M E T A P H Y S I C AInternational Journal for Ontology &
Metaphysics Editors: HANS BURKHARDT (Munich) RAFAEL HNTELMANN
(Frankfurt)UWE MEIXNER (Regensburg) ERWIN TEGTMEIER (Mannheim)
___________________________________________________________ Special
Issue 3 Ramseys Ontology ANNA-SOFIA MAURIN / NILS-ERIC SAHLIN Some
ontological speculations:Ramsey on universals, particulars and
facts7 HERBERT HOCHBERG Ramsey vs. Russell: Particulars, Universals
and Truth 29 FRASER MACBRIDE Negation and Predication: A Defence of
Ramseys Thesis61 ARNOLD KOSLOW Ramsey on Simplicity and Truth89
NILS-ERIC SAHLIN / MARTIN KAS PALM Ramsey sentences: an
observation109 Authors Addresses: Dr. Anna-Sofia Maurin, University
of Lund, Philosophy Departement, Kungshuset, Lundagrd, 222 22 Lund,
[email protected]; Prof. Dr. Nils-Eric Sahlin, University
of Lund, Philosophy Departement, Kungshuset, Lundagrd, 222 22 Lund,
[email protected]; Prof. Dr. Herbert Hochberg, The
University of Texas at Austin Philosophy, 1 University Station
C3500, Austin, TX 78712-0310, [email protected];Prof. Dr.
Fraser McBride, School of Philosophy, Birkbeck College, Malet
Street, London WC1E 7HX, UK, [email protected]; Prof.
Dr. Arnold Koslow, Faculty of Philosophy, The Graduate Center, The
City University of New York, 365 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY
10016-4309, [email protected]; Martin Kas Palm, University of
Lund, Philosophy Departement, Kungshuset, Lundagrd, 222 22 Lund.
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HERMANN WEIDEMANN MNSTER, GERMANY ANNA-SOFIA MAURIN AND NILS-ERIC
SAHLIN Some ontological speculations:Ramsey on universals,
particulars and facts* Proem
ntologicalquestionsareatthecoreofmuchofRamseyswriting,
whetheronnumbers,probabilities,thestatusoftheoreticaltermsor
general propositions and causality. But to say that Ramsey has an
ontology, or that he subscribes to a particular type of
metaphysics, is to depart from historical fact. In his papers
Ramsey argues for and against the theories of his friends and
colleagues; he develops ideas and theories of his own, and
doingthishetriesthingsout,movesfromonepositiontoanother.Inone
paperhedoubtstheexistenceoffactsandpropositions(seeKoslowspa-perinthisvolume)inordertoexploretheconsequencesofthatposition,
while in another, facts and propositions are the groundwork for his
explora-tions.One of his many impressive contributions to
philosophy is his analysis
oftheproblemofuniversals.1HispaperUniversals,whichdeniesany
fundamentaldistinctionbetweenuniversalsandparticulars,surmountsse-rious
objections to a realist view of universals and, at the same time,
solves
severallong-standingproblemsaboutthem,dismissingothervenerable
enigmas as nonsense.2 Various reasons for making the distinction
between
universalsandparticularspsychological,physicalandlogicalcanbe
advanced.Ramseyarguesthatlogicjustifiesnosuchontologicaldistinc-tion.
Allusion to the grammatical subject-predicate distinction will not
do, sinceSocratesiswise,withthesubjectSocratesandthepredicate *
TheauthorswishtothankHughMellor,KevinMulligan,andtheMiniSeminarat
theDepartmentofphilosophy,LundUniversity,forconstructivecommentsandsup-port.
1SeehispapersUniversals(Ramsey,1990)andUniversalsandtheMethodof
Analysis (Ramsey, 1926). 2See (Mellor, 1983), see also (Sahlin,
1994). O 8wise, asserts the same fact and expresses the same
proposition (p. 12)
asWisdomisacharacteristicofSocrates,withsubjectwisdomand predicate
Socrates.3
Moreover,thereis,heargues,noessentialdifferencebetweenthe
(in)completenessofuniversalsandthatofparticulars.Wisecan,forex-ample,
be used to generate propositions not only of the atomic form
Soc-rates is wise, but also of the molecular form Neither Socrates
nor Plato is
wise.ButSocratescanalsobeusedtogeneratepropositionsofboth these
forms: e.g. Socrates is wise and Socrates is neither wise nor just.
There is therefore a complete symmetry in this respect between
individuals and basic properties (qualities). As Ramsey succinctly
puts it,
thewholetheoryofparticularsanduniversalsisduetomistakingforafunda-mentalcharacteristicofrealitywhatismerelyacharacteristicoflanguage(p.
13). AndRamseyarguesthattherecannomorebecomplexuniversalse.g.
negative(not-wise),relational(wiserthan)orcompound(grue)
thantherecanbecomplexparticulars.SupposeSocratesistotherightof
Plato.Onecouldthenimaginethreepropositions:afirststatingthatthe
relation being to the right of holds between Socrates and Plato; a
second statingthatSocrateshasthecomplexpropertyofbeingtotherightof
Plato;andathirdstatingthatPlatohasthecomplexpropertysomething has
if Socrates is to the right of it. Thus if there were complex
universals,
besidesthefactthatSocratesistotherightofPlato,therewouldalsobe
twonon-relationalfactswithdifferentconstituents.Butthatisnonsense,
theargumentgoes;thereisonlyonefact,thefactthatSocratesistothe right
of Plato. In the present paper we intend to do four things. First,
we want to give a brief outline of one of Ramseys major
contributions to metaphysics; and that we have already
accomplished. Second, we want to focus on some as-pects of Ramseys
first argument the symmetry argument. We want to see on what
assumptions it is based, and to ask what it can contribute to a
con-temporary metaphysical debate. Third, we want to investigate
more closely one basic assumption upon which the success of Ramseys
arguments rests: the assumption of a logical atomism. Fourth, and
finally, we want to further investigate and assess an argument
against the particular-universal distinc- 3 Quotes by Ramsey are
all from (Ramsey, 1990). HERBERT HOCHBERG Ramsey vs. Russell:
Particulars, Universals and Truth
n a well known controversy concerning the question Are the
Character-isticsofThingsUniversalorParticular?G.E.MooreandG.F.Stout
took two things for granted. First, that there were both things,
which were assumed to be particulars, and characteristics of
things; second, that things
andcharacteristicsdifferedinlogicallyandontologicallycrucialways.
Their debate concerned whether the characteristics of things were
universal attributes or what are now commonly called tropes. One
can fittingly
la-belaviewthattakescharacteristicstobetropesmoderatenominalism.
Quine,alongwithnumerousfollowers,adoptedamoreradicalformof
nominalismgoing back to an 11th century view attributed to
Rocelinusthattakespredicatestoreplaceproperties,andhencedeniesthatthereare
any characteristics at all, whether universal or particular. F.
MacBride has
recentlytakenafurtherstep,invariousarticles(MacBride,1998,1999,
2004),byquestioningthepresumeddistinctionbetweenuniversalsand
particulars.Indoingsohehasrecalled,reliedonanddefendedRamseys line
of argument set out in the once classic paper Universals. I.
Predicables, Terms and Facts
Ramseysargument,nowresurrectedasachallengetothosewhowould
distinguishuniversalsfromparticulars,isdirectedprimarilyagainstRus-sell
and the latters purported proof of the existence of universals.To
con-siderRamseyschallengeonemustsetoutacontextforconsideringRus-sells
argument. Russell, like Moore and Stout, started from certain
factsthatthereweretwoobjectssaytworedcircleswithan(apparently)
commonattributethecolor.Calltheobjectsaandb,or,giventhe
currentspeechhabits,baptizethemaandbandtherebyinitiatea
causalchainthatmaylast,hopefully,forthetimeittakestoreadthispa-per.
Or, in keeping with Ramseys, rather than Russells examples, we can
considertheindividualsPlatoandSocratesandtheassumptiontheyare
bothwise,makinguseofpresumablytemporallylongcausalchainsand
ignoring,asphilosophicallyirrelevant,theviewthatthereisnotsucha
chaingoingbacktotheattributeofbeingwise.Russellargued,andpur-I
30ported to establish, that a and b were particulars and red (or
the color
like-nessofaandb)auniversalor,inthecaseofPlatoandSocrates,thatthe
celebratedAthenianswereindividualsorparticularsandthatwisdomisa
universal. Thus Russell begins with what we normally take to be
individu-als or objects, on the one hand, and qualities or
attributes, on the other. He
arguesthattheobjectsaandbmustbeparticulars,meaningthatthey
arenotqualitiesorcollectionsofqualities.Healsoarguesthatwemust
recognize universalsmeaning by that that the qualities (actually
the
simi-larityrelationorrelationsinvolved)areuniversalsandnottropes.Given
Ramseysarguments,weshouldnotforgetwhatRussellsargumentsas-sume as
starting points.
Ramseyarguesthatthepurported(seesectionIV)atomicfactthat grounds
the truth of the sentence Plato is wise can be expressed either in
thestandardwayorasWisdomcharacterizesPlato.Thus,grammati-cally,
either is wise or characterizes Plato can be considered to be the
predicate of a version of thesentence expressing the fact and,
hence, that
eitherPlatoorwisdomcanbetakenasthesubjectsign.Thissuppos-edlyindicatesthatthesubject-predicatedistinctionismerelyalinguistic
one that provides no ground for holding that the facts we take to
ground the truths of sentences, like Plato is wise and Socrates is
wiser than Plato, reflect or presuppose a purported ontic
distinction between characteristics, like wisdom (and relations
like is wiser than), and particulars, like Socrates and Plato. But
Ramsey is actually making a stronger claim than the one he appears
to make and which MacBride, commenting on Ramseys claim: it becomes
clear that there is no sense in the words individual and quality;
all we are talking about is two different types of objects such
that two objects one of each type, could be the sole constituents
of an atomic fact. (Ramsey 1960, p. 132) understands him to make:
...itwasnopartofRamseysconclusionthatparticularsanduniversalsmust
enjoythesamelogicaltype.ForalthoughRamseywaswillingtocountenance
thepossibilitythatthereareparticularsanduniversalsofthesametypehein-sisted
only on the weaker conclusion that particular and universal need
differ by no more than type: (MacBride 2004, p. 183) FRASER
MACBRIDE Negation and Predication:A Defence of Ramseys Thesis 1.
Introduction
tcanhardlybedeniedthatanalyticphilosophyoncetookalinguistic turn,
returningfor a significant period of its historydistinctively
lin-guistic answers to questions about epistemology, ontology and
the
charac-terofthought.Butitisnolessdistinctiveofanalyticphilosophythatits
practitionershavebeensuspiciousoflanguage,suspiciousofthecapacity
of language to channel and control even the most fundamental
judgements of speakers. Witness Russells 1924
attempttoelucidatetheessentialfea-tures of logical atomism (at
least as he saw it). There he could not refrain from issuing a
philosophical health warning to his co-workers:
Theinfluenceoflanguageonphilosophyhas,Ibelieve,beenprofoundand
almost unrecognised. If we are not to be misled by this influence
it is necessary
tobecomeconsciousofitandtoaskhowfaritislegitimate.(Russell1924:
330) Russelldidnotissuethiswarninglightly.ForovertwentyyearsRussell
had laboured to promote the cause of relations, their novel logic,
their
un-derlyingreality.Russellnowrealisedthatitwasagainsttheinvidiousin-fluence
of language that he had struggled. According to Russell, the
tradi-tionalsubject-predicatelogicthelogicthatcomessonaturallytospeak-ersofEuropeanlanguageshassurreptitiouslyconditionedphilosophers
to take for granted a substance-attribute ontology; if only
philosophers had
beenacquaintedwithlessfamiliarlanguagegroupsthen,Russellmain-tained,
they would have been far less liable to deny the reality of
relations, relations being nowhere apparent in the schedule of
substances and attrib-utes more familiar languages
suggest.Oneofhisco-workers,FrankRamsey,tookRussellswarningvery much
to heart. But Ramsey soon came to the conviction that philosophers
hadnotonlybeenmisledbylanguagetoadoptandadheretoasubject-predicatelogicandadenialofrelations.Writinginhis1925Mindpaper
Universals (hereafter U) Ramsey declared: I 62
nearlyallphilosophers,includingMrRussellhimself,havebeenmisledby
language in a far more far-reaching way than that; that the whole
theory of
par-ticularsanduniversalsisduetomistakingforafundamentalcharacteristicof
reality, what is merely a characteristic of language. (U: 13) Why
should Ramsey have thought of the theory of particulars and
univer-salsinsuchscepticalterms,theconsequenceofalinguisticillusionthat
leads unsuspecting philosophers to mistake what is merely
appearance for
genuinereality?Becausetraditionallyphilosophershavederivedthedis-tinctionbetweenparticularsanduniversalsadistinctionintendedtobe
objective and worldly, deep in the nature of thingsfrom a
linguistic dis-tinctionthe distinction between subjects and
predicates. Whereas
particu-larshavebeenconceivedasitemsfitonlyforsubjectexpressionstopick
out,universalshavebeenconceivedasitemswhosenaturesaredistinc-tivelyrevealedintheactofpredication,inconnectionwiththepredicates
that express or denote them. But the linguistic distinction between
subject
andpredicateenjoysnoobjectiveorworldlysignificance.OrsoRamsey
maintained.Instead,heargued,thedistinctionbetweensubjectandpredi-cate
enjoys a different kind of significance, arising from (variously)
differ-ences in literary style or the point of view from which we
approach the fact(U: 12), the presence or absence of a subjective
property that
de-pendsnotindeedonanyonemindbutonthecommonelementsinall
mensmindsandpurposes(U:24),oreventhemathematiciansbiased interests
(U: 28). If Ramsey is right about thisthat the subject-predicate
distinction enjoys no worldly significancethen philosophers have
indeed
beenthesubjectsofanillusion.Theyhavebeendeludedtothinkthatthe
subject-predicate distinction corresponds to another distinction
deep in the nature of things, the distinction between particulars
and universals.
Butsurelysuchascepticaloutlookisincapableofbeingsustained.
ForsurelyRamseysscepticismisbeliedbyoneofthefoundationalin-sights
that Aristotle bequeathed to Western metaphysics, his dictum that a
quality has a contrary but a substance does not. For expressed in
the formal mode this dictum amounts to the claimthat scarcely seems
to require an
argumentinitsfavourthatpredicatesmaybenegatedbutsubjectsnot. And
this claim, it may be argued, surely marks a logical, and therefore
ob-jective, distinction between subject and predicate.
Ramseysscepticismcannotbesocursorilydismissed.Wecan-notifwearetoactwithdueintellectualconsciencetaketheso-called
ARNOLD KOSLOW Ramsey on Simplicity and Truth n the spring of 1922,
Ramsey read a paper to the Apostles of Cambridge in which he
discussed two related questions.1As he states it: [W]hat types of
things there are, and the nature of truth.(p.1)
Thetwoquestionsremainopenquestionsattheendofthepaper,butin the
course of the discussion they are related to each other in ways
that are
surprising.Itishisdiscussionoftheinterconnectionofthesetwoissues
that reveals a hidden depth to Ramseys view of truth.His claim is
that the idea that true is an incomplete symbol and the idea that
the world is sim-ple are part of the same view (p.8).Theaccount
that is discussed in this early paper is significantly different
from the redundancy theory of truth
thatheisusuallytakentoendorse.Itshouldbenotedhoweverthatal-thoughhisremarksaredeftlythoughsketchilyprovided,itisacarefully
consideredview,alotofwhichgetssupportfromlaterthingshewrote about
truth.
Sincethispaperisrelativelyearly,itsdifficulttosaythatitrepre-sents
his final view on either of thesetwo subjects.Although the bulk of
his paper is devoted to explaining the consequences of taking the
world to be simple rather than complex, and the consequences for
truth in particular
isatheorythatmakestrueanincompletesymbol,itisnonethelessa view
which can be held without resting on the simplicity thesis.And I
be-lieve thatRamseyscontinued acceptance of theincomplete symbol
ac-count helps to explain why he thought of truth as something that
would be easily obtained from an adequate account of belief
ascription.2 1 I am grateful to Mrs. Jane Burch, Ramseys daughter,
for her most kind permission to quote from Ramseys typescriptwhich
is on deposit in the Kings College Archives. The nine page
typescript with Ramseys corrections inked in is dated April 29th,
1922 (FPR/4/1).Special thanks are due to Hugh Mellor, Nils-Eric
Sahlin N. Rescher, Dr. R.
Moad,ArchivistofKingsCollegeCambridge,andthemembersoftheSeminaron
Ramsey at the Graduate Center, CUNY. 2 I hope to make this
connection evident on another occasion. I
90Thefirstquestion,Whatkindsofthingsarethere?isclearlyonto-logical,butinasenseotherthanthefamiliarQuineanwayofsettingthe
matter.It asks a question which Quines criterion does not pretend
to
an-swer.Ramseyfirstnotesthattherearelotsofthingsandtypesofthings.Simplicity
concerns [t]he only things in whose existence we have reason to
believe, are simple, not complex. Ramsey says that he got the view
that everything is simple from Russell in conversation and doubts
that he would have thought of it alone.Its a view a little
reminiscent of those who think of ontology as consisting of the
ba-sic furniture of the world, the simple things; not the complex
ones.On-tology is concerned with the simples; anything else being
made up from themorconstitutedbyorconstructedoutofthem.Noneofthese
terms are used by Ramsey, but some of them were certainly used by
Rus-sell.The underlying idea seems to be that nothing would exist
if the sim-ples didnt. On the Quinean view, we can consider the
ontology of certain properly formulated or regimented theories of
the world, but those theories, no matter how well supported, do not
tell you that they are the basic enti-ties. For example, according
to the Quine Criterion of Ontological
Com-mitment,atheoryofelectronssuchasLorentzs,Webers,Kaufmannns, or
Diracs, implies that there are electrons. However, none of those
theo-riesimpliesthatiftheelectronsitspeaksofdidntexist,thennothing
would.Noneofthosetheoriesimpliesthattheelectronsitspeaksofare the
basic simple constituents of the world.Its clear then that whatever
the Quinean commitments of a theory may be, they do not
automatically
iden-tifyexactlythosethingsthatarethebasicsimpleexistents.Infact,it
looksasiftheQuineanCriterioncouldnotbeusedtodetermineexactly
thebasicsimples.Ifthatswhatthecriteriondid,thenanytwotheories
exactlyoneofwhichimpliedtheotherwouldhavetohaveexactlythe same
Quinean ontological commitment.There are just too many examples of
scientific theories for which this just isnt so. The Quinean
Criterion wont help settle what the simples are.
Ram-seydoeshoweverfurnishalistofthekindsofthingsthathethinksare
simpleandthosethatarecomplex.Givenhiswayofsortingthingsout there is
an implication for truth.Heres Ramseys list: If you were making a
list of the types of thingsthat there are you would
natu-rallyenumeratethefollowing:individualsorparticularthings,classes,proper-NILS-ERIC
SAHLIN AND MARTIN KAS PALMRamsey sentences: an observationIRamsey
argued that the best way to understand how the theoretical termsof
a theory function is to picture them as existentially bound
variables.Given three such terms, the best way to write our theory
according to Ram-sey is: , , (dictionary & axioms) (p.
131).1This is the theorys
Ramseysentence.2Theexistentiallyboundvariablesarethecarriersofontologicalcommitment;
if the Ramsey sentence is true, they tell us what there is.It is
well-known that the Ramsey sentence and the original theory havethe
same empirical content. That each observational consequence of the
Ram-sey sentence is a consequence of the original theory follows
from the fact thattheformerisanexistential
generalizationofthelatterandthusimpliedbyit.
Thereverseimplicationisnotthatstraightforward, butnearlyso.
Letsands0betwosentencesofascienticlanguage, andassumethatthelat-ter
sentence does not contain any theoretical terms. Let ET(s) be a
completeexistential generalization of s with respect to theoretical
terms, and AT(s) itsuniversal counterpart. If s implies s0 then
(trivially) AT(s s0). Elementarylogic tells us that x((x) (x))
(x(x) x(x)), so we conclude thatET(s) ET(s0).3But ET(s) can of
course be taken to be the Ramsey sentenceof a theory, and since
ET(s0) simply is s0, we conclude that any
non-theoreticalconsequence of the original theory is indeed a
consequence of the Ramsey sen-tence.4In this paper, our point of
departure is the question: does the foregoing re-sult hold also in
truly dynamic contexts, where the appropriate semantics is notThe
authors wish to thank Christian Bennet, Arnold Koslow, Hugh Mellor,
PeterRoeper, Fredrik Stjernberg and the Mini Seminar at the
Department of Philosophy, LundUniversity, for valuable input.
Credit for this paper should be divided equally betweenthe
authors.1All Ramsey quotes are from (Ramsey, 1990).2The theory is
assumed to be nitely axiomatizable.3Modulo a little handwaving.4See
(Bohnert, 1968).110quite familiar? The answer seems to be that it
might, but then again might not.In order to sharpen the question
and arrive at our preliminary answer, we needto say a few words
about what might be dubbed experimentally
interpretedquantiers.IIThe question:If (in some suitable sense) we
accept, in the long run, the sen-tences in the set , will we (in
the same sense) accept the sentence ?, can nodoubt be attacked in a
multitude of ways. Here is one attempt.5We set up a framework for
answering questions like this by providing aformal semantics,i.e.
structures and a satisfaction relation,for the languageused in {}.
The aim is to use the syntax of rst order logic (FOL), and alsoto
construe the semantics as a dynamic version of FOL semantics.
Basically, wetake an experimental structure to be an -sequence of
ordinary structures (lyingalong an imagined, discrete time-line)
that is subject to certain constraints. In asimplied but still
reasonable version, these are: constancy of domain, eventualxation
of reference for terms, and a point of convergence for every
pair:(basic n-ary predicate , n-tuple of individuals). To
paraphrase the last constraint:a given tuple can only pop in and
out of a given predicate extension a nitenumber of times.If (Ai)iis
such an experimental structure, we can proceed to dene
anexperimental(dynamic)satisfactionrelation: (Ai)i E [s].
Giventheconstraints,
thereisoneobviousandstraightforwardwaytodenethisforquantier-free
formulas. The atomic case is:(1) (Ai)i E R(t1, . . . , tn)[s]
ijj>i(t1[s], . . . , tn[s]) RAjAnd the molecular cases follow
the denitions for ordinary . It is (almost) aroutine matter to
check that this works out as expected.6Forquantication, however,
therecertainlyisroomforvariation. Asasimple illustration, ask
yourself when you would consider xFx to be true-in-the-long-run.
When aijj>i(a FAj)?Or would you demand the strongercondition
ijj>ia(a FAj)? Now ask the corresponding questions for
exis-tentials. This is just one possible distinction between inner
and outer inter-pretations of quantiers, and things tend to get
quite complex when we consider5This is inspired by the mainly
meta-mathematical work in (Jeroslow, 1975),andalso by (Putnam,
1965).6It must be stressed that the convergence assumptions really
play a crucial role here.P h i l o s o p h i s c h e A n a l y s e
P h i l o s o p h i c a l A n a l y s i s
______________________________________________________________________
Edited by Herbert Hochberg Rafael Hntelmann Christian Kanzian
Richard Schantz Erwin Tegtmeier Vol. 1 Herbert Hochberg Russel,
Moore and Wittgenstein The Revival of Realism ISBN 3-937202-00-5,
334 pp, Hardcover 94,00 Vol. 6 Wolfram Hinzen / Hans Rott Belief
and Meaning Essays at the Interface ISBN 3-937202-05-6, 250 pp,
Hardcover 58,00 Vol. 2 Heinrich Ganthaler Das Recht auf Leben in
der Medizin Eine moralphilosophische Untersuchung ISBN
3-937202-01-3, 167 pp, Hardcover 58,00 Vol. 7 Hans Gnther Ru
Empirisches Wissen und Moralkonstruktion Eine Untersuchung zur
Mglichkeit von Brckenprinzipien in der Natur- und Bioethik ISBN
3-937202-06-4, 208 pp, Hardcover 58,00 Vol. 3 Ludger Jansen Tun und
Knnen Ein systematischer Kommentar zu Aristoteles Theorie der
Vermgen im neunten Buch der Metaphysik ISBN 3-937202-02-1, 302 pp,
Hardcover 70,00 Vol. 8 Rafael Hntelmann Existenz und Modalitt Eine
Studie zur Analytischen Modalontologie ISBN 3-937202-07-2, 189 pp,
Hardcover 58,00 Vol. 4 Manuel Bremer Der Sinn des Lebens Ein
Beitrag zur Analytischen Religionsphilosophie ISBN
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Petrus Monism ISBN 3-937202-19-6, 340 pp, Hardcover 70,00 Vol. 5
Georg Peter Analytische sthetik Eine Untersuchung zu Nelson Goodman
und zur literarischen Parodie ISBN 3-937202-04-8, 332 pp, Hardcover
94,00 Vol. 10 Maria Elisabeth Reicher Referenz, Quantifikation und
ontologische Festlegung ISBN 3-937202-39-0, ca. 300 pp, Hardcover
89,00 Forthcoming Spring 2004 Vol. 11 Herbert Hochberg / Kevin
Mulligan Relations and Predicates ISBN 3-937202-51-X, 250 pp,
Hardcover 74,00 ontos verlagFrankfurt . Lancaster ontos verlag P.O.
Box 15 41 D-63133 Heusenstamm www.ontosverlag.com P h i l o s o p h
i s c h e F o r s c h u n g P h i l o s o p h i c a l R e s e a r c
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Edited by Johannes Brandl Andreas Kemmerling Wolfgang Knne Mark
Textor Georg Meggle (ed.) Social Facts & Collective
Intentionality 3-937202-08-0, Hardcover, 478 pp., EUR 138,00 Social
Facts & Collective Intentionality: the combination
ofthesetwotermsreferstoanewfieldofbasic research. Working mainly in
the mood and by means of
AnalyticalPhilosophy,attheveryheartofthisnew
approachareconceptualexplicationsofallthevarious
versionsofSocialFacts&CollectiveIntentionalityand
theramificationsthereof.Thisapproachtacklesthe
topicsoftraditionalsocialphilosophyusingnew
conceptualmethods,includingtechniquesofformal
logics,computersimulationsandartificialintelligence. Yet research
on Social Facts & Collective Intentionality
alsoincludesontological,epistemological,normative and - last but
not least - methodological questions. This volume represents the
state of the art in this new field. Georg Meggle (Ed.) Ethics of
Terrorism & Counter Terrorism 3-937202-68-4, Hardcover, 410
pp., EUR 98,00 We are supposed to wage war against Terrorism but
exactly what we are fighting against in this war, there is
nearlynoconsensusabout.And,muchworse,nearly nobody cares about this
conceptual disaster the main thing being, whether or not you are
taking sides with the good
guys.Thisvolumeisananalyticalattempttoendthis
disaster.WhatisTerrorism?Areterroristactstobe defined exclusively
on the basis of the characteristics of
therespectiveactions?Orshouldwerestrictsuch
actionstoactsperformedbynon-stateorganisations?
And,mostimportant,isterrorismalreadybyitsvery nature to be morally
condemned? Mark Siebel Mark Textor (Hrsg.) Semantik und Ontologie
Beitrge zur philosophischen Forschung ISBN 3-937202-43-9,
Hardcover, 445 pp., EUR 93,00
DerzweiteBandderReihePhilosophischeForschung
spanntzweiKerngebietederAnalytischenPhilosophie
zusammen:dieSemantikunddieOntologie.Wassind
dieGrundbausteineunsererOntologie?Wiebeziehen
wirunssprachlichbzw.geistigaufsie?Dieseund
weitereFragenwerdenvoninternationalrenommierten
Philosophenaushistorischerundsystematischer Perspektive diskutiert.
DieBeitrgesindinDeutschundEnglishverfasst.Sie
stammenvonChristianBeyer,JohannesBrandl,
DagfinnFllesdal,DorotheaFrede,RolfGeorge,Gerd
Grahoff,PeterHacker,AndreasKemmerling,Edgar
Morscher,KevinMulligan,RolfPuster,Richard
Schantz,BenjaminSchnieder,OliverScholz,Severin
Schrder,PeterSimons,ThomasSpitzley,Markus Stepanians, Ralf Stoecker
und Daniel von Wachter. Ren van Woudenberg, Sabine Roeser, Ron Rood
(Eds.) Basic Belief and Basic Knowledge Papers in Epistemology ISBN
3-937202-70-6, Hardcover, 293 pp., EUR 89,00
Overthelasttwodecadesfoundationalismhasbeen
severelycriticized.Inresponsetothisvarious
alternativestoithavebeenadvanced,notably
coherentism.Atthesametimenewversionsof
foundationalismwerecrafted,thatwereclaimedtobe
immunetotheearliercriticisms.Thisvolumecontains 12 papers in which
various aspects of this dialectic are covered.Anumberof
paperscontinuethetrendto defendfoundationalism,andfoundationalisms
commitmenttobasicbeliefsandbasicknowledge,
againstvariousattacks.Othersaimtoshowthatone
importantobjectionagainstcoherentism,viz.thatthe notionof coherence
is toovague to beuseful, canbe countered. ontos verlagontos verlag
Frankfurt Paris Ebikon Lancaster New Brunswick www.ontosverlag.com
logoj Studien zur Logik, Sprachphilosophie und Metaphysik Hrsg. von
/ Edited by Volker Halbach Alexander Hieke Hannes Leitgeb Holger
Sturm Vol. 1 Reinhardt Grossmann Die Existenz der Welt Eine
Einfhrung in die Ontologie ISBN 3-937202-12-9 187 Seiten Paperback
15,00 Vol. 2 Georg Brun Die richtige Formel Philosophische Probleme
der logischen Formalisierung ISBN 3-937202-13-7 402 Seiten
Hardcover 44,00 Vol. 3 Herbert Hochberg Introducing Analytic
Philosophy Its Sense and its Nonsense 1879 2002 ISBN 3-937202-21-8
280 pp. Paperback 22,00 Vol. 4 Hans Rott Vitezslav Horak (Eds.)
Possibility and Reality Metaphysics and Logic ISBN 3-937202-24-2
310 pp. Paperback 32,00 Vol. 5 Timm Lampert Klassische Logik
Einfhrung mit interaktiven bungen ISBN 3-937202-29-3 385 Seiten
Paperback 28,00 Vol. 6 Andrea Clausen How can conceptual content be
social and normative, and, at the same time, be objective? ISBN
3-937202-57-9 268 pp. Hardcover 79,00 ontos verlag P.O. Box 15 41
63133 Heusenstamm nr. Frankfurt Germany www.ontosverlag.com ontos
verlag North and South America by Transaction Books 390 Campus
Drive Somerset, NJ 07830 USA www.transactionpub.com ontos verlag
United Kingdom by Gazelle Books Falcon House Queen Square Lancaster
LA1 1RN www.gazellebooks.co.uk ontos verlagFrankfurt .
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