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Chapter 3
Hearing, Feeling, Grasping GesturesAmic Cox
Musical gcstures are musical acts. and our perception and
understanding ofgestures involves understanding the physicality
involved in their production. Alone leve! this is a rather
straightforward mauer, but when it comes 10 using rheconcepl of
'gesture' 10 analyse meaning construction, sorne of our
assumptionsleave problematic gaps in our cxplanations. For example,
consider the followingclaims by David Lidov (1987: 82, emphases
added):
The variables of pulse are speed and intensity, Speed is
excuing.lntensity is involving. The values of simple pulse are
fairly obvious:trong, forcground pulse as in folk dances and
marches controls
11101c111c111 directly. Attcnuatcd pulse is a factor in the
sublimation o/somaticforce.
On the surfacc there may not be a problcm here, since pulse is
sornething we oflenfeel when listening to music and it does seern
lo control movement in certainconiexts. But there is a circularity
here, for we could jusi as well say that a feelingof moverncnt
generales a fecling of pulse, and that the sublimation of somatic
forceis a factor in attenuated pulse - or so 1 would claim. Wherc
does this feclng ofpulse originatc? lfwe say tbat it is a property
oftbe music (of the acoustic stimuli),which we fcel when listcning
to music, thcn we are lcd bnck lo whcrc \Vestartcd:wc fccl pulse
bccause pulse is thcre 10 be fcll. Thc problcm hcrc is onc shnrcd
byother concepts rclatcd to embodicd meaning, including 'gcsturc':
How is it thatmusic rnakes us feel anything al ali? (1 am not
refcrring nccessarily to emotionalfeelings but 10 the more visceral
sensations related directly lo movement.) In thecontext of folk
music and marches it might not seem that this is a matter in need
ofexplanation: peoplc dance to dance rnusic and march to mnrch
music, and thequcstion o how music works in thcsc contexts may not
scern to sorne a crucialarca of scholarly inquiry. However, Lidov
is using these exarnples of obviousphysicnl engagernent as part oan
cxplanation of how similar types of engagernentoccur in musical
experience generally, including 'art music', and sincc
thisengagemenl and its cause are not as obvious as in other
repertoires, and because agreat deal is at stake, this claim
requires a more explicit understanding of howmusic engagcs us. What
is at stake, to my mind, is the claim that musical meaningis
generated by our embodied experience of it - that our embodicd
experience isnot only nccessary for expcricncing meaning that is
somchow inhercnt in the music
Copyl'l
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46 Muste mu/ Gestureitsclf, but that meaning arises in our
conccptualizations of cmbodicd musicalexperience and that abstrae!
meaning is the product of embodied reasoning. Thisbroad claim
requires an examination of the concepts that we tend to take
forgranted, including the far-reaching question of how we
conceptualize relationsamong musical events in tcrms of 'rnotion'
generally, and io tcrms of 'gesture'specifically, The topic of tbis
chapter is tbc quesrion of what motivares andstrucrures
conccptualization of music in tcrms of 'gcsrures', and what scnsc
theremight be in using 'gesture' in addition to, or instcad of, the
afien cocxtensivc'motive' and/or 'figure'. To answer this, 1 first
offer an account of how musicengages us bodily.
Thenretical Background: The Mimetic Hypothcsis
Do you ever ftnd yourself tapping your toe to music? Jf so, why
should this be?This very common response to music, along with other
subtly overt embodiedresponses such as head-bobbing or swaying, is
not something we normally chooseto do (nlthough we are of course
certainly capable of choosing to engage witbmusic in overtly
cmbodicd ways). lnformaUy conducting, playing 'air guitar',
and'beat boxing' (vocal imitation of the rhythm section in rap) are
similar responses.although these are perhaps more often a matter of
volition. But we do more thanvisibly move to music; we also sing
along, in real time and in recall, aloud and inour heads. By way of
example, let me offer the following anecdote.
1was at a recital by the renowned bass Thomas Quasthof in which
he sangthc Kcms/Hammcrstein tune 'Old Man River' for an encore. As
he sang 1 thoughtthat 1heard a sort of echo and theo realized that
an elderly gentleman was actuallysinging along. His wife shushed
him, but when the cborus rerurned he startedsinging along once more
(much to her quite evidcnt cmbarrassmcnt). As 1read thisscenario.
this man's impulse to cngage with the music as he did ovcrrode his
socialinhibition: it was clear that his wifc thought he should
listen quietly, but it was as ifhe could not hclp himself. 1
believe that bis response is of the same sort as toe-tapping and
other kinds of involuntary participation, and 1 believe that these
areovert forms of an imitative participation that is a regular pan
of musical cxperienceand comprebension. Bascd on observcd mimetic
panicipation of these sorts 1haveproposed thc following hypothcsis:
pan of how wc understand music involvesimagining making the heard
sounds for ourselves, and this imagincd participationinvolves
covertly and overtly imitating the sounds hcard and irnitating the
physicalactions that produce these sounds.1 Mimetic participation
occurs in three forms: ( 1)covert and oven imitation of the actions
of pcrformers (whether the performers areseen and hcard, or heard
only, or rccallcd); (2) covert and overt subvocal imitationof the
sounds produced, wbether the sounds are vocal or instrumental
(likely toinclude an imitation of timbre as well as pitcb, rhythm
and dynamic lcvcl): and (3)an amodal, cmpathctic, visceral
imitation of thc excrtion partcms that would likclyproduce such
sounds. Each of thesc forms occurs in real time and in
recall.sometimes within the same modality (as in vocal and subvocal
imitation of asingcr) and olcn across modalities (vocal and
subvocal imitation of an
Copyncl1l1't1 m1::~r1
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Hearing, Feeling, Grasping Gestures 47
instrumental melody). The strength of each fonn of mimetic
part.icipation varesfrom person to person, which establishes a
variability in the meanings that wederive from musical experience,
including the meaning of 'gesrure'. Understandingthe variability in
different listeners' particular habits of mimetic engagement
isimportan! for communication about music in tenns of 'gesture' and
other bodilybased conceptions.
Before considering the evidcnce for the hypothcsis, 1should
compare lhisto similar ideas on the subject. The rnimetic
hypothesis is similar to ideas pul forthby Patricia Carpenter
(1967), Manfred Clynes (1977), Thomas Cliflon (1983),David Lidov (
1987), KendaU Walton ( 1993, 1997), Naomi Cumming ( 1997)Andrew
Mead (1999) and thc ninetecnth-ccntury philosopher Herbert Spenccr(
1857). What cach of thcsc writcrs agrcc on is that imitation on thc
pan of listcnersscems clearly lo play a role in musical expcrience;
however, there are threcimportan! ways in which their conceprions
differ from the mimeric hypothesis:they provide liule orno evidence
(beyond the anecdotal such as 1have offered thusfar in a
preliminary way); thcy do not examine the forms, or modalities, of
mimeticparticipation; and tbey do not consider the breadth of tbe
implications.2 In thiscssay 1 follow this third rcstriction,
although clsewhcrc 1 considcr briefly thcvarious aspccts of musical
meaning in which mimetic participation would scem toplay a role
(Cox 2001 ). One implication beyond the topic of 'gesture ', which
1must allude to here in the interest of contextualization, is the
construction of theconcepl of musical verticality, or 'high' and
'Iow' notes. Most of us take this asone of our most basic,
quasi-literal concepts, but cven whilc acknowledging itsmetaphoric
basis there is not a generally accepted account of thc
metapboricrcasoning that gives us this conccpt. 1 havc offcrcd a
preliminary account of howthis conccpt can be undcrstood to be
motivated by mimctic panicipation (Coxl 999a), which in turn
activares the cmbodied metaphoric rcasoning described byGeorge
Lakoff and Mark Johnson ( 1980, 1999; Jobnson 1987). The
significancefor tbe present context is tbat the mimetic hypothcsis
is something that hasimplications eveo for our most basic,
quasi-literal concepts - including conceptssuch as 'asccnt',
'dcsccnr' and 'contour' which dcpend on thc concept of
musicalverticality - as well as thc conccpt of 'gesturc', which is
why this aspect of musicalcxperience and conceptualization needs lo
be deiailed with carc.
Mimctlc Participation in Dally Lifc and in Musical
Expcriencc
Mimetic participation is fundamental to human comprchcnsion, and
its role inmusical experience is very much simply a special case of
how the cmbodicd mindworks generally. Since thc evidcncc is
detailcd elsewhcre (Cox 2001) 1will rcvicwit only bricfly hcre.
Clinical evidence for the mimctic hypothesis can be sorted intofour
kinds: (1) studics of imitation in facc-io-face communicarion; (2)
motorimagery studies involving mirror neurons; (3) subvocalization
studies for spcechand for rnusic; and (4) non-vocal motor imagery
studies for music. lt is Importantto note that each of these is a
kind of motor imagery: hand and limb movernents,adjustmcnts of
posturc, facial gesrures and vocal 'gesrures' (the motor actions
thnt
Co1..yr .1htcdir,-.1011
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48 Mvsic and Gestureproduce speech and song). To pul it another
way, in each case thc sounds areevidence of the motor actions that
produce them, and our comprchension of thesounds involves
comprehension of the relevant motor actions. In addirion to
theclinical evidence, we also have (5) the indirect evidencc of our
vocal descriptionsof non-vocal sounds: we regularly describe
instrumental sounds in terrns of vocalsounds (such as cantabile for
an instrumental mclody), and thc voicc is rcgularlyuscd as a modcl
for mclodic playing in instrumental pcdagogy. One implication
ofthis is that instrumental sounds are rcgularly conceptualized in
tenns of vocalcxpcrience, and that this is motivated by subvocal
imitation of non-vocal music,l. Imitation in face-to-face
comrnunication includes, among other tbings,srudies of
infant-parent intcractions.3 Babies imitatc ihosc around them and
this ispan of how we lcam to understand otbcrs: wc scc and hcar
things - facial, vocal,gestural - and wc imitare thcsc actions. Our
specics sccms to have evolvcd in sucha way that succcssful
imitation is crucial for succcssful communication, includingleaming
to reproduce thc vocal sounds of spcech. Signi ficantly, when
infants andparents imeract it is not only the infants who do thc
imitating but the parents aswell. Why should it be that parents
spend any Limeirnitating their bables? One way10 understand this is
that mutual imitation fosters mutual understanding. In
mutualimitation we bccome likc those we are trying to undcrstand -
we undcrstand (insorne mcasure) what it must be like to be thcm
because we are being like them.This son of empathy is fundamental
10 being human, which brings up anotherpoint. While it might seem
thai the imitation we praciise as infants is something weoutgrow.
it appears instead that our imitation becornes more covert as wc
mature -and occasionally becomes overt in certain situations. We
can understand this asresuhing from thc gradual development of
motor imagery: the capacity toremcmber and plan motor actions in
imagination, without having to rehcarse theseactions ovenly.2. Some
of the best evidence for mirnetic participarion gcnerally comes
fromstudics of mirror 11e11rom.These are neurons that firc not only
when a goal-oricruated action is pcrformed - particularly grasping
gestures - but also whcnsimilar actions are obscrved. Care must be
takcn in applying this evidencc tomusic-producing actions (which
have yet to be studied direetly). but the findingsare suggestive.3.
Perhaps the most spccialized motor imagery is that rclatcd to
speechproduction and comprehcnsion, and part of how wc comprehend
speech is throughmimetic subvocalization (Gibson & Levin 1975;
Gathercole & Baddcley 1993).5Wc can vicw subvocalization in
aduhs as a covcn form of what infants andchildren do in acquiring
language. We can also see this as a special case of motorimagery:
this aspee! of speech comprehension is comprehension of the
motoractions that produce thc sounds of spccch. In addition to the
speaking voice, notsurprisingly, a similar process occurs in
comprehending the singing voice,6 so thatpan of how wc undcrstand
song (in real time and in reeaU) involves subvocalimitation. Since
subvocalization is groundcd in the physical cxpcricncc of
ovcrtvocalization, comprchension of heard song thus appears 10
involve comparisonwith our own experience of singing or otherwise
vocalizing. This subvocalcmpathy is part of what wc fccl when
listcning to singing, and difTerent kinds of
OL.Yr Jh"
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Hearing, Feeling. Grasping Gestures 49
singing (e.g. Dusty Springfield, Maria Callas, Janis Joplin,
Ella Fitzgerald) can beunderstood to generate dilTerent kinds of
feeling in pan because they invitediffercnt kinds of mimetic
participation.4. There is a similar story to be told about
instrumental musical sounds but itis twofold. There is little
dircct evidencc for mimctic motor imagery regarding thcmotor
actions of instrumental musicians - we have, for example, the
fingcrmovemeots of pianists when listening to piano music (Haueisen
& Knoschc 2001)- but 1believe that it is only a matter oftime
before we have more evidence in thisdomain. Clynes's (1977) work
indicares a degrec ofisornorphic physical responsesacross
modalitics. By itself his work rnight be interpreted as indicating
little morethan thc fact that music generales a physiological
response that somchow marchesthe intensity of the rnusic heard;
however, in combination with thcse other kinds ofcvidence his work
can be interpreted as part of an impulse to understand
throughimitation - by matching (unconsciously, or normally so) the
physiological intensitythat is somehow isomorphic with the rnusic
and its meaos of production.5. Of panicular interest is the
cvidcncc for subvocalizaticn for instrumentalmclodies (Baddeley
& Logie 1992; Smith, Reisberg & Wilson 1992). Since mostof
us havc a voice and havc used it to make and imitare sounds for
most of ourlives, it should not be surprising that we would draw on
vocal irnagcry tounderstand instrumental musical sounds generally.
But this means that musicalsounds generally are understood partly
in terms of our embodied vocal experience,making the exertions of
specch and song relevant for understanding musicgenerally. In other
words, pan of what we fccl when listcning to music are theimagined,
imitativc (sub)vocal cxertions along with the imagined, imitative
intra-modal exertions (the exertions specific to a given
instrument). We can see this asbeing reflected in our vocal
descriptions of instrumental sounds: 'cantabile",'cantilena' and
'mezza vocc' in music for strings and for piano;
polyphonic'volees': 'voicings' of piano hammers and organ pipes;
'choirs' of strings;'scrcarning' jazz trumpets and rock guitars;
and getting notes to 'speak' on windinstrurnents. To feel what
1mean, try the following: recall a favourite instrumentalmclody -
perhaps the slow movcmcnt of a symphony or a chambcr work -
andwhile doing so, ask whether your voice is engaged in any way at
ali: thc fccling ofsinging along, or only the urge to somehow
participare subvocally. With fewexceprions peoplc repon that they
do indeed feel sorne son of subvocalcngngement. (There are several
ways in which this could be and should be tesredcmpirically, along
with the question of whether people subvocalize without beingaware
of it.) This is a remarkablc phcnomcnon - that rccall of an
instrumentalmclody should cngagc thc voice - because it indicates
that pan of how wecornprehend music (at least in rccall), is in
terms of vocal cxpcriencc, rcgardless ofthe medium of the sourcc.
This would makc the exertions of vocal experiencerelevan! for
comprehension and conceptualizarion of music generally
andregularly, and this would give us une way of showing explicitly
how musicalmeaning is embodied. For this to be dircctly relevant to
'gesture', however, itwould have to be shown how exertions in the
vocal modality are felt in othermodalities. 1 addrcss this in thc
next scction.
Gopyr .ihtodm i1cn
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50 Music and Gesture
Grasping Gestores Within and Across Modalities
If the physicality of gestures were grasped only within the same
modality in whichthey are produced, their meaning would have quite
a different character than 1believe they do in fact have. When we
hear, say, the sound of a violin, the mimetichypothesis holds that
we comprehend it in three ways: (1) via (covert) imitation ofthe
arm and finger movements; (2) via subvocal imitation of the sounds
produced;and (3) via an amodal, visceral imitation of the exertion
dynamic evident in thesound (a pattem of exertions that would
produce the same or similar sounds). Theintra-modal imitation will
vary according to experience: a violinist, for example,will
comprehend the finger and arm movements of a violin performance
differentlythan a musician who has never played a string
instrument, who in tum willcomprehend these differently than
someone who has never played a musicalinstrument. Yet even having
never played the same instrument or any instrument atall, we will
automatically have sorne idea of what it must feel like to move
one'sfingers and arms in a certain way.
1 have already discussed the cross-modal example of subvocal
imitation,but there is another kind of mimetic comprehension that
is akin to subvocalizationand this is the comprehension of one
instrument (or voice) in terms of anotherinstrument - for example,
representing violin sounds in terms of the motor actionsthat
produce essentially the same sounds on the piano. 1 believe that
this is moreleamed than innate, and it may also be more intentional
and less automatic thanother kinds of representations, but it is
common enough among musicians that itought to be considered here.
The ability to represent one modality in another ispossibly (or
perhaps likely) dependent upon an amada/ representation of
theexertion dynamic that would produce a sound or a sound pattern
in one domain oranother, and this is the third kind of imitation
listed above. This is a very difficultmatter to discuss because the
relevant feelings are ineffable and, related to this,their location
is invisible. But it is a visceral response to music which is not
locatedin either the limbs or the voice and yet is fundamental to
the embodied foundationsof musical meaning. To understand the roles
of these various kinds of imitation,consider the gesture that opens
the final movement ofBeethoven's Violin Concerto(Example 3.1).
Violin
. / -p ~ ~ - ~ ==~Example 3.l Beethoven, Violin Concerto in D
Major, Op. 61, 111,bars 1-4
~Let us focus on the initial two-note gesture. According to the
hypothesis,
this event (or event pair) would motvate imitation of the arm
and fingermovements of the violinist (whether the violinist were
seen and heard or heardonly, or whether the performance were only
recalled or otherwise imagined), as
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Hearing, Feeling, Grasping Gestures 51
well as subvocal imitation of the pitch, contour, rhythm,
accents (phenomenal andagogic) and dynamic level. But I believe
that most of us would also feel somethingthat was not located in
either the limbs or the voice - something in the gut thatsomehow
matched the energy pattern of the music. This might well be
manifest inthe modalities of toe-tapping, head-bobbing and/or
conducting, but none of theseare specified by the music (the violin
playing). The question of where in the bodyan amodal representation
might be located is irrlportant, and it may be that this isonly a
phantasm resulting from the fact that embodied representations can
be andare manifest in any of several modalities.7 But the more
crucial point here is that,according to the mimetic hypothesis, a
musical gesture motivates imitativerepresentations that are not
confined to the modality in which they are produced(for example,
the finger and arm movements of a violinist). This means that
agesture has a meaning which is at once in accord with its mode of
production andtranscendent of its mode of production. The melodic
'sigh', for example, retains itsvocality while being comprehensible
as a sigh in any instrumental medium. It isnot sigh-like only by
exterior (acoustic) association with its origins in
vocalrepertoire, because even in an instrumental realization it is
comprehended in partvia subvocal imitation: it is sigh-like because
it is comprehended by the sigh-producing medium of the voice. At
present, however, although the mimetichypothesis shows that
comprehension is cross-modal, it can only suggest that theremight
be an amodal, visceral representation.
Robert Hatten and the Mimetic Hypothesis
If the mimetic hypothesis has relevance for theories of musical
gesture, then thereis no better place to demonstrate this than in
the context of Robert Hatten's work.In this section I consider how
the mimetic hypothesis bolsters the claims andexplanatory power of
Hatten's proto-theory as set forth in a series of onlinelectures
(Hatten 2001).
In Lecture 2, 'Embodying Sound: The Role of Semiotics', Hatten
offers aset of eight 'presuppositions for a semiotic theory of
gesture'. Number 1 reads:'Gesture is movement interpretable as a
sign, whether intentional or not, and assuch it communicates
information about the gesturer (or character, or persona
thegesturer is impersonating or embodying).' If applied to danceor
theatre, there is noimmediate difficulty here: the gestures
referred to are those of the gesturer(including
gesturer-as-character/persona). But when we speak of musical
gestures,to what extent are we speaking of the gestures of the
performers? Without questiona performer's gestures communicate
information about the gesturer (theperformer), but the role of the
musical performer in reproducing signifyinggestures is different
than that of other performers. The same musical gesture -
forexample, the 'melodic sigh' - can be produced by a great variety
ofphysical means- for example, on the violin, the oboe, or the
piano - and yet be classified the same(as a 'melodic sigh'). These
various modes of performance of what we take to bethe same thing
must then have something in common, and we ought to be able tosay
precisely what this is. If we focus on music's acoustic features
(pitch, contour,
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52 Muste and Gesture
rhythm) thcn 1scc lcss scnsc in using tcrms such as 'sigh' and
'gesturc'. In thc caseof the 'sigh , we might say that in each
performance medium it sounds like a sigh.This is true enough, and
an exterior mapping - this event sounds like that eventsounds -
might suffice to account for the metaphoric tcrm 'melodic sigh',
\Vecould also specify thc identity in terms of shared acoustic
features in order tocxplain the rcasoning. But 1do not fiad this
satisfactory. for whcn 1hcnr a 'sigh' 1feel a sigh, or somcthing
very much like the feeling of a sigh. 1 believe that thisfeeling
motivares and grounds the meaning ofterms like 'sigh' and
'gesturc', and 1believe we ought to seek a theory that accounts for
the viscerally afTectivedimension of musical meaning.
\Ve might apply Johnsoa's theory of image schemata (Johnson
1987) andnote that cach mclodic sigh performcd by vnrious
instrumcnts maaifcsts. somchow,thc samc irnagc schcrna; and wc
rnight furthcr note that imagc schcmata aregrounded in ernbodied
experience, and that this ernbodied grounding is thus thebasis for
using the terms 'sigh' and 'gesturc'. Such an application of
Johnson'swork gives usa very good conjecture, but we would still
need to specify the meansby which musical gestures are ernbodied.
This, thcn. is preciscly where thcmimetic hypotbesis bccomcs
relevan! for gcsture theory. First, sincc thc tcrm'rnclodic sigh'
makcs seosc in sorne measurc as a sigh, regardlcss of
theperformance medium, and since the term 'musical gesturc' makes
sense in sornemeasure as gesture, regardlcss of the performance
medium, thcn we must considcrwhat ihese have in common as sighs and
other gestures. Second, since the acousticfeatures by themselves
motivare only a superficial understanding (this sounds liketltat),
thosc of us interested in embodied meaning must explain how events
called'rnelodic sighs' and 'musical gesrures' fee/ like gestures
and sighs. According tothe mimetic hypothesis, events that wc call
'gcsrurcs' and 'sighs' not only souodalike, but thcy also fccl
alikc because thcy are ali comprehendcd in part viamimctic
participation. Specifically, cornprehcnsion of a mclodic sigh
involvcs thcfollowing (in various rneasures, in both real time and
rccall):
011 tire vio/in: (1) imitation of the fingering and the bowing;
(2) subvocalimitation of the musical sounds produced (the rwo-note
dcscent, likely sbaped insorne mensure by timbre aod dynamic
level); and (3) amodal. visceral imitation ofthc exenion dynamic of
the evcnt.
011 tite oboe: (1) irnitation of the fingcring, cmbouchurc and
blowing; (2)subvocal imitation of the musical sounds produced (thc
two-note dcsccnt); and (3)amodal, visceral imitation of the
exertion dynamic of the event,
on the piano: (1) imitation of tbe finger and arm movernents;
(2) subvocalimitation of the musical sounds produced (thc two-note
dcsccnt); and (3) amodal,visceral imitation of thc cxcrtion dyoamic
of the cvcnt.
Notice that only the superficial medium difTers(the fingcrings
and so forth), whichis not where the essence of 'sigh' tics.
Rcgardless of thc performance medium,
Capyri
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Hearing. Feeling. Grasping Gestures 53
each is comprchendcd via subvecal imitarion, and in this way
each not only soundslikc a sigh butfee/s like a sigh.
11is worth noting here that in each case the fingcr movernents
are nlsoimitated, and we ought to ask why this docs not motivare a
compctingconceptualization. There are severa! factors that work
against a digitally basedconceprualization. Onc is that there is
not necessarily a one-to-one correspondencein each case, since a
stepwise dcsccnt on the oboe might involvc a combinarion ofsevera!
fingers. Anotber reason is that the finger acrions here are out of
proponionwith thc most salicnt features o the cvent - thc duration,
contour, timbre, dynamiclevcl and harrnonic/tonal context - and are
instead rcsponsible for only the verticaldimension of the contour.
Nonetheless, in another context the finger acrions couldeasily
bccome much more salient, as in a virtuosic passage work, and in
sucb acase a different sort of conceptualization would be motivated
- sucb as thernctaphors of 'passagc' or 'run' (including thc
corrente).
Returning now to Hauen's prcsuppositions. the first ofthesc also
leads toanothcr importan! qucstion: how might gcstures bccome
abstractcd into gesturcs ofa charactcr or a persona? According 10
ihc mirnctic hypothcsis, we experiencepauerns of exenion by way of
mimetic participation. and in this way it is as if weare acting -
acting in a way that is more or less isomorphic with the
sound-producing actions heard (and sccn). In conceptualizing these
patterns of exertion.wc rnap these amo our own experiencc of making
similar cxcnions. and among thcmost straighrforward rnappings is
that omo gestures: wc do not fcel only abstrae!sensarions of
cxertion; wc also undcrstand these as the intentional,
expressivegestures that we have madc and have scen made in other
domains of experience.One result of this mimetic participation is
that we enact the role of a character orpersona - that oan ideal
gesturing perforrner (at once making music and not, sincetbc
excrtions are not confined to tbe spccific domain of sound
production), At tbesame time. howcvcr, thc othemcss of the music
rcmains, sincc wc are not thcprincipie (original) souree of the
sounds with wbich we are engaging. The fact thatthe musie is
produced by a source exterior 10ourselves may be what motivares
aprojcction of our rnimetic musical agency outwards, perhaps
towards this exteriorsource. 8111sincc this agency cannot be
identified directly with the actlons of theperformers, it remains
nn ideal agency 1ha1 is noi-us. We call this agent 'themusic', and
its genesis might follow this pattern: (1) the sound-producing
actionsofthe pcrforrncrs are (2) henrd/scen and imitatcd by a
listcner, which (3) morivatcsa participatory agcncy within the
listcncr, which (4) is thcn projectcd ourwardstowards the original
sourcc but which (5) cnnnot be identified directly with thissource
and so rcmains ideal.
The only oiher of Hallen's cight prcsuppositions that 1 wish to
considerhere is that regarding posture (presupposition 8), which he
says 'rnay be consideredas gesture "under a fermata." A "frozen
rnotion" or pose may revea! the energy andaffect with which it is
invested. Sucb momcnts can be among the most powerful inmusic. Part
of their affect results simply frorn the anticipation of what will
follow.hui part ofit results from the feeling ofbolding an imagined
pose. According to themirnetic hyporhesis, in the case of a hcld
mamen! we fecl vicariously thc cnergyrcquired to sustain a sound -
ar 10sustain a silcncc - in sorne cornbination of intra-
-
54 Muste and Gesturemodal, cross-modal (including particularly
thc subvocal) and amodal (visceral)imitation. The scnsation of
holding a pose would result also from the same sense ofmimctic
agency described above: among the gesrures made by our musical
persona(our own, or that projected away from us) are poses which
may be held forexpressive purposes just as in othcr domains of
expcricncc.
Let me apply and extcnd this to an exarnple from Hattcn 's
analysis of theopening of Schubert's late A major sonata, D. 959. 1
should note that the topicfrom which the following excerpt derives
is the question of 'resonance' as agcsrurc; however, for my
purposes hcre 1 am interested in thc pcrsonification andlocomotivc
metaphors. The analytical excerpt refers to the beginning of thc
firstrnovement (Exarnple 3.2).
11'll"' ' ,,.---...-"-"-1 ., # I~ * ; ; - ;1 .,;. w'~it/ ft, ft,
==- =-.,._ -
~. . 1 ! 1 1 ' ' '~.Example 3.2 Schubcrt, Piano Sonata in A
Major, D. 959, 1, bars 1--0
Hallen (2001: Lccrure4: 3, emphases added) writes:
Here, the le hand has the (...) gestural motive onc, and its
'stoichcroisrn' mny be scen to 'resonare' ihe right-hand's
sustained chords,which [...) strive in stepwise ascent until
rclaxing into thc half cadenceon thc dominont in bar 6. The
determined wil! of a persona is clearlyimplied and gesturally
projected.
1 havc alrcady described the role of mimctic participation in
thepcrsonification of music, but it is one thing to talk in general
about gestures andanothcr to talk spccifically about the strivings
of a persona in a stepwisc asccnt,That is, once we havc a musical
persona, how do we spccify its acrions within themetaphorical
terrain of musical space? We have 10 start by rejecring the view
thattherc is a bass line rhat ascends by step. along with the view
that a personificationof this motion is a rnetaphoric
interpretarion of the objcctivc facts. As Marion Guck( 1994) has
pointcd out, even such quasi-objective obscrvations are
analyticalcuons based on a metaphoric understanding. Our musical
fines, ascents and stepsare mctaphoric conccptualizations of
relations among tones in tcrms of spatialrelations. Thc conception
of musical motion and space and the conception ofmusical personae
are both products of the sarne embodied metaphoric reasoning, solet
me sketch an account of this embodied reasoning.
According to the mimetic hypothesis, when we hcar the opening of
thissonata we participare vicariously with the production of the
music - specifically,thc bass linc and the sustained chords - and
our participation takes threc fonns:
o: 'Yr.1hl,
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Hearing. Feeling. Grasping Gestures 55
imitation of the ann gesrurcs, subvocal imitation of the sounds
produced, nnd avisceral exertion that matches the excrtion dynamic
manifest in thc music. Again,the degree and combination of
participation will vary from pcrson to pcrson, sothat more properly
1should say that thcse are ihe specific kinds of participation
thatthe music affords and motivates. With respect to the bass-line
chords, we feel therwo-part arm gcsturcs and thcir gradual
progression 'up' the keyboard (that is, theirprogression 10 thc
right), Wc also fccl what it would be like to sing the sounds
thatare produced by these gesrures, including the difference in
tcrms of what wc cali'pitch', which in this case gives us 'asccnt'.
Finaliy, we also fecl an amodal,visceral excrtion that is in this
case more or less isomorphic with the imagined annand vocal
excrtions. As in other domains of experience, the embodied
feelingsmotvate conccptualization in tenns of basic, concrete
experience (Lakoff &Jobnson 1980, 1999; Johnson 1987), and
these include 'gesture as wcli as thequasi-objective spatial
conceptions. Tite pattern of cxcrtion in the Schubert, withinand
between the succcssive lefl-hand gcsturcs, activares thc conceptual
metaphorsgreater is higher and states are locations, along with the
related metaphors ofchange o/ state is motion between locations
(change is motion} and differencebetween states is distance between
locations (differencc is disumce).8
The conceptual metaphor greater is higher is onc of our most
commonmetaphors, undcrlying conccpts such as 'highcr' priccs,
'higher' quality, 'highcr'cducation and 'higber' frequencies, ali
of which are literaliy greater andmetaphorically 'higher'. In tite
present case, this mctaphor is activated by thegreater and lesser
exertions fclt in imagining producing the piano sounds by way
ofubvocalization, where the phenomenon that we call 'ascent'
norrnaliy involvesgreater exenion. The state-locations meraphors
are also very cornmon - giving usemotional, financial, musical and
othcr mctaphoric locarions - and in this contextthcy givc each
musical evcni a location, with small, discrctc differcnces
conccivedas 'steps' (on successive downbeats in the bass). and
greatcr, discrete dilTcrcnccconceived as 'leaps' (the crotchet
octave leaps in each bar). These mctaphorscombine to give us
musical locarions, distances and motion within the verticalmusical
dimensin. while the horizontal dimensin is the product of these
andother conceptual rnetaphors that simiJarly becorne rclevant va
mimeticparticipation, Although thc dctails of our conccptions of
musical rnotion and spacecannot be cxplored Itere, thc crucial
clnim is that ali such spatial conceptions beginwith the feeling of
an exenion dynamic that rcsults from mimctic participarion.Once
felt, and then conceived in terms of kinds of motion, we can then
srep backand adopl a third-person analyrical perspccrivc, positing
an ideal agcnt in our place.lt is this musical agent that thcn
exerts in this way and that way, performinggesturcs and moving in
various ways through and between meiaphoric locations.Our
conceptual and linguistic habits thcn perpetuare the analytical
perspective - forexample, the common fonnulation, 'here thc rnusic
does this' - but languagedepcnds on the ernbodicd mctaphoric
rcasoning 1 have skctched (both originallyand as a reinforcemcnt of
language's meanings). lt makes scnsc to describe thcopening of this
Schubcrt sonata in terms of 'striving' and otherwise 'gesruring '
notbecause we cmpathize with the actions of sorne already-given
musical persona, andnot because there is a musical motion already
given, but because we feel the
-
56 Music ond Gesture
excrtions involvcd in thc sound's production, and the exertion
dynamic that we feclis more or lcss isomorphic with the fecling of
striving, progressing and gesturing.
Hcaring, Feelng,Comprchcnding, Conccivingand Grasping
'Gcsturcs'
My primary intcrest gcncrally is in how music engages us and in
the rclationshipberween experience and conccptualization. Although
ali of our rnetaphoricconceprions of motion and space can be
understood to bear thc residue of theirembodied origins, 'gcsiurc'
secms to foreground Lhiscmbodiment more than most.My final point in
this chapter concems the place of 'gesturc' in musiccpistcmology
and thc diffcrcnccs bctween Lhis and othcr conceptualizations
interms ofthe kinds ofknowlcdgc thcy hclp cstablish.
Our cmbodicd engagcmenl wilh music afTords an intimatc, visceral
andintuitive way of knowing music. A good portion of Lhis type of
knowlcclgc isineffable (RafTmaa 1993), but our embodied expericnce
also motivaresconcepruatizations whose mcaaings remain tied to this
embodied cxpcricnce bywny of the pauerns of cxcrtion shared betwecn
music and other domains ofcxperience, 'Gesture' is one such
conccpt, and whilc it might be extended 10includc largc-scale
relationships, and perhaps to other less immcdiate events
andrclations, the more immcdiatc cvents and relations that are
roughly coextensivcwith 'motives' and 'figures' are in a sense more
viscerally cngaging and thus morerneaningful." These irnrnediate
events nnd relations, as in the opcning of theSchubert A major
Piano Sonata, are those which we can most rcadily
'grasp'(comprchend) and thus know in a way that is different from
large-scalerclationships. Thc use of thc term 'gesture' highlights
this diffcrencc, but whatadvantage is there in the use ofthis tcrm
over 'figure' and 'motive'?
lf one examines the concepts in English related lo knowing, one
quicklyfinds that thesc are dominated by visual terms (Johnson
1987; Swcetser 1990).aturally, this extends to music analytical
discourse (Cox l999b; Johnson 2002),
where we 'reveal ', 'show', 'clarify' and so forth. lndeed, rhe
very word 'theory' isitself a visual term (rneaning 10 show', with
the same root ns theatre). Siacehuman perception is dominated by
visual iuformation, this visual bias in ourcpistemology is not
surprising; and since most of the non-visual perccptualinfommtion
we den) with also has a visible sourcc - invisible smclls, lastes
andsounds come from othcrwisc visible objccts - in most cases this
bias
-
Hearing, Feeling, Grasping Gestures 57
have the advantage of aligning with our more general
epistemology but which alsohave the disadvantage of objectifying a
non-objective, embodied experience.
But we have another way of conceptualizing knowledge in English,
andthat is in terms of 'grasping' (Johnson 1987; Sweetser 1990; Cox
1999b).'Comprehend', 'conceive' and 'perceive' are each grounded in
the experience ofgrasping. Much like our visual bias, the
importance of grasping objects in thehistory ofour species makes it
unsurprising that 'grasping' should structure ourconception of
conceiving and comprehending. But grasping has a different feelthan
seeing: grasping is more immediate; and while it still objectifies
that which isgrasped, our knowledge of the thing grasped is more
intimate and visceral than it iswhen we simply regard it. The
large-scale 'structure' of a musical work is perhapsnot easily
graspable, but in contrast to this, we know a work more intimately
in ourmoment-to-moment experience of its more easily graspable
events and relations(Levinson 1997), and these events and relations
are at the level of motives, figuresand gestures. But 'motive' and
'figure' do not reflect that quasi-tangible featureindicated by
'gesture', which focuses our attention on a more physically
intimateunderstanding of how the music works.
To see this - to feel this - compare the following
conceptualizations ofthe opening two-note event of the finale of
the Beethoven Violin Concerto: (1) afigure, (2) a motive, (3) a
leap and (4) a gesture. 'Figure' suggests something thatis external
to us and fixed. 'Motive' highlights the dynamic of change,
conceivedas motion, but still leaves the event(s) as extemal. 'Leap
' suggests a moreembodied sense of motion, but it is too big for us
to feel directly in terms of ourown experience of leaping: to leap
requires a much greater exertion than theexertion reflected in this
opening event; it has an analogous dynamic, or exertion'contour',
but it is out of proportion. However, 'gesture' suggests not only
ananalogous exertion dynamic, but one of the same proportion, and
this isomorphismaffords a closer comparison with our own embodied
experience.
'Gesture' seems to match best the level at which we grasp
(comprehend)music most viscerally and intimately, and in this way
it highlights a kind ofmusical knowing that is distinct from our
more visual and quasi-objectiveconceptualizations. By focusing on
musical gestures we draw attention to a crucialarea of musical
meaning, and by understanding how musical gestures are graspedand
conceived we strengthen our understanding of how musical meaning
isconstructed.
Notes
1.This is a slightly different formulation than that in Cox
2001.
2. One exception is Clynes (1977), who offers a particular kind
of empiricalevidence which I discuss below. Lidov (1987) bases his
arguments on Clynes'swork.
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58 Music and Gesture
3. A good sample of such research as it bears directly on music
can be found inPapousek (1996), Malloch (1999/2000) and Trevarthen
(1999/2000).
4. Much work has been done in this area; a representative sample
includes Galleseet al. (1996), Rizzolatti et al. (1996), Gallese
and Goldman (1998) and Fadiga et al.(1998).
5. 1 take subvocalization to include both silent vocal imagery
and sotto vocerehearsal and imitation.
6. Evidence for this can be drawn from Baddeley and Logie
(1992); Smith,Reisberg and Wilson (1992); Smith, Wilson and
Reisberg (1995); Vaneechoutteand Skoyles (1998).
7. Daniel Stem (1985) has argued for amodal perception in
infants. Although hesuggests that we eventually outgrow this, it
may be that amodal perceptionbecomes disguised by the gradual
dominance o modally specifc perception.
8. For a fuller explanation of how this and how other conceptual
metaphorsstructure musical thought, see Cox l999a.
9. Compare Hatten (2001), Lecture 4: l.
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