Hearing Transcript - 18 August 2003 Morning

8/8/2019 Hearing Transcript - 18 August 2003 Morning

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Hearing Transcripts

1 Monday, 18th August 20032 (10.30 am)3 LORD HUTTON: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Mr Knox,4 yes.

5 MR KNOX: My Lord, the next witness is Miss Pamela Teare.6 MISS PAMELA TEARE (called)7 Examined by MR KNOX8 Q. Miss Teare, could you tell the Inquiry your full name9 and occupation?10 A. My name is Pamela May Teare and I am currently Director11 of News at the Ministry of Defence.12 Q. How long have you been working in the Civil Service?13 A. I have been in the Civil Service for nearly 25 years.14 Q. How long have you been working in the Government15 Information and Communications Service?16 A. Since September 1986.17 Q. What is your current post?

18 A. My current post is Director of News in the Ministry of19 Defence.20 Q. When did you take that post up?21 A. I began that post in November 2002.22 Q. Before then, which press offices, if any, had you worked23 in?24 A. I had worked in press offices in the Home Office, in the25 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, in the Department of

11 Trade & Industry and in the Department of Transport.2 Q. It would be fair to say you are reasonably experienced3 in that field?

4 A. Reasonably.5 Q. In your current post, what do your responsibilities6 cover?7 A. My responsibilities cover a number of areas. I have8 responsibility for the media operations team, which9 plans and implements the media arrangements that take10 place during a military operation. They also deal with11 documentaries, approaches for documentaries on broad12 defence issues. I deal with the press office and13 I also -- when I say "deal" I mean I am responsible for14 the press office and I am also responsible for the15 network of press officers around the country.16 Q. In broad terms what are the functions of the press

17 office?18 A. Essentially the press office are there to deal with19 media enquiries, to produce handling plans, to rebut20 incorrect stories, to -- well, the normal range of media21 activities really.22 Q. Could you explain, what is the structure of the press23 office and who does it report to?24 A. The press office reports to the chief press officer and25 there are three teams, each one led by a senior

21 information officer, and they are responsible for2 particular subject areas.

3 Q. And who does the chief press officer report to?4 A. She reports to me.


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5 Q. And who, in turn, do you report to?6 A. I report to the Director General of Corporate7 Communications.8 Q. Who is that?9 A. Tony Pawson.10 Q. In the course of your responsibilities do you talk to

11 Ministers or senior officials at all?12 A. Yes, part of my responsibility is to advise Ministers13 and senior officials directly on media related issues.14 Q. Which Ministers would you expect to advise on such15 issues?16 A. I would certainly expect to advise the Secretary of17 State but also the other Ministers if they were handling18 issues that were very high profile or difficult.19 Q. When you say the Secretary of State, that would be20 Geoffrey Hoon?21 A. Yes.22 Q. On a typical day what would you spend most of your time23 doing, on a typical day in the office?

24 A. It is quite difficult to generalise, I guess, but25 I would often have a very brief meeting in the morning

31 with the Secretary of State. I would then have the2 morning meeting with all of the press office and other3 representatives from the corporate communications4 directorate where we would run through the press5 cuttings, identify key issues of the day and also go6 through the diary to see what was happening.7 Q. When you say the diary, whose diary?8 A. Sorry, our own diary, you know the press office diary9 which has all the events for that day to make sure that

10 everything was in place. Again on a typical day,11 I would often be involved in policy discussions, policy12 meetings to advise on media aspects; and sometimes, say13 if we had oral questions in the House, I would go over14 to the House of Commons for that or attend Parliamentary15 debates. It is quite difficult to pin down what16 a typical day may be.17 Q. You will obviously know about the piece that18 Andrew Gilligan put out on 29th May on the Today19 Programme. Were you in England at the time that piece20 went out in the morning?21 A. I was actually just leaving that morning to go on22 holiday.

23 Q. And for how long did you go on holiday?24 A. I returned to the office on 9th June.25 Q. Are you able to say whether the Ministry of Defence

41 press office itself put out any rebuttals of the piece2 by Mr Gilligan?3 A. No, the Ministry of Defence did not issue a rebuttal on4 that.5 Q. In other words your press office did not issue any6 rebuttals?7 A. No.8 Q. That, as I understand it, was done by the No. 10 press

9 office?10 A. That is right.


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11 Q. Did the Ministry of Defence press office put out any12 rebuttals of Susan Watts' piece which appeared on13 Newsnight on 2nd June and again on 4th June?14 A. No, we did not.15 Q. It is clear from various press clippings which can be16 made available that there were a number of press stories

17 at the beginning of June, essentially focusing on the18 dissatisfaction within the intelligence community about19 the production of the September 2002 dossier. Were you20 aware of those press stories by the time you got back?21 A. Not by the time I got back, no; and in fact I think, as22 is often the case, if you have not actually heard23 broadcasts et cetera and been there and discussed them24 at the time they do not perhaps make the same impact on25 you as if you had been there. But on my return I was

51 briefed by the chief press officer on the interview that2 Adam Ingram had done on the Today Programme on 28th May.

3 Q. But you were not briefed on the various articles in the4 press or on Susan Watts' story?5 A. No.6 Q. We know that on 28th June Ben Bradshaw gave an interview7 on the Today Programme and the interview, I think that8 was John Humphrys said that Mr Gilligan's story had been9 checked with the Ministry of Defence before it had been10 broadcast.11 A. Hmm, hmm.12 Q. Did you hear that interview?13 A. Yes, I did.14 Q. I think we can just look up the relevant passage. It is15 CAB/1/382. I think this is part of the interview

16 between I think it is Mr Humphrys and Ben Bradshaw. You17 should see, fairly near the end of the page at 382, some18 italics where JH says:19 "Well all right, no, I bow to you on that. Clearly20 you, you work for the BBC, you talk to people every day21 in the BBC as I do, I fully understand that. I thought22 you were running a bit of a Government department but23 there we are, you are spending your time talking to the24 BBC, that is fine. But let me just tell you that what25 we did before the Gilligan report was published, what

61 Andrew Gilligan did was he checked with the Ministry of

2 Defence. You say that you -- he called the Ministry of3 Defence and told them the story was being run so they4 had an opportunity to rebut it."5 Now, did you speak to anyone about that aspect of6 the interview on 28th June?7 A. Yes. I heard the interview. I was surprised at the8 categorical way the presenter had said that it had been9 checked with the MoD because I certainly was not aware10 of it. The chief press officer then rang me to discuss11 this; and she explained to me that, you know, it was not12 true, as indeed I had thought. She had been involved in13 discussions with the Today Programme on the evening of14 the 28th May and therefore was in a position to say what

15 had happened.16 Q. Can I just ask you: who is the chief press officer?


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17 A. My chief press officer is Kate Wilson.18 Q. Was a press statement therefore drafted on behalf of the19 MoD to deal with this point?20 A. Yes, it was.21 Q. I think we can go to MoD/9/12.22 This is an e-mail which has been shown to us. As

23 I understand it, this is the original drafting; is that24 right?25 A. Yes. This e-mail formed the text of the statement that

71 was issued by the Ministry of Defence duty press2 officer.3 Q. And was a press statement therefore put out on the same4 day in exactly the same terms as you see here?5 A. Yes, the MoD statement comprised the comments we see6 there.7 Q. The crucial paragraph is the second paragraph:8 "Andrew Gilligan did not call MoD to discuss either

9 WMD or the dossier. He spoke to the MoD about an10 interview request for the following day on a different11 issue altogether."12 A. Yes.13 Q. This then was followed by some further correspondence.14 If you go to MoD/9/13, the next page along, there is15 a letter from Richard Sambrook to Ben Bradshaw. It16 would seem this letter must have been copied to the17 press office, is that right?18 A. Yes, I think it came either into the Secretary of19 State's office or direct to us. But on the day that the20 MoD issued the statement we were aware that Ben Bradshaw21 was also going to write to the Today Programme and this

22 was the response to that letter.23 Q. The BBC here set out what they say about it. There are24 some markings down the left-hand side of the page. Do25 you know who made those markings? Are they anything to

81 do with you?2 A. No, as I gather they were made by Kate Wilson.3 Q. You will notice the third of the markings looks like4 "2.30" or possibly "10.30 pm -- Chris Howard to5 Richard -- 2 mins on WMD."6 A. That is 10.30. That is someone, I think it is7 Chris Howard from the Today Programme talking to

8 Richard, who was Richard Whalley, our duty press officer9 that evening, and he just rang and said, "Can we do two10 minutes on WMD as well as cluster bombs?" and that was11 it.12 Q. In other words this appears to be the marking made on or13 about presumably 29th June by someone in the press14 office?15 A. I am sorry?16 Q. This marking here, this handwritten marking would have17 been on or about 29th June as far as you are aware?18 A. I would not have thought so. The 29th June was a Sunday19 so it would have been made earlier that week. Sorry,20 early the following week.

21 Q. We know that at MoD/9/14, Mr Hoon set out a response to22 Mr Sambrook's letter --


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23 A. Hmm, hmm.24 Q. -- when he explains the MoD's side of the story and the25 important passage for the present purposes is at

91 page 15. He sets out, on page 15, what he says the

2 relevant chronology was.3 A. Yes.4 Q. The essence of it is he says: you did not give us any5 advance notice of my piece on WMD accusing us of6 tampering with the dossier.7 A. That is right, and the point was that when the programme8 rang just to ask if they could add in a couple of9 minutes on WMD, the only WMD issues that we were aware10 of at the time concerned some comments that11 Donald Rumsfeld had made about whether or when WMD might12 be found in Iraq, and secondly stories that had been13 circulating about the February dossier, otherwise known14 as the "dodgy dossier". Those were the only two issues

15 we knew were current and Adam Ingram was briefed on16 those accordingly.17 Q. Do you know if there are any records on the basis of18 which this letter was drawn up, that is to say any19 records kept by the MoD?20 LORD HUTTON: I think Mr Ingram made some reference, did he21 not, to a single source for the 45 minutes claim?22 A. He did, yes.23 LORD HUTTON: But was he briefed on that, as far as you are24 aware?25 A. I did not hear the interview, but my understanding was

10

1 that, as I say, we were not expecting the story that2 Andrew Gilligan rang and therefore -- well, until we3 heard it at -- I think it was broadcast at 6.07.4 LORD HUTTON: Yes.5 A. So it was only on hearing that broadcast that we were6 aware that the Minister would have to answer a question7 on it. I think there was insufficient time to get him8 briefed properly and he I think just sort of drew on9 information he had had in relation to that in his own10 head.11 LORD HUTTON: I see. Thank you very much.12 MR KNOX: Looking at the information we see on page 15 of13 MoD/9, are there any notes or contemporary records on

14 the basis of which this document was drawn up? It looks15 as if someone has kept notes which enabled them to say16 the various times at which things were recorded.17 A. Yes.18 Q. But we do not have them at the moment.19 A. Oh, right. When press officers are on duty at the20 Ministry of Defence out of hours they log all their21 calls. So the two calls that the programme made later22 in the evening to the duty press officer are logged.23 That was one, I think, that confirmed that they wished24 to interview Adam Ingram, and the second one that said25 could they have two minutes on WMD at the end.

111 Q. When you say "logged" there will be handwritten notes,


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2 will there?3 A. It is kept on the computer, there is a log.4 Q. If you could turn to MoD/9/18, you will see a reply from5 Mr Sambrook to Mr Hoon, replying to the letter that we6 have just been looking at.7 A. Hmm, hmm.

8 Q. And you will see he says:9 "Well, if we fell short of what we believe to be10 acceptable, we shall say so."11 Then Mr Hoon replies at page 17 of MoD/9, the12 previous page. In that letter, at MoD/9/17 Mr Hoon13 says:14 "I was extremely disappointed with last night's15 decision by the BBC to drop the interview with me from16 this morning's Today Programme. You may be aware that17 I was asked on the programme to talk about18 reconstruction in Iraq. I agreed to do this and also19 for the opportunity to reply to the allegation that20 Andrew Gilligan's story of 29th May was 'checked with

21 the MoD'. I understand that having seen the letter sent22 to you yesterday evening, the programme decided against23 an interview with me."24 Were you at all involved with Mr Hoon in discussing25 this aspect of the case?

121 A. I think I may have discussed with Kate Wilson, and his2 private office, the fact that we thought it was worth3 taking up that the Today Programme had dropped their4 interview request for the Secretary of State because5 they were not willing to give him an opportunity on air6 to refute the claim that the original story had been

7 checked with the MoD --8 Q. Is this the idea that the BBC wanted to interview9 Mr Hoon but as soon as Mr Hoon said: well, I want to10 correct the record, the BBC then withdrew its11 invitation?12 A. That is right. We had indicated the Secretary of State13 was very happy to talk about reconstruction in Iraq and14 in doing so he would also like the opportunity to talk15 about the allegation that the story had been checked16 with the MoD.17 Q. Do you know if the BBC gave any reason for withdrawing18 the invitation?19 A. Again, I did not speak to them directly but it was

20 either this occasion or when the same thing happened the21 following day, the Today Programme said that they were22 not prepared to accept Mr Hoon on that basis and they23 only liked one subject interviews.24 Q. Moving on to MoD/9/19, were you copied in on this25 correspondence, the letter from the BBC to Mr Hoon?

131 A. Yes, I was.2 Q. Moving over to MoD/9/20 again, were you copied in on3 this?4 A. Yes, I was.5 Q. Can you just explain what the purpose of this

6 correspondence was, from your point of view; what were7 you trying to establish?


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8 A. This, again, was a follow-up letter. We had been9 through a similar procedure to the previous day, when10 the Today Programme had asked to interview the Secretary11 of State and then they had turned -- they had said no,12 because he wanted a second chance to refute the claim13 that the story had been checked with the MoD.

14 Q. If you move over to page 21, this is a letter from the15 BBC, this time it seems, in the fourth paragraph down,16 effectively apologising for not having kept a clear17 account of the BBC's dealings with the MoD; and then,18 over the page, at 22, you will see there is a further19 letter from Mr Sambrook referring to a meeting he has20 had with Mr Hoon on 9th July.21 A. I think the meeting was actually on 8th July.22 Q. Were you copied in on this correspondence?23 A. I am sure I was, yes. It would be clear from the top.24 Q. And were you in discussion with Mr Hoon as to how to25 handle the issue with the BBC at this stage?

141 A. Well, I mean, I think that the meeting had taken place2 on the 8th but then we had had this subsequent letter3 that -- and I really -- I think that we sort of felt4 that we reached a bit of an impasse on that, as you will5 see that Mr Sambrook there says that the position is6 unchanged, that their team "... genuinely believed they7 outlined some details of the allegation but do not have8 written notes to back that up [and] your team ...9 genuinely believe insufficient detail was given."10 Q. What was the purpose of the meeting on 8th July between11 Mr Hoon and Mr Sambrook?12 A. The point of the meeting was to sort of emphasise the

13 point and to show Mr Sambrook the log, the Ministry of14 Defence duty press officer log so that he could see --15 Q. Mr Hoon took that with him to the meeting, did he?16 A. Yes.17 Q. And he showed it to Mr Sambrook?18 A. Yes.19 Q. We know that Dr Kelly wrote to his line manager on20 30th June 2003 saying effectively he had spoken to21 Mr Gilligan on 22nd May. When did you first become22 aware that someone had come forward with this23 explanation?24 A. I first became aware of it in the late afternoon of25 Friday 4th July.

151 Q. And were you told Dr Kelly's name at that point?2 A. Yes, I was.3 Q. And who told you?4 A. Kate Wilson.5 Q. Had you heard any gossip on this point before this?6 A. No, none whatsoever. Kate had been called over to the7 permanent secretary's office earlier on that Friday and8 was informed of these events. I had been out at9 a seminar that morning otherwise I would have been the10 one to go rather than her. So it was when she came back11 from that meeting she relayed this information to me.

12 Q. And the permanent secretary's name is?13 A. Sir Kevin Tebbit.


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14 Q. And what exactly did the chief press officer tell you15 about this letter, that had come in from Dr Kelly?16 A. She told me that he had come forward and admitted that17 he had had an unauthorised contact with the media,18 namely with Andrew Gilligan, that the matter of19 45 minutes had cropped up, and also that Dr Kelly had

20 said that he had contact with -- over a number of21 years -- quite a broad range of journalists. There may22 have been some other details as well but those are the23 ones that stick in my mind, at the time.24 She also said that he had decided to come forward25 because a friend of his -- I think he thought that

161 friend was in RUSI at the time -- had recognised some of2 the comments that Andrew Gilligan had made to the FAC3 about the source as being the sort of comments that4 Dr Kelly himself might make.5 Q. Did she tell you that Dr Kelly, in his letter, had

6 denied saying to Mr Gilligan that the Government had7 sexed up the dossier?8 A. She certainly said to me that Dr Kelly felt he was not9 the source for the story.10 Q. Did the chief press officer tell you anything else11 about, for instance, how to handle this piece of12 information?13 A. She told me that during the discussions that had been14 had in the permanent secretary's office, all parties15 concerned were worried that this information might leak16 in some way, get into the public domain in some way over17 the weekend and that because of that a contingent press18 line had been agreed for use if it was required.

19 Q. And what was that contingent press line?20 A. I think the Inquiry has a copy of it, do you not?21 Q. If you look at page MoD/1/62, I wonder if you can help22 us and see if this is the right document?23 A. No, that is the Q and A material.24 Q. Sorry, MoD/1/51. Do you have that?25 LORD HUTTON: Sorry, 51?

171 MR KNOX: 51:2 "An individual working in the MoD has volunteered3 that he met with Andrew Gilligan on 22 May to discuss4 Iraq in general. This was one week before Gilligan's

5 story claiming that the Iraq dossier was 'sexed up'.6 The account of the meeting given by this official does7 not match the account given by Gilligan of his 'single8 source'."9 Is this the document?10 A. That is the document.11 Q. Do you know who drew this up?12 A. I understand that it was provided by Richard Hatfield13 and Martin Howard.14 Q. In the event, a press announcement to this effect was15 not made that evening, was it?16 A. No, the purpose of this statement was not to make an17 announcement. It was purely in case some of the story

18 got into the public domain. We would then have at least19 something to offer or something to say. It was not


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20 meant for proactive use.21 Q. Why did you not make an immediate announcement?22 A. Well, as I say, I was not privy to the meeting; but as23 I understand it, the feeling was that, you know, we did24 not really have enough facts. Dr Kelly had said very25 clearly that he did not believe himself to be the

181 source. There were a number of discrepancies; and2 I think really it was a bit too early to actually take3 a view on what to do.4 Q. Were any arrangements made on 4th July for a question5 and answer briefing?6 A. There was a very rough draft prepared but it was never7 pursued because we actually, Kate and I, in the press8 office did not have material on which to produce9 a comprehensive document.10 Q. Was that rough draft ever typed up?11 A. It was, but it had big gaps in it because we just did

12 not have the information. And it was never circulated13 for clearance.14 Q. I do not think it has been provided to the Inquiry.15 Does the document still exist somewhere?16 A. I am not sure whether the -- if you know what I mean --17 the original original does because I think it was built18 on -- it was an evolving, working document. It was not,19 as I say, anything that I felt was ready for use because20 it had not been cleared by anybody.21 Q. Do you think it would be possible, in due course, just22 to check whether the original draft as prepared on23 4th July is available?24 A. Yes, most certainly.

25 LORD HUTTON: Miss Teare, may I ask you, you said there was

191 concern that Dr Kelly's name might leak out.2 I appreciate you only came into this discussion after it3 was reported to you that the chief press officer had had4 a meeting with the PUS when you were away at a seminar.5 Are you able to say from what source or sources you6 thought the name might leak? Did you give that any7 thought? I appreciate you may not and there may have8 been the general feeling that the name might leak, but9 did you yourself give any thought to the possible source10 or sources from which the name might leak?

11 A. On Friday 4th?12 LORD HUTTON: Yes.13 A. I think it was a combination of things. The fact that14 a colleague had identified some of Dr Kelly's remarks --15 sorry, recognised from Mr Gilligan's evidence to the FAC16 some of Dr Kelly's remarks or thought they could be17 Dr Kelly's remarks. So already in the public domain18 there were people out there that were speculating.19 LORD HUTTON: Yes.20 A. And similarly because he had volunteered that he was21 a regular contact among quite a circle of journalists.22 So given that this was an issue of such, you know,23 political interest, then those were the sort of things

24 I had in mind as to be worried that it might leak.25 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you very much.


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201 MR KNOX: On Friday 4th July did you yourself tell anyone2 that Dr Kelly had come forward?3 A. No, I did not. I was given the information on the4 strict understanding it would go no further.

5 Q. We know on Saturday 5th July an article appeared in6 The Times which is at CAB/1/487. This is an article by7 Mr Baldwin, saying that sources from inside the BBC8 amongst other things are preparing to admit defeat.9 Now, just looking at this article were you aware of10 this article at the time it came out, that is on11 Saturday 5th July?12 A. Yes, I was.13 Q. And in your view at the time, did it make any difference14 to the position?15 A. In my view, at the time, it actually heightened my16 concerns that Dr Kelly's name could be emerging, because17 there are a number of pointers there that perhaps, you

18 know, it was just with a bit of knowledge that there19 appeared more pointers than -- to, you know, the average20 reader of The Times. It did heighten my concern that21 there was interest in the journalistic community in22 identifying Andrew Gilligan's source and that they might23 actually think it was Dr Kelly.24 Q. Was there anything in particular in this article which25 heightened that concern? Were there any particular

211 details that you thought made it more likely that2 Dr Kelly was going to be identified very soon?3 A. I think it was in relation to that he may be one of

4 a number of specialists helping search for WMD and the5 implication that he might be in Iraq.6 LORD HUTTON: But when you say that it heightened your7 concerns, now are you able to be a little more specific8 as to what underlay those concerns? I quite appreciate9 one speaks in general where you were concerned that the10 name would come up. Did you have any deeper concern or11 what did those concerns relate to or perhaps you did not12 pursue that particular line of thought. I quite13 appreciate you are using the term in quite a general14 way, I fully appreciate that.15 A. By concern I suppose perhaps I mean given this16 development, it had implications for needing to consider

17 how we would handle this whole issue.18 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you.19 MR KNOX: Can I put it this way: was there any fear on your20 part that Dr Kelly's name would come out because you did21 not want it to come out?22 A. Certainly my position over that weekend was that I hoped23 that any part of this subject would not come into the24 public domain, because I felt that we did not have25 sufficient information ready to handle it effectively

221 and the statement is very bald.2 Q. Effectively your concern was really a mechanical

3 concern, namely if the name came out then you, in the4 press office, would be in difficulties fielding


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5 questions?6 A. Yes, essentially, at that point, that was how I viewed7 it.8 Q. Do you know whether or not there were any particular9 lines of communication between No. 10 or No. 10 press10 office and Mr Baldwin who wrote this article?

11 A. I have no --12 Q. The reason I say it is because there have been13 suggestions in the press that there are particularly14 close links between Mr Campbell and Mr Baldwin. Do you15 know anything about that?16 A. I have no knowledge of that.17 Q. We know on 6th July the BBC made a press announcement18 which is at CAB/1/376.19 This is a statement by Gavyn Davies where he deals20 with both the Gilligan story and also the Susan Watts21 story. If you drop down to the ante-penultimate22 paragraph on 376 beginning:23 "We note that an entirely separate story was

24 broadcast by an unconnected BBC journalist on Newsnight25 on 2nd June. This story reported very similar

231 allegations to those reported by Andrew Gilligan on the2 Today Programme, but the story has not been singled out3 for similar criticism by Government spokesmen."4 Then, going over the page, you will note the final5 paragraph:6 "In summary, the governor is ultimately responsible7 for ensuring BBC upholds highest standards of8 impartiality and inaccuracy. We are wholly satisfied9 BBC journalists and their managers have sought to

10 maintain the impartiality and accuracy during this11 episode."12 Before you saw this announcement, had you yourself13 been aware of the Susan Watts piece on Newsnight?14 A. No, I do not think I had actually.15 Q. No-one presumably had therefore even discussed it with16 you in the press office before you saw this17 announcement?18 A. That is right. Again the position was on dealing with19 questions arising from the Andrew Gilligan report of20 28th May about the dossier, MoD was not the lead21 department. So as I say, I was away for the week it was22 broadcast and also the MoD press office was not in the

23 lead in dealing with that.24 Q. Did the reference to a story by an unconnected25 journalist on Newsnight on 2nd June, did that have any

241 significance at the time you saw this announcement on2 your part?3 A. It was something I asked -- I had a look at the4 transcript of it.5 Q. You had a look at the transcript of what?6 A. Sorry, the Susan Watts Newsnight broadcast on the Monday7 I think it was.8 Q. This was Sunday. So you come in on Monday and get hold

9 of a transcript of the Susan Watts broadcast?10 A. Yes.


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11 Q. Does anything occur to you as a result of that?12 A. It was a point I had in my mind, but when it did take on13 more significance was on Tuesday 8th when, for the first14 time, I actually read Dr Kelly's letter to Mr Wells of15 30th June and saw, from that, that he mentioned amongst16 other contacts with journalists that he had a regular

17 contact with Susan Watts.18 Q. And why did, then, that seem to be significant to you?19 A. It seemed to be significant to me, as I say, because the20 BBC had drawn attention to the fact that there were two21 reports on basically similar allegations; and here again22 Dr Kelly had indicated on the one hand with23 Andrew Gilligan he had definitely had a meeting with him24 and also pointed to a possible meeting with Susan Watts.25 So that was just something I noted.

251 Q. Did you mention this point to anyone on 8th July?2 A. Yes, I did. I mentioned it to the permanent secretary's

3 private secretary and --4 Q. Is that Mr Wilson?5 A. Yes, and I mentioned it, I think, to Martin Howard.6 Q. And did they say anything in response to that point?7 A. No, no, they just thought it was interesting as well.8 Q. Moving back now to 7th July. You come in on the morning9 of 7th July. Were you kept informed of current10 developments at all?11 A. During that day?12 Q. On 7th July.13 A. Yes I was.14 Q. What were you told in the morning?15 A. There was not a great deal in the morning. I recall

16 that I was told that over the weekend the permanent17 secretary had written round to Whitehall again, having18 seen the Times article and I cannot remember exactly19 what time it was, but I was also given an indication20 that Dr Kelly was going to be interviewed by21 Richard Hatfield and Martin Howard and Bryan Wells that22 afternoon.23 Q. Did you know, in fact, he had already had one interview?24 A. Yes, I did.25 Q. And what about the press announcement? Was anything

261 done to the proposed press announcement which you had

2 previously prepared on 4th July, just in case?3 A. Nothing was done to that during the day -- sort of4 morning/early afternoon. And in any case, you know,5 I had some other bits of my job to do. I mean I was not6 just working on this, I had other meetings and things to7 attend to.8 Later, after the interview with Dr Kelly, the second9 interview, the chief press officer and I reworked the10 original press statement to make it into a more11 proactive statement, something that we would offer.12 Q. Before I come to what the statement might have been,13 because I am not sure which of the various drafts it14 was, can I just ask you this: once you had redrafted the

15 press statement in a way that you and the chief press16 officer were happy, what did you then do with that draft


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17 press statement? Did you show it to anyone?18 A. No, I sent it to the private secretary to the permanent19 secretary.20 Q. Mr Wilson again?21 A. Yes.22 Q. Do you know whether that version was then sent over to

23 No. 10 or not?24 A. My understanding was that it had been sent over, yes.25 Q. And you gained that understanding from whom?

271 A. From Mr Wilson.2 Q. I was trying to identify the various drafts we have been3 given so far, I was trying to identify which version of4 the redraft yours might have been. Can I ask you to go5 to CAB/1/48. It might be that none of them are, but6 perhaps you can help us. CAB/1/48.7 Now, this is a handwritten note. I am not sure who8 it is actually handwritten by, but:

9 "FAO Wendy -- duty clerk No. 10, Peter Blake ...10 "Two draft statements attached. One based on the11 defensive lines prepared on Friday [that would be Friday12 4th July]. The other reflects further discussions today13 but requires further checking and represents a higher14 risk approach as we cannot be sure that he is Gilligan's15 single source.16 "Dominic Wilson, Private Secretary to17 Sir Kevin Tebbit".18 Have you seen this particular document before?19 A. No I have not.20 Q. Then, over the page at CAB/1/49 there appears to be21 version 1 which I take to be the rather lower risk

22 approach. Now, just take a look at this. I think you23 will see that the first three sentences are pretty much24 the same as the announcement you had drafted on the25 4th July.

281 A. I did not draft anything on the 4th July.2 Q. Sorry, the press statement that you and the chief press3 officer had put together as a possible statement.4 A. I think you mean the one that had been prepared by5 Richard Hatfield and Martin Howard.6 Q. I apologise, yes. You will then see about five lines7 down:

8 "The official has told us that he made no9 allegations ..."10 That appears to be a new entry. Are you able to say11 whether or not this is your version?12 A. No, that is not my version.13 Q. Right. And then over the page at CAB/1/50 is another14 version, version 2. You will see, at the top of the15 page, there is a fax marking which makes it look as16 though it was faxed over at 10.25 on 7th July. Do you17 recognise this draft at all?18 A. I recognise the draft itself without the amendments.19 I do not know who made those amendments.20 Q. If you leave the amendments alone, is that the draft

21 that you had redrafted on the 7th July?22 A. I believe it is. Could you just show me the whole


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23 document?24 Q. Yes.25 A. (Pause). Yes. That is the one that the chief press

291 officer and I drafted.

2 Q. It looks as if, although I might have to ask someone3 else, it looks as if you had in fact drafted what they4 regard as the higher risk draft and they began tampering5 with it later on that night.6 A. I cannot really comment on high risk because I would not7 necessarily have used that description myself.8 Q. Were you, yourself, copied in at all on for instance9 this version of the redraft or proposed version of the10 redraft with all these handwritten amendments?11 A. I do not think so. I do not recall seeing that; but12 certainly on the morning of the 8th I went over to the13 permanent secretary's office and there were comments14 received and a number of discussions about the draft.

15 I think the draft that was sort of used as the basis for16 going forward was the draft that I had originally come17 up with.18 Q. Are you able to help us with this: whose handwriting is19 this? Do you recognise it at all?20 A. I do not know.21 Q. If one then goes over to page 52 in the same bundle,22 again you will see a further draft.23 A. This is the note of the meeting with Richard Sambrook.24 Q. Sorry, CAB/1/52. Again you will see there seem to be25 some slightly different handwritten markings on this.

30

1 You do not have any idea whose these are?2 A. No I do not.3 Q. Just pausing on these documents here, you will see at4 the foot of the page in 52, as on page 50, this entry:5 "We assume that the Intelligence Service Committee6 will take this into account in their enquiry should they7 so wish."8 Is that in fact a misprint for Intelligence and9 Security Committee?10 A. Yes. I have to say I do not recall having that sentence11 in my original draft.12 Q. I was going to ask you about that.13 A. I think I am getting slightly confused about these

14 drafts because I was not really in a position to advise15 on appearance before committees. That is outside my16 remit really.17 Q. So in other words when the draft left your offices and18 the MoD on 7th July some time in the afternoon --19 A. I think it would have been early evening on the 7th.20 Q. -- we know they obviously do get across to No. 10, and21 people within No. 10 start making suggested alterations22 in hand.23 A. I cannot say whether those suggestions were made at24 No. 10 or elsewhere. I do not know.25 Q. Right. But one thing that appears -- can we take this

311 as read: the version you sent over, at least when it


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2 left your office, did not have this last paragraph:3 "We assume the Intelligence Service Committee will4 take this into account ..."?5 A. It is certainly not in my recollection. I could6 certainly check that, but I do not recall having that.7 Q. Had anyone made any suggestions therefore to you --

8 I take it one can draw this inference: no-one had9 suggested to you, when you were drawing up the revised10 press statement on 7th July, that you should mention11 anything about the ISC?12 A. No. But then I had not really been involved in very13 extensive discussions during the day on that. I had14 not -- you know, I had not been to any meetings to15 discuss developments. I had just been kept informed16 over the telephone.17 Q. Were you informed of this, that it was obviously very18 important that the press announcement was drafted in19 such a way as to make it clear that the man who had come20 forward could not possibly have told Mr Gilligan what he

21 was said to have told him because he simply was not in22 a position to know? Was that one of the things that was23 emphasised to you at all?24 A. I mean, no-one sort of gave me instructions in the sort25 of precise terms that you were suggesting when

321 I redrafted the press notice. The reason that I was2 redrafting it on the 7th was essentially because it had3 been reactive before, because it had been held for use4 in case asked after the weekend.5 I felt that the chances were that we would actually6 have to offer something ourselves and therefore the

7 style of it needed to be changed and it needed to8 provide a bit more detail to show this actually was9 a substantive development, whilst at the same time10 making it clear that the individual himself who had come11 forward did not believe he was the source and we were12 not in a position to judge.13 Q. Can I ask you to look at CAB/1/227? This is part of14 a press briefing given by the Prime Minister's official15 spokesman on 10th July. At page 227 you will see the16 second paragraph down. You will see the paragraph17 beginning:18 "Asked if it was possible that the source had lied19 to the Government about what he had said to Mr Gilligan,

20 the Prime Minister's official spokesman said that the21 question that mattered was whether this person was in22 a position to have made the judgments he was reported to23 have made in the light of the fact that we knew he was24 not a senior intelligence source. Asked if our main25 bone of contention was really the seniority or otherwise

331 of the person, the official spokesman said that it was2 the issue which went right to the very heart of this3 matter."4 The point he seems to be making there is: it is5 obviously critical this man could not possibly have told

6 Mr Gilligan what Mr Gilligan says because he just was7 not in a position to know and that is a critical part of


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8 this announcement. That is what he appears to be saying9 there.10 Now, going back to CAB/1/52, when you are drafting11 this announcement -- I know it is not exactly in the12 same form as you drafted because you do not recall13 drafting that last paragraph. Look at the third

14 paragraph down:15 "The individual was not 'one of the senior officials16 in charge of drawing up the dossier' as Mr Gilligan17 claimed his source was in his evidence to the FAC. Nor18 is he a member of the intelligence services."19 Then this word:20 "Crucially, although Mr Gilligan raised the issue of21 Alastair Campbell, since the individual was not involved22 in the process he did not comment. He says he made no23 allegations or accusations about any issue related to24 the dossier, in particular that the 45 minutes25 intelligence had been inserted by Mr Campbell or

341 Downing Street against the wishes of the intelligence2 community."3 Presumably, when you drew up this draft you did so4 on the basis of information that was being supplied to5 you by others?6 A. Yes. I mean, I had -- as I say, I had read Dr Kelly's7 letter -- no, I had not read Dr Kelly's letter of the8 30th.9 Q. Not at this stage.10 A. Not at this stage, no. But I had had discussions11 that -- because I think what I was attempting to do in12 this statement was to say that here is someone who has

13 come forward voluntarily. They did admit discussing14 these issues of public concern, but there were a number15 of discrepancies.16 Q. Yes, but obviously looking at the paragraph which I have17 just read out, someone -- you, I take it, accept you18 drafted something along these lines?19 A. Hmm, hmm.20 Q. What I am putting to you is someone must have obviously21 told you information to this effect.22 A. Yes, I mean since Friday 4th, that afternoon, during --23 well not over the weekend, but on Monday 7th certainly24 I had discussions where I found out more about what had25 been claimed; and I think I would have discovered that

351 mainly from the permanent secretary's office.2 Q. You see this is not just a piece of information. This3 is really a bit of an argument, is it not? Presumably4 someone really told you to put this argument in this5 statement?6 A. I mean, I do not really see it in terms of an argument.7 As I say, I saw it in terms of there were several key8 points that Andrew Gilligan had made in relation to his9 single source. If we were to put a statement out, which10 I felt we would be obliged to, about the development11 within the department that an official had voluntarily

12 come forward to say he had a conversation with13 Andrew Gilligan on these matters, then the obvious


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14 questions that were going to be put to us were really15 whether you think the official is the source or not, and16 to be able to discuss that, it was necessary to flag up17 where there were similarities and where there were18 discrepancies.19 Q. Can I ask you this: who supplied the information to you

20 on the basis of which this draft was drawn up?21 A. I would have got the information from a number of22 sources. I was getting more information from23 Kate Wilson about, you know, the meeting she had had on24 the 4th. Also I would have had information from the25 permanent secretary's office. But it was certainly

361 within the department.2 Q. So in other words you did not speak to Mr Hatfield when3 you drafted this?4 A. I do not recall that I did, no.5 Q. Or Mr Howard?

6 A. I may possibly have spoken to him, but I cannot recall7 for certain.8 Q. Once you drafted it, did you pass it by anyone to get9 their approval before sending it to Mr Wilson?10 A. No, I did not, because it was quite late at night and11 I think it was certainly recognised that this was by no12 means a sort of final draft.13 Q. It certainly seems to have been recognised somewhere14 else.15 A. Obviously a lot of people felt similarly. But this was16 really taking the opportunity to provide a sort of17 redraft, if you like, given that my view was that we18 were moving from using the statement that was, if you

19 like, passive, in response to questions, to actually20 moving to the fact that you would be obliged to make21 a statement, to offer a statement. And the two are in22 different forms accordingly.23 Q. Moving to 8th July, which is Tuesday, did you do24 anything in the morning in relation to this press25 announcement or these issues that it gave rise to?

371 A. During the morning of the 8th I was called over to the2 permanent secretary's office and there I had a number of3 discussions about the draft statement itself.4 Q. With whom?

5 A. With Martin Howard, with the permanent secretary's6 private secretary because the permanent secretary was7 out on a visit that morning, and with two people from8 No. 10 press office.9 Q. And who were they?10 A. Godric Smith and Tom Kelly.11 LORD HUTTON: Just before we proceed Ms Teare, these draft12 statements we have been looking at refer to "an13 individual working in the MoD", they do not refer to14 Dr Kelly by name; and you have told us that you were15 given Dr Kelly's name in confidence. Now, can you just16 say, it is probably obvious, but why the reference was17 to "an individual working in the MoD" rather than naming

18 Dr Kelly?19 A. I think, at that point, the issue of whether Dr Kelly


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20 should be named in the statement or not had not been21 fully discussed; and certainly I was working on the22 basis, at that time, that that was how he would be23 referred to in a public statement, though I know from24 papers that I have seen subsequently that the permanent25 secretary did ask the officials who interviewed Dr Kelly

381 for a second time that they might actually discuss with2 him the idea that he might be named in the statement.3 LORD HUTTON: Yes.4 A. But as I understand it, that discussion did not go very5 far.6 LORD HUTTON: Yes. But would it be right to infer that the7 reason why Dr Kelly was not named in the drafts we have8 been looking at was because you had been told his name9 in confidence?10 A. I had, at that point, yes.11 LORD HUTTON: Yes.

12 A. And I had not pursued the idea of introducing the name13 into the statement.14 LORD HUTTON: No. Yes, thank you. Yes.15 MR KNOX: It was in this conversation, presumably, on16 8th July, in this meeting you had with, I think,17 Mr Wilson, Mr Kelly, Mr Smith, and Mr Howard, is that18 right, in the morning of 8th July?19 A. It was not a sort of formal meeting; and the20 conversations I had with those from No. 10 were on the21 telephone.22 Q. I see.23 A. And I was actually sitting in the permanent secretary's24 outer office. This all sounds rather unusual but the

25 reason for that is that my own office is not in the same

391 building as the permanent secretary's and the2 Minister's. As this whole subject matter was being3 dealt with on a very tight basis in terms of those who4 knew about it, the simplest thing really was for me to5 go over there. So I was sitting in the permanent6 secretary's outer office, Richard Hatfield came in at7 one point and Martin Howard came in on a couple of8 occasions, one longer time, one shorter time.9 Q. It was in the course of this meeting that you pointed10 out the point about Ms Watts?

11 A. I pointed out the point about Ms Watts as soon as I read12 Dr Kelly's letter of 30th June.13 Q. What else did you discuss in this meeting?14 A. Well, as I say, it was not one formal meeting. It was15 a sort of series of ad hoc discussions.16 Q. What was the gist of those ad hoc discussions?17 A. Well, some of them were suggested amendments to the18 press statement; and the longer discussion I had with19 Martin Howard was I was concerned that we did not really20 have any -- as it was seeming likely that we were going21 to make a statement either that day or the day after,22 but fairly imminently, that we did not have any Q and A23 material that would provide support to that statement.

24 So Martin Howard and I actually sat down and discussed25 the content of that material and I typed it up.


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401 Q. Before I come on to the Q and A material, were you2 yourself involved in any of the revised drafts of the3 press statement that was eventually made?4 A. I mean, I had some comments that were suggested, which

5 I do not actually recall sort of typing up as a sort of6 finished product; but I know that the permanent7 secretary on his return from Portsmouth then went over8 to No. 10 for a meeting.9 Q. Were any drafts put before your eyes on 8th July?10 A. There was the draft we discussed and finalised when the11 permanent secretary came back from No. 10.12 Q. So in other words you saw the final version before it13 went out?14 A. Yes. When the permanent secretary came back from No. 1015 we discussed the draft in the light of those discussions16 and we finalised it.17 Q. Yes. If I can just ask you to look at CAB/1/54 just to

18 confirm whether or not you saw any of these other drafts19 because there are quite a few of them. I am not going20 to ask you to read them all in detail. At CAB/1/5421 there is an e-mail from Godric Smith, one of the22 official spokesmen at No. 10, to it may be Mr Wilson,23 I imagine?24 A. Yes, it is.25 Q. A revised version 2. Going over the page, one then

411 sees, I take it, the revised version 2. It looks quite2 like, I think, the version you had previously drafted.3 Do you remember seeing this at all on 8th July?

4 A. Yes, I think I did.5 Q. Who showed it to you?6 A. It would have been Mr Wilson.7 Q. And did you make any comments on it?8 A. None in particular. I mean, I suppose I would have9 tried to get something in on the ISC, but that was not10 really my area of specialism.11 Q. When you say you would have tried to get something in on12 the ISC, what do you mean?13 A. I am not being very articulate. The last paragraph14 there says something about the ISC. I would probably15 have attempted to get a slightly different form of words16 to that.

17 Q. Obviously. You yourself were not involved in redrafting18 anything about the ISC on that day?19 A. No.20 Q. Then page 56 there seems to be a rather longer version21 apparently, according to the writing at the top, saved22 on Godric Smith's machine at 4.35 in the afternoon but23 created at 12.35.24 Do you remember being shown this at all?25 A. (Pause). I mean, this looks remarkably similar to

421 the -- well, in parts, similar to the final. It is not2 totally the same.

3 Q. Were you shown this or asked to comment on this version4 at all?


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5 A. (Pause). I cannot say for sure. I mean, there were6 a number of drafts that, you know, have small7 differences in them. I am afraid I cannot actually8 recall how many drafts I was shown on the day and which9 individual ones were. But I was conscious that there10 was a fair amount of traffic on the changes to the

11 statement.12 Q. Can you remember, in broad terms, what the concerns13 being expressed to you were about the various drafts?14 A. I can remember that Godric Smith raised with me the15 point that is contained in the last paragraph.16 Q. This is at CAB/1/56?17 A. Yes, the one that is on screen currently.18 Q. He raised concerns with you about that last paragraph,19 that is:20 "We do not know that this official is the single21 source quoted by Mr Gilligan."22 A. It was more about bringing in the point that23 Mr Gilligan -- you know, we know that Mr Gilligan had

24 told the FAC he had only one source for his story and25 that three other sources mentioned to the FAC did not

431 talk to him about the September dossier. We know that2 he was interested in that point.3 Q. What, he was concerned about that?4 A. I do not he was concerned. I think he was saying that5 was something worth having in the statement.6 Q. And did you, yourself, express any concerns about7 anything that appeared in the final draft of the press8 statement or were you happy with it?9 A. I was happy with the final draft.

10 Q. You have mentioned the questions and answers that were11 drafted. Can I ask you to look at MoD/1/62? These have12 been disclosed by the Ministry of Defence. You will13 see, at the top "Q and A. Who is the official?" These14 questions and answers continue for about four pages15 until we get to MoD/1/65. There is no need to go to16 that for a moment.17 Are these the questions and answers you were18 involved in drafting on 8th July?19 A. Yes.20 Q. Can I ask you to go about five lines down on MoD/1/62.21 "Question and answer.22 "Who is the official?

23 "The official works in MoD.24 "What is his name and current post?25 "We wouldn't normally volunteer a name.

441 "If the correct name is given, we can confirm it and2 say that he is senior adviser to the Proliferation and3 Arms Control Secretariat."4 I was interested by the underlining "if the correct5 name is given". Was that in the original draft6 questions and answers that were drafted on 8th July?7 A. No, I do not believe it was.8 Q. Is that why it appears in an underlined form in this

9 eventual document we have here?10 A. No, it is not. The position with the Q and A as drafted


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11 on the night of 4th July was that it was fairly -- well,12 to say that it was green was the understatement. It was13 drafted by myself and Kate Wilson who by no means had14 all the facts, hence there were big gaps in it. And it15 was also drafted with a fear in mind that Dr Kelly's16 letter of 30th June might have leaked. So it was

17 nothing approaching the Q and A material that was18 eventually produced when I had more of the information,19 which is this one.20 The reason that that section "if the correct name is21 given" is underlined is making the point that it would22 only be under those circumstances that we would be23 prepared to confirm the name.24 Q. I understand that the question and answers you drafted25 on the 4th did not contain this suggestion; but what

451 about the first draft of the questions and answers you2 drafted on 8th July? Did they have this suggestion as

3 well or did this suggestion come later on on 8th July?4 A. No, the sort of attempt at -- not attempt but the first5 sort of drawing together of all the information happened6 at lunchtime on 8th July when I ran through the7 questions and the answers that were to be given with8 Martin Howard. That was sort of like the first time9 properly pulling together all the information that we10 had and then that section was included therein.11 Q. So you have a meeting with Martin Howard and the two of12 you agree on the questions and answers. Did you take13 handwritten notes and then subsequently type those14 handwritten notes up on to a computer or did you have15 a computer with you at the time?

16 A. No, I subsequently typed them up.17 Q. So you have some handwritten notes from which you typed18 these up?19 A. Well, I had.20 Q. You had them?21 A. Yes, I did.22 Q. And I take it, therefore, that it was Mr Howard who23 suggested to you this answer:24 "If the correct name is given, we can confirm it and25 say he is senior adviser ...", is that right?

461 A. I would not say it was Mr Howard's suggestion. We had

2 formed a view -- I think there was a consensus amongst3 those closely involved in this issue in the department,4 really from the beginning, on two points: really that5 ultimately the MoD would have to make a public6 statement, would have to offer a public statement and7 that, secondly, Dr Kelly's name was likely to come into8 the public domain. If that is the case, which we9 believed it to be, we had to agree an approach whereby10 we could handle that situation.11 LORD HUTTON: Ms Teare, may I just ask you before we go on12 to consider the sentence "if the correct name is given"13 when the answer is given there, "we wouldn't normally14 volunteer a name". Would you just like to comment on

15 that? I mean, is that the general policy of the16 Ministry of Defence, that if a question is asked about


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17 an official, that normally his name would not be given18 to the press or to the media?19 A. The position on giving out the names of civil servants20 is not subject to any official guidelines within the21 Ministry of Defence and essentially it would be viewed22 on a case by case basis. We would not gratuitously

23 reveal the name of a civil servant; but, by the same24 token, there is no absolute presumption that a name25 cannot be revealed particularly if it is linked to

471 important events. So we do not have any firm guidelines2 and we have to look at each case both in the3 circumstances that emerge and as those circumstances4 continue to evolve.5 LORD HUTTON: Yes. But the answer is: "We wouldn't normally6 volunteer a name." Is that a correct statement as7 regards the generality of the approach?8 A. I think there was a -- as it makes clear, we would not

9 normally volunteer a name, offer a name, because, in the10 majority of circumstances, the names of civil servants11 are -- you know, they are not normally the issue.12 LORD HUTTON: Yes.13 A. But that is why I say in terms of the naming of14 officials there are no clear or firm or official15 guidelines. It is decided on a case by case basis and16 it is an aspect on which the press office would take17 advice from the department.18 LORD HUTTON: Yes, thank you.19 MR KNOX: When it says, "If the correct name is given, we20 can confirm it ...", presumably someone suggested to you21 that that is what you would be able to do; is that

22 right? It was not, in other words, totally your own23 idea that you did not get any approval for?24 A. Oh no, I had approval for this. I mean the standard --25 Q. Can I pause there for a moment. Who then gave you the

481 approval to adopt this strategy?2 A. This approach was contained in the Q and A which was3 approved by Martin Howard and by the permanent4 secretary.5 Q. This approval was given on 8th July, is that right?6 A. Yes.7 LORD HUTTON: You say it was approved by them but I think

8 Mr Knox was suggesting to you that someone had suggested9 that that is the answer or that was the guidance that10 should be given. It did not, presumably, just come from11 you. Someone must have suggested to you, or did they?12 A. We had discussed the whole issue of handling the name;13 and essentially Martin and I had -- and essentially14 there were two issues. One, that it was possible that15 Dr Kelly's name would emerge; and the second issue was16 that during that process or at the same time as or even17 before, there were a group of other individuals who had18 similar backgrounds to him who might be identified19 incorrectly and on whom the media spotlight would fall,20 and in a case related to this particular issue, that

21 spotlight would be very strong. We agreed therefore22 that we were not prepared to have that situation, that


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23 it would be unfair on others.24 LORD HUTTON: Yes.25 A. So accordingly, if you decide on that policy that you

491 cannot have a situation whereby people are wrongly

2 identified and subjected to a lot of attention from the3 media, it follows, therefore, that if an incorrect name4 is put to you, that you will have to reject it.5 MR KNOX: Is not all this a bit of a charade though, because6 as soon as you make it plain to the press: give me the7 right name and I will tell you if you have the right8 answer, you are doing effectively exactly the same thing9 by an incorrect means as what you could do directly and10 just give the name out?11 A. No, I think we had -- you know, we had not had12 Dr Kelly -- the idea of Dr Kelly's name being made13 public had not been discussed with him. The time that14 you would have had to consider it, between when he was

15 consulted about the final version of this statement and16 when it went out, would have been insufficient for him17 to consider it properly and to make what other18 arrangements he needed.19 One of the purposes for saying to people that we20 would be prepared to confirm the right name was going21 back to what I have originally said, which was that we22 were seeking to avoid the people who were not involved23 being named in the media, and the only way we could seek24 to do that was to make it clear to journalists we would25 correct wrong names so they did not get into the public

50

1 domain.2 Q. Did you tell Dr Kelly as far as you were aware you would3 be adopting this strategy, namely confirming to4 journalists his name if they managed to come up with it?5 A. I did not speak to Dr Kelly at any point.6 Q. Do you have any reason to suppose he was told this?7 A. He was certainly told on more than one occasion, as8 I understand, that his name was likely to come into the9 public domain.10 Q. I know, but was he told that this strategy would be11 adopted by the MoD press office?12 A. Not to my knowledge.13 LORD HUTTON: I should make it clear perhaps to the press

14 that if I put certain questions to you that it does not15 mean at all I have reached any conclusion on the point.16 I have to consider a number of possibilities.17 I understand your reasoning in saying if a number of18 names are considered and they are not the correct names,19 the spotlight would fall unfairly on them; and therefore20 the thinking was: well, to avoid that, if we are given21 names which are incorrect, we will say so. But another22 way of looking at it is that if you adopt that approach,23 when the press do learn the correct name the spotlight24 falls very fiercely indeed on that particular person.25 Let us say you have six people whose names are being

511 discussed in the press. People will then realise that


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2 certainly it is very general speculation and the3 individuals named may well not be the correct people at4 all. Certainly there is no particular person who would5 be regarded necessarily as being the actual civil6 servant concerned. But did you give any consideration7 to the fact that by permitting Dr Kelly's name to come

8 out, he would be subjected to very intense media9 speculation?10 A. Yes, I mean, there are two points I would like to make.11 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Certainly.12 A. The first is that whilst you might suggest that if13 a number of names are bandied around they would not be14 subjected to a great deal of media interest and15 concentration, I think because the profile of this16 subject was so large, I think actually that it would17 have had a lot of media attention, which would have been18 most unhelpful and most unfair.19 The second point is, though, that we were certainly20 concerned for Dr Kelly. It is not as if, you know, we

21 agreed this approach just because it was purely the best22 way to avoid other people being named, and accordingly,23 as I say, he had been made aware on two occasions that24 we were likely to have to make a statement, his name25 would come into the public domain.

521 On the evening of the 8th July, Dr Kelly was rung by2 the chief press officer to alert him to the level of3 media interest that had arisen following the issue of4 our statement, to make sure that she had -- or rather he5 had her contact number, made clear she was available to6 offer advice 24 hours a day, and also to suggest to him

7 he might wish to consider staying with friends.8 So we were very mindful of that, and for the reasons9 I have given why we did not think it was fair the media10 spotlight would fall on others, we were aware that11 spotlight would be heavy and he would need guidance on12 how to deal with that.13 LORD HUTTON: Yes.14 MR KNOX: Ms Teare, you said that earlier on, I think this15 was on 7th July in the evening, you knew from the papers16 you had seen that the permanent secretary did ask17 officials who interviewed Dr Kelly that they might18 actually discuss with him the idea that he might be19 named in the statement, but, as I understand it, that

20 discussion did not get very far; in other words, the21 discussion about naming Dr Kelly did not go very far.22 Did you understand, therefore, that Dr Kelly did not23 want to be named in the statement?24 A. I did not draw any conclusion from that. The conclusion25 I drew was that this was a specific area that had not

531 actually been explored.2 Q. Well, putting it more generally: you were one of the3 people involved in the drafting of the statement and4 that statement left out his name. Was it not your5 understanding, therefore, that he did not want to be

6 named in the statement?7 A. No, that was not my understanding.


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8 Q. So no-one said anything to you about that?9 A. No, definitely not.10 Q. And you did not ask?11 A. What I had asked was to ensure that Dr Kelly had been12 alerted to the fact that we would need to make13 a statement and had also been alerted to the fact that

14 his name could become public, and, as I understood it,15 he had acknowledged that.16 Q. Now, did No. 10 Downing Street assist in the drafting of17 the Q and A material?18 A. No, they did not.19 Q. Could I just ask you to go to CAB/1/59. This is an20 e-mail from Jonathan Powell to Clare Sumner and21 John Scarlett:22 "I have put the answers in italics. Most of these23 are for the MoD. I am not sure these are the right24 questions. Godric [it must be Smith) and Tom [Kelly,25 I think] may be able to think of better questions."

541 Then you will see the e-mail attachment at CAB/1/60.2 You will see the heading:3 "Most of these will need to be answered by the MoD."4 There are a series of questions which are then set5 out. Were you shown any of these questions or any6 questions and answers along these lines?7 A. No, I have not seen that document.8 Q. So you have no idea what this is about?9 A. No.10 Q. Before the press statement went out, did you have any11 discussions with anyone else except Mr Howard? You12 mentioned having discussions with Mr Howard on 8th July.

13 Did you discuss the matter with anyone else, the press14 statement itself?15 A. About the statement itself?16 Q. Yes.17 A. No, other than those I have already mentioned.18 Q. Did you discuss the questions and answers with19 Mr Tebbit?20 A. Yes.21 Q. Did he approve them?22 A. Yes.23 Q. Did he make any suggestions on them as far as you are24 aware?25 A. When he returned from No. 10 we did sort of -- we spent

551 most of the remaining time I was there discussing the2 statement and just sort of tweaking it. But he did3 actually read the full Q and A and was content with it.4 Q. And do you know if the final version of the statement5 was cleared with Dr Kelly, as far as you are aware?6 A. I was told that it was cleared with him by7 Richard Hatfield.8 Q. At what time was the press statement released?9 A. It was released about a quarter to 6 that evening,10 something like that, just before 6.11 Q. I think one can see it at MoD/1/67. Is this the

12 announcement?13 A. Yes.


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14 Q. What was the media response to that announcement?15 A. After it was issued then there were a lot of media calls16 received on it.17 LORD HUTTON: I beg your pardon, after it was issued?18 A. We received a lot of media calls about it.19 MR KNOX: And when?

20 A. Immediately.21 Q. Immediately. And did you yourself take any of those22 calls?23 A. Yes, I did.24 Q. And what did you tell journalists when they rang you up?25 A. Well, I mean, obviously some of them rang about

561 different aspects. They were --2 LORD HUTTON: I realise that perhaps we should give the3 stenographers a break.4 (11.55 am)5 (Short Break)

6 (12.00 pm)7 LORD HUTTON: Yes, Mr Knox.8 MR KNOX: Ms Teare, we were just discussing the statement9 and the press reaction to it. Before we move on to10 9th July, do you know if Dr Kelly was contacted at all11 in the evening of 8th July about this announcement?12 A. Yes, as I have already explained, the chief press13 officer contacted him to make him aware of the level of14 media interest, to make sure he could have a mobile15 number to contact her at any time if he wanted advice16 and also to suggest to him that it might be wise to17 think about alternative accommodation.18 Q. And do you know if he called back at all that evening or

19 not?20 A. As I understand it, she contacted him. He said that he21 was out at the time and could she call back in about22 15 minutes. So she did that. She advised him of the23 situation. He said he was still out and did not have24 anything to write with but he did have the duty press25 officer's number and therefore knew he would be able to

571 contact her through there.2 Q. It appears that the BBC was given advance notice of this3 press announcement in a letter from Mr Hoon to Mr Davies4 I think on 8th July.

5 A. I think the timing was sort of pretty simultaneous.6 I do not know the exact time it went to the BBC,7 attached to the Secretary of State's letter, but it was8 probably only 15 or 20 minutes either side.9 Q. I think one can see that at page 66 of MoD/1. Do you10 see that?11 A. Yes, I do.12 Q. Do you know why it was decided to send this letter to13 Mr Davies at this time?14 A. I do not recall actually being consulted about the15 letter itself. But I knew it was happening, and that is16 all really.17 Q. On 9th July, were there any further discussions about

18 how you should handle the matter?19 A. During the Monday -- during the morning of 9th July,


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20 this was after -- two things really: after we had issued21 our initial statement on the 8th the BBC had issued22 a statement saying that the source for Andrew Gilligan's23 story did not work in the BBC and that Andrew Gilligan24 had known him for some years rather than some months and25 also that they, the BBC, did not know whether the MoD

581 official, unnamed, was Andrew Gilligan's source.2 So that was the sort of statement that they had3 issued. And the other thing that had happened was that4 the BBC had replied to the Secretary of State's letter5 saying that they were not prepared to confirm or deny6 the name if it was put to them. So --7 Q. Were you involved in any discussions about what you8 should then do because of that?9 A. So in the light of those two events, discussions took10 place on the morning of the 9th. I had my normal sort11 of 9.15 meeting with the Secretary of State on Wednesday

12 morning. It is always pencilled into the diary for just13 a quarter of an hour, so it is a brief meeting. So we14 discussed there how we might follow up this position15 with the BBC; and then during the course of the morning16 I discussed it further with Alastair Campbell and17 Tom Kelly and the Secretary of State's private office.18 Q. What did you decide to do, in the light of these19 discussions?20 A. Well, there were sort of two basic propositions. One:21 whether we should send a further letter asking them to22 reconsider; or whether we should immediately send23 a letter that actually gave them the name. Because our24 objective in all of this was to clear the issue up. So

25 eventually the Secretary of State wrote sending them the

591 name.2 Q. I think that is at MoD/1/71. Is that the letter that3 was sent?4 A. Yes.5 Q. And I think you said the point of this letter was to6 clear everything up. Could you clarify that a little?7 A. Yes. The point was if it was indeed the case that8 Dr Kelly was not Andrew Gilligan's source then, as far9 as both he and the MoD were concerned, you know, that10 particular matter would be sorted out. You know, would

11 be cleared up.12 Q. Do you mean by that that it would no longer be necessary13 to name Dr Kelly?14 A. Well, we had no approach that was designed to name15 Dr Kelly.16 Q. So you would have continued regardless to confirm the17 right name if it was put, even if the BBC had said it is18 not the same man?19 A. I think we may well have -- well, actually you are20 asking me to speculate on a situation on which I have21 taken a lot of advice so it is difficult for me to say22 straightaway because I had not really thought down that23 line before.

24 Q. So no-one really considered what would happen if the BBC25 wrote back saying the man was not Dr Kelly?


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601 A. Other than that we knew that this particular --2 I suspect what would have happened was that when that3 had been confirmed publicly, we would not have taken any4 more questions in relation to our statement. You know,

5 we would have said that we consider the matter now6 closed.7 Q. So one can put it this way: because the BBC did not8 reply one way or the other to this letter, you continued9 to take calls and eventually you gave the name out when10 the right name was put to you?11 A. Yes, if you want to look at it in that way.12 Q. Now, what about these calls from journalists?13 Presumably you took some calls on this day as well?14 A. I do not recall taking many at all actually. I did not15 take any in the morning because really I was caught up16 in the discussions on the follow-up letter to the BBC.17 Q. Are you able to give an idea as to how many calls were

18 coming through to the MoD press office on this day, on19 this point?20 A. Well, the press office was receiving quite a number of21 calls, not just about the name but on sort of other22 aspects relating to the whole issue. I mean, I could23 not tell you exactly how many. My office is down the24 other end of the corridor from the press office. But25 I know that they did receive quite a considerable

611 number, certainly in double figures, well into double2 figures.3 Q. Did someone eventually come forward with Dr Kelly's

4 name?5 A. Yes.6 Q. Who was that?7 A. That was the Financial Times.8 Q. Who was the name of the journalist?9 A. Chris Adams.10 Q. Who did he speak to?11 A. He spoke to me.12 Q. When he put the name forward, what did you say to him?13 A. I just confirmed that as being the correct name. It was14 a very brief conversation.15 Q. And roughly what time of day was that?16 A. It was around 5.30 in the afternoon, certainly no

17 earlier than that.18 Q. Did you have any reason to suppose that he had received19 that name from someone else as well or if anyone else20 had received the name around the same time?21 A. How do you mean?22 Q. Well, you have mentioned Chris Adams got the name at23 about 5.30. Do you know if anyone else managed to get24 the name as well?25 A. As I understand it, The Guardian put the correct name to

621 the duty press officer fairly soon afterwards. I mean,2 I do not know how soon, but probably within half an

3 hour, something like that.4 Q. What about other newspapers, did they all eventually


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5 manage to get the same name on that day?6 A. I know that the Daily Mail put the right name to the7 duty press officer later in the evening, and The Times8 and The Telegraph put the correct name to the chief9 press officer.10 LORD HUTTON: But did Mr Adams of the Financial Times give

11 you any indication as to how he had come to suggest12 Dr Kelly's name to you?13 A. No, he did not.14 MR KNOX: Were you given any wrong names?15 A. I know the press office were given a number of wrong16 names, yes. And I also know that, as I have said17 previously, the media -- one particular newspaper had18 contacted an official who was not the unnamed official,19 both rung him at home and sent a journalist to his20 house. So there was a lot of activity both in names21 being put to us and wrong people being identified.22 Q. Do you know if there was anyone outside the press office23 who also confirmed Dr Kelly's name to the press?

24 A. I did not know on the day but I learnt subsequently that25 someone else within the department had confirmed the

631 name.2 Q. So someone else in the department. Who was that person3 in the department who confirmed the name?4 A. It was the special adviser to Geoff Hoon.5 Q. And the name of that person is?6 A. Is Richard Taylor.7 Q. Can I ask you to look at MoD/1/62?8 A. I should just say at that point he told me of this some9 days after it had taken place, but it was clear to me,

10 from that conversation, that he had confirmed it at11 a very similar time to when I had confirmed it.12 LORD HUTTON: That is confirmed it to a member of the press?13 A. Sorry?14 LORD HUTTON: Mr Richard Taylor had confirmed the name to15 a member of the press?16 A. Yes.17 LORD HUTTON: Yes, I see, thank you.18 MR KNOX: Can I ask you to look at MoD/1/62. While you were19 fielding all these calls from the press you, presumably,20 were acting along the general lines set out in this21 Q and A, is that right?22 A. Yes.

23 Q. You will see at page 62, in the paragraph after "If the24 correct name is given, we can confirm it ..." and so25 forth, you will see another question:

641 "How long has he been in MoD?2 "He has been in his current position for 3 to 43 years. Before that he was a member of UNSCOM.4 "Did the official play any part in drawing up the5 dossier?6 "He was involved in providing historical details..."7 Under the heading "Is he in Iraq?"8 "No, though he visited Iraq recently for a week."

9 Would you have been giving out this type of10 information to journalists as they had been ringing in?


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11 A. If they had asked those specific questions we would have12 done. We were not sort of taking all the material given13 there as answers and delivering it to each caller. It14 just depended what the journalist was seeking to find15 out about, because, I mean, the purpose of a Q and A,16 which is standard practice to prepare one in support of

17 any statement, is really to try to anticipate the18 questions which journalists can legitimately ask,19 matters of fact they can legitimately ask and supply the20 answers, if it is deemed appropriate, so that press21 officers, you know, can field calls.22 Q. What it might look like is you are just providing more23 and more hints to who this man is and therefore it gets24 progressively easier to the press to guess his name,25 does it not?

651 A. Well, my assessment was there were a number of questions2 which journalists -- as I say, factual questions which

3 journalists could legitimately ask. For example, in our4 statement we say that he was not a senior official in5 charge of drawing up the dossier. So it is perfectly6 reasonable for a journalist to say: but did he play any7 part in drawing up the dossier? Hence you have the8 question supplied there that says: he provided9 historical details. I think that is a reasonable10 question.11 Q. It may be a reasonable question, but what I do not12 follow at the moment is why do you not just say: I am13 not prepared to tell you.14 A. I do not see why there was a problem there, as I say,15 having said in the statement he was not a senior

16 official in charge of drawing up the dossier.17 Q. What I think might look strange is obviously you decide18 not to name him outright but you give all these clues19 and it is inevitable, is it not, once you have given all20 these clues, the press are going to get the right name21 if you have told them "I will confirm it"?22 A. As I say, I do not accept this material was offered on23 the basis of it offering clues. There are several other24 points I would make. One is if, as you seem to be25 trying to suggest or others may suggest, all we were

661 doing was planting lots of hints about the real identity

2 of the unnamed official, then it is surprising on the3 other hand that (a) it took journalists 24 hours at4 least to work it out and (b) that they were ringing,5 putting quite a large number of names to us. So those6 two things seem to be slightly contradictory.7 Q. It might be thought you did not want to be thought to be8 seen naming him directly, is that right?9 A. No, I do not accept that. As I say, we had taken10 a decision that he would not be named in the statement11 and therefore we were not -- you know, we were not12 offering anything more that would seek to undermine that13 decision, I can assure you.14 Q. Can I just ask you, very briefly: after 9th July, did

15 you give any more briefings to the press on the Dr Kelly16 matter?


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17 A. Did I actually talk to him, do you mean?18 Q. Yes. Did you?19 A. No.20 Q. Was there much interest shown by the press with the MoD21 press office in this issue?22 A. No, it was noticeable that after 9th July the volume of

23 calls sharply reduced; and indeed the coverage of the24 issue sharply reduced; and that included the following25 weekend papers, when you might have expected the Sundays

671 to return to it.2 Q. On 15th July Dr Kelly gave evidence to the Foreign3 Affairs Committee. What arrangements did you and the4 press office make for that, if any?5 A. I asked the chief press officer to accompany Dr Kelly to6 the hearing because I knew there would be a lot of media7 there.8 Q. We know that the Foreign Affairs Committee appeared to

9 have taken the view Dr Kelly had been poorly treated.10 They wrote a letter to I think Jack Straw to that11 effect. Did you arrange for a press statement to be12 released that evening to rebut that allegation?13 A. Yes, I did.14 Q. I think that can be seen at MoD/1/90.15 Were you given any indication at all as to why the16 Foreign Affairs Committee thought that Dr Kelly had been17 badly treated apart from what they said in their letter?18 A. No, none whatsoever.19 Q. Finally, Ms Teare, is there anything else you would like20 to say about the circumstances that led to Dr Kelly's21 death?

22 A. No, I do not think I have got anything more I can offer23 to the Inquiry.24 MR KNOX: Thank you very much.25 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much indeed.

681 MR DINGEMANS: Mr Powell, please, my Lord.2 LORD HUTTON: Yes.3 MR JONATHAN POWELL (called)4 Examined by MR DINGEMANS5 Q. Can you tell his Lordship your full name?6 A. Jonathan Nicholas Powell.7 Q. I am afraid you will need to speak up a bit. What is

8 your occupation?9 A. I am Chief of Staff at No. 10 Downing Street.10 Q. And how long have you had that role?11 A. Since 1997.12 Q. And, very briefly, what does that involve?13 A. Acting as a conduit of information to the14 Prime Minister, advising him and coordinating the work15 of No. 10 Downing Street.16 Q. Turning to the dossier, which was published, we know, on17 24th September 2002, did you have any direct involvement18 in the drafting of the dossier?19 A. I did not play a major role in the drafting of the20 dossier but I did send some comments towards the end of

21 the process.22 Q. Can I take you to a document CAB/11/17 which is an


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23 e-mail that you sent on 5th September to Mr Campbell.24 You ask this, at the top:25 "What's the timing on preparation of it and

691 publication? Will TB have something he can read on the

2 plane to the US?"3 Now, in relation to that, you are referring to the4 dossier there, are you?5 A. Yes, that was the trip the Prime Minister made to the6 United States.7 Q. Do you remember the date of the trip?8 A. I think it was 7th September.9 Q. Did the Prime Minister have something to read on the10 plane to the US?11 A. I do not know, I am afraid.12 Q. You cannot recall whether he got a draft of the dossier13 at that stage?14 A. I simply do not know.

15 Q. Because we know from other material that there was16 a draft of the dossier dated 5th September. We have17 seen some little handwriting in the top right-hand18 corner. You do not know whether or not that was19 provided to the Prime Minister?20 A. I am afraid not, no.21 Q. You have told us you made some other comments on the22 dossier. Is CAB/11/69 a fair reflection of your23 involvement in that?24 A. Yes. That is the points that I made on 17th September25 in the e-mail, yes.

70

1 Q. You appear to make three points, one about demonstrating2 or not demonstrating threat; and then connections with3 Al-Qaida and, third, how Saddam Hussein might try and4 meet some of the allegations in the dossier.5 A. Yes, I think the important one there which I repeated in6 subsequent e-mails is:7 "We need to make it clear, in launching the document8 we do not claim we have evidence it is an imminent9 threat. The case we are making is that he has continued10 to deploy weapons of mass destruction since 1998 and is11 in breach of UN resolutions. Unless we check him at12 that stage, he will become a serious threat to all of13 us."

14 Q. Was that, in general terms, the extent of your15 involvement with the dossier?16 A. There was that and a couple of other e-mails we have17 sent to you on subsequent days, yes.18 Q. Turning then to the circumstances in which Dr Kelly's19 name first comes to your attention, what do you recall20 your first involvement being?21 A. My first involvement was a telephone call from the22 Defence Secretary on the evening --23 Q. That is Mr Hoon?24 A. Yes, Mr Geoff Hoon on the evening of Thursday 3rd July.25 Q. Right. Do you remember the time of the telephone call?

711 A. I know I was at home and I know that I subsequently


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2 spoke to the Prime Minister so it must have been3 somewhere around 9 or 10 o'clock.4 Q. What did Mr Hoon say to you?5 A. He said that an individual had come forward in the6 Ministry of Defence who had spoken to Andrew Gilligan7 and might possibly be the source of Andrew Gilligan's

8 story on Radio 4.9 Q. Right. What was your reaction to this information?10 A. I thought this was an important development and that it11 ought to be sort of proceeded with fairly cautiously.12 We needed to have more information about it before we13 would rush into doing anything.14 Q. Right. I think you said you had a later conversation15 with the Prime Minister that evening. Did you report16 that to the Prime Minister?17 A. Yes, the Prime Minister was in the regional tour in the18 US. He called me from his hotel room that evening. In19 the course of going through other subjects, I mentioned20 I had had this call from Geoff Hoon.

21 Q. What was the Prime Minister's reaction?22 A. The Prime Minister's reaction was, again like mine, that23 this was not something one should rush into and it ought24 to be dealt with by the MoD in accordance with their25 usual procedures for these things.

721 Q. That is the Thursday night, 3rd July. Were you working2 on Friday 4th July in No. 10?3 A. Yes.4 Q. On Thursday night were you given the name of Dr Kelly or5 not?6 A. No, I was not given the name.

7 Q. On Friday did you hear anything further about this8 potential source of Mr Gilligan's story?9 A. Yes, on Friday afternoon at around 6 pm I was summoned10 to a meeting in David Manning's office.11 Q. Can you just tell everyone who David Manning is?12 A. Sorry, Sir David Manning is the Prime Minister's Foreign13 Affairs and Defence Adviser.14 Q. Who else was there?15 A. David Omand.16 Q. If you would not mind?17 A. Sure. David Omand is the intelligence and security18 co-ordinator in the Cabinet Office, the senior official19 dealing with these sorts of matters, and John Scarlett

20 is the chairman of the JIC.21 Q. So there were those three and you?22 A. Yes.23 Q. And what was the gist of the discussions?24 A. The gist of the discussion was David Omand said he had25 been called by Kevin Tebbit, the pe

Hearing Transcript - 18 August 2003 Morning

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