

Tobesure,beliefswiththewrongcausaletiologymightbetrue;but…wehavenoreasontopresumethattobethecase.Tothecontrary,wenowhavereasontobesuspicious—nothingmore—oftheirveritisticproperties.65

Thus,touseanexampleofLeiter’s,wewouldhavereasontosuspectthetruthofPresidentGeorgeW.Bush’sclaimthatSaddamHusseinposedathreattotheU.S.,ifweknewthatwhatcausedBushtoholdthatbeliefishisknowledge“thatitwouldbeintheinterestsoftheU.S.rulingclassestohavemorereliablecontroloverlargeMiddleEastoilreserves.”66

However,forourpurposesitisimportanttoclarifypreciselyhowthe“suspicion”isgeneratedhere.Inonesense,asuccessfulgenealogydoesmorethanmerelycauseustosuspect.Rather,itcompletelyrebutstheassumptionthattheactualhistoricaldevelopmentofthebelieforconceptinquestionwasrational.AsLeitersays,onceweareawareofthegenealogicalaccount,we“havenoreasontopresume”thatthehistoricalbasisfortheadoptionofthebeliefcoincidedwitharationalbasisforthatbelief.Forexample,onceweknowGeorgeW.Bush’sactual,historicalreasonfortakingSaddamtobeathreat,werealizethatBusharrivedathisbeliefwithoutanyrationalbasiswhatsoever.Likewise,agenealogyofalegalconceptcouldeffectivelyrebutthenaïveassumptionthattheactualhistoricaldevelopmentofthatconceptwasrational.

63RobertBrandom,FromIronytoTrust:ModernityandBeyond,inASPIRITOFTRUST134(draft,forthcoming).64BrianLeiter,TheHermeneuticsofSuspicion:RecoveringMarx,Nietzsche,andFreud,inTHEFUTUREFORPHILOSOPHY191‐94(BrianLeitered.,2004).65Id.at192‐93.66Id.at193.

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Atthesametime,agenealogyisunableinanywaytoimpugnapresentrationalbasisforabelieforconcept.Ifabelieforconcepthasapresentrationalbasis—andnoclaimismadethatthisrationalbasiscoincideswiththehistoricaldevelopmentofthebelieforconcept—agenealogyhasnobite.67Forexample,ifwehadsomerationalgroundforbelievingthatSaddamdidposeathreattotheU.S.,itwouldbeirrelevanttothetruthofthatbeliefthatGeorgeW.Bushhappenedtoarriveatitonanirrationalbasis.

Insum,genealogicalaccountsmaygiveusreasonto“suspect”therationalityofaconceptonlyinsofarastheyrebuttheassumptionthattheactualhistoricaldevelopmentoftheconceptwasrational.Theyarepowerlessinthefaceofavalidunderstandingoftheconcept’srationality.

D.APhilosophicalHistoryofLaw?

Althoughhedemandstheseparationofordinarylegalhistoryfromlegalphilosophy,inhisremarksfollowingthethirdparagraphofthePhilosophyofRight,Hegelalsoenvisageswhatwemaycalla“philosophicalhistory”ofthelaw.

Hegelmentionsinpassingthatanhistoricalaccountofourlegalconceptsmaybeusefultothephilosopher,

insofarasthedevelopmentoutofhistoricgroundscoincideswiththedevelopmentoftheconception,andthehistoricalexpositionandjustificationcanbemadetocoverajustificationwhichisvalidinitselfandindependently.68

Hegelhereseemstohaveinmindasituationwherethehistoricaldevelopmentofaconceptechoesthesequenceofthoughtsthroughwhichwe,today,cancometounderstandtherationalbasisofthatconcept.Herewemightthink,forexample,ofnegligencelaw,whichmaybetaughtbydescribingitsdevelopmentinthetwentiethcenturythroughaseriesofcourtdecisionsthatprogressivelyelucidatedthevarious

67ThesamepointcanbemadeinthecontextoftheGettierproblemsthatLeiterdiscusses.Cf.RobertB.Brandom,WhyTruthisNotImportantinPhilosophy,inREASONINPHILOSOPHY:ANIMATINGIDEASch.6(2009).68§3R(Dyde).

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componentsofthecauseofaction.69Thehistoricalnarrativeheremighthappentocoincidewithaphilosophicalunderstanding.

Butwhataboutwheretherationalunderstandingofagivenlegalconceptdoesnotcoincidewiththehistoricalrecord—where,asahistoricalmatter,non‐rationalfactorscontributedtotheconcept’sadoption?Mightitneverthelessbepossibleordesirableforphilosopherstopursuea“philosophicalhistory”here?HegeldoesnotexpresslyaddressthisintheopeningparagraphsofthePhilosophyofRight.However,elsewhereheis,notoriously,concernedtoconstructphilosophicalhistoriesor“teleological”accountsofourconcepts—mostfamously,portrayingtheentirecourseofworldhistoryasnothingotherthanthemarchofconsciousnesstowardsfreedom.70

Thissortof“philosophicalhistory”isacceptabletoHegel,notwithstandinghisadmonitionsagainstmixingordinaryhistoryandphilosophy,becauseaphilosophicalhistorydoesnotpurporttoalterourunderstandingofwhat“actually”happenedhistorically.Whereasanordinaryhistorytracestheactualdevelopmentofourconceptsandresults,whichareoftentheproductofnon‐rationalcauses,a“philosophicalhistory”isconcernedonlywithportrayingtheprocessofthelaw’sdevelopmentasrational.Itundertakesa“rationalreconstruction”oftheprocessofdevelopment,inordertodepictthegradualevolutionoftheconceptsthatweendorsetoday.(Whattoday’shistoriansmightcalla“Whighistory”ofourconcepts.)71Ofcourse,asamatteroffact,variousnon‐rationalcausesmayhaveledtotheadoptionofourcurrentconcepts,butaphilosophicalhistorytreatsthosenon‐rationalelementsasmereaccidentaldetails,whichdonotunderminetheoverallstoryofrationaldevelopment.Itdoesnotmatterthatagivenstepintheevolutionofaconceptwascaused,forexample,byanhistoricalactor’svenality,solongasthatstepwasalsorationallydemanded.

Arguably,aparadigmofthissortofrationalreconstructionofthehistoryofourconcepts,or“philosophicalhistory,”istraditionalcommonlawreasoning.Ajudgeorlawyer,marshalingprecedentsinordertoreachaconclusionaboutwhatthelawis,willoftenportraythecaselawashavinggraduallyprogressedtowardsthelegalconceptorresultthat

69Forexample,fromDonoghuev.Stevenson,[1932]A.C.562(H.L.)(dutyofcare),toTheWagonMound(No.1),[1961]A.C.388(P.C.)(remotenessofdamage),throughTheWagonMound(No.2),[1967]1A.C.617(P.C.)(standardofcare).70§§341‐60;HEGEL,PHILOSOPHYOFHISTORY,supranote44.71RobertB.Brandom,History,Reason,andReality,inREASONINPHILOSOPHY,supranote67,atIII.5.

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shebelievesoughttobereachedinthepresentcase.Shewillpickoutofthecaselawacontinuousthreadleadingtothedesiredconceptorresult,andwilldisregardotherthreadsthatcouldalsobefoundinthedecidedcases.Shewillalsodisregardanynon‐rationalcausesofthedesiredconceptorresult,suchaserroneousorevenbiasedjudicialreasoninginthepreviouscases.

Thisrationalreconstructionofthedevelopmentofthelawisafamiliarfeatureofcommonlawmethod.WhenSirEdwardCokesoughttoprovethatthecommonlawisrational,hepointedoutthat“aninfinitenumberofgraveandlearnedmen”had“finedandrefined”itoverthecenturies.72AsimilarideaunderliesRonaldDworkin’smetaphorofthejudicialchainnovel,inwhicheachsuccessivejudgeseekstointerpretanddevelopthelawinthebestwaypossible,asifhewerewritingachainnovel’slatestchapter.73Toconceiveofthecommonlawascontinuallyrefinedinthisfashionistounderstanditasaprogressivelyrationalprocess.

Manylegalacademicstoday,whoseethemselvesasinheritorsofthehard‐headedLegalRealisttradition,mightbeinclinedtocondescendtothisapproach,regardingitasthetellingoflegalfairytales.ButcompellingreasontoreconsideranysuchcondescensioncanbefoundintherecentworkoftheHegelianphilosopherRobertBrandom.Brandomsuggeststhatthemethodof“rationalreconstruction”or“philosophicalhistory,”isanessentialfeatureofhumanreasoning,notjustinthecommonlaw,butinanyfieldofintellectualinquiry.74Indeed,forBrandom,traditionalcommonlawreasoningisjustaparticularlyexplicitorwell‐articulatedversionofamethodthathumansdeploywhenevertheydeveloptheirunderstandingofanything.

Consider,forexample,acaricatureoftheevolutionofourconceptofthesun.Atonepoint,perhapsfortheancientEgyptians,thesunwasagod.Next,forsomeoftheGreeks,itwasaluminousdisctravellingthroughthesky,revolvingaroundtheearth.Then,inearlymodernEurope,itbecameaballofhotmetal,remainingstillwhiletheearthrevolvedaroundit.Forustoday,thesunisastarlikemanyothersinour

72CO.LITT.97b.73LAW’SEMPIRE228‐38(1986);RobertBrandom,AHegelianModelofLegalConceptDetermination:TheNormativeFineStructureoftheJudges’ChainNovel(paperpresentedtotheInlandNorthwestPhilosophyConference,Mar.23,2012).74Hegelhimselftendedtoimpugntherationalityofthecommonlaw(see,e.g.,§211R)andEnglishlawingeneral(seeTheEnglishReformBill,inHEGEL’SPOLITICALWRITINGS,supranote42).

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galaxy,whichradiatestheenergygivenoffbymassivethermonuclearreactions.

We,endorsingthelatterconceptionofthesun,takeourconceptiontobe(themost)trueorrational,andourpredecessors’conceptionstobegreatlyflawedbutprogressivelyimprovedapproximationsofthetruth.Importantly,intakingthisapproach,weassumethatthereisasingleobject,“thesun,”towhichallofthevariousconceptionsrefer.Wedonotjustsaythathumanshavethoughtindifferentwaysatdifferenttimesaboutvariousthingsthatappearedtothemintheskyduringtheday.

AccordingtoBrandom,thispositingofasingleobjectunderlyingallofthechangingconceptionsofit—whichisaninvariablefeatureofintellectualinquiryinanyprogressivediscipline—isasignthatweareundertakingarationalreconstructionofthehistoryofourconceptions.Thepositingofasingleobjectunderlyingthedifferentconceptionsofitallowsus(a)totakeourpresentconceptiontobethe(most)rationalone,(b)toacknowledgethatourpredecessors,althoughtheyalsoendeavoredtoberational,haddifferentconceptions,and(c)toseearationalprogressionfromourpredecessors’conceptionstoourown.Incontrast,ifwehadnoneedof(a)‐(c)—iftherewasnodemandtoportraythedevelopmentofourunderstandingasrational—wecouldbecontenttodiscardtheassumptionthatweandourpredecessorshavebeenattemptingtounderstandtheverysameobject.

Inthisrespectwemaycomparethewaythatacommonlawyerorjudgeclaimstoglean“whatthelawis”frompreviouscases,extractingacontinuousthreadofconceptualdevelopmentoutofaseriesofdecisionsthatoccurredovercenturies.Whereasiftherewerenoneedtounderstandthedevelopmentofthelawasrational,commonlawyerscouldbecontenttoregardthepreviouscasesnotasaprogressiveilluminationofasingleruleorprinciple,butasjustasuccessionofdifferentopinionsaboutwhatoughttobedone.

IfBrandomisrightthatthemethodofrationalreconstructionor“philosophicalhistory”isnotapeculiarityofthecommonlawbutafeatureofrationalityingeneral,thenweoughttotakethismethodseriouslyinlegalphilosophy.Indeed,thislineofthoughtsuggeststhatadedicatedHegelianlegalphilosopheroughttoregardthepursuitofa“philosophicalhistory”asobligatory.

Theendeavortorevealtherationalbasisofourpresent“time‐slice”ofthelawisfinesofarasitgoes:ifsuccessful,itdemonstratesthatour

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presentlegalconceptsarerational.Indeedthecommonlawoftenproceedsinthisway:alawyerorjudgeaddressestherationalityoftheensembleofapplicableprecedentsastheystandtoday,ignoringtheirhistoricalsequence.(Thisisthebasicmethodofcaselaw“synthesis”taughtinlawschoollegalreasoningclasses.)However,thisapproachcannotultimatelybesatisfactory,becauseitleavesunexplainedhowthelawarrivedatitspresentrationalstate—howitgothere,giventhatitwasnotalwayshere.

Legalphilosophersmustthereforepursueaphilosophicalhistoryiftheywanttounderstandtheprocessofthelaw’sdevelopmentasrational.75(Theycannotjustnaïvelyassumethattheactualhistoricaldevelopmentofthelawcoincideswithitsrationalbasis,becausea“genealogist”willeasilyrefutethat.)Andthereisapressingdemandtoshowthattheprocessofthelaw’sdevelopmentisrational,becausewearesubjecttothatprocess.Unlesswecanembraceitasrational,theprocesswillappeartousasmerelypositive.Inwhichcaseitsdemiseshouldbeimminent,forwewouldhavecompellingreasontoreplaceitwithanewprocesswhoserationalityisintelligibletous.

75Cf.RobertB.Brandom,History,Reason,andReality,inREASONINPHILOSOPHY,supranote67,§5.