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States and Transnational Actors: WhosInfluencing Whom? A Case
Study in Jewish
Diaspora Politics during the Cold War
PETER HAGELHumboldt-Universitat zu Berlin, Germany
PAULINE PERETZUniversite Paris I-Pantheon-Sorbonne, France
Transnational actors are often assumed to be autonomous in
theirattempts to influence states. But whenever both share
commoninterests, opportunities for mutual influences exist and
states can try touse transnational actors to further their own
objectives. Whereas thetheoretical discussion in IR has largely
overlooked this possibility, it isno stranger to scholars of
diasporas and nationalism. Informed by thisliterature, we apply our
notion of state-influenced non-governmentalorganizations to the
field of transnational diaspora politics with itscomplex
relationships between diasporas and their homeland and hoststates.
Our historical case study demonstrates how Israel, via its
secretoffice Nativ, significantly influenced the Jewish diaspora
and othertransnational actors in the mobilization for Soviet Jewish
emigrationduring the Cold War. States are thus not only targets of
transnationalactors they can also influence and even initiate
transnationalmovements. In our conclusion, we discuss why such
reciprocalrelationships should be generally taken into account in
the study oftransnational relations.
KEY WORDS diaspora politics human rights Israel NGOs Soviet Jews
transnational relations
Introduction
During the last decade, transnational actors have re-emerged as
an importantsubject of International Relations (IR) theory and
their impact has been
European Journal of International Relations Copyright 2005SAGE
Publications and ECPR-European Consortium for Political Research,
Vol. 11(4): 467493
[DOI: 10.1177/1354066105057893]
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recognized as an explanatory variable for a variety of
international develop-ments (della Porta et al., 1999; Higgot et
al., 2000a; Keck and Sikkink,1998; Khagram et al., 2002; Smith and
Johnston, 2002; Risse-Kappen,1995a). This new focus is largely
trying to avoid the old controversy of astate-dominated versus a
society-dominated perspective on world politics.Instead, it puts
questions about the interactions between transnationalactors,
states and international organizations at the centre of analysis
(Risse-Kappen, 1995b; Klotz, 2002). However, most research
privileges transna-tional actors as autonomous, treating the
relationship between them andstates as one-dimensional.
Transnational actors, be they profit-orientedenterprises or
non-profit civil society organizations, are studied in theirefforts
to influence state actors in order to reach their material or
normativegoals. Consequently, models of the interactions between
transnational andstate actors (della Porta and Kriesi, 1999: 5;
Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 13)usually do not foresee the reverse
relationship state actors influencingtransnational actors in order
to further their own interests.
This neglect seems to be due to at least three reasons. First,
almost allnon-governmental organizations (NGOs) present themselves
as independ-ent from states.1 Second, a lot of research in the
field still seems to be guidedby the society versus states
framework, wherein sympathies frequently sidewith social actors and
their role as normative vanguards (Florini, 2000;Smith et al.,
1997). Third, this is reinforced by a strong reliance on
socialmovement theory, which explicitly theorizes social movements
as con-tentious politics, as social action directed against state
politics (della Porta etal., 1999; McAdam et al., 2001; Smith and
Johnston, 2002; Tarrow, 2001).Yet, manifold opportunities for
reciprocal relationships between states andtransnational actors
exist, especially whenever they share common interests.States can
then try to influence transnational actors in order to realize
theirforeign policy objectives. In this article, we will
investigate this possibility,and if the phrasing is not not
overused, one could describe our aim asbringing the state back into
transnational relations.2
Our argument derives from a case study in Jewish diaspora
politics duringthe Cold War. The plight of Jews in the Soviet Union
and their right toemigrate emerged as an international human rights
concern after World WarII. In the early 1960s, non-Jewish human
rights activists and Jewishorganizations in various countries
started putting the issue on officialpolitical agendas.
Transnational links were created to exchange scarceinformation
about developments inside the Soviet Union and to enrolsupport for
the right of Soviet Jews to emigrate. The US, being both themost
powerful state and host of the largest Jewish population, became
thecentre of activism. Between 1972 and 1974, the issue entered the
Americanpolicy process, leading to the adoption of the JacksonVanik
amendment
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that linked the extension of US economic advantages to the
Soviet Union tothe liberalization of its emigration policy.3 This
was a major foreign policychange, running counter to Nixons
detente.
At first sight, this process can be read as an instance of
successful non-statetransnational politics.4 But our research,
based on original historical sources,finds that a secret office
created by the Israeli government, code-namedNativ, decisively
influenced large parts of this activism. Animated by theZionist
goal of achieving Soviet Jews immigration to Israel, but careful
notto antagonize the Soviet Union, Nativ was responsible for covert
action inmany Western countries, initiating and supporting
transnational activism forSoviet Jews right to emigrate. While it
had no direct impact on the actionsof grassroots organizations,
Nativ was a key player behind much of theactions that emanated from
Jewish establishment5 organizations in manycountries.
Audie Klotz recently observed that much of the work on
transnationalactors in world politics takes the nature of these
agents for granted, leavingunanswered questions about differences
between types of non-state actorsand relationships between them
(Klotz, 2002: 50). Our case study takes upthis challenge and goes
beyond it by revealing the ambivalent nature of, andthe diverse
relationships between, non-state and state actors in the
transna-tional activism to help Soviet Jews. It is an interesting
case, because at itscore lie human rights issues, which are often
regarded as the domain oftransnational activism against state
policies par excellence (Keck and Sikkink,1998; Risse et al.,
1999). It is a relevant case, because it concerns animportant
foreign policy issue in the context of Cold War detente. Ofcourse,
it is also a special case in the sense that the constellation of
actorsinvolved is quite unique.
Notwithstanding this caveat, which applies to any case study,
our articledemonstrates the potential reciprocity of relationships
between transnationalactors and states. Section one reviews the
current treatment of transnationalactors in IR and presents a
framework for analysis that incorporatesreciprocity with the notion
of state-influenced non-governmental organiza-tions. Whereas the
theoretical discussion in IR has largely overlooked
thispossibility, it is no stranger to scholars of diasporas and
nationalism(Brubaker, 1996; Shain, 1999; Shain and Barth, 2003;
Sheffer, 1986,2003). Informed by this literature, in section two we
apply our framework tothe field of transnational diaspora politics
with its reciprocal interactionsbetween diasporas and their
homeland and host states. Section three thendevelops our historical
case study, which shows in detail how Israelinfluenced its diaspora
and other transnational actors in the process to aidSoviet Jews.
Finally, the conclusion summarizes our findings, indicates
Hagel and Peretz: States and Transnational Actors
469
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similar examples outside diaspora politics and discusses the
general implica-tions for future research on transnational
actors.
1. States and Transnational Actors in World Politics
While constituting an extremely heterogeneous group, three major
cate-gories of transnational actors have received special
attention. Business actorsare seen as having relevant influences on
international economic relations(Risse-Kappen, 1995a; Higgot et
al., 2000a). Epistemic communities arenoticed as contributing to
international cooperation wherever expertknowledge is needed
(Adler, 1992; Haas, 1992). Normative activists areobserved in their
efforts to establish and spread international norms (Keckand
Sikkink, 1998; Khagram et al., 2002). Though all these
transnationalactors are goal-oriented, they differ with regard to
their respective motiva-tions instrumental goals drive business
actors, shared causal ideas uniteepistemic communities, and shared
principled ideas motivate normativeactivists (Abbott and Snidal,
2002; Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 30).
In the analysis of transnational actors roles in world politics,
twoperspectives dominate. A first perspective examines how
transnational actorsestablish private international rules to
execute non-state governance fortransnational issues, circumventing
the need for intergovernmental regimes(Cutler et al., 1999; Ronit
and Schneider, 2001; Teubner, 1997). Instancesof this role exist
especially in the regulation of international business affairs,but
remain less common than international governance provided by
andthrough states. Therefore, secondly, the more prominent role of
transna-tional actors in world politics is seen in attempts to
shape internationalgovernance by influencing states foreign
policies, inter-state negotiationsand the international
organizations set up by states (Keck and Sikkink, 1998;Klotz, 2002;
Willetts, 1996). Directed at public officials and
politicians,protests, agenda-setting and lobbying by transnational
actors can achievechanges in state perceptions and interests that
lead to international policiescloser in line with transnational
actors aims. What unites both perspectivesis a dichotomy between
transnational actors and states in which therelationship between
them is unilateral. Transnational actors are treated asautonomous
actors that stand apart from states, either trying to influence
orto circumvent them.
This focus probably captures the majority of real world
relationshipsbetween states and transnational actors, as many
empirical case studiessupporting the theoretical arguments show
(Florini, 2000; Klotz, 2002).But it neglects the possibility that
states use transnational actors for theirown interests.6 Though
Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink foresee theoption that government
officials may be part of what they call transnational
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advocacy networks, they conclude that NGOs will usually play the
centralrole (1998: 9). Donatella della Porta and Hanspeter Kriesi
also mention thepossibility of external support for social
movements by foreign governments(1999: 11), but without integrating
it into their general framework.However, instances of a reciprocal
relationship can be expected to exist formany international issues,
especially whenever the interests of transnationalactors and states
overlap. Both can then cooperate to achieve common goals,and both
can try to influence each other to further their own interests.
As NGOs have become relevant players in world politics, this
issue hasbeen problematized in discussions about so-called GONGOs
(Government-ally Organized NGOs), GRINGOs (Governmentally Regulated
and Initi-ated NGOs) and MANGOs (Manipulated NGOs) (Higgot et al.,
2000b;Hulme and Edwards, 1997). GONGOs and GRINGOs need not be
ofconcern for modelling transnational relations. When an NGO is
just anextended private arm of public authority, it can be treated
as internationalactivity by states. The case of MANGOs is more
complicated and goes tothis articles heart of the matter where does
manipulation start, and howdoes it work? The assessment of
manipulation being a qualitative judgementnot devoid of polemics,
it is more useful to conceptualize the relationshipbetween
transnational actors and states along a continuum. On one side
arepure civil society organizations that operate transnationally
without anyparticipation of state actors. On the other side are
GONGOs and GRINGOsas state agencies with a private legal standing.
In between, any kind ofmutual influences are possible, and NGOs
turn into what have been calledMANGOs or we propose this as a more
neutral and comprehensive term SINGOs (State-Influenced NGOs; see
Figure 1).
To be appealing and to gain influence, state actors have to
offersomething. This can be resources information, funding or
political power and it can also be a framework of meaning that
reaches beyondparticularistic state interests. If interests between
states and transnationalactors coincide, cooperation can be
conducted openly, as loose interestcoalitions, within advocacy
networks or as publicprivate partnerships. Forexample, the US
government, US-based multinational corporations and
thetransnational NGO Transparency International all wanted an
internationallegal instrument against business-diluting corruption
and together pushedfor the adoption of the OECD Anti-Corruption
Convention (Abbott andSnidal, 2002). Yet, whereas their interests
are usually ultimate goals forNGOs, the same interests are
sometimes only partial or instrumental goalsfor states. States can
join forces with NGOs in order to fight child labour orrain forest
exploitation. Whereas NGOs consider such practices as bad perse,
states might primarily attach trade interests to them. A
governmentmight support an NGO because it shares its humanitarian
mission in a
Hagel and Peretz: States and Transnational Actors
471
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foreign country, but also for other overarching foreign policy
reasons(Baitenmann, 1990; Cohen, 2003). Thus, a first mechanism for
stateinfluence on transnational actors consists of using value
interests to achievenon-value goals.7 A second, more sophisticated
mechanism is to influencethe normative framework of meaning in a
policy area, so that transnationalactivism takes place in a
normative context that better suits states interests.Contemporary
examples can be seen in states attempts at reshaping thenormative
framework of international development by incorporating
newconcepts, e.g. conflict prevention or good governance (Duffield,
2001).With both mechanisms, states go beyond mere cooperation on
the groundsof common interests, and influence transnational actors
to reach their owninterests. Such reciprocal relationships between
states and transnationalactors can appear in many policy
constellations and hence need to be takeninto account in the study
of world politics.
2. Transnational Diaspora Politics
A field in which reciprocal relationships are especially salient
is diasporapolitics. The (re-)drawing of international borders and
transnational migra-tion movements creates complex relationships
between the emigration orhomeland state, the diaspora dispersed in
several countries, and theimmigration or host state (Cohen, 1997;
Shain and Barth, 2003; Sheffer,1986, 2003). Able to build networks
of political activism across borders,diasporas are potential key
players in the relations between homeland andhost state, and can be
influenced by both. The collusion of interests betweendiasporas and
states may take many directions, touching both domestic and
Figure 1Framework for Analysis of Transnational Actors
pure civil society private state agencies
NGOs GONGOs/GRINGOsSINGOs
TRANSNATIONAL ACTORS
STATE ACTORS
influencing
directing
reciprocallyinfluencing
instrumentaluse of value
interests
shaping theframework of
meaning
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foreign policies (Esman, 1986: 340ff.; Sheffer, 2003: 180201).
Yossi Shainand Aharon Barth distinguish between diasporas active
and passive roles insuch transnational interactions (Shain and
Barth, 2003: 452ff.). In theirpassive role, diasporas become part
of the foreign policy objectives of usually homeland states without
really being an actor themselves. Maininstances of this role are
nation-states ambitions to interfere in other statesdomestic or
foreign policies on the ground of taking care of their diaspora.In
Central and Eastern Europe, such interactions have been widespread
atleast since the 19th century (Brubaker, 1996; Mandelbaum, 2000).
As Shainand Barth rightly conclude, analysis of these cases belongs
[. . .] to thestandard IR scholarship dealing with foreign policy
and internationalbehavior (Shain and Barth, 2003: 453).
For truly transnational politics, diasporas need to assume an
active role inthe relations between homelands and host states.
Diasporas can try todirectly influence homeland politics from
abroad, e.g. by financing specificcauses or spreading their vision
of national identity and politics. An earlyexample is the Irish
Republican Brotherhood, which, with its major base inthe US,
organized mobilization to free Ireland from British dominationsince
the second half of the 19th century (Hanagan, 2002). Another
optionfor diasporas is to indirectly influence homelands by
lobbying host states inorder to affect their foreign policy towards
homelands (Shain, 1999; Smith,2000). The foreign policy changes
lobbied for can include increases ineconomic aid and military
support for the homeland, or the recognition ofthe homeland as an
independent state. Both the Jewish and Palestiniandiasporas efforts
at affecting the course of the IsraelPalestine conflict
areprominent cases in point. Frequently, direct and indirect
diaspora influenceson the homeland coincide. Thus, in the above
example, the Irish-Americanssuccessfully managed to enlist US
support in addition to their own financialand ideological transfers
to their homeland.
As long as diasporas act autonomously in their efforts to
influencehomeland politics and host state foreign policies, they
constitute a subset oftransnational actors that conforms to the
standard perspective. But thingsget complicated as soon as
homelands or host states approach theirdiasporas with own interests
(Sheffer, 2003: 180201). Often, homelandinterests will only concern
the diaspora itself. Developing countries, inparticular, have an
interest in ensuring flows of money and skilled labourfrom the
diaspora back into the homeland. For these purposes, manyemigration
states have created special offices to foster material and
culturallinks with their diaspora (Gutierrez, 1999). However, when
the homelandwants the diaspora to intervene on its behalf with the
host state, therelationship becomes delicate. Throughout history,
diasporas have beenaccused of being a fifth column of their
homeland in host states, especially
Hagel and Peretz: States and Transnational Actors
473
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in times of crisis and war, when diasporas dual loyalty has been
questioned(Esman, 1986: 341f; Shain, 1999: 155; Sheffer, 2003:
21938). But beingthere more or less by choice, diaspora loyalties
towards the host state willtend to be strong. Even if they lie more
at home, the homeland cannotexercise much more than ideological
pressure, whereas the host state can useall the disciplinary
mechanisms a state possesses against people residing onits
territory.
Opportunities for a reciprocal relationship appear whenever
homeland orhost states share interests with diasporas. A host
countrys government thatwants regime change in a foreign country
with authoritarian leadershipmight try to draw on the political
refugees of that country to mobilizetransnational opposition among
the diaspora against the homeland govern-ment. Relations between
the US and Cuba or Iraq show many elements ofsuch a constellation.
The issue of minority rights for diasporas is anotherfield in which
homeland and diaspora share interests in the design of thehost
states regime for minorities. Since the 1990s, for example, the
statusand rights of its diasporas have been a key foreign policy
objective forHungary (Kovrig, 2000). In our case study, the web of
entanglementsbetween diasporas, homeland and host states exhausts
almost the wholerange of possible interactions, demonstrating the
need for a critical view ontransnational actors autonomy.
3. Transnational Activism to Help Soviet Jews
The black years of Stalinist anti-Semitism already belonged to
the past in thelate 1950s, but Soviet Jewry with its nearly 3
million members still suffered,both as a national minority and as a
religious group (Decter, 1963). Notonly was Jewish religious
practice suppressed during the second part ofKhrushchevs mandate,
synagogues and yeshivas were closed but alsoJewish culture the
teaching of Yiddish and Jewish history was banned,the memory of the
Shoah fought and anti-Semitic literature spread.Simultaneously,
Jews were discriminated against numeri clausi inuniversity and
state functions were adopted and Jews were
convicteddisproportionally for economic crimes. This anti-Semitism
calmed downmomentarily after 1964 with Brezhnev coming into power,
but startedagain even more brutally three years later when the
Israeli victory in the SixDay War gave rise to a violent
anti-Zionist campaign that lasted at least until1971 (Govrin, 1998;
Pinkus and Frankel, 1984). If Jews could notintegrate into Soviet
society, they could not emigrate either, as emigrationwas forbidden
for every Soviet citizen.
Except for the fate of those put on trial in 195253, the plight
of SovietJews was generally not known abroad. One reason was that
until the
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Leningrad trials of 1970,8 Soviet authorities were extremely
careful not toprovoke any event that could make the headlines in
the international press.Another reason was that Jews, as all Soviet
citizens, had no relations with theoutside world. Contacts between
Soviet Jews and world Jewry had been cutoff by the Kremlin during
the 1930s. Some information was neverthelesscoming out via
diplomats, foreign correspondents and, after the
mid-1960s,tourists, but it definitely remained scarce until the
early 1970s. To those whoknew what it really was, the situation of
Soviet Jews required help andinternational mobilization.
Issue Emergence and Transnational Mobilization
In the late 1950s, the Soviet Jewish issue emerged as an
international humanrights concern inside and beyond the Jewish
diaspora. In various countries,three types of actors famous public
figures, progressive politicians andJewish organizations raised
their voices on behalf of Soviet Jews.Intellectuals like Raymond
Aron and Mane`s Sperber in France,9 and JoseLuis Romero in
Argentina, denounced Moscows policy vis-a-vis Jews (Roi,1991: 110).
In April 1963, the British philosopher Bertrand Russell wrote
aletter to Khrushchev condemning the overrepresentation of Jews
amongpeople sentenced to death for economic offences.10 Three years
later, theFrench Jewish survivor and writer, Elie Wiesel, came back
from the SovietUnion with an essay, The Jews of Silence, that
exposed the repression of Jewsand portrayed them, against all odds,
as still attached to Judaism (Wiesel,1994). Conferences of
intellectuals dealing with Soviet Jewry were orga-nized in many
countries 1961 in Italy, 1963 in Great Britain and LatinAmerica,
1964 in Belgium and 1965 in Scandinavia (Govrin, 1998:21213). Most
ambitious was the Conference on the Status of Soviet Jews,which
took place in Washington and adopted a declaration calling on
theSoviet Union to stop discrimination against Soviet Jews.11
At the same time, progressive politicians started confronting
Soviet leaderswith the plight of Soviet Jews. During Khrushchevs
1956 visit to GreatBritain, the leaders of the two main parties
approached him with questionson the treatment of the Jewish
minority (Levanon, 1999: 75). A few yearslater, he had to answer
similar queries coming from Lester Pearson, theCanadian Minister of
Foreign Affairs, and from Scandinavian PrimeMinisters (Roi, 1991:
107). Some European communist leaders also voicedcondemnations of
the Kremlins Jewish policy in the wake of the SovietCommunist
Partys XXth Congress. For example, in 1966, a leader of theItalian
Communist Party denounced the discriminatory treatment of Jewsby
Soviet authorities in a preface to a book devoted to the subject
(Morozov,1999: doc. 10).
Hagel and Peretz: States and Transnational Actors
475
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With some delay, Jewish diaspora organizations in various
countries alsobecame active on behalf of Soviet Jews. After a first
move in the UnitedStates during Khrushchevs visit to Washington in
1959, significant mobil-ization only started during a new peak of
Soviet anti-Semitism in 196263.In Canada, the Jewish Labour
Committees representatives managed tomeet the Soviet ambassador and
complained about Moscows treatment ofits Jewish citizens (Morozov,
1999: doc. 7). In the United States, severalestablishment
organizations, mostly those that were anticommunist orZionist,
voiced their criticism to Soviet officials and at the United
Nations(UN). The American Jewish diaspora was also the first to
create a single-issue organization entirely devoted to Soviet
Jewry. Its aim was to triggercommunal mobilization and to sensitize
government officials and Congressto the situation of Soviet Jewry
(Orbach, 1979).
A Driving Force: Israels Office Nativ
Two questions arise when one tries to understand the
simultaneity and thesimilarity in this mobilization of seemingly
unrelated actors. How did theybecome aware of the plight of Soviet
Jews, and what was their source ofinformation? Why did all these
actions follow the same pattern? The answerslie in the activities
of a secret office code-named Nativ that Israel hadcreated in 1952
and that directly reported to the Prime Ministers Office(Levanon,
1995; Kedmi, 2002; Melman, 2003).12 Although it had
alreadyabandoned its policy of non-alignment, Israel did not want
to threaten itsfragile relationship with the Soviet Union by
raising the question of Jewishemigration. Therefore, the government
decided to have two arms dealingwith the Soviet Union the
diplomatic delegation pursuing Israels officialstate interest, and
Nativ as a parallel organ. Though it was still utopian at thetime,
Nativs goal was to ingather the exiles from the Soviet Union,
whichhoused the second largest Jewish diaspora, in order to
contribute to theaccomplishment of the Zionist goal and to populate
the new Jewish land. AsBaruch Gur, former Nativ emissary to
Washington and later its vice-director,explains From the very
beginning, [. . .] the idea was to bring SovietJews into Israel. It
was from the start a Zionist campaign.13 Nativ set up asmall-scale
clandestine operation relying on emissaries based in the
Israeliembassy in Moscow, trying to get in contact with Soviet
Jews. It wanted toencourage their identification with Israel and to
trigger their wish toemigrate once it became possible. Results were
very limited before theemissaries left the Soviet Union when the
SovietIsraeli diplomatic relation-ship broke after the Six Day War
in 1967. But Nativ had not waited for thatrupture to expand its
activities.
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In 1955, Nativ had launched an operation called Bar with the aim
ofgathering international support for the emigration of Soviet Jews
incountries with important Jewish communities (Levanon, 1995,
1999). Toreach this goal, it had devised a strategy to set up a
transnational campaignthat would raise the issue of Soviet Jewry as
a human rights concern. Nativcould then channel this mobilization
into the demand for the respect ofemigration rights. At the outset,
international conditions were favourable. Inthe aftermath of the
Soviet Communist Partys XXth Congress, the Kremlinhad become
sensitive to its image abroad and was willing to enter intopacific
coexistence with the West. After 1967, Nativs mission
wasfacilitated by the consequences of the Six Day War reviving
Zionism inthe diaspora, the new international aura of Israel and
growing anti-Semitismin the Soviet Union. To all the countries it
had selected, Nativ sentemissaries who worked from within the local
Israeli embassy or consulate.Officially, these were diplomats
specialized in Soviet affairs, but their realtask was to spread
information on Soviet Jews and to provoke public actionon their
behalf. In several countries, Nativ also secured the assistance of
alocal Jewish intellectual coming from the non-communist Left and
who waswell grounded in the political and academic scene, to
disseminate literatureprovided by Nativ and to raise consciousness
in these circles. The linksbetween the Israeli office and these
intellectuals, which created effectivebrokerage mechanisms,
remained long concealed (Sheleg, 1992).
Nativs first targets were progressive intellectual figures and
politicians,whom emissaries were trying to engage in transnational
advocacy networksto publicize the situation of Soviet Jews. Most of
them simply shared thegoal of helping Soviet Jews on the basis of
human rights concerns withoutknowing anything about Nativ. In
September 1960, for example, the Israeliemissary in Paris, Meir
Rosenne, organized the first international conferenceon the
situation of Soviet Jews, to which he invited 40
prominentintellectuals, Jews and non-Jews from 14 different
countries. The outcomewas a call on the Soviet Union to respect the
religious and cultural rights ofSoviet Jews.14 Similarly, in
December 1963, the Israeli office co-ordinatedthe writing of a
collective letter condemning the repression of Jewishculture,
addressed to Khrushchev and signed by Nobel prize winners,pacifists
and writers.15
The involvement of politicians was more difficult to achieve,
with most ofthem regarding their activities as anchored in their
national political system.Still, Nativ could count on transnational
political organizations of whichMapa, the Israeli governing party,
was a member, such as the SocialistInternational. During its eighth
Congress in 1963, for example, theInternational condemned Soviet
anti-Semitism and advocated the reunifica-tion of families. Nativ
also tried to convince statesmen to bring the issue into
Hagel and Peretz: States and Transnational Actors
477
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international arenas such as the Council of Europe and, more
often, the UN.From 1961 onwards, representatives of, among other
countries, Australia,Canada and the US delivered speeches on the
Soviet Jewry issue at the ThirdCommission and at the Subcommission
on the prevention of discriminationand the protection of
minorities, on the basis of articles 13(2) and 18 of theUniversal
Declaration of Human Rights (Roi, 1991: 16578).16
Non-Jewish allies having been found, ensuring a broad support
base,Nativ next approached the diaspora to activate its latent
solidarity withSoviet Jews. The slowly emerging memory of the Shoah
and the diasporasaccompanying feeling of guilt for not having been
able to prevent itreinforced the appeal of Nativs aims. In the US,
the Jewish establishmentswish to present a clear anti-Communist
profile further eased Nativs task inthe beginning. Its emissaries
enticed several national Jewish establishmentorganizations to
create institutions specifically devoted to Soviet Jewry, suchas
the American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry (AJCSJ) in 1964,
theNational Council for Soviet Jewry in the United Kingdom and the
CanadianCommittee for Soviet Jewry in 1971. Interviewed by the
American JewishCommittee, Yoram Dinstein, a former emissary of
Nativ to New York, statedin 1989 The AJCSJ was essentially our
creation.17 Diplomatic docu-ments also show that in 1965, Golda
Meir, then Minister of Foreign Affairs,intervened herself to
express Israels backing of the AJCSJ and to ask theAmerican Jewish
establishment to give higher priority to the Soviet Jewishissue.18
In all the countries where it was active, Nativ provided what
Keckand Sikkink call the common frame of meaning (Keck and Sikkink,
1998:7). It persuaded each Jewish establishment organization to
abandon therespect of cultural and religious rights for Soviet Jews
as their main objectiveand to make emigration rights their first
priority.19 Nativ succeeded byhaving a representative attending
most of the meetings dealing with SovietJewry and by channelling
selected information on Soviet Jews, which theorganizations could
not have obtained otherwise.
Once the common frame of meaning had been adopted by
Jewishorganizations in various countries, Nativ induced them to
work together ina transnational manner after the Leningrad trials.
The most visible step inthat direction was the convening, by Nativ,
of the first World Conference onSoviet Jewry, which took place in
Brussels, in February 1971. It gatheredIsraeli politicians,
international Jewish leaders, and 760 delegates from 38countries,
representing organizations that had been working with Nativduring
the previous years. In the US, Nativs emissaries attended
allpreparatory meetings for the conference, making clear what their
preferredoptions were. Zvi Netzer, the head of Bar in Tel-Aviv,
controlled most ofthe organizational details, and all the
background documents had beenprepared by academics working in close
contact with Nativ. Another proof of
European Journal of International Relations 11(4)
478
-
the Israeli offices strong influence was the declaration adopted
by theconference, which put most emphasis on emigration. Also, the
conferencecalled for closer collaboration among Jewish
organizations.20 Under theaegis of Nativ, transnational cooperation
between national Jewish establish-ment organizations was
institutionalized, allowing for information exchan-ges and
harmonization of strategies.
Through Nativ and its emissaries who could count on Jews sense
ofkinship and non-Jews attachment to human rights Israel provided
theimpetus for the transnational mobilization on behalf of Soviet
Jewry. Goingbeyond diaspora politics, it not only relied on Jewish
organizations, but alsoformed a coalition of international public
figures to condemn the Kremlinstreatment of Soviet Jewry. This
proved to be especially clever, since itgathered in advance the
allies that Jewish organizations would later needduring the
policy-shaping phase. On the continuum we have drawn, all
thesetransnational actors fit without doubt much better into the
SINGO categorythan into the normal NGO category. Israel provided
only information andadvice, and the transnational actors sometimes
resisted instructions comingfrom Nativ. Still, Israel significantly
influenced them to mobilize for SovietJews emigration, Nativs
Zionist goal.
Grassroots Independence
It would be wrong, however, to think that the transnational
campaign onbehalf of Soviet Jewry was only Nativ-driven. Conforming
to the standardperspective on transnational actors, it was also due
to civil society action bygrassroots NGOs situated on the left end
of our continuum. In that respect,this mobilization offers an
excellent example of the differences betweentypes of non-state
actors that can exist within one campaign. In manycountries, Jewish
activists who stood in opposition to the Jewish establish-ment also
wanted to aid Soviet Jews. They were primarily motivated by
guiltfor not having been able to rescue Jews from the Shoah, and a
will to takeanother chance to help a persecuted part of the
diaspora.21 In theirbackgrounds and methods, grassroots activists
strongly differed from theestablishment, which feared the intrusion
of these newcomers into diasporapolitics. In fact, Nativs
collaboration with the establishment became one ofthe main reasons
why the grassroots refused to work with it.
Already in the late 1950s, some individuals had created
grassrootsorganizations devoted to Soviet Jewry. In 1958, Maoz was
founded in Israelto fill what was perceived as an absolute lack of
concern Nativs actionbeing secret (Roi, 1991: 2313). In 196364,
grassroots organizationssprang up in the US, such as the Cleveland
Council on Soviet Anti-Semitism, and the Student Struggle for
Soviet Jews, joined by local councils
Hagel and Peretz: States and Transnational Actors
479
-
for Soviet Jewry that federated into the Union of Councils for
Soviet Jewry(UCSJ) in 1971. Later, similar groups were formed in
Israel the ActionCommittee of Newcomers from the Soviet Union; in
the United Kingdom the Women 35s; and in Canada the Toronto Council
for Soviet Jews.All these organizations operated on a voluntary
basis with very limitedfinancial resources and promoted action
through non-establishment means,e.g. interruptions of Soviet
cultural events or boycotts of firms doingbusiness with the USSR
(Orbach, 1980: 78).
Though these organizations were aware of each others activities,
theyonly started working together as a transnational advocacy
network in 1969.The trigger was, in August, a petition written by
18 Georgian Jewishfamilies, addressed to the UN Human Rights
Commission. It revealed to theWest the existence of Soviet Zionist
groups that had been formed in theaftermath of the Six Day War and
opened opportunities for the creation ofchannels between Soviet
Jews and Western activists. What Keck and Sikkinkcall the boomerang
pattern started to take effect at that point and, as theyemphasize,
the central role of information explains the drive to
createnetworks (1998: 12ff., 18ff.). Soviet activists had no way of
influencing theirown government, but they could count on
international allies to putpressure on the Soviet Union from
outside. This boomerang could onlywork if Soviet Jews were capable
of transmitting messages to Westernactivists. For activists who had
no access to the information processed byNativ, the costs of
getting information were very high a telephone call tothe USSR was
still an expensive and hazardous operation, the reliability ofthe
mail low, and skills in Russian rare. Consequently, the quest for
contactsand up-to-date news triggered cooperation between the
grassroots.
Two networks operated simultaneously one linking Western
activistsamong themselves, and one connecting them with Soviet
Jews. Within thefirst network, grassroots activists gained
awareness of actions taken by othergroups and access to information
on Soviet emigration policy, as well asnames and addresses of
activists and refuseniks. A very good example is theCleveland
Council on Soviet Anti-Semitisms cooperation with grassrootsleaders
in Canada, Israel and the United Kingdom who were regularlycalling
the Soviet Union.22 These frequent contacts led to mutual
inspirationand similar styles of activism, but compared to the
institutionalizedcollaboration of the establishment organizations,
the grassroots networks inthe West remained loose and random. The
second network was even morefragile. Its purposes were to provide
Western activists with the credibilitythey needed to speak on
behalf of Soviet Jews, and to enable the latter toexpress their
expectations towards the West, mainly to put a greateremphasis on
their right to emigrate. Due to exchanges in this network,American
activists in particular could generate information that was
reliable,
European Journal of International Relations 11(4)
480
-
transmit it to political actors and engage in what Keck and
Sikkink callinformation politics (1998: 16). The networks created
by the grassroots inparallel to those of Nativ allowed them to
strengthen their local activities,but their mobilization was never
as effective as the establishments.
Agenda-Setting and Policy-Shaping in the United States
Once the transnational campaign had installed the Soviet Jewish
emigrationissue as an international concern, it took a decisive
political turn in the USthat led to a major change in American
foreign policy. Right from thebeginning, Nativ had considered the
US as a special actor, because it wasthe only state that could
potentially affect the Soviet Unions domesticpolicies. Also, the
significance of the American Jewish community called fora key
American role it was the most numerous 5 to 6 million Jews the best
organized, and the most powerful. Pluralist by nature, theAmerican
political system was relatively open to ethnic groups influence,and
the US had a tradition of humanitarian intervention on behalf of
Jews(Smith, 2000).
For these reasons, Nativs intervention in the United States was
the mostsophisticated version of all that had been put into place
in other countries.With two emissaries one in New York dealing with
Jewish organizations,one in Washington establishing contacts inside
the Administration andCongress and with the help of Jewish
intellectual Moshe Decter, Nativwas well prepared to carry out its
mission. It enrolled wide support highlevel liberals, such as
Eleanor Roosevelt, Justices William Douglas andArthur Goldberg;
Civil Rights figures like Bayard Rustin and Martin LutherKing, Jr;
and members of Congress, some Jewish Abraham
Ribicoff(Republican-Connecticut) and Jacob Javits (Democrat-New
York) somecoming from a constituency with a large Jewish base most
senators andrepresentatives from New York and California some who
were old friendsof Israel such as Senator Henry Jackson
(Democrat-Washington)(Levanon, 1995: 195210). Nativ also managed to
influence the AJCSJ/NCSJ like no other Jewish SINGO in the
diaspora. The Americanconditions were just as ideal for pure civil
society NGOs, which also hadtheir share in shaping American
societys perception of the Soviet Jewryissue, but mainly on a local
level. Due to this broad-based mobilization,which intensified
during and after the Leningrad trials in December 1970,the Soviet
Jewish situation was gaining in popularity as a human
rightsconcern. The increasing number of articles published on the
issue in theNew York Times after 1969 demonstrates this impact (see
Figure 2).
The mobilization succeeded in putting the issue on the US
foreign policyagenda. Establishment and grassroots Jewish
organizations tried, through
Hagel and Peretz: States and Transnational Actors
481
-
national and transnational action, to convince American public
opinion andpoliticians to pressure the White House. The Executive
was then to compelthe Kremlin to respect its human rights
obligations vis-a-vis Jews. Theydiffered in their methods, their
(in-)dependence from Nativ and theirpolitical clout. In comparison
to the establishments actions, the grassrootsattempts at
influencing political actors had limited effects, because they
werenot being taken as seriously. Until the early 1970s, the
agenda-settingobtained only minor results. The American delegation
at the UN raised theissue several times, and members of Congress
introduced several resolutionsand bills trying to pressure the
Kremlin to comply with international legalnorms, but none of these
actions succeeded.23
With the first SovietAmerican detente-summit in May 1972,
theAmerican movement entered a fully political phase. Great
progress had beenmade through detente negotiations on arms
limitation, the resolution ofthe ArabIsraeli conflict and trade
relations were taking the right direction,
Figure 2Number of Articles on Soviet Jews Published in the New
York Times*
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1973 197419720
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
USSRAnti-Semitism
USSR Politics(articles on Soviet Jews)
USSR,Immigration
* The classification follows the subdivisions of the New York
Times Index. USSR, Immigrationrefers to Jewish emigration from the
Soviet Union and Soviet Jewish immigration into theUS.
European Journal of International Relations 11(4)
482
-
at the same time as the Basic Principles were adopted. The
Kremlin neededto get out of its economic isolation, and Washington,
still recovering fromthe Vietnam War and noticing the Soviet Unions
narrowing of the missilegap, was ready for rapprochement (Garthoff,
1994: 27ff.). Since theinternational condemnation of the Soviet
regime that followed the Lenin-grad trials in 1971, the Kremlin had
shown its understanding that SovietJewish emigration had become a
necessary concession to pursue detentewith the West.24 While
emigration had remained very low until then,Moscow now opened its
doors and let more than 30,000 Jews leave thecountry in a year. In
this context, the adoption, in August 1972, of aneducation tax on
would-be emigrants appeared as regression and maderapprochement
unacceptable to all human rights defenders. Nixon andKissinger
agreed to raise the issue with the Soviets,25 but they refused to
linkdetente to Soviet internal affairs. They feared that such a
linkage wouldthreaten their foreign policy and were convinced that
linkage should be usedonly with regard to international issues.
A few members of Congress some of whom had been approached
byNativ and Jewish organizations had another idea of what linkage
shoulddo. They proposed linking the extension of economic
privileges creditguarantees and most favoured nation status to the
liberalization of Sovietemigration policy. Grassroots activists
contributed to the formulation of thelinkage proposal, which landed
on Senator Jacksons desk.26 It matched hisCold War liberal agenda
at a time when he was running as the Democratpresidential candidate
it opposed Nixons detente, it would portray himas the defender of
human rights and it would surely bring him the supportof American
Jews and Labour (Kaufman, 2000). Jackson therefore intro-duced the
linkage as an amendment to the EastWest Trade Reform Act on4
October 1972, and later to the Trade Reform Act that included
theratification of the Trade Agreement with the Soviets. It united
detentesopponents, human rights defenders, progressive liberals and
protectionistsopposed to trade with the Kremlin (Stern, 1979).
Jewish organizations establishment SINGOs and grassroots NGOs that
had previouslycontributed to the framing of this issue were very
influential in the lobbyingprocess that led to the adoption of the
amendment in December 1974. Atthe local level, by organizing
letter-writing campaigns and meetings withrepresentatives; at the
national level, by persuading individual members ofCongress to
become co-sponsors or to stop opposing the amendment.Establishment
organizations, which were counter-lobbied by Nixon whosaw the
amendment as a major threat to detente, were successful in
resistinghis pressure (Peretz, 2003). Also, both types of
organization played animportant role in conveying the support of
Jewish organizations from other
Hagel and Peretz: States and Transnational Actors
483
-
countries, just like Soviet activists, with whom they were
maintaining anongoing liaison the boomerang was fully
functioning.
Nativs role in the adoption of the JacksonVanik amendment was
limited.Most important, the linkage idea had not originated in its
office. It appearedon the congressional agenda approximately a year
before the Yom KippurWar, a most sensitive time for Israel, whose
first priority had become toobtain Washingtons assistance. Despite
Nativs firm backing of the amend-ment, the Israeli foreign ministry
hesitated to support JacksonVanik,because it ran counter to Nixons
foreign policy and could hence threatenthe American aid Israel
badly needed. Finally, Prime Minister Golda Meirdecided that Israel
would not try to convince Jewish establishment leaders todrop their
support for the amendment (Levanon, 1995: 397401).27 Froma
historical perspective, however, Nativ had already fulfilled its
goal. In about15 years, the activities of its emissaries had
created the context awarenessof the Soviet Jews plight and empathy
for them and the conditions issue framing, network-building,
agenda-setting that were necessary forshaping a policy that could
help Soviet Jews to emigrate. Its men hadprepared the ground that
led to the American demand for Moscow torespect Jews emigration
rights, and to the creation of a political instrumentthat could
have leverage on the Kremlin.28 Nativ was thus responsible
forindirectly influencing the foreign policy of a country host to
the largestJewish diaspora vis-a-vis a state that housed the second
largest part of thediaspora. It had accomplished this long
term-goal by fostering a fully-fledged transnational mobilization
on behalf of Soviet Jews.
Conclusion
Our case study shows that states are not only targets of
transnationalactivism they can also influence and even initiate
transnational move-ments, which supports our argument for
introducing the category of state-influenced NGOs (SINGOs) into the
study of transnational relations. Partof the worldwide mobilization
for Soviet Jewish emigration is in line withthe standard
perspective on transnational actors. Jewish grassroots
organiza-tions established a small-scale cross-border network to
help Jews leave theUSSR. In the US, they had the idea of linking
emigration with trade andlobbied for the JacksonVanik amendment
that would introduce this linkageinto trade relations with Moscow.
But their activism alone would not havesufficed to make a political
difference. The engagement of more establishedactors with more
political weight was necessary for the campaign to achievethe
adoption of JacksonVanik, which constituted a major foreign
policychange during detente. This mobilization emanated from
Israels secretoffice, Nativ, which had pursued a long-term strategy
to put the Soviet
European Journal of International Relations 11(4)
484
-
Jewry issue on the international political agenda, to organize
transnationalsupport and to make emigration the principal
demand.
To exercise influence on transnational actors, states have to
offersomething. This can be resources or a framework of meaning
that reachesbeyond particularistic state interests. In our case, it
was both. Nativ had theinformation about Soviet discrimination
against Jews and commandedpersonnel to spread awareness of it. And
it could frame its interest as auniversal human rights concern that
was able to attract a wide coalition oftransnational allies. Jewish
establishment organizations in many countriesbecame engaged because
Nativ activated solidarity among the diaspora.Would establishment
organizations not have raised their voice without Nativjust as
well? As a counterfactual, this question can only be answered
withmaybe. But their diaspora activism would surely have happened
later, in aless transnational fashion, and probably without making
emigration thepriority issue. This last point is essential because
appeals to the Kremlin toend discrimination and to respect the
cultural and religious rights of SovietJews would have been other
possible focal points of the campaign. AsBaruch Gur emphasizes
Nativ could tolerate the diversity of voices, butthey had to have a
common denominator: to accept the role of Israel andaliyah
[literally ascent to Israel] as a goal; to talk about Jewish
culture inthe Soviet Union, but without considering it too
seriously.29 Nativsinfluences on the diasporas value interests and
the common framework ofmeaning were decisive to achieve Israels
non-value interest of gathering theSoviet diaspora in the new state
of the ancient homeland.
Similar constellations can exist in many transnational
relations, which iswhy we contend that the notion of SINGOs
generally needs to be taken intoaccount. Diaspora politics are a
primary field for reciprocal relationshipsbetween states and
transnational actors because of the variety of interestsboth
homeland and host states can have towards their diasporas. But
theyare certainly not the only such field in world politics. In our
case, Israelsinfluence went well beyond the diaspora when Nativ
orchestrated its effortsto have public figures and progressive
politicians join the transnationalcampaign, most of whom had no
idea about Nativ and its mission.Whenever transnational actors
goals overlap with states foreign policyobjectives, opportunities
for collaboration arise, particularly if states offerresources for
achieving common goals. But while their objectives are
usuallyultimate goals for NGOs, they are sometimes only
instrumental goals forstates, or at least states can attach other
interests to them, like installingregional security and stability,
opening up export markets, or mobilizingresistance against an
unwelcome foreign regime (Cohen, 2003; Hulme andEdwards, 1997).
Hagel and Peretz: States and Transnational Actors
485
-
With the ideological and geopolitical struggles between
communism andliberalism, 20th-century history is rich in examples
of states influencingtransnational actors on the basis of shared
values and goals. After theRevolution, the USSR used the Comintern
to spread its version of commu-nism abroad via the control of
national communist parties and satelliteorganizations, such as
unions, youth movements and intellectual groups.Consequently, the
evolution of communist organizations in other countriesreflected
both the rivalries inside the Kremlin and Moscows foreign
policyobjectives. Until 1928, while being bolshevized, the
Comintern imposed aradical restructuring upon them; under Stalin,
their autonomy was emascu-lated and they were pushed to adopt the
class vs class tactic; and the volte-face towards the Popular
Fronts and anti-fascist unity in 1934 was due to theCominterns new
leadership and Moscows quest for collective securityagreements
(Broue, 1997; McDermott and Agnew, 1996).
After World War II, impressed by the USSRs transnational
manoeuvres,the US drew inspiration from the Cominterns practices
and used the CIA topromote its views of a liberal and federalist
Western Europe among societalgroups and organizations. The USs
secret support to the EuropeanMovement (Aldrich, 2001), its efforts
to make European trade unions andthe British Left less socialist
and more Atlantist (Wilford, 2003) and itsbacking of the Congress
on Cultural Freedom (Scott-Smith, 2001) are welldocumented. In all
these cases, the CIA channelled funds through
Americanintermediaries and helped to create new organizations,
select their leadershipand generate mass support for their ideas.
Yet, the CIA was never a puppet-master [US] state agencies [. . .]
did not control the private spherebut directed it in the pursuit of
its strategic vision (Lucas, 2003: 60).
In the expanding area of transnational humanitarian activism,
oftensupposed to be politically neutral, states can also influence
NGOs byconnecting aid with other foreign policy goals. For refugee
and relief workduring the Afghan war in the 1980s, Helga Baitenmann
has shown in detailhow most NGOs working cross-border, and most
advocacy NGOs wereconscious agents of political interests (1990:
82) Pakistan and the US, inparticular, supported them in sustaining
the anti-Soviet Afghan forces. Inthe post-Cold War environment,
questions about how states make NGOshumanitarian aid part of their
strategic calculations remain just as relevant,e.g. in conflicts in
Kosovo, Rwanda or Sudan. Being the donors that fundsubstantial
parts of NGOs humanitarian operations, states increasingly wantto
make sure that these also contribute to broader development and
securityaims (Cohen, 2003; Duffield, 2001).
The apparent independence of some of the major transnational
NGOs likeAmnesty International or Greenpeace might be responsible
for the wide-spread academic assumption of transnational actors
autonomy. Our case
European Journal of International Relations 11(4)
486
-
study in diaspora politics and the aforementioned considerations
about othertransnational relations demonstrate that this cannot
always be taken forgranted. Since states can build upon common
objectives and use theirresources to influence transnational
actors, the latters autonomy can only bea hypothesis that demands
careful examination (Tarrow, 2001: 16). Betweenthe operations of
GONGOs and pure civil society activism lie a wide rangeof
reciprocal influences among states and transnational actors that
can becaptured within the category of SINGOs. Exploring this field,
futureresearch may further differentiate how and to what extent
state influencehappens, particularly with regard to the distinct
uses of covert operationsand open collaboration. The mechanisms we
identified states instru-mental use of value interests and their
strategic shaping of the commonframework of meaning are likely to
be employed in other transnationalrelations, too, with probably
less need for secrecy than in our Jewishdiaspora case. Considering
the creativity states have shown in influencingdomestic actors,
subsequent research will certainly expand the variety ofmechanisms
at work vis-a-vis transnational actors. In particular, the
materialinterdependencies that emerge out of state-sponsored
funding for transna-tional actors services present a rich field for
more studies on SINGOs.
Notes
We thank Walter Mattli for very valuable advice, three anonymous
reviewers and theeditors of EJIR for insightful and beneficial
comments, and the participants of theJournees Histoire et Science
Politique in March 2004 in Paris for helpfulsuggestions on earlier
versions of this article.
1. Therefore, collaboration between state actors and NGOs might
often be of aninformal or even secret nature. In our case study,
only in-depth research inarchives and via interviews permitted the
discovery of the interaction betweenstate actors and NGOs.
2. The definition of transnational relations as regular
interactions across nationalboundaries when at least one actor is a
non-state agent or does not operate onbehalf of a national
government or an intergovernmental organization (Risse-Kappen,
1995b: 3) allows for the involvement of state actors. But, as our
casestudy shows, it is not always clear how autonomous non-state
actors are.
3. At the time, this was the amendments main objective. Its
phrasing, however, ismore general in order to apply to any
non-market economy. It was later appliedto Rumania, Bulgaria, China
and Vietnam, and is still in effect today.
4. No comprehensive study exists on this issue. Paula Stern
(1979) explains theadoption of the JacksonVanik amendment as the
sole result of congressionalmobilization, highly underestimating
the role of Jewish organizations and totallyignoring that of
Israel. J.J. Goldberg (1996) depicts it as the result of
Jewishmobilization, but goes too far when he sees it as a founding
moment for theJewish lobby. He mentions the influence of Israel in
the creation of the American
Hagel and Peretz: States and Transnational Actors
487
-
Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry, but fails to understand that
it is only onepart of a larger international campaign designed by
Nativ. Howard Sachar(1985) succeeds better in showing the
international ambitions of the operationdesigned by Israel, but is
not able to give a satisfying overview of Nativsactions.
5. The term establishment designates the Jewish community
organizationsdirected by a small and self-perpetuating leadership
drawn mainly from theJewish elite.
6. We concentrate on the interactions between transnational
normative activistsand states. However, our remarks probably also
hold true for other transnationalactors and their roles in
establishing private governance and influencinginternational
organizations. For analysis of how states can influence
privategovernance, see Drezner (2004).
7. Our understanding of state influence on NGOs resembles what
Payne (2001:446) discusses as strategic framing. To be effective,
such cognitive mechanismsneed to be combined with relational
mechanisms like brokerage (McAdam et al.,2001: 25ff.). In our case,
this happened when Nativ established links with andamong Jewish
diaspora organizations and human rights activists, and cooptedsome
diaspora activists, in order to frame the issue of Soviet Jewish
emigrationaccording to the Israeli states interests. For the
general analysis of socialmechanisms, see Hedstrom and Swedberg
(1998).
8. These trials imposed death sentences upon Jewish activists
who had tried tohijack a plane in Leningrad to leave the Soviet
Union. The harshness of thesesentences gave rise to an
international condemnation of the Kremlin.
9. Interview with Meir Rosenne (Nativ emissary to Paris and New
York, later Israeliambassador to France and the US), Jerusalem, 17
October 2002.
10. 130/4326/7, Israel State Archives (ISA).11. Moshe Decter,
5/2, SSSJ archives, Yeshiva University.12. Also interview with
Nechemia Levanon (Nativ emissary to Moscow and
Washington, and head of Nativ, 19721982), Kfar Blum, 24 October
2002. Allinformation about Nativ in this article is firmly rooted
in interviews with formerNativ personnel, archives of American
Jewish organizations and documents ofthe Israeli Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. We probably underestimate Nativs realscope of
action, because its own archives are still classified.
13. Interview with Baruch Gur, Tel-Aviv, 21 October 2002.14.
Conseil Representatif des Juifs de France, Conference
internationale sur la
situation des Juifs en Union sovietique, Paris, 1960.15.
130/4326/7, ISA.16. Article 13(2): Everyone has the right to leave
any country, including his own,
and to return to his country; Article 18: Everyone has the right
to freedom ofthought, conscience and religion; this right includes
freedom to change hisreligion or belief, and freedom, either alone
or in community with others and inpublic or private, to manifest
his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worshipand
observance.
17. Transcript of an interview with Yoram Dinstein, Soviet Jewry
movement in
European Journal of International Relations 11(4)
488
-
America, New York Public Library and American Jewish Committee,
OralHistory Collection, 1989. See also Peretz (2004). The AJCSJ was
reorganizedand renamed National Conference on Soviet Jewry in
1971.
18. Telegram from Avidar to Moshe Bitan, re: meeting between
Golda Meir andthe CPMAJO, 8 October 1965, 93.8/6550/12, ISA.
19. Interview with Jerry Goodman (former executive director of
the NCSJ), NewYork, 25 April 2002.
20. Brussels Conference on Soviet Jewry, box 44, NCSJ
collection, AmericanJewish Historical Society.
21. An important reason for people to create new grassroots
organizations was thatthey held the establishment responsible for
failing to rescue European Jews fromthe Shoah.
22. Interview with Lou Rosenblum (former head of the CCSA and
later of theUCSJ), Cleveland, 18 June 2003.
23. Among them were the Senate resolution on full religious
freedom in 1963, theSoviet Jew relief Act of 1971, and the Bill to
amend the Export AdministrationAct of 1969 in order to promote
freedom of emigration in May 1972.
24. The latest research on the issue in Soviet archives shows
that the Kremlin did nothave a coherent policy line (Morozov,
1999). Most of the time, it reacted toexternal pressures, be they
American, Israeli or Arabic. Two own interests were emigration as a
way to solve internal difficulties (to get rid of activists
andunassimilated minorities, to create openings in selected areas
of housing andprofessions for the growing Russian middle-class, to
get currency), andemigration as a means to have leverage on the
international scene (to furtherdetente, to influence both Israel
and Arab states).
25. The Nixon Presidential Materials (housed at the National
Records and Archivesin College Park, Maryland) show that Nixon did
not raise the issue of SovietJewish emigration during the first
Moscow Summit in May 1972 despite strongdomestic pressure, but that
he could not oppose this pressure any longer afterthe imposition of
the education tax by the Soviets (National Security Council,Country
files-Europe, boxes 710, 719724 and Country files Europe-USSR,boxes
67, 7172, 7677).
26. Interview with Lou Rosenblum, Cleveland, 18 June 2003, and
Rees bill,CCSA archives, Western Reserve Historical Society.
27. Also interview with Levanon, Kfar Blum, 24 October 2002.28.
In the end, this leverage failed when the Soviet Union retreated
from the trade
negotiations and Soviet Jewish emigration decreased. On the
complex reasons ofJacksonVaniks failure to reach its objective, see
Peretz (2002). This, however,does not diminish the activists
policy-shaping accomplishment.
29. Interview with Baruch Gur, Tel-Aviv, 21 October 2002.
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