Harmonisation, Decentralisation and Local Governance
Mar 27, 2015
Harmonisation, Decentralisation and Local Governance
DPWGs Country Specific Guiding Principles:Strengthening fiscal decentralisation and local authorities financing:
“Fiscal decentralisation is a key factor and driver for successful decentralisation.
Support to fiscal decentralisation should aim at strengthening the long-term
financial development and sustainability of local governments.”
Session overview
Understanding the context of fiscal decentralisation
Assigning expenditure responsibilitiesInstruments for financing local government
intergovernmental transfers local taxation and user fees investment capital
Budget implementationHarmonisation and alignment of support to
fiscal decentralisation
First and second generation fiscal federalismsCosts and benefits
Revisiting the wall of wonders
Decentralisation - Traditional definition
“Decentralisation is the transfer of authority and responsibility for public
functions from the central government to subordinate or quasi-independent
organisations or the private sector.”
(Litvack and Seddon 1999)
Observations about fiscal decentralisation around the worldIt is often history and politics -not economics-
that determines subnational government structure and drives fiscal decentralisation reforms
Many fiscal decentralisation reforms shifted the financial resources to the local government level, but failed to decentralise the discretion to manage these resources
New “consensus” on decentralisation
“(Fiscal) decentralisation is the empowerment of people by the (fiscal) empowerment of
their local governments.” (Roy Bahl, 2005)
Benefits associated with fiscal decentralisation?
More accountability on the part of government officials
More willingness on the part of the local population to pay for services
Promise of increased revenue mobilisationIncreases potential for innovation in
economic decision-making
Costs associated with fiscal decentralisationLess macroeconomic controlNational priorities for capital investment do
not conform to local government choicesLead to a lower rate of spending on
infrastructure, perhaps jeopardising national growth
Revenue centralisation gives a greater potential for equalisation
Linkages with administrative and political decentralisationThe system of intergovernmental fiscal
relations should be well-designed in its own right
The fiscal, political and administrative dimensions of decentralisation should be properly aligned
For every element of decentralisation (including fiscal decentralisation), there is a need to balance discretion with accountability
Linking fiscal decentralisation to domestic accountability
The provision of fiscal discretion to local governments - whether in the form of expenditure discretion or discretion over revenues - helps strengthening the downward accountability by: encouraging the citizens to participate in decision-
making processencourages them to monitor local government
financesmaking sure that local finances are actually used in
accordance with the priorities set forth in the budget
Intergovernmental finance: Four pillars
Musgrave’s economic roles of governmentFinance should follow function
Musgrave’s economic roles of governmentThe role of the public sector is to:Provide a stable economic environmentPromote a more equitable distribution of
income/resourcesAssure a more efficient allocation of resources
(when markets fail)
But, no-one says that these can all be done best by the central government!
Finance should follow functionOne cannot establish the required level of
subnational government revenues independent of an estimate of expenditure needs.
If finance does not follow function it becomes difficult to effectively impose a hard budget constraint at the subnational level if there is an insufficient revenue assignment.
The economically efficient assignment of revenues requires a prior knowledge of expenditure assignment.
Revenue assignmentIntergovernmental transfers
The revenue assignment question (second pillar)Which tax sources or non-tax revenue
sources (including fee revenues) will be made available to subnational governments in order to provide them with revenue sources?
Why have sub-national taxation?Sub-national governments are often more
accountable for controlling spending if they are also responsible for revenues
Reduces excessive demand by sub-national governments for transfers from the centre
Allows tax policy (tax levels and structure) to be tailored to the conditions and preferences of sub-national governments
Features of an ‘ideal’ local revenue sourceTaxes that achieve a ‘correspondence’ between the tax
and the benefits from local government services Relatively easy to administerShould not be easy to give ‘perverse incentives’ to
taxpayers Suitable local taxes are: Property taxes; Market fees and
other local user fees; A ‘piggy-back’ personal income tax; Motor vehicle taxes
Lessons learntLocal revenues should be an important part of a
well-functioning intergovernmental fiscal system, both for economic and accountability reasons
But, raising more local revenues is only efficient if the revenues are well-spent, and
Neither central politicians nor local politicians have a strong incentive to rely heavily on local government revenues
As a result, local revenues are often an under-emphasised part of fiscal decentralisation
ReasonsDesign
Intergovernmental fiscal transfers (the third pillar)
Own source revenues are (almost) never enough to cover local expenditure responsibilities
Central (or regional) governments may provide local governments with additional resources through a system of intergovernmental fiscal transfers
In most countries, transfers are (by far) the main funding source for local government, esp. for social sector services
Reasons for intergovernmental fiscal transfers
Providing incentives for efficient spending and utilisation of the municipal revenue base
Guaranteeing sufficient funds for managing local functions by mitigating vertical imbalances
Supporting regional equalisation of communities by mitigating horizontal imbalances
DesignDetermining the distributable pool:
1. as a fixed share of national government revenues; 2. as part of the annual budget decision; 3. as a proportion of approved specific local
expenditures to be reimbursed.Distribution of the pool among subnational
governments1. Gap-filling model2. Local government respects hard budget
constraint3. Fiscal capacity based methods
Design implicationsCentralised control and the uncertainty associated
with this:Can lead to poor budgeting practicesUndermines the accountability to citizensAffects the stability and predictability in local policy
makingMakes the system more prone to political pressures
DPWG-LGD underline the need for Development Partner (DP) dialogue, analytical work and technical assistance on this issue
Lessons learntThere is a need for:Close dialogue amongst all core stakeholders in
the design workProper buy-in to the introduction of the reforms
from core stakeholders, champions of the reform and clear institutional framework
Current follow-up and support to the administration of the transfer system (particularly regarding performance-based systems)
Transparency and accountability in all phases of the work on transfer systems
ImportanceRestrictions to subnational borrowing
Finally, the fourth pillar of subnational finance: deficits and debtIn many developed economies, local
borrowing is an appropriate way for local governments to fund capital infrastructure:
(i) it corrects the inter-temporal mismatch between costs and benefits (in terms of efficiency, equity, timing and practicality)
(ii) there are numerous mechanisms that can assure responsible borrowing
Restrictions on borrowingIn many LDCs, the absence of market-based mechanisms to enforce a ‘hard budget constraint’ requires restricting local borrowing:
Rules-based restrictions Permission required Local government bank / loan fund No borrowing allowed
Lessons learnt (1)Local government borrowing should be backed
by a robust and transparent legal framework and systems and procedures for where to borrow, for which purposes, and possible ceilings and monitoring and supervision frameworks
Central governments should maintain a hard line against subnational debt relief.
Intermediate borrowing institutions need to be carefully designed to avoid pitfalls
Lessons learnt (2)Debt thresholds may be established to ensure
that local governments borrowing is not getting out of hand.
Strong incentives for local governments to ensure creditworthiness should be supported
Local governments are not in a good position to function as borrowing institutions for others
In cases where there is no formal regime in place for local government borrowing, there are examples of severe informal borrowing.
PurposePerformance based grant systems
Purpose of local PFMAt their best, these mechanisms balance political
and economic risks, by: Providing a reliable account of money spent and received.Showing evidence that finance is being used responsibly
for the public good and in compliance with regulations.Demonstrating “value for money” and good governance
in terms of economy, efficiency, effectiveness and equity.Supporting good decision-making and assisting leaders
and managers to assess the financial consequences of policy choices.
Serving as a basis for planning for the future, maximising income sources and aligning these resources with service delivery objectives.
Performance based grant systemsShift from “traditional” ex ante control on
budgetary inputs to accountability ex post on the basis of results.
In a performance-based system, there is a need to monitor the quantity and quality of outputs, and to measure the result of delivering these outputs.
A key publication in this regard is UNCDFs 2010 publication on Performance Based grant systems.
Example of PFM in the education sector
Lessons learntPFM reforms should:Be part of the overall support to fiscal
decentralisation and other components of decentralisation in a mutually strengthening manner
Focus on incentives in addition to more traditional focus on technical improvements
Apply a step-wise approach where there is focus on the basic issues, while preparing for more advanced reforms
Support the intergovernmental fiscal transfer systemUse a learning-by-doing approach whenever
appropriate
Good practices in harmonisation and alignment of support
Small group discussion
Supporting the implementation of FD in partner countries
What is the policy objective of decentralisation in my country?
What is the current status of (fiscal) decentralisation in my country?
What reforms are government and donors already pursuing to enhance decentralised local governance?
What more can be done?
Challenges and opportunities for harmonisation & alignmentSupport to FD reforms has often been
fragmented, scattered and without and overall strategy and action plan
But there are several initiatives that show great potential to improved harmonisation and alignment:Performance Based Grant Systems Joint Financing AgreementsIntegrated fiscal decentralisation
Key lessons for development partners’ support for FD reformsIn small-groups, try to come up with a list of
around 10 key lessons on support to fiscal decentralisation reforms
What are – according to you - the most promising opportunities for harmonisation and alignment within the field of fiscal decentralisation reforms?(20 min)
Assign one group member to present your findings.