Hazop Oil & Gas

HAZOP REPORT

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KAZAKHSTAN – CHINA PIPELINE

HAZOP REPORT

PREPARED BY MAKETSTROY LLP MAKETSTROY LLP KAZAKHSTAN, KYZYLORDA, MOSTOVAYA STREET Fax +7 7242 23 57 68

Job No. 0001 Doc No. SCS-HAZOP-001-KCP Revision A Date 21 DECEMBER 2012 File Ref.

S:Projects /JU-05674 SCS Design Review HAZOP/6.0ENGINEERING/6.10 Pipelines/HAZOP/JU-05674-REPS0002 Rev A Pipeline HAZOP report.doc

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Rev Date Description of Change A

10 December 2012

Issue for MKS

B

21 December 2012

Issued for Client Review

Prepared Checked Approved

Name N.Shusharin A.Kudrin Y.Galimov Signature

Reliance by any other party on the contents of the report shall be at its own risk. SCS makes no warranty or representation, expressed or implied, to liabilities with respect to any other party use of or damages resulting from such use of any information, conclusions or recommendations disclosed in this report.

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CONTENTS ABBREVIATIONS 1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 General 1.2 Background 1.3 HAZOP Team

2.0 SCOPE OF WORK 3.0 SUMMARY

3.1 High Risk Actions 3.2 Other Actions

4.0 HAZOP STUDY PROCEDURE 4.1 HAZOP Process 4.2 Study nodes 4.3 Attendees 4.4 Documentation

5.0 FINDING 5.1 High risk Actions 5.2 Medium risk Actions 5.3 Low risk Actions

6.0 ENVIROMENTAL RISKS APPENDIX I HAZOP GUIDEWORDS APPENDIX II HAZOP WORKSHEETS

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ABBREVIATIONS

ANSI American National Standards Institute

CP Cathodic Protection CPPE China Petroleum Engineering

e.g. for example EPC Engineering Procurement and Construction ESD Emergency Shutdown ESDV Emergency Shutdown Valve HAZOP Hazard and Operability Study HHLS High High Level Switch ILF Ingenieur Gemeinschaft Lasser & Feizlmayer KCP Kazakhstan China Pipeline Limited KING Kazakh Institute of Oil and Gas km kilometre LIT Level Indicator Transmitter

LAHH Level Alarm High High LALL Level Alarm Low Low LSHH Level Switch High High LSLL Level Switch Low Low MAOP Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure MOV Motorised Operated Valve N/A Not Applicable NAH No Additional Hazard PA Pressure Alarm P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Diagram PS Pressure Switch PV Pressure-Vacuum QED QED International RV Relief Valve SCADA Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition SNiP USSR Construction Norms and Regulations

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 General This report details the findings of a HAZOP study of the basic engineering design of the Kazakhstan-China Pipeline, stations 8, 10 and 11 on behalf of MKS LLP. The HAZOP was performed during 6th December to 21st December 2012 at the Project Office in Kyzylorda, Kazakhstan.

1.2 Background The Kazakhstan-China Pipeline will carry crude oil in a pipeline from Atasu in Kazakhstan to Alashankou in China, a distance 962,2 km. The project includes the design and construction of the pipeline; pumping facilities at the existing Atasu station; mainline block valves; intermediate pump station; pig trap stations for future pump stations and a metering station at Alashankou. The pipeline will be controlled using a computer operated SCADA system complete with dedicated data and voice communications. In addition the necessary ancillary control and maintenance buildings, emergency response and other supplementary facilities will be provided.

1.3 HAZOP Team The team was led by a highly experienced independent chairman who is also a process engineer. The HAZOP team consisted of an independent pipeline engineer, a process engineer as secretary and engineering personnel from MKS LLP. An interpreter was present for translation of English and Russian.

The main objective of this HAZOP study was to systematically identify as many foreseeable hazards and operational concerns as possible that were associated with the design of the pipeline and Stations 8,10 and 11. At the start of the HAZOP study, the chairman briefed the HAZOP team on the HAZOP process and identified the guidewords to be used. HAZOP was reported in full using Microsoft Word software and the current worksheet was visually projected so that all team members could see the progress of the discussions as they were being recorded.

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2.0 SCOPE OF WORK

The scope of work was to conduct a HAZOP on the basic design of the Kazakhstan to China pipeline and stations 8, 10 and 11 owned by KCP to identify the areas where changes could be made to reduce any hazard associated with the operation of the pipeline and improve its operability.

The HAZOP process was applied to each station (8,10,11) and section of the pipeline and associated piping and equipment. The extent of the study was from immediately upstream of the Kumkol and West Siberia pig receivers at Atasu to immediately downstream of the metering runs at Alashankou using the PEtlD's provided. The electrical, communications, buildings and other portions of the project which are ancillary to the basic process and not shown on the P&ID's were excluded from the HAZOP.

3.0 SUMMARY

The HAZOP addressed the basic engineering design of the stations 8, 10, 11 and Kazakhstan-China Pipeline and associated facilities. There were no hazards identified that were considered to be of sufficiently high level of risk to result in a substantial delay to project completion.

3.1 High Risk Actions Hazards identified where the Pipeline Operation and stations 8, 10, 11 considered to be exposed to major risks are:

• Operation, Maintenance and Control Philosophy Document

There is a requirement for an approved Process Control, Shutdown, Emergency Shutdown and Start-up Philosophy to be in place before proceeding to detailed engineering. The risks associated-with not having an approved Philosophy in place are high because there could be a loss of integrity in the detailed design leading to hazardous situations, loss of production, and which could have an impact on the reputation of the Operating Company.

• Meter Precision The precision of the Atasu and Alashankou meters will be compromised because of leakage paths to or from the meter prover circuit during meter proving. Also, oil could leak through the meter run discharge valve while meter proving. These will result in errors in the metered volumes.

• Pipeline Plugging The problem of pipeline plugging must be studied and recommendations made to minimize it and clear the plugged line. The temperature of the oil could fall below the pour point resulting in wax formation with the possibility of complete line blockage. If the line becomes blocked then there will be a significant loss of production.

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• Drainage of Impressed Current of the Pipeline Cathodic Protection System

There is a potential for the cathodic protection impressed current to drain through the valve stem and motor operator of the pipeline block valves. If this occurs then the corrosion rate along the pipeline will be increased resulting in eventual pipeline failure, loss of containment of crude oil and loss of production.

• Internal Corrosion The anticipated internal rate of corrosion should be established to determine the design pipeline corrosion allowance to ensure that the wall thickness at the end of the life of the pipeline meets code requirements. Failure to establish the internal rate of corrosion could result in pipeline failure with the consequent loss of crude oil containment and loss of production.

• Overpressure of Piping and Valves

At Pump Stations 8, 10, 11 and Alashankou there are sections of piping that are not designed to withstand the pressures that could be generated by the system. Also at these Pump Stations there are two valves upstream of the surge relief valves that are underrated. These sections of piping and the valves must be uprated or protected against overpressure because the risk of overpressure is high and the potential consequences resulting from a valve failure or piping rupture are unacceptable.

System of smoothing waves of pressure

In the operation process of pipeline there are risks related with emergence of pressure waves which can lead to a rupture of pipes in certain places. Such risks are avoided generally by use of systems of smoothing pressure waves and valves which are independent of electricity consumption.

3.2 Other Actions A complete listing of all identified hazards is given in Appendix II. This listing includes recommendations to address the identified hazards.

4.0 HAZOP STUDY PROCEDURE

4.1 HAZOP Process The aim of the HAZOP process is to identify potential deviations in process and control parameters that may lead to possible hazardous situations or operability problems. A systematic analysis is used for challenging the design by applying guidewords rigorously to each part of the process system identified on the P&IDs. The process systems are divided into nodes which provide manageable sections of plant for analysis. The purpose of the HAZOP process is to assist the design engineer by identifying hazards so that the design engineer can assess them and mitigate the hazards as appropriate.

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The identified hazards relate to protection of people, protection of equipment, protection of production, protection of the environment; and the engineering design must address ways of mitigating, these hazards. Eliminating these hazards through design increases the integrity of the design, minimises loss of production and protects the reputation of the Operating Company.

Hazards or operability problems were identified during the analysis. The hazards or problems were then discussed and recorded, taking into account design safeguards and mitigating measures. If the system arrangements were considered inadequate or deemed to require further review then an action was recorded.

4.2 Study nodes

NODE DESCRIPTION Station 11 1a Station 11 Pig Receiver Suction to Pig Launcher

Discharge

1b Station 11 Pig Receiver Operation

1c Station 11 Pig Launcher Operation

1d Pig Station 11 Trap Drainage System Station 8 2a Station 8 Pig Receiver Suction to Pig Launcher

2b Station 8 Pig Receiver Operation 2c Station 8 Pig Launcher Operation 2d Pig Station 8 Trap Drainage System

Station 10 3a Station 10 Pig Receiver Suction to Pig Launcher 3b Station 10 Pig Receiver Operation

3c Station 10 Pig Launcher Operation 3d Pig Station 10 Trap Drainage System

Alashankou

4a Drains system (ST-12101) Atasu 5a Kumkol to RV to Filter to Heat Exchanger Inlet

5b West Siberia to Filter to RV to Heat Exchanger Inlet/tankage

5c Heat Exchanger Inlet to Outlet

5d Tanks (new build)

5e Metering to pipeline

5f Metering prover loop

5g Pipeline Pig Launcher

5h Pump set P07405/6/7 vertical

5i, 5j, 5k

Drain system

5l Firewater

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4.3 Attendees

Имя Должность Компания Yerkebulan Aimurzayev Chief Executive Officer SCS Anuar Mustafin Deputy CEO SCS Nartay Orazbek Process Engineer SCS Bolat Kudaibergenov Independent Pipeline Engineer SCS Alish Bazarbayev Inspection Engineer SCS Nurdilda Sagimbayev Head of HSE department SCS Hamit Zhumabekov Engineer SCS Zhanna Sadikova Engineer (ISO 9001) SCS Kerkez Miodrag Process Engineer CIS Bovan Milan Process Engineer CIS Hornyak Misho Process Engineer CIS Gligich Miodrag Process Engineer CIS Kaprish Stevica Process Engineer CIS Vrovak Miodrag Process Engineer CIS

Total System 6a General

6b Normal Operation

6c Controlled Shutdown

6d Emergency Shutdowns

6e Restart

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4.4 Documentation

P&ID REVISION NAME KCPP-06-E-IN-DW-0002 KCPK2-10-E-PR-DW-0001 KCPK2-10-E-PR-NM-0008 КСPP-0201-E-PR-DW-0001 KCPP-0201-E-WF-DW-0010 KCPK2-10-E-PR-NM-0005 KCPK2-08-E-PR-DW-0001 KCPK2-08-E-MA-DW-0001 KCPK2-10-E-AF-OT-0002-00 KCPB01 -E-IN-DW-0001 -001 -0 KCPB01-E-PR-DW-0002-01-1

Rev 0

28/01/05

Rev0 13/11/12

Rev0 12/11/12

Rev0 16/06/10

Rev0 20/05/10

Rev0 12/11/12

Rev0 12/07/12

Rev0 18/11/12

Rev0 18/11/12

Rev 0 17/05/05

Rev 1

08/06/05

MPS Atasu Reconstruction P&ID

№ 10 Pump Station P&ID

Platform of valves of dumping of waves of pressure at the exit to NPS 10 №11 Pump Station technology scheme № 11 Pump Station plan of networks of water supply, sewerage and fire extinguishing № 10 Pump Station Platform of the pump of the return injection

No. 8 Pump Station P&ID No. 8 Pump Station Fire Fighting System P&ID Alashankou Metering Station P&ID Pipeline Block Valve Station P&ID (592 - 962.2 km) No. 11 Pig Trap Station P&ID

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5.0 FINDINGS

The HAZOP addressed the basic engineering design of the Pump Stations 8, 10, 11 and Kazakhstan-China Pipeline as well as associated facilities. The results of the HAZOP are detailed in the HAZOP worksheets detailed in Appendix II, which contain a complete list of recommendations. Some of the recommendations contain solutions that were discussed by the HAZOP team members. However, these solutions are included for information only - there may be other solutions that will adequately address the recommendations. Based on the HAZOP team discussions and experience, the SCS team members made a qualitative assessment of the level of risk to the Pipeline Operation for each of the identified hazards. Three levels of risk were used: high risk where there could be a major adverse impact on Pipeline Operation, medium risk where there could be a significant impact on Pipeline Operation and low risk where the impact on Pipeline Operation was not considered to be of major significant due to the small likelihood of the situation occurring and the consequences not being substantial

The hazards listed in this report are not in order of priority.

There were no hazards identified that were considered to be of sufficiently high level of risk to result in substantial delay to project completion.

5.1 High Risk Actions The following items are considered to have a high risk with a high possibility of them occurring and having severe consequences. These items should be addressed and actions implemented to minimise the risk associated with the hazard.

• Operation, Maintenance and Control Philosophy Document

Currently there is not an approved Process Control, Shutdown, ESD, Start-up or Restart Philosophy. There is a requirement for these philosophies to be written to provide a basis of design for detailed engineering to proceed. The Philosophies must incorporate all aspects of Operation including loss of services such as Communications. The risks associated with not having an approved Philosophy in place are high because there could be a loss of integrity in the detailed design. The design must follow a set of requirements that is agreed and approved and must address the protection of people, equipment, production and the environment. If any of these is compromised then a hazardous situation could result, there could loss of production and there could be an impact on the reputation of the Operating Company.

• Meter Precision

It is critical for custody transfer meter and prover systems as present at Pump Stations 8,10, 11, Atasu and Alashankou, that there are no possible leak paths between the meter and the prover outlet so that all oil passing through the meter also passes through the meter and through the prover will lead to an invalid meter factor. As result of this, the subsequent metered volumes will be incorrect by possibly a relatively large amount.

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On the basic design P&IDs there are a number of potential leak paths that need to be eliminated or designed such that any leak can be easily detected. Possible means of detecting a leak could be by the use of tundishes, or by using double block and bleed valves. The leak paths identified include lines to the closed drain system, the prover RV discharge line, lines to and from the calibration and flushing connections and the valve in the main oil flow line downstream of the meter.

• Pipeline Plugging

The problem of pipeline plugging must be studied and recommendations made to minimise it and a method to clear a plugged line developed. The temperature of the oil could fall below the pour point resulting in wax formation with the possibility of complete line blockage. If the line becomes blocked then there will be a significant loss of production. It is probable that plugging of the pipeline will occur and a method of clearing the blockage should be designed to minimise the time that the plug exists. A method of clearing a plugged line that is commonly used is to have standpipes either side of the pipeline block valves to permit the clearing of a short section using a portable high pressure piston pump.

• Drainage of Impressed Current of the Pipeline Cathodic Protection System

There is a potential for the CP impressed current to drain through the valve stem and motor operator of the pipeline block valves. If this occurs then the corrosion rate along the pipeline will be increased resulting in possible pipeline failure, loss of containment of crude oil and loss of production. The valve extension, the valve shaft and the instrumentation adjacent to the valve must be electrically isolated from the pipeline at every pipeline block valve and an isolating joint should be installed immediately downstream of the barred tee at Atasu.

• Internal Corrosion

The anticipated internal rate of corrosion should be established to determine the design pipeline corrosion allowance to ensure that the wall thickness at the end of the life of the pipeline meets code requirements. Failure to establish the internal rate of corrosion could result in pipeline failure with the consequent loss of crude oil containment and loss of production over an extended period.

• Overpressure of piping and valves

At Pump Station 8, 10, 11 and Alashankou there are sections of piping that are not designed to withstand the pressures that could be generated by the system. Also at Pump Station 8, 10 and 11 there are two valves, XV09114 and XV09117, upstream of the surge relief valves that are underrated. These sections of piping and valves must be identified and uprated or protected against overpressure. The risk of overpressure is high and the potential consequences resulting from a valve failure or pipe rupture are unacceptable.

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• System of smoothing pressure waves During the operation process of pipeline there can be an unauthorized shutdown of pumps, additionally they are stopped and start dueto change of an operating mode of the pipeline. In such cases there is a sharp change of speed of oil that leads to pressure increase in the pipeline. In this cases the wave of a high pressure reaches sound speed. The hydroblow from such wave is capable to lead to destruction of shutoff valves and the pipeline and the most weak spots, for example at Pump Station exit where working pressure sometimes reaches a limit of a bearing capability. In order to avoid such risks it is necessary to provide system of smoothing pressure waves as well as to supply with nitric drives not only SSVD valves but also all valves of the pipeline which will provide stable pressure in case of planned or unauthorized shutdown of pumps.

5.2 Medium risk Actions The following items are considered to have a medium risk with a high possibility of occurring or having severe consequences should they occur. A means of mitigating the risks should be implemented where possible.

• Stored Energy in traps

During normal operation of the pipeline the pig traps would normally be depressured, drained and shut in when not being used for pigging. However, there are leakage paths for crude oil to enter the traps either by passing through the closed main line valve or through the kicker or bridle line valves. If the drain or vent on the trap is blocked with wax then there is a possibility that the trap pressure could rise because of leakage and not be detected. Opening of the closure under these circumstances would cause a release of the stored energy with potentially catastrophic results. Some industry standards require double block and bleed valve arrangement on the main inlet and outlet trap lines because fatalities have occurred. The design of the traps should have either a double block and bleed valve arrangement or they should be designed with alternative protection against accidental release of stored energy. The alternative protection must have an equivalent level of integrity as a double block and bleed valve arrangement.

• Tank vents

No vents are shown on the surge relief tanks at Pump Station 9 and Alashankou. These tanks are critical to the surge relief path and Project must ensure that the tanks are correctly vented to prevent rupture or collapse.

• Crude oil entering thermal oil heater

There is a possibility of crude oil entering the thermal oil circuit should there be a tube rupture within any of the crude oil/thermal oil shell and tube heat exchangers. In this circumstance thermal degradation of the crude oil in the heater could occur leading to failure of the heater and subsequent loss of production. The design should minimise the risk of this occurrence.

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• ESDVs

During an emergency shutdown there is the possibility of continued flow through Atasu, Pump Station 9 and Alashankou. ESDVs are required to be fitted at these sites to provide tight shut off. The ESDVs should not be able to be bypassed and should not be motor operated.

• Pipeline transients

The main line block valve closure times should be reviewed to ensure that transients are not generated by the closure of one of these valves resulting in potential damage to the pipeline.

• Piping Overpressure

The protection against overpressure of the piping downstream of the pumps at Pump Stations 8, 10 and 11 is dependant upon the third pump not starting when two pumps are in operation. The Project should ensure that SCADA inhibits the starting of the third pump.

• SCADA interlocks

SCADA interlocks are required on the pig traps so that misoperation of the trap valves cannot take place allowing the trap closure to be opened with mainline, kicker or bridle valves opened or a valve to be accidentally opened while the trap closure is open.

• Insulating joint

An insulating joint between Atasu and the outgoing pipeline is required to electrically isolate the CP pipeline from the station piping and prevent drainage of impressed current. Failure to do this could result in increased corrosion rates on the pipeline which could lead to pipeline failure and subsequent loss of production.

• Back Pressure Control for Meter Runs

Back pressure control of the Atasu and Alashankou meter runs is required to ensure that the flow is above the minimum flow and that the pressure is sufficient to prevent bubble formation. Both of these events will lead to inaccurate meter readings.

• Buried piping Corrosion Protection

There is no means of protecting station buried piping from external corrosion. Buried piping needs to be protected from corrosion by applying an adequate coating material and installing a sacrificial or impressed current CP system to mitigate corrosion.

• Alashankou Additional filter

An additional filter at Alashankou is recommended so that a blocked or failed filter does not result in a pipeline shutdown.

• Pipeline Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure

Confirmation is required that the MAOP of the Pipeline is sufficient to withstand pressures resulting from the highest possible pressure at Atasu and

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pump stations 8, 10 and 11 with all pumps operating (including standby pumps). If the MAOP is exceeded then operation would be outside the SNiP design code.

NTD of welded seams

After accomplishment of welded connections it is necessary to execute NDT of welded seams by methods of a X-ray, ultrasound and magnetic powder for the purpose of prevention of gaps and leakages in the pipeline, drainage reservoirs, reservoirs, etc.

• Reconstruction of existing Pump Stations

The pipeline construction establishes increase in capacity in 20 million tons per year. Initial designing was conducted taking into account in 10 million tons per year, therefore it is necessary to review handling capacity of all earlier constructed Pump Stations, nodes and locking fittings about handling capacity.

5.3 Low risk Actions A complete listing of all identified hazards, including those considered to have a low risk to the Pipeline Operation, is given in the HAZOP worksheets in Appendix II.

Operating Procedure Documents must be written to cover all possible operations for the Atasu to Alashankou Pipeline for each mode operation, viz. normal operation, start-up, re-start, normal shutdown and emergency shutdowns. The procedures should be written when the detailed engineering design has been completed. In addition,

Maintenance Procedures should be written. Actions in the HAZOP worksheets referring to Operating Procedures are for the specific operations raised by the HAZOP team members. The actions are not a comprehensive list of all the possible operations that could take place for the Pipeline Operation. The actions are for specific operations that the HAZOP team members identified as being necessary for inclusion in the Operating Procedure Documents.

Other low risk actions which were identified include requirements for thermal relief of blocked-in above ground piping; leak detection at drains tanks and drawing drafting errors which already have been addressed in the detailed design but the detail design should be checked to ensure that these items have been incorporated where appropriate.

The PEtlDs for Atasu were found to be confusing to follow. It is recommended that the Atasu P&IDs are re-drawn to give clarity and precision. There is a possibility that mistakes could be made when using the existing set of Atasu P&IDs.

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APPENDIX I HAZOP GUIDEWORDS

Parameter Guideword Deviation may be caused by -

FLOW or VELOCITY

More Reduced backpressure, surging, suction pressurised, controller failure, valve stuck open, leak, incorrect instrument reading

Less Leak, partial blockage, sediment,

cavitation, low suction head, process turndown.

No Blockage, pump failure, closed / stuck

valve, leak, suction vessel empty, vapour lock, control failure.

Reverse / Cycling Check valve failure or wrongly inserted, poor isolation, wrong routing, control failure, delivery over pressurised, back siphoning, pump reversed, slugging.

Misdirected Incorrect valve selection, valve leakage TEMPERATURE Higher External fire, heat tracing , sun, flare Lower Expansion, heat loss, vaporisation, rain.

Fluctuating Seasonal or day/night variation PRESSURE Higher Blockage, gas release, reaction,

thermal expansion, explosion, elevation change.

Lower Siphoning, gravity draining, vacuum

Fluctuating Surge, slugging LEVEL (vessels)

Higher Flooding, pressure surge, carryover

Lower Leakage, controller/valve failure COMPOSITION Other than Presence of impurities (e.g. air,

water, acids, salts, lube oil), formation of wax, hydrates, scale. Solids, equipment leaks.

Part of Different number of phases, foaming.

Change in viscosity, density, conductivity

Different Change in proportions, water or

solvent, more/less additive. OPERATIONS Modes of operation Bypass, turndown, recycle, parallel steps

Commissioning / Start-up Strainers, overrides, utilities, cleaning

Normal shut down Stagnant corrosion, trapped pressure

Emergency shutdown Valve/actuator/limit switch failure MAINTENANCE Preparation for Isolation, draining, venting, gas-freeing

Execution Access, lifting, space

Re-instatement after Inspection & test, de-isolation

Reliability Voting, redundancy, testing OTHER Failure of material Erosion, corrosion, cycling fatigue,

acoustic vibration, cold embrittlement.

Utility failure Instrument air, water, hydraulics, power. Valve failure position

Pollution Leakage, bunds, oil spill response

Fire & explosion Ignition sources, F&G detection, fire protection, leakage

Design documentation Errors, spec breaks, line gradient, tag nos. CORROSION

(internal/external)

DRAWING

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HAZOP REPORT SCS-HAZOP-001-KCP

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APPENDIX II HAZOP WORKSHEETS

HAZOP WORKSHEET PROJECT: Kazakhstan - China Pipeline Project Atasu - Alashankou Crude Oil Pipeline

Date: 21/12/12

Pipeline section: Node 1a - Station 11 - Pig Receiver Suction to Pig Launcher Discharge P&iD number: No. 11 Pig Trap Station KCPB01-E-PR-DW-0002-01-1 Rev 1 08/06/05

Design intent: To bypass pig traps at Station 11, normal operating route.

DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION No Flow Shut Valve

Blockage of line Pig stuck in line

Loss of production None 1. Operating procedures to be written for Station 11.

More Flow See Node 6a "More Flow"

Less Flow Outage of intermediate pump station Partial blockage

Loss of production None 2. Operating procedures to include outage of intermediate pump at Pump Stations.

Reverse Flow Upstream pipeline rupture depending on topology See Node 6a "More Flow"

Loss of production None 3. Line walk and air inspection to be formalized for the whole pipeline.

Misdirected Flow

Open bypass NAH


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DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION Open trap

valves, traps not ready e.g. Drain valves open

Spillage None 4. Operating procedures to include management of traps at Station 11. 5. SCADA interlock to prevent misoperation of valves at Station 11. 6. Provide physical containment of oil spills at Station 11.

Higher Temperature

Thermal expansion between closed valves in above ground piping

Leakage None (assume piping above ground)

7. Consider requirement for thermal relief at Station 11.

Low Temperature

Weather Wax build up None 8. Consider installing means of mitigating wax build up and plugging at Station 11.

Higher Pressure

Sudden valve closure at metering

Transient pressure Transient relief valve at the downstream metering station

Sudden pipeline block valve closure

Transient pressure None 9. Review main line block valve closure times throughout pipeline.

Slow closure of downstream valve

Increase pressure Pumps shutdown by SCADA

Lower Pressure

Increased viscosity due to cold weather

Reduced flowrate Pipeline plugging

Pressure Transmitter 10. Hydraulic analysis of pipeline to review viscosity concerns.


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Pipeline shutdown and cold weather

Potential slack line None 11. Operating procedures to be written to ensure that minimum line pack is maintained at all times, including shutdown.

Composition NAH Operation NAH Internal Corrosion

Addressed in Node 6a "Internal Corrosion"

DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION External Corrosion

Addressed in Node 6a External Corrosion


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HAZOP WORKSHEET

PROJECT: Kazakhstan - China Pipeline Project Atasu - Alashankou Crude Oil Pipeline

Date: 22/12/12

Pipeline section: Node 1b - Station 11 - Pig Receiver Operation P&ID number: No. 11 Pig Trap Station KCPB01-E-PR-DW-0002-01-1 Rev 1 08/06/05

Design intent: Pig management

DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION No Flow NAH Less Flow Wax in

bridle/drain lines Inability receive pig Spillage on opening pig receiver

None 12. Operating and maintenance procedures to be written for Station 11 receiver operation.

Misdirected Flow

Routed to drain/vent

Loss of containment through drain/vent Overfilling of drain tank

One block valve on vent 13. Provide second block valve on pig receiver vent at Station 11 or other means of integrity of isolation.

Through trap closure

Spillage Injury

None 14. Ensure that there is a fail safe interlock system on Station 11 receiver main valve, bridle line and closure, so that closure can only be opened when valves are closed e.g. Key lock system.

Reverse Flow NAH Higher Temperature

Weather, locked in system

Higher pressure Potential leak

PSV-11101 15. Operating procedure to include requirement for receiver to be de-pressured and drained during normal operations at Station 11.

Low Temperature

NAH

Higher Pressure

High pressure through leaking valve when trap not in use

Potential injury when trap is being put into use

None 16. Recommend double block valves on inlet to Station 11 receiver or another alternative system that has equivalent isolation integrity to a system with double block valves. See action 17. t


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DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION

Lower Pressure

NAH

Higher Flow Pressure differential across bridle valve when pressuring pig trap

Deterioration of valve leading to passing valve

None 17. Recommend addition of small bore pressurising line incorporating globe valve and block valve (bypassing bridle valves) at pig receiver at Station 11.

Levels NAH Operation No valves on

individual bridle lines on trap

Poor control of receiving pig. Potential damage to pig or closure

None 18. Recommend provision of additional valve on each bridle line on the Station 11 receiver or removal of the second bridle line on the Station 11 receiver. The remaining bridle line is to have an additional valve to give double block capability or other means of positive isolation.


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Date: 21/12/12

Pipeline section: Node 1c - Station 11 - Pig Launcher Operation PEtID number: No. 11 Pig Trap Station KCPB01-E-PR-DW-0002-01-1 Rev 1 08/06/05


DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION 19. Operating and maintenance

procedures to be written for Station 11 launcher operation.

No Flow NAH Misdirected Flow



One block valve on vent 20. Provide second block valve on launcher vent at Station 11 or other measures of ensuring integrity of isolation.


Spillage Injury

None 21. Ensure that there is a fail safe interlock system on Station 11 launcher main valve, kicker valve and closure, so that closure can only be opened when valves are closed e.g. Key lock system.




PSV-11102 22. Operating procedure to include requirement for launcher to be depressured and drained during normal operations at Station11.

Low Temperature

NAH


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DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION Higher High pressure Potential injury when trap is None 23. Recommend double block valves on Pressure through leaking

valve when trap not in use

to be put into use outlet and kicker line on Station 11 launcher or another alternative system that has equivalent isolation integrity to a system with double block valves.


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Date: 21/12/12

Pipeline section: Node 1d - Pig Station 11 - Trap Drainage System P&ID number: No. 11 Pig Trap Station KCPB01-E-PR-DW-0002-01-1 Rev 1 08/06/05

Design intent: Management of pig traps

DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION No Flow Wax blockage in

drain line Traps cannot be drained None 24. Operating procedures to be

prepared for drainage system and to include the event of wax blockage in Station 11 drain line.

Less Flow NAH More Flow NAH Misdirected Flow

From one trap to other

Liquid in other trap Isolation valve

Temperature Low

Weather Inability to empty tank, viscosity is too high (wax)

None See action 24.

High Temperature

NAH

High Pressure

NAH

Low Pressure NAH Level High Pump Failure

Level Transmitter Failure

Overfilling None 25. Recommend that the LIT on Station 11 drain tank transmits to SCADA. 26. Recommend that LSHH is installed on Station 11 drain tank. 27. Drawing to show local or remote operation of pump at Station 11 drain tank.

Low Level NAH


Page 26 of 91

■■....' "■ ■

...........■■ ■-■ "■ ■■ DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION

Corrosion Tank leakage, no indication None 28. Confirm leak detection provided in the pit around the Station 11 drain tank. 29. Recommend tank corrosion protection system, including sacrificial anodes for Station 11 drain tank.


Page 27 of 91


Date: 21/12/12










Loss of production None 32. Line walk and air inspection to be formalised for the whole pipeline.

Misdirected Flow

Open bypass NAH


Page 28 of 91




Higher Temperature

Thermal expansion between closed valves in above



Low Temperature


Higher Pressure

Sudden valve closure at metering




Slow closure of downstream


Lower Pressure









Page 29 of 91




Page 30 of 91


Date: 21/12/12






Misdirected Flow





Spillage Injury






Low Temperature

NAH

Higher Pressure



None 45. Recommend double block valves on inlet to Station 8 receiver or another alternative system that has equivalent isolation integrity to a system with double block valves. See action 17. t


Page 31 of 91

DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION Lower Pressure

NAH









Page 32 of 91

HAZOP WORKSHEET


Date: 21/12/12










Spillage Injury






Low Temperature

NAH


Page 33 of 91





Page 34 of 91


Date: 21/12/12









Temperature Low


None See action 24.

High Temperature

NAH

High Pressure

NAH




Low Level NAH


Page 35 of 91

■■....' "■ ■




Page 36 of 91


Date: 21/12/12










Loss of production None 61. Line walk and air inspection to be formalised for the whole pipeline.

Misdirected Flow

Open bypass NAH


Page 37 of 91




Higher Temperature

Thermal expansion between closed valves in above ground piping



Low Temperature


Higher Pressure

Sudden valve closure at metering station




Slow closure of downstream valve


Lower Pressure





Page 38 of 91








Page 39 of 91


Date: 21/12/12






Misdirected Flow





Spillage Injury






Low Temperature

NAH

Higher Pressure



None 74. Recommend double block valves on inlet to Station 11 receiver or another alternative system that has equivalent isolation integrity to a system with double block valves. See action 17. T


Page 40 of 91

DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION Lower Pressure

NAH









Page 41 of 91

HAZOP WORKSHEET


Date: 21/12/12










Spillage Injury






Low Temperature

NAH


Page 42 of 91





Page 43 of 91


Date: 21/12/12









Temperature Low


None See action 24.

High Temperature

NAH

High Pressure

NAH




Low Level NAH


Page 44 of 91

■■....' "■ ■




Page 45 of 91


Date: 21/12/12

Pipeline section: Node 4a - Alashankou - Drain system (ST-12101) P&ID number: Alashankou Metering Station KCPP-06-E-IN-DW-0011 Rev 0 28/01/05 Design intent: To drain Alashankou equipment


drain line Trap cannot be drained None 88. Operating procedures to be

written for drainage system and to include the event of wax blockage in the Alashankou drain line.


NAH

Lower Temperature


None See action 36.

Higher Temperature

NAH

Higher Pressure

NAH

Lower Pressure

NAH

Level High Pump Failure Overfilling LIT

Low Level NAH Corrosion Tank leakage, no indication None 89. Recommend a method of

containment in the event of a leak and a method of leak detection for the Alashankou ST-12101 drain tank. 90. Recommend tank corrosion protection system, including sacrificial


Page 46 of 91


Operation Inability to drain trap

Spillage none 91. confirm that oil drained from Alshonkou slabs under the traps is contained and disposed of appropriately


Page 47 of 91


Date: 21/12/12

Pipeline section: Node 5a - Atasu - Kumkol to RV to Filter to Heat Exchanger Inlet P&iD number: MPS Atasu Reconstruction KCPP-06-E-IN-DW-0002 RevO 28/01/05 KCPP-06-E-IN-DW-0006 Rev 0 28/01/05

Design intent: Introduction of Kumkol fluids to Atasu

DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION No Flow Shut valve

downstream Blockage of line Shut valve upstream Stuck pig

Loss of production High pour point fluid, potential plugging of piping

None 92. Operating procedures to be written for Atasu.

Less Flow NAH More Flow Line rupture Loss of production

Environmental impacts Leak detection based on pressure/flow volume Visual inspection above ground

See action 154.

Reverse Flow From West Siberia fluids From heat exchanger area

Loss of production from Kumkol pipeline or West Siberia pipeline

None 93. The problem of pressure balance should be reviewed and resolved between Kumkol and West Siberia fluids. 94. Operating procedures to include the pressure balancing between Kumkol and West Siberia fluids. 95. Recommend non-return valve between barred tee and connection to XV6.


Page 48 of 91

DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION Misdirected Flow

To pig receiver when receiver is not in operation

Potential spillage None 96. Operating procedures to include management of Kumkol receiver. 97. Confirm SCADA interlock system exists to prevent misoperation of the valves on the Kumkol receiver. 98. Provide physical containment of oil spills from the Kumkol receiver.

To West Siberia receiving facilities

Operational difficulties None 99. To be addressed in operating procedures for Atasu.

Higher Temperature

Thermal expansion between closed valves

Leakage Buried piping within Atasu.

Lower Temperature

Cold weather Waxing and gelling KING stated that the Kumkol pipeline is not operated in winter.

100. Consider installing means of mitigating wax build up and plugging at Atasu. e.g. one option is heat tracing.

Higher Pressure

Shut valve Rupture Relief valves 101. Confirm pressure rating of Atasu piping and record this data on P&ID.

Transient pressure Rupture None 102. The potential for pressure transients at Atasu should be reviewed.

Lower Pressure

See above

Composition See above External Corrosion

Buried piping at Atasu

Leaks Spillage

None 104. Recommend corrosion protection on buried piping at Atasu.

Internal Corrosion

Process fluids Leaks None 105. Assessment should be made of the condition of existing piping at Atasu.

Maintenance NAH


Page 49 of 91


Date: 21/12/12

Pipeline section: Node 5b - Atasu - West Siberia to Filter to RV to Heat Exchanger P&iD number: MPS Atasu Reconstruction KCPP-06-E-IN-DW-0002 Rev 0 28/01/05 KCPP-06-E-IN-DW-0006 Rev 0 28/01/05

Design intent: Introduction of West Siberia fluids at Atasu

DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION No Flow Shut valve

downstream Blockage of line Shut valve upstream Stuck pig

Loss of production None See action 110.

Less Flow As "No Flow" More Flow Line rupture Loss of production

Environmental impacts

Leak detection based on pressure/flow volume Visual inspection above ground

See action 154.

Reverse Flow From Kumkol fluids From heat exchanger area

Loss of production from West Siberia pipeline or Kumkol pipeline

None See Node 6a "Reverse Flow" action no. 118. 106. Recommend non-return valve between barred tee and connection to XV5.

Misdirected Flow

To pig receiver when receiver is not in operation

Potential spillage None 107. Operating procedures to include management of West Siberia receiver. 108. Confirm SCADA interlock system exists to prevent misoperation of the valves on the West Siberia receiver. 109. Provide physical containment of oil spills from the West Siberia receiver.


Page 50 of 91

DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION To Kumkol

receiving facilities Operational difficulties None 110. To be addressed in

Atasu operating procedures. Higher Temperature

Thermal expansion between closed valves

Leakage Piping predominantly buried within Atasu.

Lower Temperature

NAH

Higher Pressure

Shut valve Rupture Relief valves See actions 110. Transient pressure Rupture None See actions 110.

Lower Pressure

See above

Composition See above External Corrosion

Buried piping at Atasu

Leaks Spillage

None See actions 110.

Internal Corrosion

Process fluids Leaks None See actions 110.

Maintenance NAH


Page 51 of 91


Date: 21/12/12

Pipeline section: Node 5c - Atasu - Heat Exchanger Inlet to Outlet P&ID number: MPS Atasu Reconstruction KCPP-06-E-IN-DW-0006 Rev 0 28/01/05

Design intent: To heat process fluids at Atasu. There are two of shell and tube heat exchangers: crude oil on shell side/crude oil on tube side and crude oil on shell/thermal oil on tube side.

DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION No Flow Thermal oil heat

exchanger shut in on crude side

Over heating, over pressure, deterioration of crude oil

Not yet determined 111. Confirm specification of heat exchangers at Atasu and the protection against overpressure

Misdirected Flow

Burst tube Possibility of crude oil transferring to thermal oil circuit

Not yet determined 112. Design to ensure that the risk of crude oil entering the thermal oil system is minimized at Atasu.


Page 52 of 91


Date: 25/06/05

Pipeline section: Node 5d - Atasu - Tanks (new build) P&ID number: MPS Atasu Reconstruction KCPP-06-E-IN-DW-0004 Rev 0 28/01/05 Design intent: To store and mix crude oil.

DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION Drawing 113. P&IDs to show internal floating

pontoon tank design. 114. Confirm internal floating pontoon has pressure/vapour release device and anti-static earthing cable. 115. Confirm that the tank roofs have adequately sized air vents with flame arresters.

No Flow NAH Higher Level Excess flow

entering the tank Overflow LAHH and LSHH

Lower Level Excess flow exiting the tank

LALL and LSLL 116. Show tank drain lines on P&IDs and disposal routes.

Maintenance NAH


Page 53 of 91


Date: 21/12/12

Pipeline section: Node 5e - Atasu - Metering to pipeline P&iD number: MPS Atasu Reconstruction KCPP-06-E-IN-DW-0005 Rev 0 28/01/05

Design intent: Metering of oil from tanks to pipeline.

DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION No Flow Block valve closed Loss of production None 117. Operating procedures to be

written for the Atasu metering operation.

Less Flow Blocked Filter Partial closure of valve or blockage of downstream line

Loss of production Two operating and one standby metering runs

Partial closure of valve or blockage of downstream line

Flow rate outside meter linearity range

None 118. Review need for back pressure control valve downstream of meter runs at Atasu to.ensure flow is above minimum.

Misdirected Flow

To pig launcher Spillage None See action 96.

Higher Temperature

NAH

Lower Temperature

NAH

Higher Pressure

See "No Flow"

Lower Pressure

See "Less Flow"

Operation See "Less Flow"


Page 54 of 91


Corrosion Leakage None 119. Insulating joint required between Atasu installation and outgoing pipeline.

Operation Difference between Alashankou metering and Atasu metering

Difference in metered flow Loss of integrity

None 120. Confirm that both metering stations have equivalent output and temperature and pressure compensation.

Emergency shutdown

Continued flow None 121. Recommend installation of an ESD valve between metering station and pig launcher. 122. ESD valve must not be motor operated and not have a bypass.


Page 55 of 91


Date: 21/12/12

Pipeline section: Node 5f - Atasu - Metering prover loop P&iD number: MPS Atasu Reconstruction KCPP-06-E-IN-DW-0005 Rev 0 28/01/05

Design intent: Custody transfer.

DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION No Flow NAH Less Flow NAH More Flow NAH Reverse Flow NAH

Misdirected Flow

To drain system from inlet or outlet lines of prover loop. Prover loop drains system. Relief valve passing.

Volume of oil passing through meter differs from volume of oil passing through prover resulting in invalid meter factor and consequential large inaccuracy in metered volume.

None 123. Closed drains on piping between meter and prover at Atasu should have a break to give visual indication of aleak. (e.g. via tundishes) all drain valves must be plugged. 124. All relief valves between meter and prover outlet at Atasu to be routed via tundish to drain to allow inspection for passing during meter proving.

To prover loop flushing/calibratio n equipment

As above None 125. Spectacle blinds required for positive isolation of diesel flushing system and water calibration system on Atasu prover take-off points.

Through main oil line of the meter run

As above None 126. High integrity shut off valves with double block and bleed configuration required on each Atasu meter run downstream of prover connection.

Higher Temperature

NAH


Page 56 of 91


Lower Temperature

NAH

Higher Pressure

NAH

Lower Pressure

NAH

Operation Lack of operating procedures

Misoperation None 127. Operating procedures to be written for Atasu prover loop operation.

Corrosion NAH


Page 57 of 91


Date: 21/12/12

Pipeline section: Node 5g - Atasu - Pipeline Pig Launcher P&iD number: MPS Atasu Reconstruction KCPP-06-E-IN-DW-0003 Rev 0 28/01/05

Design intent: To launch pigs.


procedures to be written for the Atasu launcher operation.



Spillage None 129. Ensure that there is a fail safe interlock system on the Atasu launcher main valve, kicker line and closure, so that closure can only be opened when valves are closed e.g. Key lock system.

Drawing No drain or vent line on PEtlD

130. Confirm that there is a drain and vent line on the Atasu launcher with two block valves on each line and show this information on the P&IDs. 131. Confirm disposal route of vent line, drain line and thermal relief valve on the Atasu launcher.




PSV 132. Operating procedure must include the launcher to be de-pressured and drained during normal operations at Atasu.

Low Temperature

NAH


Page 58 of 91


Higher High pressure Potential injury when trap is None 133. Recommend double block valves Pressure through leaking


being put into use on outlet of trap and kicker line on Atasu launcher or another alternative system that has equivalent isolation integrity to a system with double block valves.


Page 59 of 91


Date: 21/12/12

Pipeline section: Node 5h - Atasu - Pump set P-07405/6/7 vertical P&iD number: MPS Atasu Reconstruction KCPP-06-E-IN-DW-0004 Rev 0 28/01/05 KCPP-06-E-IN-DW-0005 Rev 0 28/01/05

Design intent: Oil loading pumps. This is an existing system impact of new facilities will not increase hazard. HAZOP comment: Existing system. NAH from Project.

DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION Drawing 134. Confirm accuracy of PaiDs KCPP-

06-E-IN-DW-0004 Rev 0 and KCPP-06-E-IN-DW-0005 Rev 0.


Page 60 of 91


Date: 21/12/12

Pipeline section: Node 5j - Atasu - Drain Tank P&iD number: MPS Atasu Reconstruction KCPP-06-E-IN-DW-0002 Rev 0 28/01/05

Design intent: To drain Kumkol and West Siberia filters. HAZOP comment: Existing system. NAH from Project.

DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION Drawing 135. Confirm venting arrangements

on the drains tank and show on P&ID KCPP-06-E-IN-DW-0002 Rev 0.


Page 61 of 91


Date: 21/12/12

Pipeline section: Node 5k - Atasu - Drain Tank P&iD number: MPS Atasu Reconstruction KCPP-06-E-IN-DW-0006 Rev 0 28/01/05

Design intent: To drain P-07409H/10H. HAZOP comment: Existing system. NAH from project.


Drawing 136. Confirm venting arrangements on the drains tank and show on P&ID KCPP-06-E-IN-DW-0006 Rev 0. 137. Clarify the vent symbol on the tank fill line.


Page 62 of 91


Date: 21/12/12

Pipeline section: Node 5l - Atasu - Drain Tank P&iD number: MPS Atasu Reconstruction KCPP-06-E-IN-DW-0004 Rev 0 28/01/05 Design intent: Drainings from tanks N1/N2.

HAZOP comment: Existing system. NAH from Project.

DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION Drawing 138. Confirm venting arrangements

on the drains tank and show on P&ID KCPP-06-E-IN-DW-0004 Rev 0. 139. Clarify the vent symbol on the tank fill line.


Page 63 of 91


Date: 21/12/12

Pipeline section: Node 5m - Atasu - Firewater P&ID number: MPS Atasu Reconstruction KCPP-06-E-IN-DW-0007 Rev 0 28/01/05 Design intent: To provide firewater for fire fighting and deluge

DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION No Flow (of Fire Water)

Empty firewater tank Block valve shut

No firewater available Unable to produce foam

None 140. Confirm control system on makeup water supply to firewater tanks. 141. Confirm venting arrangement on the Atasu firewater tanks.

Pump outage Insufficient firewater /foam Two pumps initiated, one pump standby, for both firewater and foam pump sets.

Control system failure

Insufficient/no firewater Local hand switch Manual panel mounted switch

Operation 142. Operating and maintenance procedures to be written for the firewater system at Atasu.

Higher Temperature

NAH

Lower Temperature

NAH

Higher Pressure

NAH

Lower Pressure

NAH


Page 64 of 91


Date: 21/12/12

Pipeline section: Node 6a - Total System PaiD number: N/A Design intent: General

DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION More Flow Line rupture Loss of production

Environmental impacts Leak detection based on pressure/flow volume Visual inspection above ground

143. Line walk and air inspection to be formalised for the whole pipeline.

Operation Vapour emissions from PV vents and lightning strikes in the vicinity causing explosion

Explosion None 144. Investigate need for lightning rod (dependant upon the frequency of lightning strikes)

Static discharge Fire None 145. Wherever a PV vent is instalted on equipment a flame arrester should be included on the atmospheric side of the vent.

No Flow Blockage of impulse lines

Inaccurate reading of instrument

None 146. Ensure that all piping instrument tappings are not located on the underside of the piping.

Internal Corrosion

Process fluids Pipe leak None 147. Confirm projected rate of corrosion, requirements and corrosion allowance.

External Corrosion

Damage of coating Increased rate of corrosion and potential leak

Maintenance and CP testing 148. Maintenance and testing requirements to be written. Confirm that CP requirements are in place.

Influence of induced current in the pipeline

Increased rate of corrosion and potential leak

Isolation joints upstream and downstream of station

149. Confirm all above ground station piping is earthed.


Page 65 of 91


General corrosion of above ground piping


None 150. Check requirements for painting of above ground piping.

Corrosion of underground piping


None 151. Confirm that underground piping has adequate corrosion protection.


Page 66 of 91

HAZOP WORKSHEET


Date: 21/12/12

Pipeline section: Node 6b - Total System P&ID number: N/A Design intent: Normal Operation of Pipeline

DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION Operation 152. Operating philosophy for the

total pipeline system to be written.

Less Flow Reduction of incoming flow Reduction of flow caused by restriction in downstream system Change in composition (higher viscosity)

Loss of production Drop in level in Atasu tanks Loss of suction to pumps at pump Stations Maladjustment of Alashankou pressure control valve Change of hydraulic profile

153. Operating philosophy to address these consequences of a change in flowrate caused by a reduction in incoming flow and or a restriction in the downstream system.

Turndown Lack of control Slack line

None 154. Investigate the method to be used for reducing the flowrate and ensure flowrate is not less than minimum.

Reverse Flow Rupture of pipeline

Loss of production Leak detection system See action 3.

Misdirected Flow

NAH


Page 67 of 91


More Flow Increase of incoming flow Increase of flow into downstream system Change in composition (lower viscosity) See Node 6b "Less Flow"

Overloading of pump electric motors. Increase in friction loss resulting in low pressure at downstream end of pipeline sections.

None 155. Recommend SCADA to continuously monitor the pressure readings either side of the high point prior to Alashankou and compute and alarm the minimum pressures at these high points. 156. Recommend SCADA to continuously monitor the pressure readings either side of the high point prior to Pump Station 9 and compute and alarm the minimum pressures at these high points. 157. Confirm maximum allowable pressure of pipeline is adequate to contain the pressures resulting from the maximum possible pressure that can be generated at Atasu and Pump Stations.

Higher Temperature

NAH

Lower Temperature

NAH

Higher Pressure

NAH

Lower Pressure

NAH


Page 68 of 91


Date: 21/12/12

Pipeline section: Node 6c - Total System P&iD number: N/A Design intent: Controlled Shutdown of Pipeline


Operation 158. Operating procedures to include controlled shutdown of the pipeline.

Operation Inappropriate method of shutdown

Transients Loss of line pack/re-start problems

None 159. Undertake dynamic analysis of pipeline shutdown and determine operation shutdown/sequencing.


Page 69 of 91

HAZOP WORKSHEET


Date: 21/12/12

Pipeline section: Node 6d - Total System P&iD number: N/A Design intent: Emergency Shutdown of Pipeline


Operation Emergency Continued operation during None 160. ESD philosophy to be written to

shutdown emergency include total pipeline shutdown, pump Pump Stations shutdown and local emergency shutdowns at Atasu.


Page 70 of 91


Date: 21/12/12

Pipeline section: Node 6e - Total System P&iD number: N/A Design intent: Restart of Pipeline

DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION Operation Plugged Line Inability to restart pipeline None. 161. Restart operating philosophy

to be written. 162. Dynamic analysis of restart to be undertaken for both above pour point and below pour point scenarios.

Lower Temperature

Temperature of the oil is above pour point

NAH

Temperature of the oil is below pour point

Inability to restart None 163. Means of moving a blockage in the pipeline needs to be determined along with any additional facilities required.

Operation Air ingress after repair or cut-out

Explosion None 164. Procedures to be written to cover restart following repair cut-outs and methods to minimise air ingress.


Page 71 of 91

CONCLUSION This expert analysis of operational risk Hazop on the project "The second queue of the second phase of the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline project. Atasu – Alashankou section. Construction and reconstruction of PS-11, PS-9 and Alashankou oil metering station" contains all necessary information characterizing reliability of safe functioning and operation, ensuring control of technical parameters and observance of security measures and environment. In summary it should be noted that the project doesn't worsen safety of operation Atasu – Alashankou section of the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline. However, for decrease an influence of a human factor on safety operation of the pipeline it is recommended to develop and implement the regulating document regarding philosophy of safe operation of this oil pipeline.

Hazop Oil & Gas

Documents

hazop process

hazop team

regulations hazop report

hazop study procedure

kazakhstanchina pipeline

hazop guidewords appendix

high risk actions

low risk actions