HDR - Afghanistan 2004 -Security with a Human Face

AFGHANISTANNATIONAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2004

Security with a Human Face:Challenges and Responsibilities

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Afghanistan

U ND P

©United Nations Development Programme 2004

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form orby any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of UNDP.

The analysis and policy recommendations of this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the UNDP nor those of theIslamic Republic of Afghanistan.

The report is a publication commissioned by UNDP and authored by an independent team.

Cover designed by the Afghan artist Sharif Ahmad Haidari, from Herat, winner of the UNDP competition for the NationalHuman Development Report cover.

Design and Printing: Army Press, Plot # 1, Street 40, I & T Center, G-10/4, Islamabad, Pakistan

The Preparatory TeamNational Coordinator of the Project

Abdullah Mojaddedi

Editor-in-Chief

Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh

Principal Authors

Daud S. Saba and Omar Zakhilwal

Contributing Authors

Abi Masefield and Michael Schoiswohl

National Advisory Panel

Minister Haneef Atmar (Chair), Abdul Baqi Banwal,Abdul Rashid Fakhri, Hafizullah Haddad, AbdullahHaqaiqi, Helena Malikyar, Nilab Mobarez, DaudRawish, Safia Siddiqi and Asadullah Walwalji

International Expert Committee

Katarina Ammitzboell, Nancy Hatch Dupree, Carolle-Duc, Ishaq Nadiri, Omar Noman, Barnett Rubinand Andrew Wilder

Background Paper AuthorsMohammad Najeeb Azizi, Homira Nassery, Daud S.Saba, Lutfullah Safi, Naqibullah Safi, Said MubinShah and Nasrullah Stanikzai

Thematic Paper AuthorsAbdul Baqi Banwal, Ramazan Bashar Dost, NancyDupree, Abdul Rashid Fakhri, Abdullah Haqaiqi, MirAhmad Joyenda, Partaw Nadiri, Ahmad Zia Neikbin,Daud Rawish, Asadullah Walwalji and Seddiq Weera

StatisticianR. N. Pandey

Data AnalystHaqiq Rahmani

Administrative and Research AssistantSadeq Wardak

Research AssistantsAbdul Latif Bari and Khial M. Sahebi

UNDP Focal PointsFakhruddin Azizi and Michael Schoiswohl

Foreword

Afghanistan has come a long way sinceDecember 2001 when the TransitionalIslamic State of Afghanistan came intoexistence. The Government has movedtowards consolidating its power, bringingsecurity and national unity. Today, wehave a new Constitution, have madeprogress in our state-building activitiesand have improved our ability to providegood governance. For the first time inhistory, Afghanistan has an electedPresident. The economy has picked up andso has the reconstruction of theinfrastructure. Since 2002, we have seena record high school enrolment of about4 mill ion students, and severalaccomplishments in the health sector,particularly in the vaccination campaigns.As the high levels of voting in thePresidential elections attested, the Afghanpeople now have high expectations for thenew Government to deliver on securityand reconstruction, and to do it on thebasis of the rule of law and a commitmentto transparency and accountability.Afghanistan has once again restored itsstatus in the international community,which in turn has reaffirmed its supportfor the reconstruction efforts throughgenerous pledges committed at the donorConference in Berlin. We now lookforward to the preparation for theParliamentary elections in April 2005.

The Government recognizes the challengesahead, including those of providingsecurity and at the same time livelihoodsfor all Afghans. Curbing corruption,bringing reconstruction gains to all regionsof Afghanistan, drawing in foreigninvestment in a secure involvement, andopening up the political process toparticipation remain the top priorities ofthe new Government. As the country nowturns a new leaf, our ambition is to givehope to each and every Afghan.

At this crucial juncture in our history, Iam very pleased that the first NationalHuman Development Report (NHDR) ofAfghanistan has been prepared for the year2004 with the relevant theme of humansecurity. The concept of human

development , as an a l ternat ivedevelopment paradigm that emphasizespeople as both the agents of change andobjects of development, is highlyappropriate for post-conflict Afghanistan.With the country now engaged in atransition from relief to development, fromemergency projects to sustainable policies,from short-term contingency planning tolong- te rm perspec t ives , humandevelopment can be an ideal frameworkfor the development vision of Afghanistan.I am optimistic that the preparation ofNHDRs in Afghanistan will help us vetdifferent policy options and design betterpeople-oriented policies and programs.

The preparation of the first NHDR inAfghanistan enjoyed strong Governmentsupport, since we believe in its contributionto current efforts to develop a coherentdevelopment strategy for the upcomingyears based on reliable data and objectiveanalysis.

As was expected, the report has painted agloomy picture of the status of humandevelopment in the country after twodecades of war and destruction. TheHuman Development Index (HDI) valuecalculated nationally puts Afghanistan atthe dismal ranking of 173 out of 178countries worldwide. Yet the HDI alsopresents us with a benchmark againstwhich progress can be measured in thefuture.

The Government of Afghanistan may notagree with all the contents of this NHDR,which has been prepared by a team ofindependent authors, but we are confidentthat the recommendations and conclusionsof the report will contribute to themultiplicity of debates for shaping thefuture of Afghanistan.

Hamid KarzaiPresident of the Islamic

Republic of Afghanistan

FOREWORD V

Preface

It is my pleasure to introduce the firstNHDR for Afghanistan. Since 1990, theUnited Nations Development Programme(UNDP) has produced annual globalHuman Development Reports as analyticaland policy tools designed to promote theconcept of human development. Each year,these reports calculate the HumanDevelopment Index and rank about 175participating countries; unfortunately,Afghanistan has not been included since1996 due to the unavailability of data. Weare especially proud this year to be ableto put Afghanistan back in the globalranking, which assesses progress madetowards the well-being of all people.

Since 1992, UNDP has also sponsoredNHDRs prepared as well as owned byindependent national teams. So far, morethan 479 national and sub-national reportshave been produced by 135 countries, inaddition to 24 regional reports.Afghanistan’s first NHDR, commissionedby UNDP but compiled by an independentteam of authors, joins this family in 2004.

After 23 years of war, Afghanistan hasnow entered a period of stabilizationconduc ive t o t he de s ign andimplementation of a new developmentvision. As the new Government sets outto devise long-term, sustainable policies,the first NHDR for Afghanistan proposesan ambitious vision: putting all Afghanpeople equally at the forefront of all newpolicies, both as the ends and the meansof democracy and development.

The report uses a human security lens tolook at the linkages between safety, dignityand livelihoods. For too long, the problemsof Afghanistan were seen as being theresult of a political conflict that requiredmilitary solutions. The NHDR expandsthe notion of “security” in Afghanistan tocover not only freedom from violence and

human rights abuses, but also the abilityof the Afghan people to access basic needs(education, health, food, shelter, incomes,livelihoods, etc.) and strategic needs(participation, dignity, empowerment, etc.).The report argues that while many gainshave been made in the past two years, thecountry could still fall into a cycle ofconflict and instability unless the genuinegrievances of people – the lack of jobs,health, education, income, dignity,opportunities for participation, etc. – aredealt with adequately. The report analysesthe local roots of insecurity today, andmakes recommendations for policies andactions required from the new AfghanGovernment, civil society and theinternational community.

This first NHDR for Afghanistan providesthree out of four human developmentindices: the Human Development Index(HDI), the Gender Development Index(GDI) and the Human Poverty Index (HPI).At this stage, the HDI, GDI and HPI couldonly be calculated at the national level,given that stat ist ics on incomedisaggregated by district or even provincewere not available. I am confident that anexpanding and increasingly reliable poolof data will allow subsequent NHDR teamsto prepare more thorough analyses in thenext few years.

With this report, UNDP is also launchinga long-term commitment to support theproduction of biannual NHDRs inAfghanistan. These will contribute to thecalculation of progress in humandevelopment indicators. While the currentreport presents a broad overview ofnumerous interlinked challenges forAfghanistan today, future editions will bedevoted to particular topics. Therecommendations in this NHDR are broad;subsequent in-depth studies will evaluateconcrete policy options.

PREFACEVI

The preparation of this report laid thefoundations for extensive sharing ofinformation and advocacy on humandevelopment through trainings, thecommissioning of studies, lectures andnationwide consultations. It also led tocapacity building for the systematiccollection, verification and analysis of datato produce the HDI. The NHDR teammade every effort to carry out a nationalprocess under the guidance of a NationalAdvisory Panel. Workshops, consultationsand dialogues were held with Afghans inKabul and four other provinces regardingthe theme, the process and the findings ofthe report.

A large team of national and internationalexperts contributed to the preparation ofthis NHDR, and I am grateful for all theirefforts, as well as for the support providedby the Transitional Islamic State ofAfghanistan during all stages. I am

especially grateful for the support ofMinister of Finance Ashraf Ghani, andMinister of Rural Rehabilitation andDevelopment Haneef Atmar, a humandevelopment champion.

I hope that this and future NHDRs forAfghanistan will become important toolsfor the promotion of people-centredapproaches to policy making. I also hopethat the information offered here will proveuseful for the planning and programmingpurposes of the new Government, as wellas for those national and internationalorganizations working on behalf of theAfghan people.

Ercan MuratCountry Director

UNDP Afghanistan

PREFACE VII

Preface from the NHDR Team

Based on the recommendations of theNHDR Corporate Policy, the preparationof the first NHDR for Afghanistan wasinitiated by the Government of Afghanistanand UNDP in line with the principles ofnational ownership, objectivity andindependence in April 2003. The NHDRproduction team made every effort toinvolve Afghans in the identification ofproblems and solutions for the country.Preparation included five stages during ayear and a half of activities:

• Stage 1 included capacity buildingthrough two trainings, three seminarsand four thematic lectures in Kabul,and four workshops in Jalalabad,Bamyan, Balkh and Herat. This stagealso involved the creation of a NationalAdvisory Panel and an InternationalExpert Committee, consultationsthrough workshops with the media,and parallel statistical capacity buildingwith the Central Statistical Office(CSO) of Afghanistan.

• Stage 2 consisted of commissioningseven sectoral background papers and18 thematic papers from nationalresearchers. Consultations were alsoheld in Kabul and in some regions toprepare boxes for the report onpeople ’ s v iews about the i rdevelopment and security needs.

• Stage 3 saw the compilation of thefindings into the various chapters bythe national and contributing authorsunder the guidance of the editor-in-chief.

• Stage 4 involved consultation on thefinal draft with national andinternational advisors. Two rounds ofpeer review on the summary and draftchapters solicited written and oralcomments from key ministers of theGovernment, the National Advisory

Panel, the International ExpertCommittee, UNDP staff and “Friendsof the NHDR”.

• Stage 5 covered the preparation forthe dissemination of the report,including the creation of press kits anda communication strategy involvinga number of workshops with themedia. Sensitizing representatives ofthe media through inviting them toworkshops and press conferences tookplace throughout the NHDR process.

The Human Development ResourceOffice

The nerve centre of the production of theNHDR for Afghanistan was the HumanDevelopment Resource Office, headed byNational Coordinator Abdullah Mojaddedi,and staffed by an administrative andresearch officer, an internationalstatistician, a data analyst and a translator.The office was supported by UNDP inAfghanistan, especially by CountryDirector Ercan Murat, and NHDR focalpoints Fakhruddin Azizi and MichaelSchoiswohl.

Under the management of Mr. Mojaddedi,the resource centre was equipped withcomputers connected to the Internet, aphotocopier, a library of books andresources on human development, and ameeting room. It was located first in theoffices of the UNDP ProgrammeImplementation Unit, and then movedwithin the compound of the AfghanistanInformation Management Service (AIMS)Office in Kabul.

The Human Development Resource Officeworked in close cooperation withgovernmental agencies, research andacademic institutions, and internationalagencies involved in gathering data andresearch. It also organized NHDR seminars

The HumanDevelopment Reportsof Afghanistan shouldbe an instrument foraccountability. Theyshould be used by thepeople of Afghanistanto monitor how wehave performed withregard to their needsand aspirations.

Haneef Atmar, Minister of RuralRehabilitation and Development,a human development champion

PREFACE FROM THE NHDR TEAMVIII

and human development lectures on aregular basis.

The Authors

The NHDR involved a large number ofauthors, contributors and background paperwriters. These included:

Editor-in-chief:

• Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh: AdjunctLecturer, Columbia University; GuestProfessor, Institut d’Etudes Politiques(Sciences-Po), Paris; and formerNHDR Policy Advisor, HumanDevelopment Report Office, UNDPNew York.

Authors:

• Daud S. Saba: independent researcher,writer and former lecturer at the KabulPolytechnic University.

• Omar Zakhilwal: Senior Advisor tothe Minister, Ministry of RuralRehabilitation and Development; andProfessor of Development Economics,Kabul University.

Contributing authors:

• Abi Masefield: poverty specialist,consultant and former advisor to theMinistry of Rural Rehabilitation andDevelopment in Kabul.

• Michael Schoiswohl: lawyer, UNDPProgramme Officer, Kabul.

The NHDR office commissioned sevensectoral background papers and 18 briefthematic papers or theoretical think-pieces.

Background papers authors:

• Poverty: Mohammad Najeeb Azizi,former macroeconomist, Ministry ofFinance.

• Gender: Homira Nassery, Advisor toSenior Women in Management,UNDP and the Ministry of RuralRehabilitation and Development.

• Environment: Daud S. Saba,independent researcher, writer andformer lecturer at the KabulPolytechnic University.

• Education: Lutfullah Safi, EducationCoordinator, UNESCO.

• Health: Naqibullah Safi, SeniorA d v i s o r , P r i m a r y H e a l t hCare/Preventive Affairs to the Ministryof Health.

• Economy: Said Mubin Shah,economist, Da Afghanistan Bank.

• Governance: Nasrullah Stanikzai,Director , Foreign Relat ions ,President’s Secretariat; and Lecturerat the Faculty of Law and PoliticalScience, Kabul University.

Thematic papers authors:

• Abdul Baqi Banwal: Lecturer ofEconomics, Kabul University; andProject Coordinator, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.

• Ramazan Bashar Dost: Minister ofPlanning.

• Nancy Dupree: Senior consultant,ACBAR Research and InformationCenter (ARIC) and the AgencyCoordinating Body for Afghan Relief(ACBAR).

• Abdul Rashid Fakhri: Director ofDemography, Central Statistics Office.

• Abdullah Haqaiqi: Professor ofEconomics, Kabul University.

• Mir Ahmad Joyenda: Deputy Directorfor Communication and Advocacy,Afghanistan Research and EvaluationUnit (AREU).

• Partaw Nadiri: Media Manager,Afghan Civil Society Forum.

• Ahmad Zia Neikbin: Head of theDepartment of Philosophy andSociology, Kabul University.

PREFACE FROM THE NHDR TEAM IX

• Daud Rawish: Dean of the PedagogicalUniversity and former Chair of theDepartment of Social Sciences, KabulUniversity.

• Asadul lah Walwal j i : wr i te r .

• Seddiq Weera: advisor, Ministry ofEducation.

Data Collection

Collecting data and statistics in a post-conflict country like Afghanistan was notan easy task. In the absence of a nationalcensus for 25 years, a nationwidedemographic survey and a householdincome survey, and with a low capacityto gather and analyse administrative datafrom different ministries, the NHDR faceda daunting challenge in correctly estimatingmany of the main human developmentindicators. The project worked closelywith the CSO and the national andinternational agencies that have conductedsurveys up to now. The NHDR also usedthe services of Mr. R. N. Pandey, Directorof the Department of Industrial Policy andPromotion at the Ministry of Commerceand Industry of the Government of India.During three months in Kabul, he helpedcompile the human development indicatorsused in this report.

In addition to the CSO data and StatisticalYear Book 2003, the NHDR heavily reliedon the UNICEF/CSO Multiple IndicatorCluster Survey (MICS) of 2003, whichcovered the entire country, and the 2003National Risk and VulnerabilityAssessment (NRVA) survey, whichprovided data on poverty in ruralAfghanistan. For provincial data, collectionwas hampered by lack of sufficient centre-periphery communication, infrastructureand networking problems, and the overalllack of access to provinces, especiallyremote ones. Disaggregating the human

development indices for provinces provedan impossible task due to the lack of data.

The NHDR National Advisory Panel

The ten-member NHDR National AdvisoryPanel constituted itself on 2 September2003, and served as the steering committeeoverseeing the drafting of the report andproviding substantive guidance. Thecomposition of the panel reflected variousprofessional fields relevant to humandevelopment. The panel was chaired byMinister of Rural Rehabilitation andDevelopment Haneef Atmar. Othermembers included many of the drafters ofthe thematic papers:

• Abdul Baqi Banwal: Lecturer ofEconomics, Kabul University; andProject Coordinator, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.

• Abdul Rashid Fakhri: Director ofDemography, CSO

• Hafizullah Haddad: Head of Planning,Academy of Sciences.

• Abdullah Haqaiqi: Professor ofEconomics, Kabul University.

• Helena Malikyar: researcher, NewYork University.

• Nilab Mobarez: medical doctor andrepresentative of the NGO EnfantsAfghans.

• Daud Rawish: Dean of the PedagogicalUniversity and former Chair ofDepartment of Social Sciences, KabulUniversity.

• Safia Siddiqi: Advisor, Ministry ofRural Rehabilitation and Development;Spokesperson of the ConstitutionalLoya Jirgah, December–January 2004;and Deputy Chair of the ConstitutionalLoya Jirgah.

• Asadullah Walwalji: writer.

PREFACE FROM THE NHDR TEAMX

The International Expert Committee

An International Expert Committee,consisting of international researchersworking on Afghanistan, provided theNHDR Team with relevant expertise onthematic areas. The members included:

• Katarina Ammitzboell: formerAss is tan t Count ry Direc tor ,Governance, UNDP Afghanistan.

• Nancy Hatch Dupree: seniorconsultant, ARIC Resource andInformation Center and ACBAR.

• Carol le-Duc: Senior Social Scientist(Gender), World Bank (WB), Kabul.

• Ishaq Nadiri: J. Gold Professor ofEconomics, New York University, andsenior member of the National Bureauof Economic Research.

• Omar Noman: Senior Advisor to theDirector, Regional Bureau for AsiaPacific, UNDP New York.

• Barnett Rubin: Director of Studies,Center of International Cooperation,New York University.

• Andrew Wilder: Director of AREU,Kabul.

Workshops, Lectures and Consultations

As part of the strategy to build thenecessary capacity for the drafting ofAfghanistan’s first NHDR, workshopswere held in Kabul and four otherprovinces. These also raised publicawareness of human development and theNHDR process.

• The first workshop was held in Kabulon 8–9 December 2003 for 43 nationaland international participants. It wasmeant as a first opportunity to trainthe National Advisory Panel memberson the concept of human developmentand calculation of the humandevelopment indices. Participantsbrainstormed on possible themes for

the report and laid out a plan for tasksrelated to preparation.

• A second workshop on statistics washeld on 5–11 April 2004 for 20representatives of the CSO and variousministries. Participants were givenexercises on the calculation of thehuman development indices andreceived a final certificate.

• As part of a regional outreach strategy,a series of workshops and lectures onhuman development, human securityand the NHDRs were held at thefollowing academic institutions inKabul. Each lecture was followed bydiscussions and consultations, andquestionnaires were circulated tocollect the views of participants:

Kabul University: Around 300students attended and activelyparticipated in a discussion led byNational Advisory Panel membersAbdul Baqi Banwal and AsadullahWalwalji on 9 May 2004.

Academy of Sciences: Around 30scholars of various disciplines attendeda discussion led by National AdvisoryPanel member Hafizullah Haddad on10 May 2004.

Pedagogical University: One hundredand fifty students and teachers fromthe Pedagogical University and thePolytechnic Institute attended aworkshop led by National AdvisoryPanel members Abdullah Haqaiqi andDaud Rawish on 16 May 2004.

• Similar workshops and lectures wereheld at universities in four majorprovincial capitals. National AdvisoryPanel members presented lectures,answered questions from 1,000students and instructors, and collectedVoices of People. These eventsincluded:

Jalalabad: discussions led by SafiaSiddiqi

PREFACE FROM THE NHDR TEAM XI

Bamyan: discussions led by AbdulRashid Fakhri and Helena Malikyar

Balkh: discussions led by AsadullahWalwalji

Herat: panel member AbdullahHaqaiqi and NHDR author Daud Sabaheld a gathering in the District ofAdraskan’s Grand Mosque thatbrought together religious scholarsand representatives of various tribes.They also spoke with the Board ofDirectors of the Association ofProfessionals in Herat, and held a townhall meeting in the municipality anda workshop at the University of Herat.

The NHDR team had also planned to visitKhost, Takhar and Kandahar, but thosetrips did not materialize due to a shortageof time, and logistics and securityproblems.

A Lecture Series

Starting in April 2004, the NHDR officeorganized monthly lectures on topicsrelated to human development. Theseincluded:

• “The Gender Issue in Afghanistan”by Homira Nassery

• “The Health Situation” by NaqibullahSafi

• “The Status of Education inAfghanistan” by Lutfullah Safi

• “Environment in Afghanistan” byDaud S. Saba

Advocacy

• Articles were published on humandevelopment, human security and theNHDR in local newspapers andjournals by panel members AbdullahHaqaiqi and Daud Rawish, and byNHDR Research and AdministrativeAssistant Sadeq Wardak.

• On 10 February 2004, the NHDROffice and panel members NilabMobarez and Asadullah Walwaljiannounced the preparation of the firstNHDR in Afghanistan to the media,and discussed the human developmentconcept.

PREFACE FROM THE NHDR TEAMXII

Afghanistan’s first NHDR was the productof a multidisciplinary team. This allowedthe report to incorporate multipleperspectives, which was particularlyappropriate given the kaleidoscopic natureof Afghanistan today. The authors tried togo beyond a simple presentation andanalysis of human development indicators.Instead, the intention was to contextualizethem in a broader framework, and toanalyse possible causes, consequences andimpacts. Given that the report is anintroductory NHDR, the authors also triedto present theories and baselines uponwhich the upcoming cycle of biannualanalyses could be based. Future reportswill provide more detailed analyses ofparticular topics as well as concreterecommendations.

To this end, the structure of the reportmoves the reader gradually through varioussteps culminating in the conclusions andrecommendations presented in the lastchapter. These building blocks, each ofwhich could stand on their own, wereintended to have a cumulative impact.They include:

• A conceptual framework that explainswhy the authors are taking a particularview on the current problems inAfghanistan.

• A presentation of indicators as theystand today, using sources from theCSO, the most comprehensive surveysavailable (NRVA and MICS), andpublished statistics from internationaland national agencies. Most data arefootnoted to show their source.

• An analysis of the causes andconsequences of these indicators fromthe point of view of greed andgrievances, fears and wants. Theanalysis presented in the report buildson the latest global discussions on therelationships between democracy,development and conflict.

• Where applicable, historical facts thatoffer lessons from the past.

• An examination of governance anddevelopment processes from the

viewpoint of human security andhuman development.

• Lessons learned from the role of aidin post-conflict situations.

• A set of both broad and more specificrecommendations.

The report has a number of intendedaudiences in mind. The authors sought toprovide some knowledge of Afghanistanas well as conceptual thinking ondevelopment, an important element forstrategic consideration of long-term needs.Both aspects will prove useful for:

• Policy makers, who may draw ideasfrom the report’s conclusions.

• International aid workers, whosecontribution to the stabilization ofAfghanistan could benefit from lessonslearned in other conflict and post-conflict situations. The historicaloverviews may also help developmentpractitioners and members of theinternational community to betterunderstand the complicated context inwhich they work.

• Members of civil society inAfghanistan and outside, who coulduse parts of the report for advocacy.

• Students, who may learn and discussthe report’s various theories.

The different forms of expertise that shapedthe report are reflected in the variouschapters. Social scientists contributed tothe theoretical framework of Chapter 1,and the greed and grievance analysis ofChapter 4; statisticians calculated theindicators presented in Chapters 2 and 3;lawyers and constitutional experts helpedform the analysis of governance in Chapter5; development specialists and economistscontributed to the analysis of strategies inChapter 6; development practitioners withinternational experience reviewed the roleof aid presented in Chapter 7; and socialhistorians provided input on Afghanhistory. The conclusions were vetted withthe authors as well as with members of theNational Advisory Panel.

A few words about the report

A FEW WORDS XIII

Dupree, Carol le-Duc, Ishaq Nadiri, OmarNoman, Barnett Rubin, Andrew Wilder)provided guidance throughout the processand gave invaluable comments on the draft.

Acknowledgements go to all the authorsof the background and thematic papersnamed above. Authors Daud Saba andOmar Zakhilwal did an outstanding jobcompiling the findings from the papers,and conducting additional research toproduce the first draft. Along with AbiMasefield and Michael Schoiswohl, theycontributed countless hours to writing thedifferent chapters and commenting on theoverall report. Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh’sdedicated support to the AfghanistanNHDR included designing the project,conducting trainings in Dari, contributingto the writing of chapters and editing thefinal report during various missions toKabul and electronically at other times.Students from her spring 2004 HumanSecurity Class at Sciences-Po, Paris,especially Hanna Schmitt, Jeanette Kroesand Chowra Makaremi, contributed papersas well.

The international statistician R. N. Pandeyworked for three months with the NHDRteam to calculate the human developmentindices and compile the statistical annexesfor the report.

Abdul Qayum Qawim and MohammadHussain Yamin edited the Dari version ofthe report, which was translated by SadeqWardak and his team. The design, layoutand printing were done by Army Press,Islamabad. We are grateful to Zanbel-e-Gham magazine’s staff and cartoonists forallowing us to use their cartoons.

Acknowledgements also go to Researchand Administrative Officer Sadeq Wardak,Data Analyst Haqiq Rahmani, ResearchAssistants Abdul Latif Bari and Khial M.Sahebi, and Translator Talib Rahman

The preparation of this report was madepossible due to the contributions andsupport of many organizations andindividuals, who generously gave theNHDR team their valuable time and ideas.

The NHDR benefited greatly from theadvice and guidance of the prominentexperts on the National Advisory Panel,including Minister of Rural Rehabilitationand Development Haneef Atmar, AbdulBaqi Banwal, Abdul Rashid Fakhri,Hafizullah Haddad, Abdullah Haqaiqi,Helena Malikyar, Nilab Mobarez, DaudRawish, Safia Siddiqi and AsadullahWalwalji.

The valuable feedback provided byMinister of Finance Ashraf Ghani andMinister of Rural Rehabilitation andDevelopment Haneef Atmar is deeplyappreciated.

The team is grateful for the constantsupport of UNDP Afghanistan CountryDirector Ercan Murat, Senior DeputyCountry Director Karen Jorgenson, andformer Assistant Country Director KatarinaAmmitzboell. UNDP focal pointsFakhruddin Azizi and Michael Schoiswohlconstantly provided assistance. A readersgroup made up of UNDP Afghanistanofficials provided very useful comments,inputs and suggestions on the draft of thereport. Zahira Virani’s comments and editsare especially appreciated, as are EmiliaMugnai’s contributions to Chapter 5, andGretchen Luchsinger Sidhu copyediting.Omar Noman, Senior Advisor to theUNDP Regional Bureau for Asia Pacific,provided constant support. ElianaEscobedo Gonzàles, UNDP MediaConsultant, designed the communicationstrategy for the launch and outreach of thereport.

The International Expert Committee(Katarina Ammitzboell, Nancy Hatch

Acknowledgements

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSXIV

Rahmani. The entire project came togetherunder the able management of NationalCoordinator Abdullah Mojaddedi.

Several national and internationalinstitutions shared their knowledge,research materials, surveys and data withthe NHDR team. We benefited in manyways from the following institutions inAfghanistan and their officials: UNICEF(Jonathan Cauldwell and Nadia Behboodi),the CSO (Director Mohammad AliWatanyar, and Asmatullah Ramzi andAbdul Rashid Fakhri), the AIMS (DavidSaunders, Golam Monowar Kamal, JoeCrowley and Ahmad Sear Rifahy), theMinistry of Finance, the Ministry of Health,the Ministry of Education, the Ministry ofHigher Education, the United NationsAssistance Mission in Afghanistan(UNAMA), AREU (Andrew Wilder,Thomas Muller and Royce Wiles),UNHCR (Pablo Mateu and Anna Bendall),UNODC (Ziauddin Zaki and Nazir AhmadShah), UNMACA (Abdul GhafarMohibzada), the WFP, UNEP and DaAfghanistan Bank (Asadullah Mojaddidiand Said Mubin Shah). The continued

valuable support of Andrew Pinney(NRVA) is also highly appreciated. Thelist of officials mentioned in the aboveorganizations is not comprehensive, butgratitude goes to all those who providedassistance.

Provincial authorities and universities inHerat, Jalalabad, Balkh and Bamyan werevery helpful in organizing the regionalworkshops and public consultations.Authorities of the University of Kabul, thePedagogical University of Kabul and theAcademy of Sciences in Kabul also helpedin facilitating workshops and consultationson their premises.

Financial support for the NHDR wasprovided by UNDP, the CanadianInternational Development Agency(CIDA) and the WB. Without their support,it would not have been possible to sustainthis comprehensive project.

Last but not least, we are grateful to allthe “Friends of the NHDR” for theirsupport of the process, as well as theircontributions to and participation in ourworkshops and lectures.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS XV

AACA Afghan Assistance Coordination AuthorityACBAR Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan ReliefAIHRC Afghan Independent Human Rights CommissionAIMS Afghanistan Information Management ServiceANA Afghan National ArmyANBP Afghan New Beginnings ProgramANP Afghan National PoliceAREU Afghanistan Research and Evaluation UnitARTF Afghan Reconstruction Trust FundCSO Central Statistical OfficeDAB Da Afghanistan BankDAD Donor Assistance DatabaseDDR Disarmament, Demobilization and ReintegrationFDI Foreign Direct InvestmentGDP Gross Domestic ProductGNP Gross National ProductHRW Human Rights WatchIARCSC Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service CommissionICG International Crisis GroupICRC International Committee of the Red CrossIDP Internally Displaced PersonIMF International Monetary FundIOM International Organization for MigrationIRC International Rescue CommitteeISAF International Security Assistance ForcesITAP Immediate and Transitional Assistance Programme for the Afghan PeopleJEMB Joint Electoral Management BodyLCG Local Consultative GroupMDGs Millennium Development GoalsMICS Multiple Indicator Cluster SurveyMRRD Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and DevelopmentNDB National Development BudgetNDF National Development FrameworkNEEP National Emergency Employment ProgrammeNRVA National Risk and Vulnerability AssessmentNSP National Solidarity ProgrammePDPA People’s Democratic Party of AfghanistanPPP Purchasing Power ParityPRT Provincial Reconstruction TeamSF Strategic FrameworkTISA Transitional Islamic State of AfghanistanUXO Unexploded OrdnanceWB World BankUNAMA The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

Abbreviations

ABBREVIATIONSXVI

Bank-i Milli National BankChaddari VeilHejrat MigrationKareez Underground canals connecting wellsKuchi NomadLoya Jirgah Grand Council, “Grand Assembly of Elders”Maharam Man from the women’s familyMaulawi Religious ScholarMeshrano Jirgah SenateMujahideen Freedom FightersShariat or sharia Islamic LawSharwali MunicipalityShura CouncilUlama Religious ScholarsWalayat ProvinceWolesi Jirgah National AssemblyWoleswali District

Glossary of Afghan expressions

GLOSSARY XVII

Map 0.1: Afghanistan with Provincial Borders

MAP OF AFGHANISTANXVIII

Table of Contents

Photo: Anthony Fitzherbert

The Preparatory Team

Foreword V

Preface VI

Preface from the NHDR Team VIII

A Few Words about the Report XIII

Acknowledgements XIV

Abbreviations XVI

Glossary of Afghan Expressions XVII

Overview XXV

Chapter 1

Concepts and Implications

1.1. Human Development and Human Security as an Analytical Framework 31.2. Relevance of a Human Security Framework for Afghanistan 61.3. The Responsibility for Human Security 10

Chapter 2

The Status of Human Underdevelopment and People’s Insecurities in Afghanistan

2.1. Introduction 172.2. The Status of Composite Human Development Indicators in Afghanistan 182.3. Components of the Human Development Indices 262.4. Some Human Insecurity Indicators for Afghanistan 332.5. Conclusions 45

Chapter 3

A Threat-based Analysis of Wants and Fears

3.1. Why a Threat-based Analysis? 493.2. Threats to Human Security in Afghanistan Today 513.3. Conclusions 89

Chapter 4

Causes and consequences of insecurities

4.1. Introduction 934.2. A Framework of Motives and Opportunities 964.3. Causes of the Conflict: Grievances and Greed 984.4. Impacts and Coping Strategies 1134.5. Conclusions 119

Contents

CONTENTS XXI

Chapter 5

Evaluation of Afghanistan’s State-building Process from a Human Security Perspective

5.1. The Current Reconstruction Process from a Human Security Perspective 1235.2. The Path to State-building 1245.3. Rule of Law and Human Rights 1435.4. Security Sector Reform 1525.5. Role of Civil Society Institutions 1555.6. Conclusions: Building a State for Good Governance 160

Chapter 6

What Kind of Development Vision is Needed for the New Sovereign State?

6.1. Introduction 1656.2. History 1656.3. The Present: Setting National Development Priorities 1686.4. A Future of Human Security 1826.5. Conclusions 198

Chapter 7

The Role of the International Community: Aid and Peace-building

7.1. Accountability and Legitimacy 2017.2. Analytical Framework: The Conspicuous Role of Aid in Conflicts 2027.3. Lessons from a History of Politicized Aid 2057.4. A Promise to Keep and a Responsibility towards Human Security 2087.5. Challenges to Needs Identification and Aid Distribution in Afghanistan 2117.6. Conclusions 219

Chapter 8

Recommendations: Laying the Foundations for Democracy, Development and Human Security in Afghanistan

8.1. The Dilemma of Afghanistan 2238.2. Recommendations and Elements of a Human Security Vision for Afghanistan 2288.3. Human Security as Public Good for Afghanistan 2368.4. Summary: Dimensions of Human Security in Afghanistan 243

Bibliography 247

Annexures

A.1. Building Statistical Capacity and Infrastructure: An Urgent Need 263A.2. Technical Appendix on Statistics 269A.3. Statistical Indicators Template 275A.4. Definitions of Statistical Terms 285

CONTENTSXXII

MAPS

0.1 Map of Afghanistan with Provincial Borders XVIII2.1 Percentage of Children 7-13 Years Not Enroled in School by Province, 2003 302.2 Percentage of Girls 7-13 Years Not Enroled in School by Province, 2003 313.1 Calorie Gap Rate by Province, 2003 543.2 Distribution of Doctors per 10,000 People by Province 643.3 Distribution of Hospital Beds per 10,000 People by Province 653.4 Number of Students per Teacher by Province 673.5 Distribution of Schools per 10,000 People by Province 683.6 Percentage of Households with No Drinking Water by Province, 2003 733.7 Percentage of Households Not Using a Flush or Pit Toilet by Province 743.8 Percentage of Villages per District in which Landmines Affect Access to Schools,

Markets, Agricultural Land, Water or Homes, 2003 873.9 Mined Area Situation in Afghanistan as of May 2004 883.10 Total Area Cleared of Landmines as of March 2004 884.1 Deforestation in Nuristan, Kunar and Nangarhar Provinces (1977-2002) 1054.2 Afghanistan Poppy Production by Province 2003-2003 1084.3 Afghanistan Poppy Cultivation by Province, 2002-2003 109

BOXES

1.1 A Human Security Framework for Post-conflict Peace-building 72.1 Health-related Statistics 272.2 Findings of the NRVA 363.1 Study on “Human Security and Livelihoods of Rural Afghans, 2002-2003” 504.1 The Different Phases of the Afghan Conflict since 1979 944.2 Daulat Versus Yaghestan: An Afghan Tragedy of Representative Government 965.1 The State According to the 1382 (2004) Constitution 1305.2 The Afghan Constitution and Educational Rights 1315.3 Main Administrative Constraints 1335.4 The Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission 1345.5 State-periphery Relations in Post-conflict Situations 1365.6 Access to Justice in Post-conflict Situations 1455.7 Treaties to Which Afghanistan is a Party 1495.8 Security Sector Reform and the Berlin Declaration 1545.9 Defining Civil Society and its Significance in the Afghan Context 1565.10 Examples of Civil Society Involvement in Afghanistan 1595.11 Good Governance – For What? 1606.1 National Priority Programmes 1696.2 Financing Development 1816.3 Debt in Afghanistan 1907.1 What is the Rationale for Aid? 2108.1 What Afghanistan Needs - What People Need 2248.2 What kind of Democracy does Afghanistan Need? 2268.3 Why is Culture Important to Human Development? 232A.1 The Government and UNDP set the Standards 266

CHARTS

2.1 HDI Comparison with Neighbouring Countries, 2002 192.2 Comparison of PPP-Adjusted GDP per Capita, 2002 192.3 Comparison of Literacy Rates 20

CONTENTS XXIII

2.4 GDI Comparison with Neighbouring Countries, 2002 202.5 Comparison of Male/Female Life Expectancy at Birth, 2002 212.6 Comparison of Male/Female Adult Literacy Rate (Age 15 and Above) 212.7 Comparison of Male/Female (Primary, Secondary and Tertiary) Gross Enrolment Ratios, 2002 222.8 Comparison of Male/Female PPP-Adjusted Per Capita GDP, 2002 222.9 Comparison of HPI Values, 2002 242.10 Probability at Birth of Not Surviving to Age 40, 2002 242.11 Household with No Safe Drinking Water from Pumps or Protected Springs 252.12 Children Underweight for Age (% under age 5), 2001 252.13 Comparison of Life Expectancy at Birth, 2002 262.14 Distribution of Food Expenditure by Income Groups 352.15 Reported Poverty Shocks 372.16 Correlation between Population without Sanitation (%) and Child Mortality Rate 392.17 Reason for Not Returning to Place of Origin 432.18 Reason for Displacement 433.1 Regional Disparities in the Distribution of School Students, 2002 693.2 Gender Disparities in Distribution of School Students, 2002 693.3 Landmine Victims in 2003 893.4 Landmine Victims by Gender 2003 896.1 Sectoral Components of the Development Budget 1383 (2004) – 1389 (2010) 182

TABLES

2.1 Human Development Indices, 2002 182.2 Selected Indicators for Poverty, Vulnerability and Risk in Afghanistan 262.3 Literacy and Gross Enrolment Ratios 282.4 Education Related Statistics 292.5 Gross Domestic Product by Sector 322.6 Investment Record in Million US$ 322.7 Trade Records during 1381 (2002) in Million US$ 332.8 Distribution of Income and Consumption 342.9 School Non-attendance Reasons by Wealth Group and Gender 403.1 Distinctive Characteristics of Urban Poverty and Vulnerability in Afghanistan 563.2 Percentage of Rural Afghans who cannot Access Reproductive Health Care, 2002-2003 593.3 Percentage of Rural Afghans who can Access Reproductive Health Care, 2002-2003 633.4 Percentage of Rural Afghans Living Among Landmines and UXOs by Province, 2003 874.1 Afghanistan Opium Production from 1999 to 2003 1075.1 Rural Afghans’ Opinions of the New Constitution 1286.1 Operating Budget Expenditures 1381 (2002) - 1382 (2003) 183-1846.2 MDG Targets for Afghanistan 1856.3 Debts incurred by Previous Administrations 1380 (2001) and Before 1907.1 Donor Disbursement Table 2137.2 Total Assistance to Afghanistan 1380 (2001) - 1382 (2003) 214

FIGURES

5.1 Structure of Administration 1305.2 Structure of the Government 1335.3 Public Employment in Afghanistan 1355.4 NSP: Breakdown of Responsibilities 1385.5 National Initiatives in Security Sector 1536.1 Consultative Group Mechanism 1706.2 Growth Scenarios of Afghanistan 188

CONTENTSXXIV

OVERVIEW XXV

Overview

Security with a Human Face: Challenges and Responsibilities

Security is not just the end of war, but theability to go about one’s business safely,to go to work or home, to travel outsideknowing that one’s family will not sufferharm. It is the assurance that developmentgains made today will not be taken awaytomorrow. For Afghans, human securityis not only the ability to survive, but alsothe chance to live a life of dignity and haveadequate livelihoods. Bringing an end toinsecurity should not therefore be soughtsolely through short-term militarysolutions, but with a long-term,comprehensive strategy that abides by thepromises of development and thepromotion of human rights.

For too long, the security problem inAfghanistan has been interpreted narrowlyas the security of the “state” from internaland external aggression, or as the protectionof the interests of fragmented groupsclaiming political legitimacy, or from theperspective of global and regional interests.Often neglected have been the humansecurity needs of the population at large.Forgotten were the legitimate concerns ofordinary people who sought safety anddignity in their daily lives.

This NHDR ventures beyond thetraditional narrative of the “securityproblem” in Afghanistan. It proposes thatthe real security challenge is for thereconstruction process to generate themeans to provide services and jobs, andprotect human rights, especially in ruralareas. Insecurity in Afghanistan is not onlya problem of physical safety, but also ofdeprivation and restricted access to healthand education facilities, legal and politicalrights, and social opportunities.

The NHDR team that prepared this reportgathered a variety of voices from theirmeetings at universities and town halls.The overwhelming majority of peopleexpressed their sense of pessimism andfear that reconstruction has bypassed theordinary Afghan.

Centring a discussion about security onall the people of Afghanistan entails theidea that human security is a public goodto which everyone is equally entitled. It isnot the privilege of those defending theirinterests through war. This approach leadsto two messages for state-building inAfghanistan:

1) First, a positive message of newresponsibilities for the new Afghandemocracy: Human security as apublic good entails state responsibility,as well as a corresponding duty ofengagement by the people. The statedraws its meaning and morallegitimacy from its response to thepeople. With the ultimate aims ofensuring survival, livelihoods anddignity, the obligations of those inpositions of power – the state and theinternational community – consist ofprotecting, providing and empowering.Those in a position to receive – peopleand communities – must assume,demand and defend their rights.

2) Second, a warning to prevent a newcycle of further instability and renewedconflict: The existence of “horizontalinequalities”, defined in this report asdifferentiated access to socio-economicopportunities, resources and power-sharing among various groups, couldcreate a reality of multiple experiences

OVERVIEWXXVI

within Afghanistan. Horizontalinequalities could renew deep-rootedconflicts when they combine identitywith inequality in a historically oremotionally charged situation. Powerinequalities and asymmetries inAfghanistan today include sources oflong-term as well as short-termgrievances, ranging from economicinequality to imbalances stemmingfrom gender, geography, religion,ethnicity, etc. Because these grievanceshave been manipulated to fuel conflictin the past, their continued existenceis not only unfair, but also potentiallydangerous.

In the future, preventing conflicts willrequire targeting and responding to rootcauses, both internal and external. Withthe renewed sovereignty of Afghanistan,a window of opportunities has opened tobuild a sustainable peace based on popularaspirations and participation. The humansecurity challenge in Afghanistan today isfor a devolution of power to take place atthe same time that power is consolidatedat the centre. Striking the right balancewill call for the state to provide humansecurity as a public good, while at thesame t ime incorporat ing publicparticipation in the peace-building process.

These messages are elaborated withinAfghanistan’s first NHDR in eightchapters.

• Chapter 1 presents the conceptualframework of human development andhuman security, and introduces theirapplication to the situation inAfghanistan today.

• Chapter 2 assesses the status ofhuman development indicators forAfghanistan: the Human DevelopmentIndex (HDI), Gender DevelopmentIndex (GDI) and Human Poverty Index(HPI) are calculated for the first time.These highlight the challenges of

reconstruction and development inAfghanistan, and provide a baselinefor measuring future progress.

• Chapter 3 provides a threat-basedanalysis of the human developmentand human security indicators forAfghanistan, categorizing them interms of “fears” (safety as well asstrategic needs such as human rights)and “wants” (the basic needs ofdevelopment).

• Chapter 4 employs a framework of“greed” and “grievances” to analysethe causes of 23 years of conflict.Political, social and economicprocesses that have led to or resultedfrom the Afghan wars are discussedfrom their relationship to people’s“wants” and “fears”. The chapter thenconsiders the impact of conflict onAfghans and the institutions that affecttheir lives.

• Chapter 5 evaluates Afghanistan’sstate-building process from a humansecurity perspective, and examines thechallenges of political transition,participation and centre-peripheryrelations.

• Chapter 6 builds on the nationaldevelopment strategies as they havebeen designed in the past two years tomake recommendations on what typeof economic growth and developmentvision are needed for a “humanlysecure” Afghanistan.

• Chapter 7 examines the role of theinternational community in providingincentives and disincentives throughaid for peace-building in Afghanistan.

• Chapter 8 presents the report’sc o n c l u s i o n s a n d m a i nrecommendations. It outlines the seveningredients necessary for developmentand democracy in Afghanistan, andfor providing human security as apublic good for all Afghans.

1

Photo: Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh

Concepts and Implications

Chapter

1.1. Human Development andHuman Security as anAnalytical Framework:Concepts do Matter

Chapter 1 presents the analytical andnormative framework on which thefollowing analysis of the situation inAfghanistan is based. As this is a firstNHDR for Afghanistan, this introductorychapter presents the definitions andimplications of the concepts of humandevelopment and human security in orderto lay a foundation for analysis in this andsubsequent cycles of biannual NHDRs.

Human Development:A People-centered Approach

As argued first in the UNDP global HumanDevelopment Report of 1990, the conceptof “human development” has beenconceived first and foremost as analternative vision to the prevailingdevelopment paradigms of the time.

Since the 1950s, the subject of“development” has seen an evolution thathas responded to the theoretical andpractical needs of various decades.Throughout the developing world, thecolonial legacy had led to low incomes,low savings and investments, appallinghealth, low literacy, and primaryproduction with little manufacturing andtotal dependency. The 1950s and 1960sbrought an emphasis on economic growthbased on industrialization and investments.The ensuing rapid growth, however, didnot produce sustained development.Dependency remained and distributionproblems resulted in unemployment,underemployment and poverty, as thehuman dimension was neglected, and thetrickle-down theory proved not to beautomatic.

By the 1970s the growth-only agenda wasbeing challenged, with developmenttheories criticizing money income,questioning the Gross National Product(GNP) as the measure of development,and putting as objectives employment andredistribution with growth. The end of thatdecade witnessed the emergence of thebasic needs approach, which emphasizeda group of basic goods and servicesrequired for the poor to live decently.However, the approach was criticized forits paternalistic view, its utilitarianism andits commodity fetishism. The 1980s thensaw the debt crisis, as well as a risingemphasis on poverty. Adjustment andstabilization programs, which had calledfor shrinking the role and size of statesand increasing the role of markets, led toincreased inequalities and poverty,prompting thinking around “adjustmentwith a human face”.

The human development paradigm,established in 1990 by Mahbub ul Haq,Amartya Sen, Frances Stewart, PaulStreeten and others, set itself apart fromprevious development theories by arguingthat economic growth does notautomatically trickle down to improvepeople’s well-being, while approachessuch as basic needs do not hand overdecision-making to beneficiariesthemselves. The human developmentconcept thus advocates putting people backat centre stage, both as the means and endsof development. It distinguishes betweentwo sides: One is the formation of humancapabilities, the other is the use that peoplemake of their acquired capabilities forwork or leisure.

This approach includes both an “evaluativeaspect” and an “agency aspect”. Theevaluative aspect means improving humanlives as an explicit development objectivea n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g h o w t h e s e

Chapter 1

Concepts and Implications

The obvious is the mostdifficult to see: The true

wealth of a country isits people.

Mahbub ul Haq, founder of theHuman Development Reports

NHDR 04 3

improvements can be made; it emphasizesequity as a policy objective. The agencyaspect is what people can do to improvetheir lives through individual, social andpolitical processes. This second aspect,which has gained increased attention inthe past decade, has introduced individualas well as collective agency, added socialmovements and political reforms toeconomic development policies, and,ultimately, considers human rights anintrinsic as well as instrumental value ofdevelopment.

By emphasizing the diversity of humanneeds, human development was thusconceived as an alternative to pureeconomic development and straightjacketpolicy prescriptions – such as the neo-liberal Washington Consensus, whichdictated a set of standard reforms and theirsequencing, often regardless of nationalrealities. Human development argues thateconomic growth centres exclusively onthe expansion of only one choice – income– while a holistic development approachmust embrace other choices that peoplevalue: greater access to knowledge, betternutrition and health services, more securelivelihoods, security against crime andphysical violence, satisfying leisure hours,political and cultural freedoms, a sense ofparticipation in community activities, andself-respect and dignity. Economic growththerefore is only a means to better humanwelfare, not an end in itself. The causallink between economic growth andimproved well-being does not ariseautomatically, but rather has to be createdconsciously through public policies.

The essential elements of the humandevelopment concept are:

• Efficiency/productivity: the optimaluse of existing resources throughinvestment in the education, health,aspirations and skills of people.

• Equity: distributive justice, and thefair distribution of incomes and assetsthrough equal access to opportunities.

• Sustainability: concern for not onlypresent generations but future ones aswell.

• Empowerment/participation:enabling people to attain a level ofindividual development that allowsthem to make choices close to theirhearts.

The human development concept avoidsprescriptions and concentrates more ondestinations, which should be the ultimatevision of development. Focusing on thedestination, however, does not mean thatthe path to get there is open-ended anderratic. And while the paths taken can leadto different destinations, humandevelopment suggests a simultaneous, notsequential achievement of the fourprinciples above.

The equal weight of these values has ledcritics to highlight the various conflictsand trade-offs that exist among them, aswell as the difficulties of adapting theseutopian ideals to public policies at thenational level. These conflicts and trade-off should be subject to a much moreextensive discussion and analysis than ispossible within this report. Laying thefoundations is intended to at least offer apoint of departure for debates onAfghanistan’s human development future.

Human Development in ConflictSituations

While the objective of economic growthand development should be humandevelopment, for countries emerging fromconflict, such as Afghanistan, sustainablepeace requires a guarantee that gains madetoday will not be taken away tomorrow.This idea is embodied in the concept of“human security”. On the one hand, itentails the notion of “safety”, which goesbeyond security in the traditional sense,and on the other hand, it includes theguarantees and assurances that underpinthe concept of “social security”. Humansecurity, therefore, becomes both the

Chapter 14

People need security soas to enjoy the greatestpossible degree offreedom and dignity intheir lives.

Amartya Sen, 2000

prerequisite for human development aswell as a guarantee of its sustainability.While human development is a process ofwidening the range of people’s choices,human security means that people canexercise these safely and freely while beingrelatively confident that the opportunitiesthey have today are not lost tomorrow. Assuch, it is a particularly relevant lensthrough which the challenges ofAfghanistan can be examined.

Expanding the Notion of Security– the Human Security Concept

In the same way that traditional economicdevelopment paradigms had failed toaddress the broader concerns of people,traditional “security” discourses are nolonger adaptable enough to address thenew threats to the safety and well-beingof people within states. With a combination

of new global trends, the rise of non-stateactors, and new types of non-militarythreats to the internal stability of statesand people within them, the traditionalconcept of “security” as a realist pactbetween nations became obsolete at thebeginning of the 21st Century. If, in thepast, existential threats were assumed toemanate from external sources, and securitymainly focused on protecting the state andits sovereign territory from external attacks,new non-military threats such as poverty,infectious diseases, environmentaldisasters, massive population movementsand drugs – all of which travel without apassport – have now become part of the“security” agenda.

The demise of the Cold War between thetwo super-powers, the United States andthe Soviet Union, with their proxy

NHDR 04 5

Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 5, May 2002.

confrontations in countries such asAfghanistan, meant that threats to nationalborders became a diminishing securityconcern. Intra-state unrests and conflicts,often fueled by the socio-economic andpolitical marginalization of certainsegments of society, became new threatsto be dealt with instead. People wereincreasingly identified as the victims ofviolence on the one hand, and the causeof new threats to the stability of states onthe other. Weak states became identifiedas those unable or unwilling to respond tothe welfare of their people, and failed statesbecame a threat to the stability of theinternational system in addition to that oftheir own people.

According to the global HumanDevelopment Report of 1994, humansecurity is broadly defined as "safety fromchronic threats such as hunger, disease,and repression as well as protection fromsudden and harmful disruptions in thepatterns of daily life – whether in homes,in jobs or in communities.”2 Humansecurity is referred to as freedom from fearand freedom from want. Seven threats areidentified: economic security, foodsecurity, health security, environmentalsecurity, personal security, communitysecurity and political security. Aselaborated by the Commission on HumanSecurity, “the objective of human securityis to safeguard the vital core of all humanlives from critical (severe) and pervasive(widespread) threats, in a way that isconsistent with long-term humanfulfillment.”3 As a normative concept, it“means using processes that build onpeople’s strengths and aspirations. It meanscreating political, social, environmental,economic, military and cultural systems

that together give people the buildingblocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.”4

Human security is concerned withreducing, and if possible, removing theinsecurities that threaten human lives. Itis a dramatic shift from the traditional viewof “state security”, according to which thestate would monopolize the rights andmeans to safeguard the integrity androbustness of the state vis-à-vis other statesas its first priority. Too many exampleshave demonstrated how states can becomeperpetuators of insecurities themselves,not only failing to fulfill their obligationstowards their citizens, but also becominga source of threats. The human securityapproach calls instead for a multi-prongedstrategy: identifying threats, seeking toprevent them from materializing,mitigating harmful effects for those thatoccur, and helping victims cope with theconsequences of widespread “insecurities”such as conflict, human rights violationsand massive underdevelopment.

1.2. Relevance of a HumanSecurity Framework forAfghanistan

The Traditional “Security” Narrative

For too long, Afghanistan’s securityproblem has been interpreted narrowly asthe security of the “state” from internaland external aggression, or as the protectionof the interests of fragmented groupsclaiming political legitimacy in the absenceof a state, or from the position of globaland regional interests. Often neglectedhave been the human security needs of thepeople in Afghanistan. Forgotten were thelegitimate concerns of ordinary peoplewho sought security and dignity in theirdaily lives. Yet, security should be firstand foremost a public good, not the

We must also broadenour view of what ismeant by peace andsecurity. Peace meansmuch more than theabsence of war.Human security can nolonger be understoodin purely military terms.Rather, it mustencompass economicdevelopment, socialjustice, environmentalprotection,democratization,disarmament, andrespect for humanrights and the rule oflaw.

UN Secretary-General KofiAnnan.1

1 Kofi Annan 2001.2 UNDP 19943 The independent global Commission on Human Security was established in 2001 by the Japanese Government and was co-chaired by Nobel Laureate

Amartya Sen and former UNHCR High Commissioner Sadako Ogata. It included Lakhtar Brahimi, the former UN Secretary General’s Envoy for Afghanistan.4 Commission on Human Security 2003.

Chapter 16

Ensuring public safety

In the aftermath of a conflict, nationalauthorities usually face the challenge ofensuring personal security, one of themost vital and immediate aspects ofhuman security. Public safety maydisintegrate in the wake of increasedcrime rates, looting, revenge killings andreverse ethnic cleansing. Furthermore,interpersonal violence will likelyincrease, especially gender-basedviolence, as a consequence of thedisruption of social structures such asfamilies and communities. Other criticalquestions that may need to be solved arethe disarmament, demobilization andreintegration (DDR) into society offormer combatants and their dependents,along with the creation of economicopportunities to prevent them fromrejoining rebel armies. Moreover, it isimportant to remove small arms and lightweapons and landmines from conflictareas.

Meeting immediate humanitarianneeds

After the fighting has stopped, it is crucialto provide the earliest possible life-savinghumanitarian assistance, in the form offood, basic health services, shelter, waterand sanitation. Moreover, specialattention should be given to addresstraumatic experiences throughpsychological care and counselling aswell as the reunification of families. Itis crucial to address the entire population,including internally displaced persons(IDPs), refugees, children and youth.

Launching rehabilitation andreconstruction

Economic insecurities are a commonfeature of societies emerging fromconflict. They find expression inunemployment, low wages, low job

security, low social provisions for theunemployed, and so on – factors thatintensify inequalities and poverty. Inorder to build a sustainable peace, it isimportant to relaunch economic activityand growth, and transform the wareconomy into a normal economy.R e h a b i l i t a t i o n a n d p h y s i c a lreconstruction, which can be a majorincentive for peace, should begin at theearliest possible time. Relief anddevelopment activities should ideallywork in parallel, and people shouldbecome increasingly independent ofhumanitarian relief. Post-conflictreconstruction programmes shouldinclude providing key services,rebuilding basic infrastructure,reintegrating displaced people,demobi l i z ing combatan t s andreintegrating them into the economy,and establishing a social safety net andmacroeconomic framework.

Emphasizing reconciliation andcoexistence

One important consequence of violentconflict is that it erodes trust, namely inpeople, communities and existinggovernment institutions, and thusundermines social cohesion. In otherwords, it endangers community security,which is focused on the protection ofgroups that are threatened by otherentities. If these questions are ignored,they can lead to a radicalization ofidentity politics, and new violence mayerupt. Thus, there is an urgent need forthe provision of justice by establishingthe truth and punishing perpetrators, butalso for reconciliation programs thatfocus on establishing the rule of law aswell as strengthening the judicial systemand the respect for human rights. In termsof human security, it is important tocomplement this strategy with acommunity-centered approach involving

as many people as possible. A minimallevel of trust and confidence must bepromoted between the people in a war-torn society in order to makereintegration and coexistence possible.This might be achieved through fosteringdialogue between communities andencouraging joint activities.

Promoting governance andempowerment

Another crucial aspect of human securityis political security, which means theenjoyment of civil and political rights,and freedom from political oppression.According to the UN Secretary-General,“Good governance at the local, nationaland international levels is perhaps thesingle most important factor in promotingdevelopment and advancing the causeof peace.”5 The Commission for HumanSecurity identifies the following keygovernance issues that need to beaddressed fo l lowing conf l ic t :democratization; participation indecision-making; accountability ofdecision makers; respect for the rule oflaw and human rights; and inclusive,equitable and fair rules and institutions.These institutions will allow for theeffective empowerment of people andcommunities, which in turn is essentialfor effective governance. One centralaspect is the rule of law, which is key tothe functioning of institutions and theprotection of the population. Establishingthis, however, goes beyond the draftingof a constitution and laws, the creationof courts, etc. It requires the inclusionof norms, principles and practices thatestablish relations among people, andbetween people and the state. Moreover,it is important to strengthen civil societyin post-conflict environments, as itprovides a mechanism for people toparticipate, express their views and holddecision makers accountable.

Adapted by Hanna Schmitt, from “Recovering from Violent Conflict”, Chapter 4 in Human Security Now (the Report of the Commission on Human Security), 2003.

5 Kofi Annan, United Nations General Assembly, 2002.

NHDR 04 7

Box 1.1.

A Human Security Framework for Post-conflict Peace-building

privilege of those defending their intereststhrough war.

There is much talk of insecurity inAfghanistan today. Its impact on politicalprocesses, on the work of the internationalcommunity, and on Afghanistan’s potentialfor drawing in foreign direct investmentis hammered home daily in theinternational press. The internationalnarrative on Afghanistan sees bombings,terrorism, kidnapping and physicalinsecurity as undermining the peaceprocess, hindering democratic processes,and forcing the withdrawal of internationalaid organizations from the southern andeastern regions of the county. Populationsvulnerable to “terrorist” attacks are aidworkers, Government officials, troops,and, in the summer of 2004, electionofficials. Traditional insecurity is furtherexacerbated by a system of incentives forarmed regional militia to remain loyal toindividuals instead of institutions, as wellas criminal opportunists, especially narco-criminals.

The answers to this security dilemma havebeen sought in the expansion of theInternational Security Assistance Forces(ISAF) troops led by NATO outside ofKabul, the demobilization of formermilitias, the bolstering of the AfghanNational Army (ANA) and AfghanNational Police (ANP), and an enhancedfight against Al-Qaida by Coalition Forces.The main problems are seen as the lack ofpolice training, and a limited commitmentto security forces by the internationalcommunity.

Fanning the insecurity is the lack of lawand order, as well as negotiating spacesbetween competing power-holders indifferent regions. The story of Afghanistanis that of a crisis of legitimacy:disappointment in government in theperiphery, competition with rival powerstructures, warlords and their privatearmies, intimidation by extremists, slowprogress on the disarmament of formermilitia, and poor delivery on promises of

progress and stability. All of these factorsdiminish support for state-building.

Only when instability in Afghanistan beganto bleed into insecurities for the Westernworld did the global community, led bythe United States, respond through militaryforce by removing the Taliban regime.While the initial focus was on eliminatingthe remnants of the Taliban, it soon becameapparent that Afghanistan needs a stablestate, that is at peace with itself and nodanger to the world community. The state-building process started with the December2001 Bonn Agreement, which providedfor the creation of first an interim andsubsequently a transitional government.Consultative processes led to a newConstitution in January 2004, nationalpresidential elections in October 2004 andthe return of over 3.5 million refugees sofar. Billions of dollars for the economicreconstruction of the destroyed countrywere pledged first at the AfghanistanReconstruction Conference in January2002 in Tokyo and then in March 2004 inBerlin.

However, despite all of this, the realchallenge of another type of “insecurity”,remains that stemming from the lack oflivelihoods, access to water, health,education and other public goods for allAfghan citizens. For too long, the peopleof Afghanistan have been subjected to theconsequences arising from an approach tosecurity based on the interests of a state,of groups, of clans and tribes or of theinternational community.

• For 23 years, they experienced someof the worst violations of their humanrights, ranging from political killingsto systematic impoverishment. Foreigninterventions fueled a series of brutalwars that entrenched the power ofunaccountable power-holders, dividedthe country along ethnic lines, anddestroyed its already limitedinfrastructure and economic base.

Security, security,security – the mantrahas been repeatedalmost daily inAfghanistan since thefall of the Taliban twoyears ago.

BBC Report, 8 January 2004

Chapter 18

• Some of the excesses were committedduring this time by successiveirresponsible governments in the nameof “state security”. Gross violationsof human rights by the Soviet-backedCommunist regime, the Mujahideenself-styled government and therepressive Taliban were all done inthe name of national security.

• During years of a state vacuum,political power shifted from traditionalcommunity-based systems thatallowed for popular participation toethnically and religiously basedmilitary factions who ruled throughforce.

• The Western world was moreinterested in curbing the expansion ofthe Soviet Union than in theconsequences of heavily armingresistance groups. It then abandonedAfghanistan, and its people, after thepull-out of the Soviet Army.

• Regional players continued to meddlein the affairs of Afghanistan bybacking various ethnic or languagegroups against each other. Powerstruggles in Afghanistan became amatter of regional security.

• Up until 11 September 2001, the plightof Afghans passed largely unnoticedby the outside world. Whilehumanitarian agencies struggled tocope with the catastrophe with limitedresources, the international communityimposed economic sanctions onAfghanistan that harmed ordinarycivilians perhaps more than the Talibanregime.

• September 11th directed theoverwhelming attention of theinternational community towardsAfghanistan because it was believedthat those who carried out this act ofterror on US soil were hiding andtraining in Afghanistan. Instability

there was no longer an internal concernof the Afghans alone, but of the worldcommunity as well.

The investment programmes presented bythe Transitional Islamic State ofAfghanistan (TISA) for accessing bilateraland multilateral funds were consequentlybuilt on the logic of presenting anultimatum for a “failed” or “narco-state”that represents a danger to the internationalcommunity. Although the pledges havebeen part of a noble and empatheticengagement by the internationalcommunity, and their generous amountswill help development in Afghanistan, theyhave been first and foremost an indicationof concerns for global and regionalinsecurity.

The Broader “Security” Vision

Today, security continues to be seen in itstraditional sense: regional stability,territorial security for the nation-state,small arms, and even security of politicaland economic systems as identified bythreats to democracy, market stability,investments, etc. The unit of considerationcontinues to be the state, the market, theregion and the international system.

In contrast to this definition, this reportproposes that the real security challengein Afghanistan is for the reconstructionprocess to generate the means to provideservices and jobs, and protect human rights,especially in rural areas. Security is notjust the end of war, but also the ability togo about one’s business safely, in a safeenvironment; to have a job; to participatein political processes; to have choices forthe education of one’s children; to lead ahealthy life; and to do all this with theknowledge that these gains will not betaken away tomorrow. Insecurity inAfghanistan is not only a problem ofphysical safety, but also of deprivation andrestricted access to health and educationfacilities, legal and political rights, andsocial opportunities. Dealing with

NHDR 04 9

insecurity should not be sought (solely)through short-term military solutions, butthrough a long-term comprehensivestrategy that abides by promises ofdevelopment and the promotion of humanrights.

This report seeks to dispel the belief thatthe only way to provide security and buildlasting peace is through military action, inthe form of the expansion of internationalpeacekeeping forces throughout thecountry or victory over Al-Qaida by theCoalition Forces. Rather, there is a moraland ethical imperative to promote publicpolicy reforms and state-building effortsthat allow for participation, and to reducethe local incentives that trigger conflict inthe first place. To minimize chances forrenewed conflict while improvinglivelihoods and the prospects for dignifiedlives for all Afghans, state-buildingstrategies need to expand the notion of“security” to cover not only territorialsecurity, or freedom from violence andhuman rights abuses, but also basic humanneeds (education, health, food, shelter,incomes and livelihoods, etc.) as well asstrategic “needs” (such as participation,dignity, empowerment, etc.).

Because human security threats continueto exist in Afghanistan even after theimposition of peace in 2001, the situationtoday can be considered as a potentiallydangerous one, where threats could leadto instability and to the furtherimpoverishment of people and their qualityof life.

In a country where security anddevelopment are interdependent, it makeslittle sense to insist on one as a conditionfor another. Recognizing the co-conditionality requires commitments toimproving people’s lives and addressinginequalities while involving ordinarycitizens as stakeholders of their future.Preventing future conflicts calls for

targeting and responding to root causes,both internal and external. As the countrymoves beyond president ia l andparliamentary elections, and as theoptimistic pledges of the internationalcommunity after the Berlin Conferencetrickle in, this is a window of opportunitythat should not be missed.

1.3. The Responsibility forHuman Security

Because human security is a public goodthat belongs to all and cannot be exclusive,it entails a responsibility for the state toprovide guarantees that people will notfall below an acceptable threshold, butalso a corresponding duty among peopleto remain engaged. It is in its response toits citizens that the state finds its meaningand moral legitimacy. As the HumanSecurity Now report puts it, “achievingHuman Security includes not justprotecting people but also empoweringpeople to fend for themselves.”6 Humansecurity is thus not a mere challenge of“protection” and “provision”, but one ofempowerment and participation. If thestate is to be entrusted with theresponsibility to provide public goods,people have to be able to engage it in orderto hold it accountable. People are not onlypassive recipients of “security”, or evenmere victims of its absence, but activesubjects who can contribute directly toidentifying and implementing solutions tothe dilemma of insecurity. Security is notan objective good that can be deliveredfrom the outside, but ultimately a publicgood and a subjective feeling that requiresa conscious willingness to be “provided”by the state and the capacity to be requestedby the people.

This shift in focus, however, is neithersimple nor politically easy, as it wouldrequire a re-examination of priorities andthe responsibilities of the state and the

6 Commission on Human Security 2003.

Chapter 110

international system. The shift is alsoparticularly difficult in Afghanistan, whereindividual identity is deeply embedded incollective units (tribe, clan, family, etc.).These reinforce accepted norms ofbehaviour and function as economic,political and cultural units that act on behalfof those who comprise them.

With an expanded notion of security comenew types of responsibilities:

• First and foremost, those of the state:If sovereignty once meant monopolyover the use of violence and protectionof territory from external threats, itnow has to incorporate the idea ofresponsibility to protect people from

extreme underdevelopment and humanrights abuses, and to empower them.This is not a responsibility to be takenlightly. Agents of the state areresponsible for their actions; that is tosay, they are accountable for their actsof commission and omission.7

The raison d’être of any actor or institutionrests with their contribution to the well-being of the very people who brought theminto being in the first place. State-buildinghence becomes a means, not an end byitself. The end is the safety, welfare anddignity of the people of Afghanistan.

The notion of human security does notreplace but ultimately supplements that of

Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 5, May 2002.

NHDR 04 11

7 International Commission on Interventions and State Sovereignty 2001.

state security. Human security requiresstrong and stable institutions, while statesecurity provides an environmentconducive to the birth, growth and strengthof such institutions. The focus on humansecurity, therefore, does not mean an endto the role of the state in the managementof development or security issues. Theabsence of a state or its lack ofeffectiveness can be detrimental to humansecurity. Indeed, “order requires rules,rules require authority, and authority isexercised on behalf of people by states.”8

For this order to be socially, economicallyand environmentally sustainable, peopleneed a state to mediate distribution.9

The responsibility of a viable state shouldtherefore be stability, enabling equitableeconomic growth, ensuring essential socialservices, regulating markets to preventnegative externalities such as inequalities,and allowing the participation of allstakeholders in decision-making processes.

• Second, an expanded notion ofsecurity calls for growing recognitionof the role of people, of individualsand communities, in ensuring theirown security. Measures for empower-ment and education become key goodsthat the state and internationalcommunity can provide. Individualsand communities must in turn assumeresponsibility for demanding what isowed to them.

People can contribute directly to identifyingand implementing solutions to thequagmire of insecurity. In Afghanistan,bringing diverse constituents together torebuild their communities can solvesecurity problems while involving themin the reconstruction process, andultimately foster the ability to be engaged.

Empowered people can stand up for theirdignity when it is violated. They can create

new opportunities for wealth through theiraspirations and address many problemslocally. And they can mobilize for thesecurity of others, for example, bypublicizing food shortages early,preventing famines or protesting humanrights violations. Mistrusted andmistrusting people, by contrast, cannotcontribute to the overall well-being of theirsociety.

Supporting people’s ability to act on theirown behalf means providing educationand information so that they can takecollective action. It means building a publicspace that tolerates opposition, encourageslocal leadership and cultivates publicdiscussion. It also means creating a largerenvironment of support, one that providesfreedom of speech, the press, information,conscience and belief, along with thefreedom to organize.

• Third, the paradigm shift on securityalso involves the residual responsibilityof the international community in caseswhen the state is unable – or unwilling– to fulfill its responsibility to protect,provide and empower its citizens.

As the Commission on State Sovereigntyand International Intervention noted in its2001 report, the responsibility of theinternational community has expandedfrom a “right to intervene”, as written inthe UN Charter, to a “responsibility toprotect”. This requires that in somecircumstances, action must be taken bythe broader community of states to supportpopulations in jeopardy or under seriousthreat.”10 It comprises not only the“responsibility to react”, but also the“responsibility to prevent” and the“responsibility to rebuild”.

This argument should not be interpretedas an excuse for ad-hoc militaryinterventions for “humanitarian” reasons.

8 R. O. Koehane and J. S. Nye 1998.9 Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh 2004.10 International Commission on Interventions and State Sovereignty 2001.

Chapter 112

Rather, it encourages the global communityto assume responsibility for fair rules ofengagement in preventing not only conflict,but also mass underdevelopment, hunger,disease, environmental degradation, etc.Preventing and mitigating the impact ofviolent conflicts through military meansis not enough. Pledging and deliveringsufficient funds, providing humanitarianaid, pursuing inclusive and equitabledevelopment, establishing a level playingfield with respect to trade regimes, andupholding norms of human rights throughrespecting dignity and diversity are someof the essentials.

Upholding all three forms of responsibilitylisted above in the Afghan context, with its

precarious security situation, is a formidablechallenge for all actors – the state, the peopleand the international community. However,making this commitment, and building onexisting and new models of the participationof people and communities is a firstimperative that would unleash trust,aspirations and potentials.

While this initial chapter provided anormative conceptual framework forlooking at human development challengesthrough a human security lens, thefollowing chapters will examine each ofthese responsibilities in detail in the contextof Afghanistan.

NHDR 04 13

2

Photo: Raphy Favre

The Status of Human Underdevelopmentand People’s Insecurities in Afghanistan

Chapter

Afghanistan is a landlocked country withan area of 647,500 sq. kms., borderingPakistan to the east and south, Iran to thewest, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan andUzbekistan to the north, and China to thenorth east.1 Exact population figures forAfghanistan are not available because acensus has not taken place since 1979.H o w e v e r , a n a t i o n w i d e 2 0 0 3UNICEF/CSO MICS estimate puts thetotal population figure at 23.85 million,with 28.8 per cent living in urban areasand 71.2 per cent in rural regions, and apopulation growth rate of 2.5 per cent peryear.2 Overall, the population is scatteredat a rate of 40 people per sq. km., whilethe distribution is very uneven – rangingfrom 489 persons per sq. km. in Kabulprovince to 0.7 persons per sq. km. inNimruz. Administratively, Afghanistan isdivided into 34 provinces (Welayat), eachfurther divided into smaller administrativeunits (districts) called Woleswali.3 Theboundaries of two new provinces have notyet been defined.

The county has hardly seen any significantspan of stability during the past twodecades. Areas have changed handsfrequently between warring parties,resulting in frequent destabilization of

regions and the migration of people tosafer places. Years of conflict and neglecthave taken a devastating toll, as measuredby dramatic drops in human, social andeconomic indicators.4 By early 1992, theglobal Human Development Reportrecorded a per capita income of US$819(in purchasing power parity, or PPP terms),a life expectancy at birth of 44.5 years,and an average adult literacy rate of 28.7per cent. Women’s literacy rate was only12.7 per cent. Only 29 per cent of thepopulation had access to health services,which were clearly more available in urbanareas (80 per cent) than in rural ones (17per cent). Only 23 per cent had access tosafe water – again predominantly in urbanareas, where 40 per cent of householdshad access versus 19 per cent in ruralareas).5

By the beginning of the new century,human development estimates as recordedin this NHDR had become even morealarming: Life expectancy today isapproximately 44.5 years, with healthylife expectancy at birth estimated at 33.4years. One out of five children dies beforethe age of five, and one woman diesapproximately every 30 minutes frompregnancy-related causes.

1 CIA Factbook.2 The CSO demographic figures put the current population at 22.2 million; the urban and rural shares and the annual population growth rate at 22.2 per cent,

77.8 per cent and 1.92 per cent respectively. However, this NHDR utilizes the figures derived by the UNICEF/CSO MICS.3 Abdul Rashid Fakhri 2004.4 Abdul Baqi Banwal 2004.5 UNDP global Human Development Report 1995 (indicators for 1992-1993).

NHDR 04 17

Chapter 2

The Status of Human Underdevelopmentand People’s Insecurities in Afghanistan

2.1. Introduction

2.2. The Status of CompositeHuman DevelopmentIndicators in Afghanistan

The Human Development Index

The evaluative aspect of humandevelopment as discussed in Chapter 1 ismeasured by three of the most importantbasic and universal capabilities: The abilityto lead a long and healthy life, to haveaccess to and make use of knowledge, andto earn a decent standard of living. Othercapabilities such as the ability to participatein the community, and to achieve securityand even happiness are as important as theother capabilities. However, because theyare not objective factors – i.e., havedifferent meanings for different people –and because data is not always availableon them, they have not been included inthe basic Human Development Index(HDI), the standard for measuring progressin human development.

The HDI combines longevity as measuredby life expectancy at birth, knowledge as

measured by a weighted average of adultliteracy (two-thirds), and combined grossenrolment in school (one-third) andstandard of living as measured by real percapita income adjusted for a county’s PPP.The HDI sets a minimum and a maximumfor each dimension and then shows whereeach country stands in relation to them(See Annexure 2, technical appendix ons ta t i s t i c s fo r ca lcu la t ions andmethodology).

Afghanistan’s HDI value of 0.346 falls atthe bottom of the list of low humandevelopment countries, just above Burundi,Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and SierraLeone (See Table 2.1). Afghanistan alsohas the lowest HDI indicator among itsneighbours (See Chart 2.1). With theexception of Pakistan, all of its neighboursfall in the category of medium humandevelopment.

Because information on income is notavailable, the HDI could not bedisaggregated by province or by urban andrural areas for this NHDR.

The lack of basic thingssuch as drinking water,schools, health facilitiesand so on has been thebiggest impediment tohuman development.These basic needs needto be pursuedaggressively in order tomake any progress onhuman development inAfghanistan.

Nazar Mohmmad Joya, fromLogar

Literacy Gross Life Per HDI HDI GDI GDI HPI HPIRate Enrolment Expectancy Capital Ranking Ranking Ranking

at Birth GDP(PPP adjusted)

Niger 17.1 19 46 800 0.292 176 0.278 144 61.4 94

Burkina Faso 12.8 22 45.8 1100 0.302 175 0.291 143 65.5 95

Sierra Leone 36 45 34.3 520 0.273 177 - - - -

Guinea-Bissau 39.6 37 45.2 710 0.350 172 0.329 141 48 86

Afghanistan* 28.7 44.93 44.5 822 0.346 173 0.300 143 59.3 94

Tajikistan 99.5 73 68.6 980 0.671 116 0.668 93 - -

Uzbekistan 99.3 76 69.5 1670 0.709 107 0.705 85 - -

Turkmenistan 98.8 81 66.9 4300 0.752 86 0.748 67 - -

Iran 77.1 69 70.1 6690 0.732 101 0.713 82 16.4 31

Pakistan 41.5 37 60.8 1940 0.497 142 0.471 120 41.9 71

Table 2.1: Human Development Indices (2002)

* Due to the unavailability of data, Afghanistan was not included in the HDR 2004. The rank of 173 is where Afghanistan would have placed had it beenincluded in the global report..

Sources: UNDP global Human Development Report 2004, UNICEF/CSO MICS 2003, CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003; authors’ calculations.

Chapter 218

The values of HDI follow closely thedifferences in per capita Gross DomesticProducts (GDPs) (See Chart 2.2). Countriessuch as Niger, Burkina Faso, Sierra Leoneand Guinea-Bissau that have HDI valuesclose to that of Afghanistan also havesimilar per capita GDP values. Moreover,the per capita GDP values are significantlyhigher in neighbouring countries with

higher HDI values. The only exception isTajikistan. Its Purchasing Power Parity(PPP)-adjusted per capita GDP of US$980is not significantly different than theUS$822 of Afghanistan, but its HDI valueis almost twice as high. This is dueprimarily to its education indicators, giventhat the reported literacy rate is close to100 per cent (See Chart 2.3).

Source: UNDP global Human Development Report 2004; authors’ calculation

Chart 2.1: HDI Comparison with Neighbouring Countries, 2002

Sources: UNDP global Human Development Report 2004, CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003; authors’ calculations.

NHDR 04 19

Chart 2.2: Comparison of PPP-Adjusted GDP per Capita, 2002

The Gender Development Index

The Gender Development Index (GDI)reflects the level of discrepancies betweenmen and women in terms of the HDI

indicators – life expectancy at birth,educational achievements, and standardof living as measured by GDP. The GDIvalue for Afghanistan places the countryfurther down on the scale of low human

Sources: UNDP global Human Development Report 2004, UNICEF/CSO MICS 2003.

Chart 2.3: Comparison of Literacy RatesData for all countries 2002, except Afghanistan 2003.

Sources: UNDP global Human Development Report 2004, CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003; authors’calculations.

Chart 2.4: GDI Comparison with Neighbouring Countries, 2002

Chapter 220

%

Niger BurkinaFaso

SierraLeone

Guinea-Bissau Afghanistan Tajikistan Uzbakistan Turkmenistan Iran Pakistan

development (See Chart 2.4). With a GDIvalue of only 0.300, Afghanistan is justabove only Niger and Burkina Faso.Afghanistan’s GDI is much below all itsneighbours, with Pakistan at the top of the

low human development countries and therest all making it to the medium humandevelopment range. Components that makeup the GDI are presented in Charts 2.5 to2.8 for further comparison.

Sources: UNDP global Human Development Report 2004, UNICEF/CSO MICS 2003.

Chart 2.5: Comparison of Male/Female Life Expectancy at Birth, 2002

Sources: UNDP global Human Development Report 2004, CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003; authors’ calculations.

Chart 2.6: Comparison of Male/Female Adult Literacy Rate (Age 15 and Above)

Data for all countries 2002, except Afghanistan 2003.

NHDR 04 21

Sources: UNDP global Human Development Report 2004, CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003; authors’ calculations.

Chart 2.7: Comparison of Male/Female (Primary, Secondary and Tertiary)Gross Enrolment Ratios, 2002

Sources: UNDP global Human Development Report 2004, CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003; authors’ calculations.

Chart 2.8: Comparison of Male/Female PPP-Adjusted Per Capita GDP, 2002

Chapter 222

12,000

10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

The Gender Empowerment Measure

The Gender Empowerment Measure(GEM) shows the participation of womenin political and economic life. It includesthe share of women in Parliament, and inofficial positions in law and management,professional and technical fields, as wellas women’s opportunities for incomegeneration. A low GEM shows thatwomen’s participation in political andsocial life is limited, and they lackopportunities to make use of theircapabilities. The GEM was not calculatedfor Afghanistan because of the absence ofdata on these indicators.

The Human Poverty Index

At present, when poverty has become ahuman development priority, calculationof the Human Poverty Index (HPI) is ofhigh importance. The index is designed toportray poverty as more than just a lackof income. It also involves limited accessto opportunities, which in turn hinderscapabilities. While the HDI measuresaverage achievements , the HPIconcentrates on deprivations. Deprivationof a long and healthy life is defined as

vulnerability to death at a relatively earlyage and calculated through the probabilityat birth of not surviving to age 40. Lackof knowledge is measured as exclusionfrom the world of reading and calculatedthrough illiteracy rates. A decent standardof living is considered in terms of accessto overall economic provisioning, asmeasured by the average of the percentageof the population without sustainable accessto an improved water source and thepercentage of moderately and severelyunderweight children under five. In theglobal Human Development Reports,developing countries are compared togetherusing an HPI-1 index, while Organisationfor Economic Co-operation andDevelopment (OECD) countries are rankedby the HPI-2 index, which adds to the HPI-1 a dimension of social exclusion.

The HPI-1 for Afghanistan is calculatedto be 59.3 (See Chart 2.9). This value islower than those for Niger and BurkinaFaso, meaning that Afghanistan fares betterin terms of poverty. However, its HPIvalue is much higher than the calculationsfor Iran and Pakistan (16.4 and 41.9respectively).

Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 9, October 2002

NHDR 04 23

Components that make up the HPI are presented in Charts 2.10 to 2.12.

Chart 2.9: Comparison of HPI Values, 2002

Source: UNDP global Human Development Report 2004, authors’ calculations.

Chart 2.10: Probability at Birth of Not Surviving to Age 40, 2002

Source: UNDP global Human Development Report 2004. authors’ calculations.

%

Chapter 224

61.465.5

48

59.3

16.4

41.9

Source: UNDP global Human Development Report 2004, UNICEF/CSO MICS 2003.

Chart 2.11: Households with No Safe Drinking Water from Pumps or ProtectedSprings

Data for all countries 2002, except Afghanistan 2003.

Chart 2.12: Children Underweight for Age (% under age 5), 2001

Sources: UNDP global Human Development Report 2004, CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.

41

58

43 44

60

8 10

%

4034

27 25

49

11

38

%

NHDR 04 25

Guinea-Bissau

Life Expectancy

In 1990, the World Bank (WB) recordeda life expectancy of 42.5 years forAfghanistan. By 2000, the UN PopulationDivision put it at 43.5 years for women

and 43 years for men. In 2002, the CSOand WB put the estimate at 44.5 years: 45for men and 44 for women. These lastfigures are used for the calculation of theHDI in this report.

2.3. Components of the Human Development Indices

Chart 2.13: Comparison of Life Expectancy at Birth, 2002

Sources: UNDP global Human Development Report 2004, CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003 .

44.5

70.1

60.8

68.6 66.9 69.5

50.6

63.266.6

GDP per Life Infant Populationcapita expectancy mortality without(US$) at birth rate per sustainable(2002) (years) 1,000 live access to an

(2002) births improved water(2002) source % (2000)

Afghanistan 190 44.5 115* 60*Iran 1,652 70.1 35 8Pakistan 408 60.8 83 10Tajikistan 193 68.6 53 40Turkmenistan 1,601 66.9 76 -Uzbekistán 314 69.5 52 15Least developed countries 298 50.6 99 38South Asia 516 63.2 69 15Low human development countries 322 49.1 104 38Low-income countries 451 59.1 80 24World 5,174 66.9 56 18

Table 2.2: Selected Indicators for Poverty, Vulnerability and Risk in Afghanistan

* Figures for 2003.Sources: UNDP global Human Development Report 2004, UNICEF/CSO MICS 2003 and CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.

Chapter 226

Compared to all of its neighbours, lifeexpectancy in Afghanistan is at least 20years short. It is about 6.1 years lower thanthe averages of the Least DevelopedCountries, and 18.7 years lower than inthe region of South Asia (See Chart 2.13).

Infant and maternal mortality rates inAfghanistan are currently among thehighest in the world. The two figures standat 115 per 1,000 and 1,600 per 100,000

live births respectively.6 One out of fivechildren die before the age of five and onewoman dies from pregnancy related causesapproximately every 30 minutes. Less than15 per cent of deliveries are attended bytrained health workers. About half ofchildren under five years of age are stunteddue to chronic malnutrition, and up to 10per cent suffer from acute malnutrition.Mental health is also a major concern aswill be further elaborated in Chapter 3.

Mother and Child Health

Infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births: 165*Under-five mortality per 1,000 live births: 257*Maternal mortality ratio per 100,000 live births: 1,600Provinces with obstetric care: 11 out of 31Low birth weight: 20%Children under five with malnutrition: 10% acute, 50 % chronicUnder fives dying from diarrhoea: 85,000 per yearA women dies of pregnancy-related complications every 30 minutesAcute malnutrition stands at 10 %Chronic malnutrition stands at 50 %

Immunization Coverage

Less than 40% of Afghan children receive life-saving vaccinations

Disease Burden

There are an estimated 72,000 new cases of tuberculosis each yearDeath from tuberculosis: 15,000 per year (12-13,000 are women)Cases of measles: Estimated 35,000 a yearPolio: 11 in 2001 (120 cases in 2000)Malaria: 2 to 3 million per year, with 6% p. falciparum

Mental Health

Over 2 million Afghans are estimated to suffer from mental health problems. Due to theongoing war for the last 22 years, it is estimated that most Afghans are suffering some levelof stress disorder. Mental disease that one would see in any population has not been attendedto for years in Afghanistan.

Water and Sanitation:

Access to safe water: 23% (18% rural, 43% urban)Access to adequate sanitation: 12% (28% rural, 6% urban)* The Securing Afghanistan’s Future was released before the UNICEF/CSO MICS. The estimates differ between

the two publications.

Source: TISA, Securing Afghanistan’s Future, 2004

6 UNICEF/CSO MICS.

NHDR 04 27

Box 2.1

Health-related Statistics

Education

The literacy rate in Afghanistan today isone of the lowest among developingcountries, above only Niger, Burkina Fasoand Mali (See Table 2.3). Compared toneighbouring countries, Afghanistan hasthe lowest literacy rate. However, in termsof gross enrolment, its rate is higher thanthat of Pakistan by almost 8 per cent (44.93per cent as apposed to 37 per cent forPakistan).

According to the UNICEF/CSO MICS,only 28.7 per cent of Afghans over age 15can read and write. The current primaryenrolment ratio is estimated to be about54.4 per cent, girls’ primary schoolenrolment is still only 40.5 per cent of thetotal.7 So not only are the rates of literacyand primary enrolment extremely low,they are also skewed towards male literacy(See Chart 2.6 p.21 and Chart 2.7 p.22).

Three years ago, the enrolment figures forAfghanistan stood below 30 per cent.Enrolment declined throughout the 1990s,largely as a result of war, the destructionof schools, exile and the restrictive policiesof the Taliban. However, this trend has

been reversed recently. In 2002, more than3 million students were enroled in grades1–12, which was beyond the Government’sexpectations of 1.5 million. Last year’s“Back to School” campaign entailed urgentprovision of student and teacher kits,including 10 million textbooks. The totalschool enrolment is now 3.7 millionchildren, 30 per cent of whom are girls.8

Still, a third of the children are not inschool, while the other two-thirds studyunder mainly primitive conditions.9 (SeeTable 2.4 for some other importanteducation-related statistics).

Despite the major achievement inincreasing enrolment, over 61 per cent ofchildren are not enroled in school inprovinces such as Farah, Nimruz,Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, Paktika,Uruzgan, Badghis and Nuristan, while inKabul, Balkh, Herat and Badakhshan lessthan 30 per cent of children are not enroled.On girls’ enrolment, the situation is evenmore alarming. In provinces such as Farah,Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, Paktika,Khost, Paktia, Uruzgan, Ghor and Badghis,over 80 per cent of girls are not in school(See Map 2.1 and Map 2.2).

Ignorance is what hasdestroyed this countryand education wouldrebuild it. Education iswhere most of ourfocus should go.

Salarzai, from Kunar

7 The primary, secondary and tertiary combined enrolment ratio is estimated to be about 45 per cent, with males making about 67 per cent of the total.8 CSO Statistical Year Book, 2003.9 UNDP 2004b. Opening Doors to Opportunity: Afghanistan's Millennium Development Goals.

Literacy Rate Male Female Combined GrossTotal Enrolment Ratios

Niger 17.1 25.1 9.3 19Burkina Faso 12.8 18.5 8.1 22Sierra Leone 36 -- -- 45Guinea-Bissau 39.6 55.2 24.7 37Afghanistan 28.7 43.2 14.1 44.93Tajikistan 99.5 99.7 99.3 73Uzbekistan 99.3 99.6 98.9 76Turkmenistan 98.8 99.3 98.3 81Iran 77.1 83.5 70.4 69Pakistan 41.5 53.4 28.5 37

Table 2.3: Literacy and Gross Enrolment RatiosData for all countries 2002, except Afghanistan 2003.

Sources: UNDP global Human Development Report 2004, CSO Statisitcal Yearbook 2003, UNICEF/CSO MICS 2003

Chapter 228

Economic Indicators

The GDP per capita for Afghanistan wasUS$190 in 2002, based on calculations ofan estimated non-drug GDP of aroundUS$4.05 billion (while the drug-relatedincome was US$2.54 billion) for anestimated population of around 22 million.10

A year before the war began in 1977,Afghanistan’s GDP was estimated to beabout US$3.7 billion but it had droppedby about 20 per cent to US$3.1 billion by1987.11 The early 1990s were a time ofstagnation, and by 2000, GDP had fallento US$2.7 billion. With the post-Talibaninterim government, the economyrecovered significantly, with GDP risingto about US$4 billion, giving it a yearlygrowth rate of between 25–30 per cent in2002, and an estimated rate of some 15–20per cent in 2003.12 The 2004 recovery orgrowth rate may achieve the same pace.These figures, however, have also beenestimated to be as low as seven percent,and are generally calculated to fallsomewhere around 16 per cent. Overall,it is expected that Afghanistan will achieve

10 –12 per cent GDP growth (non-drug)for the next decade or so.

The economic recovery reflects a returnto relative peace and stability, and renewedmarket confidence. In addition, the GDPgrowth rate of the past two years has beenboosted by injections of internationalassistance, which are most visible in theservices and construction sectors. Theseare rapidly expanding in cities, especiallyin Kabul.13 The Afghan economy continuesto be predominantly based on agriculture,which amounted to 52 per cent of GDP in2002, according to the CSO. This makesAfghanistan the country with the greatestshare of agriculture in its GDP among thecountries of the surrounding region (SeeTable 2.5).14

Agricultural products, which comprise alion’s share of Afghanistan’s exports, havealso significantly contributed to GDPgrowth.15 In 2002, agriculture consistedof 52 per cent of the aggregate nationaloutput, with a value of about US$2.1billion. The values for the aggregateproduce in the years 1977 and 2000 were

Many of our socialgrievances areembedded in people’seconomic deprivations.I propose that thegovernment wouldfocus on helpingpeople with theireconomic security – therest will arrange byitself.Safir Ahmad, from Bamyan

10 CSO 2003 data quoted from Securing Afghanistan’s Future.11 Tawfiq Ghanim, The Afghan Economy and 12 Years of War, as quoted by Mubin Shah 2004.12 The economic analysis relies on the background paper by Mubin Shah 2004.13 IMF 2003.14 WB. World Development Indicators 2003.15 According to the CSO (2003), the share of agriculture in total exports in the prewar period was 71 per cent in 1978. In 2003, the same figure was 84 per

cent.

Latest availableAverage annual teacher salary (as multiple of per capita GDP) 2.7Spending on inputs other than teacher salaries (as US$ of primary 40education recurrent spending)Unit (classroom) construction cost (US$) 8,000% of primary students with textbooks N/ASchool hours per year – primary grades 632School hours per year – secondary grades 728% of public financing in higher education 99Number of students in higher education 26,000Number of faculty with a Ph.D. 89Number of accredited universities (public) 17Number of accredited universities (private) 1

Table 2.4: Education Related Statistics

Source: TISA, Securing Afghanistan’s Future, 2004.

NHDR 04 29

Map 2.1: Percentage of Children 7–13 Years Not Enroled in School by Province (2003)

Chapter 230

Map 2.2: Percentage of Girls 7–13 Years Not Enroled in School by Province (2003)

NHDR 04 31

per cent and the latter fell to 21 per cent.19

In 2002, the industrial sector grew by aremarkable 50 per cent, with improvementsalso made in its labour absorption capacity.Much of this recovery has been due torobust private sector investment, which ismost visible in the cities, and whichcontributed about 13 per cent to GDP in2002.20

The total private investment during 2001was only about US$10 million, a figurethat dramatically increased to over US$250million in the following year.21 The figurefor the first two quarters of 2003 stood atclose to US$150 million, and increasedexponentially for the remainder of the year.The share of foreign direct investment(FDI) in total investment has beensignificant (See Table 2.6). Nevertheless,FDI has been largely focused on small-scale service provision, mostly operating

US$1.8 billion and US$1.5 billionrespectively.16 The recovery in theagriculture sector was made possible bythe return of farmers to their land, donors’assistance with irrigation, improvedcereals, mine clearance and rainfall, amongother factors.17 Currently, over 60 per centof Afghanistan’s labour force is absorbedby the agriculture sector.

The industrial sector never was a big partof the aggregate national output inAfghanistan. Its share of GDP was about20 per cent before 1978, and it absorbedonly about 6 per cent of the Afghan labourforce.18 The industrial sector was severelydamaged during the war, which alsochanged its structure. For example, beforethe war, the share of food production inaggregate industrial output was only 17per cent, while that of textiles was 53 percent. In 1985, the former increased to 53

16 CSO 2003.17 FAO/WFP 2003.18 Tawfiq Ghanim, The Afghan Economy and 12 Years of War, as quoted by Mubin Shah 2004.19 Rosanne Klass 1987.20 Abdul Rashid Fakhri 2004a.21 CSO 2003.

Country Gross Domestic Product

Billions of US$ Agriculture Industry Manufacturing ServicesValue-added Value-added Value-added Value-added

% of GDP % of GDP % of GDP % of GDP

1990 2001 1990 2001 1990 2001 1990 2001 1990 2001

Iran 120.0 114 24 19 29 33 12 16 48 48

India 316.9 477.3 31 25 28 28 17 16 41 48

Tajikistan 4.33 1.05 33 29 38 29 25 25 29 41

Uzbekistan 23.67 11.27 33 34 33 23 0 9 34 43

Afghanistan 4.0 52 24 24 Sources: CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003, World Development Indicators 2003.

Table 2.5: Gross Domestic Product by Sector

2001 2002 First two quarters of 2003

Domestic 10.66 66.48 12.3

FDI 0 198.56 134.7

Total 10.66 265.05 146.9

Table 2.6: Investment Record (Million US$)

Source: CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.

Chapter 232

in Kabul, and has stemmed mainly fromminor investments from Iran and Pakistan.Investment in larger sectors, which is oftenlong term, is severely constrained bygeneral insecurity, as well as the lack ofinstitutional structures to protect investorsand investments. Corruption, bureaucraticred tape, and the absence of banking andlegal systems also raise the costs of doingbusiness in Afghanistan.

International trade is another area in whichthe Afghan economy has experienced asignificant turnaround over the past coupleof years. Improvements in internationaltrade have been due both to the rise ofaggregate national income and the globalopening to Afghanistan for trade andbusiness. Although the current nationalincome is not significantly different thanwhat it was before the war began,Afghanistan’s exports and imports havegrown to seven times what they were atthat time.

In 2002, imports and exports (includingre-exports) accounted for almost half ofthe aggregate national income. In 1977,each was about 10 per cent. The otherdifference between now and then has beenthe increasing share of imports in the totalshare of trade, and therefore a relativelyhuge trade imbalance or deficit. The shareof imports was 52 per cent of the totaltrade volume in 1977, but this increased

to 72 per cent in 1985 now stands at over94 per cent (See Table 2.7).

Exports consist of agricultural commoditieslike cotton, wool, leather and fruits. Importsconsist of consumption commodities, fueland lubricant, and other durable goodssuch as televisions, refrigerators and itemsrelated to transportation. By the end of thethird quarter of 2003, transportation-relatedgoods had reached 33 per cent, food items15 per cent, industrial products 22 per cent,and consumption goods 19 per cent, withconsumption commodities making up 56per cent of total imports. These figuresrepresent only officially recorded importsand exports, and do not include substantialinformal trade.

2.4. Some Human InsecurityIndicators for Afghanistan

There are no established “human securityindicators” that have been recognizedglobally for defining and measuring humansecurity. The Afghanistan NHDR, becauseof its emphasis on survival, dignity andlivelihoods, considers as part of its analysisthose indicators showing discrepancies inequal opportunities and access for variousvulnerable groups.

Income Inequality

What does Afghanistan’s expectedeconomic growth and recovery mean in

22 Afghanistan uses the Islamic Calendar, which is based on lunar cycles. The Calendar uses as a reference point the Hijrah or migration of the ProphetMuhammed from the city of Mecca to Medina in 622 c.e. 2003 of the Gregorian Calendar is 1424 of the Islamic Calendar.

Items 1381 (2002)

Export of goods 2,406.9

Recorded own exports 100

Re-exports (including unofficial) 2,306.9

Imports of goods 3,734.8

Recorded imports 2,452.1

Unrecorded imports 1,188.8

Table 2.7: Trade Records During 138122 (2002) in Millions of US$

Source: CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.

NHDR 04 33

terms of the well-being and welfare of theAfghan population? The answer to thisquestion depends in part on the distributionof income across the population and thelevel of persistent inequalities.

Since 1987, the CSO has collected no dataon the extent of inequalities – whetherthey are related to income, gender orspatial. Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB) usedits own estimates to calculate a Gini indexthat measures inequality.23 Comparing thebank’s 35.5 value for Gini with thosereported for other countries in the globalHuman Development Report, however,Afghanistan is no worse than other CentralAsian countries and better (lower) thanmost Latin American and African countries(See Table 2.8).24 The lowest 30 per centof the population receives only nine percent of the aggregate national income,while the upper third absorbs 55 per cent.Given the unreliability of data the Giniwas based on, however, one has to readDAB’s calculation with a note of caution.

Using food consumption as a proxy forthe variable in income, the 2003 NationalRural Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA)data show relatively unequal distributionof wealth across five wealth groups, fromthe poorest to the richest. The poorest 20per cent of the population is spending fourtimes more on food than the richest 20 percent. Although these are preliminaryindicators of inequalities in assets, incomesand consumption, the NHDR recognizesthe need for more data to draw out existinginequalities in quantitative as well asqualitative ways.

The Most Vulnerable: the Poor 

According to the NRVA, poverty is “acondition that reflects physical, economic,social and political deprivation, as well asa lack of assets and income…. [Whereas]poverty reflects an unacceptable level ofwell-being, vulnerability captures theexposure to uninsured risk leading to asocially unacceptable level of well-being

23 The Gini coefficients are aggregate inequality measures and can vary anywhere from 0 (perfect equality) to 1 (perfect inequality).24 Said Mubin Shah 2004.

Percentage share of income or consumption

Gini index Lowest 10% Lowest 20% 2end 20% 3rd 20% 4th 20% High 20 % Highest 10%

Afghanistan 2002 35.50 2.00 7.00 13.00 19.00 26.00 35.00 20.00

Bangladesh 2000 31.80 3.90 9.00 12.50 15.90 21.20 41.30 26.70

India 1997 37.80 3.50 8.10 11.60 15.00 19.30 46.10 33.50

Iran 1998 43.00 2.00 5.10 9.40 14.10 21.50 49.90 33.70

Pakistan 1998-99 33.00 3.70 8.80 12.50 15.90 20.60 42.30 28.30

Tajikistan 1998 34.70 3.20 8.00 12.90 17.00 22.10 40.00 25.20

Uzbekistan 2000 26.80 3.60 9.20 14.10 17.90 22.60 36.30 22.00

Turkmenistan 1998 40.80 2.60 6.10 10.20 14.70 21.50 47.50 31.70

Russia 2000 45.60 1.80 4.90 9.50 14.10 20.30 51.30 36.00

Botswana 1993 63.00 0.70 2.20 4.90 8.20 14.40 70.30 56.60

Namibia 1993 70.70 0.50 1.40 3.00 5.40 11.50 78.70 64.50

Sierra Leone 1989 62.90 0.50 1.10 2.00 9.80 23.70 63.40 43.60

Table 2.8: Distribution of Income and Consumption

Sources: WB, World Development Indicators 2003 and Da Afghanistan Bank estimates 2004.

Chapter 234

in the future.”25 The majority of the Afghanpopulation can be classified as poor. TheNRVA, a survey of some 11,000 ruralhouseholds from across Afghanistan,indicated that 20.4 per cent of the ruralpopulation consumes less than 2,070kilocalories per person per day.

Human poverty in Afghanistan is amultidimensional problem that includesinequalities in access to productive assetsand social services; poor health, education

and nutritional status; weak socialprotection systems; vulnerability to macroand micro-level risks (both natural andhuman-triggered); human displacement;gender inequi t ies and pol i t ica lmarginalization.26 Low incomes and lowlevels of living standards for the poor aremanifested in their poor health, nutritionand education, which in turn can lowertheir economic productivity, and therebylead directly and indirectly to a slowergrowing economy.

Source: NRVA (2003).

25 WB 2004b.26 Werblow 2002.

Chart 2.14: Distribution of Food Expenditure by Income Groups

NHDR 04 35

Who are the rural poor?

Measuring poverty and vulnerabilitythrough consumption data, the NRVAcollected data on food intakes over sevendays, concluding that half of the ruralsample (48 per cent) were poor, becausefor these households, food expenditureswere less than the cost of purchasing2,100 calories a day per person basedon local prices. Food insecurity wasreported by half of the rural sample.Overall, around 20 per cent appeared tobe extremely poor and chronically foodinsecure, with a further 60 per cent livingeither in poverty or close to poverty (andoften suffering from a lack of dietarydiversity and ill health). Only 20 percent of households were better off,although they too face serious problemsaccessing basic services. As expected,poorer households were more likely tobe headed by a single parent, often awoman, and have a higher proportionof people with disabilities. By contrast,better-off households were more likelyto be literate and to own land.

Alarming spatial and gender disparities:The NRVA confirmed the wideinequalities in access and opportunitiesthat exist in Afghanistan. Poverty, asmeasured by consumption and access toservices, displayed wide disparities:between provinces, within provinces andwithin households. Power, medicalservices and transport were available tothose who could pay for them, but access

to public services such as drinking water,transportation, schools, clinics andhospitals was extremely low amongalmost all households. Other disparitiesincluded the fact that while childrenfrom poorer households have lowerschool enrolment rates, the gender gapwas similar for households regardlessof wealth, with gender gaps even worsein some provinces (e.g., Kandahar, Ghor,Zabul and Helmand). The survey alsosuggested that some parts of Afghanistanmay have overall poverty levels that arehigher than others, particularly the west,north and central west, with the northeastrelatively better off. However, cautionis expressed as to the accuracy of thesefigures in the absence of accuratepopulation figures by province, and giventhe existence of pockets of poverty inevery province.

How do they live?

The survey demonstrated that rurallivelihoods were highly complex andvaried, with agriculture (includingpoppy) playing a major role as a copingmechanism. Contrary to expectations,the majority of the rural poor in thesample did not produce food or engagein farm activities: 24 per cent reportedthey were completely landless, andalmost half of all rural employmentinvolved non-farm activities (such asconstruction, trade, manufacturing,transport, mining and other services).Remittances from relatives migrating to

neighbouring districts and provinces forseasonal and cross-border work (by landto Iran and Pakistan) were crucial to thesurvival of many poor rural families.

What are some of the causes ofpoverty?

Eighty per cent of households said theyhad been affected by some form of shockduring 2002–2003, and the majorityidentified drought as the most seriousexample. As the majority of drought-affected households (70 per cent) hadnot recovered income or asset losses, 40per cent of rural households had to reducefood consumption to cope.

Poor health among poorer householdswas also confirmed by the NRVA, whichfound that the poorest rural householdssampled had double the chance of havingexperienced a death in the family, andespecially a child under the age of five,than the richer households. Theassessment also confirmed that shockssuch as the death of a family memberalso have a negative impact on thewelfare of households, resulting in a lossof human capital, incurred costs andeven early marriages. These miseriesfuel a vicious cycle of poverty. Contraryto expectations, only two per cent ofhouseholds reported violence as ahousehold-level shock, although thesefindings may have serious flaws givensensitivity on the issue.

Source: MRRD/WFP, Preliminary Findings of the NRVA (first release), 2004

The NRVA identifies drought as the maincause of rural poverty (See Chart 2.15),affecting more than half of the ruralpopulation. Other causes included farm-related shocks such as the loss of animals,natural disasters such as landslides orflooding, epidemic diseases such asmalaria, and economic shifts such as

market price increases. Surprisingly,violence as a cause of poverty was reportedby only five per cent of the ruralpopulation.27

Other issues confront Afghans living inurban areas. The Government estimatesthat around 6.4 million people live in cities

27 WB 2004b.

Box 2.2

Findings of the NRVA

Chapter 236

– 30 per cent of the population. This figurewill have doubled by 2015 at the currentrate of urbanization. Thousands ofreturnees have chosen major cities suchas Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat, Mazar andKabul as their residence in order to benefitfrom their facilities and social services.Owing to the influx of returning refugees,the population of Kabul alone has increasedfrom 1.7 million in 2000 to around 3million in 2003.28 A crisis of rapid anduncontrollable urbanization has led to anacute shortage of housing, particularly inKabul. The majority of new urban residentsare landless returnees and IDPs who havesettled in unplanned and hence un-servicedportions of the cities. Most have little orno access to conventional services.

While most Afghans in both rural andurban areas can be classified as poor, somegroups and/or households are most

vulnerable to poverty, or to falling deeperinto poverty. These include children,women, the disabled, IDPs, returnees, andthe Kuchis, pastoralists who move fromplace to place.

Children as Victims 

Children were some of the primary victimsof the two and a half decades of conflictin Afghanistan. The 1.5 million peoplekilled may have included more than300,000 children.29 In addition to the lossof lives, there have been grave physicaland emotional scars that will affectgenerations of Afghans who have knownnothing but war.

A 1998 UNICEF study found that amongthe more than 300 children ages eight to18 interviewed in Kabul by mental healthworkers, 72 per cent experienced the deathof a family member between 1992 and

Chart 2.15: Reported Poverty Shocks

Source: NRVA 2003 (from Poverty, Vulnerability and Social Protection in Afghanistan, 2004).

28 TISA 2004e. “Technical Annex: Urban Development.” Securing Afghanistan’s Future.29 The figure of 1.5 million is quoted in Ahman Rashid 2000. The figure of 300,000 was taken from Save the Children (US) 2002.

Children were some ofthe primary victims ofthe two and a halfdecades of conflict inAfghanistan. The 1.5million people killedmay have includedmore than 300,000children.

60

0

10

20

30

40

50

Drought Farmingshocks

Naturalshocks

Epidemics Foodprice

increase

Farmgateprice

decrease

Violence Highinflux ofreturnees

55

46

38

2926

5 5 4

%

NHDR 04 37

1996. In 40 per cent of these cases, thechild had lost a parent. Almost all of thechildren had witnessed acts of violenceduring the fighting, while two-thirds ofthem saw dead bodies or parts of bodies,and nearly half saw many people killed atone time in rocket and artillery attacks.Ninety per cent of the children interviewedsaid they believed they would die duringthe conflict. Almost all the children,sometimes or often, felt that life was notworth living.30

Risks and shocks identified by childrenand their families include politicalrepression, war, displacement, poverty,family loss and separation, family tensions,physical illness, danger from the physicalenvironment, heavy and exploitative work.These threats harm children’s overall socialand emotional well-being, affecting theirsocial development, morality, behaviour,mental health and the opportunities theyare able to access. Moreover, many yearsof war, drought, hunger, disease, lack ofproper medicine, and the migration offamilies in search of survival, food andnew livelihoods have resulted in poorhealth and poverty that stretches the copingmechanisms of many people to the limit.31

The burden of poverty falls heaviest onchildren, who are frequently kept out ofschool – even at a young age – to helpsupport the family.32 They work on theirfamilies’ farms, collect water and firewood,and scavenge for scrap metal to sell forspare change. In Kabul alone, 50,000children – mostly aged eight to ten – workon the streets polishing shoes, selling fruitfor shopkeepers, burning incense forprayers, acting as porters in the markets,

washing cars or simply begging for money.They also search wasteland and ruins forfirewood, scraps of food, plastic, metal orpaper – anything that can be used in thehome or sold.33

A 2003 survey of vulnerable children andtheir families carried out by Save theChildren (US) and UNICEF verifiedpoverty as the incubator of other humaninsecurities for children. For example,poverty was reported to increase tensionsin the home, force children to work on thestreet, pressure parents to pull their childrenout of school and encourage early marriagefor daughters – all of which had emotionaland sometimes physical impacts.34

For children, threats posed by poor healthare even more deadly than armed conflict.According to UNICEF, Afghanistan’sunder-five mortality rate is at a staggering17 per cent. That means that almost onein five children dies before reaching theage of five. Afghanistan has the secondhighest maternal death rate in the world,and the highest rates of infant and childmortality in Asia.35 Afghan children alsoface health risks from infectious diseases,many of which are preventable by vaccine.Measles alone is estimated to kill 35,000children every year. It is followed as amongthe leading causes of death for children bypneumonia and other acute respiratoryinfections in winter, and diarrhoea diseases,particularly during the summer months,that derive from severe water shortages,notably in rural areas, and inadequatesanitation.36

According to the UNICEF/CSO MICS,approximately 39 per cent of the population

30 UNICEF, as quoted by Amnesty International 1998.31 Save the Children (US)/UNICEF 2003.32 In 2002, Save the Children (US), with support from UNICEF, conducted a significant consultation with children and their families living in Kabul. The

aim of the research, using primarily qualitative methods, was to listen to children’s views and to access their experiences of daily life in order to guide thedevelopment of support programmes. More than 600 people participated in the group discussions.

33 Save the Children (US) 2002.34 Save the Children (US)/UNICEF 2003.35 Ibid.36 Twenty-five per cent of child mortality is due to diarrhoea, 19 per cent to respiratory tract infections, 16 per cent to measles, six per cent to scurvy and

the remaining 34 per cent due to other factors.

Chapter 238

in urban areas and 69 per cent in ruralareas do not have access to safe water,with considerable regional disparities.Waterborne diseases take the lives of halfthe children who die under the age of five.This means that about 125 out of every1,000 children die because of contaminatedwater and the unhygienic situations wherethey live. This is among the worst figuresin the world (See Chart 2.16).

Against this background, some successeshave been achieved with respect tochildren’s health. In 2002, over 11 millionchildren were immunized against measles(measles immunization coverage nowstands at about 80 per cent) and some 6.4million children were immunized againstpolio in five rounds of vaccinations (poliocoverage now exceeds 80 per cent). Thereis a concern that cross-border transmissionmay occur if maximum polio immunizationcoverage is not achieved soon.

Even before the war, Afghanistan’sresources for education were very limited.The war made the situation worse as schoolbuildings were destroyed or neglected, andteachers received little or no training.

Thousands of qualified teachers were alsoforced out of the country. As a result, anentire generation of Afghan children wasdeprived of education and the opportunityfor a better life. Taliban control from themid-1990s until 2001 led to strictlyenforced bans both on girls attendingschool and on female teachers. By the endof the 1990s, only five per cent of girlscompared to 60 per cent of boys weregoing to school. In March 2002, theAfghanistan Interim Authority launchedthe “Back to School” campaign, whichresulted in some three million children and70,000 teachers returning to school. Today,an estimated 3.7 million children attendsome form of learning, the vast majorityat the primary level. Nationally, girls makeup on average 30 per cent of the studentpopulation, a massive increase evencompared to the years prior to the Talibanrestrictions.

There is still a chronic need for rebuildingschools, with over 60 per cent of formalinstitutions having suffered some degreeof damage. Water and sanitation facilitiesare available in only a fraction of schools,presenting a potential barrier to girls’

Source: MRRD, 2004

Chart 2.16: Correlation between Population without Sanitation (%) and ChildMortality Rate

Afghanistan

Pakistan Myanmar

Bhutan

India

NepalBangladesh

Maldives

Srilanka

300

250

200

150

100

50

00 20 40 60 80 100

Population without Sanitation (%)

Data from WB, 2003

Chi

ld M

orta

lity

Rat

e 10

00

NHDR 04 39

attendance.37 According to the 2003NRVA, the lack of school availability wasthe main causes of non-attendance (SeeTable 2.9). In 13 of 32 provinces surveyed(there are now 34 provinces), over 70 percent of households identified theunavailability of schools as the main reasonfor girls not attending them.

A relatively new but rapidly growing threatto the well-being of Afghan children isabduction and trafficking. In 2003, policerescued nearly 200 abducted children –both boys and girls – in different parts ofthe country, while some 750 children weretrafficked to Saudi Arabia alone.Trafficking can be attributed to manyfactors, including conflict, lack of internalsecurity, poverty and poor socio-economicopportunities. A recent report by theInternational Organization for Migration(IOM), stated that there were many formsof human trafficking practiced inAfghanistan, including child prostitution,exploitation of prostitutes, forced labour,slavery and practices similar to slavery,servitude and the removal of body organs.38

With increasing concerns about childtrafficking, local human rights bodies and

the United Nations have started acountrywide awareness-raising campaignin a bid to sensitize government officials,local police, religious leaders and parentsabout the existence and consequences ofthe problem. Besides the drug mafia, childtrafficking is proving now to be anotherdifficult issue for fledging state institutionsto address.

The Plight of Afghan Women 

Years of discrimination against women,coupled with poverty and insecurity, haveleft Afghan women with a legacy of someof the worst social indicators in the worldtoday. Only 14 % are literate. Every halfan hour a woman dies of pregnancy-relatedproblems: 1,600 out of 100,000 die duringchildbirth, a rate 60 times higher than thatfor women in industrial countries. Seventyper cent of people affected by tuberculosisare women.

In Kabul, 50,000 Afghan women arewidows and heads of households. Sixty-five per cent surveyed by the organizationPhysicians for Human Rights were foundto have suicidal tendencies and 16 per centhave actually attempted suicide.39 Thefeminization of poverty, serious

37 USAID 2002.38 IOM 2004.

It seems like thegovernment has not paidas much attention tohuman security as itshould. Everyday we hearabout children andwomen abducted forinhuman purposes.Women are used forsexual pleasures andchildren for sex abuse,drug trafficking and bodyparts. It is theresponsibility of thegovernment to put a stopto these sorts of crimes,and if it cannot do it byitself it should seekassistance from theinternational community.

Jawid Hussain from Jaghori,Ghazni

  BOYS % GIRLS %Very poor Poor Medium Total Very poor Poor Medium Total

School not available 27 25 31 28 58 54 61 58

Family commitment/ 10 12 13 12 18 25 21 22marriage/tradition

Expensive 27 18 8 15 14 7 3 6

Employment 16 19 16 17 3 3 5 4

Too far away 17 22 28 24 7 9 9 8

Other 4 4 4 4 1 2 1 1

Table 2.9: School Non-attendance Reasons by Wealth Group and Gender

Source: NRVA 2003.

Chapter 240

malnutrition, exclusion from public life,gender-based violence, rape, lack of basichealth facilities, illiteracy, forced marriageand routine denial of justice are some ofthe many human security concerns facedby Afghan women. The situation of womenas a manifestation of inequality and a threatto human security will be discussedthoroughly in Chapter 3.

The Disabled

Afghanistan is one of the world’s mostheavily mined countries. But very fewreliable data exist on disability issues,including the number of people withimpairments. An estimate from a numberof uncoordinated sample surveys puts thefigure at around four per cent of thepopulation, which means approximatelyone million people.40 The number may behigher since negative stereotypes togetherwith poor infrastructure and a lack ofresources to conduct proper surveys makeit difficult to identify all those withdisabilities. Moreover, considering thatdisability does not only affect individualsbut also families, it can be argued that thepercentage of the population coping withdisabilities is much higher than four percent.

An ongoing national survey by the Ministryof Martyrs and Disabled in 2003 showedthat among the 13,000 disabled peoplesurveyed across the country, the majority(86 per cent) were physically impaired orhad multiple disabilities.41 Only five percent noted a mental disability. Menrepresented 78 per cent of those withdisabilities, and, as expected, 38 per centof them had been disabled by the war and16 per cent by mines. Among women, tenper cent were affected by the war followedby disease or congenital disabilities. Half

of the men and almost all of the womenwith disabilities were illiterate.

The survey also found that while hundredof thousands of Afghans were disabledthrough war or landmines, many morehave been victims of harsh nature and poornurture. Years of drought and poverty, theresulting malnutrition and natural disastershave left many people with impairments.Preventable diseases such as polio, birthdefects and accidents are other factors.Moreover, the lack of awareness ondisability prevention leads to many newcases that could be avoided. Poor medicalinfrastructure means that many treatablecases end up as permanent impairments.42

Years of conflict in Afghanistan havetouched every stratum of the society, butdisabled people have suffered much morebecause of their vulnerable social position.Political and economic inequalitycompounded by negative social attitudesand stereotype that see disabled people asdependent, inactive and non-productivehas marginalized them to the level ofseclusion, leaving an overwhelmingmajority of disabled Afghans and theirfamilies with social and economicdeprivation. Poverty and unemploymentare key factors for perpetuating thisexclusion. A survey conducted by theMinistry of Labour and Social Affairs andthe International Rescue Committee (IRC)has found very high unemployment amongdisabled people, estimated at 84 per cent.43

The lack of legislation to protect the rightsof the disabled has also led to institutionaldiscrimination.

IDPs and Returnees 

Afghans comprise the second largestnumber of refugees and IDPs in the world,

39 UNIFEM, statement by Noeleen Heyzer at “Learning from Experience from Afghanistan: Second Lesson Learning Workshop”, UNDP 2002.40 TISA 2003c, Comprehensive National Disability Policy.41 Wardak and Turmusani 2003.42 TISA 2003c.43 Wardak and Turmusani 2003.

NHDR 04 41

after Palestinians. Not too long ago, it wasestimated that one in every three Afghanwas either a refugee or an IDP, promptingthe United Nations to declare Afghanistanas the major site of human displacementin the world. At the beginning of 2002,there were approximately 6 million Afghanrefugees in Pakistan (3.5 million) and Iran(2.5 million). Since the fall of the Taliban,over 2.5 million Afghans have returnedfrom Pakistan (1.8 million) and Iran(600,000),44 yet an estimated 3.4 millionAfghans remain outside their country.45

The IDPs were estimated at 1 million atthe beginning of 2002. During the courseof 2003, some 70,000 IDPs returned totheir places of origin, predominantly inthe northern and western provinces.However, the southern and western partsof the country – Kandahar, Helmand,Nimruz, Uruzgan and Zabul provinces –still host approximately 200,000 IDPs.They are comprised primarily of nomadicKuchi who lost their livelihoods duringthe four-year drought, and Pashtunsuprooted by ethnic violence in the northand west of the country.

Most of these IDPs are willing to returnto their places of origin in the north, andsince the Constitutional Loya Jirgah, returnhas became an issue of political priorityfor the Government. Some progress hasbeen made towards that end, includingsecuring pledges of support or at least nointerference from the military strong menin the north. However, the preconditionsfor their return also include the removalor control of local commanders,disarmament and the establishment of therule of law through police training,improved district administration and thecreation of a mechanism for the resolutionof land disputes. These steps have not yetbeen achieved.46

The Kuchi IDPs from Registan comprisepastoralists who use the area as a keyresource. They can be divided betweenthose who permanently stay there and thosewho are seasonal users. Making up about25–30 per cent of the total number of IDPs,they are willing to return to their place oforigin. Facilitating their return, however,requires a substantial improvement in localconditions and support to restart sustainablelivelihoods. Necessary components wouldinclude rehabilitation of existing watersources, rebuilding livestock herds,community-led and capacity buildingprojects, income-generating activities, andaccess to social services such as educationand health.47

Other Kuchis have been affected bydrought, and make up about 30–40 percent of IDPs. They include pastoralistswho used to migrate from the southernprovinces towards the central highland –from Kandahar and Helmand to Zabul andGhazni. Drought has caused severe lossesamong their livestock, and has beenexacerbated by the lack of access to majorgrazing areas due to conflicts over pasturerights. A majority of this category are alsowilling to return to their places of originif provided with livestock.

The non-Kuchi IDPs affected by droughtare estimated to comprise some five percent of IDPs, and are scattered in all IDPsettlements. They are composed mostly oflandless and economically vulnerable ruralinhabitants who have lost their source oflivelihood due to the drought. Manyconsequently opted to settle in IDP campsin order to benefit from their humanitarianassistance. The lack of land and assets arestated as obstacles for their return to theirplaces of origin.

Much of the media analysis on the IDPsand returnees highlights the problem with

44 IDPs include those who have been internally displaced as result of a combination of environmental, political, tribal and economic factors.45 TISA 2004f. “Technical Annex on Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons.” Securing Afghanistan’s Future.46 TISA 2003. Consultative Group on IDPs, IDP Strategy for Afghanistan.47 Global IDP 2003.

Chapter 242

respect to security, war-lordism, ethnictensions and factional conflicts. Yet fromthe perspective of the IDPs themselves, itis the gloomy prospect of limitedlivelihoods in their areas of their originthat is preventing them from returning.

In a recent UNHCR survey of some 20,000IDP households, a majority (61 per cent)of the respondents expressed their

willingness to return to their places oforigin. However, in answer to the question“What prevents you from returning?” avast majority identified human securityconcerns.48 Forty-six per cent mentionedthe lack of drinking water, only about 14per cent identified security-related issues,and the remaining 40 per cent pointed tolivelihood concerns (See Chart 2.17).

48 UNHCR 2004b.

Chart 2.17: Reasons for Not Returning to Place of Origin

Chart 2.18: Reasons for Displacement

Source: UNHCR, IDP Profiling Survey, April 2004.

Source: UNHCR, IDP Profiling Survey, April 2004.

NHDR 04 43

Similarly, in response to a question about“reasons for displacement” a vast majorityof the respondents identified humansecurity issues as primary factors. Astaggering 49 per cent were forced to movebecause they lost their livestock due todrought, followed by 19 per cent and tenper cent respectively who reported a lackof drinking water and loss of daily labour(See Chart 2.18). Armed conflict came asa distant fourth, with only nine per cent ofthe respondents identifying it as a reasonfor displacement.

Clearly, livelihood security is a pressingconcern for the majority of the IDPs, whostruggle to scrap together the most basicelements of survival and dignity. Forpromoting a return to the communities oforigin, there is a need for balancing thefocus of assistance between the areas ofdisplacement and the areas of return. Anyarea of return needs to be a place that issecure and that offers opportunities forvulnerable community members to regainand enhance their livelihoods.

The Kuchis

The Kuchis constitute a significant part ofAfghanistan’s cultural tradition. Forcenturies, they have migrated across partsof the country semi-annually with theircaravans of goats, sheep, donkeys andcamels. Their motivation for constantmigration is twofold: to search for seasonalpastures for their livestock and to benefitfrom milder climates, since the tents inwhich they live do not provide adequateprotection from either heat or cold. Thepattern of migration is, therefore,predictable, determined by the availabilityof pasture and the climate.49

Given incomplete demographic data,accurate population figures for the Kuchisare non-existent. The last official figureson their number stem from the 1979

census. The nomads then were registeredas 1,074,000 individuals, or nine per centof the total population. Currently, the CSOestimates there are 1.5 million Kuchis, orabout 6.3 per cent of the total population.

The livestock owned by Kuchis used tomake important contributions to thenational economy in terms of meat, skinsand wool. In the 1970s, livestock was saidto make up 18 per cent of Afghanistan’sdomestic product and was an importantcomponent of national exports. The Kuchisowned about 30 per cent of all sheep andgoats and most camels. At a village level,they provided tea, sugar, matches,kerosene, guns, etc., in exchange for wheat,vegetables, fruits and other foodstuffs.They also acted as moneylenders andoffered services in transportation alongwith additional labour at harvest time.Their flocks fertilized the fields after theharvest, when the farmers allowed theanimals to graze the fields. Relationsbetween the settled people and the Kuchiswere, therefore, largely based on exchangesof goods and services.

The Kuchis’ lifestyle initially came underthreat due to changes associated with“modernization”. For example, thedevelopment of road systems in the 1950sand 1960s led to severe competition betweentruckers and the Kuchi’s traditional camelcaravans. Driven out of business, someKuchis began operating trucking businessescombined with land ownership. Otherspurchased or hired trucks to assist in movingbetween pastures. However, the slow declineof the Kuchis accelerated after the warbegan and during the droughts of 1971–1972and 1998–2002. Bombing campaigns bythe US-led coalition starting in 2002 as wellas the spread of land mines during 23 yearsof conflict decimated the Kuchis’ animalherds – their major economic asset. Fightingalso often blocked migratory routes.50

Shamir, who lost all200 of his sheep andgoats in the drought,says "...we used to singabout everything.Women would dance,especially atweddings...but all thathas graduallydisappeared. Poorpeople cannot afforddrums and music. Thiswar and now thisdrought have swepteverything away.”

Mark Herold, 2003.

49 AFSU/Vulnerability and Analysis Mapping (VAM), WFP 2002.50 Marc Herold 2003.

Chapter 244

The drought of 1998–2002 is said to beresponsible for the death of 75 per cent ofthe Kuchi animals. Consequently, manyof the once independent, self-sufficientKuchis have been reduced to destitutefarmers, IDPs, casual labourers andbeggars.

Constraints on grazing areas haveexacerbated their vulnerability. Access isimpaired for most due to historical andsocio-territorial factors. In the past, disputesover land use, and competition overresources between permanently settledAfghans and the Kuchis have reachedviolent levels, today, there is no overallpolicy regarding land tenure and pasturerights, and access is determined by thelocal authorities and the specific attitudesof the people involved. The traditionalsystem of pasture rights seems to haveeroded been replaced by the power of thegun. Many Kuchis still hold documents –some as old as a 100 years – giving themrights to pastures in different areas, buttheir current value is undetermined.

The Kuchis’ current relations with settledpopulations vary across the differentregions, depending on past relations, theextent of ethnic polarization of, ethniccomposition and other factors. The typeof relationship the Kuchis hold with thesettled people in the areas in which theylive is crucial for understanding theirvulnerability. For example, the Kuchis ofthe south and of central Hazarajat have arelatively low community coping capacitydue to their weak links with the settledpopulation.

Although the National DevelopmentFramework (NDF) states quite stronglythat the living conditions of Kuchis shallbe improved, with an emphasis on the needto revive the livestock production sector,current governmental policies andprogrammes are largely focused on settledpopulations. The Kuchis are often excludedfrom government serv ices anddevelopment opportunities because most

service delivery and interventionprogrammes provided by the governmentand the aid community do notaccommodate their mobility.

Kuchis currently make up over 70 per centof Afghan IDPs. Conditions in the IDPsettlements are arguably better than thosein the areas of origin, with potable drinkingwater and access to education and healthcare. Pull factors to the areas of originhave to be created, complemented byprojects aiming for longer-termreintegration. These include improvedaccess to water, support for livestock,access to pastures, skills training in animalhusbandry, livestock products processingand veterinary services, and access tomarkets and social services. The Kuchisreturn to their inherited livelihood willonly be sustained through area integrationprojects that benefit not only those whoare returning but also the neighbouringcommunities. Project activities shouldtherefore be directed towards includingboth populations; promoting coexistence,particularly in areas of potential ethnictension; and establishing the view thatKuchis are assets rather than a form ofcompetition to the settled population.

2.5. Conclusions

Even before its long conflict, Afghanistanwas already one of the poorest countriesin the world, with low levels of access tohealth care, education, potable drinkingwater and opportunities for incomegeneration. The years of war andinstability, along with the ravages of nature,have only made the situation worse by anymeasure of human development andhuman security.

Today, whereas education indicators haveimproved and are expected to continue todo so, the health situation has not changedmuch. Moreover, the remarkable GDPrecovery of the past couple of years andthe projected robust growth over the nextfew years may certainly improve

Haji Khan used to have300 sheeps, two horsesand nine camels. Henow has only onecamel and lives in afour metre by twometre UNHCR tent inthe sprawling refugeecamp of Spin Boldak.He recalls other timesbefore the rainsstopped. Life was good,we never used to let ourdaughters marrypeople from the citybecause if they settledthey would be like abird in a cage. Now weare like a bird in a cage.

Marc Herold, 21 September 2003

NHDR 04 45

Afghanistan’s HDI ranking, but may nothelp the overall human security situation.One reason is the unequal distribution ofwealth and poverty. While reliable data isnot available, anecdotal evidence pointsto the facts that the growth has done littleto alleviate poverty and has worsenedinequality.

These figures and evidence highlight theseverity of the challenges of reconstructionand development in Afghanistan, but theyalso provide direction and meaning formovement forward, as well as benchmarksfor progress.

Chapter 246

3

Photo: Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh

A Threat-based Analysis ofWants and Fears

Chapter

3.1. Why a Threat-basedAnalysis?

Chapter 3 reexamines the indicatorspresented in Chapter 2 according to threatsto “wants” (basic needs related todevelopment) and “fears” (deficienciesrelated to human rights and strategicneeds). The rationale behind an approachis based on a number of assumptions:

• Fears and wants, as symptoms ofv io lence , abuse and under-development, are inter-related. Thisinterdependence means one cannot beprioritized over the over;

• Threats include both objective,tangible elements, such as insufficientincome, chronic unemployment,dismal access to adequate health careand quality education, etc., as well assubjective perceptions of threat, suchthe inability to control one’s destiny,indignity, fear of crime and violentconflict, etc;

• Threats can be both direct (those thatare deliberately orchestrated, such assystematic persecutions, or drug-related crimes) and indirect (those thatarise inadvertently or structurally, e.g.,underinvestment in key social andeconomic sectors such as educationand health care);

• Fears and wants include human rightsand dignity as underlying factors.Human rights for this NHDR are notconfined to the first generation of civiland political rights (i.e., freedom fromviolence, rights abuses, freedom ofexpression and participation, etc.) butalso second-generation social,economic and cultural rights (includingthe right to development and freedomfrom wants).

Ultimately, a threat-based analysis allowsthe recognition of the causes andconsequences of vulnerability to a widearray of threats. The persistence of thesehas to be addressed by appropriatepreventive and corrective state policies,since they endanger the human securityof the Afghan people, as well as thestability of the state.

First, a word of caution. References to “thepeople” can be problematic. Cultural,gender, generational, ethnic and otherdifferences change the way individualsperceive themselves from place to place,but also in time. While one can assume acertain minimum of universal needs, wants,rights and feelings, human securitychallenges differ from region to region,province to province, household tohousehold, and individual to individual.Settled people do not suffer from the samevulnerabilities as IDPs. Women facedifferent challenges than men. Rural andurban populations, ethnic groups, thedisabled, and young and elderly people allperceive the complexities of humansecurity in different ways.

A complete threat analysis in Afghanistanwould require data disaggregated bygender, profession, province, ethnicity,language group, settlement, income, etc.,which at the moment is not available. Itwould also require an opinion poll andperception study to allow for thesubjectivity of the threats. In the absenceof perfect data, the NHDR analysesavailable objective and quantitative dataas well as the findings from various surveysand assessments. The report team also heldconsultations with students, instructorsand researchers in Kabul, Jalalabad, Balkh,Herat and Bamyan. Some governmentofficials, aid workers and ordinary people

Chapter 3

A Threat-based Analysis ofWants and Fears

NHDR 04 49

were also consulted. Disparities arechronicled in the report to the extentpossible, although generalities are madeand the picture may be incomplete fornow.

Beyond survival, this chapter looks as wellat the quality of life, defined in a broad

way as existence with dignity. Among thevarious threats to dignity, the chapterdiscusses the series below, in no particularorder, as they all seem to be importantpriorities. While the indicators have beenpresented in Chapter 2, here the reportanalyses the factors that contribute to theappalling numbers.

A report by the Feinstein InternationalFamine Center at Tufts University in theUnited States, funded by the US Agencyfor International Development (USAID),documented and analysed recent trendsin the relationship between humansecurity and livelihoods throughout ruralAfghanistan from 2002–2003. The studywas based on the analysis of NRVAsurvey data, and analyses of six provincesbased on primary research by the TuftsUniversity team in Badghis, Balkh,Herat, Kabul, Kandahar and Nangarhar.

The report emphasizes the importantlinks among four key aspects of humansecurity in the livelihoods of ruralAfghans, and the prospects for peaceand development in the country in thelonger term. The four aspects of humansecurity are:

1) Human rights and personal security2) Societal and community security3) Economic and resource security4) Governance and political security

The report also examines the formal,traditional and customary mechanismsthat are in place to address injustice andmitigate security and livelihood threatsfor rural Afghans.

Policy recommendations are made basedon these findings, which include thefollowing:

On human security and physicalsecurity:

1. Countrywide, rural Afghans havevery different views and experiences

of security than those of theinternational community and theAfghan Government. A vastmajority of areas that are a “highrisk/hostile environment” or“ m e d i u m r i s k / u n c e r t a i nenvironment” for the United Nationsand international NGOs are oftenexperienced as secure, with fewreported conflicts by the local ruralpopulations. In contrast, regions thatshow up as “low risk/permissionenvironment” on UN security mapsare areas where local populationsoften report high levels of conflictand are experiencing insecurity atthe hands of armed political groups,warlords, commanders and theirassociates, including districtauthorities and police forces.

On political participation and thelegal process:

2. The majority of rural Afghans inBadghis, Herat, Kabul, Kandahar,and Nangarhar provinces had noknowledge of the constitutionalprocess. Rural women were fourtimes less likely to be aware of itthan rural men. After learning aboutthe new Constitution from the Tuftsteam, rural women primarilystressed the importance of educationfor boys and girls, health care, andequal rights for men and women,boys and girls. Rural men primarilystressed the need for a re-enforcement of Sharia law andeconomic opportunities.

3. Countrywide, the almost completelack of participation of rural womenin political and civil affairs is a directobstacle to their human security andto their political rights, as well asto the nation-building process.

4. Formal and traditional justicesystems play a direct role inundermining the human rights ofwomen and girls.

On access to education andhealth care:

5. There are almost no rural, school-age girls attending school in thesouth and south central regions ofAfghanistan. The primary reasonsthat both boys and girls in rural areasare not in school countrywide arethe lack and distance of facilities.

6. In 38 per cent of rural districts, themajority of rural Afghans have noaccess to any form of health care,and in 62%, the majority have accessto only basic health care, includinghealth posts, basic health carecentres and traditional healers. Thesebasic facilities often lack well-trained personnel and adequatemedical supplies or medicines.

7. Between 43–78 per cent of ruralAfghans in Badghis, Herat, Kabul,Kandahar and Nangarhar provinceshave no access to reproductivehealth care. When they are able toaccess care, the majority report thatthe quality is poor.

Box 3.1

Study on “Human Security and Livelihoods of Rural Afghans, 2002–2003”

Chapter 350

3.2. Threats to Human Securityin Afghanistan Today

Threats to Survival and a RenewedLook at the “Security Dilemma”

Traditional security threats to the peopleof Afghanistan are both direct (violence,killings, etc.) and indirect. The latteremerge from a weakened state capacityand challenges to the legitimacy ofinstitutions outside the capital, or from thewithdrawal of international aid agenciesfrom dangerous but needy zones.

As researchers have pointed out, the manycauses of insecurity in Afghanistan can beclassified under five categories:warlordism, the narco-trade, groups thatthreaten the peace process, regionalinterference and crime.1 Beyond securitysector reform and the DDR process, the“security dilemma” is complicated by thedistribution of responsibilities of differentcomponents of the security sector to thevarious lead donor countries involved,resulting in difficulties in coordination anddisjointed processes. Other problemsinclude donor fatigue, a lack of reforms

On rural livelihoods:

8. Countrywide, the majority of ruralAfghans use surface water (rivers,lakes and irrigation ditches) as theirprimary sources of drinking water.Countrywide, 48 per cent report thattheir primary water source iscontaminated or polluted.

9. Many Afghans in rural areas are notengaged strictly in agriculture, butrely on diversified livelihoodstrategies to generate householdincome. The type of non-agriculturalemployment differs by region.Women make contributions tohousehold income in nearly allprovinces, but usually performincome-generating work and arepaid significantly less than ruralmen for the same tasks. Childrenalso contribute to household incomein most areas of the country.

10. The effects of the drought continueto have a negative impact onlivelihoods in much of ruralAfghanistan. Environmentaldegradation caused by conflict,drought, population movement anddeforestation exacerbates theproblems of limited access to naturalresources for many rural Afghans.

On formal and traditional justicesystems:

11. The Afghan judiciary suffers froma severe lack of human capacity andmaterial resources. Many judgeslack adequate legal training. Publiclegal advocates and defenseattorneys do not exist within theAfghan legal system. Of thosejudges who are trained, the judicialleadership is divided betweengraduates of the Sharia School andthose of the Law School at KabulUniversity. These groups are oftenat ideological loggerheads with eachother. The three organs of thejudiciary – the Ministry of Justice,the Supreme Court and the Officeof the Attorney General – lackeffect ive coordinat ion andcommunication and are oftenideologically opposed.

12. The judiciary is highly susceptibleto military and political influencesat both the urban and rural levels.Formal courts, including familycourts, are either non-existent orbarely functional in most rural areas.There are few women lawyers andjudges in the urban areas and nonein the rural areas, and rural womenhave great difficulty accessing theformal court system.

13. A r m e d p o l i t i c a l g r o u p s ,commanders and warlords havestrategically targeted traditional andcustomary justice systems (Jirgahsand shuras) throughout ruralAfghanistan in an attempt to controllocal populations.

14. Very few police officers in ruralareas of Badghis, Balkh, Herat,Kabul, Kandahar and Nangarharprovinces have had any officialpolice training. Many are still loyalto their former commanders, whooften serve as the chief of police,Army officers, or district orprovincial authorities. Police stationsare extremely dilapidated, and policeofficers go without essentialresources.

15. The detention centres visited by theTufts team in Balkh, Badghis, Herat,Kabul, Kandahar and Nangarharprovinces were in very poorcondition and lacked basicnecessities such as secure structures,sanitation facilities, and blanketsfor detainees. Signs of mistreatmentwere common; juvenile offenderswere mixed with adults in a numberof centres.

16. Prisoners were occasionally held inmetal shipping containers or inprivate detention centres.

1 Mark Sedra, ed. 2003.

NHDR 04 51

within power ministries, and limitedi n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m i t m e n t t opeacekeeping.2 The police force has beenentrusted with the maintenance of order,but as an institution, it is still weak. NATOhas assumed command of ISAF, withresponsibility for the security of Kabul. InOctober 2003, the UN Security Councilextended the force’s mandate for anotheryear and authorized its expansion to otherparts of the country, but the deploymenthas been slow.

From a human security point of view,however, the NHDR postulates that the“security dilemma” for people inAfghanistan consists of the privatizationof security and a pervasive militarymentality in the country, both of whichare detrimental to peace-building.

As the state is unable to hold a monopolyon power in Afghanistan, its authority ischallenged by a number of competingfactions. Local and regional commanders,some of whom also represent governmentstructures and local officials, engage inregular fighting, often with heavy civiliancasualties. Armed regional and localprivate militia leaders, together with theirarmed followers, establish their own rulesfor the provision of welfare and security,the collection and distribution of wealthand booty, and clientelism. A slow DDRprocess continues to threaten theemergence of a truly “civil” society, wheredisputes could be settled through words,not arms. Out of the 60,000 armedmilitiamen, only about 12,0003 have beendisarmed and demobilized, and theprogramme has stalled rather thanaccelerated in recent months. The hopenow is to disarm 60–70 per cent of themilitias before the parliamentary electionsin April 2005.

Private militias have in fact become thecountry’s greatest danger. With terrorism

and these militias on the rise, the recentelection itself had to be “insured” throughexpensive private security companiescontracted by the UN, the US-led CoalitionForces and NATO.4 The president isguarded by American Special Forces;ministers and other key governmentofficials are also heavily guarded. Theonly people who have no security are poorcivilians. For them, the security dilemmameans feeling fearful, powerless anddefenceless.

While the international peacekeepers andCoalition Forces are tackling remnants ofpeace-spoilers, their presence throughoutthe country could give rise to an insecurefeeling among the ordinary population.Such a climate gives rise to vigilantes,Afghan or international, which makes itdifficult to know who genuinely is involvedin working for security through theGovernment and who is not. The use ofprivate contractors by the US Governmenthas created a challenge to the “perception”problem. Private security personnel areinterrogating detainees, but they may notalways be accountable to standards ofinternational human rights, a fact that hasbeen evident from investigations of prisonsin Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib andAfghanistan. Agents of security canbecome perpetuators of insecuritythemselves when they are not accountableto international norms.

In a militarized society, where evenCoalition Forces engage in reconstructionand rehabilitation through RegionalProvincial Teams, and the US provisionof food aid is carried out under independentmilitary authority, the distinctions betweenlegitimate and effective human rights andhumanitarian action by the UN and NGOs,and a military campaign is blurred. After24 years of independent aid to the Afghanpeople, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)withdrew from Afghanistan at the end of

2 Ibid.3 Afghanistan’s New Beginning Programme 2004.4 Nasrullah Stakinzai 2004.

We think the humansecurity cannot beensured if thedisarmament anddemilitarization is notdone and theconstitution articlesnot enforced. TheGovernment shouldpersist and focus ondisarmament anddemilitarization of theirresponsible people.The current policy ofPresident Hamid Karzaipertaining to the issueof disarmament is notsatisfactory. We ask thepresident to do more.

Saleh Mohammad Haqyar fromHerat

Chapter 352

July 2004, following the killing of four ofits staff, threats and insecurity. Amongone of the reasons it cited for withdrawalwas the “co-optation of humanitarian aidby the coalition for political and militarymotives.”

The fighting between Taliban and Al Qaidaleaders, and Coalition Forces, or factionalleaders and central authorities, inevitablyengulfs civilians. The privatization ofsecurity and the spread of a militarymentality, even if it has been instigated bythe pursuit of terrorists and peace-spoilers,has led to a climate of fear, intimidation,terror and lawlessness in many parts ofAfghanistan. Most important, such aclimate has given rise to a society that isruled by the power of armed individuals,instead of vetted democratic processes.

Human Poverty

Hunger, disease and vulnerability are thefate of thousands of Afghan families livingin absolute poverty, which for them meansnot having adequate access to food, shelter,clean drinking water and adequate medicalservices. Over two decades of war andinternal crises caused negative rates ofeconomic growth, while the positivegrowth rate of last year has not substantiallytrickled down to the poor. Therefore, themagni tude of pover ty remainsunacceptably high.5

Some of the main determinants of humanpoverty in Afghanistan are poor levels ofhealth and education among theeconomically active members ofhouseholds, especially women; highdependency rates in households; a lack ofemployment oppor tuni t ies ; lowproductivity of family plots; poor basicinfrastructure; and a lack of comprehensivesocial policies and safety nets in thecountry. In addition, factors such as theisolation of communities due to inadequateroads, and therefore poor integration of

rural markets to allow for the sale ofagricultural surpluses are among thefeatures of poverty in Afghanistan.Traditionally in this agrarian society, largefamilies and a strong reliance on kinsolidarity were considered viable strategiesof risk control and income diversification.Today, the value of this strategy is eroding.An increase in population and the returnof millions of refugees aggravate pressureon already limited resources.

As outlined in Chapter 2, the poverty linefor Afghanistan has not been establishedyet, and incidence, extent and location ofpoverty are hard to estimate. In the absenceof absolute numbers, we can deduce causesand consequences of poverty, which inAfghanistan has a very unequaldistribution. Gender, geographic location(urban/rural, centre/periphery, etc.) andethnicity contribute to how different peoplein Afghanistan experience their poverty.

The NRVA has provided a picture of theextent of rural poverty in Afghanistan,while efforts are underway to assess urbanpoverty. Using findings from the NRVAand from a human development analysisof the overall situation in Afghanistan, theNHDR recognizes differences in the causesand consequences of both urban and ruralpoverty.

Rural Poverty

Factors that contribute to and exacerbaterural poverty in Afghanistan consist of:

1. Lack of income: Household headunemployment is one the mostimportant determinants of poverty,although family size, household headmarital status and number of childrenare also critical factors.

2. Lack of access to basic necessities:This includes limited access and lackof basics such as food, shelter,clothing, safe water and sanitation

5 Najeeb Azizi 2004.

Poverty is the mother ofmany ills. Education,health, and socialstatus are all affectedby poverty. I would say,help me get out ofpoverty and I will helpmyself with all otherthings that you callhuman development.

Mohibullah from Jalalabad

NHDR 04 53

Map 3.1: Calorie Gap Rate (Calorie Deficiency) by Province

Chapter 354

facilities, formal education, skillstraining, health care and others.

3. Social exclusion and isolation: Therural poor suffer from social, economicand political marginalization. Theylack access to basic services, markets,information and opportunities forpolitical participation to influencedecision-making at the local andnational levels. They have minimalopportunities to participate in decision-making in the crucial areas of sociallife. Thus, they are generallydisenfranchised and powerless,remaining outside mainstream social,economic, cultural and politicalprocesses.

4. Alienation and inability to interactand benefit from factors thatcontribute to productivity in life:The rural poor are alienated fromcrucial livelihood factors such as newtechnologies and related opportunitiesfor increased productivity. They alsolack adequate marketable skillstraining and educational opportunities,and chances for participation inadministration, commerce and trade.More than any other group, theygenerally lack productive assets suchas land, production tools, livestock,equipment and machinery, which aresome of the critical elementsunderpinning productivity and self-sustenance.

5. Dependence: Most of the rural poordo not enjoy property ownership rights,especially with regard to land, andthey do not have access to credit. Manyconsequently depend on the precarioussupport of other people, includingthose providing humanitarian aid.

6. Vulnerability: The rural poor are mostvulnerable to acute droughts,earthquakes, crop pests, commodity

price fluctuations, illness andm o r b i d i t y , s u d d e n l o s s o fbreadwinners and care providers, lossof employment, and other such shocks.Already living under austerecircumstances and conditions, the poorgenerally tend to be the greatestvictims of such shocks as they are theleast able and prepared to deal withor to prevent them.

7. Erosion of indigenous cultures,values and social welfare networks: The breakdown of social institutionsin rural areas of Afghanistan, due todisplacement, has affected copingskills and traditional decision-makingstructures. This has eroded values andsocial welfare systems, affecting theextended family and mutuallysupportive community systems.

All these interdependent factors can leadto chronic poverty: the emergence of avery poor population with extremelylimited human development capacity andopportunities. For this population, povertyis passed on from generation to generation.

Urban poverty

Urban poverty in Afghanistan is asmultidimensional as rural poverty, withcommon features such as the lack ofemployment, adequate housing andservices, social protection, health care,education and personal security. There are,however, some underlying factors thatdistinguish one from the other (See Table3.1).6

The 2003 NRVA, which collected data onrural areas, proposes potential similaritiesand differences between poverty in ruraland urban Afghanistan based on the mainfindings of existing assessments, mainlyrelating to Kabul. It notes:7

• Because of the dense concentration ofpeople, urban households are often

6 WB forthcoming 2004b (draft on file with the authors).7 NRVA 2003.

NHDR 04 55

more dependent on complex publicdelivery systems to meet their needsthan their rural counterparts may be.Protracted conflict and instability hasresulted in the collapse of basicsystems for urban management andinvestment in Afghanistan, and dataon disability and diarrhoea prevalencein children under five years suggestslittle difference between rural andurban areas.

• Employment opportunities are oftenhighly insecure in Afghan cities andtowns, and the frequent movement ofhouseholds (often living in rentedaccommodations) can have a negativeimpact on community supportnetworks, leaving the poor extremelyvulnerable.

• Urban areas are a magnet for extremelypoor and destitute households andindividuals who may be highlydependent on support for their survival.However, at the same time, with ahigher proportion of expenditure on,for example, rent and fuel costs inurban areas, many poor householdsmay face food insecurity.

• For many poor households, urbanAfghanistan presents a high-riskenvironment: with accidents (road,fire, etc.), personal violence andcrowded unsanitary living conditionswidely reported.

• Nevertheless, an initial survey in themost vulnerable areas of Kabulsuggested that over half of the sampled

Dimension of Poverty and Distinctive Aspects of Urban Poverty and VulnerabilityVulnerability

Income Greater dependence on cash and market access for consumption needs. Inherent instability ofemployment opportunities derived from informal sector. High ratio of dependents to able-bodiedadults.

Education Insufficient service provision in rapidly growing cities. Inability to afford school expenses. Personalsafety and security risks deter school attendance.

Health Pollution of air and water Injuries and deaths from traffic. Unsafe working conditions (informalsector). Overcrowded and unhygienic living conditions. Poor families struggle to meet costs of waterand fuel.

Tenure Land and housing often not affordable in authorized areas – poor occupy land illegally and constructhouses without official permission.

Personal Domestic violence. Family breakdown and reduced support for children – vulnerable urban populationsfrequently lack extended family ties, which can provide safety nets. Greater social diversity andvisible income inequality can increase tensions and crime rate.

Financial Lack of access to credit and safety nets from social and informal networks.

Disempowerment Isolation of communities disconnected from jobs and services. Insufficient channels for obtainingemployment, knowing legal rights, etc. Social fragmentation weakens ties of trust and collaborationin general.

Table 3.1: Distinctive Characteristics of Urban Poverty and Vulnerability in Afghanistan

Source: WB, “Poverty, Vulnerability and Social Protection in Afghanistan”, 2004 (draft on file with the authors).

Chapter 356

households reported having more toeat now than a year ago, compared to19 per cent who reported that theywere eating less.

The consequences of both urban and ruralpoverty in Afghanistan can be classifiedas follows:

• Vicious circle of poverty: Owing toa lack of resources, entitlement orinformation, or because theinfrastructure and services are simplynot available, the poor do not haveaccess to all sorts of essentialinfrastructure and services. As aconsequence, they usually have littleor no education and are not in goodhealth. This limits their ability to findwork and earn an adequate income,which in turn limits their access toinfrastructure and services. The poorrarely take part in decision-makingthat affects their lives, and as aconsequence they cannot claim a shareof development. Afghanistan thusfollows patterns more broadlyobserved in the developing world,where income (or expenditure) iscorrelated with other factors generallyassociated with poverty andvulnerability, such as unemployment,low levels of schooling or genderdiscrimination.

• Inability to make use of newopportunities: Lack of incometranslates into limited access toservices or infrastructure that areincreasingly fee-based, given a visionof development led by the privatesector.

• Limited opportunities to participatein decision-making on the issuesrelated to their own lives. Humanpoverty hence constrains theparticipation of people in the newdemocratic processes of Afghanistan.

• Handing down poverty: Childrenborn in the poor strata of society havea high probability of poverty, which

then trickles down from generation togeneration.

• Limited consumption and lack ofuse of facilities: Poor households havedifficulty even in providing for theirbasic food needs, and make less useof medical institutions. Expenditureson medical costs per person amongthe urban or rural poor is often muchless than that of a person from highincome group.

• Risky behaviour: Poverty andunemployment and attempts to breakthese cycles are often accompaniedby crime and vices as well as violence.

• Lack of integration of the poor intothe economy and state-buildingprocesses can also lead to socialfragmentation, lack of trust ingovernment, lack of social capital, etc.

Job insecurity

Dismal livelihood prospects are one of thegreatest threats to human security inAfghanistan. Despite new opportunitiesfrom donor investments and the return ofpeople to their land, unemploymentremains a pressing problem. Althoughprecise statistics are unavailable, it isestimated that unemployment is as highas 2 million out of an estimated labourforce of some 8 million. While the recoveryand reconstruction programme may resultin the creation of 500,000 to 600,000 jobs,an employment gap of over a million jobsmay remain. This could have seriousconsequences for both peace-building anddevelopment. Creating adequateemployment opportunities is critical toreducing the high levels of poverty amongthe majority of Afghans. It could help inrestoring normalcy and building a stakein maintaining peace, and provide people,particularly young men, real alternativesto fighting.

The share of the employed inmanufacturing is almost negligible (two

NHDR 04 57

per cent), while 80 per cent are employedin agriculture and 18 per cent in services,8

mainly low paying jobs. Outsideagriculture, there are few opportunities forsecure employment. Afghanistan is atraditional agrarian society, in which thepeasants, almost all of them poor, dependon what they can grow, and are particularlyvulnerable to degradation of land resources.The agricultural sector is and will remaincritical to economic growth and humandevelopment. However, in its currentstructure and capacity, this sector isinefficient, and creates more environmentalproblems than it pays for.9

The importance of agricultural and ruraldevelopment in Afghanistan is highlightedby the fact that the rural population is thelargest share of the total population, i.e.,71.2 per cent in 2003.10 Thus, theagricultural sector, along with agricultural-based industry such as food processing,will remain a large and important economicarena for providing livelihoods to themajority of Afghans, particularly the poor.In this context, rural development remainscrucial for poverty reduction.

Health Deficit

The lack of adequate health care systemand the presence of widespread healthproblems are both threats undercuttinghuman security in Afghanistan. Lifeexpectancy at birth is a meager 45 yearsfor males and 44 years for females,according to the CSO.11 There is little dataor analysis on the causes of theseappallingly low levels. However, it isreasonable to assume that certainconditions such as poverty, poor nutrition,

lack of adequate shelter and access to safedrinking water and sanitary conditions,limited access to health services, andincreased infant mortality contribute tothe high death rates.

High infant and child mortality ratescharacterize the country’s poor health caresystem. The rates are estimated to be 115per 1,000 and 172 per 1,000 live births,respectively, among the highest in theworld.12 Vaccine preventable diseases aremajor killers. The main reported causesof death among children under five yearsold are diarrhoea (25 per cent), respiratorytract infections (19 per cent) and measles(16 percent).13 Diarrhoeal disease isparticularly common in the summerseason, causing a characteristic seasonalincrease in the prevalence of acutemalnutrition.14 This is mainly due to pooraccess to safe drinking water and adequatesanitation – the UNICEF/CSO MICSfindings indicate that 60 per cent ofhouseholds in Afghanistan drink unsafewater.15 Other factors contributing to poorhealth outcomes are inadequate infantfeeding and caring practices, as well asthe poor nutritional status of women andtheir economic constraints.16

The maternal mortality ratio inAfghanistan is also one of the highest inthe world,17 standing at 1,600 deaths per100,000 live births. The ratio varies widelyacross different parts of the country, asindicated by the Center for Disease Control(CDC), UNICEF and Ministry of Healthin their 2002 study. They found a rangefrom 200 per 100,000 live births in Kabulto as many as 8,000 per 100,000 live birthsin Badakhshan, one of the highest recorded

8 CSO 2003.9 Daud Saba 2004.10 UNICEF/CSO 2003.11 CSO 2002.12 UNICEF/CSO MICS 2003.13 Ministry of Health/CDC/UNICEF 2003.14 Naqibullah Safi 2004.15 According to another survey, 75 per cent of households use unsafe water sources for drinking: Ministry of Health/CDC/UNICEF 2003.16 Naqibullah Safi 2004.17 Ibid.

Chapter 358

ratios in the world.18 Over 46 women dieevery day from pregnancy-related causes.19

A lack of access to adequate health carefor women, particularly during theirdelivery, is an important determinant inthis threat to human security. A study byTufts University in five provincesconcluded that a large number of ruralwomen do not have access to any form ofreproductive health care, and even wherereproductive health facilities are available,the quality of service is generally poor(See Table 3.2).

Afghanistan is one of the 22 highlytuberculosis-burdened countries in theworld, with an estimated annual risk ofinfection reaching 2.55 per cent, anincidence of sputum positive cases at 143patients per 100,000 people per year, andall active cases at 319 per 100,000 peopleper year.21 There are 65,000 active TBcases in the country, of whom 70 per cent

are women.22 At the end of 2003, therewere 144 health facilities in 126 districtsoffering Direct Observation TherapySystem (DOTS)23 tuberculosis treatment,although only an estimated 56 per cent ofthe patients are served.24

Malaria is another public health threatthat is prevalent and on the rise in morethan 60 per cent of the country. The annualincidence is estimated to be 2–3 million,with the highest intensity of transmissionin and around rice-growing areas of theeast and northeast. Currently, of the 34provinces in the country, 14 recordmoderate and high transmission, and 14.7million people are at risk, according tothe World Health Organization (WHO)data on national immunization. All agegroups are equally affected, except in theeastern regions, where those under 15years of age are more vulnerable,suggesting more intense transmission of

18 Ibid.19 UNICEF/CSO MICS 2003.20 Other studies indicate that women in Kabul have much greater access to reproductive care than in other provinces, as Kabul has more advanced medical

care and at least one functioning maternity hospital. The Tufts study was strictly rural, and included villages close to the city in Paghman district as wellas extremely remote villages in the insecure Surobi district where health care facilities were reportedly unavailable. Of course, it is also possible that thisnumber is inflated, and that respondents may have meant that women “did not give birth in a hospital”, but in fact women were able to access reproductive care.

21 Naqibullah Safi 2004.22 GFP, “Global Fund Proposal for the third round call for proposals to fight AIDS, TB and Malaria”, 2003.23 The internationally-recommended TB control strategy is DOTS.  DOTS combines five elements: political commitment, microscopy services, drug supplies,

surveillance and monitoring systems, and use of highly efficacious regimes with direct observation of treatment.24 WHO 2003b.

Province Cannot access Cannot access care Quality ofreproductive health during pregnancy reproductive

care (%) /birth (%) health care

Badghis 78 90 Poor

Herat 59 34 Poor

Kabul20 75 75 Good

Kandahar 46 29 Poor

Nangarhar 43 34 Poor

Table 3.2: Percentage of Rural Afghans Who Cannot Access Reproductive Health Care,2002-2003

Source: “Human Security and Livelihoods of Rural Afghans, 2002–2003”, Feinstein International Famine Center, Youthand Community Program, Tufts University, June 2004. This survey was conducted among rural populations in fiveprovinces: Badghis, Herat, Kabul, Kandahar, Nangarhar.

NHDR 04 59

this disease in this area. In 2002, severaloutbreaks were also confirmed in thenortheastern parts of the country, indicatingthe rapid spread of malaria to places wherecases had not previously been recorded.25

The increased incidence of malaria couldbe attributed to many factors, e.g., thedegraded environment and unbalancedecosystem, vulnerable and malnourishedpopulations, lack of health infrastructureand poor access to health care services,functional illiteracy causing non-adherenceto treatment regimes, and the overuse ofpoor quality and counterfeit medicines thatincrease the resistance of biological agentsto drugs.

Mental disorders are another ofAfghanistan’s war wounds, yet they havebeen largely ignored. WHO estimatesindicate that 95 per cent of the populationin Afghanistan has been affectedpsychologically, and one in five peoplesuffers from mental health problems.26 In

fact, as many as 30 per cent of Afghansmay suffer from anxiety, depression,psychosomatic problems such as insomniaand forms of post-traumatic stress disorder.Although it is difficult to estimate theprevalence of mental illnesses amongparticular groups of people, a survey amongwomen in Kabul found that 35 per cent ofrespondents reported that symptoms ofmental health problems interfered withdaily activities; 98 per cent met thediagnostic criteria for post-traumatic stresssyndrome, major depression or severeanxiety; and 40 per cent met the criteriafor all three diagnoses.27 The mental healthsituation in Afghanistan is complicated byan extremely incapacitated mental healthcare system. Integration of mental healthinto basic health care services couldsubstantially increase the effectiveness ofthe response to mental health problems.28

Medical conditions emanating from drugabuse also threaten the human security ofAfghans, as Afghanistan becomes themajor producer of narcotics in the world.In recent years, the UN Office of DrugC o n t r o l ( U N O D C ) , o t h e r U Norganizations, NGOs and Afghancommunities themselves have expressedconcern about the escalation of problemdrug use in communities in Afghanistanand among refugees in both Pakistan andIran. In particular, concern has been raisedabout problem drug use among vulnerableat-risk groups such as the unemployed,poppy cultivators, people disabled by war,ex-combatants, IDPs, refugees, womenand children.

Although statistics are not available on theoverall number of drugs users nationwide,the Drug Demand Reduction Project ofthe UN Drug Control Programme(UNDCP) has carried out a number ofsmall-scale but telling community drug

Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 11, and Feb.2004

25 Naqibullah Safi 2004.26 Anna Badken 2004.27 IMC 2003.28 Peter Ventevogel, Sayed  Azimi, Sayed Jalal, & Frank Kortmann 2003.

Chapter 360

profiles since 1999. These have includedan initial assessment, a profile of a groupof Afghan women refugees, a comparativestudy of 300 Afghan street drug addictsin Quetta and Peshawar, and a July 2003assessment of drug use in Kabul city.Collecting reliable data about illicit druguse in Afghanistan has been problematic.As the UNODC states, the use of allintoxicants in Islam is haram (forbidden),and in Afghanistan, the Taliban left alegacy of severe punitive measures fordrug users caught by the Department forthe Suppression of Vice and Promotion ofVirtue. This resulted in drug use becomingan increasingly hidden and secretiveactivity, compounded by a fear of arrestby the police, and fear of being stigmatizedby the community.29

Among the 200 drug users interviewed byUNODC in Kabul, women constitutedonly four per cent of heroin users and nineper cent of hashish users. However, theyconstituted 29 per cent of opium users and35 per cent of users of pharmaceuticaldrug, particularly the benzodiazepinetranquillizer Valium. Key informantsestimated that five to ten per cent of heroinusers in their area were women. Nearly 50per cent of heroin users interviewed hadfirst started to use heroin in either Iran orPakistan, signifying the importance of drugabuse prevention programmes for therefugee population.

While in many remote rural areas ofAfghanistan, only a few drugs, particularlyopium, may be available, in many urbanareas, drug-producing districts and refugeecamps there is a plethora of drugs, inparticular opium, heroin, hashish andpharmaceuticals. UNODC estimates that“Drug use is not the prerogative of anyone group in Afghan society, althoughsome groups may be more at risk of

particular types of problem drug use thanothers, for example, women, youth, theunemployed, the war-disabled, refugees,and those who live in opium cultivationand opium and heroin production areas.”30

The problems experienced by many drugusers are compounded by their generallack of accurate, practical and realisticinformation about drugs. Misconceptionsand misinformation about the nature ofdrugs and their effects are common, andthere is often little understanding of thepotentially harmful consequences of drugssuch as heroin, opium and Valium,particularly in terms of the risks ofoverdose, dependency and addiction. Manypeople who started using these drugs didnot know that in the long term, they ranthe risk of becoming addicted. This bringsparticular problems to an impoverishedpopulation with very limited access tosuitable treatment and rehabilitationservices. Reliable reports from drugtreatment centres in Kabul suggest thatsome drug injectors are also sharingneedles and syringes, thus increasing therisk of transmission of blood-born diseasessuch as HIV/AIDS and hepatitis B and C.

At a time when the drug economy is in itsboom phase, the extremely low socio-political and economic status of women,huge population displacements, poor socialand public health infrastructure, drugtrafficking, use of injecting drugs and lackof blood safety practices make Afghanistana high-risk country for the spread of HIVand other transmissible diseases. Indicatorssuggest that there is an increase in injectingin areas such as Kabul, Gardez, Farah andHerat; in general, drug abuse is widespreadin Kabul31 and other major cities ofAfghanistan. A community drug profilestudy conducted by the UNODC in Kabulrevealed that there are over 7,900 heroin

29 UNODC 2003c.30 Ibid.31 Naqibullah Safi 2004.

NHDR 04 61

addicts there, out of whom more than 470are drug injectors.32 Research on Pakistaniand Afghan drug users at high HIV riskfound that only 16 per cent of thosesurveyed had heard of HIV/AIDS.33 Thesituation is especially alarming becausedrug abusers are also less likely to knowthat sharing needles or having unprotectedsex could spread sexual transmitteddiseases (STDs) and other infectiousdiseases. Although only 6.3 per cent ofthe respondents had reported druginjection, 43 per cent had shared injectingequipment, on average with four to sixusers at one time.

By the summer of 2004, only a 45-year-old father and his two children, two yearsand six months old, had died of HIV/AIDSin one of Kabul’s hospitals, becoming thefirst recorded victims of HIV/AIDS inAfghanistan. These three were among 24

people registered as infected with HIV.Although it is estimated that 200–300Afghans are affected by the virus, the realnumber is probably far higher, becausemany Afghans with HIV or AIDS avoidtalking about it publicly.34 Lack ofinformation about HIV/AIDS in atraditionally conservative society wheremost people are illiterate could potentiallylead to an epidemic.

The underlying causes of malnutrition inAfghanistan are complex and variable,both spatially and temporally, and aredetermined by a wide range of factors.These include diverse modes of agriculturalproduction, access to markets, limitedassets, variation in access to health services,urban and rural disparities in terms ofdevelopment, seasonal variations andenvironmental constraints, cultural taboosand practices regarding nutrition and

32 Ibid.33 Steffanie Strathdee et al. 2003.34 Ibid.

Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 9, and October 2002

Chapter 362

health-seeking behaviour, and variableexposure to disease through the seasons.35

Saving lives in Afghanistan depends,therefore, on putting health care at the topof the government development agenda –having health workers in the field withsufficient medical supplies, as well as food,shelter and security. The gap in materialand human resources is great. Existinghealth services only cover limitedgeographical regions, and even in thedistricts where health services are available,needs are only partially met. According toWHO (2003), in 2001, the total expenditurein Afghanistan on health was 5.2 per centof GDP. The Government contributed 52.6per cent, while 47.4 per cent was fromprivate expenditures.36 However, accordingto the CSO’s 2003 Statistical Yearbook,the percentage of expenditure on healthbetween 1997 and 2000 was only 0.5 percent of total GDP. The number of doctorsper 1,000 people (See Map 3.2) is a mere0.1 against an average of 1.1 for alldeveloping countries.37 There is a huge

disparity in the distribution of health carefacilities and staff, with most located infive big cities – Kabul, Herat, Kandahar,Mazar-e Sahrif and Nangarhar.3 8

The poor health care system in Afghanistanis revealed by the fact that throughout thecountry, there are only 210 health facilitieswith beds to hospitalize patients and 0.32beds per 1,000 people (See Map 3.3).Compared to the average of 2.7 beds per1,000 people for other developingcountries,39 this is a very low andworrisome number. Furthermore, thestrong urban bias of the existinginfrastructure is disadvantageous to 75 percent of Afghanistan’s population, thusdepriving the majority of fair access tohealth care services. Even in the districtswhere services are available, needs areonly partially met (See Table 3.3).

An Educational Deficit

Education in Afghanistan is considered akey component in influencing awarenessof life opportunities. Despite manynegative impacts from longstanding

35 Ibid.36 WHO 2003a.37 WB Group “Developing countries – health, nutrition”, 2001, as quoted in Naqibullah Safi 2004.38 Naqibullah Safi 2004.39 Ibid.

Province Can access any Average time it Primary reason why youform of health care takes to access care cannot access health care

Badghis 33% 4 or more hours No facilitiesNo transport

Herat 60% 1 or 2 hours No facilitiesBad economies

Kabul 87% 1 or 2 hours No facilities NoNo Transport

Kandahar 63% 2 to 4 hours No facilities NoNo transport

Nangarhar 43% 2 to 4 hours No facilities

Table 3.3: Percentage of Rural Afghans Who Can Access Health Care, 2002-2003

Source: “Human Security and Livelihoods of Rural Afghans, 2002–2003”, Feinstein International Famine Center, Youthand Community Program, Tufts University, June 2004. This survey was conducted among rural populations in fiveprovinces: Badghis, Herat, Kabul, Kandahar, Nangarhar.

NHDR 04 63

Map 3.2: Distribution of Doctors per 10,000 People by Province

Chapter 364

Map 3.3: Distribution of Hospital Beds per 10,000 People by Province

NHDR 04 65

as girls progress through the grades. Amajority of all students cope withsubstandard facilities – often in the openair or in tents with little or no furniture orlearning materials. The content and qualityof education is not satisfactory, andinfrastructure, equipment and services areinsufficient to meet current and futuredemands.

Unequal access

The unavailability of schools is among thetop obstacles preventing boys and girlsfrom going to school, according to theNRVA. This is more so for girls than boys.In addition, for girls, family commitments,marriage and tradition play a larger role,while for boys employment is more of arestricting factor.

There are regional as well as rural andurban disparities in education that arethreatening human security and humandevelopment in Afghanistan (See Chart3.1). Thirty years of development practicehave focused largely on urban areas, whichhave skewed the distribution of schools,students and teachers. Out of 3,705,235students, 74,205 teachers and 6,870 schoolsin the country, 1,269,665 students, 29,614teachers and 2,233 schools are located inKabul, Nangarhar, Balkh, Herat, andKandahar (See Maps 3.4 and 3.5).42 Thereare 130 kindergartens in Kabul with 12,760students and 2,466 teachers, with a teacher-to-student ratio of 1:5, while in the rest ofthe country there are 106 kindergartenswith 11,460 students and teachers, with ateacher-to-student ratio of 1:13.43 In thehigher education system, there are a totalof 22,717 students and 1,449 teachers.44

Gender d ispar i t ies a lso p lagueAfghanistan’s education system. Out of3,705,235 school students, 1,171,963 are

conflict, one positive outcome has been adramatic change in attitudes towardsformal school education. Not only doparents now understand the importance ofeducation for the future of their children,but children themselves attach a high valueto going to school. These findings arereported consistently among urban as wellas rural Afghans.40 They are alsoexemplified by the improvement of thesix grade retention rate, which for boyshas risen from 29 per hundred in 1993 to44 per hundred in 1999 (152 per cent),and for girls has increased from 18 to 26per 100 (144 per cent).

Afghanistan introduced free andcompulsory primary schooling as far backas 1935. The Constitution of 1964, drawnup by King Zahir Shah, guaranteed freeand compulsory education for all. Yet, in1980, 89 per cent of people 25 years andabove had no schooling and only 0.3 percent had completed first level. By 1999,69.5 per cent of Afghans (including 85 percent of women) were illiterate.4 1

Afghanistan’s long conflict left itseducation system as one of the worst inthe world. An estimated 80 percent of thecountry’s 6,870 schools were damaged, ifnot completely destroyed.

Due to a dramatic change in societalattitudes towards education and withincreased support from the internationalcommunity, in 2002, Afghanistan enroled3.7 million students in grades 1–12, thelargest figure in its history. Of these, 80per cent went to primary schools, amongwhich 78 per cent were in grades 1–3, and30 per cent were girls. Nevertheless,fundamental challenges remain: only halfof the school-aged children were enroledin primary schools, and significant genderdisparities persisted, especially in ruralareas. Female cumulative enrolment drops

Illiteracy is the sourceof many problems inAfghanistan. Withliteracy people getaccess to informationand information iswhat brings changes inpeople. Positivechanges such asimproved humandevelopment andhuman security arethings people can dofor themselves but theyneed to be empoweredwith information andknowledge throughliteracy.

Shiralam Kamalzai from Jalalabad

40 Sallick and Hashimi, as quoted by Lutfullah Safi 2004.41 UNICEF 1999.42 CSO 2003.43 Lutfullah Safi 2004.44 CSO 2003.

Chapter 366

Map 3.4: Number of Students per Teacher by Province

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Map 3.5: Distribution of Schools per 10,000 People by Province

Chapter 368

female (See Chart 3.2).45 According toSecuring Afghanistan’s Future, amongover 22,000 students in the highereducation system, only 4,363 are women.There is only one female professor with aPh.D., out of 89. Women who choose topursue higher education in Kabul and don’tcome from there face the fact that out of11,749 dormitory students, only 121women have access to dormitories. A starkregional and gender disparity is alsoevident from net enrolment rates, whichare as high as 87 per cent in Kabul (boys92 per cent and girls 81 per cent). In threelocalities – the city of Herat, Badakhshanprovince and Herat province – girls’ netenrolment is higher than that of boys. The

other extreme can be found in Badghisand Zabul provinces, where enrolment forgirls is as low as one per cent.46

In the provinces, education infrastructureis concentrated in the provincial centers,while some districts do not have highschools.

Achievements and challenges ahead

The enthusiastic demand for education farexceeds expectations, and this has placedpressure on the school system in terms ofphysical access, the need for classroomsupplies and the shortage of qualifiedteachers.

45 CSO 2003.46 TISA, “Technical Annex of Education,” in Securing Afghanistan’s Future, TISA 2004, quoted in Mohammad Najeeb Azizi 2004.

Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 2, April 2003

NHDR 04 69

Chart 3.1: Regional Disparities in the Distribution of School Students, 2002

Chart 3.2: Gender Disparities in Distribution of School Students, 2002

1,269,665

2,435,570

0

500,000

1,000,000

1,500,000

2,000,000

2,500,000

3,000,000

Five Major Provinces Rest of the Provinces

Number

Data from CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003

3,705,235

2,533,272

1,171,963

0

500,000

1,000,000

1,500,000

2,000,000

2,500,000

3,000,000

3,500,000

4,000,000

Total Students Female MaleData from CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003

Num

ber

The Government now considers educationone of its top priorities, with a specificfocus on:

• Improving the education infra-structure;

• Teacher development;• Improvements in secondary education

such as through building sciencelaboratories;

• Curriculum development;• The establishment of kindergartens;• Promoting long-distance education

programmes; and• Eliminating prevailing gender

disparities.

For this, the Government budget allocatedUS$250 million, the second largest amountof its 2003 development budget. However,

Chapter 370

Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 2, April 2003

only US$77.47 million has been committedby donors, with a gap of more than 60 percent not financed.47 Much of the requiredamount was not forthcoming because ofa perception that the reforms lackcredibility. However, this represents asetback for the prospect of making stridesin education.

Shortfalls in the education system involvenot only the infrastructure aspects, whichshould be targeted by developmentprogrammes, but also curriculumdevelopment, gender disparity, equalaccess in school attendance, and the lowsalaries paid to teachers. These issues areparticularly important in areas wheretraditional religious schooling is a cheapand accessible contender for the minds ofthe young. To provide equal access to abasic and balanced education system,realistic policy goals are needed to aim forquality primary, secondary, tertiary andvocational education, as well as literacyand teacher education. This calls forincreased allocations for the educationsector, along with support for general, non-formal, functional literacy, vocational andteacher education programmes, anddistance radio learning to compensate forthe lack of capacity in remote areas of thecountry.

Over the years of conflict, particularly inthe last decade, many NGOs filled the voidleft by the lack of a central Governmentby providing services in support of Afghaneducation. There now is an ambiguityabout the role of NGOs as implementingagencies. Some argue for phasing themout of the education sector, underscoringthe need to ensure longer termsustainability and the lack of qualificationsof some NGOs to deliver educationalservices. The Ministry of Education needsto establish clearer criteria for service

delivery and to guide the selection of NGOsfor project implementation.

By its own estimates, the Ministry ofEducation needs at least 28,000 moreteachers. Most do not have qualificationsbeyond grade 12 and are paid low salaries– about US$43 per month. Moreover, whilesome 74,205 teachers are currently inservice, only 27 per cent are women. Kabulis the only city where female teachers (65per cent) outnumber male teachers (35 percent).48

There is currently no unified nationalcurriculum. At present, due to the lack ofcapacity and inadequate infrastructure, lessthan 0.1 per cent of the population reacheshigher education, one of the lowest figuresin the world. This is in an era whereknowledge is considered to be the maindriver of growth, be it economic or in termsof human development.49

Further attention also needs to be given tothe “lost generation” – an entire populationof Afghans aged 12 to 30 whose educationwas terminated by ongoing conflict.Although well beyond the usual schoolage for Afghanistan, these people must beincorporated into the educational schemethrough vocational schools that teach basicskills necessary for any productive memberof society, and adult learning centres forthose with the will to obtain a high schooldiploma.

Environmental Degradation and ItsImpact on Water, Food Insecurityand Poverty

Environmental degradation and poor accessto clean and safe drinking water andsanitation are major environmental securitythreats to Afghans. Man-made and naturalthreats to the environment have beencaused by erosion, felling of trees,

47 Ibid.48 CSO 2003.49 All figures presented here on education have been collected by the Planning Department of the Ministry of Education, and quoted in Lutfullah Safi, 2004.

However, according to the NHDR team’s calculation from CSO’s Statistical Yearbook 2003, the percentage of population absorbed in higher education isonly 0.1 per cent.

NHDR 04 71

des t ruc t i on o f wa t e r shed anddesertification. The impact on people hasbeen considerable.

Safe water and adequate sanitation

Observations and consultations with peoplefrom diverse communities have revealedthat water scarcity is one of the key humansecurity threats in Afghanistan, as it isessential to maintaining agriculturalproductivity, which is the heart of theAfghan economy and livelihoods. Thereis already a battle in the country betweenincreasing water demands and limitedavailable water resources, as the processof reconstruction and economicdevelopment creates more demand.50

Surface as well as groundwater resourcesin many parts of the country have beenseverely affected by the continuous yearsof drought, as well as by uncontrolled andmismanaged extraction procedures. Asdependence on groundwater resourcesincreases, deep wells have been drilledwithout considering the long-term impactson regional groundwater resources,including traditional Kareez systems(underground canals connecting wells),many of which have dried up in recentyears. At the same time, the country’sscarce wetlands are completely dry andno longer support wildlife populations orprovide agricultural inputs. Water-useefficiency is very low in all sectors,particularly in irrigation, and causes lossthrough evaporation of over half of thewater supply. There are also significantwater losses due to outdated water supplyinfrastructure, lack of maintenance, andpoor water supply management practicesin urban areas.51

In May 2004, a survey of households inthe southwest of the country by theAfghanistan Network on Food Security

found that reduced water quality andquantity caused a loss of income, areduction of assets or both. As a copingstrategy, some households reduced thequality or quantity of their diet in somedistricts, whereas households in otherdistricts drew on investments, took loansfrom either friends or traders, or soldlivestock. When wealthy groups wereasked about the priorities for governmentintervention in these regions, therehabilitation of irrigation systems wasmost frequently cited, although thisfrequency varied significantly betweendistricts.52

Poor access to clean and safe drinkingwater and sanitation are other major threatsto human security in Afghanistan. Poorinfrastructure limits access, and as a result,parasitic diseases such as giardiasis andamoebas, are very common. Cholera breaksout frequently during the summer seasonin different parts of the country.53 Mosthealth insecurities are indeed water-bornediseases, related to poor hygiene and unsafewater.

The UNICEF/CSO MICS found that at thenational level, only 8.5 per cent of thepopulation had access to piped water in2003, which broke down as 23.8 per centof urban residents and two per cent of ruralpopulations. The rest of the people usedprotected and unprotected wells, springs,rivers and pools. However, piped waterdoes not necessarily mean safe and cleanwater. Overall, 32.5 per cent of Afghansdrank safe water, 61.7 per cent unsafewater, and 5.8 per cent both safe and unsafewater.54 The percentage of people usingsafe sources of water varies widely betweenprovinces, and even in particular provincesbetween districts and villages (See Map3.6). For example, 30.3 per cent of peoplein Nangarhar City were using piped water,

50 Daud Saba 2004.51 UNEP 2003.52 Afghanistan Monthly Food Security Bulletin 2004.53 Naqibullah Safi 2004.54 UNICEF/CSO MICS 2003.

Chapter 372

Map 3.6: Percentage of Households with No Drinking Water by Province

NHDR 04 73

Map 3.7: Percentage of Households Not Using a Flush or Pit Toilet by Province

Chapter 374

while in Nimruz, Uruzgan, Paktia, Paktika,Zabul, Parwan, Sari-Pul and Samangan,piped water was almost non-existent, andthe majority of people used unprotectedand unsafe sources.

Perhaps worst of all, urban drinking watersupplies are contaminated with coliformbacteria, posing a considerable risk topublic health. Water resources across thecountry are threatened by contaminationfrom waste dumps, chemicals and opensewers. In Kabul, water samples clearlyindicate that the city’s drinking water iscross-contaminated.

Food insecurity

Food insecurity in Afghanistan ismanifested by poor caloric consumptionand malnutrition among a large percentageof the population. Though the situationhas recently improved throughout thecountry, the vast majority of people stillface some degree of food insecurity, bothin terms of quality and quantity.55 Thecauses are not only several years of severeand continued drought since 1999, but alsoinsufficient income to purchase necessities.The limitations on population movementsas a result of poor security in some partsof country, poor t ransportat ioninfrastructure, seasonal and climaticobstacles, depletion of productive assetsat the community and household levels,and a lack of employment opportunitiescontinue to be some of the major ongoingthreats to food security.56

According to a study by the World FoodProgramme (WFP), some 1.4 millionAfghans are affected by continued droughtand crop failure, and US$50 million isneeded to tackle the severe situation facingthe country today. With a renewed drought,cultivation continues to fall, while priceinflation keeps basic foods out of the reach

of an increasing number of poor people.Low salary levels do not correspond to thehigh price of staple food items, especiallyin the main cities, as monitored by WFP,which has maintained food prices in sixregional cities (Kabul, Kandahar, Mazar,Herat, Faizabad and Jalalabad) since 1996.

One of the reasons for the crippling foodshortage is a radical change in the patternof cultivation from wheat to more profitablepoppy cultivation, which needs a smallpiece of land without much water.

Though the population in Afghanistan hascharacteristically demonstrated aremarkable resilience to the recurrentthreats to their food security, the capacitiesand coping strategies of the most vulnerablecommunities have been exhausted. Familystructures and the labour force have beendisrupted by prolonged separations asfamily members have sought informallabour opportunities outside the country.Girls have been forced into arrangedmarriages at unusually young ages as ameans of securing income for thehousehold.57

Access to land and livestock

Access to land is both a human securitygoal by itself, and a conflict-preventionmeasure, as competition over land andwater has been showed to potentially flareinto disputes and conflicts. The aggravationof tensions is conditioned by the lack ofavailability of arable land (currentlystanding at 12 per cent of total land of thecountry)58, the inefficient access to and useof water and land, and related social factors,i.e., settlement patterns, destructive copingstrategies, and to a lesser extent, inter-communal prejudice and practices ofexclusion.

55 S. Lautze, et al. 2002.56 Naqibullah Safi 2004.57 Naqibullah Safi 2004.58 Mir Ahmad Joyenda 2004.

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Loss of access to land and the scarcity ofwater for agricultural use, combined withpoor diets, have led to the displacementof distressed populations. A recent Ministryof Health/CDC/UNICEF survey indicatedthat an estimated 37 per cent of householdshave been displaced largely to urbancentres due to food insecurity related toland.59 This situation is further exacerbatedby a sharp increase of the population inthe past 25 years, the return of ruralrefugees, and the recent urban developmentboom on agricultural lands. In major citiessuch as Kabul, Herat, Kandahar and Mazar-e-Sharif, the expansion of urbandevelopments is eating up the most fertilelands, a process that, if it is not stopped,will irreversibly degrade and destroy thefragile and limited agricultural lands ofAfghanistan, depriving many of theirlivelihoods.60

Pastoralist groups of Afghans, such as theKuchis’, are seriously threatened by lossof access to pastures, declining numbersof livestock due to disease or distress salesduring the latest drought years, as well aslimited employment opportunities. TheKuchis are facing a higher degree ofnutritional and food security risks thanothers.6 1 Additionally, widespreadoutbreaks of livestock diseases and thereduction of veterinary services andvaccination programmes has negativelyimpacted livestock and livestock products,both in numbers and quality.62 This is at atime that less than one per cent of the landis protected, and no management is takingplace to safeguard biodiversity andconserve the ecological integrity andwildlife of Afghanistan, as the basis andmeans of livelihoods and production forthe poor.63

Restoration of forests and other vegetationcover combined with grazing managementare high priorities to combat erosion,desertification and flood risks. Reorientingproduction in rural areas from subsistencemodels to market-oriented approaches willalso help overcome some of theenvironmental problems that degrade landresources.

Air pollution

Of all the environmental concerns, thelevel of air pollution is the most obviouschallenge to the health of urbanpopulations. Prevailing public and mediaignorance, however, minimizes concerns.Afghanistan’s urban dwellers are exposedto many of the worst toxic and carcinogenicair pollutants known. Smog is a commonphenomenon in Kabul and other majorcities, while a combination of dust andsmoke particles is a common form of airpollution in rural areas.64 Air pollution isconsidered one of the leading risk factorsfor respiratory diseases, such as chronicobstructive pulmonary disease, lung cancer,pulmonary heart disease and bronchitis.

Addressing air pollution requires concertedefforts towards sanitary waste disposal,inspection regimes for air quality, bettermanagement of traffic, improvement ofefficiency in household energy use, andabove all, an adequate policy forsustainable urban development. The designand implementation of a national air qualitystandard and policy could be a prerequisiteto achieving these goals.

Energy

There are multiple links between energy,poverty and the environment that have tobe addressed. Afghanistan is an energy-

59 Ministry of Health/CDC/UNICEF 2003, quoted in Naqibullah Safi 2004.60 Daud Saba 2004.61 MRRD/WFP 2003.62 FAO/WFP 2003.63 UNEP 2003.64 Daud Saba 2004.

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deprived country, and per capita energyuse is substantially low by internationalstandards, a problem that has to be tackledwith adequate policy design andimplementation. The production and useof energy have env i ronmenta lconsequences to which the poor areespecially vulnerable. This is because theyuse inefficient and more polluting energysystems than those who are better off. Aswell, while low energy consumption is nota cause of poverty, the lack of availableenergy services correlates closely withmany poverty indicators. Increasing thelevel of energy services is a prerequisiteto sustainable and adequate livingconditions.65

Improving the levels of humandevelopment in Afghanistan is directlyconnected to the ability to adapt newtechnologies and innovations to satisfy theneeds of economic development and ofthe people. Developing small and mediummulti-purpose hydro-electric systems onthe country’s many rivers will providenew modes of water management andirrigation, and supply direly needed energy.

Multiple impacts on poverty

Most of those who suffer from air andwater pollution, inadequate sanitation, andpoor solid waste management are the poor.Sewage and wastewater often spew intoopen gutters and canals, posing an extrarisk to poor children. People in povertyare also most affected by floods, erosion,felling of trees, destruction of watershed,desertification, earthquake disasters andharvest failures.

Among vulnerable populations, men andwomen are exposed to environmentalstresses in different ways. Their workenvironment often varies, a fact that mayhave considerable health consequences.

For example, women are more exposed tohigh levels of indoor air pollution due tothe fact that they spend more time at home,working in the kitchen. They end up doublyaffected by environmental deterioration,first because of poverty, and secondbecause of their status in their traditionalpatriarchal society. In such a setting, theybear a disproportionate burden that exposesthem to a greater number of environmentalhazards.66

Gender Discrimination

Gender insecurities persist in Afghanistandespite the achievements of the past twoyears in opening schools and puttingwomen back in public spaces.

The context of gender relations inAfghanistan must be viewed through theprism of traditional Afghan culture, whichis intensely patriarchal.67 It must berecognized that the primary social unit inAfghanistan is the family, extending tokin group and tribe. Most Afghan womendo not want to be marginalized from theirfamily unit, and the integrity of the familymust be respected, particularly whentargeting specific groups for assistance,especially women. Afghan culture is basedon the code of honor, which is largelymanifested in the behaviour of one’s“women”.

The foundation of gender roles is thedivision of space into the public/community (men’s) space and theprivate/domestic (women’s) space, withcorresponding roles and responsibilitiesfor each.68 Many men and women,particularly in rural areas, are satisfiedwith this arrangement in relation to oneanother. What is not acceptable are theircurrent social conditions. Basic needs forfood, shelter, health and education are notbeing met, and the demand for these

65 Ellen Morris and Sudhir Chella Rajan 1999.66 WRI 1996.67 Homaira Nassery 2004.68 Ibid.

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necessities transcends gender roles.Deprivation of basic human needs affects–everyone – men, women and children.

Two important developments challengetraditional gender roles and will serve ascritical catalysts for change:

1. The inevitable advent of globalization,with the influx of large amounts ofaid and opening up of markets andmedia, forces Afghanistan to join theinternational community, so it is to beexpected that traditional gender roleswill shift.

2. Decades of conflict have forcedwomen to take on new roles as headsof household, following the death,displacement and participation incombat of their customary maleproviders. These women havemanaged lands, properties, agriculturalactivities and families. To see Afghanwomen only as victims grosslyunderestimates their growth andcontributions.69

A disrupted progress

Strides towards modernization andprogress for women began some 120 yearsago and continued through the better partof the 20th Century, only to be pushedback by the events of the last two decades.In the 1880s, Amir Abdur Rahman, in linewith Islamic teachings, forbade child andforced marriages, and supportedinheritance and divorce rights for women.His grandson, King Amanullah Khan,further improved the status of women byestablishing girls’ schools, granting rightsfor men and women to choose their ownmarriage partners, encouraging women toestablish their own women’s associations,and offering women a choice with regardto wearing the traditional veil.

In the 1950s, opportunities for womensignificantly increased. They entered the

workforce and Government, began toaccess higher education and attenduniversities, served in Parliament and thecabinet, worked as diplomats, judges andeven army generals, and helped write theAfghan Constitution of 1964, whichgranted them equal rights with men. Thesestrides toward modernization and progresswere slow but solid. In the 1980s, womenmade up 70 per cent of the country’steachers, 40 per cent of its doctors and halfof its government workers.

Some progressive steps were taken forwomen under the communist regime ofthe 1980s, when Afghanistan was occupiedby the Soviet Union. For example literacyprogrammes for women were expanded,and women were allowed to travel, go toschool and bring knowledge back withthem. However, for the first time, womenwere sent to jails and tortured by thecommunist government on suspicion ofpolitical ties with opposition groups. Ruralwomen were subject to routine bombingtogether with other civilians.

The ensuing lawlessness that followedduring the years of civil war curtailedwomen’s right to full participation in social,economic, cultural and political life.Women and children became victims ofartillery attacks and armed conflict,abduction and rape, all resulting in extremetrauma.70 Millions of Afghans, a majoritybeing women, became refugees inneighboring countries.

Under the Taliban, women’ rights weresuppressed altogether. By closing all girls’schools, women were deprived of the rightto education. They were ordered to remainin their houses, and employers werethreatened with dire consequences fortaking on female employees. Women lostthe right to travel: No woman could ventureout of the house alone and unaccompaniedby a prescribed male member of thewoman’s immediate family. They were

69 Ibid.70 AI 1995.

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deprived of the right to health: A womancould not see a male doctor even in life-threatening instances.

A renewed promise?

Afghanistan’s emergence from its longstruggle after the defeat of the Taliban inNovember 2001 led to some notablepositive changes and progress for women.They went from complete marginalizationto greater freedom to participate in publiclife, access to education and employment,and participation in decision-making inthe peace process and the reconstructionof the country. The re-emergence of media,the reopening of academic institutions andthe formation of professional associationsare increasingly expanding women’s roles.The NDF stressed the enhancement ofwomen’s status, for it saw progress towardsgender equality as a critical issue forAfghanistan.

As a result, important institutional changeshave occurred. Women were guaranteeda quota in the constitutional process in2003, a quota of reserved seats inParliament (64 of 250 seats in the lowerhouse), ministerial representation in theCabinet (with a Ministry of Women’sAffairs and a State Minister for Women),and a semiformal caucus in thegovernment–donor aid structure. Afghanwomen began raising their voices, whethereducated or not. Proof came in a projectedparticipation of 11 per cent for women inthe first Emergency Loya Jirgah, whichwas exceeded by almost half. Women alsomade up 44 per cent of the voters registeredfor the presidential elections. And women’spublications have proliferated in spite ofthe prevalence of fear and the threat ofretribution against women who dare toclaim a public presence.71

The most remarkable accomplishment withrespect to women’s position in Afghan

society has been Afghanistan’s newConstitution, which was ratified on 4January 2004. “Any kind of discriminationand privilege between the citizens ofAfghanistan are prohibited. The citizensof Afghanistan – whether man or women– have equal rights and duties before thelaw.”72 The Constitution also reserves 25per cent and 17 per cent of the seats in theNational Assembly and the Senate forwomen respectively. Each province willhave one woman representing it in theLower House of Parliament, the House ofthe People, and the President will appointone third of the delegates to the upperhouse, the House of the Elders, half ofwhom will be women (one-sixth of thetotal).73 In addition, the Constitutionpledges to promote educationalprogrammes and health care for women.

Although Afghanistan’s new Constitutiondeserves acclaim for granting women equalrights and a greater share in the country’spolitical structure, its implementation isperhaps one of the most importantchallenges facing Afghanistan. A key issuerelates to women’s legal identity and accessto legal resources, about which data aremostly unavailable. In 2002, only one totwo per cent of women had identity cardsand 98 per cent had no formal papers,proof of citizenship or legal identity.74

Still fearful

The lack of security across the country notonly impedes progress in the rehabilitationof Afghanistan, but also in theadvancement of women. Many girls, whilehaving the legal right to education, do notattend school for fear of being kidnappedor attacked and raped on the way. Butsecurity is not the only challenge towomen’s full and equal participation inthe rebuilding of their country. Theprevalence of conservative attitudes limitstheir role in civil, cultural, economic,

71 Homaira Nassery 2004.72 TISA Afghanistan Constitution 2004i.73 UNIFEM, “Update, Issue #3”, November 3, 2003.74 WOMANKIND 2002.

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political and social life, at all levels ofsociety.

Women continue to suffer from gender-based violence, both as a consequence ofthe past conflict and in the course of theirdomestic lives. There are incidents of earlyand forced marriages, domestic violence,kidnapping of young girls, and harassmentand intimidation. In impoverished ruralareas, families have been reported to selltheir daughters to escape desperateconditions or to settle bad blood betweenfamilies. An IOM report released inFebruary 2004 claimed that Afghanistanwas an important source for humantrafficking, including that of women andchildren. Human rights violations relatedto trafficking take the form of forced labor,forced pros t i tu t ion and sexualexploitation.75 Incidents of self-immolationby women to escape forced marriages anddomestic violence are not rare. In the pastyear, the Afghan Independent HumanRights Commission (AIHRC) recorded atleast 110 cases of self-immolation bywomen in just five parts of the country.

According to Amnesty International, thecriminal justice system is simply unwillingor unable to address issues of violenceagainst women. “At the moment it is morelikely to violate the rights of women thanto protect and uphold their rights.”76

Police reform and the integration of womeninto the police forces therefore holds greatpromise for Afghan women at present.The prisons for women are abysmal, andthe crimes most imprisoned women areconvicted of are dubious.77 Seriousattention needs to be paid to theimprovement of judicial institutions andtheir implementing bodies. The DDRprogramme must include women as

decision-makers and evaluators – becausethe target population of male ex-combatants will be returning to villages,cities and communities that consist ofwomen and girls.

Still not free from wants

With the increase in female-headedhouseholds due to the war anddisplacement, as well as the loss oftraditional kin-based coping mechanisms,poverty disempowers Afghan womenmuch more insidiously than officialdiscrimination does. As long as womenare focused on meeting their own and theirfamilies’ basic needs for food, water andshelter, they are effectively blocked fromseeking real power via education, activismand legislation. This is where the need forpractical gender needs sometimes conflictswith strategic gender needs.78

According to the NRVA, female-headedhouseholds have the highest incidence ofpoverty of all the vulnerable categories,and they also have a higher than averagepresence of disabled members. They aremore inclined to be landless, have lowerownership of cows, low access toelectricity, and worse than average waterand sanitation facilities.79

Self-employment for Afghan women hasbeen limited due to the lack of credit andbanking facilities in the country. Whenwomen do secure external funding sources,as in the carpet weaving populations ofthe north, they are usually in the form oftraders in the markets, who charge fairlyhigh levels of interest, so that the finalproduct, when sold, provides a marginali ncome . Mic ro -c r ed i t s chemesimplemented by NGOs have had mixedresults, and the overall impact on the livesof women and children has not beenmeasurable.80

75 IOM 2004.76 Amnesty International 2003a.77 Homeira Nassery 2004.78 Ibid.79 NRVA 2003.80 Homeira Nassery 2004.

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The majority of Afghan women are rural.This has serious implications for howgender is mainstreamed into rural andagricultural projects, as well as localgovernance structures, particularly sincemost of the needs assessments have notsought the views of rural women (andmen), and thus their voices have not beenheard. The burden of labour that falls onrural women is substantial, since it canencompass agriculture, child-rearing,livestock and traditional crafts (as a sourceof income), in addition to care of thefamily. The fundamental causes of ruralwomen’s lack of access to basic needssuch as water, land, credit, training andextension services must be taken intoconsideration in project planning anddelivery. It is also important to understandthat the interconnections between women’sand men’s roles are stronger in the ruralareas than in the cities due to the symbiosisof their labours.81

On the health and education status ofwomen, the indicators continue to bestaggering. The data available reflectsAfghan women’s lack of health careservices, and inadequate food, water andshelter. Other factors influencing theirhealth include early marriage, frequentpregnancies, little or no access to birthcontrol, and lack of money for health care.According to UNFPA, the average Afghanwoman who survives until the end of herchildbearing years will have had an averageof eight live births and several moreunsuccessful pregnancies. Over 80 percent of maternal deaths are consideredpreventable.

The high illiteracy levels for women andgirls continue to be not only a primaryobstacle to their full participation in society,but also to their health and well-being.

According to this cartoon, many men seemto be threatened by the attention and

funding that is being directed towardswomen in the post-Taliban period.

Human Rights Violations

As stated in Securing Afghanistan’s Future,“After more than two decades of war andinternecine violence, a culture of impunityhas become the norm rather than theexception in Afghanistan.”82 This sparksfears in the hearts of many Afghans.Moreover, the lack of effective mechanismsto ensure basic rights produces its firstvictim: the trust between citizens and thestate that is supposed to protect them.

In addition to the violations of women’srights discussed in the previous section,and the right to development, which forthis NHDR are part of the larger contextof human securities, a number of humanrights violations continue to be reportedin Afghanistan.

81 Nancy Dupree Hatch 1996.82 TISA, “Technical Annex: Human Rights,” Securing Afghanistan’s Future, 2004g.

Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 2, Feb.2002

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These are exacerbated by the continuationof low-intensity conflict in many areasoutside Kabul, the weakness of law-enforcement structures, and ineffectivelegal and judicial processes, includingcourts in some regions. A general disregardfor the rule of law persists unfortunatelyamong not only paramilitary organizationsand independent “warlords”, but alsoagents of the state and even theinternational community. Ultimately, thecontinuation of human rights violations isa reflection of a lack of political will onone side, and the low awareness of humanrights issues among the population on theother.

A number of steps have been taken inmonitoring human rights abuses inAfghanistan since the Bonn Agreement,not the least of which is the ratification ofa Constitution that recognizes thefundamental rights and duties of the people.A human rights oversight office has beenestablished in the Ministry of Interior, andthe AIHRC was set up with a “complaints’department within the Ministry of Justice.It has registered 634 cases of violationssince June 2003. Human rights violationshave also been monitored closely byHuman Rights Watch (HRW), AmnestyInternational and Physicians for HumanRights (PHR) among others.

Yet, a number of important challengesremain, not the least of which have to dowith a commitment to human rights withinthe state-building process.

Marginalization of human rights withinthe reconstruction process

At the Bonn Conference, the UnitedNations was asked to support theAfghanistan Interim Authority, supervisethe reconstruction, lay the foundations fora political democracy, and introduce ahuman rights regime at the same time. To

coordinate these three tasks simultaneouslyp r o v e d m o r e c h a l l e n g i n g i nimplementation than on paper. The NHDRrecognizes four of the challenges ofmainstreaming a rights-based approach inthe reconstruction process:

1. UNAMA has a clear mandate topromote human rights in Afghanistan,and the UN Commission on HumanRights, based in Geneva, contributedto the strengthening of the AIHRC andto mapping human rights violations.Nonetheless, no donor (or group ofdonors) has taken on a strong humanrights advocacy role.83 UNAMA, asthe UN’s peacekeeping mission inAfghanistan, initially had a weaki n s t i t u t i o n a l c o m m i t m e n t ,demonstrated through under-sourcingand marginalization of the humanrights component, and lack ofpersonnel devoted to this within theorganization in Kabul and in theregions during the first year of itsactivities.84 The current structure forUNAMA improves on this pattern byintegrating human rights into themission’s political and developmentpillars. However, it will requiresignificant political will and resourcesto follow through on the major tasksof establishing accountabilityprocedures that apply to all people,including current leaders, andi n c o r p o r a t i n g r i g h t s - b a s e dprogramming throughout all UNoperations.85

2. The reconstruction process may nothave adequately integrated a rights-based approach to its programming.This has been demonstrated throughthe marginalization of human rightsconcerns within strategies such asSecuring Afghanistan’s Future,perhaps as an indication that financial

Human security isembedded in Islamand so is democracy.When we talk aboutdemocracy or humansecurity or social justiceor human rights, etc.we shouldn’t present itas if these are newideas that could not befound in our religion.

Zabihullah from Logar

83 Suhrke, 2004.84 Ibid.85 CESR 2002.

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ins t i tu t ions involved in thereconstruction process generally viewhuman rights activities outside of theirmandates and mark a distinctionbetween political and economicprocesses.86 Yet addressing the humaninsecurities of Afghans requires notonly rhetorical human rightscommitments, but the provision ofsufficient resources and precise toolsto inco rpora te r igh t s -basedprogramming within all reconstructionprojects.

3. Another shortcoming has been the lackof genuine consultation with theAfghan people on the determinationof priorities and needs. Most of thedevelopment strategies designed inthe past two years have had to facethe constraints of logistics, time,capacity, etc. which has resulted ininsufficient participation of not onlythe Afghan people, but also of manypolicy-makers within ministries. Lackof consultation on national policiescould lead to a lack of trust and adenial of the right to participate.

4. Logistical and capacity constraintsaside, there has not been sufficientpolitical will for a comprehensivehuman rights needs assessment toensure that reconstruction programmesare based on priorities expressed byAfghans themselves, to establishbaselines and benchmarks, and toaddress root causes of deprivation andinsecurities. Coupled with this is theneed for enabling genuine publicaccess to information to ensuretransparency and public scrutiny ofprogrammes, as well as monitoring tog u a r a n t e e t h e p r o g r e s s i v eimprovement of people’s livingstandards as called for in human rightstreaties.87 Such assessments are a toolof empowerment, enabling community

participation and providing a checkagainst corruption and waste.

Key human rights problems prevailingthroughout the country can be summarizedas follows:

Intimidation by armed groups

Human rights organizations have notedextortion, harassment and violence againstcivilians at military and police checkpoints;the forced conscription of civilians,including under age boys; abductions;arbitrary and politically motivated arrests;and some extrajudicial killings by thepolice and other security forces.Intimidation and torture have not beenlimited to the Afghan police, officialsecurity forces or warlords and their clients.In March 2004, HRW reported that “today,on Afghan soil, the United States ismaintaining a system of arrests anddetention as part of its ongoing militaryand intelligence operations that violatesinternational human rights law andinternational humanitarian law (the lawsof war). In doing so, the United States isendangering the lives of Afghan civilians,undermining efforts to restore the rule oflaw in Afghanistan, and calling intoquestion its commitment to upholdingbasic rights.”88

Access to and ownership of land

Some of the most common violationsrecognized by the AIHRC are thedestruction of houses, the occupation ofland and the forced selling of properties.The AIHRC has investigated and registeredaround 300 violations related to arbitraryhouse destruction and property occupationsince June 2003. The UN Rapporteur onHousing exposed high government officialsas culprits in a case of “land grab” in Kabulin September 2003. The AIHRC has calledfor the resolution of property-related

86 Ibid.87 Ibid.88 HRW 2004b.

There is no humansecurity in Afghanistanfor so far it is the law ofthe jungle that is rulingour country. Warlordsare the effective rulersalmost everywhere inthe country. Humanrights of ordinarypeople are at theirmercy, they violatethem as the wish. Noone can dare to defendtheir rights.

Mohammad Ashraf from Kabul

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disputes and the creation of a sustainablesystem for property allocation, distributionand registration as among the prerequisitesfor the development of the country, anddubbed property theft a major human rightsconcern, especially for disadvantagedgroups (minorities, returnees and refugees,women, etc.).

Distribution of, access to and utilizationof land, pastures and woodlands is of keyimportance to the livelihoods of the vastmajority of the population in Afghanistan.Not surprisingly, conflicts and disputesover land ownership and tenure areoverwhelming traditional and formaljudiciary institutions.89 The problem withland tenure conflicts is not an absence ofa legal system. It is, firstly, the parallelexistence of at least three types of codifiedrights (written and unwritten customarylaw, religious law and state law). Secondly,no matter whether conflicts are dealt withby councils (shuras), commanders,administrators or traditional judges, theyall have to take into account the real powerof the conflicting parties. In that sense,none of the available procedures forconflict resolution are reliably shieldedfrom power politics.90 Years of “commandoadministration” have deeply discreditedofficial institutions such as courts. Mostpeople therefore turn to customary lawand traditional conflict managementinstitutions, including violent self-help.While customary law appears to have asound normative foundation with regardto farmland, it is much weaker and moredisputed with regard to the complex issuesof differentiated, sometimes seasonal rightsof access and utilization of pastures andforests.91

The exploitation of ethnic or religiousdifferences to justify deprivation of rightsor even violent action against opponentsin land tenure disputes is a further high

risk of such power-influenced andcontradictory normative and legal codes.Research in Badakhshan producedevidence that this practice has a legacy ofat least 20 years and, though less violentof late, appears to plague some districtswith multi-ethnic or multi-faithcommunities.92

The right to movement and ethnicdiscrimination

During the war, the right to movement wasrestricted by different Governments andgroups. Between 1978 and 1992,movement from resistance-controlled areasto Government-ruled ones (mainly fromrural to urban) were very difficult for evencommon people. After 1992, the countrywas split into numerous fiefdomscontrolled by different parties and ethnicgroups, and it was not easy for people tomove freely, at times even within one city.Today, approximately 60,000 Pashtun IDPshave yet to return to their former homesin northern provinces after localcommanders targeted Pashtuns followingthe fall of the Taliban for murder, looting,rape and destruction of property. Securityconcerns, as well as the drought, discouragesome refugees from returning to theircountry.

Human rights of detainees

The AIHRC and other human rightsmonitoring bodies, including the US StateDepartment’s Annual Human RightsReport, have point out the ill-treatmentand torture of detainees, arbitrarydetentions, prolonged pre-trial detentionsdue to a severe lack of resources in thejudicial system, and inhumane conditionsin prisons. The main concerns of theAIHRC are cases of torture, arbitrarydetentions, extrajudicial killing cases inprisons by local authorities, and illegaldetentions stemming from property

89 For land and pasture disputes, see Mir Ahmad Joyenda 2004.90 Jan Koehler 2004.91 Ibid.92 Ibid.

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disputes. Overcrowding and limited foodand medical supplies contribute todeteriorating health and even death amongprisoners. Human rights organizations havealso noted the existence of private prisonswhere torture is committed that belong tothe commanders and warlords in provinces.Some, as the international press came tofind out in the summer of 2004, are runby American bounty hunters, who, forinstance, kept a private jail in Kabul.

The right to participation

The right of citizens to participate in thedecision-making processes of a nation isa key indicator of the health of its civilsociety. Afghanistan’s newly ratifiedConstitution has paved the road towardsnational elections. The Presidential electionmarked the first time Afghanistanexperimented with direct and countrywidesuffrage for the choice of a national leader.However, elections are only the first stepstowards ensuring meaningful participation.It must be kept in mind that the purposeof participatory political systems is toensure that the rights of citizens areprotected. It will be naive to assume thatthe elections by themselves will lead tothis result. The subsequent Parliamentaryelections needed to overcome not onlylogistical problems but also cultural,political and social challenges, includingthe lack of security, lack of a reliablecensus, lack of experienced politicalparties, and lack of general awareness inthe population about the process and valueof elections.93

Political intimidation

Intimidation was widespread during thevoter registration process, leading to thedeaths of both male and female officials.The US State Department’s CountryReports on Human Rights Practices for

Afghanistan noted that intimidation,attacks, and killings took place during the2002 Loya Jirgah process.94 HRW reportedallegations of violence and intimidationagainst regional representatives anddelegates in the preparation of theConstitutional Loya Jirgah, includingduring the process, where several powerfulmilitary and party leaders threatened lesspowerful delegates, and agents of theNational Directorate of Security spied onand delivered threats to delegates. HRWwarned that vote-buying and intimidationhad undermined the assembly duringDecember 2003. As the State Departmentreport noted: “Human rights sourcesindicated that political intimidation andviolence in the Constitutional Loya Jirgahregistration process was a problem.However, other reports, including thoseprepared by the U.N., suggest thatintimidation was localized and did notsignificantly impact the outcome ofelections.”95

Perceptions of Poor Governanceand Justice

Many Afghans have high expectations thatpolicy-makers will take the uniqueopportunity that Afghanistan has forreforms following the elections. However,the slow record of change up to now andlack of delivery on promises of securityand development may have graduallyeroded trust in weak state institutions andspread a fear that the existing peace mayonly be partial or temporary. This fearresults in the withdrawal of many fromactively participating in political life. Oncewithdraw their support from the peaceprocess, the state may become isolatedfrom society, and the window ofopportunity may close.

Political exclusion is visible in the formof labeling and stereotyping entire ethnic,

93 Nasrullah Stanikzai 2004.94 United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – ”, released 25 February

2004.95 Ibid.

There are lots of wordsbut little action. Onesees few deeds on thepart of theGovernment thatwould suggest theGovernment’sseriousness withrespect to humansecurity; whereas, itshould be the toppriority.

Nezam Gul from Laghman

NHDR 04 85

linguistic or religious groups; the monopolyof power; inadequate ethnic representationin higher ranking government positions;denial of the right to employment to certaingroups such as the disabled; access tohigher education that is restricted to certaingroups; unequal distribution of resources;and the monopoly of the public media byone group.

Threats also include the perception thatpeople have about the relationship betweenthe state and warlords and narco-mafiabosses. In the summer of 2004, regionalstrongmen still wielded significantinfluence over scarce resources, and oftenset and enforced their own rules and theirown personal or group interests. To changethe negative domination and menace ofpower-holders over the state-buildingprocess in the country, it is necessary toimplement a radical reform to addressconflicts of interest in the structure of thestate, and in doing so, to secure the nationalinterests of Afghans, rather than theinterests of particular groups.

Without an institution that transcendscommunalism, steps to address the threatsthat arise from fragmentation cannot takehold. A functioning state must replace thestatus quo, the wielding of power by localwarlords. Otherwise, the lack of statepower and influence at the local level willcontinue to be a critical deficit. Toovercome this problem, connecting localcommunity management capacities to localstate institutions must become a strategicgoal. So far, the central Government’s softapproach has failed to provide institutionalcornerstones for conflict transformation,state-building, and social and economicreforms, even though people’s demand formore state involvement in local governanceis high all over the country.

With political and militia groups stillfocused on personal, group, or ethnicinterests, allegations and labels such as

“war criminal” are assigned only to theloser groups. No one is being tried thehuman rights violations or crimes againsthumanity that have persisted for 23 years,and accusers have failed to assume anyresponsibility for their own crimes. Thispolitical dishonesty was identified duringthe NHDR consultations as a seriousobstacle to national reconciliation.Assuming responsibility and trying to learnfrom mistakes would be an essential steptowards mending broken relationship andregaining lost trust, among Afghans, andalso between the state and the citizens. Inthe eyes of Afghans, an incompetentgovernment is one that is unable toadequately address major grievances, failsto enforce law and order, and cannot meetthe basic needs and aspirations of thepeople.

Threats to Survival: Mines

A serious threat to survival in Afghanistanis the continued presence of mines.Afghanistan is one of the three most mine-afflicted countries in the world, with anestimated 10 million scattered throughoutthe country. The landscape is littered withother unexploded ordnance (UXO) –rockets, mortars, grenades and fuses thathave the potential to maim or kill. Childrenare especially vulnerable to injury. Manyare at risk just by performing everydaychores such as gathering wood, tendinglivestock and collecting water for theirfamilies.96 The latest estimates indicatethat between 150 and 300 people are killedor injured by landmines every month, manyof them children. Estimates from the UnitedNations Mine Action Programme forAfghanistan (UNMACA) indicate that 860people were killed or injured by landminesin 2003 (See Chart 3.3). The InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross (ICRC)calculated that 7,097 Afghans had beenkilled or wounded by landmines between1998 and 2003.97

96 Save the Children (US) 2002.97 United States Department of State 2004.

Afghanistan has nopolicies for any of thethings that help withhuman security andhuman development.It has no educationpolicy, it has no healthpolicy, it has noeconomic policy, it hasno environmentalpolicy, it has no securitypolicy. It just takeseverything by the dayand many of the daysare bad. I wish I couldhave been moreoptimistic.

Hamdullah from Jalalabad

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Map 3.8: Percentage of Villages per District in Which Landmines Affect Access to Schools,Clinics, Markets, Agricultural Land, Water or Homes (2004)

Source: UNMACA 2004.

Province Badghis Herat Kabul Kandahar Nangarhar

Landmines 13% 17% 62% 7% 24%

Table 3.4: Percentage of Rural Afghans Living Among Landmines and UXOs byProvince, 2003

Source: “Human Security and Livelihoods of Rural Afghans, 2002–2003”, Feinstein International Famine Center, Youthand Community Program, Tufts University, June 2004. This survey was conducted among rural populations in fiveprovinces: Badghis, Herat, Kabul, Kandahar, Nangarhar.

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Map 3.9: Mined Area Situation in Afghanistan as of May 2004

Source: UNMACA, 4 August 2004, Kabul.

Map 3.10: Total Area Cleared of Landmines as of March 2004

Source: UMACA, 4 May 2004, Kabul.

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3.3. Conclusions

An analysis of the “fears” and “wants”that characterize everyday existence inAfghanistan today leads us to make thefollowing conclusions about how theyrelate to threats to human security:

1. It is not constructive to prioritizewants and fears: It is often notedthat security is a pre-requisite fordevelopment. The threat analysispresented here, however, shows thatdevelopment concerns can createinsecurities themselves, and are justas urgent. Human security embodiesthe notion that problems must alwaysbe addressed from a broaderperspective that encompasses bothpoverty and inequality. Both lead toinsecurity and conflict, in addition tobeing “inhumane” by themselves. Thei m p e r a t i v e i s t h e r e f o r e t osimultaneously work on “freedomfrom fear”, which entails provision ofsecurity and a violence-free day-to-day life for everyone in the country,and “freedom from want”, which callsfor providing not only the basic needsof food, shelter and services, but alsothe more strategic needs that supportlong-term, sustainable development.

2. Threats are interconnected: Threatsto human security in Afghanistan areinter-connected in two ways. First,

they are mutually linked in a kind ofdomino effect: health insecurity couldlead to poverty, which could lead toeducation deficits, etc. Or responsesto insecurities stemming fromenvironmental degradation couldcontribute to population movementinto other fragile ecological settings,a deteriorating health situation, hunger,loss of livelihoods, and so on. Second,the various threats can spread withinthe country (with impoverished areas,for example, threatening the stabilityof more progressive ones); bleed intoother regions (through massiveemployment migration, export of arms,environmental degradation, etc.); andnegatively impact global security(through breeding discontented armedgroups , drug expor ts , e tc . ) .Dysfunctionality in one part of thesystem structurally and sequentiallyaffects other sub-systems, and leadsto a vicious cycle of causes and effects. These linkages increase the urgencyof dealing with threats.

3. The answers are not just military:The real guarantor of national securityis not solely military power, or theexpansion of ISAF or ANA troops,but a strategic and sustainable humandevelopment agenda that favourssocial, political and economicconditions from a rights-based and

Chart 3.3: Landmine Victims in 2003

Source: UNMACA database, 2004.

Chart 3.4: Landmine Victims by Gender 2003

Source: UNMACA database, 2004

Landmines Victims in 2003 (UNMACA Database)

676

860

184

0

200

400

600

800

1000

Injured Killed Grand Total

Num

ber

Landmine Victims by Gender 2003 (UNMACA Database)

75 76

709

860

0

200

400

600

800

1000

Female Male Unknown Grand Total

Num

ber

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inclusive perspective. Such an agendashould imply a secure livelihood,wh ich inc ludes sus t a inab l eemployment with a decent income;access to universal and quality healthcare and education; a clean andsustainable environment; freedomfrom fear of crime and infringementof civil rights; and freedom from fearof violent conflict.

4. The responsibility does not belongto the state alone: The state seems tohave a special responsibility in theminds of the people of Afghanistan,although historical experience showsthat the state itself at times became aperpetuator of insecurities. The notionof state responsibility was expressedby people consulted by the NHDRteam, and in a CARE survey that

showed that 81 per cent of Afghansexpect the Government to provideservices in the next three years, whilegroup discussions revealed seriousconcerns about accountability andcapacity. That people in Afghanistancontinue to rely on a state that they donot trust poses serious questions aboutthe level of awareness andempowerment that individuals andcommunities have. While publicpolicies by the Government andinternational community are the maintools to achieve human developmentand security goals, one cannot neglectother critical components, includingadvocacy by civil society, goodpractices by market forces, andproactive action by individuals andhouseholds.

Chapter 390

4

Photo: Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh

Causes and Consequencesof Insecurities

Chapter

1 This section draws among other sources from the background paper by Hanna Schmitt 2004.

employment and security. This in turncould eventually lead to disenfran-chisement and disillusionment. Ineffectiveand short-term policies focused on politicalcompromise will not prove an adequatestrategy. Instead, there is a need to identifythe root causes that may continue toendanger the new democracy.

A Historic Overview of the AfghanConflict

The causes and consequences of crisis,and their implications for state-building,cannot be understood in isolation fromAfghanistan’s historical and internationalcontext.1 A historical perspective isespecially important in assessing the rootsof the country’s current situation. Afghanshave a historical memory of tensions overland, failed states, challenges to powerstructures and external intervention. Thismemory lingers long after the guns havebeen set down.

A detailed examination of Afghanistan’shistory of unremitting conflict and externaldomination exceeds the scope of thisreport. However, to be accurate, anyanalysis of the current situation andreconstruction efforts needs to beunderpinned by an understanding of thecauses and the impact of the conflict.Internally, Afghan history is characterizedby tribal and ethnic rivalries, and a strugglefor progress. Externally, powerfulneighbours and regional powers havesought influence and imposed regimes.Overall, ordinary Afghans have had littleopportunity to participate in the decision-making processes that have affected theirlives.

4.1. Introduction

This chapter analyses the impact of twodecades of conflict on the people ofAfghanistan and on the institutions thataffect their lives. It examines the “howand why” of the threats discussed inChapter 3, and then goes on to discuss thepotential causes of the conflict using aframework of “greed and grievances”.Political, social and economic processesthat have led to or resulted from the Afghanwars are viewed in terms of theirrelationship to people’s wants and fears.

A Warning

The following chapter argues thatpreventing future conflicts in Afghanistanrequires targeting and responding to rootcauses, both internal and external.

Although external factors such as foreigninvasion and interference were thepredominant factors fomenting conflict inAfghanistan, persistent and pervasivehuman insecurity deepened and sustainedthe war and devastation. In the future,stronger human security could be viewedas a requisite mechanism for preventingnew eruptions.

Conflict in Afghanistan can be ascribedto both grievances (motives) and greed(opportunities). This NHDR postulatesthat both grievances and greed still flourish,and may not have been dealt withsufficiently enough to prevent futureconflicts. Greed spurred by the drugeconomy and on the rise among thosehungry for more power and wealth haskept the Government fragile. It is unableto fulfil many of its responsibilities to meetpeople’s needs in terms of welfare,

Chapter 4

Causes and Consequences ofInsecurities

NHDR 04 93

Afghans have ahistorical memory oftensions over land,failed states,challenges to powerstructures and externalintervention. Thismemory lingers longafter the guns havebeen set down.

Afghanistan, a largely mountainouscountry capped by the majestic HinduKush, has always been of strategicimportance to the colonial “great powers”(Russia and Great Britain, and later theUnited States). The country’s presentborders were established at the end of the19th Century, when the great powerssought to establish a buffer state betweenthe British and Russian empires. After theSecond World War, the “Great Game”began once again, this time between anexpansionist USSR looking south, and anew superpower, the United States, keento influence events in Iran, Central Asiaand China. While Afghanistan preservedits political neutrality, it receivedconsiderable quantities of developmentand military assistance from both theUnited States and the USSR.2

In 1964, under King Zahir Shah,Afghanistan adopted its first liberalConstitution. It allowed for greater politicalfreedom and provided for a two-chamberlegislature. These changes ushered in aperiod of democratic experimentation,accompanied by some freedom of the pressand rudimentary forms of political activityby many newly formed political parties.The 1970s, however, were a tumultuousdecade. Shah was overthrown by his cousinMohammad Daud in 1973, and a second,military coup in 1978 by the People’sDemocratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA)installed a pro-Soviet communist regime.In 1979, in response to increasing fears ofIslamic resistance both within Afghanistanand in the newly declared Islamic Republicof Iran, the PDPA “invited” the Soviets toinvade Afghanistan, marking the beginningof Afghanistan’s 23-year-long war.

2 From 1955 to 1978, the Soviet Union provided Afghanistan with US$1.27 billion in economic aid and roughly US$1.25 billion in military aid, while theUnited States furnished US$533 million in economic aid. See Barnett Rubin 2002b.

1979–1988 – Jihad in a Cold Warcontext: The Afghan rural resistancefights the Soviet-backed Kabul regime.The Sunni resistance parties receivemilitary and financial support fromPakistan, the United States and SaudiArabia, and the Shia parties from Iran.More than 5 million Afghans becomerefugees in Iran and Pakistan. TheGeneva agreements of 1988 pave theway for the Soviet withdrawal. Aninterim Government, composed mainlyof Sunni parties but also including someShia parties such as the Hizb-e Wahdatand the Harakat-e Islami Mohsini, is setup under the aegis of the United States,Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

1989–1992 – Jihad among Afghans:After the Soviet withdrawal, an internalwar between the Soviet-supported

Government of President Najibullah andthe various Afghan factions ensues withcontinued support from the Soviet Unionand the United States. However, thecollapse of the USSR and the ending ofUS aid alter the balance of power. TheNajibullah regime collapses whenDostum and his Uzbek militia switchallegiance from the Kabul regime to theMujahideen, who enter the capital inApril 1992.

1992–1996 – Factional war: TheMujahideen Government is fractured byinternal power battles and shiftingalliances among the major party leaders.As superpower influence declines,regional power interests reassertthemselves and the conflict assumes thecharacteristics of both a regional proxywar and a civil war. In late 1994, the

Taliban emerge, with a stated objectiveof restoring stability. In September 1996,they take Kabul.

1996–2001 – Talibanization: Fightingcontinues between the primarily PashtunTaliban, backed by Pakistan and theUnited States, and the non-PashtunUnited Front (UF), backed by Iran,Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and India.The Taliban control roughly 90 per centof the territory, and the UF occupy theremaining pockets of land. Both sideshave access to external aid andinternational markets, and continue topursue their objectives through militarymeans.

2001–Present: US-led international“war against terrorism”.

Adapted from Mohammed Haneef Atmar and Jonathan Goodhand, “The Challenge of Winning the Peace", published in: Searching for Peace in Centraland South Asia, 2002.

Box 4.1

Different Phases of the Afghan Conflict Since 1979

Chapter 494

The Afghan conflict mutated over time,passing through several distinct phases.From late 1979 until February 1989, Sovietmilitary forces occupied the country,encountering fierce resistance from theWestern-backed Afghan guerilla fighters,known as the Mujahideen.

The resistance movement receivedsubstantial international assistance. Aidshot up from US$30 million from theUnited States in 1980 to US$630 millionin 1987, with Saudi Arabia approximatelymatching the US contribution.3 During thisperiod, about 3 million refugees settled incamps along the Afghan border in Pakistan,and about 2 million fled to Iran.

Various international NGOs establishedoperations in refugee camps, providinghumanitarian assistance to refugees andalso helping to channel international aidto the Afghan areas that were under thecontrol of the Mujahideen. The Sovietoccupation was also characterized by large-scale changes in rural Afghan society andits institutions, as villages emptied andexisting hierarchies eroded in the wake ofmassive displacement. Authorityincreasingly came from local Mujahideenmilitia commanders, whose newly acquiredwealth and power was bolstered by anaid–arms industry.

Soviet troops withdrew in 1989, followingthe international Geneva Accords of 1988.The Accords, however, failed to addressthe post-occupation government setupneeded for peace-building, and warcontinued between the Mujahideen andthe Soviet-installed regime of PresidentNajibullah. In 1992, the United Nationsnegotiated a deal with President Najibullahunder which he would step down toestablish a broad-based transitionalauthority. However, this attempt was

hijacked by the divided Mujahideenfactions, who could not agree on a power-sharing formula and instead stormed Kabulfrom different directions. While fightingensued, Afghanistan was renamed theIslamic State of Afghanistan, althoughthere was no united strategy for runningthe Government.

In the course of this phase of the conflict,different commanders took over differentparts of the country. Front lines andcoalitions changed frequently, with theinfighting fuelled by neighbouringcountries backing various Mujahideenfactions and commanders willing to servetheir interests in Afghanistan.4 Once again,atrocities were committed against theAfghan population at large; many peopleended up internally or externally displaced.Another important aspect of this time wasthe transformation of Afghanistan’seconomy. As financial assistance from thesuperpowers declined with the end of theCold War, fighters were obliged to procurealternative local sources of funding theiractivities. Consequently, Afghanistanbecame a “transport and marketingcorridor” for drugs and contraband.5

The third phase of the Afghan conflictbegan with the arrival of the Taliban onthe Afghan military scene in 1994. TheTaliban, who consisted mainly of Pashtunyouth, rose out of the refugee camps inPakistan, from where they brought theconservative values taught in themadrassas (Quranic schools). The Talibanenjoyed the financial and military supportof Pakistan’s Inter-Services IntelligenceAgency, and were also welcomed by themajority of the Afghan population, whichwas traumatized by the behaviour of localMujahideen fighters. Initially, the role ofthe Taliban was to secure the maintransport routes, and to remove or disarm

3 Barnett Rubin 2002b.4 In the course of the conflict, the different factions became proxies for the interests of their own regional sponsors, namely Pakistan and Saudi Arabia on

the one hand, and Iran, Russia, India, and the central Asian republics of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan on the other.5 Christopher Cramer and Jonathan Goodhand 2002.

NHDR 04 95

the different Mujahideen checkpoints.6

Sultan Barakat 2002. In 1996, groupsopposed to them formed The UnitedNational Islamic Front for the Salvationof Afghanistan (The Northern Alliance),and open conflict broke out between thetwo camps. The Taliban, however, enjoyedmilitary superiority and advanced withrelative ease, taking control of Kabul inSeptember 1996. In October 1997, thecountry became the Islamic Emirate ofAfghanistan.

The Taliban regime was based on a verystrict interpretation of Sharia law.Television, music and photography werebanned, as were games and numerouspopular leisure activities. Taliban ruleparticularly affected the lives of urbanwomen and girls who had to wear the allenveloping chaddari, and who wereforbidden to attend schools or university,to work, or to leave their homes withouta male relative. Men had to grow theirbeards, wear traditional Afghan clothesand attend prayers regularly in the mosque.During the Taliban regime, the wareconomy was further consolidated andAfghanistan became the world’s majorsource of opium, with a production of4,600 tons in 1999. Simultaneously, theTaliban abandoned many of the corefunctions of the state, such as welfare andrepresentation.7 By mid-2001, the Talibancontrolled more than 90 per cent of theterritory of Afghanistan, and hadestablished some level of security byending factional fighting. Nevertheless,the Taliban were never accorded officialinternational recognition, and their strictpolicies (especially those regardingwomen) earned them the condemnationof most of the international community.8

The last phase of the Afghan conflictstarted in October 2001, when, as a

response to the September 11th terroristattacks, an international coalition led bythe United States invaded Afghanistan andousted the Taliban regime with the helpof the Northern Alliance. The Taliban werethen replaced by a Government composedof the three Mujahideen coalition groupsand the Rome group led by the formerKing, Zahir Shah. The internationalcommunity negotiated this arrangementin Bonn in December 2001.

4.2. A Framework of Motivesand Opportunities

As the opening page of the Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen’s OnEconomic Inequality asserts, “The relationbetween inequality and rebellion is indeeda close one”. The poor may rebel to induceredistribution, and the rich may mountsecessionist rebellions to preemptredistribution.9 From this perspective,income and asset inequality, which intraditional agrarian Afghanistan mainlyimplies land ownership and access to water,could be considered as a trigger of theconflict in 1979. It started in the aftermathof land reform policies carried out by theGovernment at that time.

Although the complexity of the Afghanconflicts cannot be oversimplified, for thepurposes of a human security analysis onecould propose that the first phase of theconflict (1978-1992) may have had a verydifferent motive than the second phase(1992-2001). In the first phase, conflictcould be accounted for in terms of motives.Rebellion occurred as a result of grievancesthat included threats to independence,cultural values, poverty, illiteracy, politicalrepression, threats to livelihoods, andhuman rights violations, all fueled byforeign occupation. These grievancesprompted people to engage in violent

6 Sultan Barakat 2002.7 Christopher Cramer and Jonathan Goodhand 2002.8 Ahmed Rashid 2000.9 This is analogous to the theory of tax exit proposed by Buchanan and Faith 1987.

Chapter 496

protest in defense of their motherland,national dignity and cultural identity.Theirs was also a civil aspiration forfreedom, justice and fairness, as well asfreedom from poverty.

In contrast to this phase, the post-1992conflict could be explained in terms ofopportunities.10 According to this model,conflict as an industry generates profitsfrom looting in such a way that “Theinsurgents are indistinguishable frombandits or pirates”.11 Rebellion during1992-2001 in Afghanistan was mainlymotivated by greed, which was sufficientlycommon that profitable opportunities forrebellion were not passed up.12 Aparticularly powerful factor in this contextwas the dependence of many of theMujahideen groups upon primarycommodity exports, such as lapis lazuli,emeralds, rubies, timber, and, in the laters tages , opium gum along witharchaeological and antique artefacts. Allof these provided income to financethe war.

Recent studies of the causes of conflictcast economic agendas (greed) againstpolitical ones (grievances) in causing andsustaining conflicts.13 The Afghan case,however, shows that economic agendashave been intertwined with social andpolitical crises. Grievances have includedworsening poverty and inequality that cancentre on ethnic or cultural identities. Theyhave been fuelled by and in turn addedfuel to “greed”, associated with the rise ofconflict entrepreneurs and war profiteers,private militia commanders and narco-mafia-style profit seekers. It is thisdimension that has led to the collapse oflegitimate state authority and social control,which has bred crime and disorder,disturbed livelihoods, diminished

resources, degraded the environment,spread poverty-related diseases and hunger,exhausted the national budget, spikedinflation, depleted the national historicalheritage, and, in the end, led to furtherdependence on international humanitarianoperations.

A human security analysis gives as muchweight to the objective reality ofopportunities (greed) as to the moresubjective perception of the motives(grievances). Perceptions of threat may beas significant as any objective differencesin economic wealth or political or militarypower. Fear is easily reinforced andmanipulated by those in power, and canprove as effective a means of control asovert violence.14

Conflict as Transformation 

It is misleading to talk about “the Afghanconflict” with a unified term. First, theconflict in Afghanistan has had verticalties with a conflict system that comprisesinterconnected zones of instability andspans the entire Central Asia region aswell as southwest Asia.15 Second, theconflict itself underwent severaltransformations, which may not havealways been about breakdowns, but alsoabout opportunities for beneficiaries. It istherefore misleading to hope for a smoothtransition from “war” to “peace”, especiallysince the distinction is blurry in the historyof Afghanistan. “Wars are sites ofinnovation, leading to the creation of newforms of legitimacy and protection.Conflict and struggle have historicallybeen essential for the advancement ofpeoples on the margins and one couldargue that minorities have advanced theirposition as a result of the conflict. Violentresistance may ultimately have positive

10 See H.I. Grossman 1991 and H. I. Grossman 1999.11 Grossman 1999.12 According to the “Machiavelli Theorem” (Hirshleifer 2001) no one will pass up a profitable opportunity to exploit someone else.13 See, for instance, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler 2001.14 Sarah Collinson 2003.15 Barnett Rubin and Andrea Armstrong 2003.

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A human securityanalysis gives as muchweight to the objectivereality of opportunities(greed) as to the moresubjective perceptionof the motives(grievances).

social outcomes – the growingassertiveness of historically excludedgroups such as the Hazaras may be oneexample. Conversely ‘peace’ may beassociated with particular political agendas,and in the interests of dominant groups –‘national reconciliation’, promoted by theNajibullah regime for instance, or the‘security’ brought by the Taliban couldnot bring lasting and equitable peace.”16

The transition from war to peace istherefore not a simple agenda. Recognitionof conflict as a form of breakdown butalso of opportunities requires a subtleapproach. Old conflicts will continue (forexample, center–regional tensions) andnew ones will emerge (for instance, landconflicts related to returnees). War hasaltered institutions and social structures,such as by leading to new relationshipsbetween the bazaar and the countryside,between ethnic groups and their access topower, etc. A nuanced approach to conflictreso lu t ion , peace-bu i ld ing andreconstruction therefore requiresrecognizing the underlying process oftransformation. Policy objectives cannotsimply be “peace” or “ending wars”, butmust be directed towards transforminginstitutions, networks and incentivesystems, regionally, nationally andlocally.17

4.3. Causes of the Conflict:Grievances and Greed

Grievances

Horizontal Inequalities and Poverty

The causes of conflict are often manifold,and attempt to agree on one determiningfactor are generally not successful. Fromthe onset, it is hard to pinpoint whethergrievances such as unusually highinequality and weak political and civilrights are the main motives that explain

rebellion in Afghanistan. They have alwaysbeen, however, serious and widespread.Absolute poverty, social and politicalexclusion, acute inequality, and inequityin the distribution of resources andopportunities among different identitygroups based on ethnicity, geography, etc.have made Afghanistan vulnerable toconflict in the past, as they may in thefuture. One can postulate that poverty andlack of progress on development indicatorsexacerbated and sustained the conflict inAfghanistan. Poverty forced people to joinmilitias as an alternative to employment,for example. The lack of viable andalternative livelihoods or opportunitiesperpetuates the sense of frustration, creatingnew tensions (such as over land and naturalresources) or feeding into existing tensions(e.g., inter-ethnic rivalries). Whileunderdevelopment may not directly causeviolent conflict, poor social, economic andenvironmental conditions as well as weakor ineffective political institutions certainlydiminish the capacity to manage socialtensions in a non-violent manner.

The existence of “horizontal inequalities”,defined as a differentiated access to socio-economic opportunities, resources andpower-sharing, has fostered a reality ofmultiple experiences within Afghanistan.These inequalities can lead to deep-rootedconflicts when they combine the issue ofidentity with that of inequality in ahistorically or emotionally chargedsituation. Power inequalities andasymmetries can include sources of long-term as well as short-term grievances,ranging from economic inequality toasymmetries stemming from gender, race,religion, ethnicity, etc. It is not the mereexistence of these inequalities, but acollective feeling of “unfairness” stemmingfrom a skewed distribution of developmentgains among different groups, as well aspolitical opportunities for power and

16 Johnathan Goodhand 2002.17 See B. Rubin, A. Ghani, W. Maley, A. Rashid and O. Roy 2001.

Chapter 498

One can postulate thatpoverty and lack ofprogress ondevelopmentindicators exacerbatedand sustained theconflict in Afghanistan.Poverty forced peopleto join militias as analternative toemployment, forexample.

expression, that can feed animosities.Ignoring these factors points to the failureof political structures to address theseinequalities on the one hand, and to curbthe dominance of particular groups on theother.

In Afghanistan, the relative human povertyof different ethnic, gender or geographicgroups is hard to identify given the lackof disaggregated statistics. If available,these data could show the scope of povertyor illiteracy by different groups, and theextent of their marginalization frominternational markets or state benefits. Itmay be safe to assume that aggregatestatistics can hide realities. But pockets ofpoverty and inequality can provedetrimental to the overall situation whenthey result in instability.

Conflict and peace in Afghanistan pointto a dialectical relationship, i.e., peacemakes development possible, butdevelopment must also start now in orderto reinforce and consolidate peace, andprovide a platform for human security andhuman development. Obviously, if peoplewere busy and cared for, they would notseek out conflict. Poverty, on the otherhand, which is the reality across much ofsouth and southwest Afghanistan, in placessuch as Paktia, Paktika, Zabul, Helmand,Nimruz,and Uruzgan, could lead tosituations where people don’t haveanything to lose. They can therefore beeasily manipulated by extremists,international terrorist organizations andnarco-mafia lords. For these groups,conflict creates an opportunity to grabpower, means of production, assets, andso on.

Land and Water Resources

Land degradation has long contributed totension and grievances in Afghanistan.While lack of access to land has been aconcern for the majority of Afghans

(grievance), it has also been an asset anda means of control for power-seekers(greed). Land disputes are preoccupyingin that, if not dealt with within a reasonableperiod of time, they can foster conflict,particularly if they have been exploitedfor political and military ends.

More than 100 years of power strugglesin Afghanistan have set the scene forpresent day land disputes. Each region hasits own history of land changing handsmultiple times as one of the most preciousspoils of war.18 The multiple claims thatstem from this history are unfortunatelyaccompanied by few title deeds. Wherethey exist, they are often contested becausecustomary, religious and state laws havegenerated various forms of documentationto prove land ownership. As theInternational Crisis Group (ICG) noted,“Every commander that comes starts givingout land to his people with legaldocuments. There are multiple claims toland and many of these disputes involvebig commanders. If they just involveordinary people they can be solved at alocal level, usually in the form ofcompromise, but these are only the smalldisputes. Often land is controlled bycommanders who have no wish to let go,then they threaten, they kill.”19 Twodecades of migration have furthercomplicated the situation. As largenumbers of refugees return to resettleregions where they once made their homes,they are finding themselves confrontedwith new conflicts and insecurities overland rights.

About 80 per cent of Afghans depend onwhat they can grow, but the countryincreasingly lacks water and fertile land.Even in the relatively peaceful 1970s, lessthan six per cent of the land was irrigated.The war almost halved that. Drought,which has withered the land for as manyas seven years in some regions, has lowered

18 Jeanette Kroes 2004.19 International Crisis Group 2003c.

NHDR 04 99

About 80 per cent ofAfghans depend onwhat they can grow,but the countryincreasingly lackswater and fertile land.

water levels across the country. Pumpsbrought in to lift water to higher landsoften deprive those downstream, whilewater taken for agriculture frequentlydraws down the shallow wells that are theonly source of drinking water for villagers.Generally, the drought has increasedinequalities, as the wealthy have met theirwater and land needs at the expense of thepoor. It was also an ally of the Taliban.They could not have pushed north withoutpicking up farmers along the way who,having lost their crops and herds, hopedto earn something by shouldering a gun.

As Afghanistan’s IDPs and refugeescontinue returning home, the country’sland and water resources will be stretchedto the limit if they are expected to satisfythe needs of all. The parched southernregions in particular were suffering fromthe effects of continued drought in 2004.People in this area are increasinglydesperate and isolated, which naturallyrenders them all the more receptive to thefruits of the one crop that is supremelysuited to both Afghanistan’s geographyand its political instability – opium.

Ethnic Fragmentation and Domination

Internal strife in Afghanistan has oftenbeen characterized by outside experts asan ethnic struggle. Those who throw theethnic factor into the mix of major rootcauses for the Afghan crisis base theiranalysis on the observation that warringfactions were formed around ethnic andregional lines. In the chaos of the 1990s,following the withdrawal of Soviet troops,ethnicity seemed to become the dominantfactor in the civil war. The Jamiat-e-Islamiof President Rabbani and General Masoud,the Jumbesh-e-Milli of General Dostum,and the Hizb-e-Wahdat of Abdul KarimKhalil i presented themselves asrepresentative of the Tajiks, Uzbeks andHazaras, respectively. This enabled themto mobilize troops and justify their

existence. The Taliban too fit seamlesslyinto this ethnic pattern on the basis of theirpredominantly Pashtun membership andsupport from the south and east.20 Factionswithin the anti-Taliban alliance derivedtheir military manpower from theirrespective ethnic groups: Tajiks, Uzbeksand Hazaras of northern and centralAfghanistan. All factions were extremelyethnocentric, with each having committedexcesses against the people of rival ethnicgroups on numerous occasions. This, inturn, has been touted as evidence ofgrievances among ethnic groups turninginto bitter internal conflicts.

Some sources suggest that substantialinequality and discrimination over a longtime may account for current ethnictensions. Before the war, Pashtunsdominated the Afghan state. However, theconflict brought a new assertiveness fromnon-Pashtun minorities such as the Tajiksand Hazaras, who also mounted aneffective resistance to the Soviet invasion.There was consequently a shift in the ethnicbalance of power during the course of thewar. The political motives of interestgroups behind the opposition broughtethnic differences to the forefront.Although few resistance parties wereabsolutely mono-ethnic, they werenonetheless geographically based and thusdominated by a particular group. With thefall of the Najibullah Government in 1992,Afghanistan fractured mostly alongregional and ethnic lines. All partiescommitted human rights abuses, and onceatrocities began, ethnic polarizationincreased. Clearly, it is impossible toseparate the rise of ethnic tensions fromsubsequent political developments, andthe use of ethnic identity and pastgrievances to serve the political andhegemonic ends of greedy interest groups.The state of overall insecurity inAfghanistan has created an environmentof human vulnerability ideal for this kindof manipulation.

20 Frank A. Clements 2003.

Chapter 4100

While the observation that Afghan warringfactions were factionalized along ethniclines may be accurate, the analysis andconclusions drawn from it have often beenmisleading. Such analyses fail to take intoaccount the fact that the Afghan conflictwas kicked off by a foreign invasion andthen kept alive by the meddling ofneighbouring countries. They continuouslypursued their various self-interests inAfghanistan though their Afghan clienteles– who often belonged to the same ethnic,linguistic and religious groups. The Afghanpopulation, by and large, and regardlessof their ethnic, linguistic, regional andreligious background, detested their ownethnic warring factions as much as thoseof other ethnicities.

Although some experts equate ethnicgroups with dominant military–politicalmovements and see them as uniformbodies, many insist that there has been noreal “ethnicization” of the Afghan conflict.In fact, it would appear “...even therelevance of ethnicity as a factor of militaryand political cohesion remained limited inAfghanistan's civil war, with countlesscommanders and combat units changingtheir allegiance several times out ofpolitical opportunism and economicincentive – independent of their ethnicaffiliation.”21

In a report about human rights andreconstruction in Afghanistan by the Centerfor Economic and Social Rights – basedon a countrywide survey in December2001, when the war against the Talibanand Al-Qaida was at its very height –respondents largely disputed theimportance of ethnic-based societaloutbursts as the cause of the Afghan war.Blame for ethnic tensions was attributedto political interest groups and militaryfactions, along with their foreign sponsors,who were accused of building regional

power bases along ethnic lines andcontinuing to manipulate ethnicity as apretext for political revenge andprofiteering. Many expressed fear thatongoing ethnically targeted human rightsabuses by these factions could underminethe social cohesion of the country for yearsto come. The United Nations was alsocriticized for taking up false ethnicdivisions at the behest of Afghan leaders,rather than working to bring ordinarypeople together around issues of commonconcern. The director of an internationalNGO was quoted as saying, “I conducteda survey of 700 people on the importanceof ethnicity in Afghan society. The onlypeople who raised the issue as importantwere aid workers with the UN andNGOs.”22

Contrary to many common assumptions,the various ethnic groups such as Pashtuns,Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Turkmens,Baluchs, Nuristanis and others haveevolved into a mix of Afghans with a fairlycommon culture, psychology and ethos.For example, Pashtuns from the easternand western parts of Afghanistan havemore in common with Tajiks and Uzbeksfrom the north than with the Pashtuns ofPakistan. A more accurate conclusion maybe that although they are ethnically diverse,the Afghans have mingled into one distinctidentity, historically, politically andsocially. It is this distinction that preventedAfghanistan from disintegrating, as hasbeen the case in ethnically dividedcountries such as the former Yugoslavia.

As Afghanistan moves towards a newpolitical system, it may need to wrestlewith the fact that even in democracies, asmall group may fear permanent exclusionif political allegiance is based on ethnicity,and one ethnic group claims to be amajority. The incentive to exploit theminority increases with the size of the

21 Conrad Schetter 2001.22 Center for Economic and Social Rights 2002.

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Contrary to manycommon assumptions,the various ethnicgroups such asPashtuns, Tajiks,Uzbeks, Hazaras,Turkmens, Baluchs,Nuristanis and othershave evolved into a mixof Afghans with a fairlycommon culture,psychology and ethos.

minority, since there is more to extract.23

Hence, a minority may be most vulnerableif the largest ethnic group constitutes asmall majority, a situation referred to byCollier and Hoeffler (2001) as ethnicdominance. It is defined as occurring ifthe largest ethnic group constitutes 45-90per cent of the population. Although thisphenomenon is as common in peace as inconflict, the use of ethnicity by armedgroups in Afghanistan has surfaced mainlyin terms of physical force against others.

The source of inter-group tension hastherefore not been ethnic diversity itself,but the phenomena of polarization anddominance. It is also worth noting thathistorically, societies characterized byethnic and religious diversity have beensafer than homogenous societies, as longas they avoid dominance. Diversity makesrebellion harder because of the greater costof rebel cohesion, although it would bedifficult to argue that diversity reducesgrievance.

While the recent history of the Afghansociety is marked by political and evenviolent attempts for ethnic dominance,diversity in the country has positivelyprohibited disintegration, keeping thenational integrity of the country intact.

The danger today in Afghanistan is thecontinued manipulation of differences bydominant factions, who have wroughtcatastrophic consequences by targetingminorities in areas under their control.Many ethnically and politically targetedvictims from the past decade feel bitternessover the neglect of justice andaccountability with respect to thoseresponsible for these heinous crimes. Inthe end, the problem in Afghanistan is notethnicity, but the skewed distribution ofresources and justice across the entirepopulation.

Greed: Conflict as an Opportunity

Using the notion of opportunity to explainconflict in Afghanistan is consistent withthe economic interpretation of conflict asgreed-motivated, as well as the grievancemotivations perceived by Afghansthemselves.

During the conflict, many rebellions hadtheir roots, either directly or in general, inthe grievances of the past. However,opportunity also accounted for theexistence of both for-profit and also not-for-profit rebel organizations. Conflict canbe both economically and politicallyfunctional for those who are able to retainpower through violence. Althoughresources in Afghanistan became both anobjective and an important means ofsustaining violent conflict, it is difficult todetermine whether activities related to wareconomies, such as smuggling, resourceextraction and drugs, are responses to thestresses of war, or would have been carriedout in normal situations.

23 P. Collier and A. Hoeffler 2001.

Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 6, July 2002

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The source of inter-group tension hastherefore not beenethnic diversity itself,but the phenomena ofpolarization anddominance.

Weak states, strong networks and terrain

Afghan social networks have beenextremely resilient and have adapted tomany changing conditions. Historically,the state has both utilized and beencolonized through such networks.24

Countries with interests in Afghanistanalso have turned to these networks whenchanneling arms to the resistance. TheMujahideen drew upon them to mobilizefighters, and more recently, they have beentapped for drug smuggling and othercriminal activities.

Conflict has also been a force for socialchange that has reworked many socialidentities and challenged power hierarchies.The war brought intense ideologicalstruggles into the most remote valleys. Itprecipitated new leadership, the reworkingof traditional patron–client relationships,and an adherence to larger-scale identitiesbased on religion, ethnicity and politicalgroupings.25 The Taliban victory, forexample, represented a “social revolution”in which the sons of poor tribes and clanswere able to overthrow a tribalaristocracy.26 In a dramatic reversal ofprevious patterns, it was the countrysidethat ruled the capital. Violence was thusviewed as a means to restore status andpower.27

The collapse of the Government and thetotal chaos in the country in the aftermathof the withdrawal of the Soviet forces lefta weak state with weak military capability,which opened another avenue foropportunity and greed. Added to theinstitutional vacuum was the harshmountainous terrain, which favoured rebelgroups, such as the ones based in the forestsin eastern and southeastern Afghanistan,or in the mountains in the central, andnortheastern regions. Cohesive social

networks served rebel military needs inareas where they existed, but were lesseffective in regions with ethnic andreligious diversity. Other social factors,mainly low population density and limitedurbanization, inhibited the centralGovernment’s ability to control rebellion,which in the end helped prolong theconflict.

War economy

War transforms an economy by affectingboth its workforce and its capital. Wartimeentrepreneurs – often referred to asprofiteers, economic criminals and greedywarlords inspired by the prospects ofgreater profits – are those who possess thedetermination and often the ruthlessnessto engage in economic activity despiteincreased risks. Due to their “underground”nature, wartime economic activities areusually characterized by the accumulationof very specialized skills and marketconnections, particularly where illicitcommodities are concerned. Wartimecapital accumulations are typicallyobtained through brutal, primitivemeasures, such as slavery, oppressiveworking conditions, fear and force. “Underconditions of primitive accumulation, thedistinction between ‘interests’ and‘passions’ breaks down. Normally,successful wartime accumulation of thiskind requires social organization andcommand over means of violence as a toolof accumulation and to protect interests.”28

In post–conflict situations, such socialstructures and interdependencies frequentlyremain entrenched and are difficult todeconstruct.

Conflict in Afghanistan clearly has had itsbeneficiaries. Afghanistan became atransport and marketing corridor for aflourishing illicit economy based upon

24 Mohammad Haneef Atmar and Jonathan Goodhand 2002.25 Kristian Harpviken 1999.26 Barnett Rubin 2002b. Matthew Fielden and Jonathan Goodhand 2001a.27 Fielden and Goodhand 2001a.28 Christopher Cramer and Jonathan Goodhand 2002.

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Conflict can be botheconomically andpolitically functionalfor those who are ableto retain powerthrough violence.

opium and smuggled consumer goods, forexample. Economic agendas becameincreasingly important and incentivesystems developed for vested interests tocontinue violent conflict. “Conflictentrepreneurs deployed ‘top down’violence to control markets and incentivesystems and created a monopoly ofpredation. The poor and vulnerable,because of a lack of alternatives, wereforced to engage in bottom up (orsubaltern) violence, to secure alivelihood.”29

Greed in this context refers to seekingopportunities by grabbing power andresources. A corrupt and opportunistleadership recruits people into a low-costinfrastructure of power in an attempt toequip their institutions for grabbing evermore opportunities as they becomeavailable.

In Afghanistan, quantitative indicators ofthe levels of greed practiced by those whotook advantage of opportunities related toconflict are many. They include three majorfunding sources for rebellion: illegal trade,extortion of natural resources andcontributions from hostile governments.

In the first instance, the Afghan economy’sdependence on primary commodityproduction and export actually helpedfinance the war. As the years of conflictwore on, commodity exports shifted fromitems such as dry fruits and handicrafts toillegal trade in gemstones, archaeologicalartefacts and poppy gum. These exportsremained at high levels, even as theeconomic system as a whole collapsed tothe point of negative growth. Collier andHoeffler30 demonstrate the link betweencommodities and war: At peak danger,where primary commodity exports makeup 32 per cent of GDP, the risk of civilwar is about 22 per cent, while a countrywith no such exports has a risk of only oneper cent. In today’s Afghanistan, amongthe illegal commodity exports, poppyproducts equal 38.2 per cent of thecountry’s official GDP, notwithstandingthat gem smuggling, lumber extraction andexcavation of archaeological artefacts stillcontinue, keeping the risk of conflictresumption at or over the peak.

The exploitation of forests served asanother source of revenue for war.

29 Jonathan Goodhand 2002.30 Ibid.

Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 11, February 2004

Chapter 4104

According to the United NationsEnvironmental Program (UNEP), satelliteimagery reveals that conifer forests in theprovinces of Nangarhar, Kunar andNuristan have been reduced by over a halfsince 1977 (See Map 4.1). Up to 200 timbertrucks a day, representing the loss of upto 200 hectares of forest, ply the main roadin Kunar, according to local officials.Probably two-thirds of their cargo isdestined for export markets in Pakistan.31

This process has resulted in localcommunities losing control of theirresources to warlords, timber barons andforeign traders controlling illegal andhighly lucrative logging operations.

Pistachio woodlands in the north, whichcould produce 35–50 kg of nuts per year,providing significant revenue for thousandsof families, have also been disappearingat a critical rate. Almost no trees could be

detected by satellite instruments in Badghisand Takhar provinces in 2002, comparedto 55 and 37 per cent land coverage in1977, respectively.32 The main cause ofthe deforestation is pervasive poverty andlack of access to other sources of fuel.Conifer forests in the east and southeastwere extracted for profit only, sometimesagainst the will of local communities.

Trafficking of archeological artefacts hasbeen another source of booty that haspropelled the war in Afghanistan. Thoughthe share of GDP that comes from theillegal selling of archaeological artefactsis not known, the flow of money from thesale of these items is quite significant. Itis estimated that 75 per cent of the ancientartefacts belonging to the NationalMuseum in Kabul have been smuggledout of the country since 1992.33 These werepart of the Museum's vast collection, which

31 UNEP 2003.32 Ibid.33 Amrollah Mas'oudi, head of the National Museum of Afghanistan, interview with IRNA (12 April 2003), as quoted by the Afghanistan Press Agency (APA).

Map 4.1: Deforestation in Nuristan, Kunar, and Nangarhar Provinces,1977 and 2002

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Conifer forests in theprovinces ofNangarhar, Kunar andNuristan have beenreduced by over a halfsince 1977. Pistachiowoodlands in the northhave also beendisappearing at acritical rate.

ranged from prehistoric treasures to earlyBuddhist art to modern artefacts with amonetary value in the range of hundredsof millions of dollars. As a noted culturalhistorian of Afghanistan said, “Thebreakdown of law and order which hasplagued Kabul ever since the arrival offractious Mujahideen groups in April 1992has spelled disaster for the museum.” Inthat case, “...all indications suggest thatthe looting was carried out with carefulconsideration”.34 As of today, almost31,000 pieces of historical and culturalvalue have been stolen and sold outsidethe country,35 and illegal digging andsmuggling is continuing.

Narco-Warlordism and The Opium Trade

It will take serious internationalengagement to transform Afghanistan’sdeeply embedded war economy, whichleaves the majority of Afghans living inheightened states of both fear and want.The legacy of the opium industry and thedrug lords that thrive from it undeniably

represents one of the most dauntingobstacles to state-building.

This legacy comes from the years followingthe end of the Cold War, when a declinein superpower support led to local warlordsbecoming more dependent on localresources to maintain their militaryactivities. During this time, Afghanistanbecame a transport and marketing corridorfor drugs and contraband. Under theTaliban, Afghanistan emerged as theworld’s major source of opium, withproduction peaking at 4,565 tons in 1999.36

The drought was also an ally of opiumtraders, as herders, who used to movelivestock around the country, now movedopium by being paid advances on the nextyear’s harvest.

A June 2000 ban by the Taliban hiked upthe prices of opium gum while reducingopium output to relatively insignificantamounts in 2001 (185 tons). But the post-Taliban years have again seen a profitableexpansion. Afghanistan produced 3,400

34 Nancy Hatch Dupree 1995.35 Enemies of the Afghan Heritage, www.rawa.org/museum.html.36 UNODC 2003a.

Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 11, February 2004

Chapter 4106

tons in 2002, 3,600 tons in 2003 (See Table4.1 and Map 4.2), and even higher amountsare predicted for 2004, allowing it toreclaim the title of the world’s largestproducer.37 According to a UNODC report,high prices have spurred the recruitmentof more farmers, spreading poppycultivation to all provinces of the countryThe report claimed that Afghan opiumfarmers and traffickers took home aboutUS$2.5 billion in 2003, about half of thecountry's legitimate GDP and almost tentimes the Government’s tax revenues.38

The cultivation of marijuana is anotherissue, having become widespread in thenorth of the country.

It was a combination of exhausted assets,accumulated debts and the sharp rise inopium prices that presented opium poppyproduction as a major opportunity forlivelihood through wage-labour and trade.Consequently, the rural elite and the poorerstratum of indebted households embracedthe poppy economy, the former as astrategy to further accumulate wealth, thelatter as a coping mechanism tocompensate for the losses they havesuffered from drought. Drought, drugs andinsecurity appear now to be feeding offeach other. Three of the country's five bigdrug-producing provinces – Helmand,Uruzgan, and Kandahar – are both unsafeand parched. Poppy cultivation is alsospreading to new areas, and with itinsecurity. Whether they produce out offear or financial insecurity, however,Afghans living in these regions hardlyhave any appealing alternatives, given thatmost individuals live in dire conditions.

The growing professionalization of thepoppy economy may have been caused bythe attempts of an emerging narco-state orinternational terrorist and mafiaorganizations to criminalize the poppyeconomy of Afghanistan in order to controlpolitical and economic processes.Indicators of this direction include theappearance of an estimate of 21 heroincourtyard factories, employing “foreign”experts, and allegedly being protected byregional or central political patronage.Another sign is the professionalization ofthe trade, which now involves strong tieswith Russian and Tajik business partnersacross the border.39

Presently, drug-related activities are thecore component of the informal andcriminal economic sector. They coverproduction, refining, trafficking andconsumption of opium poppies and heroin,all under the control of the warlords andmafia-style organized criminal gangs, localas well as regional and international. Therisk that the drug economy and violentconflict could spin into a vicious circle,where one reinforces the other, is stillpresent. The enormous profits that the drugindustry generates have been shown tocorrupt state officials and underminealready weak state capacities.

Revenues from trade in opium products in2003 are estimated to have reached US$2.5billion, more than half the country’s annualGDP. Cultivation of poppy in 2003 hadincreased to 80,000 hectares from 74,000hectares in 2002 (See Map 4.3), an 8 percent increase in one year.40 Experts predict

37 Ibid38 Ibid.39 Jan Koehler 2004.40 UNODC 2003b.

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Tons of opium 4,565 3,276 185 3,400 3,600

Table 4.1: Afghanistan Opium production from 1999 to 2003

Source: UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey, 2003.

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Map 4.2: Afghanistan Poppy Production by Province (2002-2003)

Source: UNODC and Counter Narcotics Directorate (CND), Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003.

Chapter 4108

Map 4.3: Afghanistan Poppy Cultivation by Province (2002-2003)

Source: UNODC and Counter Narcotics Directorate (CND), Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003.

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an even sharper increase with record highcultivation rates in 2004.41 UNODCestimates that the amount of land devotedto poppy cultivation has more than doubledin a little over a decade, with a mere oneyear low-level deviation in 2001.

It is estimated that in 2003 Afghanistanproduced three-quarters of the world’sillicit opium42, supplying some 80-90 percent of the heroin consumed in Europe43

According to the UNODC, as much ashalf the quantity of the illicit drugsproduced in Afghanistan are consumed inneighbouring Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan,Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and other statesin Central Asia and the Persian Gulf.44 U.SSeizure data suggest that at least fivepercent of the heroin imported into theUnited States originates in Afghanistan.45

In other words, the high levels ofproduction threaten the human security ofmillions of people all over the world.

Officials warn that Afghanistan couldbecome a narco-terror state in the future.Drug production is no longer an obscureissue. Enough Afghan officials andwarlords are now so heavily involved inthe illicit trade that they threaten the state'sfledgling economy. Interior Minister AliAhmad Jalali told reporters, “In some partscriminals are supported by those who havepower,” referring to regional warlords whohold sway over large parts of the country.46

International Functions: The Aid, Tradeand Arms Pipeline

One of the major causes of conflict inAfghanistan can be attributed to theexternal interventions of states,

neighbouring and distant, all of whomhave attempted to manipulate internalAfghan affairs to benefit their owninterests. The support provided to warringfactions in Afghanistan is a clear case ofgreed.

The flow of aid to Afghanistan played asignificant role in the formation and theconservation of a “prosperous” wareconomy. During the Soviet occupationat the end of 1979, Western developmentprogrammes were effectively terminated,and the Soviet Union became the country’smajor source of foreign aid, particularlyfor residents of urban areas. During the1980s, Western-backed humanitarian aidprogrammes became entangled with ColdWar and, later, post-Cold War politicalagendas. In the early part of the decade,Western aid was part of a consciousstrategy to undermine the pro-Sovietcommunist Government. Avoiding officialstructures and instead working throughlocal commanders, mostly in easternregions where the central Government wasweak, patterns of aid distribution tendedtowards preferences for political ties overreal humanitarian need.

T h i s i n e v i t a b l y a c c e n t u a t e dnational–regional and centre–peripherytensions, and legitimized Mujahideengroups in rural areas. Essentially,humanitarian aid was being distributed toresistance groups much in the same wayarms had been only a few years earlier. Inaddition to creating a “culture ofdependency”, particularly on food aid, the“aid and arms pipeline” led directly to thebuild-up and legitimization of factional

41 Associated Press, “Afghan President Ready for Elections,” 200442 US State Department’s 2004 International Narcotics Strategy Report, quoted in “Poppy crop in Afghanistan at record high,” AFP, Washington, Mar 01

2004.43 CIA, “The World Fact Book, Illicit Drugs”. Updated 18, December 2003.44 UNODC 2003b.45 US Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report -, Southwest Asia, Released by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law

Enforcement Affairs, March 2003.46 “Afghan Officials Involved in Drug Trade,” Paktribune, 14 May 2004.

[http://paktribune.com/news/index.php?id=64987&PHPSESSID=706ee2ee0abecea7ea9adf44316f3f17].

Poppy, guns andterrorism reinforceeach other. ForAfghanistan to havepeace, we have toaddress all three at thesame time.

President Hamid Karzai

Chapter 4110

forces, and eventually to the expansion ofsmuggling and other businesses.47

During the phase of the Cold War thatstretched between 1979 and 1989, theMujahideen groups received about US$7billion in military and economic aid fromthe US and some other western countries.48

This kind of support was very open duringthe Cold War, when each great powersupported its proxies. The opportunity forrebellion may have been exacerbated bythe fact that conflict-specific forms ofcapital, such as military equipment, wereprovided either for free or at an unusuallycheap rate.

The military sponsorship of warringfactions by regional powers prompted aHRW study in 2001 to investigate thedelivery of arms and other forms of militaryaid to both sides by Pakistan, Russia andIran (by passing the United States), andthe impact of this aid on human rights.49

The report detailed the nature of militarysupport provided to the warring parties,the major transit routes used to move armsand other equipment, the suppliers, therole of state and non-state actors, and theresponse of the international community.HRW then called for internationalsanctions, including a comprehensiveembargo on arms and other forms ofmilitary assistance, against all warringfactions in Afghanistan by the internationalcommunity. Likewise, the group notedthat governments that provide militaryassistance to abusive states and rebelgroups should be held accountable for theresulting abuses.

Various forms of international trade alsosupported Afghanistan’s instability. A WBstudy estimated that trade in 1997 was

about US$ 2.5 billion, largely throughunofficial exports to Pakistan.50 Duringthe Taliban years, Afghanistan may havebeen the second largest trading partner ofthe United Arab Emirates (which, alongwith Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, was oneof only three states that recognized theTaliban regime). Afghan traders wouldpurchase duty-free goods in Dubai andship them onward for smuggling.51 Asnoted by an expert on Afghanistan,“Several networks have linked Afghanistanto a wider arc of conflict, or a regionalconflict formation, stretching fromMoscow to Dubai.52 Regional conflictformations are transnational conflicts thatform mutually reinforcing linkages witheach other throughout a region, makingfor more protracted and obdurate discord.In South Central Asia, the regional conflictcomprises state and non-state actors inAfghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Iran, Pakistan,Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan andKashmir. Networks of armed groups, oftencovertly aided by neighboring states ...linkthe conflict within Afghanistan to violencein Kashmir, Chechnya, Tajikistan,Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Networks ofnarcotics traffickers, collaborating witharmed groups, link Afghan poppy fieldsto global markets via Pakistan, Iran, andCentral Asia. Networks of traders, morebenignly, seek access to buy and sell theirgoods, even when profit requires avoidanceof customs regulations. Cross-border socialties among the region’s various ethnic andreligious groups underpin all of thesenetworks. That conflict that grippedAfghanistan over the past 25 years was[therefore] much more than a local ornational power struggle and must be seenin its regional context.”53

47 Jonathan Goodhand 2002.48 Ahmad Rashid 2001.49 HRW 2001.50 Zareen F. Naqvi , “Afghanistan-Pakistan Trade Relations”, Islamabad: WB, 1999.51 Barnett Rubin 2000.52 Regional conflict formations are transnational conflicts that form mutually reinforcing linkages with each other throughout a region, making for more

protracted and obdurate discord. In South Central Asia, the regional conflict comprises state and non-state actors in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Iran, Pakistan,Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kashmir.

53 Barnett Rubin and Andrea Armstrong 2003.

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In general, Afghanistan’s economicsituation has had and continues to havesignificant regional spillover effects –through unofficial trade, narcotics,terrorism and extremism, financial flowsand the movement of people.  Theseimpacts tend to undermine revenuecollection and the effectiveness ofeconomic policies in neighbouringcountries. At the same time, and despitefailed policies of the past, regional actorscontinue to seek influence withinAfghanistan’s borders, potentially fuelingrenewed struggles and factionalism alongethnic lines.

Hopes for an end to interference lie in astronger, more unified central Government.The renewed sovereignty of Afghanistanopens the formidable possibility that thereconstruction process could transformnegative spillovers into possibilities fortrade and economic development, not onlyin Afghanistan, but in the region as awhole. The common languages andcultures that Afghans share with theirneighbors could be used to further positiveinteractions. The changed politicalcircumstances after the Taliban providean opportunity to improve regionalrelations by expanding legitimate trade

Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 11, December 2003.

Chapter 4112

and initiating other forms of positivecooperation. A regional approach isparticularly critical for the border areasbetween Afghanistan and Pakistan, whichhave become incubators of violence,migration, smuggling and drug traffickingbecause of their deep and stubborn poverty.

4.4. Impacts and CopingStrategies

It is very difficult if not impossible toquantitatively assess the impacts of all thedamages produced by violent conflict onhuman security and human developmentindices in Afghanistan. It is as difficultfrom the livelihoods point of view toestimate how much productivity loss canbe attributed to the continuouslytraumatized people, or how much has beenlost in terms of foreign investment, tourismand incomes by the falling international“image” of Afghanistan. Yet what is clearis that at the individual level, conflictinflicted enormous misery, destroyingconfidence and mutual trust, leadershipand entrepreneurship.

The Diversification of Livelihoodsand Coping Strategies

One of the most notable outcomes of theconflict has been the extraordinaryresilience of the Afghan people. Peoplecope with and survive conflict andhumanitarian crisis first and foremost byadapting and diversifying their livelihoods.The transformations in the wider politicaleconomy are therefore mirrored in variedand often irreversible changes in people’slives. In Afghanistan, years of conflict sawgrowing vulnerability across most of thepopulation, with a gradual erosion of assets,compounded by the weakening or collapseof governance institutions and a range ofexternal shocks to poor communities’coping strategies. But Afghanistan also

demonstrated that people use a variety ofcoping strategies, which depend upon theirlocation, the strength of local governancestructures and social networks, and accessto roads, land, markets and water. Theirresponses ranged from reducing foodconsumption and disposing of assets, tomoving to Iran, Pakistan, Europe and NorthAmerica. Afghan families with membersworking in Europe, the Gulf, or NorthAmerica were often able to profit andincrease their asset base throughremittances, while those dependent onworkers in Pakistan and Iran were morelikely to be using the remittances simplyto survive.

Survival strategies, however, also had anumber of negative consequences. Fuel-gathering under drought conditions resultedin severe deforestation and denudation thatresulted in increased susceptibility to floodand avalanches. At the same time, conflictand migration limited the labour availableto maintain the functionality of watersystems, such as kareez and canals.54 Debtand migration resulted in shifting patternsof land tenure and the expansion of a classof landless labourers with limited orinsecure access to natural assets. In suchan atmosphere, in order to secure theirlivelihoods, most Afghans pursued suchstrategies as holding multiple jobs, anddiversifying sources of income throughtheir own production or disposition ofassets and wage labour.55

Afghan survival strategies also point tothe role of mutual support mechanisms.In some communities, where social capitalwas destroyed, kinship systems brokedown, particularly where there had beenperiods of settlement by different ethnicgroup. In some others, these systems weremaintained and strengthened by extendedties of economic interdependence and astrong sense of mutual support.56 Afghanhouseholds as well as individuals pursued

54 Peter Marsden 1996.55 Adam Pain and Sue Lautze, AREU, 2002.56 Sarah Collinson 2003.

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One of the mostnotable outcomes ofthe conflict has beenthe extraordinaryresilience of the Afghanpeople. People copewith and surviveconflict andhumanitarian crisisfirst and foremost byadapting anddiversifying theirlivelihoods.

livelihood strategies based on thecombination of assets they owned and theopportunities and restrictions created bytheir institutional environment, mainlyinformal factional and regional militiainstitutions. As a study on livelihoodscarried out by the AREU showed, people’sprimary objectives were and continue tobe pursuing food security to ensure theirsurvival, and an income to satisfy theirother basic needs, i.e., clothes, shelter,energy and medicine. But beyond basicneeds, households also showed inclinationstowards wider indicators of well-being,such as a dignified absence of poverty andsocial values such as freedom, choice andself-esteem.57 The resilience of the peoplein Afghanistan during the years of naturaland social miseries was the result of theirown efforts, using their own resources.These included subsistence farming, wage-labour migration, strategic family alliancesand negotiation with armed forces.58

Innovative coping strategies and theresilience that shapes them will likelycontinue to remain critical for stability,economic growth, human security andsustainable human development across thecountry.

Livelihood security requires that policiesfocus on identifying opportunities andbuilding strengths rather than emphasizingconstraints to development. The heart ofa policy framework oriented aroundlivelihoods is essentially the householdand its access to natural resources such asland and water; physical resources suchas agricultural equipment, kareez systemsand irrigation canals; financial resourcessuch as cash availability, credit and debt;human capital such as health andeducation; and social resources such astrust, social and moral norms, andcommunity networks.

The Informal Sector as SurvivalStrategy

In rural Afghanistan, the cultivation andtrafficking of opium as a survival strategyfor indebted farmers that yields income,employment and cash for food securityhas been widely studied. The other lessstudied informal economic activity, morelegal than the poppy trade, is the informalsector, which existed and continues toboom in urban centres, primarily Kabul.

A discussion of survival strategies inAfghanistan would be incomplete withouta look at this burgeoning area of economicactivity. The informal sector is based onthe existence of a dual economy, mostlyin urban areas: a registered and wage-earning sector, and an un-enumerated,small-scale, labour-intensive, self-employed sector.59 The irregular (alsoknown as black or underground) economyproduces legal outputs, but uses illegalpractices in either production or distribution(for example, no taxes are paid). This isdistinct from the criminal sector, whichrelies on similar illegal practices but oftenproduces illegal products such as drugs.The difference between quasi-legal andillegal enterprises resides in the fact thatthe former are not actively sanctioned (andare thus only de jure illegal), while thelatter are consciously hidden from andactively punished by law enforcers.60 Theinformal sector often operates as an“incubator economy”, where newentrepreneurs learn to operate in the urbanmarket economy and develop their micro-enterprises through trial and error. Thesector is also a phenomenon of cities wherethere is a higher demand for services.

A 2001 study by the WB and UNDP ofthe impact of unofficial trade onAfghanistan’s economy concluded that itcontinued to provide employment and

57 Adam Pain and Sue Lautze, AREU, 2002.58 Adam Pain and Sue Lautze, AREU, 2002.59 Timor El-Dardiry 2004.60 Ibid.

Chapter 4114

The informal sectoroften operates as an“incubator economy”,where newentrepreneurs learn tooperate in the urbanmarket economy anddevelop their micro-enterprises throughtrial and error.

revenues during the Taliban regime. Thefindings indicated that the cities of Herat,Jalalabad and the town of Weish werethriving as hubs of trade. “Jobs are beingcreated in the transport, fuel, road-buildingand repair, wholesale and retail tradesectors. Export markets for the indigenousproducts provide revenues for agriculture,horticulture, sheep farming, carpets, semi-precious jewelry, and handicrafts.”61

The informal sector continues to grow inAfghanistan’s cities today. Large importsof construction materials indicate that somesegments of the Afghan economy areinvesting in housing, warehouses, marketsand shops. This activity is fuelled bymassive foreign aid inflows and grossincome from drug production. The incomeof the expatriate community, the returningdiaspora, the nouveaux riches and stateemployees creates new demands forimports and local services. For the moment,the extent and nature of the informal sectorhas not been measured. In order to estimateits size, surveys based on questionnaireswould be one option, although people maynot want to disclose such informationthrough an interview. Other methodologiescould involve measuring the demand forcurrency as proxy. Assuming that most, ifnot all, transactions in the informaleconomy are paid with cash, there will bemore demand for currency than officialnational income figures would predict.However, the shortcomings of thisapproach are that a large proportion ofinformal economic activity may be basedon barter.62 Despite these methodologicaldifficulties, however, leaving out theinformal sector when formulating publicpolicy based on official statistics willoverlook the activities of many people.

The growing importance of the informalsector in providing a form of security tomil l ions of Afghans cannot be

underestimated. Recognizing its role willallow policy-makers to design developmentstrategies that provide new opportunitiesfor alternative livelihoods, based onpeople’s proven resilience. For thosewithout access to regular employment, theinformal sector acts as a safety net, offeringthe chance to earn a modest income aswell as social protection normally providedby the state. Yet the informal sector canalso be a problematic safety net. It mayprevent people from falling throughaltogether, but it can be very hard for themto significantly improve their incomes andescape poverty. Moreover, informalalternatives are almost always imperfectsubstitutes for state protection.63

Migration as a Way of ReducingInsecurities, Including IncomeDisparities

Even prior to the Soviet occupation, therewere migra to ry movements toneighbouring countries (especially Iran)for seasonal labour. Cross-bordermovements from Afghanistan have beensubstantial and regular, and driven byeconomic and social opportunities (andmotives), but have not been accuratelyquantified either by number or duration.The existence of transnational householdswith networks in both Iran and Pakistanis thought to have grown appreciably inthe last 25 years. The economiccontribution of these networks (includingthe wider Afghan diaspora) to familybudgets is believed to run into hundredsof millions of dollars annually.

Facilitated by better transport andcommunication, internal and internationalmigration has become more circular.Remittances have contributed to asubstantial reduction in the incomedisparity between urban and rural areas,where many households may in fact

61 WB and UNDP, “Impact of Unofficial Trade on Afghanistan’s Economy”, 2001, .62 Timor El-Dardiry 2004.63 Ibid.

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depend on them for much of their income.Migration should thus be viewed in termsof the free flow of labour to areas whereit can earn at a higher rate. Within thecountry, rural–urban migration, which hasbeen renewed since 2001, may becontributing to economic growth andreducing income disparities.

Migration is not a single, decisive moveby the entire family that ruptures all tieswith the place of origin. Many familiesact according to a deliberate strategy,sending different members to differentplaces. Those in the city save money tosupport their families in rural areas. Thefamilies may use the savings to create aneconomic base for the migrant for his orher return. Migrants provide informationto the family back home about newemployment opportunities, and helprelatives and friends settle in the urbanarea or abroad. For many, migration hasthe long-term objective of providingchildren with a good education so that theywill have a better life than their parents.The return of migrants to their homes canalso mean the introduction of new skills,ideas and knowledge.

Migration may also have some negativeimpacts, such as the loss of labour tocultivate the land. It can lead to the break-up of the family, or to men having twofamilies, one in an urban area and one ina rural area. When men migrate, women’sposition in the rural society changes, asthey are forced to undertake taskstraditionally limited to men. A drasticincrease in the population in Kabul andthe growing number of unregisteredresidents expands the scope of informalemployment, and with its humaninsecurities.

Perhaps one of the most lasting impactsof migration from a human security pointof view has been changes in traditionalsocial values and attitudes, and the

character of social interaction. Newinfluences, both destructive and innovative,have filtered in from the experience ofexiles in refugee camps and towns, butalso from Western societies as the diasporareturns. The adoption of conservativevalues, which were the experience of ruralmen brought up in refugee camps, changedthe culture of cities in Afghanistan duringthe Taliban years. External influences onattitudes and values manifested in youngmen who enlisted in militia forces, as wellas in men and women going toneighbouring countries as migrant workers.The large number of Afghans based inWestern countries could indirectly (throughcontacts with relatives) or directly (if theyreturn) influence attitudes related toproduction, consumption and other aspectsof economic and social life in Afghanistan.

The result of such a fluid movement ofpeople has been an unprecedented contrastin terms of social behaviour and livingstandards, between those who remainedin the country and those who made itoutside. These new influences couldsignificantly change the social balance inAfghan society, including the way materialresources are generated and distributed atall levels.64

Forced Migration: The Experienceof Displacement

Though the massive displacement ofpeople is often perceived first and foremostas a threat to state and even regionalsecurity, refugees are rarely, in and ofthemselves, the cause of conflict, but rather,one of its tragic results.65 States mayencounter serious difficulties when forcedto cope with the influx of refugees in largenumbers. However, in such cases, it isclearly the security of the individuals thatis most threatened. They may have beenforced from their homes, perhaps attackedduring their flight, and have arrived at adestination where their basic needs may

64 Umer Daudzai 2003.65 Discussions in this part are adapted from Chowra Makaremi 2004.

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Migration may alsohave some negativeimpacts, such as theloss of labour tocultivate the land. Itcan lead to the break-up of the family, or tomen having twofamilies, one in anurban area and one ina rural area.

not be met. In the event that displacementendures over a longer period of time, thereare greater chances that conflict mightarise depending on the degree of prosperityand integration that refugees experiencein their host countries.

The case of Afghanistan’s humandisplacement is complex and “unique inthe twentieth century (as Afghan refugees)make up the greatest population of thesame region ever transplanted outside theirown borders – an exodus from the southto the south, and the poor towards otherpoor.”66 Many Afghans have beendisplaced up to four times due to ongoingconflict, beginning with the Sovietinvasion, then the warring Mujahideenfactions, then the terror of the Talibanregime combined with their ongoingclashes with the United Front, and finallythe US-led coalition air strikes.67

Afghanistan’s exodus first exploded as thewar between Soviet invaders and theresistance intensified. There were 3.9million refugees fleeing the war in 1983.In 1988, at the height of displacement,Afghan refugees constituted as much as60 per cent of the entire world refugeepopulation. The second act played out in1989, when the Soviet forces withdrewand a first repatriation occurred. When theMujahideen conquered Kabul in 1992, oneobserver noticed “a huge surge of collectiveoptimism which resulted in no fewer than1.2 million Afghans returning fromPakistan in six months – none of themassisted by an extremely stretchedUNHCR”.68 This phase of chaos witnesseda dual movement of people: Despite theinsecure situation following the entry ofthe Taliban, 1.7 millions refugees wererepatriated by 2000, while a new wavefled the obliteration of Kabul and otherareas to join over 4 million of their fellowcitizens in exile.

Displacements intensified as the Talibanregime weighed down a population alreadyweakened by dramatic droughts. This ledto a huge increase in refugee movementin October 2000, combined with large-scale internal displacement. The humansecurity of Afghan refugees deterioratedconsiderably after 2000, when countriessuch as Pakistan and Tajikistan, who hadpreviously received their neighbors indistress, closed their borders. Food securitydrastically decreased beginning in October2001 when aid workers, upon whom theAfghan population had grown dependentfor their basic needs, withdrew from thecountry in the weeks before the coalitionair strikes.

The fourth phase of displacement beganalmost immediately following theSeptember 11th attack. Once again,Afghans attempted to flee, this time inanticipation of US retaliation against thecountry that harboured Osama Bin Laden.However, large numbers of refugees werestopped at the closed borders of Iran andPakistan as they attempted to escape thecertain warfare. With neither the optionof seeking security in neighboring countriesnor in their homeland, many Afghansremained internally displaced, worseningthe already precarious humanitariansituation.

For 2002, the Transitional AfghanGovernment figures showed approximately5.6 million Afghan refugees, with 2.3million in Iran and 3.3 million in Pakistan,1 million people were internally displaced.Since then, the Government, with the helpof UNHCR, has established repatriationprogrammes, which brought back 1.2million refugees by 2003. Despite theconsiderable success in repatriation,however, many returning refugees facefurther displacement and thus become newIDPs69: the cycle of human displacementhas not yet been broken.

66 Micheline Centlivres-Demont 1994.67 Susanne Schmeidl 2002.68 Colville 1997.69 AI 2003b.

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Many Afghans havebeen displaced up tofour times due toongoing conflict,beginning with theSoviet invasion, thenthe warringMujahideen factions,then the terror of theTaliban regimecombined with theirongoing clashes withthe United Front, andfinally the US-ledcoalition air strikes.

Despite common features, displacementis not one single phenomenon, but changesaccording to the country of asylum, thecauses of displacement, and the time whenit occurs. During the massive exodus fromthe mid-1980s to the year 2000, differentmovements took place – from hejrats toindividual displacements – with differenteffects on Afghan’s societal structures.The hejrat is an organized religious exodusin Islamic societies, is based on the beliefthat it is the duty of every believer to leavea land that is no longer Muslim and seekasylum on Muslim ground. As a responseto the Soviet invasion in the1980s, tribalchiefs organized collective hejrats whichallowed groups to maintain their socialstructures in exile.70 In many cases, tribalpopulations moved en masse to Pakistan’sfrontier areas, because the host populationis Pashtun and has similar social structures.

Contrary to the hejrat , survivaldisplacements were individual strategiesfor facing economic or political insecurity,as well as responses to social and politicalexclusion. These individual exoduses werecharacterized by disorder and lack of groupcohesion, each family deciding separatelyto leave. First people found refuge inneighbouring valleys, and then in Kabulor in a neighbouring country. A researchernoticed the destructive effect of such forcedmigrations: If families often managed toremain together in exile, the group at acommunity level didn’t form again.71 Thisoccurs mainly because forced migrationis a “totalizing phenomena”, involving“acute degrees of disintegration ascommunity structure, social networks andeven kin groups may be dispersed todifferent resettlement sites”.72

“The experience of war, displacement andrefugee life have led to changes in

women’s roles, offering greater levels ofresponsibility on the one hand and exposingthem to greater levels of vulnerability onthe other” noted a study on Afghan womenand international aid.73 The position ofwomen in the public and private spheresevolved with the specific conditions ofprotracted exile in refugee camps inPakistan. The absence of refugee men,many of whom were engaged in militaryoperations inside Afghanistan andcontinued to have links with their homevillages, often involved refugee women indecision-making processes that wouldnormally have been undertaken eitherjointly with men, or by men alone.74 Manywomen were also involved in constructionwork as the camps evolved towardspermanent establishments. It was the firsttime most had ever undertaken such tasks.

Rural Pashtun women immigrating toPakistan (who comprised more than 85per cent of female refugees) wereaccustomed to relatively free movementwithin their villages. For them, migrationled to a dramatic change in their lives as“they found themselves confined in vast,overcrowded refugee camps, sometimesin temperatures of 45+ degrees centigrade,with no available running water, littleshade, and no space”.75 In these conditions,women had to face strict reactions fromtheir communities, who accentuatedtraditional ways to preserve their identityfrom external influences and put extremepressure on women to maintain theirhonour, considered the guarantee of thegroup’s integrity. “Many womenexperienced harassment from youngMujahideen, while attacks on families whoallowed women to work with foreigners,go to school, or go shopping without amaharam relative, could be extremelyvicious.”76

70 Olivier Roy 1985.71 Ibid.72 Anthony Oliver-Smith 1991.73 Sultan Barakat and Gareth Wardell 2002a.74 Ibid.75 Ibid.76 Ibid.

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The harsh segregation of men and womenand the loss of community boundaries andmeaning in every day life became keyfactors behind the emergence of second-generation refugee warriors.77 While thefirst generation had grown up inAfghanistan, and thus “could recount theirtribal and clan lineage, remembered theirabandoned farms and valleys with nostalgiaand recounted legends and stories fromAfghan history”, the Taliban belonged toa generation that never knew theirhomeland or peace, and who had grownup in the manly world of the madrassasand in a culture of war, with hardly anycontact with women, including mothersor sisters. According to their most notedhistorian, because of the loss of communityidentity produced by displacement, theTaliban had “no memories of their tribes,their elders, their neighbors nor thecomplex ethnic mix of peoples that oftenmade up their villages and their homeland.These boys were what the war had thrownup like the sea’s surrender at the beach ofhistory.”78

4.5. Conclusions

History matters, and the history of theAfghan conflict is one of greed andgrievances feeding into each other andperpetuating social fragmentation. As theAfghan case demonstrates, the linkbetween conflict and development is acomplex one. Conflict can be exacerbatedif not caused by a breakdown indevelopment, while development can alsobe the solution for conflict resolution andprevention. Central to any interventionstrategy should be the understanding thatprevention cannot be orchestrated fromoutside, but needs to build on localaspirations and circumstances, prioritiesand capacities.

Such a notion was explicitly expressedduring consultation sessions the NHDR

team held with local communities. Forexample, in Adraskan, a district orwoleswali of Herat province, people saidthe major reason for the failure to copewith drought was the lack of consultationand understanding of real local grievancesand aspirations.

Some of the most pertinent lessons thatcan be learned from the history of theinterdependence between developmentand conflict include:

1. The root causes of fragmentationhave to be addressed. At the sametime, there is a need to understandthe motivation behind violence andrecognize its transformatory role.Understanding the Afghan conflictmeans understanding what motivateswarring groups and the broader roleof violence in society in general. Inany conflict, there is usually acontinuum of different forms ofviolence, from organized warfare andsystematic economic violence by thestate or other organized military actors,to more individualized forms linkedto crime and opportunism. InAfghanistan, economic agendas havebecome intertwined with social andpolitical crises, making it difficult todisentangle the causes and effects ofthe conflict from wider processes atwork. Patterns of vulnerability mayalter rapidly with the shifting fortunesof different communities or socialgroups. Understanding what motivatesviolence could help policy-makersrecognize and anticipate these changes,and respond appropriately. Effectivepolicies are those that deal with thecauses and the consequences ofconflict simultaneously, and make anattempt to integrate conflicttransformation and social cohesionobjectives into governance, povertyreduction and environmental

77 Ahmad Rashid 2000.78 Ibid.

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programmes. By keeping injustice onthe agenda, governance processes inthe new democratic Afghanistan mustaddress and not exacerbate existingpower inequalities. Finally, a long-term strategy for cutting the roots ofAfghanistan’s instability needs to buildon the positive aspects of inter-groupand inter-ethnic relations, such asrespect, tolerance and the benefits ofdiversity, in order to promote jointproblem-solving and consensus-building.

2. With high levels of poverty andunemployment, holding on toKalashnikovs or engaging in poppycultivation and the narco-industryare still considered ways to survive.In many rural communities, the youngare increasingly dependent on incomefrom cultivation and trade of opiumpoppies. Any untargeted interdictionprogramme would most certainly havea very negative effect on the foodsecurity of a resource poor group thatonly recently managed to upgrade theirsurvival strategy to coping due to thepoppy economy. In other cases,enlisting in a militia group or joininga criminal band may for manyindividuals still represent a livelihoodstrategy. Reducing the vulnerabilityof rural communities to predation maythus depend on finding suitablelivelihood options for those involvedin illegal industries, banditry andmilitia violence.

3. The response to societal securityproblems must be genuinereconciliation – something that sofar Afghanistan’s state-buildingprocess has shied away from.Reconciliation is a process throughwhich a society moves from a dividedpast to a shared future. It is a complexprocess that includes the search for

truth, justice, forgiveness and healing,in order to find ways for formeradversaries to coexist. It is clear thata mere provision of financial supportfor reconstruction-oriented statebuilding is not sufficient. Success liesin embedding the concept ofreconciliation into the process of state-building.

4. Ethnic, linguistic, cultural andr e l i g i o u s d i v e r s i t i e s a r eAfghanistan’s rich legacies andcannot be discounted only aspolitical factors. It cannot beemphasized enough that a Governmentable to bring a lasting peace andstability to Afghanistan has to representall ethnic, cultural and regional groups.The state-building process must giveevery citizen a sense of belonging tothe Government and to the country,by giving recognition to theirrespective cultural, religious andlinguistic values – as has been doneby Afghanistan’s new Constitution.

5. There is a regional dimension tomany of the security problems thathave beset Afghanistan for manyyears. These include black marketregional trade, narcotics, cross-borderarms smuggling, human trafficking,ethno-regional identities that competewith national ones, etc. The changedpolitical circumstances after theTaliban provide an opportunity toimprove regional relations byexpanding legitimate trade andinitiating other forms of positivecooperation. Regional problemsrequire regional solutions, an approachparticularly suitable for the borderareas between Afghanistan andPakistan, where violence thrives onpoverty, and in terms of the CentralAsian republics, which offer renewedopportunities for collaboration.

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5

Photo: Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh

Evaluation of Afghanistan’s State-buildingProcess from a Human Security Perspective

Chapter

1 Ramazan Bashar Dost 2004a.2 UNDP,“Governance in Post-Conflict Situations”, 2004d.

gain confidence and essential publicsupport.

To cultivate a “culture of democracy” ina post-conflict situation is an enormoustask, both with regard to generating theresponsibility of the decision-makers toprovide “good governance”, and theresponsibility of the constituency toparticipate.1 Newly emerging governmentalstructures will often operate without awell-developed system of checks andbalances, including indirect accountabilitythrough public opinion and media.Moreover, political transition may giverise to governmental structures overlydependent on key power-holders. This caneasily exacerbate the risk of corruption aswell as the manipulation of systems forthe benefit of a few, instead of thecommunity. Simultaneously, the peopleoften feel more concerned about theirimmediate needs and see themselves asdetached from a state structure that is notable to meet these. This will particularlyapply if the state structures are too remotebecause of geographic and politicalconditions. Perceptions of inequalities onethnic or other grounds may further enlargea growing rift between the state and itsconstituency.

Against this background, the peace-building and state-building processes arecritically dependent on:

• Rebuilding governance institutions.

• Promoting respect for human rightsand the rule of law.

• Ensuring basic security.

• Fostering participatory dialogue.2

5.1. Introduction: The CurrentReconstruction Process from aHuman Security Perspective

A central objective of the national as wellas international reconstruction and state-building processes in the transitional periodhas been to re-unite the country around aclearly defined and sequenced unitaryreform agenda. Hampered by the absenceof fully functional state institutions andcontinuing security risks, reforms havebeen slower than anticipated. Few wouldargue with the fact that political insecurityis the main obstacle to Afghanistan’sdevelopment. However, it is becomingincreasingly apparent that a short-termfocus on security objectives, in thetraditional sense, is insufficient to addressthe root causes of chronic nationalinstability: the grip of strongmen and theirmilitia, the absence of the rule of law,chronic poverty and widespread humansuffering, the violation of basic humanr igh t s and pe rvas ive po l i t i ca lmarginalisation. The legitimacy of the newAfghan state will depend upon its capacityto address the needs both immediate andstrategic of its citizens, and to promotethe enlargement of opportunities throughensuring both freedom from want andfreedom from fear.

Naturally, post-conflict processes have todeal with the challenge of attracting publicconfidence in the face of prejudices thatmay have been caused by previous abusesof power by the state. Yet becausedevelopment and conflict prevention areclosely linked to democratic governance,state-building processes need to beparticipatory and address inequalities,instead of exacerbating these, in order to

Chapter 5

Evaluation of Afghanistan’s State-building Processfrom a Human Security Perspective

Our primary focus is torevive and build theState apparatus, asystem of democraticgovernance with activeparticipation of thecitizenry.

President Hamid Karzai, Tokyo,2002

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This chapter analyses the current state-building processes with regard to thesefour broad components, against the keyelements of the human security paradigm:participation, and addressing horizontalinequalities and responsibilities. Theseelements are closely interlinked, asparticipation enhances responsibility (ofthe constituency as well as the state throughmechanisms of accountability) and therebydiminishes the dangers of horizontalinequalities.

It is argued that while central reforms havealready provided a strong de jure basis forthe unitary institutions of a state, muchremains to be done in order to promotethe conducive de facto environmentrequired to ensure lasting and completehuman security. While the state retains alarge measure of responsibility to becomethe provider of human security as a publicgood, the undertaking of building a stablestate capable of satisfying the needs of thepeople also requires the people to assumetheir responsibility and participate in state-building processes.

5.2. The Path to State-building

The following sections outline and discussthe major building blocks of the state-building endeavour upon whichAfghanistan has embarked. This hasessentially followed the path “agreed upon”at the Bonn talks, held shortly after theregime change initiated by the US-ledcoalition in late 2001.

The section commences with a brief reviewof the past two years, including anoverview of the Bonn Agreement as wellas its shortcomings, the political transition,and the constitution-making process.Turning to the present, an analysis of thenewly adopted Constitution from a humansecurity perspective is followed by a briefdescription of the current administrativestructure and administrative reforms. In

looking into the future, two “buildingblocks” namely, centre-periphery relationsand elections are discussed through theirdirect relevance to the three key elementsidentified above (participation, horizontalinequalities and responsibilities).

Political Transition: A Long Wayfrom Bonn

On 5 December 2001, one month after thefall of the Taliban regime, talks brokeredby the United Nations resulted in theAgreement on Provisional Arrangementsin Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent GovernmentInstitutions (the Bonn Agreement). Theagreement laid out a roadmap for theestablishment of the interim administration,and paved the way for constitutional andelectoral targets, presenting a time-line forboth electoral reform and for conductingpresidential and parliamentary elections.

In essence, the Bonn Agreement envisagedthree “building blocks” for thereconstruction of the state of Afghanistan:the establishment of an Interim Authorityto be succeeded within six months by theTransitional Authority; the adoption of anew Constitution for Afghanistan within18 months of the establishment of theInterim Authority; and finally, the creationof a fully representative Governmentelected through free and fair elections.Since elections could not be heldimmediately in view of the prevailingsecurity vacuum, the Bonn Agreementfacilitated an instrument of nationalconsultation that has figured prominentlyin Afghanistan’s history: the Loya Jirgah(“Grand Assembly of Elders”). 3

Incorporating the traditional consultativemechanism deeply rooted in Afghancommunity affairs, the Bonn Agreementcalled for the convening of an EmergencyLoya Jirgah, which was to form a

3 Barnett Rubin 2004.

We have so far notplayed our importantrole in the state-building process to theextent we could forthree reasons: one, byand large, we have notyet enjoyed the benefitsof the multi-billionstate-building orreconstruction project,second, we have notbeen made part of thevery project that isintended for us; third,instead of seeing thosewho have committedexcesses against us inthe past two decades insome accountabilityprocess, we see them aspart of the state.

Fazel Rahman from the easterncity of Jalalabad

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transitional Government that would remainin power unti l presidential andparliamentary elections. Another LoyaJirgah was to be convened for the adoptionof a new Constitution, modelled after theConst i tu t ional Loya J i rgah forAfghanistan’s five previous Constitutions(1923, 1931, 1964, 1977 and 1987).4

Specific commissions were establishedeither to directly facilitate these politicalprocesses, such as in the case of the SpecialIndependent Commission for theConvening of the Emergency Loya Jirgahand the Constitutional Commission, or tolay the “substantive” foundations for legalreform (the Judicial Reform Commission),the observance and protection of humanrights (AIHRC) and the future publicadministration (the Civil ServiceCommission). Last but not least, theannexes to the Bonn Agreement addressedthe need to fill the security vacuum byrequesting the deployment of ISAF andspecify the role of the United Nations insupporting the state-building processes.

The Bonn Agreement and its roadmaphave proven a success: A 30-member

Interim Authority, chaired by PresidentKarzai, was immediately established, andthe Security Council authorised thedeployment in Kabul and the surroundingareas of the ISAF by its resolution 1386.In March 2002, through Resolution 1401,the Security Council established the UnitedNations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan(UNAMA). Headed by the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative (currentlyMr. Jean Arnault), UNAMA was mandatedto assist the Afghanistan TransitionalAdministrat ion (ATA) with theimplementation of the Bonn Agreement.In June 2002, the Emergency Loya Jirgahmet to establish the ATA under theleadership of President Karzai. TheConstitutional Loya Jirgah convened inDecember 2003 and adopted a newConstitution on 4 January 2004. Thepresidential elections were held on 9October 2004, and parliamentary electionsare scheduled for April 2005.

The process envisaged in Bonn was builton the international community’sassumption that a democratic andrepresentative state would allow Afghans

4 Din Mohammad Jawaid and Asadullah Walwalji 2003. Barnett Rubin 2004.

Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 7, August 2002

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to exit the vicious cycle fuelled by a historyof internal armed conflict, natural disastersand underdevelopment, as well as fosterstability in the region, which would cutthe roots of terrorism. The internationalcommunity, encapsulated by the UnitedNations, was ready to provide all supportnecessary to make the state-buildingexercise outlined in the Bonn Agreementa success, despite the challenges of a tightschedule and past state-building failures.

However, the Bonn Agreement remainedisolated from the daily realities of thepeople within Afghanistan; It was a top-down exercise, which hoped to generatethe necessary “buy-in”. The Loya Jirgah,as a means to enhance the legitimacy ofthe central Government as well as theadoption of the constitution, could onlyserve as a limited substitute forrepresentative public participation. Whiletrust may gradually be forged throughreforms and a visible democratisationprocess, the transition to a democraticenvironment remains a complex process.To many Afghans, democracy certainlyremains appealing in principle, but still adream that has been born in Bonn and hasyet to come alive at home.

The pace of the roadmap furtherexacerbates the remoteness of the Bonnprocess from the realities of most Afghans.At first, indirect elections were held inearly 2002 to determine the 1,500 or sodelegates to the Emergency Loya Jirgah.Roughly a year later, preparationscommenced for the – again indirect –elections of the delegates to theConstitutional Loya Jirgah, which manyparticipants confused with the voterregistration programme that had beenlaunched simultaneously.

Moreover, Bonn was more about processand less about the substance with whicha democratic state of Afghanistan is to be

built. In particular, the Agreement did notaddress the need for peace andreconciliation between the warring factionsas the foundation for a democratic state.Instead of reducing inequalities in politicalparticipation, Bonn sanctioned them. Giventhe hastily organised nature of the talksheld in Bonn briefly after the Taliban-regime had been ousted, as well as theimbalanced composition of the participantsin the talks, the focus remained on settingthe path and the necessary benchmarks togradually build a representative andlegitimate Government.5 the The BonnAgreement itself recognized the lack ofrepresentation, stressing in its preamblethat the interim arrangements wereintended “as a first step toward theestablishment of a broad-based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic and fullyrepresentative government.”6

While the Bonn Agreement did indicatethe path towards democratization, neitherin terms of participation nor content did itresemble a peace agreement that wouldlay the foundation for reconciliationbetween warring factions. The Bonn talkswere exclusively held among those whohad fought against the Taliban, remnantsof which were continuing to fight the US-led coalition in December 2001. Lack ofrepresentation at that time naturallyprevented the Bonn talks from establishinga basis for reconciliation and transitionaljust ice . Rather , the process ofdemocratization aimed at creating anenabling environment within which thepolitical landscape would gradually bepacified.

To many observers, the ConstitutionalLoya Jirgah showed that such an enablingenvironment was in the making, given thatpolitical and military groupings wereparticipating in the political arena, ratherthan opposing it by force. However, the

5 Barnett Rubin, Adib Farhadi, Humayun Hamidzada, and Abby Stoddard. 2004.6 Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, signed on 5th of December

2001, available at www.af.

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Bonn Agreement’s emphasis on processneglected the core issue of theredistribution of power, while the mainchallenge remained: How to diminish thepolitical influence of those whoselegitimacy rested mainly on military andeconomic power largely fuelled by illegalsources, rather than on democratic support?In other words, the apparent flaw and ironywas to create a mechanism by which thepower of various factions would beconsolidated in the form of an interimadministration, while subjecting it to ademocratization process, which effectivelyaimed at diminishing their political rolein the long run.

In essence, at a time when the Bonnroadmap is approaching its end, the processhas affirmed the position of key power-holders on both the national and locallevels. Although the internationalcommunity has successfully been able topressure those with money and guns toabide by the rules through the leveragesof international aid, support andrecognition, democracy has fortified theirposition to such an extent that thedemocratic processes have become proneto manipulation.

Laying The Formal Foundation fora State – The Constitution-makingProcess

A major step forward in Afghanistan’sstate-building process was the adoption ofa new Constitution on 4 January 2004. Inthe context of a post-conflict situation, aparticipatory process for the drafting of aconstitution is as crucial as its content, forthe legitimacy and sustainability of thedocument will largely depend on itsacceptance by the people. Given thechallenge of mobilizing public participationand support, the process involved someattempts to facilitate broad consultationsand public participation, despite the tighttime-line provided in the Bonn Agreement.

However, these attempts were perceivedas inadequate and too limited.

For purposes of developing preliminaryrecommendations on the contents of theConstitution and in line with the processstipulated in the Bonn Agreement, thePresident of the TISA appointed a nine-member Const i tut ional Draft ingCommission in October 2002. Thec o m m i s s i o n p r e s e n t e d i t srecommendations on the content as wellas format in March 2003. Theserecommendations formed the basis of thework of the Constitutional ReviewCommission a 33-member body, includingseven women, representing the country’sdiverse regional and ethnic composition.President Karzai had appointed thecommission in April 2003; its mandatewas to conduct a public consultationprocess.7

At that time, a political debate on thevarious constitutional models had fullyunfolded, exposing the work of thecommission as well as the Government tosevere criticism, particularly with regardto the alleged secrecy of the process. Therefusal to make any draft public combinedwith the lack of a formal public approvalprocess through a nation-wide referendumwas perceived by many as yet anotherattempt to impose a constitution fitting theneeds of the Transitional Administrationand its allies. However, the commissionand its secretariat tirelessly emphasizedthat it could only speak of a draft oncepublic consultations had been conducted,the views analysed and incorporated.

In order to obtain guidance from theAfghan people, while simultaneouslyeducating them about the process as wellas its importance, the commission distribu-ted a total of 484,450 questionnaires andgathered over 100,000 completed question-naires from citizens all over Afghanistan.Its members attended about 555 “public

7 Information on the Commission, the constitution-making process, etc., is available at www.constitution-afg.com.

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consultation meetings” in all provinces ofAfghanistan, as well as in Iran and Pakistanto consult with the large refugeecommunity. The views expressed bypeople were recorded and compiled in thePublic Consultation Report, which was toform the basis for the preparation of thedraft Constitution. Despite the efforts ofthe commission’s secretariat, the publicconsultation process was somewhathindered by a general lack of bothunderstanding and a “culture ofconstitutionalism”, in addition to theabsence of comprehensive civic educationcampaigns.

The President finally released the draftConstitution, which was to form the basisfor the deliberations by the ConstitutionalLoya Jirgah, to the public on 3 November2003. While the draft certainly reflectedthe ATA’s preferences concerning thefuture governmental structure forAfghanistan, i t was left to theConstitutional Loya Jirgah to adopt thefinal Constitution. Provincial registrationmeetings were conducted in all provincesto register the Emergency Loya Jirgahdistrict representatives who would elect344 delegates to the Constitutional LoyaJirgah in early December. The electionsfor the 106 representatives of the so-called

“Special Category Groups” women,refugees in Pakistan and Iran, IDPs,Kuchis, Hindus and Sikhs took placethroughout the month of November. Inaddition, the President appointed 52delegates directly. The convention gatheredon 14 December 2003, and the 502delegates adopted the Constitution byconsensus on 4 January 2004.

While some national and internationalobservers criticized the Constitution-making process as flawed, having littlepublic participation or transparency, and“elite-driven”,8 it proved to be a remarkablestep in a shift from military confrontationto political dialogue. Appearing ontelevision throughout the nation, delegatesto the Constitutional Loya Jirgah weregenerally able to express themselves freely,even though factional interests lurkedunderneath the debates.

Constitutionalism, however, has a poorrecord in Afghanistan’s war torn history.At best, previous constitutional modelswere widely accepted but have commonlysuffered from a lack of implementationand enforcement. Moreover, theConstitution itself stands witness tocompromises that had to be brokered onall sides to find common denominators

8 See, for example, International Crisis Group 2003a and 2003b.

But is it enough to havea constitution?Certainly not! As Mr.Brahimi said, aconstitution can be nomore than a stack ofpapers. There has toexist a national will(irrada-i-millee) to putprinciples into practice.And there has to exist anationaladministration(iddara-i-millee) toensure theimplementation of thelaw.

Address to the Closing Ceremonyof the Constitutional Loya Jirgah,Kabul, January 2004, by HamidKarzai, President of theTransitional Islamic State ofAfghanistan.

Province Rural women: Rural women: most important Rural men: aware of Rural men: mostaware of new rights in new Constitution new Constitution important rights in newConstitution Constitution

Badghis 0% Right to health and education 0% Reinforcement of Sharia law

Herat 0% Right to education 53% Right to education

Kabul 0% Right to health and education 30% Ensure security

Kandahar 8% Right to education 39% Reinforcement of Sharia law

Nangarhar 26% Equality between males and females 67% Disarmament of armed groups

Source: Tufts University, “Human Security and Livelihoods of Rural Afghans: 2002–2003”, 2004.

Table 5.1: Rural Afghans’ Opinions of the New Constitution

Chapter 5128

among the various political interestsrepresented by the delegates. It is, therefore,crucial for the success of Afghanistan’snew Constitution that its legitimacy isfortified by widespread information andawareness-raising campaigns to enhanceunderstanding and acceptance among allAfghans. According to a recent TuftsUniversity survey, the majority of ruralAfghans in Badghis, Herat, Kabul,Kandahar and Nangarhar provinces hadno knowledge of the constitutional process.Rural women were found to be four timesless aware of the constitutional processthan rural men. No rural womeninterviewed in three of these provinces(Herat, Kabul and Badghis) had ever heardof a constitution, while only eight per centof women in Kandahar and 26 per cent inNangarhar9 were aware of it.

Ultimately, constitutional provisions needto be respected first and foremost by stateorgans that derive their legitimacy as wellas mandate and authority to act on behalfof the state from the Constitution. In this

regard, it is necessary that state officialsare sufficiently familiar with the documentand abide by its terms. Usually, this issafeguarded by entry exams for civilservants, who, depending on theirprofessional level, will require varyingdegrees of constitutional knowledge. In acountry like Afghanistan, which has hadto cope without a legitimate constitutionalframework to guide civil servants andcitizens alike, state officials at allprofessional levels need training to becomefamiliar with the Constitution.

In any post-conflict environment, civiceducation assumes a fundamental role interms of participatory processes. This, intheory, not only requires educating allAfghan citizens about the meaning ofdemocracy as enshrined in the recentlyadopted Constitution, but also focusing inparticular on community leaders. Whilenational as well as international institutionshave always identified civic education andthe participation of civil society as key tothe long-term success of the democratic

Is this Constitutionperfect? Most probablynot. Will it be criticized?I fear it will, both insideand outside ofAfghanistan. Butnevertheless, I thinkthat you have everyreason to feel proud ofwhat you haveachieved and I amcertain that the peopleof Afghanistan are veryhappy tonight and seein this constitution anew source of hope. Ofcourse, we all knowthat all we havetonight is a number ofpages on which wordsin Dari and Pashtu arewritten. It will be yourresponsibility Mr.President, with yourGovernment, withthese delegates and therest of the people ofAfghanistan totranslate these wordson a piece of paper intoa living reality.

Impromptu remarks at theClosing Ceremony of theConstitutional Loya Jirgah, Kabul,4 January 2004, by LakhdarBrahimi, Special Representativeof the UN Secretary-General.

9 Tufts University, “Human Security and Livelihoods of Rural Afghans 2002–2003”, 2004.

Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 9, December 2003

NHDR 04 129

Overall, the Constitution seeks anequilibrium between building a strongcentral executive branch to furtherstrengthen national unity and rebuild thenational institutions that were destroyed,and respecting the rights of volition ofthe provinces to exercise more authorityin managing local af fa i rs byinstitutionalizing district and provinciallevel councils. It provides for checks andbalances between a strong presidencyand a two-chamber National Assemblywith extensive powers of inquiry, whichcannot be dissolved by the President.Furthermore, it represents a carefulcombination of respect for moderate andtraditional Afghan values, and adherenceto international human rights anddemocracy.

Under the President, who is also theChief of Staff, the following politicalstructures have been established (SeeFigure 5.1 for an outline of the entiresystem):

Judicial Branch: The judicial branchconsists of a Supreme Court whosemembers are appointed by the Presidentand approved by the House of the People,or the lower Parliament. The judges forthe High Courts (appeal courts) andprimary courts are recommended by theSupreme Court, but also appointed bythe President.

Executive Branch: The Cabinet, whosemembers cannot be members of theNational Assembly, oversees theexecutive branch of Government. Theexecutive is regulated by theadministrative rules and proceduresdetermined by the IndependentAdministration Reform and Civil ServiceCommission (IARCSC), which apply toboth national and sub-national levels ofadministration and civil service.

Legislative Branch: The legislativebranch provides for a bicameralParliament including a house of elders

(Meshrano Jirgah) elected largely byprovincial and district councils (66 percent) and the balance being determinedby the President (33 per cent). Themembers of the lower house, or Houseof the People (Wolesi Jirgah) will beelected in the forth coming parliamentaryelections through free, general, secretand direct balloting. The 250 membersof the lower house serve for five yearsand are elected in proportion to thepopulation of each province. To insurethat 25 per cent of the members arewomen, the Constitution requires thattwo female delegates be elected fromeach of the 32 provinces of the country.Such a high quota for women is rare,both in Islamic and non-Islamiccountries. The President appoints one-third of the senators, 50 per cent of whichmust be women.

Figure 5.1: Structure of Administration

Legislative Branch

Meshrano Jirgah

(House of Elders)

• 2/3 Members elected from

provincial and district councils

1/3 members appointed

by President

Wolesi Jirgah

(House of the People)

All members are elected

Judicial Branch

Supreme Court

• Members appointed by

President and approved

by Wolesi Jirgah

High Court (Appeal

Courts), Primary Courts

• Judges recommended

by Supreme Court,

appointed by President

Executive Branch

Cabinet

• President (Chair)

• Ministers (cannot be members

of the National Assembly)

Administration (Civil Service)

• Ministries

• Central Agencies

• Other independent bodies

• Local administrative

units (Provinces)

President

Box 5.1

The State According to the 1382 (2004) Constitution

Chapter 5130

process, time constraints and deterioratingsecurity conditions have largely renderedefforts towards these superficial at best.Moreover, the well-conceived initiative tocreate a secure environment for electionsthrough a DDR programme to beconducted at the same time as the voterregistration proved to be little more thanan idealistic goal, with the numbers ofcombatants actually disarmed, demobilisedand reintegrated having little impact onthe overall –distribution of power.

The 1382 (2004) Constitution andHuman Security

The ratified Constitution provides aframework for the protection of citizens’rights as well as the responsibilities andstructure of state. Of particular significance,Article 21 provides for equal rights andfull participation of women by stating thatany kind of discrimination and privilegebetween the citizens of Afghanistan is

prohibited: “The citizens of Afghanistanwhether woman or man have equal rightsand duties before the law”. Further, Article24 states: “Liberty is the natural right ofhuman beings. This right has no limitsunless affecting the rights of others andpublic interest, which are regulated by law.Liberty and dignity of human beings areinviolable. The state has the duty to respectand protect the liberty and dignity of humanbeings.” Article 34 states: “Freedom ofexpression is inviolable. Every Afghanhas the right to express thoughts throughspeech, writing, or illustration or othermeans by observing the provisions of thisConstitution. Every Afghan has the rightto print or publish topics without priorsubmission to the state authorities inaccordance with the law. Directives relatedto printing house, radio, television, press,and other mass media, shall be regulatedby law.”

We, the People ofAfghanistan... for thecreation of a civilsociety free ofoppression, atrocity,discrimination andviolence and basedupon the rule of law,social justice,protection of humanrights, and dignity andensuring thefundamental rightsand freedoms of thepeople... have adoptedthis Constitution incompliance with thehistorical, cultural andsocial requirements ofthe era....

Preamble, 1382 Constitution

Article Forty-three: Education is theright of all citizens of Afghanistan, whichshall be provided up to the level of theBachelors (lis‚ns) free of charge by thestate.

The state is obliged to devise andimplement effective programs for abalanced expansion of education all overAfghanistan, and to provide compulsoryintermediate level education.

The state is also required to provide theopportunity to teach native languages inthe areas where they are spoken.

Article Forty-four: The state shalldevise and implement effective programsfor balancing and promoting educationfor women, improving of education ofthe nomads and elimination of illiteracyin the country.

Article Forty-five: The state shall deviseand implement a unified educationalcurriculum based on the provisions ofthe sacred religion of Islam, nationalculture, and in accordance with academicprinciples, and develops the curriculumof religious subjects on the basis of theIslamic sects existing in Afghanistan.

Article Forty-six: Establishing andoperating of higher, general andvocational education are the duties ofthe state. The citizens of Afghanistanalso can establish higher, general, andvocational private educational institutionsand literacy courses with the permissionof the state.

The state can also permit foreign personsto set up higher, general and vocationaleducational private institutes in

accordance with the law. The conditionsfor admission to state higher educationinstitutions and other related matters tobe regulated by the law.

Article Forty-seven: The state shalldevise effective programs for thepromotion of science, culture, literatureand the arts. The state guarantees therights of authors, inventors, anddiscoverers and encourages and supportsscientific researches in all areas andpublicizes the effective use of theirresults in accordance with the law.

Article Forty-eight: Work is the rightof every Afghan. Working hours, paidholidays, right of employment andemployee and other related affairs areregulated by law. Choice of occupationand craft is free within the limits of law.

Source: TISA 2004.

Box 5.2

The Afghan Constitution and Educational Rights

NHDR 04 131

To highlight a particular example of thesignificance of the Constitution foraddressing threats to human security, Box5.2 outlines key articles related toeducational rights.

However, the example of education alsoillustrates that the extent to which thecurrent administration has so far developedthe core capabilities in good governancerequired to enact consti tut ionalcommitments remains in doubt. One ofthe main critiques of a rights-basedapproach to development is that realizationof citizens’ full rights would requireresources and institutional capacities thatare rarely feasible in practice. InAfghanistan, the co-existence of competingpower structures, warlords and drug lordsremains a major counter constraint to therealization of citizens’ rights. It will takemany years to resolve these tensionsthrough a politically inclusive developmentprocess and with unwavering internationalsupport. In response to such issues, muchof the work on rights and developmentfocuses on extracting key principles andobjectives that should inform analysis andintervent ions : socia l inc lus ion,participation, etc.. The implication is thatthere is a variety of means for contestingrights and determining outcomes, and thatefforts need to focus not only on thedefinition of rights, but also on theirinterpretation and implementation throughlegal, policy and administrative processes.

Reform of the legal environment has beenslow. Few reforms have been fully adoptedunder the law, and many are held up inthe Ministry of Justice. Key legal textshave been approved and these relateprimarily to administrative reform and toreform of the banking system.10 The legalbasis for administrative reform has far-reaching consequences for governance and

the rule of law as it seeks to sequentiallybring key departments into the reformagenda. However, laws related to thenational budget, procurement andinvestment are still caught within thesystem. A significant component of newlaws may not be passed until the Parliamentis fully operational perhaps in late2005–2006.

However, spearheading policy andinstitutional reform in the early post-conflict years remains a crucial pre-condition for overall investment in humansecurity. Legal reforms in the area of familylaw are also very much needed, but arelikely to take many years given thecomplicated nexus of social issues thatneed to be overcome all in the context ofIslam and international law.

Afghanistan’s CurrentAdministrative Structure

Under the Taliban, there were 24governmental ministries, as well as otherlegal budget entities related to security andthe rule of law the Department of Viceand Virtue being among the most notablefrom a human rights point of view. In theaftermath of the Taliban regime and afterthe June 2002 Emergency Loya Jirgah,the size of the Cabinet expandedsignificantly to accommodate differentpolitical interests. Currently, 30 ministries,11 independent bodies and several othercentral government agencies provide theadministrative structure of state. At thesub-national level, around the office of theprovincial governor, there are ministerialdepartments for finance, health, education,agriculture, rural development and so on,depending on the administrative divisionof the parent ministry in Kabul. In spiteof the overly large ministerial structure,the basic organizational and administrative

10 The Central Bank Act, ratified by the transitional Government cabinet on September 2003, gives Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB) the over-riding responsibilityand full autonomy to maintain price stability and implement monetary and foreign exchange policies. Following ratification of this legislation, the DABissued its first operating licences to foreign commercial banks, so that for the first time DAB will disengage from commercial banking and focus on itscentral banking role. This achievement is an important milestone in modernizing the financial sector.

Chapter 5132

structures, functions and politicalaccountabilities appear broadly to be intact.

However, the sub-national administration,at the provincial (Walayat) and district(Wolaswali) levels, is largely dysfunctionalwith poorly qualified staff, no autonomousbudget, and few operations and sustainablesupport for maintaining state assetsparticularly in the areas of health andeducation (See Figure 5.2).

Under the new electoral laws, women areto comprise a minimum of 25 per cent ofparliamentary membership and 30 per centof provincial and district electedrepresentatives.

In summary, there are 34 provinces andapproximately 326 districts with eachprovince comprising between five and 20dis t r ic t s . There a re provinc ia lmunicipalities (Sharwali Walayat) within

• Party political structures remainfragmented, undermining the efficacy ofcentral Government.

• Administrative structures too arefragmented with overlapping mandatesand functions.

• The lack of professionally qualified staffwithin key ministerial or departmentalpositions significantly undermines theefficiency and effectiveness of statemanagement capabilities.

• Fiscal problems constrain options forpay reform, reducing the recruitment ofqualified staff.

• There is no merit-based recruitingpatronage systems are visible at everylevel.

• Administrative systems are slow andcumbersome, with virtually no delegationof authority to lower ranks or toprovincial departments.

Source: TISA 2004.

Figure 5.2: Structure of the Government

Cabinet

Central Administration

2 constitutionalagencies

30 Ministries Central agenciesand independent

bodies

34 provincialmunicipalities overseen

by Ministry of Interior

Provincial departments ofMinistries in 34

provincesElected Provincial Councils

District Municipalitiesoverseen by Ministry of

Interior

District offices ofprovincial departments

in 355 districtsElected Provincial Councils

Box 5.3

Main Administrative Constraints

NHDR 04 133

of human resources within theadministration is at an all-time low,necessitating urgent reforms. Moreover,while parts of the administration havesurvived, it should be stressed that thesefunctioning branches have been workingunder various authorities, based on de factocontrol of military force and henceeconomic assets and flows. However, thestate (as a political entity with a monopolyin legitimate force over the nationalterritory) can be said to have collapsed.

The new economic policy of theGovernment also foresees that it will movefrom the role of (state) provider to (state)enabler; this too has legislative implicationsfor both public and private sectors. For thestate apparatus to ensure the attainment ofnational social and economic objectives,fundamental reform of the public

each province (normally one) and at leastone rural municipality (SharwaliWoleswali) within each district. Currently,the Government is deliberating over areform framework that would downsizethe Cabinet by at least 25 per cent to around20 ministerial entities. This would enhancethe effectiveness of budget formulationand execution procedures, and clarifyinstitutional responsibilities for security,administrative, judicial and developmentfunctions.

Administrative and Civil ServiceReforms

Remarkably, the rules and procedures ofnational administration in Afghanistan,however archaic, nevertheless appear tohave remained intact throughout the yearsof conflict. At the same time, the quality

In June 2003, the Government formedthe IARCSC to coordinate and managethe Public Administration Reform (PAR)Programme. It comprises: (a) a CivilService Management Departmentresponsible for developing a new legalframework (including a Code of Ethics)for the civil service, as well as modernhuman resources management policiesand procedures; (b) the IndependentAppointments Board, responsible forensuring that appointments are based onmerit; and (c) the Independent AppealsBoard, responsible for hearingcomplaints against unfair, illegal ordiscriminatory behaviour in theworkplace.

The IARCSC passed the Priority Reformand Restructuring (PRR) Programmedecree in July 2003 to initiate the processof reforming the most critical functionsof Government. The PRR allowsadministrative departments to place key

staff on an elevated pay-scale whileproviding funds for organizationalrestructuring. The Government’s PARprogramme has been developed toprovide a framework to build a soundlegal, administrative and physicalenvironment in which civil employeescan function efficiently, and be heldresponsible for their performance. In the2003–2004 National DevelopmentBudget (NDB), the Governmentpresented a detailed short-term strategyfor public administration and civil servicereform, aiming at creating a lean, capableand motivated civil service, dedicated tosupporting the country’s nationalinterests.

The PRR programme is now beingexpanded across al l levels ofadministration, centrally and throughoutprovincial and district administration, aspart of the Afghan StabilizationProgramme. Moreover, it will take

substantial effort to internalize significantnumbers of public sector employees inthe PRR process; and options forretrenching staff will have to beconsidered. According to the WB, thereare currently some 360,000 individualsin public employment. Fewer than 10per cent of these posts will be formallyretained under the PRR by the end of2007 (See Figure 5.3), in order to forma core civil service.

Programme Management Units havebeen created in selected ministries toenhance project ownership by ministriesand strengthen implementation capacity.These units will improve the corefinancial management capacities of theadministration. Further, so as to enhancethe political reform process andstrengthen executive decision-making,a Cabinet Office Secretariat is also tobe established.

Source: WB 2003.

Box 5.4

The Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission

Chapter 5134

administration is key. It should be stressedthat reforming and training the civil serviceis a necessary but not a sufficientprecondition for building a nationalpolitical authority that monopolizes thelegitimate use of force. Trainingadministrators without measures to providethe national Government with necessarysupport to consolidate power and authoritycan potentially serve to reinforce thecurrent position of de facto power-holders.

Fundamental reforms have, however, beena very slow and complicated process inAfghanistan. With no private sector toabsorb redundant workers, shrinking thepublic sector or paying competitive salarieshas been a challenge for the Government.As a result, many skilled and competentemployees have sought jobs with theUnited Nations, embassies and the aidcommunities, creating a brain drain ofdwindling human resources. TheGovernment has now initiated a major

reform programme in order to revamp thecivil service by introducing incentives suchas higher salaries and training for reformingministries at the national and local levels.The Government has also committed tofighting corruption and reforming the civilservice through the establishment of theAnti-Corruption and IndependentAdministrative Reform and Civil ServiceCommission (IARCSC).

State-periphery Relations: (De-facto) Decentralization andParticipatory Planning

The difficulties entrenched in finding aproper balance between the need to builda strong central Government toimmediately consolidate peace andstability, and the need for decentralisationto secure equal distribution andparticipation in the long term, areparticularly strong in the context of post-conflict Afghanistan.11 Based on the

Figure 5.3: Public Employment in Afghanistan

Source: WB 2003.

11 Ramazan Bashar Dost 2004b.

Population (2003 est.) 21.8 millionCivilian Central Govt.as % of Population 1.3%Education 0.5%

TOTAL PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT360,448

of which:EducationHealthPolice

18,4199,047

16,814

83,36010,34841,147

Total101,779 Education

19,395 Health57,962 Police

Based in KABUL90,088

Based in the Provinces201,261

ARMED FORCES60,000

CIVILIAN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT291,348

MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION3,000

STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES6,100

GENERAL GOVERNMENT354,348

NHDR 04 135

imperative that state-building inAfghanistan requires the central state togradually assert its authority at the locallevel, the evolving relationship betweenKabul and the provinces has been shapedby three factors: control of the central state,which determines the authority of the stateat the local level; perceptions in theprovinces of the transition process; andthe political economy of central–regionalrelations.12

Strikingly, the formal administrationinherited by the Afghan Interim Authoritywas largely centralized, but in late 2001,most civil servants were under the controlof local leaders who had reasserted

themselves after the Taliban. Attempts bythe central Government to regain oversightover civil servants in the regions byfortifying control over the payroll (registry)have been difficult to implement. TheGovernment’s attempts to reassert controlin provinces under the de facto authorityof key provincial leaders, through theissuance of decrees and reshuffling ofgovernors, similarly yielded only limitedsuccesses; the ability of the Governmentto bring about change was marginal atbest, as long as the local power structuresremained intact. This applied even moreso to the district level, where local powerstructures remained largely unaffected bythe Government in Kabul.

12 Astri Suhrke 2004.

Under peace t ime cond i t i ons ,decentralized governance, carefullyplanned, effectively implemented andappropriately managed, can lead tosignificant improvement in the welfareof people at the local level, thecumulative effect of which can lead toenhanced human development. The keyto human development-friendlydecentralized governance is to ensurethat the voices and concerns of the poor,especially women, help guide its design,implementation and monitoring. Fordevelopment and governance to be fullyresponsive and representational, peopleand institutions must be empowered atevery level of society – national,provincial, district, city, town and village.Decentralized governance entails theempowering of sub-national levels ofsociety to ensure that local peopleparticipate in, and benefit from, theirown governance institutions and, byextension, urban/rural development, mustbring policy formulation, service delivery

and resource management within thepurview of the people. These institutionsshould enable people, especially the poorand the marginalized, to exercise theirchoices for human development.

In post-conflict situations, societies areinstitutionally weak: they are sociallyfragmented, psychologically fracturedand physically devastated, requiringefforts to simultaneously restore people’sconfidence and satisfy their basic needfor water, waste disposal, food, jobs,health services, education, income andsecurity. Post-conflict situations usuallyentail weak central government, if anyat all. Service provision to the citizenryis minimal at best. A decentralizednetwork of local institutions andindividuals, often linked to humanitarianoperations, can often be an opportunityto re-establish government services,mobil ize communit ies , fur therdemocratic processes and demonstrateresponsiveness of public institutions.

In post-conflict settings, as in others,decentralized governance initiatives arenot a panacea. On the one hand, theimplicit reallocation of power andresources that decentralization impliescan generate, re-ignite or intensify powerstruggles, thus leading to further chaosor conflict. On the other hand, withoutappropriate accountability mechanisms,abuse of power, corruption, and captureby elites are a risk. Conflicts may alsoarise when reforms fail to address issuesof social inclusion, particularlyvis-à-vis ethnic and religious minorities,and respect for local customs andtraditions. These challenges are addedto those facing all decentralizedinitiatives: poor capacities, poor cultureof participation, and lack of economicviability to secure mobilization ofresources, among others. These and otherrisks can be minimized if decentralizedinitiatives and capacity developmentefforts fit within the overall nationalpost-conflict peace-building andreconstruction strategies.

UNDP, Governance in Post-conflict Situations, 2004.

Chapter 5136

Box 5.5

State-Periphery Relations in Post-conflict Situations

Aware of the need to reach communitiesat the village level in order to strengthentrust in the central structures, as well as tocreate a sense of popular empowermentto the detriment of the local power brokers,the central administration launched theNational Solidarity Programme (NSP),which aims at “community-drivendevelopment.” In essence, the NSP is basedon elected village councils, whichdetermine the spending priorities for smallgrants distributed directly to the villages.Another, more conventional approachadopted by the Transitional Administrationhas been to work with existing powerstructures at the provincial level to identifyprojects to be centrally funded. Followingthis scheme, the National Area-basedDevelopment Programme, supported bythe Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation andDevelopment and UNDP, started focusingin 2002 on helping provincial governorsto establish district-level priorities over atwo-year period.

The NSP: CommunityEmpowerment for Democracy

On 22 January 2002, at the TokyoI n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n f e r e n c e f o rReconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan,President Karzai, then Chairman of theAfghanistan Interim Authority, proposeda programme initiative to enhancedemocracy, generate employment andrebuild productive infrastructure.

Community development was presentedas a centre-piece of the developmentstrategy for Afghanistan, and it was statedthat the transitional Government:“...intends to implement a local empower-ment programme that would allowcommunities to manage their ownresources. Such a programme would allowlegitimate leaders to emerge and deal withissues facing their communities withforming a basis for consultative democracyin the future. Block grants would be

distributed to villages and districts, andallocated to projects through inclusive andparticipatory processes and on the basisof simple criteria.”

The objectives of the NSP are to: (a)Establish a framework for village-levelconsultative decision-making andrepresentative local leadership as a basisfor interaction within and betweencommunities on the one hand, and withthe administration and aid agencies on theother; and (b) Promote local-levelreconstruction, development and capacity-building, which will lead to a decrease inpoverty levels.13 The Government’s statedtarget is to have NSP cover the country’sestimated 20,000 rural villages over a four-year period, so as to provide a single-window framework for village levelreconstruction and development activities.The long-term vision is to build sustainablehuman capital and establish a nationalmechanism for the recurrent transfer ofblock grants to all village communities inthe country.

Four key elements of the NSP approachhighlight the nature of its expectedcontribution to national priorities:

1. Facilitation: Facilitation provided atthe community level to assistcommunities in establishing inclusivecommunity institutions throughelections, reaching consensus onpriorities and corresponding sub-project activities, developing eligiblesub-proposals and implementingapproved project-sub-proposals.

2. A system of direct block granttransfers: Block grants supportrehabilitation or development activitiesplanned and implemented by electedCommunity Development Councils(CDCs).

3. Capacity-building: Activities toenhance the competence of CDCmembers (both women and men) for

13 The detailed operational modalities of the programme are described in the draft NSP Operational Manual.

NHDR 04 137

In order to organizeactivities and providepeople the opportunityto actively participatein the localadministration, acouncil shall be set upin districts and villagesin accordance with thelaw. Members of thesecouncils shall beelected by the localpeople through free,general, universal,secret and directelections for a period ofthree years.

The Afghanistan Constitution2004: Article 140

financial management, procurement,technical skills and transparency.

4. Institutional linkage: Activities areundertaken to strengthen links betweencommunity-based institutions andpublic administration and aid agenciesto enhance access to responsiveservices and resources.

Given the centrality of the unification ofethnic, political and socio-economicdivisions to the NSP’s vision, and takinginto consideration the widespreaddevastation and the high prevalence ofpoverty across the country, the Governmenthas, from the outset, decided that the NSPshould not be geographically targeted.14

However, in the first year of NSP, theinitial three districts selected from eachprovince were targeted on the basis ofexisting vulnerability and refugee returndata. Facilitating partners (consisting ofboth Afghan and international NGOs andUN Habitat) assist in the delivery of NSPto communities. In each province, one ormore facilitating partners deploycommunity facilitators and technicalspecialists to support target communities.

Facilitating partners are expected to recruitand deploy female field staff to enable theinclusion of women in the decision-makingand implementation processes. To beeligible for support through the NSP,communities are required to elect a CDCas a representative community-baseddecision-making body responsible foroverseeing the preparation of theCommunity Development Plan (CDP) andthe preparation and implementation ofindividual sub-projects. The breakdownfor institutional responsibilities within theNSP is presented in Figure 5.4.

Afghanistan’s first CDCs were electedfrom August 2003 onwards, and the firstblock grant disbursements began inDecember 2003. By March 2004, and asa result of improved access to many areasafter the winter season, it is estimated thatup to 2,000 village project proposals hadbeen approved, and the first grantinstalments disbursed to these. This is inline with the target for the first year ofimplementation to reach more than 4,100village communities across the country.During the second year, operations will

14 However, in the first year of NSP, the initial three districts selected from each province were targeted on the basis of existing vulnerability and refugeereturn data.

Figure 5.4: NSP: Breakdown of Responsibilities

Responsibilities of OversightConsultants

Appraisal of community projectproposals.

Management of NSP block grants forcommunity projects (including effecting

fund transfers, tranche payments,financial management, accounting and

reporting).

Supervision of Facilitating Partnersperformance.

Planning and conducting training forstaff of MRRD and FPs together with

regular experience sharing workshops.

Undertaking technical and financialmonitoring and producing consolidated

reports.

Management of information andcommunication campaign.

Responsibilities of FacilitatingPartners

Facilitate elections of inclusive CDCs

Facilitate community project planningcomprising CDPs and sub-project

proposals

Provision of technical assistance todevelop sub-project proposals, either

directly or through facilitation of accessto market based assistance (preferred

approach)

Provision of technical assistance tocommunities during implementation

Provision of training to communities (e.g.book-keeping, procurement, contracting)

Conducting monitoring and reporting

Responsibilities of CommunityDevelopment Council

Overseeing preparation of theCommunity Development Plan

Convening community wide meetings

Overseeing planning and preparationof individual sub-projects

Mobilising community contributions andensuring community participation during

all phases

Presenting the sub-project plans atappraisal

Managing and supervising sub-projectimplementation

Overseeing or directly handlingprocurement and financial management

at the community level

Reporting to the community and to NSPon project progress and use of funds

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expand to cover all remaining villages inthe initial districts and / or villages in newdistricts. Village communities that are ableto successfully implement projects duringthe first year will receive a new but smallerblock grant during their second year, withthe same formula applied in successiveyears.

The NSP faces a number of competingdemands. On the one hand, its long-termgoal is to strengthen local governance,transparency, accountability and peoples’participation in development processes.On the other hand, in order to establish itscredibility, it must quickly financeapproved CDC plans that provide tangiblebenefits to communities. Without gainingcredibility in the short-term, the NSP isunlikely to achieve its long-term vision.Therefore, the strategy for linking CDCsand sub-national administration is basedon a phased approach that recognizes thatNSP has some short-term goals. (Thebreakdown of responsibilities for the NSPis provided in Figure 5.4). In addition tothe National Emergency EmploymentProgramme (NEEP), other programmes,such as the National Area BasedDevelopment Program (NABDP) andAfghanistan’s Stabilization Program(ASP), have been developed to strengthensub-national administration and to improveservice delivery in some key sectors suchas health and education.15

Recognizing the significance of CDCs asthe building blocks for local governance,the standardized and formal proceduresfor the election of CDC members havebeen introduced based on a secret ballot.Development councils elected through aprocess not complying with the establishedrules will not be eligible for funding underthe NSP. This move has proved

fundamental in demonstrating thatGovernment commitment to the NSP restson the recognition that block grants andsmall-scale infrastructure can only beeffective in so far as local governancesystems are strengthened and empowerthe marginalized rural poor.

During the programme design phase,various stakeholders initially expressedconcerns about the general acceptabilityof a standardized procedure for theestablishment of CDCs by communitiesthroughout the country and, specifically,the extent to which gender issues wouldbe effectively addressed in the process.However, to date this move appears tohave been greeted with great enthusiasmin villages as an empowering andmeaningful experience. Opportunities forcross-fertilization, analysis and learningare being harnessed. Elections to the CDCswill be the first experience of localcommunity participation in voting and, forthe majority of rural Afghan women, ofparticipation in decision-making on a parwith men with regard to matters that affecttheir lives.

To date, and in part as a result of thesensitivity of stakeholders to security issuesand precautionary measures, all provincesare currently integrated into the NSP andreceive the combined support ofGovernment, oversight consultants andfacilitating partners. However, the extentto which the NSP will continue to assistcommunities throughout the countryremains critically dependent on the securitysituation.

In assessing outcomes,16 the challenge willbe to go beyond immediate satisfactionwith financed sub-projects and thegeneration of labour days to an analysis

15 The National Area Based Development Programme (NABDP) managed by MRRD with UNDP support is designed to complement NSP by addressinglinkages between communities and government authorities. It aims to develope the capacity of sub-national authorities, and to help establish and maintainprovincial and district consultation mechanisms that bring stakeholders’ views into development planning and management. For the first time, a planningexercise has been conducted in all provinces identifying priority projects above the village level in each district.

16 It is clear that the potential political outcomes arising from the NSP will extend beyond conventional definitions of poverty. A mid-term evaluation of theNSP is planned for June 2005.

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of whether the programme has addressedthe greatest constraints to poverty reductionand disempowerment and ensuredoptimum net benefits to communities.Social mobilization can have numerouse f f e c t s o n d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g ,democratization, political reform anddevelopment processes at large. With itsfocus on empowerment, NSP seeks toexpand the assets and capabilities of poorpeople to participate in, negotiate with andhold accountable the institutions that affecttheir lives. This involves giving peopleaccess to information, opportunities tovoice their concerns, greater socialinclusion and participation, andorganizational strength.

In introducing new modalities at variouslevels, the experience of the NSP to datehighlights the potential significance ofcivil society and the private sector asessential and resource rich partners.However, in order to support the adaptationof these players to an increasinglyfavourable environment, it is clear thatsustained assistance and complementaryinitiatives will be required. Ensuringcommitment and resources to the long-term provision of services to facilitatecommunity empowerment processesbeyond an initial block grant transfer willbe a challenge. The realization of nationalcommitment is critically dependent uponguaranteed international support forpolitical reform and reconstruction.Moreover, many of the activities financedby NSP and NEEP require sustainedsupport from line ministries. Embarkingupon a process for the empowerment ofboth communities and local governmentsthus necessitates an assured flow of fundsfrom the central Government.

The perceptions from the provinces thesecond factor previously identified asshaping the relationship between the centreand the periphery vary from region toregion, depending on the nature of the

administrative rule and the level of security.Where administrative structures are partlyor wholly under the control of localcommanders and insecurity prevails, thecentral administration is increasingly beingblamed for its inability to assert order andchannel reconstruction aid to localcommunities. On the other hand, in regionswhere local strongmen are able to ensurepublic order, thus providing anenvironment of relative peace conduciveto trade and economic growth, support forthe central Government is similarly low.To many in the remote areas ofAfghanistan, Kabul remains far away,particularly in view of the limited impactKabul-driven politics exert on the day-to-day life of Afghans.

The political economy of centre-provincerelations remains an area of continuouspolitical concern for the centralGovernment. While internationalrecognition and support, in particular theprospect of reconstruction funds, certainlyhave the potential to exert considerableappeal, they compete with revenues raisedand kept by local leaders throughoutAfghanistan. The central Governmentreceived only about US$80 million of anestimated US$500 million collected incustoms duties in 2002, despiteconsiderable efforts aiming at the collectionof tax revenues from various provinces.Revenues generated in connection withillicit crop production and trade in narcoticsfu r the r undermine the cen t ra lGovernment’s ability to compete with localwarlords, who can easily attract localallegiances by offering the financial basisfor community survival. De factodecentralization of this kind is mostproblematic in relation to equity issues onthe national level, given the absence ofnational redistribution, which is prone toworsen existing inequalities among theprovinces.17 There are already substantialnational differences in revenue generation:

17 Astri Suhrke 2004.

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Kabul and Kandahar generated togethersome Afs. 3 billion in revenue in 2002,while the combined total revenue collectedin four other provinces surveyed(Badakhshan, Bamyan, Faryab andWardak) was slightly less than Afs. 12million.18

On paper, the newly adopted Constitutionarticulates a balance between building astrong central executive branch andrespecting the rights of volition of theprovinces to exercise more authority inmanaging their local affairs byinstitutionalising district and provinciallevel councils. The key challenge will nowbe to translate this balance into reality,bearing in mind the three factors thatcontinue to shape the centre-peripheryrelations in practice.

The Next Step – Elections

Presidential and parliamentary electionsin Afghanistan are the culmination of thepost-conflict state-building process outlinedin the Bonn Agreement. While suchelections mean the end of the roadmapenvisioned in the Bonn Agreement, theymark the beginning of a significantly newstage in the transition to a democraticpolitical environment. It offers anopportunity to leave the “conditionalities”of Bonn behind particularly with regardto participation of groups based on militarypower and create truly legitimate as wellas representative governance. Thetransition, however, has proven a challengein itself, with the country still grapplingwith the root causes for previous conflict,underdevelopment and continuous threatsto human security.

Initially, both parliamentary andpresidential elections were to be convenedsimultaneously in order to remedy thedemocratic deficiencies of the interimstructures. The Constitution thus exhorted(Article 160) that every effort was to be

made to conduct the elections within sixmonths after convening the ConsitutionalLoya Jirgah However, in view of growingsecurity concerns fuelled by numerousterrorist incidences and logisticaldifficulties, a decision was finally madeto conduct presidential elections on 9October 2004, while postponingparliamentary elections to April 2005.

In anticipation of the elections, theGovernment took numerous legislativemeasures to improve the politicalenvironment in which they were to takeplace. A new political party law wasenacted, allowing political parties toregister provided that they satisfy minimumconditions, such as the absence of anyaffiliation to military movements. Inaddition to the registration of politicalparties, the Government passed a new massmedia law and initiated the establishmentof a Media Monitoring Commission. Mostimportantly, a new electoral law wasenacted formally, paving the way forpresidential and parliamentary electionsbased on a single, non-transferable andsecret vote.

The vetting process undertaken tosafeguard the barring of parties withmilitary wings, however, somewhatcomplicated and delayed the registrationprocess. And the significance of the newlyemerging parties has been diminished bythe electoral system chosen for theparliamentary elections, which will beconducted on the basis of votes forindividual candidates per region ratherthan votes for political parties. Despitesecurity concerns and civic educationdeficits, political activities are taking placethroughout the country, with the northleading with 47 active political move-ments.19

Uneven conditions exist for the exerciseof political rights in the regions, where the

18 AREU/WB – quoted in Astri Suhrke 2004.19 AIHRC – UNAMA, Joint Verification of Political Rights, First Report (15 June – 7 July), 2004.

Political freedom andparticipation are partof humandevelopment, both asdevelopment goals intheir own right and asmeans for advancinghuman development.

UNDP, HDR 2002: DeepeningDemocracy in a FragmentedWorld.

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space that exists for political rights islargely determined by the factionalelements in power and the extent to whichthey tolerate political activities by otheractors. Political activities are also hamperedby prevailing misconceptions with regardto political parties based on decades ofconflict in which activism was subject toreprisals by competing factions.

Undoubtedly, the political environment ina post-conflict situation poses difficultchallenges to the holding of elections livingup to international standards. In such anenvironment, elections are often conductedtoo soon after conflict, before nationalpolitical issues have progressed sufficientlyand before the routines of normalpeacetime politics have had time todevelop. Ill-timed, hurried, badly designedor poorly run elections can actuallyu n d e r m i n e t h e p r o c e s s o fdemocratization.20 At the same time,elections can provide the basis for publicsupport and legitimacy by enhancingparticipation.21 Particularly in a context inwhich the exercise of political rights waspreviously impeded by years of conflictand unrepresentative governance, electionsmay serve as valuable “entry points” forpublic participation in the democratizationprocess, provided that basic politicalfreedoms are in place. While democracyis certainly not only about elections, publicparticipation through electoral processesmay gradually furnish a culture ofdemocratic discourse by providing spacefor political dialogue and mutual tolerance.

Despite the challenges, the number ofhigher-than-expected registered voters hasproved the Afghan people’s willingnessand readiness to support peace anddemocracy, and their hope for a strong,legitimate, accountable and representativeGovernment.

Applying the human security paradigmand measuring the current electoralprocesses against a framework ofparticipation, eradicating inequalities andresponsibilities, the success of currentefforts aiming at the establishment of fullyrepresentative state structures throughnational elections will depend on thefollowing factors:

• The extent to which participationof the people in the processes canbe ensured despite growing securitythreats and the tight time-frame.While security threats can certainlyhamper participation, awareness of theprocesses and the political rights arefundamental prerequisites for everyperson to be able to participate fully.Compromises on civic educationnecessitated by the tight time-framemay in this regard impact publicparticipation. The voter-registrationfigures, however, would indicate thatthe public is generally aware of theprocesses and keen on exercising itsregained political rights.22

• The extent to which the process isnon-exclusive as opposed toexacerbating horizontal inequalities.The legitimacy of elections will largelydepend on its universality, or the extentto which all groups are able toparticipate in the process. Thedeliberate or unintentional exclusionof groups will naturally undermine theoutcome of elections by inducingexcluded groups to discredit anddisassociate themselves from theprocess.

• The extent to which the Governmentassumes responsibility for enablingthe participation of all people.

20 UNDP 2004d, UNDP 2002.21 Nasrollah Stanikzai 2004.22 Overall, more than nine million of the estimated 9.5- to 9.8-million-strong electorate had registered in August 2004, with over 41 per cent of them women.

UN/JEMB 2004.

I am optimistic aboutour future. It is becausethe people are upbeatabout a positivechange. Not only dothey demand changebut they also want tobe part of it. It is thebest time in our history,I tell you.Faraidoon Ahmad from Wardak

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become part of daily political life inAfghanistan.

5.3. Rule of Law and HumanRights

While the previous pages have discussedthe main building blocks of the currentstate-building efforts, the following sectionaddresses two cross-cutting elements thatdetermine and measure the extent to whichthese blocks remain stable elements ofconstruction: the rule of law and humanrights.

Security is a critical foundation forsustainable development. This includesprotection from systematic humanrights abuses, physical threats andviolence, and territorial and sovereigntythreats. Since poverty and insecurityreinforce each other and are particularlyexacerbated when a nation’s legalinstitutions perform poorly and the ruleof law is weak, the requirement forsecurity must include the well-beingof persons and a strengthened justicesystem.

Without the protection of rights, and acomprehensive framework of laws, noequitable development is possible.Without development, justice and therule of law remain but an academic andphilosophical concept with little linkto actual justice processes and practices.Building the legal framework and itsimplementation systems lays thefoundation for the necessary confidenceand credibility required for genuineand dynamic economic development.The link between legal institutions andpoverty therefore is direct andfundamental.

Securing Afghanistan’s Future: Considerations onCriteria and Actions for Strengthening the JusticeSystem, 2004.

Participation will lead to peopleassuming “political responsibility”w h i l e a l s o e n h a n c i n g t h e“responsibility” of the Government topromote accountability through publicparticipation.

It should, in the meantime, be borne inmind that Afghanistan has only veryrecently embarked on its quest towardsdemocracy. While the internationalcommunity may be preoccupied withwhether Afghanistan’s recent presidentialelections have met and whether theimpending national parliamentary electionswill meet all international standards, thefact that elections allowing for direct andsecret voting are held may in itself fortifypeoples’ growing confidence in thedemocratic foundations that are graduallybeing built.

Despite all constraints, the majority ofAfghans want to exercise their fundamentalright to vote in national elections and havehigh expectations that the process willbring positive change to Afghanistan, inparticular contribute to “good governance”by resulting in a Government that will bestrong, legitimate, accountable andrepresentative.2 3 Building on themomentum generated by the recentpresidential elections, parliamentaryelections will provide an important windowof opportunity not only to conclude thetransitional period by establishing a trulydemocratic leadership accountable to theelectorate, but also to generate publicownership of the state and its institutions.At the same time, political maturity,responsibility, ethics and sound motivationare critical factors in the complexity ofcreating a new Parliament, especially giventhe absence of the rule of law to preventand stop corruption, nepotism and illegalacts. There is a need for considerableparliamentary support for over at least adecade in order to warrant that it canassume its constitutional functions and

23 Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium 2003.

Three major concernsof our people include areturn to civil war, lackof justice andcorruption, and theusurpation of people’srights.

Shah Mohammad Jawad fromKabul

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Re-instituting the Rule of Law inAfghanistan

The law is the normative extension of thesocial compact on which any democraticstate is built. It formally articulates theprinciples by which competing interestswithin a society are reconciled and thusoffers the basis for peaceful co-existence.The law, furthermore, formulates theframework within which the state is tooperate by authorizing organs of the stateto act on behalf of society in creating anenvironment beneficial to all. This includesthe protection of fundamental rights andfreedoms by the state vis-à-vis its ownorgans and non-state entities. A particularlyimportant aspect is the uniform applicationof the law, where the rich or powerful aredealt with in the same way as other citizens.The law “rules” when the legal frameworkis generally accepted and respected by itsaddressees both in terms of the contentsof the norms and the institutionalisedprocesses available to resolve conflicts ofinterest. The rule of law means thatindividuals as well as the state are heldaccountable against the set of applicablenorms by organs entrusted to determinewhether the law has been broken andimpose sanctions accordingly. It alsomeans that no other “law” rules than theone that is generated in compliance withthe rule-making procedures.

Viewed from the human security angle,the provision of the rule and, byimplication, enforcement of law becomesthe responsibility of the state, in the absenceof which threats such as crime, denial ofproperty rights, and discrimination prevail.In positive terms, the rule of law guaranteesthe sustainability and irreversibility ofdevelopment. While in post-conflictsituations, reaffirming the centrality of therule of law is a key prerequisite for thesuccess of the reconstruction process, italso remains the key challenge given the

inability of state structures to properlysafeguard and enforce its implementation.

In general, a fair and effective legalframework requires the following: First,that a set of rules that are known in advanceexist; second, that the rules are enforced;third, that means exist to ensure theapplication of the rules; fourth, that conflictresolution is a function of binding decisionsmade by an independent and crediblejudiciary; and fifth, that procedures are inplace for changing the rules when theycease to serve the purpose for which theywere intended.24

The pace of the reconstruction of the justicesystem in Afghanistan has been criticizedas being unnecessarily slow compared toother sectors. The blame is usuallyattributed to uncoordinated donor efforts,lack of sufficient resources and lack ofleadership by the international communityand the UN.25 Justice sector processes ofreform will inevitably take a slower pacewhere the reform requires a deep culturalshift in both the justice providers and thejustice seekers. Donors and internationalcommunity interests in seeing immediateresults against their diverse politicalagendas, and measuring success in termsof delivery and disbursement, have workedagainst ownership of the reform processby the justice institutions, and pose risksof fostering underlying factionalism.

The process of strengthening the justicesystem is based on two complementaryefforts: strengthening political will, andprovision of financial and technicalassistance. While financial and technicalsupport have been provided at a faster pace(in certain instances even too fast, giventhe country’s slow absorption pace), thesupport of the necessary political will hasbeen following more slowly. However, asin any post-conflict situation, the creationof the necessary political will and theownership of justice sector reform entails

24 UNDP 1995b.25 See, among others, United States Institute for Peace 2004.

The United Nations haslearned that the rule oflaw is not a luxury andthat justice is not a sideissue. We have seenpeople lose faith in thepeace process whenthey do not feel safefrom crime. We haveseen that without acredible machinery toenforce the law andresolve disputes peopleresorted to violenceand illegal means. Andwe have seen thatelections held when therule of law is too fragileseldom lead to lastingdemocraticgovernance ... But a‘one size fits all’ doesnot work. Local actorsmust be involved fromthe start. The aim is toleave behind stronglocal institutions whenwe depart.

Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General, 25 September 2003.

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by nature a strong cultural shift that cannotbe pushed excessively, especially fromoutside. Moreover, sustainability requiresthat the national authorities are in chargeof and own the process, not onlytechnically but mostly politically.

The international community has struggledwith investing in justice institutions thatappear refractory to change, such as theSupreme Court, the Attorney General’sOffice, or a Ministry of Justice devoid ofmany of its usual coordinating functions(for example, budget control). Theinternational community has preferred todeal with the much more palatable JudicialReform Commission, set up in the BonnAgreement with a vague mandate to “lead”the justice reform agenda and staffed with

a number of English-speaking Afghanscalled back from Europe and the UnitedStates. The Judicial Reform Commissionhas in many instances provided aninvoluntary forum for the ideologicalbattles of different donors, given theconcentration of international attention,rather than serving as an avenue forreconciling the different interests of thejustice institutions. Its failure to convenethe justice institutions and to channelreform turned the commission into an easyscapegoat for the international communitywhen it became apparent that no realreform or reconstruction could happenwithout the direct involvement of theAfghan permanent justice institutions andtheir political will.

Access to justice, security and humanrights are central to sustainable peaceand stability in any context, let alonepost-conflict settings. Conflicts, whetherinternal or cross-border, invariably leadto the erosion of the civil, political,economic, social and cultural rights ofthe populations caught in the midst.Specific violations vary with eachconflict, but they often include violationsof civil rights, such as the right to life(unjustified killings), to physical integrity( p h y s i c a l i n j u r y , e n f o r c e ddisappearances, arbitrary arrest anddetention and torture), and to freedomof movements; political rights such asfreedom of speech, of association andof assembly and the right to politicalparticipation; economic, social andcultural rights such as the right toproperty (through loss by destruction ortemporary deprivation as a result ofinternal displacement), to work, to anadequate standard of living, to a family,to freedom of information, etc.

In such situations, where there is nojustice or where there is only unequalaccess to justice, violent conflict is likelyto re-emerge. Indeed, many conflicts arerooted in the real or perceived breakdownof justice where individuals and groupsare not able to obtain a fair remedy fortheir grievances; where political, legaland institutional biases marginalizesegments of the population such thatthey resort to violence. Even where thejustice system per se may not be thecause of the conflict, with thecontinuation and the escalation of theconflict over time, the judicial and legalsystem generally becomes less able tocope with the injustices of war, thuscompounding the perception that thejudicial establishment is either unableor unwilling to fulfil the demands forjustice. Finally, there needs to be aholistic approach to security sectorreform (SSR) that ensures (i) sustainable

d i sa rmament , demobi l i za t ion ,repatr iat ion, reintegrat ion andresettlement (DDRRR) of formercombatants, (ii) development ofdemocratic, law-abiding police servicesand armed forces, including appropriatecivilian oversight mechanisms, and (iii)necessary linkages between the judicialsystem, the police service and the prisonservice.

It is of “critical importance that publicfaith in the justice and human rightssystem is restored quickly withoutleaving room for the return to extra-judicial measures such as vigilantismand “mob-justice” or “victors – justice”or massive human rights violations. Butat the same time, it must be a systemthat is credible, effective and efficient,observing prescribed legal procedures,dispensing justice and providing humanrights protection equally and equitably.”

UNDP, Governance in Post-conflict Situations, 2004.

Box 5.6

Access to Justice in Post-conflict Situations

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However, the progressively increasinginvolvement of the justice institutions inthe preparation of the national budget andthe underlying policy direction frameworkindicates that the idea of consultativereform is beginning to move forwardwithin the justice institutions as well. Astrategy based on consultations with allthe justice institutions has been formulatedthrough the Securing Afghanistan’s Futurestrategy, and is reflected in the 1382 (2003)Constitution and NDB for justice.However, the extent to which theseconsultative efforts reflect a real politicalwill for reform among the justiceinstitutions is still to be established andwill be put on trial through the currentongoing process of choice and formulationof priority projects within the NationalPriority Programme for Rule of Law andJustice and the involvement of the justiceinstitutions in any future policy-settingmechanism.

The main problems encountered instrengthening Afghanistan’s justice systemare of a political, structural and legal nature.

From the political point of view, the lackof control and security over the territoryhave made it hard for the formal justicesystem to have a presence outside the mainprovincial capitals. The lack of politicaldialogue among the main stakeholders hascaused a lack of leadership and ownershipin the coordination of the reform efforts.Dialogue, cooperation and engagement ofthe main justice institutions are allimportant in building the necessarypolitical will to expand the control of thecentral Government at district level.

• It is necessary to strengthen the justiceinstitutions in their administrativecapacities, and support them for ameaningful participation in policy-setting and prioritization of resources.The justice system rehabilitation

should be coordinated to the maximumextent with all other initiativesenhancing provincial and districtgovernance and security (disarmament,public administration reform, policereform, and the deployment, formationand deployment of the national Armyto fight against armed groups,trafficking, narcotics, organized crimeand corruption, and to oversee areasof large return and displacement).Clear identification of criteria andmechanisms for prioritization ofprovincial interventions and theirsequencing are key.

• The process of strengthening thejustice system is still very fragile inthe provinces and dis t r ic ts .Participation of the districts andprovincial officials, both politicallyand in the identification of technicalproblems and shortcomings, andrelated future recommendations, needsto increase if the justice system isreally to produce services for thepopulation countrywide.

The justice institutions are experiencinggross structural problems and a lack ofcapacity of their staff. The internaladministrative capacity of the justiceinstitutions is so limited that they are notyet able to gather realistic data on theirfunctioning and challenges.26 Inadequatesalaries (currently US$36 per month onaverage), lack of physical security, lackof in f r a s t ruc tu re and l ack o faccommodation are the main factors thatprevent even deployment and appointmentof new justice personnel (judges, attorneysof the Attorney General’s Office, andMinistry of Justice staff) in remote ordifficult areas. In most cases, this meansthat local high-ranking members of thecommunity are appointed as magistrates,independent of their skills or formaleducation, which might put at risk their

26 Some data with regards to staffing at central and provincial levels are provided in Securing Afghanistan’s Future - Considerations on Criteria and Actionsfor Strengthening the Justice System, 2004.

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independence and impartiality andreinforce a general informal attitudetowards justice.27

Due to the disruption of its educationsystem and years of isolation, Afghanistanis also experiencing a lack of qualifiedjustice personnel, which puts at risk theintegrity of judicial administration, leavesroom for corruption, and decreasespeople’s trust in the formal justice systemas well as the political and developmentprocess. A considerable number ofpositions within the office of theprosecutors or the courts are still vacant.Further, of the current staff, only a thirdof judges and prosecutors are educated touniversity standards.28

• Significant investments need to bemade in the qualitative strengtheningof the university system and post-graduate training programmes forjustice personnel. At the same time,training for existing judges andadministrative staff of the justiceinstitutions needs to be supported,based on a thorough needs assessmentand provided in conjunction withdevelopment and governance buildingprogrammes at the provincial anddistrict levels. Again, a key factor willbe the participatory process on whichdevelopment of new curricula will bebased and the factoring in of thecomplicated interlinkages of Shariaand secular law elements. This processneeds to go hand-in-hand with theapplication of uniform criteria forentering the judicial professions.

• A critical element of the justice andsecurity sector is the functioning ofthe correction system in accordancewith human rights norms. InA f g h a n i s t a n , g o v e r n m e n t a l

responsibility for the correction systemhas shifted from the Ministry ofInterior to the Ministry of Justice. Theshift has, for the most part, left thesector under-resourced and the staffinstitutionally unrepresented. Thesituation is aggravated by the fact thatthis is an area where it is extremelydifficult to get donor support.However, the representatives of theprison department of the Ministry ofJustice have been actively participatingin the NDB, highlighting the needsfor a nation-wide approach, enablingthe rehabilitation of a correctionsystem in line with internationalstandards and pointing to the vast gapin resources.29

• Not to be forgotten is the systemicunbalance of the Afghan justice systemdue to the almost total lack ofprofessional lawyers, especially femalelawyers, participating in courtproceedings. While the right to defenceand legal assistance for the indigenthas been recognized in the Constitution(Article 31), the Afghan judicialsystem does not have a tradition ofprofessional lawyers assisting clientsin court cases, nor does it have a barassociation or systems of provision oflegal aid. However, the work of NGOs(including the Norwegian RefugeeCounci l , Internat ional LegalFoundation and Medica Mondiale),who are providing legal assistance andlegal aid to clients in both formal andinformal proceedings, shows that thepositive effects of legal representationgo beyond the immediate advantagesfor the justice seeker. Such supportalso helps to highlight shortcomingsin the adjudication process and providetraining for judges, prosecutors andcorrectional staff. Further efforts ofthe international community in

27 Ibid.28 Ibid.29 The National Development Budget for Justice is available from the Afghan Government website: www.af.

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developing the legal professions arebadly needed, although a decision onthe institutional framework in whichit will operate (what form of barassociation) will require consultationsin and outside Kabul.

• In a broader way, the internationalcommunity has, to date, mainlyfocused efforts on the lack of capacityto provide justice by the AfghanGovernment, leaving it to human rightsbodies like the AIHRC and a fewNGOs to build the capacity to seekjustice within the Afghan population– through legal awareness and legaleducation programmes and legal aidschemes. This will need to be rectifiedif the Afghan justice system is toprovide access to justice for all,regardless of ethnicity, gender, andfinancial, military and political power.

The legal framework operating inAfghanistan is also in a transitional phase.While the new Constitution presents theoverall framework, the work of indexingand creating a digest of the existing lawsto underpin future law reform efforts isyet to be done. The fact that there is nodemocratically elected legislative bodyalso undermines the legitimacy of theexisting legal framework. Current lawreform efforts are uncoordinated and areaimed mostly at the swift creation of anenabling environment for private sectordevelopment to flourish, along with foreigninvestment, trade and exploitation ofmineral resources.

However, while these might be needed inthe short term to expedite economicdevelopment, a purely technical approachto law reform risks producing laws thatare completely detached from the overalllegal context and are thus hardly appliedin practice, especially outside Kabul. Donor

efforts would be better placed in supportingthe strengthening of the capacity oftechnical bodies like the Ministry of Justicelegislative department, which could eitherdirectly support the future Parliament indrafting laws or whose capacity could betransferred to the Parliament once it is inplace. Matters are even more complicatedby the lack of clarity on the relationshipbetween formal and informal justice.

Surveys and studies carried out30 show thatthe majority of judicial cases outside Kabulare dealt with by informal justicemechanisms. There is still insufficientknowledge of how prevalent their use is,how effectively they work, and what theirimpact is. While traditional justice systemsprovide access to established conflictresolution mechanisms,31 they are alsowidely criticized for reinforcing traditionalpractices that infringe on human rights,especially those of women.32

• From a reform point of view, thechallenge is to understand therelationship between the two systemsand the fact that the main point ofreference of many communities is notstatutory or Islamic law, but localtraditions governing that area. Howthe two systems could be usedcomplementarily, including in termsof gender, should be furtherinvestigated. Due to the history of theAfghan legal tradition, formal legalmechan i sms a re much l e s sconsolidated than usually presumed.While a series of reforms to enact statelaws was started at the beginning ofthe 20th Century, reforms were onlyachieved through the 1923 and 1964Constitutions. However, the 1973 coupmarked substantial changes to theadministration of justice, so that theonly time the formal legal system hadto consolidate was the nine years

30 International Legal Foundation 2003; Tufts University/Feinstein International Famine Center Study 2004.31 Hanef Atmar & Jonathan Goodhand 2002; Ali Wardak 2004.32 Ali Wardak, 2004.

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between 1964 and 1973.33 Expansionof formal legal and judicial mechanismthroughout the country now needs tobe preceded by a thorough study ofthe interface between formal andinformal justice. It should involve theparticipation of the recipients of justice,in particular, those from disadvantagedgroups.

Reinforcing Human Rights

As stated in the Bonn Agreement, theAIHRC is the main national institution todeal with monitoring and investigation ofhuman rights violations, development ofa national programme for human rightseducation, promotion of women’s rightsand transitional justice. The AIHRC hasassumed a leadership role within thenational development and securityprogrammes. The Human Rights AdvisoryGroup (HRAG) assists the AIHRC byserving as a forum for principleddiscussions on the current human rightssituation. Eventually, it will be able tomake policy recommendations intendedfor the national or provincial level. Onemechanism will be to organize workshopsfocused on key sectors, where the lead

ministries and other main partners will beinvited to engage in a constructivedialogue. The HRAG will also assist theAIHRC in assessing the overall effortsundertaken by the Government to complywith its commitments in Bonn to protectand promote human rights.34

In view of the absence of reliable statisticsor baseline studies in most areas, theHRAG recommends focusing initially onthe national (development) budget processrather than on quantitative measures. Thegroup has proposed that mainstreamingbenchmarks should be based on a numberof general criteria applicable to all LocalConsultative Groups (LCGs):

• Non-discrimination with regard toethnicity, gender, area of residence orany other criterion.

• Particular attention or focus in favourof the vulnerable groups of thepopulation.

• Full transparency, so that all concernedAfghan citizens should in principle beable to access information regardingdevelopment activities.

33 Securing Afghanistan’s Future - Considerations on Criteria and Actions for Strengthening the Justice System 2004.34 Advisory Group on Human Rights, draft ADF statement, 2004.

• International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)• International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination

(CERD)• Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)• Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or

Punishment (CAT)• Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Optional Protocol on the involvement

of children in armed conflict (CRCOPAC) as well as the Optional Protocol on the Saleof Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography (CRCOPSC)

• Convention on the Protection of Migrant Workers (CPMW).

OHCHR, Country Profile of Afghanistan and the International Human Rights System, 2004(draft on file with the authors).

Box 5.7

Treaties to which Afghanistan is a party

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• Participatory approach in the design,approval and implementation ofdevelopment projects to the extentpossible, so that potential beneficiariesare consulted in all the above phases.

The legality of the projects should beevaluated against current domesticlegislation and against international humanrights instruments to which Afghanistanis a party. The HRAG recommends thatAfghanistan should ratify the ViennaConvention on the Law of InternationalTreat ies to secure an adequateinterpretation of its human rightsobligations.

The government has already undertakensome positive initiatives to address thehuman rights situation. These include:

• The independent commissionappointed by the President toinvestigate the violent incidents atKabul University last Novemberpresented an impartial report, andmeasures were undertaken to prosecutethose responsible for human rightsabuses.

• A special human rights departmenthas been created in the Ministry ofInterior.

• The Government actively participatedin important initiatives jointlyundertaken with regional authoritiesand the international community toaddress serious human rights issuessuch as the return of IDPs to their areasof origin in the north of the country.

• The Cabinet ratified the Statutes ofthe International Criminal Court.

• The assessment of the human rightssituation has been closely linked tothe constitutional drafting process andthe judicial reforms as well as thereforms within the security sector.

Significant challenges to be addressed willinclude the provision of measures to:

• Address serious human rightsviolations such as torture, extrajudicialkillings, forced disappearances;arbitrary detentions and others.

• Encourage internal processes ofaccountability in Governmentinstitutions, particularly with respectto protecting and guaranteeing humanrights (for example, requesting lawenforcement agencies to establishappropriate disciplinary regulationsand procedures, and investigateinternally any possible allegation orcomplaint on human rights abuses).

• Ensure a commitment to respecthuman rights as a criterion in newappointments in the Government atthe central and provincial levels.

• Support politically and otherwise thework of the AIRC; respond to itsqueries and recommendations; andacquire the technical capacity to reportto appropriate treaty bodies on theimplementation of the above-mentioned international legalinstruments.

• Support and protect national andinternational human rights NGOs, inparticular, those involved in shadowreporting on the implementation ofinternational legal instruments signedand ratified by Afghanistan.

• Increase the awareness of the generalpublic on basic human rights andfundamental freedoms, with particularattention to the inclusion of humanrights aspects into the educationalsystem.

In March 2004, the Government madeseveral commitments on human rights atthe UN co-sponsored international meeting“Afghanistan and the InternationalCommunity – a Partnership for the Future”.In what has come to be known as the BerlinDeclaration, it agreed to extend fullcooperation to the AIHRC and tostrengthen Afghanistan’s institutional

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capacity to meet in an adequate and timelymanner the reporting obligations ofinternational human rights instruments. Aunit within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs(MOFA) has now been established tosupport reporting. In February 2003, theOffice of the High Commissioner ofHuman Rights organized an initial trainingworkshop, and plans are underway toprovide technical assistance to the unit inorder for Afghanistan to produce an initialreport within the next year.

While this is a welcome development,however, it will likely overlookAfghanistan’s obligations under otherinternational instruments. Nonetheless, theestablishment of the unit and of a databaseof human rights will support all furtherdevelopment efforts by the Governmentand the international community inproviding much needed baseline data forsetting human rights benchmarks andsupporting human-rights-based monitoring.

Institutionalizing human rights monitoringwithin all branches of the Government willmean that a shift will be required also bythe AIHRC, especially now that theConstitution (Article 58) recognizes thecommission as a permanent statutory body.The AIHRC has been providing directassistance in many cases of human rightsabuses, sometimes channelling themthrough the institutional channels of thegovernmental justice system, where theseexist, and sometimes assuming a directmediation role. With the expansion of theGovernment’s capacity and the realizationof its responsibility vis-à-vis its citizens,the AIHRC will need to take a step backand ensure monitoring of thesemechanisms, rather than offering analternative to them. It has been said thatthe AIHRC represents a “bright light instrengthening the rule of law.”35 While itis true that the work of the AIHRC inhuman rights education and monitoring ofhuman rights violations has contributed

immensely to sensitizing Afghans aboutbasic human rights, it cannot be forgottenthat the ultimate responsibility forguaranteeing the rule of law and access tojustice for all rests with the state, and thatonly through investing in the developmentof Government institutions mandated withproviding security and peaceful conflictresolution will Afghanistan fulfil itsobligations towards its citizens and theinternational community.

Past human rights violations

Another significant challenge that has yetto receive explicit attention in Afghanistanconcerns past human rights violations. Theneed for national reconciliation is oftenemphasized while the specific means toaddress Afghanistan’s past – entrenchedin conflict and internal strife are ignored.Both national and international actors arehesitant to touch the issues arising fromthis past, despite initial efforts toincorporate transitional justice into themandate of the AIHRC. The multi-ethniclayers of Afghan society combined withthe fragility of state-building efforts, whichremain dangerously exposed to polarizationwith the potential to perpetuate conflict,necessitates a cautious approach towardsrevisiting the past as a means to promotea process of national reconciliation.

While few would disagree that long-termpolitical stability in Afghanistan is closelytied to the resolution of past grievances –including human rights violations, warcrimes and crimes against humanity – whatis yet to be determined is the sequencingof reconciliation as well as the mechanismby which a process of “national healing”can unfold. Essentially, the crucial issuewill be whether the models of “transitionaljustice” that have been applied in otherpost-conflict contexts can be adapted tofit the complex history of war inAfghanistan.36 On the one hand, the modelof “truth and reconciliation” may be too

35 Tufts University / Feinstein International Famine Center Study 2004.36 Rama Mani, AREU 2003; International Center for Transitional Justice 2004.

NHDR 04 151

simplistic in a context in which perpetratorsand victims are spread throughout society.On the other hand, the prosecutorial model,which emphasizes the need for justicethrough war crimes tribunals, mayjeopardize the peace processes bythreatening powerful strongmen who maybe inclined to exploit ethnic divisions toescape from prosecution. Moreover, theprosecu tor ia l mode l would bepreconditioned on either a strong judicialsystem within Afghanistan or heavyinternational support, similar to theinternational war crimes tribunalsestablished in the past. Neither systemseems to be a given at present.

Less confrontational mechanisms –involving historical accounting throughdocumentation and oral reports as well asrestorative justice that facilitatescommunity reconciliation using customarymethods – may provide an intermediatemeasure of transitional justice. In order toobtain the views of the Afghan populationconcerning past human rights violationsin relation to the building of a new state,the AIHRC has conducted consultationswith 4,000 individuals and 200 focusgroups. On the basis of these,recommendations on mechanisms fortransitional justice in Afghanistan will bemade to the President. Moreover, theUNHCR is conducting a mapping exercisewith regard to past human rights violations(1978–2001).

It is becoming increasingly apparent fromthese exercises that a majority of Afghansdemands that perpetrators of human rightsviolations must not be allowed to hold(key) governmental positions. Although amajority would seem to insist on judicialaccountability in the long term, therecurrently is a lack of public trust in nationaljudicial institutions to perform such animportant task for national reconciliation.It is hoped that judicial reforms and stronginternational support will ultimately yieldan environment conducive to addressingthe past through judicial means.

Rights-based programming

It is clear that the human rights situationwill be one of the main parameters bywhich international donors and the Afghanpeople will assess developments inAfghanistan. Sustained investments inencouraging demand from below and aconstituency for claiming rights from abovewill be crucial for the progressiverealization of human rights for all. Manychallenges remain to be overcome in termsof shaping appropriate processes andoutcomes within the context of anemerging rights-based agenda.

The establishment of the AIHRC providesa key forum for the ongoing assessmentof Government efforts to comply with thecommitments subscribed to in Bonn, andto protect and promote the rights of allAfghans. Similarly, the creation of a humanrights database and the efforts on reportingto UN human rights treaty bodies willprovide the international community withthe visible benchmarks of rights-baseddevelopment and assist the Governmentin programming development assistancethrough a human rights lens. The nextchallenge facing Afghanistan’s policy-makers and the international communityis to support civil society in its demandfor sustained development and basic rights.

5.4. Security Sector Reform

As described in Chapter 1 of this report,the notion of security in its traditionalsense does not sufficiently grasp the needsof the individual in terms of humandevelopment. Rather, the focus has to beon a broader understanding of humansecurity as freedom from fear and freedomfrom want. However, throughout thepreceding sections, the need for a strongcentral authority – and its peripheralrequirements – has been repeatedlyemphasized. Such an authority should beable to effectively address threats tosecurity (in the traditional sense, that is,threats to survival) as a precondition toaddressing issues of human development,

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involving the creation of an environmentconducive to reconstruction and equaldistribution. It is well known that thesecurity situation in Afghanistan is notonly poor , but i s const ra iningreconstruction and development activities,especially outside of Kabul, andparticularly in the regions most affectedby drought, past and current. The centralauthority, in its state-building efforts, hasfaced the difficult challenge of establishinga security apparatus adequately equippedto tackle the threat to survival posed byinsurgent groups, criminals and warlords.This section briefly evaluates the securitysector reforms undertaken so far andhighlights the lessons that could be learned.

Security sector reform is the key toensuring political stabilization and lastingsecurity in post-conflict settings. Theconcept, first elaborated in the late 1990s,refers to the transformation of a country’ssecurity apparatus with the aim of ensuring

that it is managed and operated in a mannerconsistent with democratic norms andprinciples. Responsible and accountablesecurity forces should reduce the risk ofconflict, provide effective security for thecitizenry and foster an environmentconducive to development activities.However, the record of security sectorreform in post-conflict states has beenmixed. In the Afghan experience, forexample, progress on DDR has been slow.37

While security is a fundamental precondi-tion for effective national programmeexecution, security sector reforms inAfghanistan have in general been slow,with insufficient coverage. The continuedco-existence of opposing forces threatensreconstruction altogether. In recognitionof the centrality of security sector reformfor other development plans, five nationalprogrammes have been initiated to improvesecurity (See Figure 5.5).

37 Mark Sedra and Peter Middlebrook 2004.

With respect to thecentral government’spolicy on security wehave to say that it is afailure. There arecurrently many stateswithin a state indifferent parts ofAfghanistan. Forexample, the IslamicState of Herat; theIslamic Republic ofMazar-e Sharif and, ofcourse, the powerfulRepublic Panjshir.These states haveeffectively underminedthe central governmentand will continue to doso. But these mini statesare not doing their jobwith respect to securityeither. In Herat thepolice, instead ofensuring peace andsecurity, createconflicts, as we saw oneday in Baghi Azadiwhen a security policestarted beatingstudents. There arethousands of otherexamples.

Bashir Ahmad Ibrahimi, Herat

Figure 5.5: National Initiatives in the Security Sector

National Security Advisor

Afghan NationalArmy

Ministry ofDefense

Ministry ofJustice

ConstitutionalCommission

IndependentHuman RightsCommission

Afghan NationalPolice Force

Ministry ofInterior

Ministry ofBorder and

Tribal Affairs

JudicialCommission Independent

Administrativeand Civil Service

ReformCommission

National DefenseCommission

Priority National Programs

ProvincialReconstruction

Teams

Afghan NewBeginnings

Program (DDR)

AfghanStabilization

Program

NationalAccountability

and Rule of Law

Priority Reformand

Restructuring

NationalSecurityCouncil

Afghan MilitaryForce(AMF)

Security Sector Institutions

NHDR 04 153

a well-functioning and well-structuredsecurity sector, according to the SecuringAfghanistan’s Future report, ‘securitysector reforms, where progress has beentoo slow during the past two years, arenow afforded the highest priority. Theoverall objective of security sector reformis to strengthen the capability of the securitysector to provide an accountable, equitable,effective, and rights respecting service.The institutions that fall under its umbrellaare needed to provide a basic level of safetyand security for the public and facilitate areturn to normalcy in the political,economic, and social spheres. To this end,the following steps must be taken:

• The establishment of democraticoversight over all security forces.

• Ensuring that resources are rationallyand efficiently distributed within thesecurity sector and through the budget.

• The preparation of security forces tomeet existing threats and provide the

38 As of May 2004, there were a total of 8,000 newly trained soldiers, some who are already in service in Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif.39 There are currently 5,800 fully trained police, and police academies have been established in Kabul, Gardez, Kandahar, Kunduz, and Mazar-e-Sharif.

Over the past two years, there has beenremarkably little progress in security sectorreform. Forward movement has beenstalled by the lack of national ownership,poor donor coordination, the absence ofan integrated political process, the lack ofstable governance provided in coordinationby the centre and peripheral bodies, theslow pace of administrative reforms in thesecurity sector, and the high level of off-budget defence spending. As a result, twokey strategies have not been met: Theestablishment of an adequate nationalarmy38 and police force39 loyal to the centralGovernment , and the ef fec t ivedemobilization of ex-combatants. Theabsence of a peace agreement and anagreed process for political representation,combined with the dominance of regionalpowerbrokers, has undermined these twocritical reform paths.

Given that the success of Afghanistan’sstate-building enterprise depends to asignificant degree on the establishment of

The plans presented were very ambitious and included:

• The demobilization of 40 per cent of the Afghan Army (using stated troop strength asthe base) by June 2004, including the decommissioning of military units.

• Agreement that NATO and the international military forces would continue to supportthe ANP and ANA.

• Extend full cooperation to the AIHRC Strengthen Afghanistan’s institutional capacityto meet in an adequate and timely manner its reporting obligations under internationalinstruments.

• The Afghan Government will develop human rights monitoring, documenting andreporting mechanisms in partnership with the international community.

• Establish a Supreme Court according to the Constitution with the necessary capacityto fulfil its mandate.

• Strengthen the administrative and financial management capacity of justice institutions.• Accelerate the legislative reform process through adoption of key laws that would be

compatible with the Constitution, including laws and procedures on the organizationof judicial offices, criminal and civil codes, and a penitentiary law.

• Establish a national legal training centre.

Source: Berlin Declaration, 2004.

Box 5.8

Security Sector Reform and the Berlin Declaration

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civilian population with an adequatelevel of security.

• The clear delineation of the tasks andresponsibilities of the various securityforces and institutions to avoid overlapand redundancies.40

Future reform efforts will need to focus on:

• Expansion of military capability andthe prevention of armed conflict.

• Disarming, demobilizing and re-integrating combatants in line with theexpansion of the new national army.41

• Law enforcement (police).

• Judicial system reforms.

• Crime prevention and reduction ofadministrative corruption.

• Reduction in ethnic tensions throughan inclusive political process.

• Reduction in drug production andtrafficking.

• Clearing landmines.

5.5. Role of Civil SocietyInstitutions

If the state is to effectively provide humansecurity, mechanisms are required throughwhich the public can meaningfullyparticipate in institutionalized dialoguewith the state. Empowered civil societyinstitutions are also necessary. InAfghanistan, there are various traditionalmechanisms through which the publicengages with the –affairs of the state, suchas shuras, Jirgas and religious networks.Moreover, civil society organizations areincreasingly active in the state-buildingefforts, engaging in civic education,awareness raising, peace-building, andadvocacy for human rights and genderequality. The implementation of an

40 TISA, Securing Afghanistan’s Future, 2004d.41 By 15 July 2004, a total of 10,770 officers and soldiers had turned in their weapons, while 10,460 had been demobilized. Some 9,000 of the personnel

had started or are about to start their reintegration exercise. Taken from a press briefing by David Singh, Senior Media Relations Officer at UNAMA andby UN agencies in Afghanistan, 15 Jul 2004, available at www.reliefweb.int.

Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 9, December 2003

NHDR 04 155

effective strategy for the strengthening ofand engagement with civil society, asexemplified by the Government’s flagshipNSP, will be a critical component inmeeting the expectations of localcommunities.

As highlighted in Box 5.9, civil societycan play a key role in the promotion ofhuman security, pressing for basic andstrategic entitlements to be established inlaw and ensuring that they are effectivelyenforced. Without group solidarity andcollective representation (communitygroups, social movements, unions ornational NGOs, etc.) the poor are unlikelyto be granted rights, or, to the extent thatthey are granted them, to be able to holdstate and non-state actors accountable fortheir realization. A national commitment

to ensure human security does not, forexample, imply that the state has to providefree public services in all cases, but ratherthat it is required to respect, protect andfulfil rights, whether by direct provisionor by the state acting as a regulator andfacilitator for other actors (such as themarket and civil society), who provideservices where this is the most effectiveand sustainable approach possible with theresources available.42 Internationalexperience confirms that networks andalliances at both national and internationallevels can have a powerful impact in termsof scaling up local voices and prioritiesinto organized claims. Moreover,experience highlights that the state is notmonolithic and that there are organic linksbetween actors within the state and actors

42 Tim Conway, Caroline Moser, Andy Norton and John Farrington 2002.

The concept of civil society refers to abroad range of non-governmental andnot-for-profit organisations that have apresence in public life, expressing theinterests and values of their members orothers, based on ethical, cultural,political, scientific, religious orphilanthropic considerations. Theyinclude community groups, NGOs,labour unions, indigenous groups,charitable organizations, faith-basedorganizations, professional associationsand foundations. Civil societyorganizations are increasingly recognizedas influential actors in public policy anddevelopment efforts. An effectivestrategy for engagement with civil societyin Afghanistan will be an integral partof the strategy for poverty reduction andachievement of the MillenniumDevelopment Goals (MDGs).

The benefits civil society can bring todevelopment efforts include:

• Giving a voice to stakeholdersparticularly poor and marginalizedpopulations and helping ensure thattheir views are factored into policyand programme decisions

• P r o m o t i n g p u b l i c s e c t o rtransparency and accountability aswell as contributing to anenvironment favourable to goodgovernance

• Promoting public consensus andlocal ownership for reforms, nationalpoverty reduction and developmentstrategies by building commonground for understanding andencouraging publ ic–privatecooperation

• Bringing innovative ideas andsolutions as well as participatoryapproaches to solve local problems

• Strengthening and leveragingdevelopment programmes byproviding local knowledge,targeting assistance and generatingsocial capital at the community level

• Providing professional expertise andincreasing the capacity for effectiveservice delivery, especially inenvironments with weak publicsector capacity or in post-conflictcontexts

Civil society organizations can beengaged through the provision ofresources, training, technical support,etc. as envisaged for the process offormulating Afghanistan’s povertyreduction strategy. Dialogue andconsultation with civil society on keyissues, policies and programmes (suchas by listening to their perspectives andinviting suggestions), can strengthen theresponsiveness and effectiveness ofnational policy reform processes.

Box 5.9

Defining Civil Society and its Significance in the Afghan Context

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within civil society. At the same time, itshould be stressed that civil society isheterogeneous and that its interests arediverse. Afghan communities, like thosein other countries, contain powerful socialnetworks among the elites, which can oftenwork against the interests of the poor,while the poor themselves are often dividedalong ethnic, cultural or gender lines.

The opinion of many international actors,lamenting the absence of civil society inAfghanistan, builds on the assumption thatcivil society in Afghanistan is, if not non-existent, at least very weak. Often thisperception results from a narrow, culturallybiased definition. However, Westernnotions of “civil society” do not transfereasily to the Afghan context. The idea ofbuilding a broad civil-society constituencyfor peace may only be possible in contextswhere civil society is composed ofvertically and horizontally integratedformal, rule-based organizations.Moreover, research from elsewheresuggests that where the state is weak andfractured, civil society will be similarlydivided and lacking in voice; a strong,healthy state is usually the preconditionfor a strong and healthy civil society. InAfghanistan, by contrast, the state hascollapsed and civil society predominantlyconsists of a complex web of informal,norm-based networks based on blood,kinship, and tribal, religious, cultural ande thn ic i t i e s . 4 3 A comprehens iveunderstanding of civil society inAfghanistan thus necessitates taking intoaccount the particular historical, culturaland political context of the country.

Identifying Afghan Civil Society

Civil society as a concept originatingwithin modern Western democracies oftenonly includes associational forms such asNGOs and voluntary associations. In anon-Western setting, and particularly in

an Islamic and traditional country likeAfghanistan, a broader definition,encompassing shuras, Jirgas and religiousnetworks in addition to voluntaryassociations and NGOs, is necessary.44

Community Councils

Afghanistan is very rich in its tribal andtraditional structures. Throughout thecountry, a variety of local councils referredto as shuras or Jirgas exist. These are usedas tools for negotiation and dialogue.Stakeholders belonging to different tribesand networks approach one another inorder to solve disputes, gain resources,influence political processes or reachoverall consensus upon major issues. Aidagencies increasingly work with shurasas partners for community development.Yet these councils do not function exactlyalong the same goals and principles ofcivil society, as the basic perspective of ashura is reactive rather than proactive.Through capacity-building measures,however, the mandate of shuras can bereoriented, in order to strengthen its civilsociety functions.

Religious networks

Religious leaders and networks havealways played a prominent role inAfghanistan, especially in times of crisis,when they undertake crucial functionseither in the form of legitimizing resistanceor even forming its backbone. Due to theirinfluence in society, religious councils,religious scholars (Ulama), and traditionalIslamic leaders, including Mullahs andMaulawis, can serve as important elementsof civil society in Afghanistan.

Voluntary associations

In urban areas especially, recent years haveseen the formation of various voluntaryassociations and interest groups. Theseinclude women’s, professional, youth,student, social and cultural groups. A

43 Hanef Atmar and Jonathan Goodhand 2002.44 Nasrollah Stanikzai 2004; Assadullah Walwalji 2004.

Security in general isthe responsibility of thepeople themselves. InAfghanistan theGovernment is makingus dependent onforeign security forces.This is not good for thecountry. TheGovernment has to relyon its own people.

Said Rahim Rahimi from Kabul

NHDR 04 157

prominent example is the Professionalshura of Herat that was founded in early2002. It mainly consists of the localintelligentsia (doctors, lawyers, engineers,professors, etc.).

NGOs

Even though NGOs are a relatively recentphenomenon in Afghanistan and havemainly been established from the late1980s onwards, there has been anexplosion in their number in recent years.Today, more than 2,000 NGOs areregistered with the Ministry of Planning.The majority of these, however, cannot beconsidered as genuine civil societyorganizations. Most are involved inemergency and reconstruction aid, andtheir primary role is implementing projectsrather than fostering popular participationand social organization, or advocating theinterests of the local population.Nevertheless, there are NGOs inAfghanistan that focus on civil-society-related issues such as human rights, peace-building and civic education. Some playa significant role in facilitating andencouraging constructive dialogue withincivil society, as well as between civilsociety and the state.

Afghan Civil Society and the State

In order to act as a counterweight to thestate, and influence the formulation ofGovernment policies, civil society needsto have access to the state. Given theweakness of Afghanistan’s currentadministrative structure, it is difficult forcivil society organizations at present toassume this role in an institutionalizedmanner. First of all, in the past there hasbeen a lack of a governmental “culture”to involve and strengthen civil society.45

Presently, contacts and interactionsbetween the Government and civil society

are often strained due to intolerance andmistrust. These stem from ethnic, politicaland personal conflicts, or may simply bedue to a gap in understanding about therole and function played by NGOs. At theprovincial level, local power holders oftencreate obstacles for civil societyorganizations to interact with communities,as this is perceived as a threat to their holdon the people. Moreover, since civil societyappears to have only a limited influenceon the current dynamics of the conflict, itis difficult to see it becoming a leadingedge in a peace-building process. Thepotential for exerting pressure "frombelow" to influence the incentive systemsof leaders and promote humanitarianprinciples appears to be limited.46

However, at this critical juncture ofAfghanistan’s state-building efforts, civilsociety has began to raise its voice. Since2001, the numbers of Afghan civil societygroups have not only increased sharply,they have also become much more visibleand are demanding room to influence thepeace process. Civil society representativeswere invited to attend the Bonn Conferencein 2001, and civil society groups haveincreasingly been drawn into the peace-building process as a balance to militaryand political organizations. They have alsobeen involved in activities such as civiceducation, awareness-raising, peace-building, and advocacy for human rightsand gender equality.47

The Role of Civil Society inDevelopment

In general, civil society can play animportant role in reconstruction, state-building, deepening democracy, peace,reconciliation and stability, provided it isrecognized by the authorities, utilized andencouraged.48 Projects planned and

45 Assadullah Walwalji 2004.46 Hanef Atmar and Jonathan Goodhand 2002.47 Stephan Massing, UNDP Kabul, contributed to the section on civil society.48 Assadullah Walwalji 2004.

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managed by the communities themselvestypically show rates of return higher thanthose planned and managed byGovernment agencies, as well as enhancedownership, a key factor to ensuresustainability.

Poor people are often viewed as the targetsof poverty reduction efforts, rather thanas assets and partners in the developmentprocess. Experience has shown that givenclear plans, access to information andappropriate support, poor men and womencan effectively organize to provide goodsand services that meet their immediatepriorities. Not only do poor communitieshave greater capacity than is generallyrecognized, they also have the most to gainfrom making good use of resourcestargeted at poverty reduction. As one of

the Government’s core priority nationalprogrammes, the NSP has taken apioneering approach in the Afghan contextto building grassroots confidence in thenew central administration. Withcommunities empowered to makedecisions and control resources during allstages of the project cycle, the programmeis laying a national foundation for gooddemocratic governance.

The Afghan people have sufferedtremendously as a result of decades ofconflict, political instability and theeffective collapse of the nation state. Thehigh level of community expectations thathave accompanied the launch of the state-building and reform processes have notbeen matched as quickly as many wouldhave liked, particularly in the form of

Even though the sphere of civil societyactivities in Afghanistan may still be afar cry from an ideal – where civil societyhas a major influence on peace processes,political stability, economic productivityand human well-being – there are anumber of civil society organizations orrepresentatives from civil society thatare engaged in a variety of activities andhave successfully implemented severalinteresting projects in the past years. Thefollowing examples intend to illustratethat promising ini t ia t ives andorganizations do exist and constituteentry points for sustained cooperationand partnership.

Afghan Civil Society Conferences

Civil society conferences, withrepresentatives of diverse civil societygroups took place prior or parallel to thepolitical conferences in Bonn (2001),Tokyo (2002) and Berlin (2004). The

goal of these meetings was to involveAfghan civil society in the peace andreconstruction processes in order toachieve a more sustainable post-conflictreconstruction. At the most recentconference in Berlin, 40 representativesfrom civil society presented conciserecommendations to the inter-governmental meeting and theGovernment of Afghanistan. The activeparticipation of civil society in suchmeetings underlines that civil societygroups have become much more visible,increasingly demand influence, and areeager to be part of the peace anddevelopment processes in Afghanistan.

The Afghan Civil Society Forum

The Afghan Civil Society Forum cameinto being at the first Afghan CivilSociety Conference in Germany andbegan its activities in February 2002. Itsmission is to support and strengthen civil

society in Afghanistan. The mainobjectives of ACSF are to:

• Provide a platform for dialoguewithin Afghan civil society;

• Fac i l i t a te and ensure theinvolvement of civil society in thecountry’s peace and reconstructionprocesses;

• Foster an engagement with politicaland international actors; and

• Use modern civil society agents(such as NGOs) in order to reachout to traditional members ofAfghan civil society.

ACSF’s primary activities compriseraising awareness; and conducting civiceducation campaigns, workshops anddialogue sessions (as for example, theAfghan Youth Civ i l Soc ie tyConference); producing newsletters; andfacilitating civil society networking(including by establishing databases ofcivil society actors).

Box 5.10

Examples of Civil Society Involvement in Afghanistan

NHDR 04 159

tangible improvements in lives andlivelihoods.49

The implementation of an effective strategyfor the strengthening of and engagementwith civil society, as exemplified by theGovernment’s flagship NSP, will be acritical component in this regard. However,block grants and small-scale infrastructurecan only be effective in the furtherance ofhuman security in so far as localgovernance systems are simultaneouslystrengthened and the marginalized poorare empowered. In short, the challenge forthe Government of Afghanistan will be toaddress the major strategic needs of itspeople, namely participation, dignity andempowerment within the policy andinstitutional reform processes.

5.6. Conclusions: Building aState for Good GovernanceThe “Great Democratic Game”

From this NHDR’s perspective, theultimate objective of the currentreconstruction and state-building processes

is the establishment of a governmentalstructure that, by providing for “goodgovernance”, enables and promotes humandevelopment . According to theCommission for Human Security, thefollowing key governance issues need tobe addressed in the post-conflictenv i ronmen t : Democra t i za t i on ,participation in decision-making,accountability of decision-makers, respectfor the rule of law and human rights, andinclusive, equitable and fair rules andinstitutions. These institutions will allowfor the effective empowerment of peopleand communities, which in turn is essentialfor effective governance.

• One central aspect in this process isthe rule of law, which is key toinstitutional functioning and theprotection of people. Establishing therule of law, however, goes beyond thedrafting of a constitution and laws, thecreation of courts, etc. It requires theinclusion of norms, principles andpractices that establish relations amongpeople and between people and the

49 This ‘credibility gap’ has been clearly highlighted in recent constitutional consultations. See Sedra and Middlebrook 2004.

If people can be of anyhelp in enhancinghuman security theyneed to be taken intoconfidence withrespect to the relevantpolicies. They should beprovided withinformation about thecurrent policies andasked about theiradvice with respect toimproving them.

Gul Ahmad Yama from Ghazni

From the human development perspective, good governance is democratic governance.Democratic governance means that:

• People’s human rights and fundamental freedoms are respected, allowing them to livewith dignity.

• People have a say in decisions that affect their lives.• People can hold decision-makers accountable.• Inclusive and fair rules, institutions and practices govern social interactions.• Women are equal partners with men in private and public spheres of life and decision-

making.• People are free from discrimination based on race, ethnicity, class, gender or any other

attribute.• The needs of future generations are reflected in current policies.• Economic and social policies are responsive to people’s needs and aspirations.• Economic and social policies aim at eradicating poverty and expanding the choices that

all people have in their lives.

UNDP, Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World.

Box 5.11

Good Governance – For What?

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state. Moreover, it is important tostrengthen civil society in post-conflictenvironments, ensuring a mechanismfor people to participate, express theirviews and hold decision-makersaccountable.50

• There are certainly many factors thatinfluence the outcome of post-conflictstate-building exercises, but forAfghanistan, one aspect of the humansecuri ty approach to humandevelopment seems to be particularlyprevalent: the need for participation,whether active or passive. Participationis contingent upon two preconditions:that the state provides opportunitiesto participate (political security as apublic good being the responsibilityof the state), and that the peopleassume the responsibility to participate(civilian responsibility). Currently,neither of the two conditions has beenmet in Afghanistan. Rather, peopleoften perceived the country as a nation,but not a state in which they canparticipate.

• Afghanistan needs people to translatethe idea of a social compact into areality. This requires, on the one hand,that the state structures or organsoperate for the people in a responsibleand non-exclusive manner. On theother hand, people should not perceivethe state as an exogenous organismset up for the implementation of alienpolicies serving the elite, but shouldfeel part of the larger community ascontributors and controllers. Withregard to the former, it is crucial thatthe state structures address the needsof the people and perform theirfunctions in a manner that adheres tothe axiom of “good governance”. Thiswill gradually build the necessary trustof the people, which forms the basisof the social compact that legitimizes

the state. Concerning the latter,participation helps make the peopleresponsible and bring the state closerto its constituency, which remainsingrained in communal structuresgiven the absence of functioning publicservice providers. Only oncegovernmental institutions feel“responsible” towards the people, andthe people feel “responsible” towardsthe state, will the state-buildingexercise achieve its purpose. “It is allabout what the state can do for thepeople and what the people can do forthe state.”51

• The crucial question will be for thefuture Government to promote thesocial compact through participation.Providing an environment withinwhich political security can thrive willcertainly generate trust and publicparticipation. But to a large measurethis will depend on the Government’sability to assert its central authoritywithout disenfranchising the periphery.It will also depend on the manner inwhich the state can satisfy the publicdemand for holding prominent pastand present violators of human rightsaccountable, and address growingconcerns about corruption andmismanagement.

Having successfully passed the historicchallenge of conducting Presidentialelections without any major securityincidents, the next test for the Governmentwill be the extent to which it can sustainand reinvigorate the democratisationprocess aiming at the establishment oflegitimate and accountable structures togovern Afghanistan on the basis of theConstitution. Apart from the requirementto ensure an enabling environment for theconduct ing of f ree and secureParliamentary elections scheduled forspring 2005, it is called upon to build the

50 Commission on Human Security 2003.51 Michael Schoiswhol, UNDP Programme Officer, Kabul.

Corruption is erodingpeople’s confidence inthe government. It is sowidespread, open andcommon that it is nowaccepted as some sortsof legitimategovernment fee....I don’t know why thegovernment is notpaying any attention tothis social ill.

Khan Zaman, from Kabul

NHDR 04 161

structures necessary for a functioningParliament, which can meaningfullyrepresent the people and exercise controlover the executive. Moreover, theGovernment is confronted with a plethoraof challenges in implementing itstransitional duties concerning necessarystructural reforms in the executive andjudicial branches, as provided for by theConstitution regarding the period until theestablishment of the National Assembly(Article 159). Ultimately, it will need to

inspire trust among the people by ensuringthat the rule of law, as observed by thejudiciary and executive organs, finallyreplaces the rule of the gun. In passingthese “tests”, the government will certainlyface the difficult dilemma inherent in post-conflict state-building efforts: that theestablishment of “good governance” afteryears of military confrontation takes time,even as the memories of the people are byfar more short-lived than their expectations.

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6

Photo: Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh

What Kind of Development Vision isNeeded for the New Sovereign State?

Chapter

1 The discussions below have been taken from three authors: Omar Zakhilwal, Barnett Rubin in his response to the draft of the NHDR, and Umer Daudzai2003.

2 S. Huddleston 1928.

elites without the benefit of consultationwith people. Third, economic developmentconsistently has been concentrated in urbanareas at the expense of the countryside.While significant gains were made atvarious stages of history, these were alsorapidly reversed through wars and neglect.

The modernization of Afghanistan beganwith the reforms introduced in 1926 byKing Amanullah (1919–1929), followinga nine-month tour of Europe. The reformswere especially impressive for foreignvisitors, one of who described Afghanistanin 1928 thus: “It is becoming a modernstate. Its roads and communications havebeen transformed. There is a well-trainedarmy. There are excellent schools.... In thecentre of Asia what is almost a new countryis in process of birth – or, at least, the oldcountry is being metamorphosed.”2

However, King Amanullah’s aspirationsto strengthen the state through imposingheavy taxes on peasants and traders provedless popular with the religious rural eliteand clerics who ended his rule in 1929.This was the first time – but not the last–in the modern history of Afghanistan thatrural conservatives reacted in oppositionto the modernization process of urbanelites.

In contrast to the fast reforms ofAmanullah, the reign of Nadir Shah(1929–1933) and his son Zahir Shah(1933–1973) saw a slower pace ofmodernization, while innovationsimplemented by individual entrepreneursboosted exports to Europe, often throughthe Soviet Union. Modern academic

Chapter 6

What Kind of Development Vision is Needed forthe New Sovereign State?

6.1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse,from a human security perspective, thereconstruction and peace-building visionselaborated by the TISA in its first twoyears, and to make recommendations tobe included in updated developmentpolicies of the new Government. Thechapter briefly reviews the history ofeconomic planning in Afghanistan in thepast few decades before examining thecurrent development visions and strategiesfrom a human development and a humansecurity point of view. Finally, it makesrecommendations on types of developmentpolicies that Afghanistan should considerfor a “humanly secure” future, given that,ultimately, post-conflict situations alsoprovide opportunities to promote change,and to fundamentally recast social, politicaland economic bases of power in order toinclude the excluded, heal fragmentationand erase inequalities.

6.2. History

Development Planning inAfghanistan: A Clash of Traditionand Modernity

A political history of development planningin Afghanistan points to a number of trendsthat could be used as lessons in today’spost-conflict period.1 First, the economichistory is one of great dependency onforeign aid and, with it, shifting economicpolicy orientation from a state-planned toa liberal market-based economy. Second,strategies were often designed andimplemented from the top through ruling

The Afghan economycould barely walk evenbefore this all started,but the Soviet invasioncrippled it. TheMujahideen then sentit to a coma and theTaliban suffocated it toits ultimate demise.

Afghan Professor, CESR Report,2002

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education started in Kabul in 1932,although a university was not formallyestablished until 1947. In the 1930s, AbdulMajid Zabuli founded the Bank-i Milli asa private development bank and beganaccumulating capital through investmentin the cultivation and processing of cottonin northern plains, especially aroundKunduz. The state supported this effort bydraining the malarial swamps and creatingan irrigation system of dams on the KunduzRiver. It settled Pashtuns (naqilin) fromother areas, as well as former nomads, inthis region, where they grew rice andcotton, the latter purchased by the SpinzarCotton Company, a private companyowned by Bank-i Milli.

By the end of the Second World War,Afghanistan had a reserve of about US$300million from external trade. A number ofindustrial units were established and atleast two major agricultural developmentprojects, one in the north and another inthe south, were launched. Starting in 1953,a decade with Sardar Daud as PrimeMinister witnessed the nationalization ofprivate sector institutions and a numberof state-guided initiatives for rapideconomic growth. New settlement schemesand state industries as well as improvedinfrastructure were pursued, financed byexternal borrowing. Between 1956 and1979, the country's economic growth wasguided by several five-year and seven-year plans aided by extensive foreignassistance, primarily from the Soviet Unionand the United States. Roads, dams, powerplants, factories and irrigation projectswere constructed, and the education systemexpanded. The first five-year plan waslaunched in 1956, followed by the secondfive-year plan in 1962. Sardar Daud wassuccessful in attracting foreign economicinterest, so much so that Afghanistan wasthen receiving the highest levels of foreigntechnical assistance on a per capita basisof any country in the world.

Daud’s five-year plans were plagued bythe weaknesses of centralized economic

policy and its disincentives for the privatesector and for farmers, although they alsoled to some very important changes: therapid expansion of the system of educationin the provinces; the creation of a nationalarmy, which gave the state more effectivecontrol over the territory than ever before;and the construction of the first nationalroad system, which enabled the army toreach the major regional centres and alsofacilitated the growth of a trucking industry.When the road system was completed withthe opening of the Salang tunnel, it markedthe first time that an all-weather road linkedthe country’s north and south, adevelopment that resulted in equalizingthe price of wheat. The electrical grid wasconsiderably expanded during this time,and natural gas was extracted from 1967,with 95 per cent of the total produced beingexported to the Soviet Union.

The gradual modernization of the economywas mirrored in the political arena, whichsaw a Constitution finalized in 1964,guaranteeing free elections, a free press,and similar rights. By the end of the 1970s,Afghanistan was considered a modernstate.

Educational opportunities and, to a lesserdegree, health services were expanded,although limited to the relatively smallurban sector, and leaving female enrolmentin schools and the growth of services inrural area lagging behind. Sardar Daud’sinvestments in infrastructure created anational market for the first time; however,his reliance on foreign aid led todependence on external support rather thanlocally generated private capital. This wasnot the last time in Afghanistan’s historythat the economy came to be heavilydependent on external assistance.

The next decade saw Afghanistan’ssubsequent decision-makers vacillatingbetween orientations towards Westernliberal economic policies (as in theRepublic proclaimed by Sardar Daud afterdeposing Zahir Shah in 1973), and then

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however, was concentrated in areas of thecountry taken over relatively early by theTaliban, where trade barriers had beenremoved and a certain degree of orderrestored. Subsequently, the deteriorationin social services (particularly education)was aggravated by the Taliban’s socialpolicies, which excluded women fromwork and girls from school.

On the eve of the Taliban collapse, mostof the essential infrastructure had beenvirtually destroyed, with none of theoperational attributes of a modern states u c h a s r o a d s , e l e c t r i c i t y ,telecommunication, schools or transport.War, drought, and the resulting depletionof social and human capital had madeAfghanistan one of the poorest countriesin the world.3

Lessons

Three trends stand out in the politicaleconomy of Afghanistan in the past 25years, all of which could serve as lessonsfor the present:

• The first lesson relates to the heavyreliance on foreign aid, and with it,the shifting in the orientation of theeconomic policy from state planningto a liberal market-based economy.Afghanistan’s strategic position duringthe Cold War period made it a largerecipient of foreign aid, which fundedthe running of a centralized butrelatively weak state withoutsubstantial domestic taxation. Thelimited “modernization” of the Afghaneconomy achieved by the end of 1970swas heavily dependent on foreignassistance, while the limited domesticrevenue was used mainly for theAdministration and the Army.

• The second lesson is that the variouseconomic strategies did not createsufficient employment opportunitiesfor all members of the new class

towards pro-Soviet socialist planningsystems (prompted by a coup in 1978 andthe Soviet invasion of 1979). The longdrawn-out war of Soviet occupation andsubsequent internecine conflict severelydamaged Afghanistan’s economy. By themid-1990s, most of the country’s limitedmodern infrastructure was destroyed, andtraditional irrigation systems were impairedby damage and lack of maintenance. Evenmore important was the progressivebreakdown of the state over time and theerosion of institutions – both modern andtraditional. Government-provided socialservices, which had never had muchoutreach into the rural areas, atrophiedand, to a large extent, stopped functioning.

The Afghan economy – already reducedto a miserable state by years of conflict –continued its downslide during the Talibanregime, which saw not only the impositionof economic sanctions by the internationalcommunity but also the longest and mostsevere drought recorded in the history ofAfghanistan. As the national marketdisintegrated, each region became moreintegrated with the economy of its foreignneighbour, through migration, trade andmilitary alliances, while householdincomes came to depend on remittancesfrom family members working abroad.The war economy, with opium cultivation,foreign military subsidies and printing ofmoney to finance militias came into fullbloom.

There was a modest economic recoveryin the mid-1990s in regions that werelargely free of conflict. Agriculturalproduction increased. The number oflivestock herds rose sharply, takingadvantage of widely available unutilizedgrazing lands; horticultural production alsogrew, based on restoration and expansionof orchards and vineyards. Substantialnumbers of refugees returned to their homewith international assistance. The recovery,

3 Abdul Baqil Banwal 2004.

NHDR 04 167

created by the educational system.While the education sector was usedfor the public sector, different rulersand their clients used ideologies,foreign aid and violence to eliminatetheir competitors for these niches. Atthe same time, strategies weresystemat ica l ly des igned andimplemented from the top throughruling elites, without consultationswith the people.

• The third lesson involves thesystematic disinterest in ruraldevelopment in the country. Economicdevelopment consistently concentratedon the urban areas at the expense ofthe countryside. Largely as a result offoreign aid, the country had relativelygood infrastructure, including a majorroad network as well as majorirrigation and hydroelectric facilities.But these did not extend beyond themain arteries and urban centres.

6.3. The Present: SettingNational DevelopmentPriorities

The National DevelopmentFramework, National PriorityProgrammes and SecuringAfghanistan’s Future

As Afghanistan turned a new pagefollowing the removal of the Taliban, theinterim Government, with remarkablespeed and with the help of the UnitedNations and international financialinstitutions, was able to outline its main“visions” for social and economicdevelopment in the NDF. This was puttogether in April 2002, shortly after theUN co-sponsored inter-ministerialI n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n f e r e n c e o nReconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan,held in January 2002 in Tokyo. The NDBsthen translated the priorities of the NDFinto concrete programmes and specificprojects. In March 2004, the TransitionalAdministration, in partnership with

agencies of the United Nations, the WBand ADB, also presented an investmentdocument, Securing Afghanistan’s Futureat the international meeting in Berlin on“Afghanistan and the InternationalCommunity – a Partnership for the Future”.The investment plan proposed actionsacross the major thematic areas of socialand human capital, physical infrastructureand natural resources, public administrationreform and economic management, andtrade, investment and the private sectorand security. The bill for these programmeswas a sum of US$27.5 billion, requiredover the next seven years in the form ofinvestments by the internationalcommunity in stability and peace-buildingin Afghanistan. The programme attractedan initial US$8 billion in assistance at theBerlin Conference, almost twice thesupport provided at the Tokyo Conference.

These agreements organized the prioritiesof the interim Government around threepillars of development:

• Pillar 1: Human capital and socialprotection. This was to assureconditions that allowed people to livesecure lives and to ensure theformation of sustainable humancapital.

• Pillar 2: Physical infrastructure. Thispillar would generate employmentopportunities through public worksprograms such as rebuilding roads,and water sanitation projects.

• Pillar 3: An enabling environment fordevelopment. This last pillar wasmodified twice. Within the NDF, thethird pillar supported private-sector-led development as a distinctorientation of the economy. By March2004, a more realistic “enablingenvironment” had come to mean therule of law and security, withoutrelinquishing commitments to theprivate sector. Within the budget,however, this did not include majoritems such as support to the newAfghan Army and counter-narcotics

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programme implementation units to be ledby national professional programmemanagers and joint planning teams.

Afghanistan has now embarked on a phaseof reforms prompted by the adoption of astaff monitored programme with theInternational Monetary Fund (IMF). Thesereforms include the forthcomingpreparation of a Poverty ReductionStrategy Paper (PRSP) in cooperation withthe WB and other partners in theinternational community, and a number ofstructural changes to the Administrationand to the macro-economic framework.The Ministry of Health and the Ministryof Rural Rehabilitation and Developmenthave entered into major purchaser-providerrelationships for service delivery, and theMinistry of Telecommunications is beingtransformed into a regulator rather thancontinuing as a competitor with the privatesector.4 Minister of Finance Ashraf Ghanialso explained at the Berlin Conferencethat Afghanistan has completed the first

and anti-mine action. It has shrunkfrom about 10 per cent in the firstbudget projection to only a couple ofpercentage points of the total in thelast projection.

The three pillars were first elaboratedthrough six National Priority Programmes,which were more than doubled by April2004.

In addition to the National PriorityProgrammes, the TISA also set up 16Public Investment Programmes co-ordinated by a consultative groupmechanism created for each sector, withthe participation of key nationalinstitutions, donors and aid agenciesworking within that sector. Through theconsultative group and budget processes,the Government has moved to set the rulesby which donors, UN agencies and NGOswill support its efforts. The new NationalPriority Programmes are to be implementedthrough a system of steering committeesconsisting of a number of ministers, and

4 Speech of Ashraf Ghani, Minister of Finance, TISA at Berlin Conference, March 2004.

The new programmes being considered in the summer of 2004 were:

• National Skills Development Priority Programme• National Rural and Urban Water (Drinking Water) Priority Programme• National Vulnerability Priority Programme• National Urban Priority Programme• National Agriculture Priority Programme• National Private Sector Priority Programme• National Justice and the Rule of Law Priority Programme

These complemented the Government’s existing priority programmes listed below:

• National Emergency Employment Programme (NEEP)• Irrigation and Power Programme• National Solidarity Programme (NSP)• Afghanistan Stabilization Programme• Transportation Programme• Feasibility Studies Programme• Education and Vocational Training• Health and Nutrition

Box 6.1

National Priority Programmes

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phase of building a modern Ministry ofFinance, with reforms in the treasury,budgeting, and customs policy andadministration. An autonomous CentralBank was established, and a new currencylaunched in 2002–2003. The FinanceMinistry also reversed a long policy ofoverdraft financing through printingmoney, and has taken major steps tocentralize revenue from the provinces.5

The minister added also that carrying suchreforms forward requires addressing “head-on the cancer of corruption and the weakcapacity of the Government.” Theweakness is compounded by the problem

of what he called “two internationallyfunded bu reauc rac i e s uneas i lycohabitating” one, a bilaterally andmultilaterally funded national bureaucracy,where Government civil servants are paidan average of US$60 a month, and theother centred on the UN agencies, otherdonors and NGOs, in which Afghans earnan average salary of over US$1,000 permonth. To overcome the human capitalcrisis in Afghanistan, the Government isnow proposing a lateral entry programmeof recruiting over 1,000 senior managersfrom outside Government on contracts atmarket competitive salaries, but other short-

5 Ibid.

Figure 6.1: Consultative Group Mechanism

Afghanistan Development Forum (ADF)(National Budget)

Consultative Group Standing Committee (CGSC)

Consultative Groups

Pillar I*

1.1 Refugees and IDPs

1.2 Education and VocationalTraining

1.3 Health and Nutrition

1.4 Livelihood and SocialProtection

1.5 Culture, Media and Sport

Pillar II**

2.1 Transport

2.2 Energy, Mining and Telecom

2.3 Natural ResourcesManagement

2.4 Urban Management

Pillar III***

3.1 Trade and Investment

3.2 Public Admin and EconomicManagement

3.3 Justice

3.4º National Police, LawEnforcement and Stabilization

3.5º Afghan National Army

3.6º Mine Action

3.7º DDR

Cross Cutting Issues

A.1 Gender

A.2 Environment

A.3 Humanitarian Affairs

A.4 Human Rights

A.5 Monitoring & Evaluation

A.6 Counter Narcotics

Advisory Groups

LEGEND* Human Capital and Social Protection** Physical Infrastructure*** Enabling Environment for Developmentº National Security Programmes

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t h r o u g h t h e T r a n s i t i o n a lAdminis t ra t ion, and throughincreasingly strengthened ministryportfolios, provided confidence. Thed e s i g n o f t h e p r o g r a m m eimplementation units promised therecruitment of competent nationalprofessionals.

• The broadening of the NationalPriority Programmes, both in scopeand quantity, was a sign of confidencein the ability to deliver, as well as astrategic intent to move away fromrelief and rehabilitation projects tosustainable development, especiallyin rural areas. As such, thetransformation and expansion wereconsistent with the evolution of thestate-building process in the past twoyears.

• Moving from a short-term reliefproject modality to longer termprogramming expanded the necessarytimeframe. Securing Afghanistan’sFuture proposed a strategy of growthand development consistent with theGovernment’s commitments toreaching the MDGs by 2015, and thenew National Priority Programmeswere designed with five- to –15-yearplans and objectives, with a rollingprogramme comprising annual sets ofrealistic objectives and budgets.Although avoiding the word“planning”, which was reminiscent ofthe failed five-year plans of pre-warG o v e r n m e n t s , l o n g - t e r m“programming” cast a more realisticframework for reconstruction needs.

• Transparency and accountability werealso boosted. Requirements forreporting on procurement, progress,financial management and so on weredesigned through a number ofoversight committees at differentlevels, including the Cabinet.Furthermore, the TransitionalAdministration set up a central Web

and medium-term solutions are urgentlyneeded to address this discrepancy.

A Consistent Bureaucracy

The rationale behind the identification ofbroad priorities, programmes, budgets andimplementation mechanisms in the state-building exercise of Afghanistan has beenthe urgent need to set up a structure thatresponds adequately to the large amountof resources that the new Government waspromised by the international community.The response has been the creation of abureaucracy familiar to internationalagencies and tested in other post-conflictcountries, which could accelerate deliverythrough coordination mechanisms betweennational and international structures. Inthis rush, however, although all “adequate”structures of a strong centralizedGovernment were set up on paper, animportant step had to be sacrificed, givenproblems of security, timing, capacity andinfrastructure: consultation with theultimate beneficiaries – the people andcommunities – especially those livingoutside of Kabul.

Consultation was systematically hamperedby imminent threats to disintegration ofthe state, the urgency of vast amounts ofaid, insecurity and the Government’s lackof legitimacy outside of the capital.Establishing the rules of the new state wasthe priority, given the dangerous politicalvacuum. Nevertheless, concerns remainabout the sustainability of top-down andoutside-led structures, which fail toembrace broad participation.

The structures and mechanisms set up bythe Government were meant to answer thereconstruction needs of a devastatedcountry:

• Structures and strategies were designedto mobilize national capacity so thatthe Government could manage its ownpolicies and programmes inpartnership with the donor community.Leadership, both of the overall process

NHDR 04 171

site, an expression of its commitmentto share information openly with itsinternational and national partners,and with the Afghan people. This Website, which has complemented the sitesof the Office of the President and otherline ministries, contains the majordocuments prepared by theGovernment (such as the NDB), andfrom the major internationalconferences on reconstruction. Mostof the documents, however, are inEnglish, a reflection of the intendedaudience. The site also contains aDonor Assistance Database (DAD),supported by UNDP, which providesa tool for tracking reconstruction andhumanitarian projects in Afghanistan.It contains information on whereprojects are operating, who financesthem, and which organization areimplementing them.

• Consistent with the argumentspresented in this NHDR that threatsto human security cannot beprioritized, the various NationalPriority Programs were not designedto favour some over the other. In fact,they constituted a list of developmentneeds identified by different ministriesrather than an identification ofpriorities. Budget allocations, donorinterest, and the capacity of responsibleinstitutions may, on the other hand,lead to a sequential delivery andprioritization of programmes.

• Coordination was further boosted. Bymid-2003, the Ministry of Financeoversaw the coordination of donor aid,organized now through a budgetprocess, while insisting on completeinformation from aid organizations onthe total inflow of aid. Thiscoordination led to a coherent set oflong-term priorities projected for threefiscal years (2003–2005) in thedevelopment budget. The Ministry ofFinance took an increasingly importantlead in coordinating both the aid flows

in the country as well as the revenuecollection from the regions.

• Partnership was among the targets ofthe new National Priority Programmes,which seek to provide points ofcollaboration around national policiesbetween the Government, donors, thep r i v a t e s e c t o r , N G O s a n dcommunities.

Afghanistan has been unique in comparisonwith other post-conflict situations, wheredonors have been reluctant to finance corebudget and recurrent costs of a newlyestablished Transitional Administrationbecause of the lack of control over fundingor inability to show visible results. TheMinistry of Finance in Afghanistanmanaged to mobilize support and trustthrough creating the database on donors,and by instituting a broad consultativeprocess for the preparation of the NDB.

However, the two main shortcomings ofdevelopment strategies designed by thetransitional Government were the lack ofbroad-based participation and the scantattention paid to the root causes ofinequalities in Afghanistan.

Analysis of the Priorities from theHuman Development and HumanSecurity Point of View

Using as the framework of analysis thefour principles of human developmentoutlined in Chapter 1 of this report(efficiency, equity, sustainability andempowerment), the following sectionsanalyse the transitional Government’soverall development vision as outlined inthe NDF and further elaborated in SecuringAfghanistan’s Future, as well as theNational Priority Programmes, in order todraw lessons for future visions of the newGovernment.

Efficiency

Strong commitments to efficiency can berecognized in both the priority given toeconomic growth and a core emphasis on

Chapter 6172

The solution to the problem of absorptioncapacity has been sought in the sub-contracting of private international firmsfor various functions, ranging fromconstruction to accounting. This, however,could prove costly and unsustainable.Building national capacity – and not“importing” it, is a long-term and difficulttask that requires adequate solutions fromthe incoming Government.

Equity

Commitments to equity are sought througha distr ibution of resources andopportunities regionally and acrossvulnerable populations. As the outline ofthe National Priority Programmes states:“Each NPP will be designed with theCabinet approved principle of social equityin mind, and should also be capable ofreporting its expenditures and impact interms of provincial equity.” Furthermore,various Government strategies emphasizesupport for the social protection of thepoorest sections of society – those belowthe poverty line, the disabled, female-headed households and the elderly, inparticular.

Yet, adhering to principles of regional orsocial equity is problematic when the realneeds of different communities have notbeen properly assessed. Strategies may nothave benefited from adequate participationin the design and implementationprocesses, given problems of lack ofcapacity and insecurity, which havehampered consultation, and the urgentneed to draw up plans for attractinginternational investment. Furthermore, theexisting development strategies do nothave as an explicit goal or primaryobjective the eradication of horizontalinequalities. Specific attention must bepaid to the equitable distribution of existingresources within the upcoming PRSP,which the Government will begin preparingin 2005.

The Government seeks to integrate bestpractices from free market economies by

institutional and financial accountability.Securing Afghanistan’s Future argued thatalthough a number of key structural andsystemic reforms had been carried out,much still needed to be done. IfAfghanistan is to grow out of poverty, adrug-dependent economy and anenvironment of insecurity, an annualgrowth rate of at least nine per cent willbe required. This level of growth is plannedthrough a macro-economic framework thatallow for broad-based development,financial and trade reforms, and thesimplification of banking and investmentlaws, trade and customs rates among others.All reforms are premised on commitmentsto an economic policy of marketintegration, liberal trade, the promotion ofthe private sector as an engine for growth,and a key “enabling” role for the state.

Efficiency is also ensured through plansfor core state capacity in managing fiscaland public administration: transparency inthe management of resources; the creationof high-level decision-making capacity byputting in place a core group of publicservants, supported by internationaladvisors, while recognizing long delaysin the planned broad-based civil servicereform; the establishment of a budgetaryprocess and identifiable payroll registersfor the public service; and economies ofscale through large programmes ratherthan fragmented projects.

Despite these efforts, however, theefficiency of the system is in question,given constraints on revenues as theperipheral provinces continue to collectrevenues without adequate submission tothe treasury single account. The efficiencyof the planned programmes is alsoquestioned in view of the costly strategiesadopted in the short term. A marketapproach to building absorptive capacityin the public and private sector has led tothe extensive use of foreign experts toenhance the ministries’ capacity to channellarge amounts of foreign aid toimplementing reconstruction programmes.

NHDR 04 173

focusing on economic growth, while alsoensuring social inclusion of all groups andproviding social protection for those notable to participate in that growth. Crucialimportance is being accorded to the forcesof a market economy in all ofAfghanistan’s development strategies. Yetas experience shows in a number ofdeveloping or post-conflict countriesaround the world, a market approach toreconstruction and development policiesmay inevitably have a number of negativeexternalities, which policy makers inAfghanistan must be aware of – wideninginequalities, large pockets of poverty,limited provision of social and publicgoods, and high levels of crime. ForAfghanistan, a market approach toreconstruction may fail to incorporate theroot causes of the conflict: unequaldistribution and competition overresources, lack of inclusion, poor politicalaccountability and legitimacy, amongothers.

Sustainability

Commitments to p r inc ip les o fsustainability are expressed through anumber of explicit objectives. Amongthese, the NHDR recognises four areas:

• Priority investments in human capital:The Government’s vision forinvestments in human and socialcapital is “to create the conditionsnecessary for the people ofAfghanistan to secure sustainablelivelihoods in the legal economy andto lay the foundations for the formationof long-term human development.”6

• Dealing with security and the rule oflaw as fundamental pre-requisites forpolitical normalization, nationalreconciliation, social development andreconstruction.

• Emphasis on national capacity-building.

• Emphasis on infrastructure-building,including t ransporta t ion andcommunication systems.

Although there are formidable challengesto raising national revenues in anenvironment of insecurity, lack of centralauthority, and the presence of regionalpower-holders with private armies andvested interests, nevertheless, the mainconcerns in terms of sustainability are theheavy dependence on external funding ofboth the development and the operationalbudgets of the Government. At themoment, there is a plan to get internalrevenues up to over US$1 billion annuallyin the next five years thorough customsand internat ional t ransi t , to l ls ,communications, airspace licensing andfuels.

Another fundamental challenge is to ensurethe adequate provision of public goodsand services through national and sub-national departments. Afghanistan’sreconstruction plans are based on a modelwhere the state is a regulator that managesservices and does not provide them. Inmany cases, services are provided viaNGOs and UN agencies. For example, keynational programmes for improvinglivelihoods and social protection, whilemanaged by Government ministries, haveinvolved the competitive contracting ofimplementation services by non-governmental agencies. These include theNSP, NEEP, Protracted Relief andRecovery Operation and Micro-financeSupport Facility. Inevitably, during thefirst two years of reconstruction, there wasa tendency for international assistance toseek opportunities for small manageableprojects to stave off a potentialhumanitarian crisis and ensure the deliveryof immediate and visible benefits to thepeople of Afghanistan. It was increasinglyrecognized, however, that projects arerarely effective or their impact sustainable,

6 TISA, Securing Afghanistan’s Future, 2004d.

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unless they are embedded in emergingnational pol icy and programmeframeworks. In this way, it is hoped thatNational Priority Programmes will promotebetter outreach, transparency and a moreaccountable use of resources.

Participation and Empowerment

With strong commitments to social andhuman capital, protection of the poor andemphasis on private sector developmentthrough provision of infrastructure andmicro-credit support to the rural poor andwomen, the development visions seek toensure the empowerment of the people ofAfghanistan. The NDF and SecuringAfghanistan’s Future lay a strong emphasison community participation. As the latternotes, community action, involvement,and therefore ownership will be key to thesecurity and sustainability of reconstructionefforts. Enhancing community participationcan promote the effectiveness andefficiency of implementation. TheGovernment can bes t convincecommunities of its legitimate leadershipthrough the provision of support tocommunities in ways that empower them,such as the NSP.

Three variables can be used for analysingthe national development priorities inAfghanistan from the viewpoint ofparticipation and empowerment: theparticipation in the design of the strategies;empowerment through participation in theimplementation process; and mechanismsfor checks and balances by communitiesand civil society.

• Participation in the elaboration ofstrategies: This report notes that oneof the most significant shortcomingsof the development prioritizationexercises has been the lack of adequateconsultation with communities,especially outside of the capital.Imperfect consultation has been a

problem of security; the credibility ofstate institutions outside of Kabul; therush with which strategies andprogrammes were designed to meetlarge funding conferences; and theemphasis on preparing documentationin English by foreign advisors, whichalienated by default the majority ofthe population. The Loya Jirgah,although a traditional consultativemechanism, was consulted only forthe overall structure of the transitionalGovernment and the Constitution,while development strategies such asthe NDB, NDF and SecuringAfghanistan’s Future were presentedto representatives as a fait accompli.As the state-building process maturesin the next few years, top-downdevelopment strategies need to becomplemented with bottom-upconsultation in order to be designedto ensure implementation among apartisan population.

• Participation in the implementation:Initiatives such as the NSP (involvingblock grants to communities) andNEEP (comprising labour-intensiveemergency-oriented projects) havebeen designed precisely in order toengage communities and distributeopportunities throughout the country.These programmes are key fordemonstrating the peace dividend topeople in a tangible and visible way.Accelerating them is imperative forengagement of communities in thereconstruction process.

• Checks and balances: Modalities toensure transparency, visibility andaccountability of the National PriorityProgrammes to the general public areprovided through a system to “enablecommunity, society and pressinvestigations”.7 The implementationof these modalities, however, requires

7 Outline of the NPP, Development Forum.

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soldiers. This is significant because, formany combatants, soldiering is no morethan a lucrative job opportunity, a way toescape debilitating poverty. Demobilizationplans must ensure the full involvement oflocal communities and recognize andreinforce local reconciliation processes.Voluntary demobilization should beencouraged, particularly focusing on howto best reduce and/or eliminate warringincentives. Given the levels ofimpoverishment of the population, plansmust largely be based on economic supportto communities, rather than on targetingex-combatants as a special group. Thelaunching of national reconciliationinitiatives and peace education campaignscontributes to enhancing confidence-building.

As far as food and health security areconcerned, the NDF recognizes theimmediate need to address the questionsof malnutrition and health of the Afghanpopulation. According to the strategy “thereis a major nutritional challenge ahead thatrequires urgent actions to halt deaths dueto malnutrition”.11 To meet this urgentchallenge, the framework underscores theimportance of “improving the basicpackage provided under humanitarianassistance... and distributing these topopulations where the information onchronic malnutrition is up-to-date”.12 Futuredevelopment agendas may also want toconsider the provision of trauma andmental health care to the population aspart of health security. Psychological careand counselling are crucial to overcomethe traumatic experiences of the long periodof conflict.

The Afghan Government is well aware ofthe importance of launching rehabilitationand reconstruction at the earliest possibletime in order to ensure social and economic

the empowerment of civil society, anda free and responsible press. In theabsence of adequate consultation andinformation sharing, it is difficult toassess how civil society can act as aneffective watchdog.

A Human Security Analysis ofStrategic Visions

Concern for human security in Afghanistantakes an important place in the generalgoals and priority areas of the NDF, eventhough the notion is not mentionedexplicitly. As the framework underlines:“Our vision of security, however, is broaderthan the services provided by the securitysector to the citizens. Security of livelihoodis critical to our endeavour, to eliminatepoverty, to provide social justice, removebarriers to inclusion and to create a societywhere all citizens are provided with accessto equality of opportunity.”8

The NDF emphasizes that ensuring publicsafety is key to the success of thereconstruction process: “The Afghan statemust have a legitimate monopoly ofviolence, a corollary of which is that itscitizens will not need to pay the cost ofprotection as individuals.”9 SecuringAfghanistan’s Future outlines a much moredetailed and integrated proposal, the so-called National Security Framework, whichcalls for improvement in the managementand implementation of the followingelements: police forces; counter-narcoticactions; the national Army; justice; humanrights; DDR and de-mining.10 In order toensure this, future development visionsmust stress the question of personalsecurity by designing an effective DDRstrategy for ex-combatants, which wouldinclude the simultaneous collection ofarms, education and vocational training,and economic opportunities for former

8 TISA, National Development Framework, 2002b.9 Ibid.10 TISA, Securing Afghanistan’s Future, 2004d.11 Ibid.12 Ibid.

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security. The NDF identifies detailedinvestment and development strategies torehabilitate basic infrastructure inAfghanistan, such as roads, housing, powerand transportation. One of the main goalsof the reconstruction of the infrastructureis to create an efficient, affordable transportsystem that enables “people, commodities,and ideas to move and connect”.13 Theframework includes the construction of anetwork of roads connecting the differentparts of Afghanistan, and air transportation,all of which could greatly improve jobsecurity.

The NDF also addresses the need for asocial protection policy to cater to peoplewith disabil i t ies and vulnerablepopulations, particularly women andorphans, as well as Government employeesand pensioners.14 The document identifiesprovision of employment and livelihood,as well as protection from abuse andneglect, as essential elements of the socialprotection policy.15 Securing Afghanistan’sFuture stresses the importance of thequality of economic growth, which shouldbe aimed at improving social indicatorswithout a significant deterioration inincome distribution.

Securing Afghanistan’s Future aims atabolishing the drug economy, and thereforesees a crucial need to provide thoseinvolved in opium poppy cultivation withviable alternatives. It has identified theagricultural sector as a primary option, forwhich alternative livelihoods policiesshould be shaped as part of a successfulcounter-narcotics strategy. Agriculture hasbeen recognized as the traditional economicact ivi ty of most Afghans, whoconsequently have the needed skills attheir disposal to be included in a country-

wide poverty reduction process focusedon this sector.

Securing Afghanistan’s Future alsor ecogn ize s t he impor t ance o fcomprehensive social protection policies,especially for the most vulnerable andpoor. As such, it highlights that theGovernment’s Livelihoods and SocialProtection Public Investment Programmeis “to enhance human security and promotethe reduction of poverty. It aims atempowering and supporting the poorestand most vulnerable people in Afghanistan,thereby helping individuals, households,and communities to better manage riskthrough both supporting sustainablelivelihood strategies and direct provisionof assistance to people who are unable tohelp themselves.”16 However, people withdisabilities suffer from consistent under-funding and lack of attention by theGovernment. A specific disability andvulnerability programme could bedeveloped as part of the future PRSP.

The NDF looks at the need for providingthe population with shelter and housing,17

but no concrete programmes have beendesigned so far. As to the provision ofpower, the framework emphasizes that itsgoal is “to provide power to households,enterprises and government – especiallyfor health and education – by harnessingvarious sources of energy”, includingnatural gas, coal, petroleum and otheralternative sources such as solar and windenergy. However, there is a crucial needto improve the production, transmissionand delivery of power to the people.18

Finally, two very important developmentissues stressed by the framework are toensure water supply for domestic use andagriculture, and to create sewage systems

13 Ibid.14 Government employees and pensioners fall within this category of vulnerable as their current incomes are below one dollar a day. See National Development

Framework.15 TISA, National Development Framework, 2002b.16 Ibid.17 Ibid.18 Ibid.

NHDR 04 177

and improve rural sanitation. Yet theproposal outlined by the NDB for theseservices takes little account of the needsin rural areas, focusing instead on Kabuland other main cities. While, for instance,the budget envisaged US$8 million forsupplying drinking water in Kabul for the1382 (2004) budget, a total of only US$9million was envisioned for six other majorcities in Afghanistan. The rural areas werenot even mentioned.19

Securing Afghanistan’s Future underlinesthe importance of environmentalpreservation and regeneration. Futuredevelopment visions should tackleenvironmental security in more detail,given the dangers in Afghanistan ofdrought and other natural disasters.

The question of reconciliation andcommunity security is crucial in order to

build a minimal level of trust among thepeople and make peaceful coexistencepossible. Measures suggested globally bythe Commission on Human Securityinclude:

• Ending impunity through the settingup of tribunals and the involvementof traditional justice processes.

• Establishing truth through the creationof truth commissions, as was done inmany Latin American countries andSouth Africa, for instance, along withthe restoration of the dignity of victims,especially women in the Afghan case.

• Promoting coexistence by encouraginglong - t e rm communi ty -basedinitiatives.

• Announcing amnesties for lesser crimesand assuring reparation for victims.

19 TISA, National Development Budget 1381-1382, 2002a.

Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 11, February 2004

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Yet, the NDF does not address the issueof community security at all. Futuredevelopment visions may need to beconsidered based on analyses of the rootsof the conflict, in order to confront thisconcern.

Financing Human Development

An analysis of the NDB from the humandevelopment point of view would requireanalysing the percentage of the budgetdevoted to social and human prioritiesagainst other sectors, as well as againstindented outcomes and impacts. A budgetanalysis would enable policy-makers inAfghanistan to determine what they shouldallocate as a percentage of GDP for socialpriorities to promote human developmentand progress towards the MDGs. It ishoped that such a budget analysis will becarried out in future NHDRs forAfghanistan, as more information is madeavailable on human developmentindicators.

An analysis of the budget in Afghanistanmust point to two different but relatedareas of activity: the supply of moneypledged by the international community,and the demands of the Government, asoutlined in NDB processes.

The Supply

At the first pledging conference in Tokyoin 2002, the international communitycommitted some US$4.5 billion for threeyears. Although the amount pledged inTokyo was the biggest sum of foreignassistance ever promised to Afghanistan,it came under criticism for its flaws andinadequacies. The main criticism was thatthe US$75 per person per year pledged toAfghanistan was considerably lower thanthe average US$250 per person pledgedto other post-war settings, such as Rwanda,Cambodia, East Timor and Kosovo.20

Furthermore, the Afghan Assistance

Coordination Authority (AACA) estimatedthat in 2002 and 2003, over 50 per cent ofaid had gone for humanitarian purposesand aid co-ordination.21

In March 2004, Securing Afghanistan’sFuture attempted to remedy the flaws ofinternational funding: first, by presentingthe international donor community with afigure closer to the actual needs ofAfghanistan; and second, by makinginternational assistance more focused onreconstruction and development. The statedpurpose of the report was to outline thepublic investment and associated fiscalcosts required for economic growth and afinancially viable state. It emphasizes thatthe figure requested “... is an investmentby the international community in stabilityand peace-building at the local, regionaland global levels. This funding should notbe viewed as charity, but as an investmentdesigned to lower the defense and securityspending of major nations, and reduce therisks of major terrorist incidents globally.It should also be seen in the context of thecost of existing investments in Afghanistan,including over US$13 billion per year thatis spent on Coalition and ISAF. It mustalso be seen in the context that more thanUS$2 billion has been spent over the last24 months to avoid the humanitarianemergencies that a failed state has nocapacity to address.”22

The total external financing requirementallocated over the next seven years andspent over 12 was estimated at US$27.5billion with an additional US$2.9 billionneeded to support the recurrent budget, asAfghanistan moves to self-sufficiency.The Transitional Administration estimatedinvestments in physical infrastructure andnatural resources to be US$13.4 billion,or 54 per cent of the total; human andsocial protection at just under US$7 billion,or 28 per cent of the total; and in security

20 CARE / Center on International Cooperation, 2003.21 Ibid.22 TISA, Securing Afghanistan’s Future, 2004d.

NHDR 04 179

and private sector development, includingpublic administration, at just over US$4billion, or 18 per cent of the total.

Against these calculations, the AfghanGovernment managed to get a pledge ofUS$8.2 billion for the next three years.For the 2005 fiscal year, donors pledgedUS$4.5 billion compared to the US$4.4billion the country was seeking, but thatalso meant that for the subsequent twoyears, only US$3.7 billion was promised.Although short of the budget requested,this pledge was hailed both by the AfghanGovernment and the internationalcommunity as a great success. Manylessons had been learned since Tokyo, notthe least of which was the organization ofthe demand side of costs by the Afghans.

The Demand: The National DevelopmentBudget (NDB)

Afghanistan’s new Government came along way in installing the budget as acentral instrument of policy and resourceallocation decisions. The first NDB 1381-1382 (2002-2003) suffered from limitedexperience and pressure for rapidimplementation and quick decision-making, as a trade-off for limitedconsultation processes and nationalownership. The Government then foresawthe need to establish appropriateprocurement and financial systems as atop priority, and hired internationallyrecognized firms such as KPMG to helpensure openness and accountability. Theestablishment of the budget also meantthat donor governments could now eitherdirectly support the general budget or theirspecific projects, or make contributions totrust funds in line with their priorities.

The rationale behind creating a NDB wasthat the experience of the first year ofreconstruction showed that the internationalcommunity, not the Afghans, owned thereconstruction process. The Administrationargued that the sum total of the variousdonor- and UN-driven strategies for

recovery did not amount to the mostappropriate and responsive answer toAfghanistan’s needs, and that ad hocproject design did not deliver effectiveresults, which is what mattered the mostto ordinary Afghans. This led theAdministration to take increasingly greatercontrol over the allocation of scarceresources, and the series of nationalinvestment programmes with benchmarksand clear indicators with which to judgesuccess was presented to the internationalcommunity in March 2003. The level ofsophistication in preparing the budgetimproved rapidly, with the budget beingused increasingly to allocate both cash andin-kind contributions to the Government’shighest-priority tasks. Perhaps one of themost important achievements was to focuson a medium-term expenditure framework,as opposed to the one-year time horizonthat donors had imposed during the firsttwo years of reconstruction.

In 2002–2003, a total of US$83 million indomestic revenue was generated againstan ordinary budget of US$350 million.During that time, months passed when theMinistry of Finance had insufficientresources to pay the very meagre wages –around US$40 per month – of its civilservants. In the fiscal year ending March20, 2004, and against an ordinary budgetof US$550 million, the Administrationpledged to achieve revenue earnings ofUS$200 million – a target it was able tomeet.

While foreign assistance is vital, it is nosubstitute for domestic financing ofsustainable human development. In 2004,external financing amounted to about US$5billion, with more than 90 per cent of theGovernment budget externally financed.The key for the future will be domesticrevenue mobilization, so that Afghanistandoes not continue to rely on theinternational community to pay foroperating expenses. In 2003, Afghanistanwas able to meet its revenue target of

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US$200 million, a 50 per cent increase incollections over the previous year. For2004, the revenue target set by theGovernment was US$309 million, whilethe IMF-Government sponsored StaffMonitored Programme (which monitorsexternal borrowings) had set a revenuetarget of US$256 million. The challengefor Afghanistan is to expand the economyand strengthen the revenue collection sothat domestic revenues could eventuallyfund operating expenditures. Self-sustainability is the goal that Afghanistanhas set for itself and its internationalpartners.

For the ordinary budget, improvementsalready underway during the 1383 (2004)budget include building core capacitieswithin the line ministries and establishinggreater control over staffing, particularlyfor security sector institutions. The ordinarybudget will continue to reflect an inputorientation, while ministries will be askedthis year for information on ministry goalsand objectives as a first step towardsprogramme budgeting. In the coming years,a fiscal framework will be establishedaround a macro-economic model, andexpenditures levels will be allocated toministries for national programmes.

In my opinion, the bestpossible source offinancing ourreconstruction anddevelopment goals isnumber 5. However,number 12, and 14 area matter of discussion,while the rest of theresources may not bedesirable forAfghanistan andtherefore not feasible.

Said Mubin Shah, NHDRbackground paper on economy,2004

Possible scenarios for financing the development needs in Afghanistan:

1 - Only aid

2 - Domestic resources together with aid

3 - Only foreign investment

4 - Domestic resources with foreign investment

5 - Domestic resources together with foreign investment and aid

6 - Only debt

7 - Domestic resources with debt

8 - Domestic resources with debt and foreign investment

9 - Debt with foreign investment and aid

10 - Debt with foreign investment

11 - Debt with aid

12 - Domestic resources with debt, aid and foreign investment

13 - Domestic resources with the creation of new money (monetization)

14 - Cutting Government expenditure

Government Resources (US$ million) 1380 (2001) – 1382 (2003)

Domestic Revenue 348.6

International Assistance 1,186.9

Total Government Resources 1,535.5

N.B. Domestic Revenue figures based on exchange rate of US$1= 48 Afs.

Source: Ministry of Finance, Financial Report, 24 May 2004.

Box 6.2

Financing Development

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Investments in Human Development

A preliminary analysis of the first NDB1381 (2002) - 1382 (2003) concludes thatpublic spending on social priorities –including basic education, health care,nutrition, as well as water supply andsanitation is inadequate.

Currently, investments in the securitysector, infrastructure and natural resourcesoutweigh those in the social sectors. Thisimbalance will need to be addressed asGovernment capacities increase. Whilethe proposed proportion of direct publicspending on human and social security isonly 28 per cent of total spending, theseven-year programme recognizes theprimacy of security sector reforms and theprovision of infrastructure for growth ofthe private sector as a precondition forhuman and social security. Investments inhealth and education, as well as theprovisions of basic services such as waterand sanitation, focus initially on policyand institutional reforms, cognizant of the

limited ability of the Administration in theinitial years to have a significant impact.

The NDF gives high priority to humanresource development (education), healthcare and social development as importantmeans by which Afghans could effectivelyparticipate in the rebuilding process. Thesesectors also support employment. Therelatively high priority given to educationprogrammes in the reconstruction agendais evident from the high budgetaryallocation to this sector. The total budgetfor 1381 (2002)–1382 (2003) amountedto approximately US$509 million.However, 82 per cent of this projectionwas not met.24

6.4. A Future of Human Security

Consensus on the Future: Targetsof the MDGs?

In order to move forward at this stage ofstate-building in Afghanistan, the question,now that presidential elections are over,is: What should be a responsible agendafor the new Government?

23 Ibid.24 TISA, National Development Budget 1381-1382, 2002a.

Chart 6.1: Sectoral Components of the Development Budget 1383 (2004) – 1389 (2010)23

Source: TISA, Securing Afghanistan’s Future, 2004

Pillar 1: Human and Social Protection 6,896

1.1 Refugee return 1551.2 Education 2,7031.3 Health and nutrition 1,3681.4 Rural livelihoods and social protection 2,2721.5 Culture / media / sports 400

Pillar 2: Physical Infrastr. and Natural Resources 13,429

2.1 Transport 6,1362.2 Energy, mining, telecommunications 3,6062.3 Natural resources 1,8492.4 Urban management 1,839

US$ Million - total commitments

GRAND TOTAL24,678

54%

28%

18%Pillar 3: Security and the Private Sector 4,353

3.1 Trade and investment 6903.2 Public admin and eco management 1,0823.3 Justice 933.4 Police, law enforcement 6453.5 National Army 1,0433.6 DDR 2163.7 Counter Narcotics 1643.8 Mine action 420

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Table 6.1.1: Operating Budget Expenditures 1381 (2002)Ministry Personal Services Tools and Maintenance Land, Subsidies, Total

Emoluments Materials and Repairs Structures and Grants andEquipment Pensions

President's Office 41.8 29.1 111.6 41.9 31.1 65.5 321.0Supreme Court 61.8 5.0 5.4 1.1 7.8 1.1 82.2Ministry of Finance 119.1 8.7 20.1 18.1 14.2 45.1 226.3Ministry of Defence 1,806.4 62.1 1,866.5 85.5 275.3 54.5 4,150.2Ministry of Foreign Affairs 98.7 101.2 11.8 3.4 5.3 1.1 221.6Ministry of Religious Affairs and Haj 83.8 4.9 2.9 1.6 5.3 4.6 103.1Ministry of Commerce 107.8 2.8 1.1 0.2 1.0 300.3 413.1Ministry of Interior 1,067.9 121.1 1,512.0 37.2 346.9 21.2 3,106.3Ministry of Education 1,332.0 4.8 12.2 2.9 3.6 18.9 1,374.3Ministry of Higher Education 125.4 5.3 58.3 1.7 10.1 6.7 207.5Ministry of Return of Refugees 9.5 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.2 10.4Ministry of Repatriates 0.5 1.0 0.1 0.0 1.8 0.0 3.4Ministry of Planning 11.2 1.4 0.8 0.3 1.8 0.2 15.7Ministry of Mines and Industries 20.1 5.7 1.2 0.8 1.7 6.2 35.7Ministry of Light Industries and Foodstuffs 5.7 0.4 0.9 1.6 2.2 78.6 89.4Ministry of Communication 81.0 43.2 7.2 1.3 1.6 6.7 141.0Ministry of Reconstruction 5.8 1.9 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.8 9.1Ministry of Information and Culture 99.8 32.1 16.0 4.0 18.9 0.5 171.3Ministry of Health 321.3 34.0 318.9 10.4 53.3 0.8 738.6Ministry of Women's Affairs 12.2 0.8 1.9 0.3 0.6 1.0 16.8Ministry of Agriculture 92.7 4.9 60.1 10.2 25.2 7.4 200.5Ministry of Irrigation and Water 43.1 3.0 4.6 2.4 8.5 2.1 63.6Ministry of Water and Power 62.1 1.8 1.3 0.8 116.9 0.3 183.2Ministry of Public Works 70.5 4.2 4.0 0.3 34.3 3.4 116.7Ministry of Rural Development 33.2 1.1 2.9 0.7 0.0 1.7 39.7Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled 27.2 4.1 11.1 0.2 6.7 47.9 97.3Ministry of Transport 57.6 1.5 1.0 0.1 1.7 1.3 63.2Ministry of Frontiers 16.7 1.8 5.0 0.8 6.9 2.2 33.5Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 76.5 6.8 30.7 0.6 21.1 24.6 160.3Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism 49.4 1.3 1.3 1.6 0.5 1.7 55.8Minisry of Urban Development 43.1 1.6 0.6 0.5 1.2 0.6 47.6Ministry of Justice 18.4 2.0 4.2 4.8 3.8 2.3 35.5Counter Narcotics 3.0 1.9 0.5 0.3 1.6 0.1 7.4Science Academy 12.5 1.1 0.6 0.9 1.0 1.1 17.2National Olympics Committee 2.8 3.5 0.4 0.0 105.7 2.5 115.0Geodesy and Cartography 11.6 0.7 1.3 0.5 0.8 0.9 15.9Central Statistics Office (CSO) 10.8 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.7 13.0National Security 286.0 53.4 230.4 50.0 74.2 16.3 710.3Attorney General 73.3 3.6 23.6 1.7 12.9 1.5 116.6Enterprise Assessment Commission (1) 0.3 0.1 0.1 1.2 3.8 0.1 5.6Prime Minister's Office (1) 16.7 2.3 3.1 1.2 1.7 0.4 25.4Civil Service Commission (2) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0Total 6,419.1 567.0 4,336.6 291.6 1,211.8 733.9 13,560.2Total in US$m 133.7 11.8 90.3 6.1 25.2 15.3 282.5

1. In 1382 the Enterprise Assessment Commission and the Prime Minister’s office was included in the Administrative Affairs budget.2. The Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission was created in 1382.3. Figures based on exchange rate of US$ 1 equals 48 Afs. Note that this is an approximation, as the exchange rate fluctuated during both 1381 and 1382.

NHDR 04 183

Table 6.1.2: Operating Budget Expenditures 1382 (2003)Ministry Personal Services Tools and Maintenance Land, Subsidies, Total

Emoluments Materials and Repairs Structures & Grants &Equipment Pensions

President's Office 236.2 59.0 197.8 117.0 26.8 53.4 690.2Supreme Court 103.2 3.7 14.7 3.8 9.2 1.5 136.2Ministry of Finance 172.8 20.3 29.2 14.7 30.1 32.1 299.2Ministry of Defence 3,105.4 74.5 1,546.3 124.4 561.5 9.3 5,421.5Ministry of Foreign Affairs 376.5 260.1 28.4 66.3 173.0 21.9 926.2Ministry of Religious Affairs and Haj 178.8 7.1 4.7 5.8 7.6 1.7 205.9Ministry of Commerce 33.7 6.4 4.1 0.6 82.7 0.2 127.8Ministry of Interior 1,816.3 50.1 1,391.5 282.6 1,038.7 256.8 4,836.0Ministry of Education 3,275.0 25.7 73.0 28.5 40.1 3.4 3,445.8Ministry of Higher Education 176.6 8.5 137.9 7.9 7.4 2.1 340.3Ministry of Return of Refugees 41.3 11.9 11.2 3.0 6.6 2.1 76.2Ministry of Repatriates 0.9 1.7 0.2 0.2 1.5 0.0 4.6Ministry of Planning 16.3 2.5 1.2 0.5 0.9 0.5 21.8Ministry of Mines and Industries 97.9 3.4 2.6 1.2 116.2 1.4 222.6Ministry of Light Industries and Foodstuffs 16.1 4.4 1.8 3.6 2.4 118.2 146.5Ministry of Communication 106.4 64.6 15.6 5.6 44.7 2.4 239.4Ministry of Reconstruction 16.5 47.9 6.3 18.3 8.9 0.4 98.4Ministry of Information and Culture 137.3 25.0 16.0 11.2 24.5 10.3 224.3Ministry of Health 476.1 37.4 478.5 19.9 53.0 0.3 1,065.2Ministry of Women's Affairs 24.7 2.3 2.0 0.6 0.9 0.4 30.9Ministry of Agriculture 256.1 13.7 19.1 16.6 53.9 51.6 411.0Ministry of Irrigation and Water 57.7 8.3 9.8 2.7 9.0 0.6 88.0Ministry of Water and Power 21.3 4.3 4.5 2.6 125.3 1.1 159.1Ministry of Public Works 77.3 4.1 21.6 10.4 157.3 0.6 270.3Ministry of Rural Development 42.4 5.8 7.8 5.0 317.7 2.3 381.0Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled 37.7 7.0 4.5 0.8 3.7 281.5 335.2Ministry of Transport 35.6 2.4 2.4 0.5 2.9 0.2 44.0Ministry of Frontiers 128.5 5.2 31.1 2.9 8.6 2.7 178.9Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 148.4 12.2 83.2 0.8 3.2 8.6 256.5Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism 36.7 2.6 2.1 5.2 6.1 0.2 52.8Minisry of Urban Development 14.5 2.1 2.5 1.9 1.1 0.6 22.8Ministry of Justice 110.1 14.0 101.7 20.1 27.8 6.6 280.3Counter Narcotics 3.4 0.6 0.7 0.3 4.0 0.0 9.1Science Academy 17.1 5.2 1.0 1.8 0.9 0.0 26.0National Olympics Committee 21.3 4.4 22.0 3.6 8.7 0.7 60.8Geodesy and Cartography 21.3 3.5 3.0 1.5 4.0 0.1 33.4Central Statistics Office (CSO) 21.8 2.1 1.3 0.2 1.0 0.4 26.7National Security 314.4 8.3 238.0 10.4 11.2 0.5 582.8Attorney General 144.1 4.9 16.9 2.9 14.5 0.1 183.4Enterprise Assessment Commission (1) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0Prime Minister's Office (1) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0Civil Service Commission (2) 17.2 1.5 4.2 2.6 17.2 2.3 44.9Total 11,934.9 828.7 4,539.6 808.4 3,015.1 879.2 22,006.0Total in US$m 248.6 17.3 94.6 16.8 62.8 18.3 458.5

1. In 1382 the Enterprise Assessment Commission and the Prime Minister’s office was included in the Administrative Affairs budget.2. The Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission was created in 1382.3. Figures based on exchange rate of US$ 1 equals 48 Afs. Note that this is an approximation, as the exchange rate fluctuated during both 1381 and 1382.

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In 2004, the Transitional Administrationdeclared its intentions to achieve theMDGs, eight specific goals and a seriesof related targets that emerged from aglobal agreement signed by 189 countriesin 2000. The MDGs could become anormative framework for the formulationof national policies, and an opportunityfor Afghanistan to engage in alternativelong-term models that incorporate the mostfundamental issues of development.Subsequent development frameworksshould be clearly aligned with the MDGs.

The Millennium Declaration specifies:“Men and women have the right to livetheir lives and raise their children indignity, free from hunger and from fearof violence, oppression or injustice.”25 The

inherent relationship between the MDGsand human security is like that of thechicken and egg conundrum. 2 6

Deprivations in the basic dimensions ofdevelopment also represent a deprivationof human rights and human security, andvice versa. Without security, the MDGscannot be achieved.

Investigation at the regional and sub-regional levels in Afghanistan, which probebeyond the steady progress in improvingthe human development index (HDI) andreducing poverty at the national level,reveal grave disparities. Regions of highpoverty and low HDI, (and thereby lowlevels of attainments of MDG targets) areprecisely those where conflict is beingfuelled. Regions with high levels of human

25 UN, The Millennium Declaration, 2000, www.un.org/millennium/summit.htm.26 From discussions held on the UNDP MDG Network, summer 2004.

MDG1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger

2. Achieve universal primary education

3. Promote gender equality and empowerwomen

4. Reduce child mortality

5. Improve maternal mortality

6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and otherdiseases

7. Ensure environmental sustainability andaccess to safe drinking water andsanitation

8. Develop a global partnership fordevelopment

Table 6.2: MDG Targets for Afghanistan

Source: UNDP, MDG Report Afghanistan, 2004.

CURRENT LEVELPoverty: 53%Hunger: 48%

Primary (total): 36%Girls: 21%Boys: 51%

Female primary enrolment: 21%Girls enrolment share: 30%

Under-five mortality rate: 260 per 1,000Infant mortality rate: 165 per 1,000

Maternal mortality ratio: 1,600 per 100,000

Measles: 718 cases annually, Polio: 10Malaria: 16% of population at high risk, 3million annually, Tuberculosis: 321 casesper 100,000; 91 deaths per 100,000

Population without access to safe drinkingwater: 87%

ODA (% of GDP): 48%GDP per capita (US$): 170

TARGET 2015Poverty: 26%Hunger: 24%

Primary (total): 100Girls: 100%Boys: 100%

Female primary enrolment: 100%Girls enrolment share: 50%

Under-five mortality rate: 90 per 1000Infant mortality rate: 55 per 1000

Maternal mortality ratio: 400 per 100,000

Measles: 0 casesPolio: 0Malaria: 8% of population at high risk,Tuberculosis: 48 cases per 100,000;Surveys and actions to curb rise in AIDS.

Population without access to safe drinkingwater: 43%

ODA (% of GDP): 20%GDP per capita (US$): 500

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poverty, child malnutrition and humanunderdevelopment coincide with regionsof internal insecurity.

Instead of attaining the MDGs at theaggregate national level, it is vital to devisetargeted plans and monitor attainment ofthe goals by disadvantaged groups, suchas women, different ethnic groups, or inthe case of underperforming regions anddistricts. The consistent failure of somegroups to attain the MDGs, while othersin the same country move towardsachieving them, reflects the failure of thestate to serve as an impartial agency.Restoring representative and participativegovernance, particularly at the local level,where the majority of the excluded groupsreside, may have to precede anyinternational assistance towards reachingthe MDGs. The first requirement forachieving overall growth and humansecurity, therefore, is to ensure that thereis uniform development, withoutsignificant inequalities and deprivationsacross gender, ethnic, linguistic or regionalgroups.

The MDGs are goals that need to be usedin a manner that is flexible and addresseslocal realities.27 For Afghanistan, broaderprogrammes focusing on governance,inequality, land reform, human rightspromotion, reducing domestic violenceand justice reform should accompany anationally tailored MDG strategy.

As Chapter 4 of this report points out, lackof progress on development and povertymay sustain conflict. Progress towards theMDGs could therefore contribute to theresolution of the conflict and recovery inAfghanistan, by addressing such vitalissues as land distribution, inter-ethnictensions, empowering the vulnerable (thepoor, women and children), andstrengthening governance institutions Itmay also help support people’s copingmechanisms.

What Kind of Growth Strategy DoesAfghanistan Need?

Subsequent development frameworksshould also recognize the structural causesof conflict in Afghanistan, and take intoaccount distributional justice that will allowfor even and balanced developmentthroughout the country. Following theBonn Conference, the standard neo-liberalparadigm for internationally supportedreconstruction in post-war situations thathad developed during the 1990s wasadopted in Afghanistan. This package,based on market-driven growth, an openeconomy and a minimalist regulatory state,recognizes economic growth as theprincipal strategy for development andcombating poverty, and the private sectoras the main engine of such growth.

The Government’s NDF presents, forexample, a vision of social and economicreforms based around macroeconomicstability, private-sector-led growth, liberaltrade and a key ‘enabling’ role for thestate.

But neo-liberalism, although hegemonictoday, has had a poor performance in thelast quarter century in both developing andpost-crisis countries. Compared to theperformance of post-colonial policy-making in developing countries, roughlyfrom the 1950s through the mid 1970s,neo-liberal conditionality-based policieshave performed poorly, in terms of slowingeconomic growth, greater economicinstability, rising inequality, increasingunder-employment and persistentlypervasive poverty.2 8 As was welldocumented in the late 1980s and early1990s (cf. UNICEF’s StructuralAdjustment with a Human Face andUNDP’s Human Development Reports),structural adjustment programmes haveoften imposed heavy social costs.

27 Ibid.28 Terry McKinley, UNDP 2004.

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While priority is given to economicliberalisation and building institutions ofrepresentative democracy, problems suchas poverty, inequality, poor health andeducation, environmental degradation andsocial exclusion could intensify. Too often,Bretton Woods institutions and transitionalstates are concerned with establishingdemocracy, not inclusive government,while economic and social conditionalityis directed towards promoting growth andefficiency and poverty reduction, but notreducing horizontal inequality. Yet,prevailing conditionalities will not succeedin realizing the objectives of economicgrowth and democracy if disparities persist.They need to be better targeted to placethe reduction of horizontal inequality atthe centre of development agendas, ifconflict is to be avoided.29

To begin with, the root causes of conflictneed to be factored into policies.

Any new framework for recovery inAfghanistan should be conscious ofconflict issues, for instance, factors suchas urban bias, capital flight, inflation,concentration of power in the hands ofdifferent factions, corruption, security andnarcotics. Adopting a strategy that ignoresthe differences in participation in thepolitical and economic agendas could leadto inequalities. Even if the GNP canincrease within a few years, chances arethat poverty will rise along with inequality.The higher the level of inequality, the lessimpact economic growth has in reducingpoverty, regardless of the rate of economicgrowth. Inequality not only repressesgrowth, but also has underlying politicaland social impacts on crime and politicalstability.30 Exacerbated inequality is notinevitable, and should be mitigated throughspecific policies addressing not onlytraditional causes, such as disparities ineducation, land reform and regional

policies, but also new causes, such as theuneven impact of new technologies andtrade, the threat of sharp recessions thatcan arise from stabilisation and adjustmentpolicies, a lack of coordination betweennational and international financialliberalisation and regulation, and theabsence of progressive tax policies andequitable labour market policies.

In other words, distribution issues need tobe integrated in policy advice given by theinternational financial institutions. Socialequity and distributive justice, both asinstruments and ends in themselves, shouldbe seen as an integral part of the debateon development, not as add-ons whenexisting economic policies are inadequate.Inequality is associated with socialexclusion, and declining confidence in theGovernment and the functioning ofdemocracy. It can impede growth,undermine poverty alleviation and fuelsocial tension, and therefore should be ofconcern to policy makers.31 If largesegments of the population are notadequately considered in new laws andinstitutions, and are not given theopportunity to participate in public life,the legitimacy of the new political systemswould be questioned. At the same time,however, equality has positive externalities.The empowerment of women, forexamples, not only benefits them, but alsochildren, families and the society at large.Investment in female education increaseswomen’s productivity, while decreasinginfant mortality and helping to ensure theeducation and health of future generations.

Social stress, as a result of exacerbatedhorizontal inequalities, can ultimatelymanifest through conflicted behaviour atall levels, from increasing numbers ofdivorces and a rise in domestic violence,to crime, migration and warfare betweendifferent groups.

29 See the work of Frances Stewart 2000 and 2002.30 Cornia and Court 2001.31 WB 2000.

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Figure 6.2 presents various growthscenarios for Afghanistan based on non-drug GDP growth rates. Clearly, low levelsof growth (three to five per cent) putAfghanistan’s future at risk, underminingthe visibility of growth for individuals andnarrowing the revenue base within whichthe Government can drive the reformprocess. Growth rates in the order of eightto nine per cent over the medium term willbe required to keep the reform programmeon track, and to generate jobs and incomefor all – including poor and vulnerablegroups.

The US$8 billion provided by theinternational community in Berlin in March2004 is a vital input to the reconstructionprocess, providing for enhanced security,better access to basic services in healthand education, and much neededinfrastructure such as roads and irrigationsystems. While the private sector willremain the engine for growth, public sectorsupport will be required to create theenabling environment needed to reach thegrowth rates outlined above.

What Kind of Growth is Necessaryfor Afghanistan?

A Broad and Fast One

Even an ambitious level of growth andassistance would only deliver a per capitaincome of US$500 by 2015, which maynot enable Afghanistan to attain the MDGtargets.

Strong, broad-based growth will be criticalto Afghanistan’s success. SecuringAfghanistan’s Future outlines the rangeof growth required for national and humansecurity. According to its analysis, growthhas been strong since 2001, with grainproduction doubling, and estimated GDPup by about 50 per cent in the last twoyears. Inflation has been contained byresponsible fiscal and monetary policiesand has remained stable. Afghanistan isputting in place the most liberal trade andtariff regime in the region. There has beenrapid development of telecommunications,based on private investment in mobilephone technology, and a major roadrehabilitation programme is underway.

Figure 6.2: Growth Scenarios for Afghanistan

Source: TISA, Securing Afghanistan’s Future, 2004

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SecuringAfghanistan’s

Future

A Sustainable Growth Scenario:Mobilizing Domestic Resources and DebtRelief

To avoid long-term aid dependence, theGovernment needs to mobilize moredomestic resources – boosting revenue orborrowing domestically for publicinvestment while encouraging domesticsteps towards direct lending to long-termprivate investment. Instead of cuttingexpenditures, the Government should befinding ways to mobilize resources.

Ideally, revenue collection should boostgrowth, but the precarious securitysituation, the lack of a harmoniousrelationship between the state andperiphery, the general poverty of thepopulation, and the lack of taxation on thelargest sectors, namely cross-border illegaltrade and poppy cultivation, have madeAfghanistan heavily dependent on externalaid for both its operational anddevelopment budgets.

Ultimately, foreign borrowing should leadto a substantial increase in income percapita, as well as an increase in net exports,otherwise the country may not haveadditional resources and the exchangeneeded to service its debt. Yet in the longterm, aid should not be a substitute fortaxation and domestic revenues.

Before the Tokyo Conference, Oxfam hadcalled for donors to cancel Afghanistan’sUS$45 million debt to multilateralinstitutions, including US$33 million owedto the WB and the ADB, and US$8.8million to the IMF. Oxfam noted, “Thedebt burden is both a major reason whypoverty is so deep and widespread in manycountries, and why these countries find itso difficult to find a pathway out ofpoverty. Unsustainable debt acts as a major

barrier to poverty eradication. Debtrepayments limit the resources availablefor investment in basic services which areessential to the poor. Debt also createsuncertainty for domestic and foreigninvestors, thereby restricting growth inAfghanistan.”32 As the transitionalGovernment began paying off pre-1979loans owed to multi-lateral banks, newdebts were being accumulated (See Box6.3). Although there is no doubt that thecountry needs all the support it can getfrom bi- and multi-lateral organizations,and that the loans and grants providedtarget the actual needs of thereconstruction, the experience of too manycountries points to a cycle of debt andpoverty from which it is hard to break free.

Sustainability depends on a domesticrevenue base and on raising additionalpublic revenue. An investment-led pro-poor growth strategy requires threefinancial conditions: mobilizing sufficientrevenue for public investment; mobilizingsufficient private savings to finance privateinvestment; and complementing domesticresources with stable inflows of public andprivate capital. Domestic borrowing cancontribute to financing public investment,but only as a complement to revenuemobilization.33

The Transitional Government counts ondomestic revenue and on a dynamic privatesector, both domestic and international, tosustain growth in Afghanistan. As theMinister of Finance stated, “Aid is adevelopment catalyst, but never a substitutefor a dynamic private sector, both domesticand international, that provides the engineof growth. Sustained growth transformsthe people, particularly the poor, intostakeholders in the economy and polity.”34

32 Oxfam 2002.33 McKinley 2004.34 Speech of Ashraf Ghani, Minister of Finance, at Berlin Conference, March 2004.

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35 The World Factbook, U.S. Department of State.36 Otherwise noted, the information here is from the Bank Information Center, 2003, http://www.bicusa.org/bicusa/issues/WB_ADB_in_Afghanistan_outline.pdf.37 WB. Afghanistan Country Update, 2004c.38 ADB, “A Fact Sheet on Afghanistan”, data as of 31 December 2003.39 ADB press release, March 2004, http://www.adb.org/Documents/News/2004/nr2004025.asp.

In the financial year 2003, the total debtoutstanding and disbursed was US$2,429million, according to data collected bythe ADB and the IMF. An annual foreigndebt service is equal to about one-tenthof Afghanistan’s annual GDP, non-viablyhigh for a society without an economicsurplus.

By 2004, Afghanistan had US$8 billionin bilateral debt, mostly to Russia, andUS$500 million in debt to multilateraldevelopment banks.35

Between 1964 and 1979, the WB hadprovided 21 loans amounting to US$230million, of which US$147 million wascancelled. The ADB had given loans forUS$95.1 million between 1966 and 1979,when it withdrew from Afghanistan.36

Between 1979 and 1992, Afghanistancontinued to repay the WB and ADBloans until it gained a non-accrual status

with both organizations in 1992. Anumber of governments clearedAfghanistan’s arrears (pre-1979 loans)in 2002–2003: US$26 million of the pre-1979 WB loans were paid off by Japan,Italy, Norway, Sweden and the UnitedKingdom, and US$18 million in arrearsto the ADB were cleared by the UnitedKingdom.

With the re-engagement of the WB inAfghanistan since 2002, Afghanistanhas continued to repay its pre-1979 loan(US$56 million had been repaid by 2004)with the help of bilateral agreements andthrough the Afghan Reconstruction TrustFund (ARTF); simultaneously, new debtactivities began. In 2003, the WB gaveUS$171.8 million in InternationalDevelopment Association (IDA) grants(no-interest loans called “credits) andUS$7.7 million in Japan Social

Development Fund (JSDF) grants, whilefor 2003–2004, the WB had plannedloans of US$326.4 million in IDA creditsand US$7.75 million in InternationalFinance Cooperation (IFC) loans(privatesector loans). Since April 2002, the WBhas committed US$281.8 million ingrants and an additional US$221.4million in no-interest loans.37

In 2002, the ADB approved a US$150-million “post-conflict multi-sector” loan.By December 2003, the bank hadapproved 11 loans for Afghanistanamounting to US$412.3 million38, andat the Berlin Conference it announcedthat it would consider assistance up toUS$800 million in the form of AsiaDevelopment Facility (ADF) loans andgrants at highly concessional interestrates, during 2005-2008.39

Box 6.3

Debt in Afghanistan

Lender Debt (local curr.) Debt US$m

Confirmed Debts:United States Agency for Inter. Dev. (USAID) 57.4United States Dep. of Agriculture (USDA) 25.0(Former) German Dem. Rep. 40.0OPEC Fund 1.8World Bank 49.5Asian Development Bank 9.2

Total Confirmed 182.9

Unconfirmed Debts:Bulgaria 36.0Iraq 5.7Kuwait Fund 3.74m Dinar 12.7(Former) Czechoslovakia 75.0Saudi Arabia 30.0

Total Unconfirmed 159.4

Table 6.3: Debts incurred by Previous Administrations 1380 (2001) and Before.

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Source: Ministry of Finance, Financial Report, 24 May 2004.

farmers only encouraged more to plantpoppies. Essentially, opium prices, thoughfalling, are still high, and the profits morethan compensate for the risks of the crop’snominal illegality. Changing the calculationof risk and reward would involve punishingpoppy growers and opium distillers moreconsistently, and making trafficking harderand riskier, both of which require securityinstitutions that do not yet exist. Mostimportantly, Afghans need other ways tomake ends meet.

One possibility for the diversification oflivelihoods among Afghans is dried fruit.Afghanistan used to be the world's biggestexporter of raisins and a net exporter offood. Various other fruits and herbs aregrown in the south and east, and businesspeople talk of exporting flowers and cotton.The most promising licit economicopportunities are perhaps found in thecarpet trade. Many “Afghan” rugs on salein the West are actually made in Pakistan,where much of the industry migratedduring the decades of war. The remainingcarpet-makers in Afghanistan struggle tocompete with their technically advantagedrivals in other countries. Providing thenecessary technical assistance to Afghanswould not represent a major obstacle;however, getting the carpets to marketmight.

The abysmal lack of infrastructure inAfghanistan clearly represents a hindranceto economic security. A transport systemis integral to economic regeneration inAfghanistan, both in terms of trading andin providing transit routes. Some believethat the customs revenues being siphonedoff at the various border points by regionalpower-holders are roughly equivalent tothe entire national budget.43 If there wasan adequate national road system, tollscould be charged by the centralGovernment, recapturing lost revenue.

A Secure Growth Scenario: Transformingthe War Economy

The precarious security situation inAfghanistan is ultimately linked to theperseverance of the war economy.40

Spoilers of peace persist because, asdescribed in Chapter 4, the conditions thatallow them to remain have notfundamentally changed, and because theyhave strong incentives to retain power foras long as possible. Following theexpulsion of the Taliban, regionalcommanders realized that a key source ofpower for the central Government wouldbe international aid, something to whichthey had no access. The lack of adequatedistribution of funds to the regions ledpower-holders, among others, to questionthe Government's capacity to provide basicpublic goods, and gave them the signal todevelop their own alternative resourcesthrough illegal transit fees, smuggling anddrug dealing.

Given the insecurity-related dependencyof most Afghans on private militias andpower-holders, it would appear that humaninsecurity and economic stagnation willcontinue fuelling each other until eitheran effective security system is put in place,or more profitable, licit economicopportunities come into existence.41 Forthe time being, however, it will not be easyto persuade the legions of labourers skilledin opium harvesting – not to mention thosewho reap much of the profit – to find othersources of income. For the drug economyto be eradicated, estimates are that thelegal economy would need to grow at asteady nine per cent for many years tocome.42

In general, there is little money foralternatives that would allow farmers togrow viable and legal money-earningcrops. A recent attempt to buy out opium

Lots of new high-risebuildings have beenerected in Kabul lately.Some see them as asign of improvement inthe economy. Butwhose economy? Notmine for sure! Mybiggest concern is thatboth our political andeconomic systemshave yieldedpermanent presenceand roots to warlords –the very onesresponsible for many ofthe recent humancatastrophes.

Jawad, from Kabul

40 Section adapted from Jeanette Kroes 2004.41 Abdul Baqi Banwal 2004b.42 The Economist, “It’s Hard Going Straight”, 1 April 2004.43 United States Institute of Peace 2003.

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Foreign aid and engagement are bothessential for rebuilding Afghanistan, butthe country will remain one of the world’spoorest states, and its human security willcontinue to be threatened, unless it findsa way out of the multiple vicious circlesin which it seems to be trapped. Economicprogress depends on security and a stableGovernment; however, security alsodepends on economic opportunities. Withneither security nor alternative economicopportunities, many Afghans will continueto cultivate poppies, thus enriching peace-spoilers who thrive on and sustainlawlessness.

An Equitable and Balanced Growth

It is obvious that poor countries shouldfocus on the question of growth versusincome distribution, and that developmentrequires a higher GNP and a faster growthrate. The basic question, however, is notonly how to make GNP grow, but alsowho would make it grow, the few or themany. If GNP growth is based on the rich,then it will likely be appropriated for them,and poverty and income inequality willcontinue to grow worse. But, if it is

generated by the many, then the poor willbe its principle beneficiaries, and the fruitsof economic growth will be shared moreevenly.44

If Afghanistan is to reach the target ofhalving extreme income poverty by 2015,rapid growth is certainly essential.However, if growth is more equitable – sothat the incomes of the poor grow fasterthan average – the country may have amuch better chance of reaching this target.Growth has to be rapid to improve theabsolute poverty of the poor, but alsoequitable to raise the relative position ofthe poor. If growth is to reduce poverty,it should have a pattern that directsresources disproportionately to the sectorsin which the poor work (such as small-scale agriculture), the areas in which theylive (such as underdeveloped regions) orthe factors of production that they possess(such as unskilled labour or land).

The trend in GDP growth in the past twoyears in Afghanistan will not be sustainableif longer term policies do not addressurban–rural disparities as much as povertyand inequality in general, as well as the

44 Mubin Shah 2004.

Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 5, May 2002

No society can beflourishing and happywhere the greater partof the numbers arepoor and miserable.

Adam Smith, 1776.

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inequalities between men and women.Balanced human development may notoccur automatically with economic growth,while economic growth cannot besustainable if it fails to address the causesof spatial and social inequality. High levelsof inequality are, therefore, inefficient inaddition to being unjust. Furthermore, evenif there is considerable social and economicprogress, rifts may start to appear if thecountry does not address fundamentalproblems and deep inequalities (such asland distribution, gender discrimination,urban–rural gaps, etc.) Growth modelsshould therefore be based on inclusiveeconomic processes. As part of aninvestment-led strategy of growth anddevelopment, the Government must alsoadopt policies that promote an equitabledistribution of the fruits of thisdevelopment. These must involve measuresto contain and reduce the rising inequalitiesin incomes that characterizes the situationin Afghanistan.

Without taking these steps, there is a dangerof growth that alienates the population andleads to grievances, as discussed in Chapter3. Other dangers of a skewed distributionpattern could be urban bias, which neglectsrural development, as has been the caseof almost all development models inAfghanistan’s history, as well as thepotential difficulties faced by urban areasstruggling to absorb surplus labour fromthe countryside. Failed or non-existentrural development policies pushhouseholds out of the rural areas, whileinvestment in urban areas creates the “citylights” fantasy that pulls in ruralhouseholds. Once in the city, withoutadequate housing or employment, migrantsend up joining the informal sector insquatter settlements without guarantees ofsatisfying basic human securities, such asincome, education, health, personal securityand so on.

To avoid prolonging the “Kabul and therest” perception, the new Governmentmust design a comprehensive regionaldevelopment strategy. The reconstructionefforts of the past two years as well aseconomic revival boosted by drugtrafficking have contributed to the boomingeconomy in Kabul and major urban centres.The continuation of this trend could giverise to mass migration and marginalizepeople, thereby perpetuating inequalities.

A balanced growth pattern also needs totackle the unequal redistribution of nationalrevenues, especially taxes and localrevenues received by some of the provinces(Herat, Kandahar, Mazar, Jalalabad), alarge portion of which does not reach thecentral Government. The rationale behindcreating a strong central state inAfghanistan in the first place was the sharpgeographical differences in wealth indifferent provinces. For instance, Heratprovince in 2002 generated revenues 5,000times greater than the poor province ofBamiyan, and about 2,000 times theamount generated in the province ofWardak, just south of Kabul.45 Today,central ministries are encouraged to usemarket mechanisms for distributingreconstruction projects and socialservices.46 As one researcher puts it,however, “the competitive bidding processwill exacerbate rather than diminish presentinequalities if NGOs, firms and aidagencies bid last on projects in backward,insecure or inaccessible areas, as theymight be expected to do.”47 Balanceddevelopment requires addressing theformidable challenge of adequate collectionand fair distribution of revenues throughoutthe country.

Growth Based on Employment

In countries of the Asia Pacific region, aUNDP study found that agricultural andrural development were crucial

45 Astri 2004.46 Ibid.47 Ibid.

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underpinnings of a pro-poor growthstrategy, yet such development was oftenignored in the allocation of public resourcesand in PRSPs.48 In Afghanistan, agricultureremains a large and important economicsector, particularly for employment andthe livelihoods of the poor. Thus,agricultural development, and ruraldevelopment more generally, remaincrucial for poverty reduction.

In linking growth to poverty reduction,strategies have to address the importanceof generating widespread employment.But such employment has to be at decentwages to actually reduce poverty. Thisimplies that self-employment and micro-enterprises (and the micro-finance servicessupporting them) cannot serve as thefoundation for a pro-poor employmentstrategy. Although such micro-programmescan help raise incomes, secure andremunerative employment cannot besustained by these interventions alone. Theemphasis has to shift to small and mediumenterprises, and large enterprises that areemployment-intensive and enhance skills.49

Poverty alleviation strategies, therefore,have to identify a critical set of publicpolicies that can help achieve widespreademployment at decent wages.

Growth Based on Adequate Participation

Public participation is also required todevelop national and local policies deemedboth effective and just. This should beassured through information disseminationto socially vulnerable groups in remoteareas as well as to more visible NGOs.Participation in development strategydesign itself can be done through theengagement of civil society organisationsand communities in order to take theirneeds into consideration. At the same time,they can hold Government partners,especially the UN agencies andinternational financial institutions,

accountable in meeting a number ofrequirements: environmental protectionpolicies, social protection and equalizingpolicies, and public consultation andinformation disclosure requirements.Consultation with the public is importantbecause citizens of Afghanistan have anactive role in the development process,both as beneficiaries and as agents. Theirparticipation can lead to better projectdesign and the prevention of costlymistakes. These mistakes, as the historyof Afghanistan has showed, can be botheconomically costly as well as, moreimportantly, leading to serious humancosts.

Including people in the developmentstrategy design and implementation inAfghanistan is also a way to ease the gapbetween perceptions of a “modern” statewith its modern elite and a “backward”tribal people. Rural tribes often understandfast-paced urban modernization as aninfluence of the West. Perceiving this asanti-Islamic, they are quick to reject it.

Finally, involving people in recovery andreconstruction helps build a bridge betweenprojects with a quick impact and longer-term interventions leading to theachievement of the MDGs. This promotesnew vested interests in sustaining peace.

A Private-Sector Led Growth?

At the core of the NDF is the vision of alight regulative framework to promotebroad-based private sector growth.Inclusive economic growth is aprecondition for easing livelihood strategiesbased on the militias. The frameworkaccords a central role to the private sectoras the engine of national growth,employment generation and povertyreduction in Afghanistan, hence itscentrality to overall Government policies.Sustained economic growth is a

We want democracy inthe country but not atthe expense of ourculture and religion.I believe they all couldbe reconciled and thatis what should happen.

Adam Khan from Jalalabad

48 McKinley, UNDP 2004.49 Ibid.

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precondition for poverty reduction, nationalreconstruction and sustainable self-financed service provision through thegeneration of domestic resources.

The framework asserts that overcomingthe constraints to trade, investment andmore general private sector developmentcan best be achieved through:

• Institutional capacity-building for bothpublic and private sectors.

• Improved public sector management.• Formulation of a sound, enabling

regulatory framework for businesses.• Development of banking and insurance

services.• Introducing standards, methodology

testing and quality certification services.• Labour market training and skill

enhancement.• Land titling.• Infrastructure development for trade

and investment.• Trade, transit and transport facilitation.• Support to private sector capacity

building.

The Afghan private sector also needs tobenefit more directly from the currentreconstruction process, and efforts to createpartnerships and consortia must beprioritized, as should improved informationflows in both directions.50

The Government has already takenimportant initiatives to support privatesector development, including: (1) theenactment of the Law on Domestic andForeign Investment (September 2002); (2)the establishment of the AfghanistanInvestment Support Agency (AISA), asingle-window clearance and advice centrefor domestic and foreign investors (August2003); (3) opening the telecommunicationsector to private investment, and (4) theinitiation of institutional restructuringprocess in the Ministry of Commerce. Tofoster trade, the Government has

implemented a number of reforms,including the streamlining of customstariffs and the renewal of existing tradeagreements. As a landlocked country,Afghanistan may be disadvantaged in termsof trade competitiveness. However, thesignificance of trade for human securitycan be seen in the context of the recentdrought, when commercial cereal importsplayed a crucial role in price stabilizationand ensuring that effective demand wasmet, thereby averting national catastrophe.

Future reforms for the promotion of broad-based private sector investment will needto include accelerated rehabilitation andconstruction of infrastructure, and anincreased emphasis on investment inhuman capital, the establishment of soundregulatory frameworks for investment, thepromotion of foreign direct investmentand the gradual formalization of theeconomy.

There is, however, despite the highcommitments to the principles of a freemarket, a critical dilemma. There are clearrisks inherent to strengthening markets asthey stand, firmly rooted in existing powerrelations and widespread horizontalinequalities. By reinforcing the existingand mutually beneficial interests of bigbusiness and military power holders,unregulated, informal and illicit marketscould be undermining the agendas ofreconstruction and development.51 Currentpatterns of economic growth may alsoimply a destabilizing impact on the countrypolitically. The directions of economicgrowth are informed by power relations –in the current context, there is a seriousrisk that growth is therefore likely to beneither fast nor equitable. The economy,while booming, is mainly informal andhighly illicit. Participation in markets isnot open to all, nor are the benefitsequitably spread. Furthermore, the marketsare currently having a negative effect onpolitical governance and state-building.

50 TISA, Securing Afghanistan’s Future, 2004.51 AREU, “Trading in Power: The Politics of Free Markets in Afghanistan”, 2004d.

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Thus, while the appearance may be oneof economic growth and dynamic marketforces, in practice, informal regulatoryinstitutions interacting with the market areeffectively restricting competition andparticipation.52 In this context, the benefitsfrom growth tend to be skewed towardsthe powerful. State intervention will berequired to ensure accountability of marketoperators to a formal regulatory frameworkin the interest of the public and toeffectively manage the existing threats tosocial, political and environmental security.Without additional state intervention toaddress market imperfections and facilitatethe wider distribution of growth benefits,social equity resulting from broad basedand inclusive growth will be delayed andthe environmental implications of growthwill be disastrous. Likewise, a deliberatestrategy to limit the power of thosecurrently in control of the informaleconomy will be required to acceleratepolitical security and to prevent thecontinued destabilization of the economyand political environment by existingmarket structures.

Informal free trade is not new toAfghanistan, and existed even during theyears of the communist Government.However, experience in post-war situationsshows that an enforcement of the privatesector may not necessarily serve the long-term interests of the country. Multi-nationalcorporations may exploit national resourcesfor maximizing profits without investingin a sustainable socio-economic base forthe country. As noted by a researcher,“The increase in disposable income for atiny minority, combined with the abolitionof many import controls, may lead to acorresponding increase in the range ofconsumer goods available, with energiesfocused on the marketing sector. Similarly,the introduction of cost-recovery schemesin health care and education, combined

with the curtailment or abolition of evenvery limited welfare provision, may serveto entrench poverty and increaseindebtedness, as people borrow in orderto pay for healthcare and education.”53 Inline with the market approach, contractsare awarded through competitive bidding.However, privatized delivery of healthcare services may not be suitable in viewof Afghanistan’s geographic diversity anddifficulty in assessing some areas. Reformsmay mean that poor and remote villagesmay be even worse off.

Preparing for Afghanistan’sNational Poverty ReductionStrategy

Pro-Poor, Pro-Human Security Strategies

The Government of Afghanistan has madea commitment to sharpen the poverty focusof the NDF by outlining an interim PRSPby mid-2005. This will comprise anagreement with the internationalcommunity on the adoption of specificpoverty reduction measures, from anational perspective. The preparatory workalready provided under the NDF – alongwith Securing Afghanistan’s Future, thisNHDR and the preliminary analysis basedon NRVA findings – will provide valuableinputs. The aim will be to adopt a strategyof broad-based growth, macro-economicstability, and targeted poverty reductionmeasures. The role of civil society inenhancing public policy dialogue aroundthe key themes will undoubtedly beessential to defining a sustainable,community-led approach.

As the country begins the preparation ofthe PRSP, it should bear in mind that evenwhen growth occurs in some developingcountries, it often does not reach the poor.This has raised the importance in theinternational development community of

52 Ibid.53 Sultan Barakat, 2002.

Our proposedprogramme ofinvestment andreforms will not moveus to a middle-incomecountry, but it wouldallow us to move fromabject poverty topoverty with dignity.

Ashraf Ghani, Minister of Finance,

Afghanistan

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identifying policies that can foster “pro-poor growth”. This is growth that not onlycan improve the “absolute” conditions ofpoor households (by raising their level ofreal incomes along with the average level),but also can enhance their “relative”conditions vis-à-vis non-poor households(by reducing inequality between the poorand non-poor).

Bearing in mind that institutional reformsand behavioural changes need long-termtransformation, the PRSP in Afghanistanshould make an effort to link developmentstrategies with peace and security, asconflict is one of the principal, if notexclusive, causes of poverty in the country.Poverty reduction should also be seen asa critical dimension of a strategy forconflict resolution, peace-building andnational reconciliation.

The PRSP needs to incorporate regionaland global political and economicinfluences as much as national ones. Itmay not be enough for Afghanistan toadopt democratic governance policies orfiscal reforms when external forces,especially regional geo-political interestsin war and stability, could destroy ordisrupt human development goals in thecountry.

The scale, type and status of the conflictin Afghanistan as well as the degree ofviolence must be appropriately factoredinto the strategies pursued. In this sense,a two-track policy is recommended. Itshould attempt short-term stabilization andpoverty reduction, while setting a medium-term framework for properly sequencingdevelopment and reconciliation goals.54

An integrated approach is also imperativeto minimize the disconnects between policyprescriptions provided in povertyeradication frameworks, such as the PRSP,which are conditioned to receiveconcessional lending from the IMF, andthe on-the-ground realities in post-conflict

situations. PRSPs should not ignore thestructural roots of the problems that causeconflict in the first place, as discussed inChapter 4.

Because of potential links between povertyand insecurity, the way poverty is tackledinfluences analyses about its causes,evolution and post-conflict solutions. Peacein Afghanistan therefore needs to beunderstood as a dynamic process in whichit is possible to think about liberties withoutobstacles such as fear, vulnerability andthe absence of human dignity.

Among the different proposals about thekind of economic growth that would leadto human development and security, asoutlined above, the NHDR recommendsthat the PRSP incorporate four elements:

1. A consultative process during thedesign and monitoring of the strategythat would ultimately provide betterinputs for shaping a realistic strategy.It would also improve the impact onpoverty of expenditures financed byexternal partners and the effectivenessof technical advice by increasingcountry ownership and shifting policyto a more results-oriented approach.

2. A complete analysis, during itspreparatory phase, of the root causesof conflicts in Afghanistan, as well asthe root structural causes of poverty,in order to draw potential linkages.

3. Emphasis on employment generation,especially through large-scale publicworks that offer decent wages whileproviding services needed in differentregions.

4. A comprehensive monitoring andreporting framework, correlated withthe UN and national initiatives, tocollect, analyse and monitor data.Closely related to this goal is the need

54 From UNDP Network discussion on PRSPs in conflict situations, Poverty Reduction Network, Summer 2004.

...every step takentoward reducingpoverty and achievingbroad-based economicgrowth – is a steptowards conflictprevention. All who areengaged in conflictprevention anddevelopment, therefore– the United Nations,the Bretton Woodsinstitutions,governments and civilsociety organizations –must address thesechallenges in a moreintegrated fashion.

United Nations, MillenniumReport of the Secretary General,New York, 2000, p. 45.

The system is not just.Many people are verypoor. Many of the poorhave developed mentaland psychologicalillnesses. How can youexpect them to raisequality children?

Neda Mohammad from Wardak

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to address the paucity of data, whichrequires that a database disaggregatedby gender, rural–urban habitat, sub-national disparities, ethnicity andlanguage groups, among othercategories.

6.5. Conclusions

The revival of Afghanistan’s economy isfundamental to future sustainability as wellas for providing the needed jobs of today.Economic growth is required to reducepoverty, improve disparities and provideemployment, and this calls for astrengthening of sources of growth throughkey domestic industries, not just relianceon an infusion of capital throughinternational aid.

As the country now moves towards thepreparation of a PRSP, a new opportunityis opening to review the kind of economicgrowth needed to provide human securityas a public good. The role of civil societyin enhancing public policy dialoguesaround key themes will also undoubtedlybe crucial to defining a sustainable,community-led approach.

Economic growth should be based onprinciples of poverty eradication and jobcreation, long-term sustainability, and anadequate redistribution of wealth andassets. Growth models should be based oninclusive economic processes and equitabledistribution of development. This willinvolve measures to contain and reducethe rising inequalities in incomes indifferent regions, and the gaps betweenurban and rural areas. In linking growthto poverty reduction, strategies have toaddress the importance of generatingwidespread employment.

Economic growth can be on the basis ofprivate initiatives, but in order to better

translate this growth process into the well-being of the people of Afghanistan, aproper role for the state is crucial. Thisrequires state institutions to have thecapacity to raise revenues, deliver services,properly distribute the accumulated wealthand regulate the market to preventdiscrimination. The role of the Afghanstate in the economy should be to ensureeconomic efficiency, social justice andindividual liberty, through an appropriatecombination of market intervention andplanning.

While bilateral and multi-lateral aid is thesurest immediate engine of growth in thecountry, Afghanistan strives for self-sufficiency in the future. International aidis estimated at five per cent of GDP peryear, while opium production providesalmost 40 per cent of GDP today.Afghanistan needs to explore other sourcesof growth. The Government should seekto improve labour and technology in keyindustries through training and investment,expanding markets and refurbishing theinfrastructure. This requires thedevelopment of the material base for otherexport potentials, such as animalhusbandry, mining, tourism, knowledge-based industries, and traditional crafts andfruits. The refurbishing of the industrialbase will provide jobs, and eco-tourismcould be envisioned once security isensured.

The economy can also be supported byemigrants’ remittances or by the absorptionof expatriate skills into new opportunitiesinside the country. With the developmentof roads to Central Asia, and with theprospects of an oil pipeline fromTurkmenistan to Pakistan, there may besignificant economic gains for the country,although these may not be anticipated inthe immediate future.

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7

Photo: Golam Monowar Kamal

The Role of the International Community:Aid and Peace-building

Chapter

own people, despite the latter being oneof the objectives of the Bonn Agreement.

Despite the dangers, aid is nonethelessessential for Afghanistan’s successfulreconstruction, and the manner in whichit is administered will ultimately determinewhether or not the country and its peoplewill find long-term stability and prosperity.The implementation of such an agenda inAfghanistan’s war-torn and devastatedsociety will ultimately require that donors,agencies and NGOs ensure that Afghaninstitutions are owned by and accountableto the people of Afghanistan.

After Afghanistan was identified as a basefor terrorist activities in 1998, theinternational community announcedsanctions against the Taliban. Althoughspecific studies do not exist on the subject,it is believed that the impact of thesanctions on the Taliban as non-state actorsmay not have been as punitive as theirimpact on the everyday lives of ordinarypeople. Dealing with terrorist threats to“international security” was prioritizedover dealing with the threats to the humansecurity of the people of Afghanistan.Indeed, the history of support from theinternational community for differentregimes or different opposition groupsoften serves to illustrate the risks associatedwith external assistance, which has beenperceived as unaccountable to legitimatedomestic concerns.

Yet a government that is legitimate andaccountable to its people needs to followa national process, one that the internationalcommunity could support, but not lead.Legitimacy should be sought throughaccountability to the people of Afghanistanin a smuch as to the internationalcommunity. The provision of aid can help

Afghanistan faces no easy task in its effortsto ensure a speedy and smooth transitionfrom a large-scale, short-term, externallydriven military intervention, to more grass-roots, longer term, locally driveninterventions for development. While theformer tends to perpetuate dependency,the latter must be focused on building self-sufficiency in order to safeguard the gainsachieved through the intervention. Thischapter looks at how aid in post-conflictsituations, as in Afghanistan, can provideincentives or disincentives for peace-building. It examines the lessons thatshould be learned from aid patterns inAfghanistan, not only over the past two-and-a-half years, but from decades ofengagement with the country in variousways. It also presents recommendationsto the international community on how toensure that aid does more good than harmin Afghanistan.

7.1. Introduction:Accountability and Legitimacy

In Securing Afghanistan’s Future, theAfghanistan Transitional Administrationpresented a case for extensive support fromthe international community in order toprevent Afghanistan from becoming a“narco-mafia state”. Yet, increased moneyfor reconstruction by itself may not besufficient to sustain peace-building. Moreattention must be directed to aid spendingpatterns, local institutional capacity, andthe Government’s successes in raisinginternal revenue and curbing corruption.The danger of Afghanistan becoming arentier state funded through large inflowsof foreign aid must be avoided.Dependency on this kind of funding wouldmake the Afghan Government moreaccountable to foreign patrons than to its

Chapter 7:

The Role of the International Community: Aidand Peace-building

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this process only if it is transparent andconsultative, and it can hamper it if it isnot. Aid-supported development anddemocracy should ultimately render theGovernment of Afghanistan responsibletowards its people. As Afghan civil societymatures, it can assume the role of holdingboth the Afghan state and the internationalcommunity accountable.

7.2. Analytical Framework: TheConspicuous Role of Aid inConflicts

Debates on the role of aid in Afghanistanare staged within the context of growingglobal interests in the relationships betweenaid and conflict, and how developmentassistance can be re-conceptualized asconflict prevention, what has beendescribed as the “securitization of aid”.1

During the late 1990s, donors, through theStrategic Framework (SF) process,increasingly saw aid as an instrument forbuilding peace and acting as a catalyst forpolitical agreements. Such an instrumentalapproach to aid as a tool of peace-building,however, was contested by those whoargued that this approach inevitably leadsto the distortion of humanitarian mandatesand principles, particularly those ofneutrality and impartiality. Instead of beingused for political objectives, humanitarianaid should be distinct, both for ethical andpragmatic reasons, as aid may not havesufficient leverage to tackle the politicaldynamics of conflicts.2

In Afghanistan, because aid is introducedin a political environment, it may have inthe past, and may continue in the future,to create incentive systems, both positiveand negative. “Aid affects not only thesize of the economic pie and how it issliced but also the balance of power amongthe competing actors and the rules of the

game by which they compete.... Thepolitical impacts of aid can help to decidewhether the peace endures or warresumes.”3 The potential negative andpositive externalities that assistance couldintroduce in a conflict or post-conflictsituation, based on lessons learned aroundthe world, is summarized below.

Negative Incentives: Aid CouldHarm

• Massive and sudden aid mayexacerbate conflict. It may beappropriated by military groups, as itwas during the years of resistance,first to the Soviet invasion and thento the Taliban, when aid in Afghanistanbecame an integral part of the wareconomy by nurturing, directly orindirectly, armed groups.

• Aid can also increase competition ifthe institutional mechanisms forequitable distribution have not beenestablished, anti-corruption measuresare not in place and the ethics of publicsector management and proceduresare not followed. High-profile reliefprogrammes in urban areas, such asfood distribution, can be prone tocorruption, with aid feeding clientnetworks.

• Aid that is heavily based on reliefassistance could prolong dependenceon external sources. Instead of findinglarge-scale alternatives – as, forexample, to a war economy based onpoppy cultivation – small-scale andtransient project interventions fundedthrough aid may not only beunsustainable, but even harmful. Reliefaid may potentially fuel corruptionand dependency, and supersede localresponsibility for welfare.

1 Mark Duffield as quoted in Jonathan Goodhand 2002.2 Goodhand 2002.3 J. Boyce, 2000 ‘Beyond good intentions: external assistance and peace building,’ in S. Forman and S. Patrick (eds), Good Intentions. Pledges of Aid for

Post Conflict Recovery, Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 2000 as quoted in Goodhand 2002.

It is now an acceptedfact that theGovernment cannotmake good on many ofits promises it makes tothe people. However,we also know thereasons for the inabilityof the Government andwe have lowered ourexpectations. Ourconcern, nevertheless,is the inability of theinternationalcommunity to bringimprovement inpeople’s lives. Manypeople now questionthe seriousness of theinternationalcommunity withrespect to Afghanistan.

Ahmad Fawad from Kapisa

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• The distribution of massive amountsof relief aid such as food can createmarket distortions and substitution asit generates a strong competition withlocal supply. The introduction of largeamounts of wheat in Afghanistan in2002 and 2003 by the World FoodProgramme (WFP) led to a fall inwheat prices to an all-time low,undermining efforts to revive localproduction.

• Assistance strategies that bypass thecentral Government and work directlywith regional administrationscontrolled by warlords risk heighteningtensions between the centre and theprovinces, and could potentially skewdistribution of assistance in favour ofcertain regions. Aid that solely focuseson a centralised state also risks notreaching target beneficiaries if fairdistribution is not planned orimplemented by the Government.

• Artificial “islands of development”could result from an intense influx ofrelief aid that is likely to be abruptlyhalted as the crisis scales down.

• Donor funds are usually bound to tightdisbursement schedules for budgetaryreasons, which can create conflict withlong-term planning. Furthermore,pressure on delivery can lead to wastedfunds.

Positive Incentives: Aid Can Help

The examples above are potential hazardsof large-scale, uncoordinated, ineffectiveaid. Aid that is well managed, evaluatedand monitored can effectively avoidnegative or unintended outcomes. Theinvolvement of NGOs and community-based organizations could increase boththe efficiency of delivery and account-ability, helping to ensure that aid, in fact,

does no harm in Afghanistan. Althoughno systematic and reliable analysis hasbeen conducted to assess the real impactsof aid in Afghanistan today,4 it may beconcluded that the positive incentives havebeen many and have outnumbered thenegative ones. In addition to directlyimproving livelihoods, aid can result inother welcome outcomes and externalities,such as:

• Practical interventions at the local levelthat integrate people from acrossfactional lines for the management ofcommon resources – such as irrigationor grazing, trading networks,rehabilitation of infrastructure and soon – achieve positive outcomes ofpeaceful and cooperative co-existence.

• Education programmes raise not onlythe levels of literacy but also have ahost of positive externalities rangingfrom improved household healthmanagement, to expanded decision-making capabilities, more informedresource management and so on. Thesecan significantly improve humansecurity.

• De-mining leads to vast improvementsin the agriculture sector.

• As one researcher noted, “It is alsoimportant not to undervalue the impactof aid on more intangible factors likeideas, relationships, social energy andindividual leadership. Aid agencyinterventions, in addition to theireconomic effects, may promote cross-cutting ties (or bridging social capital)between social groups, counteractingthe social compacting (or bondingsocial capital), which warlords createand use to mobilize groups.”5

• Aid can also cultivate the ground forprivate sector development. It can

4 For an evaluation of aid during the Taliban years, see Dabelstein Niels, OECD 2002, and Van Brabant and Killock, OECD/DAC 1999. For another evaluationof UNDP’s PEACE programme during the Taliban and the Habitat Community programmes that highlighted positive impacts on local governance, seeAstri , and Kristian Berg Harpviken 2001.

5 Mary Anderson 1999 refers to this as building “connectors” or “constituencies for peace” quoted in Goodhand 2002.

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create an environment for a flourishingprivate sector by taking measures toimprove security, the legal frameworkand investment guarantees.

Although such activities may not always“bring peace”, they could play a role insupporting the coping strategies ofcommunities, and providing alternativesto the war economy. At best, aid agenciesshould be simultaneously providing amixture of humanitarian, rehabilitationand development-oriented assistance, inpartnership with a range of actors,including the central Government, regionalauthorities, local authorities andcommunity-based shuras. At the very least,there will be a need to ensure that aid (bothhumanitarian and development assistance)does not undercut peace-building effortsand other policy instruments attemptingto build structural stability.

While aid cannot be the main factor tippingthe scale in a peace process, it may playan important role in consolidating a fragilepeace. But it can only do so by adoptingnew approaches. For aid not to increasetensions or contribute to existing or newconflicts, it must apply a conscious humansecurity approach that takes intoconsideration root causes, and atransformatory approach that helpstranslate “peace-making” into “peace-building.”6 Encompassing rehabilitation,reconstruction and conflict prevention,these approaches assist in legitimizingoutside interventions in order to achievethe ultimate goal of sustainable securityand peace. They can be built on thefollowing three pillars:

1. Conflict sensitivity and the searchfor root causes: Helping to prevent violentconflict and sustaining peace after it occursrequires an intensive focus on finding andcombating their “root causes”. The

question to be asked is: “How doesdevelopment impact on the risk factors forconflict, and how does conflict impact ondevelopment?” Such an approach wouldrequire first and foremost being aware ofthe negative externalities that misguidedor misused aid could incite. It requires:sensitivity to equitable benefits; flexibilityin terms of planning and implementation;monitoring and evaluation (including someform of impact assessment of peace andconflict); and strong linkages with societyin order to ensure adequate “buy-in”.Peace-building and reconstruction need tobe based upon an understanding not onlyof the issues around which the conflictbecame politicized – particularly, ethnicityand religion – but also on the prior failuresof governance. This requires aid actorsboth to think historically and to plan aheadover the long-term, based on knowledgeand the willingness to learn lessons. Yet,it is often the case that expatriates andinternational aid workers, as the distributorsof aid, often neither have a clearunderstanding of the prevailing politicalcontexts (background of members of theGovernment) nor of the historical context.This lack of local knowledge makes themprone to follow institutional approachesthat could impede peace-building in thelong run.

2. Recognizing transformation:Conflict sensitivity requires not only therestoration of infrastructure, institution-building and structural reforms, but alsochanging incentives that trigger or fuelconflict. Although many of the problemsfacing post-conflict societies existed beforethe outbreak of conflict, it can also radicallyalter the political, demographic andeconomic structure of a country, requiringan understanding of an often complex andrapidly changing reality. For example, thegender balance changes when women

6 The origin of the concept is found in the 1992 An Agenda for Peace issued by the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. His described peace-building as “an action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”. Itencompasses rehabilitation, reconstruction and conflict prevention, and legitimizes outside intervention in order to establish the ultimate goal of sustainablesecurity and peace.

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become household heads in the absenceof men. Migration of educated classesnegatively impacts the remaining humancapital. Displacement creates newethnically polarized zones. Hence, changesbrought about by the conflict need to beidentified and incorporated in rehabilitationand assistance strategies.

3. Mainstreaming conflict prevention:Building peace requires sound foundationsbased on a commitment to righting wrongsand achieving an acceptable level of socialjustice and accountability. From thisperspective, reconstruction, too, shouldhave a corrective dimension that promotessocio-economic change and not just therestoration of the status quo, if it is tosecure not only the successfulimplementation of initial reconstructionactivities but, more importantly, sustainthat investment into the future.

From the beginning of an intervention,external actors should clearly understandtheir role, the effectiveness of which willdepend on the degree to which they manageto support internal actors. This is especiallyimportant for Afghanistan, wheretransparency in peace-building efforts willbe one of the most important aspects ofregained sovereignty.

7.3. Lessons from a History ofPoliticized Aid

The legacy of the way that donors and aidorganizations operated in the past whendealing both with the Mujahideen andTaliban administrations points to thedangers of politicizing aid: Aidconditionalities seem to have hadcontradictions at times, undermined theimpartiality of the international community,and hampered the human security of thepeople of Afghanistan.

In order to understand the contemporaryrole of aid in Afghanistan, it is important

to appreciate the history of aid before andduring the conflict. As one researchernoted: “Afghan responses to the politicaltransition and the reconstructionprogramme will be conditioned by theirunderstanding of what has happened inthe past. Many of the current dilemmasare echoed from the history of Afghanistan.Having survived years away from thespotlight of international attention, Afghansmight be forgiven for being confused atthe haste with which decisions are nowbeing made about the future shape of theircountry. They might not have much left,but Afghans have their memories.”7 Thelegacy of Afghan history must be examinedthrough the role that foreign aid played increating a rentier elite and a state thatfailed to develop a social contract with itscitizens.

Pre-war aid

By the middle of the 20th Century,Afghanistan had become a rentier state,with external finance, mostly from theSoviet Union and the United States, playingan increasingly important role in fundingdomestic expenditure. By the 1960s,foreign aid accounted for more than 40per cent of the state budget.8 State-ledmodernization programmes, fundedthrough foreign aid, contributed to abifurcation of the Afghan economy andsociety – which one researchercharacterized as a society split between arural, largely subsistence economy and anurban economy dependent on a state thatin turn drew most of its income from linksto the international state system andmarket.9

Aid in the Cold War years

Following its occupation at the end of1979, the Soviet Union replaced Westerndevelopment programmes in subsidisingthe Afghan state and its mostly urban

7 Chris Johnson and Leslie Jolyon 2002.8 Jonathan Goodhand 2002.9 Barnett Rubin 1995.

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project of modernization. Humanitarianaid often became tangled in themilitarization of refugee camps, used asbases for the Mujahideen. Until 1988, theUN and the ICRC could not provide aidto Soviet-held land areas because ofsovereignty issues. NGOs, therefore,played an increasingly important role asproviders of cross-border relief operations,often planned from Peshawar andIslamabad in Pakistan.

At the same time, politically motivatedopposing flows of aid accentuated the splitof Afghan society and strengthenedunaccountable elites.10 As a researchernoted, the “Pattern of distribution reflectedpolitical ties and proximity rather thanabsolute humanitarian need. Consequently,urban populations controlled by thegovernment and populations in the centralhighlands were largely bypassed in favourof populations in the east.”11

The period also marked the developmentof systematic patterns of aid manipulation,especially of food aid, by resistancecommanders, border controllers and others,while humanitarian aid also led todependence as food production fell by halfto two-thirds. During this period,humanitarian assistance in some casescomplemented military aid, while NGOsand UN agencies were able to avoidworking with Afghan official structures.In the 1980s and 1990s, Westernemergency aid, often in the form of cash,was channelled through the Mujahideen,for whom there was often unconditionalsympathy. As one researcher pointed out,“this pattern of interaction was above alla partisan and negotiable relationship.Linking diverse humanitarian actors totheir preferred Afghan counterparts, therelationship was prone to corruption andpolitical favoritism.”12 Thus, aid in the1990s, coupled with trade with

neighbouring countries and arms provision,further weakened the central state apparatusand strengthened regional groupings.Regional power-holders invi tedhumanitarian agencies and NGOs toprovide basic health care, education andrelief services for their populations.

Aid in the post-Cold War years

The end of the Soviet occupation ofAfghanistan in 1989 was the beginning ofa period of confusion about how theinternational community should respondto the needs of the Afghans. This periodwas characterized by the fragmentation ofthe Mujahideen factions and continuedshifts in allegiances mirrored byfragmented support from the internationalcommunity. Humanitarian aid effortsdepended on commanders for cross-borderactivities, resulting in diversification ofsupport and resources.

The post-Cold War years also sawincreased aid from the United NationsOffice for the Coordination of Assistance(UNOCA) to the fragmented state, bothto Mujahideen- and Government-held areasfrom a variety of entry points inneighbouring countries. NGOs also beganworking with district or village-basedshuras in an increasingly professional way.The early 1990s witnessed the developmentof several NGO coordination mechanismsalong with new programmes in the westand north, and by 1994, there were over200 registered Afghan NGOs.

While the UN had a challenge in dealingwith the Government of the Islamic Stateof Afghanistan, which possessed limiteddomestic legitimacy and limited controlover the country, in 1997 it decided toextend support to Afghanistan for thedevelopment of the SF. Its aim was toprovide “a more coherent, effective andintegrated political strategy and assistance

10 Barnett Rubin 2000.11 Jonathan Goodhand 2002.12 Astri Suhrke 2004.

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program” through a “common conceptualtool that identifies key activities... on thebasis of shared principles and objectives.”The framework was in fact the introductionof aid conditionalities alongsidehumanitarian concerns, and of thediplomatic process as a tool for peace. Itforced a confrontation with the Taliban onissues such as peace, human rights, genderand drugs. The framework called for inter-agency coordination to introduce incentivesand disincentives related to aid – that is,a carrot–and-stick policy – and to makethe linkages between aid, peace and humanrights, based on the assumption that aidcan lead to significant behaviour changesby actors in a conflict situation.

Yet the SF cannot be considered a verysuccessful initiative. As evaluated by anOECD/DAC study,13 its policy of negativeincentives, which included militaryd ip lomacy , s anc t i ons and a idconditionalities, only isolated and hardenedthe position of the Taliban, pushing themcloser to radical Islamist groups. Aid actedmore as the only possible form ofinternational engagement than as asignificant lever for change. And it wasunable to compete with other resourceflows driving the war economy. The valueof aid to Afghanistan (roughly US$300million per annum) couldn’t stand up tothe US$2.5 billion generated in 1999through cross-border trade betweenAfghanistan and Pakistan.14 At the sametime, however, aid conditionality preventedlong-term capacity-building activities bydonors under the name of “principledprogramming”, weighing down donorefforts to provide vital institutional supportin health and education.

Coordination and a top-down managerialframework also proved a challenge fordiverse organizations operating in acomplex and changing environment. The

framework alienated NGOs such asMèdecins Sans Frontiëres, which objectedto the curb on their independence of action.Most importantly, the SF pushed the aidcommunity into a position of de factopolitical opposition to the Taliban,politicizing aid even further. In contrastto the partisan and negotiable relationshipformed with individual Mujahideenleaders, the SF encouraged a strategicdistancing from de facto nationalauthorities. This was accentuated by theUN General Assembly denyingAfghanistan's seat in the UN to the Talibanregime, and the introduction of UNsanctions against the regime in 1999.

Learning from History

The history of aid in Afghanistan providesa number of lessons that remain pertinenttoday. Aid may have widened gapsbetween warring factions and createddependencies on external agencies forbasic needs, thus undermining nationaland traditional institutions. Such adependency was exacerbated by the factthat aid was short-term, rather thansustaining long-term economic activity.In the absence of possibilities to work witha central and legitimate authority, aid wasalso concentrated in the periphery. Yet theperiphery had increasingly becomeintegrated into the economies ofneighbouring countries through licit andillicit trade. It is also safe to say thatcapacity-building generally received lowpriority, and the rush of fulfilling urgentneeds prevented long-term planning andthe engagement of Afghan counterparts inpolicy design, implementation andmonitoring. Most Afghan NGOs ended upas contractors for short-term emergencyprojects, often cutting corners in projectimplementation to sustain the organizationuntil the next contract came through.15

13 Van Brabant and Killock, OECD/DAC 1999.14 Zareen Naqvi 1999. By 2000 it was estimated that the value of Afghanistan’s exports and re-exports to Pakistan had dropped to US$1,227 million (WB

2004a).15 Suhrke 2002.

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On the whole, humanitarian assistanceduring the past two decades may havecontributed to the reinforcement of powerstructures, at both the regional and thelocal levels. Aid certainly registered somelocal development, but did not modify aregionalized political economy of war thatmade leaders more dependent upon – andresponsive to – outside forces rather thantheir own people.

7.4. A Promise to Keep and aResponsibility Towards HumanSecurity

As the international community re-engagesin Afghanistan, a window of opportunityopens to learn lessons from the past andmake good on commitments to the Afghanpeople in an ethical and transparentmanner.

Why Responsibility?

For too long, the interest of external actorshas been what many would consideropportunistic self-interest: showing offAfghanistan as a test case for internationalintervention, and benefiting from thecontrol of the drug trade while gainingaccess to Central Asian oil and gassupplies. There is a striking contrastbetween the way Western countriespursued their strategic interests inAfghanistan during the Cold War and afterSeptember 11, and their effectivedisengagement and the resulting politicalvacuum which was allowed to continueunchecked during the interim period, from1992 to 200116 Too often, democraticprinciples have had to be bypassed in theinterest of engaging with this or thatregime, starting with the politicization ofaid to overthrow the Soviet-backed regimeduring the Cold War, at the expense ofworking with less than acceptable humanrights standards. Similarly, today, the

United States and its allies are interestedin winning the “war against terrorism” andin a successful outcome in Afghanistan asdesigned through the Bonn process, evenif this requires the blurring of certainhumanitarian principles and codes ofpractice.17 The current pursuit of militaryobjectives in Afghanistan, i.e. eradicatingthe remaining Al-Qaida and Taliban groupsthrough arming militias in the south, runsthe risk of endangering peace. Theinternational agenda for action musttherefore go beyond a minimalist positionof attempting to ensure that the countryno longer harbours terrorists.

Changing the lens of security to that ofthe people of Afghanistan requirescompromises, but these have to be basedon a renewed ethical responsibility towardstheir well-being. There are plenty ofreasons why the international communityof nations should support the reconstructionof Afghanistan. For one, the “war againstterrorism” is costing the United Statesmore than US$1 billion each month, whilemuch less than that is being spent oncurbing the poverty that could breedextremism. Globally, overall aid is stillrising, but is more conditional on traditionalsecurity. As one study by Christian Aidclaimed, the year 2004 saw the diversionof US$1 billion in aid to the war onterrorism at the expense of the war onpoverty and the attainment of the MDGs.The US Congress reduced its aid packagefrom US$1.6 billion to just US$650 millionglobally, and the United Kingdom divertedabout £150 million of British developmentaid to the re-building of Iraq. Furthermore,“rich countries” development budgets,including those of Japan and Australia,have been re-defined to include items likecounter-terrorism training, which limitsthe money for poverty reductionprogrammes.18

16 Sultan Barakat 2002.17 Ibid.18 Christian Aid 2004.

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Further, aid can foster economic stabilityand trade with other countries, whilediluting the appeal of political extremism.But beyond these instrumentalistarguments lies the most important rationalefor responsibility and accountability. Giventhat Afghanistan’s human insecurities havebeen the result of conflicts compoundedby foreign interference, the world now hasa particular obligation to help resolve them.This responsibility also stems from havingsuccessfully driven the Taliban out ofAfghanistan on the promise of nation-building. In his “State of the Union” speechin 2003, President Bush pledged to helpAfghans secure their country, rebuild theirsociety and educate all their children.19

Support to the renewed sovereignty ofAfghanistan cannot therefore coincide withdonor fatigue. There is no doubt that theinternational community must engage itselfdecisively in order to prevent the countryfrom sliding back into civil war andbecoming a sanctuary for drug productionand terrorists – but a fundamental rationale

must also be to restore long-denied humansecurity for the people of Afghanistan.The human security argument for moreinvestment in Afghanistan should befocused on meeting the needs of theAfghan population, and not only thepotential cost to the international sceneshould Afghanistan become a “narco-mafiastate”.

UN Member States should support thepeace-keeping agenda in Afghanistan asan objective in itself, and as a way toreward peace and not war. In this context,donors and other agencies have aresponsibility to ensure that their workreinforces the political transition, ratherthan undermining it. At its best, assistancecould help to promote the credibility ofthe Government that emerged from theelections by improving the lives of ordinaryAfghans and giving them a stake in thefuture.

What Kind of Responsibility?

A quantitative responsibility: engagementwith Afghanistan should not dwindle

A substantial aid package is first andforemost necessary for Afghanistan totransform the war economy into a peacefulone. At the beginning of the reconstructionperiod there was talk of a Marshall Plan,but this did not materialize. Yet at theBerlin Conference in March 2004,commitments were guaranteed for the nextseven years. The international communitypledged US$4.5 billion in the first year,and met a substantial part of the Afghanrequests for US$27.5 billion for the secondand third years. In late 2003, the UnitedStates, Afghanistan’s most generous donor,also sharply increased aid, expandedtechnical assistance and actively involveditself in the Afghan constitutional processand democratic elections. The substantial

19 President George Bush, “State of the Union Address”, January 2003, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html.

Source:Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 3, March 2003

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aid promised at the Berlin Conferencerepresents a significant departure from thepolicies of the previous decade, in whichthe international response was one ofdisengagement and containment.

First and foremost, political will is neededto continue sustained peace-building effortsin Afghanistan and in the region at large.There are fears that the current levels ofinternational political support andcommitment to the rebuilding ofAfghanistan may not continue indefinitely.Evidence from other crisis-countries isthat the international community may moveon to other crises in the spotlight, or thatas agendas and administrations change, sodo political commitments to incompleteprojects, such as that of Afghanistan.

The ways in which needs are definedand prioritized have real implicationsfor the outcomes for which aid wasintended. The various ways in which theneed for aid could be computed include:

Aid based on needs: Aid could be basedon defined basic humanitarian needs ofthe population, which could form, forexample, four related “core elements” –the protection of life, health, subsistenceand physical security. Basic humanwelfare needs in a conflict situationinclude freedom from violence, and fearfrom coercion and from deprivation ofthe means for survival.20

Aid based on rights: While aid basedon humanitarian needs is value-neutral,it could also be based on the morenormative rights-based approach. Theidentification of these rights involves amoral (and perhaps a legal) claim aboutentitlements, with the correspondingresponsibilities and duties.

Aid based on threats (humansecurity): Aid based on perceived threatsconverges the basic-needs-basedapproaches (risks to survival) with therights-based approach (to entitlements,and to a life of “dignity”). It alsointroduces an element of urgency:Insecurities should be dealt with not onlybecause they are immediate threats tosurvival and dignity, but also becausethey could lead to renewed conflicts orinefficiencies in systems of democracyand reconstruction.

Aid based on costs: Arguments for aidbased on costs, which have been usedby Securing Afghanistan’s Future andthe NDB, are based on the assessed costsof the public investment needed for apolitically and economically sustainableprocess. They are based on what theministries in charge of different sectorsneed in order to function, both

operationally and for the implementationof development programmes. The shiftto aid based on costs, prompted by theMinister of Finance after the first twoyears of reconstruction, was a way forAfghan institutions to take the lead rolein determining the amount and allocationof resources pledged to Afghanistan.

Aid based on meeting long-term targets:For countries that have undertaken acosting exercise of the MDGs, aid canbe based on the assessment of what ittakes to reach the agreed upon targetsof development by the year 2015. Focuson the MDGs, which began inAfghanistan in 2004, when PresidentHamid Karzai, expressed his willingnessto sign the Millennium Declaration,transformed the discussion of aid toAfghanistan from the short-term contextof post-war reconstruction to the longerterm concern of development.

Source:Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 3, March 2003

Box 7.1

What is the Rationale for Aid?

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20 James Darcy and Antoine Charles-Hofmann 2005.

However, worldwide attention toAfghanistan brought a myriad ofinternational aid workers to the country,making the relief scene similar to otherpost-war situations. Problems associatedwith heavy foreign aid, especially in Kabul,amounted to pressure on real estate prices,which skyrocketed, and to the “whitevehicle syndrome”, which could fosterpopular resentment. They also include aserious distortion of salaries, promptingthe flight of qualified local personnel tothe aid sector. In a country decimated by“brain drain”, aid agencies “have in a senseheld in ‘cold storage’ a potential sourceof leadership for the future.”25

Although large amounts of money havebeen given to Afghanistan, the danger ofintroducing these sums is in raising Afghanexpectations of rapid growth and recoveryto an unrealistic level. Large amounts ofaid do not guarantee improved well-being,just as the human development approachargues that growth in itself does notnecessarily trickle down to all membersof society. Talking about the quantity ofaid does not address issues of efficiency,distribution impact and overall well-being.Equally important is that aid be properlytargeted, designed, implemented andmonitored to address the needs of theAfghan people.

The Puzzle of Definitions andObstacles to Assessment

An important challenge in a post-conflictsituation like Afghanistan is the lack ofsystematic definition of what the “needs”are, and who is ultimately “at risk”, andon what basis is this decided. While thisreport tries to present a case for a threat-based human security needs analysis, otherdocuments in the reconstruction landscapein Afghanistan have assessed “needs”

21 Suhrke 2004.22 Darcy and Charles-Hofmann 2005.23 Ibid.24 ITAP 2002.25 Goodhand 2002.

7.5. Challenges to NeedsIdentification and AidDistribution in Afghanistan

Needs Based on Supply: TheChallenge of a “Light Footprint”

Needs assessment typically is subsumedwithin a process of resource mobilization,conducted by agencies in order tosubstantiate funding proposals to donors.One can argue that the reconstructionproject in Afghanistan did not begin onthe basis of established real needsassessment or a carefully planned processbased on agreements among all parties tothe conflict. On the contrary, it was initiatedby external actors as part of a rushedreaction to the sequence of events thatfollowed September 11th, 2001.21 Thepledges to reconstruction in Afghanistanhave been carried out in haste and basedon the urgency of international pledgingconferences, rather than on needs analysis.

Such an assessment, which is conductedin the context of an appeal for funds, infact “encourage(s) supply-drivenresponses, and risk(s) distorting the scaleof the threat and the importance of theproposed intervention. The lack ofindependent ‘reality checks’ makes itdifficult for the system to ensure thatresponses are appropriate, proportionateand impartial.”22 In such circumstances,the political interests of the internationalcommunity, or the capacity of specificagencies, national or international, to“market” their interests may introducebiases in the situation analysis. Hence, therushed tendency of donors to “construct”and “solve” crises with little reference toevidence could erode trust in the system.23

At the Bonn Conference, the UnitedNations promised a “light footprint”.24

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based on other definitions (SecuringAfghanistan’s Future on costs, the MDGReport on goals, a Center for Economicand Social Rights (CESR) study on humanrights needs, a Tufts University study onhuman security and livelihoods needs, theNRVA on vulnerability and so on).Improving needs assessment demandsgreater consistency in the ways thatproblems are framed, symptoms areobserved, and causes and acute risk factorsare approximated. A proper assessmentrequires defining not only needs (basedon answering the question of “why aid”),but also thresholds, and the minimumrequirements for survival and dignity.What constitutes “enough” may dependon the context and the level of risk thatpeople face.

Logistical, security as well as capacityproblems have hampered both thecollection of data and the assessment ofreal needs. In Afghanistan, there is a lackof crucial information available to decision-makers, and the kinds of needs assessmentrequired to generate this are conductedonly sporadically. The result is that fewsituations are assessed as a whole, makingprioritization within and across contextsdifficult. When data is collected by variousagencies and by the CSO, it is not alwaysrelevant data, or in a form that would allowcomparisons and cross-examination. Forexample, baseline and population figureswere necessary for voter registration andwere carried out by the CSO in the summerof 2003. Yet, data collection in an insecureenvironment proved very difficult, asexemplified by the murder of numerousCSO off icials . The NRVA andUNICEF/CSO MICS surveys have beenable to shed more light on the situation ofpoverty and vulnerability in Afghanistan,but these also have been conducted in lessthan perfect circumstances and the datamay not be complete.

Needs assessment, at least in the formalsense, often plays only a marginal role inthe decision-making of agencies anddonors. However, rapid assessments in aninsecure environment such as Afghanistandepend on assumptions, estimates andpredictions rather than on observed facts,which require checking. Monitoring ofoutcomes of interventions should also bebased on an assessment of the externalenvironment and the changing nature ofrisks, rather than the typical focus on theoutput–input equation of projectmanagement.26 As the country becomesmore stable and united in the months andyears after the parliamentary elections,coherent data collection and assessmentwill become an imperative.

Coordination and Consultation

As much of the information in Afghanistancomes from international NGOs, a systemof coordinated assessment should beestablished that includes the CSO, UNagencies, NGOs and relevant Governmentbodies. Needs assessments were initiallyundertaken by individual aid agencies inaccordance with their mandate and fundingneeds, and were gradually coordinated andcorrelated by international groups such asAIMS and by the Government within theframework of the AACA and most recentlyby the Ministry of Finance. Coordinationof the various analyses and data generatedby the multiplicity of agencies that havebecome involved in what is a well-fundedpost-crisis situation will be one of themajor challenges of the new Governmentand its international partners.

Adequate consultation has been perhapsthe most thorny question in a situationwhere funding proposals have had to besubmitted to international conferenceswithin a short time, while insecurity andlack of capacity prevented consultationwith various regions and stakeholders. But

26 Goodhand 2002.

Chapter 7212

Table 7.1 Donor Disbursement table

Includes preliminary data on commitments and disbursements against pledges.Based on data provided to Ministry of Finance as 1 May 2004.

NB. This table represents the best information at this point in time that donors have provided to Government. We expect that donors will revise this informationover time and that figures will change. Zero represents either no disbursements or no information provided.

Aga Khan 25.0 20.3 8.2 25.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0ADB 15.0 15.0 10.0 10.0 58.1 2.5 0.0 0.0 58.1 2.5Australia 33.7 20.3 20.3 13.7 3.6 3.5 2.6 2.6 1.0 0.9Belgium 11.7 11.7 11.7 6.0 2.3 1.6 0.7 0.0 1.6 1.6Canada 83.0 83.0 83.0 95.0 90.9 91.0 55.8 56.3 35.1 34.7China 27.0 31.0 30.0 20.0 20.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 10.0Denmark 28.0 28.0 16.5 28.2 44.9 19.2 5.0 5.0 39.9 14.2EC 218.4 176.4 112.4 292.1 304.6 144.1 170.4 111.4 134.2 32.7ECHO 73.5 73.5 64.0 63.3 42.6 42.6 0.0 0.0 4.3 4.4Finland 13.2 13.0 13.0 11.2 5.9 4.8 2.5 2.5 3.4 2.3France 32.0 34.2 27.8 30.2 23.0 2.1 0.0 0.0 23.0 2.1Germany 142.0 104.6 104.6 107.5 102.1 51.8 11.4 11.4 90.7 40.4India 40.0 101.7 101.7 60.0 213.6 42.4 0.2 0.2 213.4 42.2Iran 50.0 68.0 68.0 50.0 19.6 48.0 1.0 1.0 18.6 47.0Ireland 4.0 4.3 4.0 5.0 4.1 2.2 3.9 2.0 0.2 0.2Islamic Devt Bank 10.0 8.8 0.0 0.0 24.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 24.3 0.0Italy 43.0 49.5 49.5 52.8 51.9 23.7 0.0 0.0 51.9 23.7Japan 357.8 357.8 357.8 142.2 252.3 137.3 0.0 0.0 252.3 137.3Korea (Rep of) 10.0 22.7 8.1 15.0 25.8 13.7 2.0 2.0 23.8 11.7Kuwait 15.0 15.0 5.0 30.0 20.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 15.0 0.0Luxembourg 5.0 0.0 0.9 1.0 6.3 4.9 0.0 0.0 6.3 4.9Netherlands 100.5 100.5 93.3 65.3 50.6 49.0 47.1 45.9 3.5 3.1Norway 40.0 40.0 40.0 53.0 41.5 40.5 30.2 30.2 11.3 10.3Oman 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0Pakistan 50.0 50.0 17.7 20.0 30.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.0 0.0Portugal 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0Qatar 20.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0Russian Fed. 30.0 0.0 0.0 30.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0Saudi Arabia 35.0 35.8 35.8 35.0 36.0 6.0 5.0 5.0 31.0 1.0Spain 25.7 6.4 6.4 62.0 12.0 0.0 0.0 0.01 2.0 0.0Sweden 30.0 30.0 30.0 35.6 27.0 10.1 6.0 6.0 21.0 4.1Switzerland 12.0 14.4 14.4 13.0 8.6 5.4 0.4 0.4 8.2 5.0Turkey 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.0 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.7UAE 36.0 0.0 0.0 22.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0United Kingdom 137.8 91.6 149.0 144.0 194.1 128.1 59.1 55.1 135.0 73.0USA 836.3 836.3 836.3 1,300.0 2,190.3 836.3 96.5 20.0 2,093.8 816.3World Bank 103.3 101.5 23.2 160.0 125.8 97.2 20.8 20.8 105.0 76.4Total 2,712.6 2,645.4 2,417.5 3,003.1 4,075.4 1,844.8 528.4 385.7 3,508.6 1,420.9

Donor 4Q80 + 81 (Jan02-Mar03) 1382 (Mar03-Mar04) of which:ALL SUPPORT TOTAL TRUST FUNDS PROJECTS

PLEDGE Com Disb PLEDGE Com Disb Com Disb Com Disb

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consultation requires effective consensus-building on the elaboration of anythingfrom development s trategies tonegotiations over small projects. InAfghanistan, in the meantime, there hasnot been much consultation on many ofthe agendas, beginning with the NDF andSecuring Afghanistan’s Future. Whilepressure, from the international communityon the Transitional Administration and onthe aid agencies, to del iver isunderstandable, the danger is that thispressure may be at the expense of properconsultation, both with the majority ofAfghans, and within the different branchesof the administration itself. It risksperpetuating the perception that aid is tosustain the presence of a large internationalcommunity. Consultation, formal andinformal, with civil society, and with theshuras and even with the diaspora isessential for planning the path towardsgenuine and lasting democracy anddevelopment while ensuring “Afghanownership”.

Afghan ownership does not only meankeeping people informed or consulting

with them. It means allowing them to bein the driver’s seat in designing strategies.At the same time, while it is vital thatAfghans take centre-stage in the decision-making processes concerning theirreconstruction, it should not be assumedthat there exists a national consensusconcerning a vision for the nation’s futurereconstruction and development priorities.There is also a danger that the country’sweak transitional structures will beoverwhelmed and marginalized indecision-making processes, especially ifthe international community takes toostrong a lead and undermines the inputsfrom the people of Afghanistan. It shouldinstead be seen as supporting nationalinstitutions at the central, provincial anddistrict levels, as well as local authoritiessuch as the shuras.

The Dilemma of Top-down VersusBottom-up Approaches

Prior to the Bonn Agreement when theinternational community was unable tocollaborate with a legitimate centralauthority, multiple aid agencies had taken

Table 7.2: Total Assistance to Afghanistan 1380 (2001) – 1382 (2003)

N.B. A significant amount of UN Agency funding is subcontracted to NGOs and private companies.Source: Ministry of Finance, Financial Report, May 24, 2004

Channel US$m % of TotalAssistance Not Provided to GovernmentTo United Nations

Emergency Loya Jirgah 22.9Constitutional Loya Jirgah 13.0Elections 75.5UN Agencies 1,845.8

United Nations Subtotal 1,957.2 45.9%

To national and international NGOs 413.1NGO Subtotal 413.1 9.7%

To Private Companiesexamples:Louis Berger 275.1Bearing Point 71.4KFW 45.9

Private Companies Subtotal 705.1 16.5%Subtotal of Assistance not Provided to Government 3,075.4 72.2%

Assistance Provided Directly to Government 1,186.9 27.8%

Total Assistance 4,262.3 100%

Chapter 7214

on the challenge of experimenting withalternative, community-based initiatives.Many of these continue today, built on theconviction that aid, at the individual andcommunity level, may effectively supportalternatives to war by cultivating ideas,values, livelihoods, forms of governanceand leadership.27 The underlying belief isthat aid, administered at the individual andcommunity level in a “conflict sensitive”manner, can subdue violence, and therebymake communities less vulnerable to theinterests and agendas of “conflictentrepreneurs”. The effects of these micro-level initiatives are likewise assumed tospill over and influence macro-levelpolitics. Though the results of such effortshave yet to be measured, the importanceof the work being done by these “socialentrepreneurs”, who attempt to bridge thegap between civil society and topleadership, should not be underestimated.

However, lessons from the past show thatone should not assume that bottom-uppeace-bui ld ing approaches wi l lautomatically have a cumulative effect.Bottom-up approaches of the past haveled agencies to avoid working with theauthorities at the national level, while theirefforts remained highly localized, not tosay fragmented. Moreover, suchcommunity-based approaches tend tooverestimate the capacity of civil societyto influence unaccountable leadership,which often comes to power with the gun,rather than through consent.

Related to a balance between top–down(aid to the central state) versus bottom-up(aid to communities) approaches,addressing human insecurities inAfghanistan requires an even distributionof aid and of peace dividends acrossregions and groupings. At the moment,data is hard to come by on the geographicdistribution of aid and rehabilitation

projects, although the DAD is now makingsuch information available. However,while data is available on a number ofprojects per province, an attempt to use itfor a comparison is impossible due todouble reporting by donors andimplementing agencies, difficulty indifferentiating between finished, ongoingand planned projects, and an uncertaintyas to whether all projects were reportedand whether those reported had actuallybeen implemented.28

The Government’s NSP, as a regional andwell-distributed community developmentinitiative, is designed to bridge the gapsbetween the supply from above and thedemand from below. In the coming years,it will be necessary for all aid agencies towork together to devise an appropriateAfghan model for aid, which would ideallyinvolve an optimal blend of top-down andbottom-up strategies.

Quick-fixes Versus Long-termInterventions

“Civil wars that end in a stalemate mayrequire rapid, re-integrative measures lestthe belligerents resume fighting. Thesituation in Afghanistan is different; themajor potential for conflict lies rather inhow to divide the spoils of peace.”29

As short-term humanitarian relief to savelives continues in many parts ofAfghanistan, aid agencies have also begunconcentrating on longer term livelihoodssupport and capacity-building. This hasinvolved building on the foundations ofcommunity coping skills to createalternatives to the war economy, rebuildingsocial capital and physical infrastructure,and, most importantly, helping to ‘de-militarise’ the mind”.30

The large amount of aid that has pouredinto Afghanistan has made it difficult to

27 Goodhand 2002.28 Suhrke 2004.29 Suhrke 2004.30 Goodhand 2002.

If people can be of anyhelp in enhancinghuman security theyneed to be taken intoconfidence with respectto the relevant polices.They should beprovided withinformation about thecurrent policies andasked about theiradvice with respect toimproving them.

Gul Ahmad Yama from Ghazni

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resist the temptation of quick-fix projectsthat demonstrate immediate results. Theproblem is not a shortage of funds, but alack of absorption capacities and policypriorities. It is also very important to avoidexpectations of a quick recovery. Slowprogress may spark disillusionment withreconstruction, especially among the highpercentage of unemployed youth.Expectations for rapid growth and recoveryare particularly acute during post-conflictsituations, where negative changes canadd up to popular resentment.

The Danger of Dependency

The inevitable dependence on externalassistance, in the short term at least, mustnot be allowed to render the TransitionalAdministration more accountable to donorsthan to its citizens. In the past, the rulingelite was never forced to develop domesticaccountability through internally derivedrevenue because of the strong role ofexternal finance. In 2004, the situationmay not be much different. Two-thirds ofthe operating budget for the year2003–2004 and the entire first NDB werefinanced by foreign aid. Internationaltechnical advisors were assigned to mostof the ministries in Kabul, and some in theprovinces as well. Absorptive capacitiesfor the large amounts of funding requestedat Berlin were guaranteed through hiringlarge international companies to assumeresponsibili ty for tasks such asreconstructing infrastructure andperforming Government accountingfunctions.

The country has now become totally relianton foreign aid to finance development.Yet, too much aid can be a curse ratherthan a blessing. It can lead to lowerdomestic savings, and higher exchangerates, which lower the competitiveness ofnational enterprises in domestic and foreignmarkets. While the contribution of aid tolong-term and sustained economic growthis questionable, it can lead to seriousindebtedness.

Large amounts of aid may mean that bothdonors and a recipient state, like the AfghanTransitional Administration, become tiedto a culture of financial accountabilityrequired for the management of short,fixed-term budgets measured by indicatorsof expenditures. Funding is geared tofinancial probity and timely disbursement,rather than to the more difficult task ofmeasuring its effectiveness through socialimpact evaluations of long lastingimprovements. For a state heavilydependent on international money, thispractice encourages accountability tointernational and national financialintuitions and tax-payers in other countries.In addition, the timeframe creates asituation wherein, even if the internationalorganizations and the state are both morallyaccountable to the beneficiaries, in practicethe accountability will be more to thosecontrolling the resources and budgetarycalendars.

Holistic Versus SectoralApproaches

Sectoral approaches may not be the bestway to deal with human security inAfghanistan, not only because they maylead to fragmentation and contradictions,but also because they may fail to take intoaccount the inter-connections between thevarious threats to well-being. Instead, anintegrated and holistic approach is needed.

For example, if food aid (relief assistance)is not correlated with food security(agriculture and rural economic recovery),it could slow post-war agriculturalrecovery. Similarly, agricultural recoveryneeds to be correlated with mine clearanceand the employment sector. Thereintegration of refugees and IDPs shouldnot be dealt with separately from thereintegration of demobilized combatants,given that they are likely to be returningto the same rural and urban communities.Similarly, although many agencies workon mainstreaming gender issues into their

Chapter 7216

programmes, women are singled out as a“category” in isolation from their widersocial, cultural and family contexts. Amacro-economic framework based onmarket incentives may lead to inequalitiesand the proliferation of needy individuals.This fragmentation extends to the way thatthe United Nations, and the variousconsultative groups and governmentministries (as discussed in Chapters 5 and6) adopt sectoral approaches, with separateprogrammes and budgets. Yet the list ofinter-connections can go on, each timepointing to the need for a more integratedapproach to planning, budgeting andmonitoring interventions across varioussectors and in collaboration with variousagencies in order to avoid negativeexternalities.

Building Capacity

One of the most important problems ofaid in Afghanistan is the pace with whichit needs to proceed on the one hand, andthe reality of slow processes and lowcapacity on the other. It is especiallyimportant to recognize the importance ofletting the Afghan political process mature,while promoting reforms and policypriorities that have long-term implications.

Capacity-building cannot be rushed. It isa process that develops and transformsitself with time, making it even moreimperative not to substitute externallyimposed blueprints and template solutionsthat tell Afghans what they “should do”instead of looking at what they “can do”.31

Afghan people and institutions must begiven the timeframe that suits them best,in accordance with necessary respect, andnot be pressured to adhere to the constraintsof budget deadlines determined by Westerncapitals. A perceived lack of capacity, thehaste of implementing relief whileproviding security, and the desire topromote Afghanistan as a showcase forthe international community may have

meant that the early s tages ofreconstruction have run ahead of Afghanpreparedness, pre-empting the process ofnational negotiation and decision-making.

Since 2002, however, there has been aprocess of building Government capacityand finding personnel that have thecompetence and authority to act as genuinecounterparts. This recognizes that thelimited capacity within line ministriescontinues to represent a major constraintto planning, implementing and monitoringdevelopment programmes. Centralinstitutions have been weakened by theconflict, and their relationships with theperiphery constrained by insecurity andthe lack of communications infrastructure.Capacity needs to be built at the centreand in the provinces simultaneously, inorder to ensure that the reconstructionprocess is indeed piloted by the Afghansthemselves.

In the meantime, given the absence orweakness of administrative structures, theUN agencies, international financialinstitutions and bilateral donorsincreasingly pursue a policy of directintervention, including becoming involvedin the day-to-day administrative runningof the Government through advisors, orthrough “technical assistance” strategicallyplaced in key institutions. The same trendis seen when NGOs substitute for the stateat the local level in providing services,with the assumption that there are nocapable state structures. Replacing the stateat the local or national levels, either directlyor indirectly, however, does not lead tolong-term capacity-building or ownership.

The lack of educational provisions for theoverwhelming majority of the youngergeneration (men as well as women) hasleft a huge gap in the general capacity ofthe nation to resume control of its affairs.This situation is already leadinginternational agencies to take the

31 Nancy Hatch Dupree as quoted in Barakat 2002.

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convenient option (from a communicationsand time-saving point of view) of relyingon returning, Western-educated expatriatesas the sole interpreters of the culture andaspirations of the whole nation. Whilethese returning nationals constitute aprecious resource, they too must undergoa learning process. In the meantime, thelargely illiterate Afghan population, stillstruggling for physical survival and comingto terms with its losses, is in danger ofbeing overridden by the usual hastysolutions, before they have time to considertheir role in the process.32

The Problem of Conditionalities

Aid conditionalities can range from explicitcontractual arrangements on budgetaryaccountability to more implicit notions ofwhat type of political, economic andincreasingly military conditions arenecessary.33 It can include positiveapproaches that reward compliantcountries, as was seen at the BerlinConference, and punitive measures, suchas suspending aid to require specific typesof economic and political reforms or theadoption of human rights principles. Thelatter can be imposed through sanctions,as was witnessed during the Taliban years.Although conditionalities are necessary inorder to assure that assistance is given tothe “right policies” of “good governance”,or that loans are returned and investmentss a f e g u a r d e d , t h e p r o b l e m o fconditionalities lies in the asymmetry ofpower and voice between the donor andthe recipient country. Conditionality inwar-torn societies can seem even moreproblematic when viewed in terms of theextreme vulnerability of populations andthe lack of bargaining powers of weakenedadministrative structures.

In fact, recipient stakeholder agendas arenot disregarded or overruled, but they often

become part of donor conditionalities.Imposing organizational changes does notnecessarily challenge well-establishedinstitutions, but promotes an elite engagedin a patron–client relationship with donors.In such circumstances, the elites becomeless accountable to the people they aresupposed to serve. Another case involvesthe legitimacy sought by new governments,especially those under threat from powerfulneighbours or internal conflict. In thesesituations, association with the internationalcommunity provides a defence orprotection. A number of other factors canalso lead impoverished people and theirnew governments down a similar path ofaccepting conditions that may be less thandesirable.34

While Chapter 6 discusses the pitfalls ofconditionalities based on standardeconomic policies, this chapter examinesthe need to be cautious about tyinghumanitarian or development assistanceto military conditionalities. The distinctionbetween humanitarian assistance andmilitary objectives is increasingly blurredin Afghanistan. This is manifested not onlythrough the implementa t ion ofinfrastructure-building carried out by theProvincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)of the Coalition Forces, but also throughmisplaced and dangerous conditionalities,such as during May 2004, when the USArmy was distributing leaflets calling onpeople to provide information on Al-Qaidaand the Taliban or face losing humanitarianaid.35

Listening and Learning from LocalResilience

The first step towards reconstruction anddevelopment is to recognize and valuepeople’s existing resilience in conflictsituations and to nurture their survival andcoping skills. In Afghanistan, despite

32 Mohammad Haneef Atmar and Jonathan Goodhand 2001.33 Barakat 2002.34 Ibid.35 The Guardian, 6May 2004.

Chapter 7218

decades of violent conflict, there arecommunity level structures and a civilsociety that have not only survived butalso continued to grow. Too often theinternational community may not recognizeor value such local initiatives, and insiston creating new structures instead ofbuilding on these. It is therefore importantthat even in such politicised environments,space is given for civil society to matureand to contribute positively to any ongoingpeace negotiations or processes. It is ofcritical importance as well that civiliansshould take centre-stage in the decision-making process in Afghanistan’sreconstruction. The dilemma facing thecountry is that there has not been a neutralspace for debate to enable a common visionof the future to emerge, or for intellectualsand development professionals to gather,to think, to discuss and to plan.“Afghanistan today is a huge, shiftingkaleidoscope of differing expectations andregional aspirations, which has been shapedby the collective experience of 23 yearsof war.”36

In the meantime, while the capacity ofinternal institutions to manage recoveryhas been severely weakened, institutionalcapacity survives in Afghan society,although much of it is customary (“rule-based”) rather than formal (“role-based”).37

As two researchers noted, “successfulprogrammes to develop institutional andindividual capacity should not be designedand implemented from outside, but theyshould evolve and grow, becausesustainable and legitimate institutions canbe created in direct relations to the socialexperiences of a people and created bythose they are to serve.”38

Aid agencies have often failed to recognizeexisting social institutions. The implicationhas been bypassing the social formationsthat have emerged through history, and

relying on a small set of organizations withcharacteristics conforming to the WesternNGO model. This cultural bias may meanoverlooking traditional social formationsthat are central to people’s lives, includingassociations based on ethnic and religiousallegiances, ad hoc and informal groupings,the extended family and so on. When civilsociety is viewed in terms of aconfrontational relationship with the state,these institutions are denied the chance ofworking both constructively with the stateand holding it accountable.39

Assessing past practices, and conductinga political and economic analysis of aid,may enable different development agenciesto learn from past mistakes. This need tolisten and learn is, however, hampered byphysical distances, high staff turnover,poor coordination and information-sharing,and the aid agencies’ concern with outputsrather than outcomes and impacts. But theknowledge does exist, both in theinternational and local communities. Nowit must be tapped into so that aid agenciescan truly make significant contributionsto development and democracy inAfghanistan.

7.6. Conclusions

International aid has a long andcontroversial record in Afghanistan. Thewrong kinds of aid have at times createdperverse incentives leading to renewedconflict. In the future, donors and aidagencies must be more self-critical andaware of these potentially negative effects.A continued priority should be placed onconflict prevention.

It is mostly through the state that peoplerelate to the international system. Theinternational community can forgo thestate and cooperate directly with sub-national societal units, but it does so at the

36 Suhrke, Strand and Harpviken 2001.37 Goodhand and Atmar 2001.38 Ibid.39 Ibid.

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risk of replacing or weakening the state.This does not necessarily enhance humansecurity in the long run. If aid agencies inAfghanistan, for example, bypass thecentral Government and work directly withregional administrations controlled byregional power-holders, they riskheightening tensions between the centreand the periphery.

Human security efforts need to be locallysustainable. They require an effective,legitimate, accountable and participatorypolitical structure capable of securing itsown resources. International interferenceis unlikely to enhance local capacities inthese directions if it does not build uponthe pre-existing efforts and capabilities ofthose directly affected.40

Integrating a human security approach indevelopment programmes and plans callsfor reorienting them to respond to newchallenges and realities. Conflictprevention measures need to be includedat all stages, even in post-conflict and so-called “normal” development situations.These peace-building and conflict-prevention measures could be:

• Correlating programmes that spanfunctional areas such as economicgrowth and distribution, food security,agricultural and urban livelihoods,governance and institution building,education, health, environment andresource management.

• Recognizing potential vulnerabilityand threats through regular humansecurity assessments or early warningsand risk analysis.

• Building capacity for dialogue amongcommunities.

• Reducing poverty with a specific viewto helping narrow and close inter-group disparities.

• Enhancing participatory development,the rule of law, and good governancethrough institutional reform aimed atimproving representation of nationalgroups or creating legal avenues ofredress for grievances.

• Integrating a gender perspective innational and local planning.

Direct assistance for peace-building as partof development is only one of theresponsibilities of the internationalcommunity, and in many circumstancesmay not be the most important. Othersinclude:

• Stemming the proliferation of weaponsand taking serious steps to limit theflow and diffusion of arms.

• Combating corruption.

• Encouraging macro-economicstability, and open regional andinternational flows of legitimate trade,inves tment , and know-how.

• Enhancing regional cooperation.

• Allowing for equitable global traderegimes.

• Targeting aid in such a way as to actas a multiplier by facilitating anenvironment for private and publicinvestments.

To meet the ultimate challenges oftomorrow requires thinking beyond aid,since sustainable peace and developmentwill, in the final analysis, not be the resultof development assistance, but of home-grown governance and Afghanentrepreneurship.

40 Commission on Human Security 2003.

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8

Photo: Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh

Recommendations:Laying the Foundations for Democracy, Developmentand Human Security in Afghanistan

Chapter

1 Sultan Barakat 2002.

building, or destroy its very foundations.Carefully planned reconstruction shouldbe seen as part of the overall peace-buildingagenda, one that builds trust in institutions,promotes participation, heals wounds andrestores dignity.

It is first important to note that there areno perfect solutions, no pre-determinedblueprints for post-conflict reconstruction.“The best that the actors ...can hope to dois to steer a course that does the least harm,by learning from past efforts.”1 SultanBarakat 2002. Reconstruction mustnecessarily be a continuous and prolongedprocess of negotiation between diverseinterest groups as well as between themand political actors.

Sustained peace in Afghanistan is notguaranteed despite the early successes instate- building that have now led toelections. Human security is still neededin Afghanistan. The breakdown ofinstitutions has left the populationvulnerable to the whims of peace-spoilersand their private militias, which can easilyraise and sustain an army from amongimpoverished populations. Rebuildinginstitutions constitutes the core task forprotecting Afghans’ human security. Thisshould be done according to an “Afghanmodel” that reflects the country’s historyand strives not only to satisfy theimmediate needs of individuals, but alsoto develop the capacities for self-sufficiency and empowerment.

The triple challenge in Afghanistan is thatan ambitious national reconstructionprogramme has been launched at the same

Chapter 8:

Recommendations: Laying the Foundations for Democracy,Development and Human Security in Afghanistan

Chap te r 8 p r e sen t s t he ma inrecommendations stemming from theholistic approach to human securityproblems that has been taken in this firstNHDR for Afghanistan. Since the reporthas primarily analysed past and currentissues within a particular framework ofhuman development and human security,the recommendations are presented asgeneral directions that the new Governmentand international community could pursue.These are meant as attempts to initiatedialogue in Afghanistan on broad and inter-connected issues. Easing some of thebarriers to progress could be soughtthrough discussions and further in-depthstudies, including in future NHDRs. Thisfirst report took a more general approachto set the scene for an integrated pursuitof the goals of human development andhuman security.

8.1. Introduction: The Dilemmaof Afghanistan

In many countries emerging from war,overt armed conflict may come to an endwhile low-level violence continues formany years, involving former factions,demobilized combatants, bandits ormilitias. Military and diplomatic measures,though important, are unlikely bythemselves to secure a transition towardsa stable peace. For development anddemocracy to take root, the manner inwhich the reconstruction is structured(needs assessed, resources allocated,partners chosen, projects implemented,results monitored, etc.) can either providepositive incentives that foster nation-

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Box 8.1

What Afghanistan Needs What People Need

time as a fragile political transition and anongoing military campaign.

• While a strong state is needed toprovide human security as a publicgood, an overly centralized state mayalso exacerbate horizontal inequalities,which could lead to conflicts. Thereis a need for order at the national level,but at the same time, the geographydoes not facilitate central control, andfreedom should be bestowed on theindependent tribes to allow for localeconomic development. Devolutionof power, therefore, is needed at thesame time as this power is consolidatedat the centre.

• Institutional capacity-building isneeded, but this is a long-term project.In the short term, the immediate needsof the people include human rights,security and jobs, imperatives thatcannot wait for the building andstrengthening of new institutions.

• The ongoing military campaign againstthe remaining Taliban fighters andpeace-spoilers could present trade-offsthat the new Government and itsinternational partners must deal with,including diversion of funds to themilitary, concentration on rogueprovinces, and so on. Although, forthe moment, this has been theresponsibility of the Coalition Forces

in Afghanistan, the sovereignty gainedafter the elections also means increasedresponsibilities to protect the citizensof Afghanistan, as well as those ofother countries affected by theinsecurities there.

The goal in Afghanistan is not simply tocreate a development or democracy agenda,but to use these tools to prevent conflict,on the one hand, and to provide the ultimategoal of human security as a public good,on the other.

A human security agenda is, first andforemost, a conflict prevention mechanismfor Afghanistan and the region. Beyondconflicts and military diplomacy betweenstates, it addresses causes of conflict fromwith in the state: hunger, disease, crimeand repression, and personal crisis causedby decades of war. These threats are easier– and less costly – to address through earlyprevention and detection, than after anotherfull-fledged war has erupted. Resortingonce again to military missions andinternational humanitarian interventionsunder pressure can be avoided, if a timely,stratified and gradual approach is adopted.

Human Security Externalities

Focusing on people as the subjects ofsecurity is an imperative, built on thefollowing premises:

Peace Survival

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Development Democracy Livelihoods Dignity

The goal inAfghanistan is notsimply to create adevelopment ordemocracy agenda,but to use these tools toprevent conflict, on theone hand, and toprovide the ultimategoal of human securityas a public good, on theother.

Systemic Goals Human Security Goals

• Conditionality for development:People must have a minimal sense ofsecurity in order to engage indevelopment activities, whiledevelopment, in turn, contributes tothe increased freedom and security ofboth the people and the state.

• Legitimacy of the state-buildingprocess: Legitimacy, so crucial forthe new Afghan Government, shouldbe based on accountability towardsAfghans primarily, and not towardsregional or international interests.

• Stability for the state: Without thefear of continued conflicts, andanticipating a pact with citizens, thestate should allocate its resources toproductive sectors, instead of tomilitary hardware or a continuedstruggle with alienated groups.

• Ownership: The peace-building andstate-building agendas should be“owned” by the Afghan people, theultimate beneficiaries.

• Increased participation: Afghansshould play a greater role in the designand implementation of new policiesand projects.

• Building trust and respect: Thealienation of the state from its peopleshould diminish, leading to positiveexternalities.

• Efficiency and sustainability:Projects, policies and budgets shouldbe designed through a demand-drivenprocess and vetted for sustainabilityaga ins t t he engagemen t o fbeneficiaries.

• Erad ica t ion o f hor i zonta linequalities: Equity between groupsof people should diminish competitionand conflict.

• Morality and ethics: The shift infocus to the security (well-being) ofpeople constitutes, ultimately, a moral

imperative for institutions and actorswhose raison d’être is to serve thosewho put them there in the first place.

Development and Democracy andConflict Prevention

Development and Conflict

Recovery in war-torn societies is anintegral part of the development challenge,with poverty reduction, developmentstrategies and interventions all capable ofhaving positive as well as negative effects.In a negative scenario, developmentinterventions may (inadvertently)strengthen underlying causes of conflict,and the actors who are pursuingopportunities for violence. In a positivescenario, development interventions maycontribute to weakening these factors, andhelp de-escalate conflict.

In fragile transitional situations such asAfghanistan, many of the causes of conflictmust be addressed if the country is to avoidsliding back into conflict. Greaterdevelopment – economic, social andpolitical – can help build peace and reducethe dangers of violent conflict. Yetdevelopment itself causes change andtransformation, which can be de-stabilizing. Even when it is successful,development raises expectations andhighlights disparities, sometimes addingto the factors that may trigger violence. Itis also important to be aware of thelimitations of development interventionsin defusing conflict and building peace.Development can only complement, neverreplace, direct peace-building measuressuch as political transformation orpreventive diplomacy, and other measuresto stop hostilities and “get back on track”.

At the same time, while development itselfis not the only response, and developedsocieties also fall prey to major internalor external crisis, research does show thatcertain levels of achievement andimprovement in conditions of life – suchas economic well-being; freedom and

War is not a singlecatastrophic event buta devastating way oflife closely associatedwith chronic povertyand social injustice.Peace is not a quick-fixbut a developmentprocess that beginsand can be nurturedlong before ceasefiresare brokered, andwhich needs to besustained throughyears of ‘post-warrecovery’.

Sultan Barakat, 2002

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choice; social stability and social justice;trusted mechanisms of open, responsivegovernance; and the respect of individualand minority rights – do ultimately tendto support peace. These public goods, inaddition to being desirable in themselves,work together to form a solid foundationfor sustainable peace.

The Role of Democracy for ConflictResolution and Prevention

Democratic governance may be the mostappropriate system for conflict preventionand resolution, assuming that democracyis a system that allows, via institutionaloutlets such as political parties andrepresentative parliaments, the sustainablemanagement of conflicts, , rather thansuppressing or ignoring them. It is a systemwhere accumulated resentments that arisefrom perceived misallocations of resourcescan be aired – whether they relate to accessto land, discrimination on the basis ofgender or religion, or any of the othermyriad sources of deeply felt grievances.In the context of deep-rooted conflict,democratic institutions are more relevantfor their potential ability to initiate a

process for conflict prevention or resolutionthan for actually resolving conflicts,per se.

Liberal democracy and a market-orientedeconomy, because they open up nationalsystems to a multiplicity of interests, arenot always the answers to all types ofdevelopment operations, nor the surestfoundations for peace. Democracy andcapitalism, both encouraging socialcompetition, could in some cases worsensocial conflicts in war-shattered states thatlack the institutional structures requiredfor conciliation. Fledgling democracies,therefore, have to face political hurdlesthat can hamper economic and socialdevelopment. Democracies may also betoo dependent upon special interest groupsthat all too often win at the expense offavourable conditions for economicgrowth. The dilemma for post-conflictcountries such as Afghanistan is toreconcile competing interests and to createa democracy that does not further wideninequalities. Instead, it should lay thefoundations for a democracy that is justand responsible, and that is based on theprinciples of participation and governance.

• Where the rule of law is respected to keep risk factors, such as greed and grievances,from being converted into conflict.

• Where security is established and maintained not only as a reinforcement of punitiveaction, but as a pro-active empowerment strategy that encourages citizens to respect therule of law.

• Where there is national reconciliation and a consolidation of peace through power sharingand democratic representation of constructive elements of society.

• Where there is genuine participation in all processes from design to implementation tomonitoring.

• Where all human rights are respected, especially those related to freedom of expression.

• Which is built on local traditions and consultation mechanisms.

• Which respects diversity, and can bridge ethnic, geographic and gender differences.

• Which is based on respect for institutions, and not on the personalization of politics.

• Which addresses asymmetries and power inequalities as a matter of injustice, whetherthey are related to gender, geography, ethnicity religion and so on.

Box 8.2

What Kind of Democracy Does Afghanistan Need?

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The Need for Information andConflict Analysis

A human security analysis should focuson the threat of inequalities within thecontext of historical changes, the dynamicsof future trends, the degree of politicization,public perceptions and linkages to poverty.In a highly fragmented society such asAfghanistan’s, where conflicts have beenwaged based on perceptions of exclusion,a disaggregated analysis across social,ethnic, gender and regional groups isneeded in order to:

• Examine the sources and consequencesof conflict.

• Determine the factors that can beaddressed th rough po l ic ies ,programmes and internationalassistance.

• Examine the country’s resilience tooutbreak or escalation of violentconflict.

• Assess the ability to de-escalate violentconflict.

• Determine how resilience can bestrengthened through developmentassistance and policies.

The WB uses nine indicators for a conflictanalysis framework that capturesdeterioration in a country.2

1 Violent conflict in the past ten years:If a country has experienced violentconflict in the past ten years, there isa high possibility of recurrence.

2 Low per capita GNI: Countries withlow per capita GNIs face a higher riskof experiencing violent conflict.

3 High dependence on primarycommodities exports: Countries witha high dependence on primarycommodities exports are more likelyto experience violent conflict.

4 Political instability: This includestwo components:

• Transformation of the statestructure: Restructuring of thestate at frequent intervals signalsserious instability and thelikelihood that violence is beingemployed to bring about systemicchanges.

• Breakdown in law and order:When the government is not ableto maintain control or effectiverule (in certain parts or throughoutthe country), law and order breaksdown, and violence is likely.

For violent conflict, these two factorscan occur independently or in tandem.

5 Restricted civil and political rights:The deliberate and systematic denialof civil liberties and political rightsincreases the likelihood that groupswill express dissenting views throughviolence, thus upping the probabilityof violent conflict.

6 Militarization: Countries may havea high defence spending as a ratio oftheir GNI and large armies as aproportion of their population.However, a militarized society alsohighlights the availability of armsamong non-state actors. These factorssuggest the likelihood of emerging orescalating violent conflict.

7 Ethnic dominance: When one ethnicgroup controls state institutions and/orthe economy, there is an increasingrisk of an outbreak of violent conflict.

8 Active regional conflicts: Regionalconflicts are likely to have a cascadingeffect, such that the internal stabilityof a country (flow of refugees, arms)is threatened, increasing the probabilityof violent conflict.

2 Conflict Analysis Framework, WB 2003,http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.nsf/67ByDocName/TheConflictAnalysisFramework/$FILE/CAFAugust03.pdf.

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9 High youth unemployment: Youthunemployment can have a criticalbearing on the probability of violentconflict. Lack of jobs and opportunitiestend to create frustration, makingunemployed youth (especially youngmen) prime candidates for recruitmentby militant organizations with fundsand arms at their disposal.

While it is likely that each of these factorsexacerbate situations that can portend theoutbreak, escalation, or resurgence ofviolent conflict, none of them isindividually “necessary” or “sufficient”for violent conflict. Still, as the number ofindicators checking positive increases, theimportance of conflict analysis also rises.

8.2. Recommendations andElements of a Human SecurityVision for Afghanistan

This NHDR considers the following sevenelements as necessary for long-term humansecurity in Afghanistan:

1. Security and safety

The political scientist Max Weber oncedefined a state as an entity that has amonopoly over the legitimate use of forcein a country. To ensure human security,and to function as a capable state, the newAfghan Government should take back itsmonopoly, and put an end to theprivatisation of security that is generatingnegative competition.

By the end of 2004, debates continued onhow peace and security should be pursued,and in whose interests Afghanistan shouldbe made secure. The argument is that while20,000 Coalition Forces largely pursuetheir own agenda, hunting down theTaliban, Al-Qaida and anyone activelyand violently opposing them, there remainonly 5,000 Kabul-based ISAF troops and15,000 Afghanistan National Army troopsto address the broader national agenda forstability and peace-building. With aninadequate and small police force, it is

little wonder that the influence of thetransitional Government does not extendfar beyond the capital.

Hence, there is a need to strengthen theANA and the ANP so that they will beaccountable, and have the will and capacityto enforce the law throughout the country.At the same time, ISAF’s current role insecurity may be both inadequate in termsof its small numbers, and inappropriatebecause its current modus operandi createsa sense of dependency amongst Kabulresidents. Instead, international securityforces should help improve the deliveryof security by extending the influence ofthe ANA and ANP, and not by creatingdependence on a foreign military presence.Today there are 15,000 National Armysoldiers and nearly 30,000 National Policeofficers, and support to these institutionsneeds to be increased.

An immediate focus should be on theremodeling and implementation of astrengthened and accelerated DDRstrategy. Disarmament, however, needs tobe carried out within a context ofemployment creation and alternativelivelihoods. An ill-planned DDR approach,involving no long-term plan for theemployment of disarmed persons and notraining for security personnel to replacethem, may be more dangerous than nostrategy at all. Even though the currentprivate militia are largely responsible forthe insecurity threats throughout thecountry, they would become more lethalif the self-assigned security responsibilityin the areas under their control is takenaway from them through DDR and thenleft to ad-hoc strategies.

At the same time, it needs to be recognizedthat while security is undoubtedly apriority, if won through an expansion ofmilitary operations, it cannot provide apermanent solution to the security dilemmain Afghanistan. Nor does such a narrowlydefined security goal amount to what willbe required to meet the human security

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needs of Afghans, the vast majority ofwho remain poor, highly vulnerable andwithout fundamental human rights. Thereis no fast track to lasting human securityand political stability through militaryaction alone.

PRTs exemplify the shortcomings of anarrow interpretation of human securityobjectives. They simultaneously seek toaddress military, political and humanitariandimensions through an expanded role forCoalition Forces in Afghanistan. Thecoalition-commanded PRTs are provingto be an inadequate and dangerous vehiclefor provision of security, however, andtheir new “humanitarian” role isincreasingly hard to distinguish from thatof genuine humanitarian and developmentaid workers.

Without peace and stability, there can beno sustainable human development inAfghanistan. Beyond the call for moreinternational forces to be deployedthroughout the country, the NHDR notesthat true security rests on a genuine nationalreconciliation process that adequatelyaddresses the greed and grievances existingin Afghanistan today.

Justice must be dealt with at the same timeas stability. While the need for nationalreconciliation is often emphasized inAfghanis tan, both nat ional andinternational actors have been reluctant totouch specific means to address thecountry’s past. The multi-ethnic layers ofAfghan society, combined with the fragilityof state-building efforts that remaindangerously exposed to polarization,necessitate a cautious approach towardsthe revisiting of the past as a means topromoting reconciliation. Few woulddisagree that long-term political stabilityin Afghanistan is closely tied to theresolution of past grievances – includinghuman rights violations, war crimes andcrimes against humanity – but thesequencing of reconciliation as well as themechanism to facilitate “national healing”are yet to be determined.

2. A Responsible State and anAccountable State-building Process

Any debate on Afghanistan’s state-buildingprocess must focus on the state’sprospective role and size.

A public good is characterized by non-excludability and by non-competition inconsumption; thus, social security, physicalsecurity and the rule of law, as well equaldistribution and the upholding of humanrights are considered as vital respons-ibilities of a “strong” state.

A number of factors contribute to the“weak state” in Afghanistan. Geographyand topography are not conducive tofacilitating communication, and they assistregional power bases competing with thecentre. The interference of strong regionaland international powers in the internalpolitical process has also prevented a strongstate from evolving, while the legitimacyand power of the centre is furtherchallenged by local tribal structures ledby powerful personalities. However, whilethe state may be challenged, the nation isnot. Afghanistan’s rich ethnic and religiousdiversity has not led to separatistaspirations by ethnic groups, despite thepresence of warring parties and factions.Instead, what is sought is a redistributionof the “power” of the state equally amongthe different groups to ensure that all areimplicated in the political discourse onstate-building throughout the country andnot only in Kabul.

The capacity to “provide” human securitydepends upon a strong state that cangenerate and distribute public goods.Human security as public good requiresthe state to have a regulatory as well as aprovisionary role; it must regulate in orderto ensure conditions for reconstruction,and provide sufficient security for themarket to function. It must also play anactive part in offering social services,quality (even if basic) health care,education and job security to all thepopulation, not only as a matter of right,but also to diminish threats.

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The viability of a peace-building processdepends ultimately on the establishmentof a legitimate Afghan state, responsiveto the demands of the population,responsible for providing the public goodsthat comprise human security, and able toresist threats from regional military groupswithin the country as well as pressuresfrom external parties. The Governmentcan delegate some activities to commercialand non-governmental organizations, butit still bears the ultimate responsibility.

Given the complex nature of post-wars o c i e t y i n A f g h a n i s t a n , s t a t eresponsibilities should increase rather thandecrease. This does not mean that the stateshould dictate the directions of theeconomy, but that it should intervene inareas where the market cannot ensure anefficient allocation of resources or equalaccess to assets and opportunities for allpeople. The role of the state should bethreefold: 1) to guarantee that thereconstruction process is equitable, efficientand empowering; 2) to promote investmentin human capabilities; and 3) to equallydistribute resources. First and foremost,the role of the state should be to equalizeopportunities.

A weak state cannot deliver human securitypriorities and can breed grievances, so“efficient” and “fair” state building is thefirst priority of a human security agenda.The inability to satisfy basic needs inprovinces can cut into the credibility ofthe central Government. State-building inAfghanistan therefore requires cooperationbetween the central Government and itslocal representatives, as well as withcommunity and tribal leaders that havebeen instrumental in creating law and orderin provinces. These relationships, basedon mutual interest, and adequately spelledout in the Constitution, need to bereinforced. What needs to be avoided isthe segregation of the country into semi-autonomous regions.

At the same time that the state shouldprovide for its people, they should also bewilling and capable of contributing to thestate. Checks and balances against thepowers of the state should be set up throughtraditional negotiation structures such asthe Loya Jirgah to ensure that therelationship between Afghan civil societyand the central state grows into one ofmutual engagement rather than distrust.

One of the crucial issues will be whetherthe models of “transitional justice” thathave been applied in other post-conflictcontexts can be adapted to fit thecomplexities of the history of war inAfghanistan. On the one hand, the modelof “truth and reconciliation” may be toosimplistic in a context in which perpetratorsand victims are spread throughout society.The prosecutorial model, on the other hand,which pursues justice through war crimestribunals, may jeopardize the peace processby threatening power mongers inclined toexploit ethnic divisions to escape sanction.Moreover, the prosecutorial model wouldbe preconditioned on either a strong judicialsystem within Afghanistan or heavyinternational support similar to theinternational war crimes tribunalsestablished in the past, neither of whichseems to be available at present. In viewof the current challenges to transitionaljustice, answers to the questions of thepast may be “postponed” until the criticalthreshold for long-term stability has beenachieved. The risk remains, however, thatwithout measures to demonstratecommitment to dealing with previousinjustices and grievances, public trust andconfidence in the newly established statestructures, particularly its judiciary, mayfurther corrode, to the detriment of thestate-building process itself. This mayparticularly apply in cases where politicalinterests seek to exploit past grievances togarner popular support.

Making reconciliation part of state-buildingis important for three reasons: 1) It would

Chapter 8230

serve justice; 2) It would send a messageto both the victims and the culprits torelegate past violations to the past andmove forward; and 3) It would helpmarginalize perpetrators of human rightsviolations.

3. Inclusive and EmpoweringInstitutions and Policies

In Afghanistan, all development strategieshave to be based on addressing inequalitiesbetween groups (gender, regions, religionsand ethnicities). Otherwise they may failin reaching their targets, while exacerbatingcauses for renewed conflict. Afghanistanis not a normal underdeveloped countrythat needs fast recovery growth based onmarket forces. It is one with deeplyimbedded inequalities that must be eased.

The implementation of a human securityvision requires policies that allow allgroups an adequate voice andrepresentation in decision-makingprocesses. This would mean addressingdisparities and inequalities in opportunitiesbased on gender (men and women),geography (urban/rural or regions),generation and age, ethnicity, and whetheror not people are settled, be they IDPs,returnees or nomads. Policies based onprinciples of equitable access toopportunities create social cohesion andan integrated, peaceful society, which iswhat Afghanistan needs first and foremosttoday.

If the differences and disparities are a resultof objective factors, then efforts should bemade, through specific policies, to diminishthese. If, however, these are a result ofpolicy decisions, then they must beeradicated. The very real constraints ofthe new Government, in terms of resources,geography and history need to be dealtwith first and foremost through politicalwill.

The immediate test for the Governmentwill be the extent to which the politicalenvironment of upcoming parliamentary

elections will be perceived as fair andsecure. The intermediate test will be theGovernment’s ability to build the necessarystructures to allow for a functioningParliament, which can meaningfullyrepresent the people and exercise controlover the executive. Whether the rule oflaw, observed by the judiciary andexecutive organs, will finally replace therule of the gun will be the ultimate test forthe Government to inspire people’s trust.In passing these “tests”, it will certainlyface the difficult dilemma inherent in post-conflict state-building efforts: that theestablishment of “good governance” afteryears of military confrontation takes time,keeping in mind that people’s memoriesare more short- l ived than theirexpectations.

4. Genuine Participation

A shift to a human security vision requiresthe involvement of people as agents ofchange and opportunities. It moves beyondviewing people as vulnerable groups forwhom projects are designed, and viewsparticipation and consultation as key tothe shift to long-term development.

There is no denying that democracy andrespect for human rights build security insociety. A representative democracy, whereall social groups have access to politicaldecision-making process and benefit fromequal representation, satisfies the goals ofequity and justice. In a post-conflictsituation like Afghanistan, the principlesof democracy can shape the bestenvironment for securing political andsocial freedoms. Empowering andinclusive governance systems can providesecurity better than military defencemeasures. Civil society can be involvedin the promotion of human security byhelping in early detection, providingfeedback into policy-making, partneringwith the state to offer protection andassistance, and informing public opinion.

All policies, development policies andplans in particular, need to involve public

NHDR 04 231

participation and voices in order for themto be meaningful, supported andsustainable. People-based institutions suchas the district and provincial level shurasand the National Assembly need to beabout more than vetting political regimes;they should be primarily involved inconsulting the Government with respectto economic and deve lopmentprogrammes. This will enable theGovernment to engage local resources forhelp with the development work, while atthe same time drawing the shuras and theAssembly’s attention away from negativepolitics to positive participation indevelopment.

Participation is to a large extent theresponsibility of individuals. It meanspeople taking responsibility for their ownfuture, which in turn creates accountability.The new Government must take steps toempower people to take on thisresponsibility. The first prerequisite is aninformed and mature civil society capableof making choices. For this, the elements

are information and forms of consultationthat allow people to voice grievances anddiscontent. Participatory planning raisesthe level of people’s commitment, enablesa human development focus, andencourages people to contribute their ownhuman and financial resources. Sharingpower and responsibility, since theydistribute the work required fordevelopment, can end up accelerating it.

Community action, involvement andownership will be key to future securityand the sustainability of reconstruction.The role of communities as monitors andchampions of infrastructure development,and in the management of health andeducation services, will need to bevigorously promoted. Given the extent towhich community participation is pivotalto successful reconstruction, investmentssuch as the NSP (establishing community-based development committees across all20,000 villages) and NEEP will necessitateappropriate and sustained levels of donorsupport.

The present critical state of Afghanistan’scultural traditions and properties isnothing new. Similar upheavals haveoccurred during the course of its longhistory. One need only recall the horriddecimation of the luxurious Ghaznavidcapital in the 12th Century, followed bythe onslaughts of Genghis Khan in the13th Century. Nonetheless, althoughconflict often inflicts irredeemablephysical damage, the massivedisplacements accompanying suchdestruction can also strengthen a people’sdetermination to preserve culturaltraditions that affirm their nationalidentity in the midst of disruption. Thisis the case with Afghanistan.

The challenges that Afghanistan facestoday are daunting, but now is the timefor new beginnings. It is time torecognize that the full potential of culture,

stimulated by innovative thinking andun-submerged by economic and politicalinterests, can make major contributionsto the human development process.

Culture establishes a nation’sintegrity and fortifies a sense ofnational identity among its citizens

A nation’s integrity is assured when itsmembers hold fast to cultural values thatfortify their sense of national identity.Afghanistan sits at the hub of anintercommunicating zone between fourgreat civilizations. The mingling of awide diversity of peoples who came atvarious times for various reasons formsa rich cultural mosaic. The vigour ofAfghan society resides in this vibrantmedley of peoples, and the nation derivesits strength from the interchanges of onewith the other.

Although a number of ethnic groupsstraddle the nation’s boundaries andsimilarities with adjacent populationscan be noted, Afghans are noticeablydistinct from their neighbours and takepride in their uniqueness. It was theirdetermination to remain true to theessence of their cultural ethos thatenabled the Afghans to endure years ofeconomic and social hardships withforbearance and courage. The nation wasutterly traumatized, but the culturesurvived.

Culture reinforces nationalcohesiveness and development

The principle that there is strength indiversity aptly characterizes this nationcomprised of peoples with so manydifferent backgrounds. Variations incultural expression exist not onlybetween its disparate groups, but within

Box 8.3

Why is Culture Important to Human Development?

Chapter 8232

5. Balanced Development

Building on its successes with initiativessuch as the NSP and NEEP, the newGovernment must design a comprehensiveregional development strategy. The initialstages of the reconstruction programmeconcentrated most development efforts inKabul and major urban centres. As thedrug economy contributes now to the rapiddevelopment of cities, the international

community and the Government musttemper this imbalanced growth with anincreased focus on rural areas, includingremote villages.

Assistance to Afghanistan should not givethe impression of uneven re-development,even if for security reasons some provincesare easier to access than others. Specialattention should be given to unstable areas;otherwise these “rogue provinces” could

groups of common origin as well,depending on the geography of theirsettlement areas. Differences alsodistinguish rural and urban populations,within which members of various socialclasses cherish their own customs andvalue systems. Yet there is also anoverriding belief in a wide range ofcommon cultural values that function ascohesive bonds to keep the nation unitedaround its own recognizable identity.

Afghan history abounds with episodesof clashes between its separate groups,but it also reveals periods of tranquility.It was during these periods of toleranceand unity that the peoples living in theAfghan area utilized their ingenuity tointroduce cultural innovations thatenabled them to achieve economic,political and artistic heights from whichthey exerted influence far beyond theterritory they controlled. The brillianceof these periods grew out of the comingtogether and fusion of the many creativeideas flourishing with the Afghanborders.

Culture is intertwined with all formsof human development.

What is meant by culture? Cultureembraces those shared ideas, beliefs,emotions and customs that mouldbehaviour and place value on creativeartistic expressions, such as art, music,literature, architecture and relationshipswith the environment. It defines the waypeople live, and the way they utilizematerial and non-material resources. Itencompasses all members of society –men, women and children, old and

young. It embodies individual andcommunity aspirations. It influencesdecision-making. Having a strong senseof one’s own culture permits individualsto develop an inner strength that inspiresthem to reach out for more fulfillinglives for themselves, their families andtheir communities.

Culture, community and humandevelopment are thus inextricablyintertwined because each focuses onpeople as agents of change in their searchto improve themselves and theenvironment around them. Yet, thepervasive role culture plays in the livesof people and their development is rarelyacknowledged. Development rhetoric attimes may allude to culture as somethingvaguely desirable, but specifics areseldom provided.

Instead, the encouragement, promotionand development of “culture” is too oftentreated as an appendage to developmentstrategies that focus on economic orsocial factors, and in which economicgrowth, reducing poverty, andminimizing education and healthdisparities become ends in themselves,dominating policy planning and choices.These key goals are valuable, but theycannot be realized without consideringthe society’s beliefs, emotions andbehaviour patterns.

Culture’s role in humandevelopment is poorly recorded.

Not only is the examination of therelationship of culture to humandevelopment a subject that is largely

overlooked, there are seriousdeficiencies and large gaps in thecultural information that is available.Because avai lable data areinsufficient, it is difficult to conductadequate quantitative assessmentsthat can be used to establishmeaningful benchmarks and evaluateprogress. The complexities that willaccompany the process ofestablishing viable, comprehensivecultural indicators that can bemeasured and monitored should notobscure the fact that the issue cannotbe reduced to a single dimension.

It would be unwise to leave theidentification of indicators solely tooutsiders. For example, a recentarchaeological inventory conceivedand completed abroad was so bloatedwith inconsequential factors as to bevirtually unusable. Relevantindicators can best be selected inconcert with those involved, forlocally generated data provideinsights into people’s perceptions ofwhat is important to them for theat ta inment of r icher , moremeaningful lives. It is their concernsand priorities that matter. Whencultural data that reflect society’sbasic values are factored into policyanalyses, the totality of humandevelopment is enhanced.

Nancy Hatch Dupree, 2004.

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threaten the stability of the entire country.What should be avoided is the evolutionof a country increasingly divided betweena turbulent south and east, on the one hand,and a more stable crescent stretching fromthe west to the north, where rehabilitationand development can move forward.

An adequate regional and ruraldevelopment strategy would enableAfghanistan to make the best use of itshuman capital. While the centralGovernment requires the resources of theprovinces, it needs to also enter intoappropriate relationships that empowerthe local communities and theirrepresentatives. By being involved in thedesign and implementation of projects andpolicies, people as well as political andcommunity leaders in different regionswill share the responsibility of maintainingpeace and stability in the area.

As an equalizing and empowering measure,the state should address the wide gaps inopportunities between different regions,as well as between urban and rural areas.A long-term human security vision shouldavoid islands of privileges (the cities)within seas of poverty (the rural areas).Wide gaps exist today in incomeopportunities, as well as in the provisionof jobs, and basic services andinfrastructure. A high concentration ofjobs in Kabul is the result of the presenceof public sector institutions, theinternational community and an informalsector boosted by revenues from drugs.

The rapid urbanization of Kabul, whichhas attracted people from rural areas forits better services and employmentprospects, is a worrying phenomenon. Thepopulation has soared from 800,000 to 2.9million people, and the ratio of rural tourban people risen from 20:80 to 30:70.

Balanced development also means curbingcorruption and correcting a situation wherethose in power have access to funds andmoney. It means a more balancedredistribution of national revenue,

especially of taxes received by some ofthe provinces, given that a large portionof local revenues still does not reach thecentral Government.

Finally, balanced development involveswomen playing an active role in thereconstruction process. The mainstreamingof gender concerns in all policies, budgetsand plans is a first step. Supporting grass-root organizations and leadership amongAfghan women will help ensure that theirinterests are adequately defended. In thefinal analysis, real democracy inAfghanistan will largely depend on thegenuine, and not just nominal ,representation of women in decision-making.

6. A Supportive InternationalCommunity

Local Ownership, International Support

The international system should helppromote peace in Afghanistan by acceptingand sustaining its responsibility to supportthe country’s peace and conflict preventionefforts. Cooperation and assistance shouldbe scrutinized for issues related toownersh ip , impac t , e f f i c iency ,coordination, political agendas, etc..Afghan ownership, leadership and capacitydevelopment should be seen as the mostimportant objectives of the aid community.

A supportive international community alsoimplies a responsibility for the globaleconomic powers to promote growththrough principles of fair trade. Since thetransnationality of human security threatsprovides opportunities for nation-states,other countries should be prepared tosubsidize certain services that Afghanistanlacks the resources to provide, but whichare of interest to countries outside of theregion. These include supporting fair traderegimes, establishing environmentalcontrols and protection, halting drugtrafficking and production, preventingcommunicable diseases, stopping thespread of terrorism and so on. Global and

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regional commitments to stem the spreadof arms are another aspect of theresponsibility of the internationalcommunity towards human security inAfghanistan.

Human security is an interdisciplinaryproblem and, as such, requires aninterdisciplinary and integrated solutionthat can be best reached through integratedprogramming and efficient coordinationamong the various internationalorganizations working in Afghanistan.Improved coordination mechanisms areneeded between the various UN agencies,between the international financialinstitutions and other agencies, andbetween the international community andthe Government.

Long-term commitment from donorcountries is needed to make Afghanistana viable state. The international communitymust know what Afghanistan has thepotential to become if they ignore it. Themust also understand that investment hereis not just in the Afghan people, but intheir security as well. While developmentsover the past two and a half years havebeen encouraging, much remains to bedone, and progress could be lost if attentionturns away from Afghanistan at this crucialturning point. The price the internationalcommunity would pay to protect itselffrom Afghanistan would be far greaterthan what it will pay to help develop thecountry.

7. Peaceful and CooperativeRegional Agendas

The international community’s generalinterest in promoting peace and stabilityin Afghanistan covers two, quite differentpositions a minimalist concern to supportjust sufficient change in the country toensure that it will not harbour militantmovements that pose a threat to otherstates, and a more ambitious commitment

to help the country modernize, developand democratize. For the countries of theregion, both positions are crucial andmutually dependent, because investmentsin Afghanistan are an investment in theregion. The development of physicalinfrastructure and internal stability inAfghanistan will help the country to re-assume its historic role of a land bridgelinking Central Asia to South Asia, a stepthat will strongly boost regional economicdevelopment and trade. Neighbouringcountries should see the reconstruction ofAfghanistan as an opportunity to changepast conflict relationships into renewedopportunities for regional developmentand mutual benefit.

Afghanistan has been isolated from theworld and regional markets for many years.Closer integration with neighbours as wellas increased access to regional andinternational markets is essential to itsfuture. The emergence of a stableGovernment and the reconstruction effortsbeing undertaken are already opening newpossibilities for regional trade andeconomic cooperation, as well asenterprises in neighbouring countries.Ongoing humanitarian and reconstructionactivities represent an opportunity for theprivate sector in the region to expand itsbusiness with international partners,increasing the exposure to internationalmarkets and procurement. In addition,better regional cooperation will eventuallyimprove the overall climate for business,build greater intra- and inter-regionalrelations, and attract larger scale foreigndirect investment.

Afghanistan’s regional economiccooperation with Central Asia, Iran andPakistan could be intensified through theactive engagement of the private sector inthe reconstruction efforts.3 Manybusinesses in the region have the provencapacity to provide cheaper goods and

3 See proceedings from a 2004 UNDP organized conference in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on “Afghanistan’s Regional Economic Cooperation: Central Asia, Iranand Pakistan”.

Today Afghanistanrepresents a uniqueexample ofinternational relations:a multilateralpartnership that isworking well, with verypromising prospects.The goal of thispartnership is to createan Afghanistan that ispolitically stable anddemocratic, andeconomicallyprosperous – anAfghanistan thatcontributes to Regionaland Global Security.

President Hamid Karzai, BerlinConference, March 2004

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services, while meeting the requiredinternat ional qual i ty s tandards .Cooperation will reinforce the overallregional interdependence and contributeto peace in the region.

Sustainable growth in Afghanistan willhave a major impact on all its neighbours.Once the road network is ready, the traveltime to a warm-water port will bedramatically reduced – every Central Asiancapital will be a maximum of 32 hoursfrom the Gulf. Central Asia’s naturalresources, such as cotton, can be sent toPakistan and India for processing andmanufacturing. Oil and gas pipelines andenergy power grids crossing Afghanistancan also help integrate the region. In sum,economic interdependence is a win-winproposition, and it will turn all thestakeholders into advocates of stability. AUNDP Conference held in Bishkek in May2004 on the economic cooperation betweenCentral Asia and Afghanistan drew aroadmap both for the critical role ofn e i g h b o u r s i n A f g h a n i s t a n ’ sreconstruction, and the role of Afghanistanas the land bridge and missing link inregional development. The implementationof such a plan should attract the full supportof donors.

Human security in Afghanistan cannot beachieved in isolation. The region’sinvolvement in reconstruction willcontribute both to getting Afghanistanback on its feet, and to ensuring sustainablehuman security solution in a number ofneighbouring states, despite all thecomplications created by the decades ofconflict. A multilateral forum to be builton the Bishkek Action Plan will easemutual suspicion and create a structure forsustained posi t ive involvement .

The failure to build on a strategy ofcooperation involves great risks for theregion. The instability in Afghanistan hashad both an “outside–inside” influence aswell as an “inside–outside” ones.Interference from far and near countries

fuelled hostilities with arms, ammunitionsand support, while the conflict had spillover impacts on the region. Theseespecially affected the countries of CentralAsia, which were the first to call for apolitical resolution to the problems inAfghanistan. I ts instabil i ty andunpredictability had direct implicationsfor Tajikistan, for example, which sharesmore than 500 kilometres of border andfell into its own civil war in 1992-1995.Afghanistan’s conflict has also led to the:

• Spread of fears about extremismthrough transparent and uncontrolledborders.

• Proliferation of arms.

• Spread of drugs both in transit and forconsumption.

• Large-scale refugee flows withadditional stress on host communitiesand countries.

• The militarization of the region.

• Creation of networks of mafiastructures and organized traffickingin arms and drugs.

• Destabilization of trade and economicsecurity for markets in the region.

8.3. Human Securty as PublicGood for Afghanistan

Beyond these seven general and directionalrecommendations, a summary of theanalysis presented in the NHDR leads toa number of recommendations for the stateand the international community. Theseaddress six components of human securityin Afghanistan, based on the definitionsoutlined in the UNDP 1994 global HumanDevelopment Report.

Economic Security

Investments in physical infrastructure(especially roads, water and electricity),agricultural markets, skills development,financial services, good governance and

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education are all expected to play a keyrole in laying the foundation for sustainedand broad-based economic growth.However, freedom from economicinsecurity and hunger requires thetranslation of growth into an assured basicincome, either from waged employment,self-employment or social transfers (formalor informal). The challenge remains toensure that inclusion in a dynamiceconomy results in the needs ofeconomically vulnerable people beingaddressed through self-reliance or effectivepublic action.

Can Growth Lead to Human Security?

Afghanistan’s economy, while booming,is mainly informally regulated and highlyillicit. To the degree that economic growthis informed by power relations (thebusiness elite have strong connections withthe sub-national political power base, andthe operation of informal markets is closelylinked to broader insecurity), growth islikely to be neither free nor equitable. Theway markets are currently functioning mayalso negatively affect political governanceand state-building. Benefits from economicgrowth strengthen existing power bases.Reinforcement of the mutually beneficialinterests of big business, and political andmilitary power holders, is spawningunregulated, informal and illicit marketsthat are undermining the agendas ofreconstruction and development.4 If thesepatterns continue, they could furtherdepress the already bleakhuman securityindices.

Economic growth in Afghanistan is widelyrecognized as a necessary precondition forstate-building and poverty reduction.However, state intervention will berequired to ensure improved accountabilityof market operators, and to promoteopportunities to participate in markets

(thereby enhancing economic, politicaland environmental security). Sociallyequi table growth impl ies someredistribution of social and economicbenefits – and a public concern with thequality as well as quantity of growth.5

Addressing non-competitive behaviourcaused by powerful institutions outside alegal framework presents an enormouschallenge. It is important to underscorethat reform of the private sector in supportof enhanced economic security restsheavily on the effectiveness of broaderpolitical reforms. Nevertheless, theGovernment can potentially play a keyrole in strengthening the effectiveness ofmarket mechanisms in support ofdemocratic state-building and povertyreduction.

Existing tax and tariff regimes (red tape)should be greatly simplified to minimizeopportunities for corruption. Thepromotion of effective and efficientfinancial service markets can play a keyrole in enabling smaller enterprises tocompete. Other constraints to economicsecurity at the macro level include poorinfrastructure, insecurity and lawlessness(a significant disincentive to would-beinvestors), and the lack of a regulatoryframework for upholding standards forexports. The shortage of human resources(expertise and professional skills) and thebreak-down of education systems alsopresent significant stumbling blocks.

Can Poverty and Hunger be Eradicatedin Afghanistan?

In Securing Afghanistan’s Future, theGovernment makes the case that sustainedinternational assistance and growth couldresult in meeting a number of the MDGsby 2015. Indeed, economic growth canhave a profound impact at the householdlevel in terms of employment opportunities

4 AREU 2004d.5 An example of economic insecurity arises in relation to the production of carpets, mainly by women, who remain almost without exception excluded from

the market place and for whom the wage levels remain alarmingly low.

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and asset accumulation. However, withoutpublic investment in human capital (health,education and social protection), the accessof poor households to the potential benefitsarising from a growing economy will beseverely restricted.

The prospect of a large proportion of poorAfghans remaining trapped in poverty,regardless of macro-economic growth,appears likely without an intensificationof efforts to support self-reliance throughpublic interventions. Since 2002, theGovernment has emphasized the need forinternational assistance to be channelledthrough coherent national programmesrather than as stand alone projects.Nowhere has this been more significantthan in the area of social protection, wherethere is a strong case that resources canbe used more efficiently and productivelythrough employment-based safety nets andcommuni ty -d r iven soc i a l f undmechanisms.

Despite widespread economic insecurityamong the majority of Afghans, theyremain remarkably resilient, havingdeveloped strong community supportnetworks during decades of conflict andin the almost total absence of servicedelivery. While some coping strategieshave adverse implications (reducedconsumption, pulling children out ofschool, under-age child marriage, etc.), itis crucial that policies and programmessupport positive existing strategieswherever possible (including livelihooddiversification and migration).6 However,the chal lenges associa ted wi thimplementing the National Drug ControlStrategy highlight the need to ensure thatalternative income-generating opportunitiesare promoted prior to eradication of poppyproduction. While the opium economy isantagonistic to national prosperity and

stability, an increasing proportion ofAfghans depend on daily wage labour asagricultural workers in poppy fields or asprocessors of opium.7

The challenge to design and deliver acoherent national strategic framework forsocial protection lies in effectively reachingthe poorest and most at-risk segments ofthe population, while supporting the abilityof communities in general to secure basicentitlements and develop the capacitiesrequired for reducing insecurity over time.In the short term, existing programmesshould be strengthened to ensure effectiveimplementat ion and meaningfulmonitoring and evaluation, which can theninform the design and innovation of newinitiatives.

• In relation to land resources andagriculture, the Ministry of RuralRehabilitation and Development andMinistry of Agriculture and AnimalHusbandry must target the well-beingof the rural poor by improving thequality, quantity, productivity andvalue of the natural resources essentialto their livelihoods. The Ministry ofIrrigation, Water Resources andEnvironmental Protection must targetimproving the environmentalexternalities associated with resourceuse and management. All policies andimplementations must be participatory.

• The Ministry of Labour and SocialAffairs should adopt medium- andlong-term policies to increasecapacities and opportunities for thepoor.

The new Government must be supportedin its efforts to produce a PovertyReduction Strategy Paper as a developmentstrategy based on policies aimed at creatinga favourable climate for stimulating

6 At least in principle, this appears to have been recognized in the recently launched National Vulnerability Programme, which has been accorded prioritystatus by the Government.

7 Evidence suggests that opium poppy cultivation involves as many as 2 million people and provides an economic safety net. In many cases, it has played akey role in helping poor rural households recover from asset losses.

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investment and productivity, and designedwith the inclusive participation ofbeneficiaries.

Health Security

Lack of an adequate health care systemand the presence of widespread healthproblems are threatening the humansecurity of Afghans, as exemplified by thelife expectancy at birth – 45 for males and44 for females. The country’s poorhealthcare system is characterized by highinfant and child mortality rates,8 while thematernal mortality rate is one of the highestin the world.9 There is a huge disparity inthe distribution of health care facilities andstaff.10 According to WHO (2003), in 2001,the total expenditure on health care inAfghanistan as a proportion of GDP was5.2 per cent, of which 52.6 per cent wascontributed by the Government and 47.4per cent was private expenditure.11 TheCSO figures for 2002 present a moredismal picture, reporting that just 0.5 percent of public expenditure goes towardshealth care. The number of doctors (MDs)per 1,000 people is a mere 0.167 against1.1 on average for all developing countries.

With this background, many competingpriorities in the health sector arechallenging the human security agenda.The poor infrastructure, lack of capacityand insufficient financial resources makethe situation complicated. To address theseproblems, important policy documents andstrategies have been designed by theMinistry of Health, but have not beenimplemented. The following issuesurgently need to be addressed:

• The Government must increase thedevelopment budget in the health caresector to enable the Ministry of Healthand other actors to contend with theshortfalls of the system in a sustainableway.

• For sustainability, the ministry shouldaccelerate the process of thePartnership Performance-BasedAgreement, and work towards an exitstrategy for the agreement in theprovinces. Certain criteria should bedeveloped to avoid bias re-assignmentof staff to rural and remote areas.Rationalization of hospital staff iscritical, and it is essential to bringgender balance among medicalstudents. Attention is required to trainallied health professionals.

• To safeguard the public from illtreatment and abuse, the quality ofservices in private clinics anddispensaries have to be regulated bythe ministry, and abusers penalized.

• Mental health units need to beestablished by the ministry at thenational level, which should designcommunity intervention programmeson mental health and coordinate allefforts nationwide.

Environmental Security

As far as health and environmental securityare concerned, the Government shouldboth improve access to basic publicinfrastructures such as sanitation and cleanwater, and aim for some basic universalhealth care protection for all, especiallythe poor, since they cannot afford privatehealth care. A variety of community-basedhealth insurance schemes exist to assureindividuals of continued income in caseof illness. Financed out of a common pool,they are an option the new Governmentshould look into. It could help bysubsidizing these initiatives and promotingthe link between them and formal healthcare institutions.

Environmental insecurity is already a majorconcern, given the critically poor quality

8 Naqibullah Safi 2004.9 Ibid.10 Ibid.11 WHO 2003a.

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of water and air. Many rivers have gonedry, as groundwater stocks sink to newdepths each year. Likewise, forms ofnatural capital, such as land, forests andbiodiversity, are undergoing long-termdecline. They increasingly constraineconomic prospects and growth, and sopose a serious threat to Afghanistan’s midand long-term stability, and sustainablehuman development.

The health of the public depends to a greatextent on the quantity and quality ofdrinking water. The UNICEF/CSO MICSestimates that 39 per cent of householdsin urban areas and 69 per cent ofhouseholds in rural areas do not haveaccess to safe water. The problem ofinadequate sanitation also deservesimmediate attention and ingenuity. InAfghanistan’s circumstances, it isnecessary to think of sanitation withoutwater, and not to consider waterimprovements without sanitation.12

Another issue involves integratingenvironmental protection and energypolicies. The Government’s capacity todrive sustainable energy development iscrucial, given its central role in societyand that it needs to be centrallycoordinated. Priority should be given tothe development of the hydropower sector,and the Ministry of Water Resources andEnvironmental Protection shouldimplement projects that have already beendesigned to develop small and mediummulti-purpose hydroelectric dams.

To achieve these goals and the MDGs, theestablishment of frameworks fordevelopment is not sufficient. Action isneeded, and this requires a major effortand commitment by many actors. Nationalpriorities for spending should be redirectedto the most basic environmental needs andcapabilities of the citizens. Successfulsustainable development programmes willensure the participation of local

communit ies in the design andimplementation of policies, and draw onlocal wisdom, experience and traditionsfor the sustainable management of naturalresources. To achieve this goal:

• The state must establish a nationalenvironmental protection, managementand information agency to design andimplement environmental policy.

• Relevant ministries, such as theMinistry of Irrigation, WaterResources and EnvironmentalProtection, must adopt a clean andgreen technology policy and conductenvironmental impact assessments onall reconstruction and modernizationprojects.

• Groundwater resources and watershedsmust be managed by empowering self-regulated community associations.

Personal Security

Personal security rests upon safety fromphysical violence and various threats. InAfghanistan, people are increasinglythreatened by sudden and unpredictableforms of violence, such torture inflictedby the security forces and police,international or cross-border terrorismadvocated by the Taliban, violent attackson civilians, threats from individuals organgs against other individuals, streetviolence, hostage-taking, domesticviolence, child abuse or rape, childabduction, neglected child labour, childprostitution, and rising drug use.

While the policies adopted in the NDF,the NDB and Securing Afghanistan’sFuture show serious concern for therestoration of human security in post-conflict Afghanistan, nevertheless, theydo not provide an integrated and coherenthuman security approach that wouldguarantee the personal safety of Afghans.It is not clear who will address personal

12 Ibid.

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insecurities and how. The objective shouldfocus clearly on people as individuals andtheir personal security needs andaspirations. Relative personal securitycould be achieved once the Governmentfulfils its obligations to the BonnAgreement with regard to disarmamentand establishment of the rule of law.

It is suggested that the Governmentseriously reconsider the DDR measuresand adopt a feasible strategy to tackle thelack of viable livelihoods as an incentiveto disarm. Labour-intensive and long-termpublic and private projects such ashydroelectric and road constructions shouldbe created in order to prevent the poor,and demobilized soldiers, from engagingin illicit economic activities or crime.

Community Security

One of the greatest impacts of the Afghanconflict has been the breakdown ofcommunity social structures and thepropagation of mistrust between differentAfghan sub-communities at clan, tribe andethnic levels. Societal grievances have notbeen the root causes of the Afghan conflict,but they certainly are one of the unfortunateoutcomes of it, which in turn can serve ashindrance to societal security. There aremany issues pertaining to communalsecurity, but the ones that demand greaterpolicy attention include the following:

Pastoral and land disputes: Land andpasture disagreements have always beenone of the main reasons for societaldisputes, and explain the ability of warringfactions to raise ethnic-based backing,particularly in the central and northernregions. This is largely due to past orpresent unresolved land and pasturedisputes between communities. Twosocietal groups that are largely affectedby this are the Kuchis and IDPs from thenorth and northwest. The IDPs, mostlyethnic Pashtuns, have been driven fromtheir homes by powerful militarycommanders out to grab their lands.Intervention to resolve this problem is of

the utmost importance in putting an endto the spiral of ethnic violence in the north.This might include seeking a legalframework for solving present cases, andmonitoring human rights related to IDPmovements in areas where violationscontinue to generate displacement.Meanwhile, confidence-building measuresbetween communities can be designed andpromoted, including discussions betweenthe local authorities and the IDPrepresentatives to seek guarantees uponreturn.

Although disputes over land use andcompetition over resources betweensedentary peoples and the Kuchis havereached violent levels in the past, there ispresently no overall policy regarding landtenure and pasture rights. The local formaland informal authorities and the specificattitudes of the people involved determineaccess. The traditional system of pasturerights seems to have been eroded andreplaced by the power of the gun, however.Development programmes for pastoralists,and in particular those aimed at setting upinfrastructure on land used by the nomads,can impact the existing relations andunderstanding between the communities.If development programmes for Kuchisare designed such that they also benefitthe sedentary population, the relationshipbetween the two communities may turn tothat of friendship and cooperation.Otherwise, development on land whichhas been used seasonally by nomads cancreate a perception among the sedentarypeople that they will in the future claimthis land, or the Kuchis will encroach uponthe lands traditionally used by the villagers– hence conflict will result.

Community participation in politicaland development processes: The successof any development and political processlies in the buy-in by Afghan communities.This can be ensured through thecommunity’s full participation not only inthe implementation of such processes, butalso in their design and monitoring.

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Therefore, the development of localcapacities is imperative for humandevelopment and state-building to succeed.As the Government seeks to buildaccountability and legitimacy in the fragilepost-conflict period, transparency in policy-making and programming, open debateand critical review are essential.

Restoration of traditional social orderand/or social capital: Afghanistan hasalways had a weak Government and astrong tradi t ional society, withunderstandable rules and conduct forsocietal order and security. The two,however, complemented each other. Nosize of military force and no degree ofcentral control will be able to restore thesense of communal security that is possibleunder traditional social structures. Thissuggests that successful political andsecurity policies and measures are onesthat revere the strength of the traditionalcommunity, and embed this in itsprinciples.

Political Security

Political exclusion is visible in many forms:labelling and stereotyping entire ethnic,linguistic or religious groups; monopoliesover power ; inadequate e thnicrepresentation in higher rankingGovernment positions; the denial of theright to employment and access to highereducation to certain groups; an unequaldistribution of resources; and thedominance over the media of a sectionwithin the Government. These practicesmust be reversed, because they havedisenfranchised many Afghans, who haveresponded with non-cooperation in allmatters of state-building, including theprovision of security.

Afghanistan is fast-tracking its transitionto democratic governance. However,democracy in a situation where political

security is not ensured could fall into thedanger of imposing a Government andParliament that legitimize proponents offorce, who so far have denied thepopulation the option to actively participatein policy formulation and decision-making.

The political power of the warlords vis-à-visthat of reformist politicians is reinforcedby the financial resources (both internaland external) at their command. Manywarlords still receive financial supportfrom countries whose interest they servedin the past or still serve. In addition, manyof the benefits of robust economic growthare skewed towards the powerful.Institutions of the market and informalregulation controlled by the people inpower ensure that competition andparticipation are restricted to theiradvantage. State intervention will,therefore, be critical to unleash marketsand allow wider distribution of the benefitsof growth. The extent to which existingmarket structures reinforce instability is amajor concern, and it necessitates a strategyto limit the power of those who controlmarkets. Another factor is the involvementof the warlords in the narcotics trade, andtheir control over Afghanistan’s preciousunderground resources, namely lapis lazuliand emeralds.

To a large extent, political security iscentred around the issue of the warlords’sphere of influence. This continues to beimposed on the people of Afghanistan,backed by weapons, market control, thenarcotics trade and control over preciousstones. The response to the first issue liesin an unwavering commitment to the DDRprocess; to the second in market and publicservice reforms, to the third in lawenforcement with respect to the demandside of narcotics; and to the fourth in thestrengthening of the central Government’scapacity and extension of its authority.

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8.4. Summary: Dimensions of Human Security in Afghanistan

Dimensions of Key findings What needs to be done How should it be donesecurity

1. Economic security High level ofindebtedness.

Opium economyequals 38.2% of thecountry’s officialGDP.

Reliable multi-year commitmentsfrom donors crucial for long-termdevelopment investments.

Strengthen legal and regulatoryframework for private sector.

Social policy to meet the needs ofvulnerable groups.

Prepare a PRSP.

Simplification of existing regulations andimplementation of appropriate laws.

Asset creation for the poor.

Targeted interventions to promote outreachfor different categories of the vulnerable.

Objective of effective and representativepoverty reduction strategy can provideopportunity for extensive consultations andfocus on gender challenge.

2. Health security The collapse of thestate resulted in aninadequate healthcare system, furtherrestricting access tohealth care services,particularly for thepoor.

Increase the development budget inhealth care sector.

Regulate the quality of services inprivate clinics and dispensaries, aswell as pharmaceutical services.

Establish national-level mental healthunits.

Ministry of Health and other actors addressthe shortfalls of the system in a sustainableway.

For sustainability, the Ministry of Healthshould accelerate the process of thePartnership Performance-based Agreement(PPA), and work towards an exit strategyfor PPA in provinces.

It is essential to bring gender balance amongmedical students.

3. Environmental security Environmentalinsecurity is a majorconcern. Water andair quality is equallypoor. Access to safedrinking water isdismal. Naturalcapital, i.e., water,land, forest andbiodiversity is undera long-term decline.

Need to install sound environmentalmanagement practices.

Design and implementation of policy througha participatory process.

Physical violence byarmed militia; tortureby the securityforces; violentattacks by Taliban,street gangs;hostage-taking;domestic violenceagainst women,abuse or rape;violence againstchildren such as childabuse, childabduction, childlabour, childprostitution; and drugabuse are the mainpersonal insecurities.

Strengthen Afghanistan’s institutionalcapacity to meet in an adequate andtimely manner its national andinternational obligations.

Separate civilian and militaryfunctions.

Strengthen human rights monitoring,reporting mechanisms, Governmentaccountability and the rule of law.

4. Personal security

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6. Political security Failure to implementsecurity relatedprovisions of theBonn Agreement.

Little progress withDDR efforts.

Illicit economies playa key role inmaintaining politicalinsecurity and in factcreate significantreturns to themaintenance ofinsecurity.

Need for externallysupplied securityduring the transition– upon which state-building is dependent.

Collapsed state –functioning parts ofsub-nationaladministration arecontrolled by localmilitia commanders.

Enhance security and the rule of law– top priority must be given tosecurity sector reforms.

State-building depends on politicalentity with monopoly of legitimateforce and hence economic assetsand flows – reforming and trainingcivil service without consolidation ofpower and authority is insufficient.

Issuing instructions to civil servantsand military personnel concerningtheir duty of political impartiality andprotection of political freedoms –appropriate sanctions must be takenagainst those who fail to fulfillobligations.

Ensuring freedom of expression andfreedom of the press.

Political normalization – full supportto emerging political institutions(Cabinet, legislative bodies, judiciary,etc.) to enhance effectiveness.

Complete the formation of National Policeand National Army (only armed forces).

Implement National Drug Control Strategy(alternative livelihoods, strengtheningsecurity, anti-trafficking and demandreduction) – avoid short term and poorlyconceived interventions against drugs.

Accelerate legal reform process tostrengthen Constitution.

Imperative to ensure that addressingpolitical, military and humanitarian objectivessimultaneously does not result in the blurringof institutional mandates and functions inthe process. Military operations should notbe presented as developmental and theimpartiality of humanitarian actors must besupported.

Channel resources from central Governmentto sub-national level to accelerate reformof public administration beyond Kabul andreduce corruption.

5. Community security Land insecuritypervasive.

Establish systems for managementand reform of land tenure.

Policy and law enforcement.

Dimensions of Key findings What needs to be done How should it be donesecurity

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Photo: Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh

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1

Photo: Golam Monowar Kamal

Annexure

Relevant, reliable and timely statistics are well recognizedas essential for setting policies, holding decision makersaccountable, monitoring progress and evaluating results.Yet despite considerable recent improvements in gatheringand analysing statistics in some countries, meeting thedemand for basic data on human development remainsa major global challenge. The problem is even moreacute in Afghanistan, which has not featured in the annualcompilations of statistics in UNDP’s global HDRs since1996. Hence, there were formidable challenges in securingstatistical inputs for the NHDR.

A Demand for Statistics and a Statistical System

As in most post-conflict situations, a high demand forupdated information in Afghanistan coincides with alow capacity to properly collect and analyse data. Morethan two decades of war have devastated the statisticalinfrastructure of the country, and a large number ofstatistical personnel have migrated to other places. Thelack of systematic knowledge of statistical proceduresis compounded by the fact that salaries paid to statisticiansworking for the CSO are too low to retain specialists.

Most of the current data in Afghanistan has been collectedeither by international organizations or in cooperationwith them. Though such information has been able tomeet many of the data requirements of the country,collection exercises have often been driven by short-

term external needs that do not always contributeadequately to a stronger statistical infrastructure.Exceptions include the United Nations Population Fund(UNFPA) support to the CSO to prepare the nationalPopulation Census, and a new project by the WB thattargets capacity building. The last census was held inAfghanistan in 1979, and even then not all the resultswere analysed thoroughly.

The CSO is currently involved in a pre-census, whichprovided preliminary population figures for the election,although the activities were hampered by the gravesecurity situation in some provinces. The main PopulationCensus is scheduled for 2005, and will be conducted withUNFPA’s assistance. It will face complexities in collectingand verifying data. Given the mobility of the population,it will have to be completed quickly and assessedadequately.

Ultimately, a fair amount of statistical information isavailable, but it is fragmented, and often recycled fromsecond-hand sources. Much secondary data can beextracted from the various existing surveys – such as theWFP VAM, the UNICEF/CSO MICS, the NRVA, etc.– although for capacity building to take place, the wealthof information derived from these surveys needs to beproperly analysed and evaluated with the help of Afghantrained specialists.

ANNEXURE 1Building Statistical Capacity and Infrastructure : An Urgent Need

“I gather, young man, that you wish to be a Member of Parliament. The first lesson that you must learn is,when I call for statistics about the rate of infant mortality, what I want is proof that fewer babies died when Iwas Prime Minister than when anyone else was Prime Minister. That is political statistics.”

Winston Churchill (1874-1965)

“To call the statistician after the experiment is done may be no more than asking him to perform a postmortemexamination: he may be able to say what the experiment died of.”

Prof. R. A. Fisher, Indian Statistical Congress, 1938

NHDR 04 263

With policy making focused on emergency and rapidresponses rather than being based on adequate situationanalyses, the national demand for statistics in Afghanistanis not very strong. Consequently, the resources availablefor various statistical activities are meager. The CSOsuffers from serious underfunding and low capacity,lacking even a conference room equipped with computersand presentation equipment.

The statistical system in Afghanistan is centralized, withthe CSO charged as the main agency for coordinatingstatistical activities across the country. Data is currentlyprovided to the central office through regional offices,which are in dire need of capacity building as they arenow mostly run by one person with no computers;ministries and their local branches; and internationalorganizations. Contributions from the last category arefirst vetted against the CSO’s own methodology, andthe office plays an important role in verifying, “owning”and promoting these statistics. However, it confrontsdifficulties in coordinating reporting on humandevelopment indicators because of a heavy workload.This stems from its concentration on conducting thenational census and surveys, and producing nationaleconomic figures, along with its low level of resources.Other obstacles include the lack of human resources andlegal authority. Provincial statistical offices need to bestrengthened, and the possibility of district or regionaloffices considered.

Most ministries in the meantime have access to theirown sets of sectoral data gathered from theirrepresentatives in the districts. Some ministries,particularly those receiving foreign assistance, such asthe Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Developmentand the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, have smallstatistical cells under the supervision of internationaladvisors. Their information is fed into the CSO, and alsoused for their own monitoring and evaluation. Hereagain, however, data collection suffers from poorconnectivity to the regions.

The ministries and the CSO both recognize the logisticaldifficulties in gathering data from provinces and villages.Communication and reporting is constrained by theabsence of roads, networks, knowledge, know-how onsurveying, etc. Representatives of these nationalinstitutions in the provinces have very limited humanresources and access to technology, and cannot properlycommunicate and align data collection with the centre.

Some Key Data Problems for the NHDR

In order to properly measure progress in humandevelopment in Afghanistan, including trends in the riseor fall of poverty and inequality, data need to besufficiently disaggregated by gender, province, rural andurban areas, ethnicity, etc. With respect to these criteria,the statistical system of Afghanistan does not fare well.Some of the problems encountered during data collectionand analysis for this report were as follows:

1. Most data was for only one year, making a trendanalysis impossible.

2. Data was not disaggregated by provinces, makingregional analysis difficult.

3. The country lacks proper recording of births anddeaths after 1979, making demographic parametersinadequate.

4. The reliability of available data was another problem.A large number of surveys have been conductedwithout a proper sampling frame, with no effortsmade to update the 1979 census frame. There weredisagreements between the national CSO and someinternational organizations about the number ofvillages and even districts in the country, whichhighlighted the problem of the reliability of datacollected in the absence of an up-to-date samplingframe. Afghanistan has also lacked a regular surveyagency, and many surveys have been carried out byNGOs without properly trained statistical personnel.

5. Different figures were quoted for the total populationof the country, even by international agencies. Theseincluded estimates ranging from 21.4 million (ADB)to 27.2 million (WB). The CSO estimates the totalpopulation by assuming an annual natural growthrate of 1.92 per cent during the period 1979 to 2003,although this number was unlikely with high infantmortality rates and migration. The MICS conductedby UNICEF and the CSO, which was the most reliableassessment, estimated population growth rates of2.50 per cent and a total population of 23.85 million.

6. The GDP rate had to be calculated separately toinclude poppy cultivation, which, according to thedocument Securing Afghanistan’s Future, wasestimated at US $2.5 billion in 2003. Proper estimatesof employment and unemployment as well as wagerates are not available.

Annexure 1264

7. The NRVA survey, used for poverty estimates, wasconducted only in rural areas. With approximately22 per cent of the population living in urban areas,its results may not be representative for the country.

8. Though collecting information on the maternalmortality ratio is much more difficult than for infantor child mortality rates, maternal mortality estimatesranging from 300 in Kabul to 2,200 in Badakshanare often quoted in international documents. Yet thereliable UNICEF/CSO MICS was not able to provideestimates of infant and child mortality for theprovinces because of small samples. It is thereforequestionable as to how the estimates of maternalmortality at province level were obtained.

9. Some sources quote the number of people withHIV/AIDS in the country to be 200 to 300. However,the 2003 WB Indicators note a 0.01 per centprevalence rate of HIV among 15-24 year olds. Thisindicates a large discrepancy.

10. Though the main theme of this NHDR is humansecurity, detailed data were not available on variousindicators pertaining to personal security, such asthe total number of crimes, sexual crimes, ethnicdifferences, economic security such as employmentopportunities in the private sector, skill availability,environmental security, etc.

Some Suggestions for Meeting the DataRequirements of Future NHDRs

The monitoring of the MDGs and the production ofsubsequent NHDRs in Afghanistan will require timeseries data. This will be possible only when systemicplans are prepared in consultation with national andinternational agencies for the collection of requisitestatistics at regular intervals.

Some of the specific suggestions for meeting the datarequirements of the NHDR are as follows:

1. The Population Census is likely to be conducted inJune 2005. This will be the most important sourceof data for the NHDR. At the time of the preparationof the questionnaire for the census, questions tocalculate various human development indicatorsmust be included in both the questionnaire and thetabulation plan. Raw data can be analysed bysubsequent NHDR teams while the census data isbeing processed.

2. A sampling frame created on the basis of thePopulation Census and updated at regular intervalsis required for conducting any large-scale survey inthe country for any purpose. This frame may bemaintained in the CSO and should be supplied toany agency wanting to conduct a large-scale survey.

As the Population Census is conducted only everyten years, some alternative sources of demographicand economic data have to be identified. As in manyother countries, a plan may be prepared to conducta large demographic and health survey during themid-census period, bearing in mind the difficultiesof establishing and improving the registration ofbirths and deaths in the near future.

3. There is an urgent need to conduct a labor forcesurvey in order to find out the employment,unemployment and wage rates, with specific referenceto the informal sector.

4. Once data is made available from the 2005 census,a life table for Afghanistan should be prepared tocalculate proper values for life expectancy. At present,various agencies provide different estimates. Somesources maintain that female life expectancy at birthis lower than that of males, whereas other sourcesclaim the reverse. In view of the prevailing healthand nutritional situation in the country, female lifeexpectancy is likely to be lower than that of males.Figures contradicting this could create confusion.

5. The possibility of using administrative data is verylimited, given the poor state of statistical set-ups inministries and provinces. In the meantime, differentministries have to collect numerous administrativedata for monitoring and planning various programmesunder their jurisdiction, and sometimes these are theonly data that provide annual figures. For example,enrolment in primary, secondary and tertiary levelsof education can be provided every year by theMinistry of Education and the Ministry of HigherEducation, based on data received from schools,colleges and universities. Similarly, data on financialassistance, and expenditures on education and health,etc. can be provided by the relevant ministries basedon their administrative records. Therefore, there isan urgent need to develop a system for analysis ofadministrative data in different ministries, with regularpublication of the analysis, preferably annually.

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Some general suggestions for the improvement of thestatistical system in the country are as follows:

1 Since statistical capacity is very low, a programmehas to be developed for training existing statisticalpersonnel on a regular basis in various statisticalfields.

2 At present, statistics are not taught as a separatediscipline in universities. Though students trainedin mathematics, economics, commerce, etc. can meetthe requirements to some extent, those educatedexclusively in statistics may be required in order tocontinuously understand and implementdevelopments in the field of official statistics. Oneconsideration could be support for the newGovernment in introducing the teaching of statisticsin universities.

3 There is an urgent need for strong statisticalcoordination. Presently, a number of international

agencies are collecting data either on their own orthrough NGOs, with little cross-agency informationsharing. Since this may result in duplicated effortsabsorbing scarce resources, a coordination role shouldbe assigned to the CSO. A detailed data collectionplan for the next five to ten years can be preparedon the basis of information received from variousagencies about their own plans. The CSO could alsoexamine the sampling design, data collection method,etc. to be adopted by the different agencies to ensureminimum statistical standards.

4 The ADB is in the process of implementing aStatistical Master Plan. All the agencies inAfghanistan, national and international, maycontribute to and participate in its successfulimplementation. It will go a long way towardsimproving the data situation.

It is widely recognized that transparentand shared information has a significantimpact on efficiency, accountability andthe alignment of resources with priorities.This in turn improves the effectivenessof reconstruction and development. Yetinformation management in Afghanistanis limited, often relying on complex orinappropriate processes, and rarelygeared towards promoting transparencyor sharing data.

The Government is now leading effortsto address these issues, in part throughthe AIMS project, which is one of anumber of UNDP initiatives focused onrebuilding information management

capacity. Involving the joint cooperationand commitment of major donors andkey Government ministries, AIMS iscreating a unique window of opportunity.

In order for the new Government to plan,coordinate and manage development, itneeds to make completed, ongoing, andplanned reconstruction and developmentactivities visible and accessible. Workingclosely with the Ministry of Finance, theMinistry of Rural Rehabilitation andDevelopment, USAID and the EuropeanCOmmission, AIMS is facilitating thedevelopment and implementation ofstandards for sharing informationbetween minis t r ies and otherorganizations.

These include the adoption of MDGindicators, international classificationsfor both functions of government andproject and sector typology, and standardactivity tracking metrics. Commonmetrics of achievement will facilitatethe identification of successful activities,while higher level indicators will helpAfghanistan track progress on the MDGs.

UNDP Afghanistan is promotinginformation transparency in governmentand other organizations, with profoundimplications for improved tracking,planning and coordinat ion ofdevelopment and in the process providingone more foundation stone forsustainable government.

Box A.1

The Government and UNDP Set the Standards

Annexure 1266

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Gross Enrolment Ratio for Primary, Secondary and Tertiary

From the Statistical Yearbook 2003 brought out by the CSO of the TISA, the total number of students in primary,secondary and tertiary for the year 2002 was taken. The proportion of females in primary, secondary and tertiaryeducation was 33 per cent, 25 per cent and 22 per cent respectively. By taking the simple average, the proportionof female in the total primary, secondary and tertiary students would be 27 per cent. Total number of students wasbifurcated in male and females by using this ratio.

The relevant age group for the primary, secondary and tertiary education is 7 to 21 years in Afghanistan. Thepopulation in this age group was derived by using the age distribution for the year 2002 given in the CSO StatisticalYearbook 2003.

Per Capita GDP (PPP US$)

In the CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003, the per capita income for Afghanistan in US$ for the year 2002 is given.However, for the computation of the indices per capita GDP in purchasing power parity (PPP US$) is required,which was not available from any source. In the UNDP’s HDR per capita income in both US$ and PPP US$ aregiven for most of the countries. The ratio between the per capita GDP (PPP US$) and per capita GDP (US$) wasworked out and applied to the per capita GDP (US$) to find out the per capita GDP (PPP US$) for Afghanistan.The ration of 4.327 used for 11 land-locked and neighbouring countries used in the Securing Afghanistan’s Futurewas used for the computation of indices.

Deriving the Male and Female Share of Income

For computation of the GDI for Afghanistan, the methodology prescribed by the HDR was used. However, asinformation on the male and female share of income was not available, approximations were made as follows:

• Female and Male Share of Economically Active Population

In the CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003, the proportion of workers in agriculture, industry and services wereestimated at 80 per cent, 2 per cent and 18 per cent respectively. It was also stated that 30 per cent of the workersin the agriculture sector were women. Using this information it was assumed that the proportion of women andmen in the economically active population is 30 per cent and 70 per cent respectively.

• Ratio of Female Non-agricultural Wage to Male Non-agricultural Wage

Similar to information on economically active population, no data is available on the wage rate for men andwomen. The NHDR used the suggestion from the UNDP’s HDR which stated that for countries lacking dataon non-agricultural wage rate, the ratio of female non-agricultural wage to male non-agricultural wage couldbe assumed to be 0.75.

ANNEXURE 2

Technical Appendix on Statistics

NHDR 04 269

Probability at Birth of not surviving to age 40 (per cent of Cohort)

Though the life expectancy at birth for Afghanistan for the year 2002 was mentioned in the CSO Statistical Yearbook2003, information about the probability at birth of not surviving to age 40 was not available. In the HDR, the valuesof life expectancy at birth and the probability at birth of not surviving to age 40 are given for large number ofcountries, indicating a strong correlation. Coefficient of -0.92. The value of correlation coefficient was -0.96 whencountries with low human development index were considered. In view of the strong correlation between these twoindicators, the value for the probability of not surviving to age 40 was obtained for the given value of life expectancyat birth using the regression analysis with least square method.

Methodology for Construction of Composite Indices

The methodology used for the computation of composite indices was the one used in the UNDP’s HDR 2003. Themethodology is reproduced below.

HDI and GDI

For constructing these two indices, human well-being was accessed for the following three dimensions.

• Longevity: The ability to live long and healthy life-Measured by indicator life expectancy at birth

• Education: The ability to read, write and acquire knowledge-Measured by adult literacy rate and combinedgross enrolment ratio at primary, secondary and tertiary level

• Command over resources: The ability to enjoy a decent standard of living measured by per capita GDP (PPPUS$).

Indicator Maximum Minimum

Male Female Combined Male Female Combined

Life expectancy at birth (Years) 82.5 87.5 85 22.5 27.5 25

Adult literacy rate (%) 100 100 100 0 0 0

Gross enrolment ratio at primary,secondary and tertiary level (%) 100 100 100 0 0 0

GDP per capita (PPP US$) 40,000 40,000 40,000 100 100 100

The actual values used for these indicators for year 2002 were as follows:

Indicator Value

Male Female Combined

Life expectancy at birth (Years) 45 44 44.5

Adult literacy rate (%)* 43.2 14.1 28.7

Gross enrolment ratio at primary,secondary and tertiary level (%) 59.34 29.57 44.93

GDP per capita (PPP US$) 1182 402 822

* Pertains to year 2003

Annexure 2270

For computing these indices minimum and maximum values for different indicators were as follows:

Calculating the HDI for Afghanistan

31

HDI = 3 i=1

Xi – Min(Xi)Ii = Max(Xi)-Min(Xi)

Calculating the GDI for Afghanistan

While the HDI measures average achievement, the GDI adjusts the average achievement to reflect the inequalities betweenmen and women in all the three dimensions of HDI. The methodology adopted for the adjustment is same as used in theHDR and is reproduced below.

First, Female and Male indices were calculated according to the general formula

Xi – Min (Xi)Ii = Max(Xi)-Min(Xi)

Second, the Female and Male indices in each dimension were combined by taking the harmonic mean of the Female andMale indices as given below to find out the equally distributed index in each dimension.

–1

Female Population share Male Population shareEqually distributed index = --------------------------------- + ----------------------------

Female index Male index

Third, the GDI was calculated by combining the three equally distributed indices in an unweighted average.For getting Male and Female share of income was estimated as:

(Sf*Y)Estimated Female earned income (PPP US$) (Yf) = ----------- Nf

(Y-(Sf*Y))Estimated Male earned income (PPP US$) (Ym) = --------------- Nm

(Wf/Wm) * EAfFemale share of wage bill (Sf) = --------------------------------

{(Wf/Wm) * EAf } + EAm

Calculating the HPI for Afghanistan

The methodology adopted for the HPI was also the same as that for developing countries in the HDR. Indicators chosenfor computing HPI were as follows:

P1: Probability at birth of not surviving to age 40 (times 100) equals 45.99 per centP2: Adult illiteracy rate equals 71 per centP3: Combined per cent of people not using improved water source (i.e. X1= 60%) and children under five who are underweight (i.e.X2=49%). Combined value for P3 was obtained as unweighted average of X1 and X2 (i.e. P3 = 1/2 (X1 + X2)

Calculating the GEM for Afghanistan

As neither the requisite data was available nor it could be generated through statistical exercise, this index could not becalculated for Afghanistan.

NHDR 04 271

X1: Life expectancy at birthX2: 2/3 X21 + 1/3 X22X21: Adult literacy rateX22: Combined gross enrolment ratio at primary, secondary and tertiary levelX3: Per capita GDP (PPP US$)

Ii

Wf/Wm: Ratio of Female to Male non-agricultural wageEAf: Female % share of economically active population.EAm: Male % share of economically active population.Y: Total GDP (PPP US$)Nf: Female PopulationNm: Male Population

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ANNEXURE 3Statistical Indicators Template (August 2004)

HDIIndicators Value Year SourceLife expectancy at birth (years) 44.5a 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.Adult literacy rate (% of age 15 and above) 28.7 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003.Combined primary, secondary, tertiary gross 44.93 2002 Estimated using students and population data from theenrolment ratio (% ) CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.GDP per capita (US$) 190 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.GDP per capita (PPP US$) 822 2002 Estimated using ratio of 4.327 based on the average of

GDP per capita (PPP US$) to GDP per capita (US$)for 11 countries (land-locked and neighbouring) - Quotedin Securing Afghanistan's Future

Life expectancy index 0.342 2002  Education index 0.343 2002  GDP index 0.352 2002  HDI index 0.346 2002  HDI rank 173 2002 Only five countries below Afghanistan.

GDIIndicators Value Year SourceLife expectancy at birth (years) Male 45 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.Female 44 2002Adult literacy rate (% of age15 and above)  Male 43.2 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003.Female 14.1 2003Combined primary, secondary, tertiary gross  enrolment ratio (% )Male 59.34 2002 Estimated using students and populationFemale 29.57 2002 data from CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.Total 44.93 2002Share in economic active population  Male 70 2002 Using the ratio in agriculture given inFemale 30 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.Ratio of female non-agricultural wage to male 0.75 .. As per HDR 2003.non-agricultural wageEstimated earned income (PPP US$)   2002 ..Male 1182 2002Female 402 2002GDI index 0.300 2002 ..GDI rank 143 .. Just above Burkina Faso with rank 143 and

value 0.291. Only two countries belowAfghanistan.

a Average of male and female

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HPI and Income Poverty Indicators Value Year Source

Probability at birth of not surviving 45.99 2002 Estimated using regression of probability at birth of to age 40 (% of Cohort) not surviving to age 40 and life expectancy at birth for

low HDI countries

Adult illiteracy Rate (% age 15 and above) 71 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003.

Population without sustainable access to an 60 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003.improved water sources (%)

Per cent of children under five who are underweight 49 2001 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.

Calorie deficient rate (%) 20.4b 2003 NRVA 2003.

Population below US$2 a day (%) 70 2001 WB's estimates quoted in Securing Afghanistan’sFuture.

HPI index (%) 59.30 2002 ..

HPI rank 94 .. Just above Niger with value 61.4 and rank 94 as perHDR 2004. Only two countries below Afghanistan.

DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS Indicators Value Year Source

Total population (millions) 23.85 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003.

Annual population growth rate (%) 2.50 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003.

Urban population (as % of total) 28.80 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003.

Population under age 15 (as % of total) 50.16 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003.

Population aged 65 and above (as % of total) 2.61 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003.

Total fertility rate (per woman) 6.30 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003.

COMMITMENT TO HEALTH: ACCESS SERVICES AND RESOURCESIndicators Value Year Source

Households using adequate sanitation 67 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003.facilities - flush or pit toilet (%)

Population with sustainable access to an 40 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003.improved water sources (%)

Population with sustainable access to 50-79 1999 UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 2001.affordable essential drugs (%) Quoted in HDR 2004.

One-year-olds fully immunized against tuberculosis (%) 60 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003.

One-year-olds fully immunized against measles (%) 76 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003.

Oral rehydration therapy use rate (%) 40 1994-2002 UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 2001.Quoted in HDR 2004.

Contraceptive prevalence rate (%) 28 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003.

Births attended by skilled health staff (%) 11,5 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003.

Physicians (per 100,000 people) 10 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.

Public health expenditure (as % of GDP) 0.50 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.

Private health expenditure (as % of GDP) 2.50 2001 UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 2001.Quoted in HDR 2004.

Public health expenditure per capita (US$) 1 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.

b Using the NRVA 2003 data, the WB estimated that 52.8 per cent of Afghans live below poverty line (Afs. 8,450/person/year). This figure quoted in SecuringAfghanistan’s Future. It was later observed that the calculation had some methodological problems and it has been now estimated by NRVA that caloriedeficient rate for Afghanistan is only 20.4 per cent, meaning that 20.4 per cent of rural population do not have 2,070 kilocalories/person/ day. The monetaryvalue corresponding to this min. calorie requirement is Afs. 3,775/capita/year.

LEADING GLOBAL HEALTH CRISIS AND CHALLENGES

Indicators Value Year Source

Under nourished people (as % of total population) 70 2001 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.

Children under weight for age (% under age five) 49 2001 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.

Children under height for age (% under age five) 48 2001 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.

Infants with low birth-weight (%) 20 2001 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.

Adult living with HIV/AIDS (% of 15-24 population) 0.01 2001 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.

Women living with HIV/AIDS (% of 15-24 population) .. .. ..

Children living with HIV/AIDS (% of 15-24 population) .. .. ..

Malaria cases (per 100,000 people) 937 2001 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.

Tuberculosis cases (per 100,000 people) 321 2001 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.

Cigarette consumption per adult (annual average) .. .. ..

SURVIVAL: PROGRESS AND SETBACKS

Indicators Value Year Source

Life expectancy at birth (years) 45 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.

Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 115 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003.

Under five mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 172 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003.

Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births) 1,600 2003 Securing Afghanistan’s Future.

Probability at birth of female surviving 38.20 2000-2005 UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 2001.to age 65 (% of Cohort) - Quoted in HDR 2004.

Probability at birth of male surviving 35.40 2000-2005 UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 2001.to age 65(% of Cohort) - Quoted in HDR 2004.

COMMITMENT TO EDUCATION: PUBLIC SPENDING

Indicators Value Year Source

Public expenditure on education (as % of GDP) 1.60 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.

Public expenditure on education 6 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.(as % of total Government expenditure)

Public expenditure on pre-primary and primary 87.60 1990 UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 2001.education (as % of all levels) Quoted in HDR 2004.

Public expenditure on secondary education .. .. ..(as % of all levels)

Public expenditure on tertiary education 12.40 1990 UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 2001.(as % of all levels) Quoted in HDR 2004.

Government expenditure per student (US$) 12.10 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.

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LITERACY AND ENROLMENT Indicators Value Year SourceAdult literacy rate (% age 15 and above) 28.7 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003.Youth literacy rate (%age 15-24 ) .. .. ..Net primary enrolment ratio (%) 27 1990-1991 UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 2001.

Quoted in HDR 2004.Gross primary enrolment ratio (%) 54.4 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003.Net secondary enrolment ratio (%) .. .. ..Children reaching grade 5 (%) .. .. ..Tertiary students in science, math and engineering 19.37c 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.(as % of all tertiary students)

TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION AND CREATIONIndicators Value Year SourceTelephone mainlines

Total Number 29000 2001 Ministry of Communications (unpublished).33050 200236700 2003

Mainline (per 1,000 people) 1.36 2001 Population - 21.4 million - 2001.1.52 2002 Population - 21.8million - 2002.1.54 2003 Population - 23.85million - 2003.

Cellular mobile subscribers (per 1,000 people) 5.67 2003 Securing Afghanistan’s Future.Internet users .. .. Ministry of Communications (unpublished).

Total Number 700 2003Internet users (per 1,000 people) 0.029 2003 Calculated as population 23.85 million.

Patents granted to residents (per million people) 0.00 2003 DAB estimates (unpublished).Research and development expenditures (as % of GDP) .. .. ..Scientists and engineers in R&D (per million people) .. .. ..

ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE Indicators Value Year SourceGDP (US$ billion) 4.05 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.GDP (US$ billion) 6.55 2002 Securing Afghanistan’s Future

(including the value of US$2.5 billion of poppy cultivation in the country).

GDP (PPP US$ billion) 17.52 2002 Securing Afghanistan’s Future.PPP ratio 4.327See indicator GDP percapita.(PPP US$).

GDP per capita (US$) 190 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.GDP per capita (PPP US$) 822 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003 and

Securing Afghanistan’s Future.GDP growth rate (%) (-)9.4 2001 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.

28.6 2002GDP per capita highest value (PPP US$) .. 1975-2001 ..GDP per capita year of highest value .. .. ..Average annual change in consumer (-)15.1 2001 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.Price index (%) 4.6 2002

c Number (4400) of students studying sciences, mathematics and engineering. Compiled from the faculty-wise details of the universities.

Annexure 3278

INEQUALITY IN INCOME OR CONSUMPTIONIndicators Value Year Source

Share of income and consumption      

Poorest 10% .. .. ..

Poorest 20% 6 2003 NRVA 2003.

Richest 10% .. .. ..

Richest 20% 43 2003 NRVA 2003.

Inequality measures      

Richest 10% to poorest 10% .. .. ..

Richest 20 % to poorest 20% 7.17 2003 NRVA 2003.

Gini index 35.50 2002 DAB estimates (unpublished).

THE STRUCTURE OF TRADE Indicators Value Year Source

Value of import of goods and services 2,531.10 2001 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.(US$ million) estimated.

Imports of goods and services (as % of GDP). 86 2001 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.

Value of export of goods and services 1,657.40 2001 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.(US$ million) estimated.

Exports of goods and services (as % of GDP). 57 2001 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.

Primary (fresh and ripe fruits, medicine botani, 72 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.spices and seeds) exports (as % of merchandiseexports).

Manufactured (skins, wool, sausages and carpets) 18 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.exports (as % of merchandise exports).

High-technology exports (as % of manufactured exports).. .. .. ..

Terms of Trade (1980 equals100). .. .. ..

FLOWS OF AID, PRIVATE CAPITAL AND DEBTIndicators Value Year Source

Official development assistance (ODA) 1,813.125 2002 DAB estimates (unpublished).received (US$ million) estimated. 1834.7 2003

Official development assistance (ODA) .. .. ..received (as % of GNI).

ODA received per capita (US$). 83.17 2002 DAB estimates (unpublished).83.40 2003

ODA received per capita (as % of GDP). 37.10 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.

39.00 2003 DAB estimates (unpublished).

Foreign direct investment inflows 1.06 2003 DAB estimates (unpublished).(as % of GDP).

Other private flows (as % of GDP). 0.00 2003

Total debt service (as % of GDP). .. .. ..

Total debt service (as % of exports of goods and services). .. .. ..

NHDR 04 279

PRIORITIES IN PUBLIC SPENDING Indicators Value Year Source

Public Expenditure on Education (as % of GDP) 1.60 2002 CSO Statistical Year Book

Public Expenditure on Health (as % of GDP) 0.50 2002 CSO Statistical Year Book

Military Expenditure (as % of GDP) 0.12 2003 DAB estimates (unpublished)

Total Debt Service (as % of GDP) .. ..  

ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT

Indicators Value Year Source

Traditional fuel consumption (% of total energy use) 97 2002 CSO Statistical Year Book

Electricity consumption per capita (kwh.) 2 2002 CSO Statistical Year Book

GDP per unit of energy use .. .. ..(PPP US$ per kg. of oil equivalent)

Carbon dioxide emissions per capita (1000 tons) 1037 1998 World Development Report 2003, WB

Total electricity produced (million kwh.) 502.67 21/3/00-20/3/01 CSO Statistical Year Book489.71 21/3/01-20/3/02557.31 21/3/02-20/3/03

Ratification of environmental treaties:      

Cartagena protocol on biosafety .. .. ..

Framework convention on climate change .. .. ..

Kyoto Protocol on the Framework Convention .. .. ..on Climate Change

Convention on Biological Diversity .. .. ..

REFUGEES AND ARMAMENTS

Indicators Value Year Source

Internally displaced people (thousands)d 1,000 2002 Securing Afghanistan’s Future.

Refugees returned by country of asylum 2,500 2002 Securing Afghanistan’s Future.(thousands)e

Refugees by country of origin (thousands) .. .. ..

Conventional arms transfers     DAB estimates (unpublished).

Imports (US$ million) 12 2003

Exports (US$ million) 0.00 2003

Exports Share (%) 0.00 2003

Total armed forces 50 2002 UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 2001.Quoted in HDR 2004.

d Data are based on police records and its coverage may not be complete. In view of this data on this indicator may be interpreted cautiously.e The Parliamentary elections are scheduled for April 2005. Data on this indicator may become available after that.

Annexure 3280

VICTIMS OF CRIMEf

Indicators Value Year SourceTotal Crime 5,084 2002 Ministry of Interior Affairs (unpublished).  6,586 2003

Property Crime 53 2002  31 2003Robbery 1,521 2002  1,644 2003Sexual Assault 185 2002  257 2003Bribery (corruption) 11 2002  9 2003

Assault .. .. ..

People victimized by crime (as % of total population) Computed using the data on crime supplied byTotal crime 0.03 2003 Ministry of Interior Affairs and total populationRobbery 0.007 2003 for 2003 available from MICS/UNICEF 2003.Property crime Negligible 2003Bribery (corruption) Negligible 2003Sexual assault Negligible 2003

GENDER INEQUALITY IN EDUCATION

Indicators Value Year SourceAdult Female Literacy      

Female rate (% 15 and above) 14.1 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003.

Female rate (as of % of male rate) 33 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003.

Net primary enrolment .. .. ..Gross primary enrolment 556,426 2001 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.

Female ratio 0 2001Ratio of female to male 0 2001

Gross primary enrolment 3,083,434 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.Female ratio 0.331 2002Ratio of female to male 0.494 2002

Net secondary enrolment .. .. ..Gross secondary enrolment 247,535 2001 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.

Female ratio 0 2001Ratio of female to male 0 2001

Gross secondary enrolment 621,801 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.Female ratio 0.245 2002Ratio of female to male 0.324 2002

Gross tertiary enrolment 22,717 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.Female ratio .. .. ..Ratio of female to male .. .. ..

Gross tertiary enrolment 29,342 2003 Ministry of Higher Educations.Female ratio 0.22 2003Ratio of female to male 0.278 2003

f Data are based on police records and its coverage may not be complete. In view of this data on this indicator may be interpreted cautiously.

NHDR 04 281

GENDER INEQUALITY IN ECONOMIC ACTIVITYIndicators Value Year SourceFemale economic activity rate (age 15 and above)      

Rate 48.1 2002 UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 2001.Index 103 2002 Quoted in HDR 2004.As per cent of male rate 57 2002

Contributing family workers      Female (as % of total) .. .. ..Male (as % of total) .. .. ..

Employment by economic activityAgriculture (%)     CSO Statistical Yeabook 2003.

Male 70 2002Female 30 2002Total 80 2002

Industry    Male .. ..Female .. ..Total 2 2002

Services  Male .. ..Female .. ..Total 18 2002

GENDER EMPOWERMENT MEASURE Indicators Value Year Source

Seats in Parliament held by women (as % of total)g .. .. ..

Female legislators, senior officials and managers .. .. ..(as % of total)

Female professional and technical workers .. .. ..(as % of total)

Ratio of estimated female to male earned income 0.34 2002 Calculation based on the data of the GDI table.

STATUS OF MAJOR INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTSIndicators Status Source/Remarks

International Convention on the Elimination of All Ratified HDR 2003Forms of Racial Discrimination

International Covenant on Civil and Political Ratified HDR 2003Rights (1966)

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Ratified HDR 2003Cultural Rights (1966)

Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Ratified HDR 2003Discrimination Against Women (1979)

Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Ratified HDR 2003Inhuman or Degrading Treatment orPunishment (1984)

Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) Ratified HDR 2003

g The Parliamentary elections are scheduled for April 2005. Data on this indicator may become available after that.

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Annexure

Armed transfers, conventional: Refers to the voluntarytransfer by the supplier (and thus excludes capturedweapons and weapons obtained through defectors) ofweapons with a military purpose destined for the armedforces, paramilitary forces or intelligence agencies ofanother country. These include major conventionalweapons or systems in six categories: ships aircrafts,missiles, artillery, armoured vehicles and guidance andradar systems (excluded are trucks, services, ammunition,small arms, support items, components and componenttechnology and towed or naval artillery under 100-millimeter calibre).

Births attended by skilled health personnel: Thepercentage of deliveries attended by personnel (includeddoctors, nurses and midwives) trained to give thenecessary care, supervision and advice to women duringpregnancy, labour and postpartum period, to conductdeliveries on their own and to care for newborns.

Carbon dioxide emissions: Anthropogenic (human-originated) carbon dioxide emissions stemming from theburning of fossil fuels, gas flaring and the production ofcement, Emissions are calculated from data on theconsumption of solid, liquid and gaseous fuels, gasflaring and the production of cement.

Cellular subscribers: (also referred to as cellular mobilesubscribers) Subscribers to an automatic public mobiletelephone service that provides access to the publicswitched telephone network using cellular technology.Systems can be analogue or digital.

Consumer price index: Reflects changes in the cost tothe average consumer of acquiring a basket of goodsand services that may be fixed or may change at specifiedintervals.

Crime, people victimized by: The percentage of Crimeto the population of the country in the given year

Earned income (PPP US$), estimated (female andmale): Roughly derived on the basis of the ratio of thefemale non-agricultural wage to the male non-agriculturalwage, the female and male shares of the economicallyactive population, total female and male population andGDP per capita (PPPUS$). For details on this estimation,see Technical Appendix.

Earned income, ratio of estimated female to male:The ratio of estimated female earned income to estimatedmale earned income. See earned income (PPP US$),estimated (female and male).

Education expenditure, public: Including both capitalexpenditures (spending on construction, renovation, majorrepairs and purchase of heavy equipment or vehicles)and current expenditures (spending on goods and servicesthat are consumed within the current year and wouldneed to be renewed the following year). It covers suchexpenditures as staff salaries and benefits, contracted orpurchased services, books and teaching materials, welfareservices, furniture and equipment, minor repairs, fuel,insurance, rents, telecommunications and travel.

Education Index: One of the three indices on which thehuman development index is built. It is based on the adultliteracy rate and the combined primary, secondary andtertiary gross enrolment ratio. For details on how theindex is calculated, see Technical Appendix.

Education levels: Categorized as primary, secondaryand tertiary in accordance with the Educational Systemprevalent in Afghanistan. Generally the age groupcorresponding these levels of educations in Afghanistanis 7-21 years.

Electricity consumption per capita: Refers to grossproduction, in per capita terms, which includesconsumption by station auxiliaries and any losses in thetransformers that are considered integral parts of thestation.

Employment by economic activity: Employment inindustry, agriculture or services as defined according tothe International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC)system (revision 2 and 3) and used in CSO StatisticalYear Book. Industry refers to mining and quarrying,manufacturing, construction and public utilities (gas,water and electricity). Agriculture refers to activities inagriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing. Services referto wholesale and retail trade; restaurants and hotels;transport, storage and communications; finance, insurance,real estate and business services; and community, socialand personal services.

ANNEXURE 4Definitions of Statistical terms

NHDR 04 285

Enrolment ratio, gross: The number of students enrolledin a level of education, regardless of age, as a percentageof the population of official school age for that level.The gross enrolment ratio can be greater than 100% asa result of grade repetition and entry at ages younger orolder than typical age at that grade level.

Exports of goods and services: The value of all goodsand other market services provided to the rest of theworld. Included is the value of merchandise, freight,insurance, transport, travel, royalties, licence fees andother services. Excluded are labour and property incomeand transfer payments.

Export, primary: Include export of Fresh and Ripefruits, Medicine Botani, Spices and Seeds, etc.

Fertility rate, total: The number of children that wouldbe born to each woman if she were to live to the end ofher child-bearing years and bear children at each age inaccordance with prevailing age-specific fertility rates.

Foreign direct investment, inflows of: Inflows ofinvestment to acquire a lasting management interest(10% or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operatingin an economy other than that of the investor, It is thesum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, otherlong-term capital and short-term capital.

Food consumption, national, share of poorest 20%in: The share of food consumption accruing to the poorest20% of the population. Data on household foodconsumption has been taken from National Risk &Vulnerability Assessment Survey

Fuel consumption, traditional: Estimated consumptionof fuel wood, charcoal, bagasse (sugar cane waste) andanimal and vegetable wastes. Total energy use comprisescommercial energy use and traditional fuel use.

GDP (gross domestic product): The sum of value addedby all resident producers in the economy plus any producttaxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation ofoutput. It is calculated without making deductions fordepreciation of fabricated capital assts or for depletionand degradation of natural resources. Value added is thenet output of an industry after adding up all outputs andsubtracting intermediate inputs.

GDP (US$): GDP converted to US dollars using theaverage official exchange rate.

GDP index: One of the three indices on which the humandevelopment index is built. It is based on GDP per capita

(PPPUS$). For details on how the index is calculated,see Technical Appendix.

GDP per capita (PPP US$): See GDP (gross domesticproduct) and PPP (Purchasing power parity).

GDP per capita (US$): GDP (US$) divided by midyearpopulation.

GDP annual growth rate: annual growth rate, calculatedfrom constant price GDP in local currency units.

Gender-related development index (GDI): A compositeindex measuring average achievement in the three basicdimensions captured in the human development index-a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standardof living-adjusted to account for inequalities betweenmen and women. For details on how the index iscalculated, see Technical Appendix.

Health expenditure per capita (US$): The sum ofpublic and private expenditure (in US$), divided by thepopulation. Health expenditures includes the provisionof health services (preventive and curative), familyplanning activities, nutrition activities and emergencyaid designated for health, but excludes the provision ofwater and sanitation.

Health expenditure, public: Current and capital spendingfrom government (central and local) budgets, externalborrowings and grants (including donations frominternational agencies and non-governmentalorganizations) and social (or compulsory) health insurancefunds. Together with private health expenditure, it makesup total health expenditure.

HIV/AIDS, people living with: The estimated numberof people living with HIV/AIDS at the end of the yearspecified.

Human development index (HDI): A composite indexmeasuring average achievement in three basic dimensionsof human development-a long and healthy life, knowledgeand a decent standard of living. For details on how theindex is calculated, see Technical Appendix.

Human poverty index (HPI) for developing countries:A composite index measuring deprivations in the threebasic dimensions captured in the human developmentindex-a long and health life, knowledge and a decentstandard of living. For details on how the index iscalculated, see Technical Appendix.

Illiteracy rate, adult: Calculated as 100 minus the adultliteracy rate. See literacy rate, adult.

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Immunization, one-year-olds fully immunized againstmeasles or tuberculosis: One-year-olds injected withan antigen or a serum containing specific antibodiesagainst measles or tuberculosis.

Imports of goods and services: The value of all goodsand other market services received from the rest of theworld. Included are the value of merchandise, freight,insurance, transport, travel, royalties, licence fees andother services, such as communication, construction,financial, information, business, personal and governmentservices. Excluded are labour and property income andtransfer payments.

Income poverty line, population below: The percentageof the population living below the specified poverty linei.e. US$2 a day-at 1985 international prices (equivalentto US$2.15 at 1993 international prices), adjusted forpurchasing power parity.

Infant mortality rate: The probability of dying betweenbirth and exactly one year of age, expressed per 1000live births.

Internally displaced people: People who were displacedwithin Afghanistan and to whom the United Nation HighCommissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have extendedassistance.

Internet users: People with access to the worldwidenetwork.

Life expectancy at birth: The number of years a newborninfant would live if prevailing patterns of age-specificmortality rates at the time of birth were to stay the samethroughout the child’s life.

Life expectancy index: One of the three indices onwhich the human development index is built. For detailson how the index is calculated, see Technical Appendix.

Literacy rate, Adult: The percentage of people aged 15and above who can, with understanding, both read andwrite.

Malaria cases: The total number of people sufferingfrom malaria in a specified year.

Maternal mortality ratio: The annual number of deathsof women from pregnancy-related causes per 100,000live births.

Official development assistance (ODA): Disbursementsof loans made on concessional terms (repayments ofprincipal) and grants by official agencies of the members

of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), bymultilateral institutions and by non-DAC countries.

PPP (purchasing power parity): A rate of exchangethat accounts for price differences across countries,allowing international comparisons of real output andincomes. At the PPP US$ rate, PPP US$1 has the samepurchasing power in the domestic economy as $1 has inthe United States.

Probability at birth of not surviving to age 40:Calculated as 1 minus the probability of surviving to age40 for a given cohort. See probability at birth of survivingto age 40.

Probability at birth of surviving to age 40: Theprobability of a newborn infant surviving to age 40 ifsubject to prevailing patterns of age specific mortalityrates.

Refugees Returnee: People who have fled their countrybecause of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasonsof their race, religion, nationality, political opinion ormembership in a particular social group and who cannotor do not want to return. The returnee refugee figure inthis report is based on the assistance provided by UNHCRto the persons returning to Afghanistan.

Sanitation facilities, population with access toimproved: The percentage of the population with accessto adequate excreta disposal facilities, such as a connectionto a sewer or septic tank system, a pour flush latrine, asimple pit latrine or a ventilated improved pit latrine.

Science, math and engineering, tertiary students in:The share of tertiary students enrolled in natural sciences;engineering; mathematics and computer science;architecture and agriculture, forestry and fisheries.

Telephone Mainlines: Telephone lines connecting acustomer’s equipment to the public switched telephonenetwork.

Traditional fuels, population using: The share of thepopulation using solid fuels, which include traditionalfuels such as fuel wood, charcoal, bagasse (sugar canewaste) and animal and vegetable wastes.

Tuberculosis cases: The total number of tuberculosiscases reported. A tuberculosis case is defined as a patientin whom tuberculosis has been bacteriologicallyconfirmed or diagnosed by a clinician.

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Under-five mortality rate: The probability of dyingbetween birth and exactly five years of age, expressedper 1,000 live births.

Under height for age, children under age five: Includesmoderate and severe stunting, defined as more than twostandard deviations below the median height for age ofthe reference population.

Undernourished people: People whose food intake ischronically insufficient to meet their energy requirements.

Under weight for age, children under age five: Includesmoderate underweight, defined as more than two standarddeviations below the median weight for age of thereference population, and severe underweight, definedas more than three standard deviations below the medianweight.

Urban population: The midyear population of areasclassified as urban. It includes population of nationalmetro cities and 26 provincial towns.

Water source, improved, population withoutsustainable access to: Calculated as 100 minus thepercentage of the population with sustainable access toan improved water source. Unimproved sources includeunprotected wells/springs/ponds, river/canal/stream orother unprotected sources.

Water source, improved, population with sustainableaccess to: The share of the population with reasonableaccess to any of the following types of water supply fordrinking: household connections, public standpipes,boreholes, protected dug well, protected springs andrainwater collection. Reasonable access is defined as theavailability of at least 20 litres a person per day fromsource within one kilometer of the user’s dwelling.

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Photo: Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh

UNDP AfghanistanShah Mahmood Ghazi Watt, Kabul

Tel: (+93) 20 2101682-87Fax: (+873) 763 4638 836e-mail: [email protected]