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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
A Critical Reevaluation of the Iraq-Kuwait
Conflict and the Crisis in the Gulf
By
Nausherwan Javed Hafeez
June 2010
A paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the
Master of Arts degree in the
Master of Arts Program in the Social Sciences
Faculty Advisor: Dr. Michael Reese
Preceptor: Dr. Avinash Sharma
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Introduction
The Iraq-Kuwait conflict was a major turning point in
international politics. It was the
first major conflict in the aftermath of the Cold War and led to
a U.S.-sponsored, multinational
coalition against Iraq. The consequences of the conflict have
been well documented1 and
illustrate the significance such conflicts can have on world
politics. The Iraq-Kuwait conflict was
seen by the U.S. as a direct challenge to the regional
balance-of-power and was viewed as a
threat to international security. With a nascent unipolar world
order dominated by U.S. interests,
it was up to the America to challenge Iraq. But did the U.S.
have to respond the way it did? Was
this conflict both necessary and inevitable? It is the argument
of this piece that the answer to all
of these questions is an emphatic no. This piece will attempt to
construct a critical reevaluation
of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict, demonstrating both the ways this
conflict could have been prevented
and how future conflicts can be preempted.
On the most basic level, this piece is about how to prevent war
and resolve international
crises. It does not aim to create a new theory on war
prevention, but rather builds on previous
scholarship dealing with the causes of war, while noting its
application to the Iraq-Kuwait
conflict.2 In particular, this piece analyzes how signaling
errors, misperception, and intentions
interact and become fundamental causes of war.3 If states are to
prevent conflict, then clearer
1 For more see: B.N. Ghosh and Nonika Singh, Politics and
Economics of the Gulf War (New Delhi: Deep & Deep
Publications, 1991); Ibrahim Ibrahim, The Gulf Crisis:
Background and Consequences (Washington D.C.: Center
for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1992); and
Walid Khalidi, The Gulf Crisis: Origins and Consequences in Journal
of Palestine Studies, Volume 20, No. 2 (Winter 1991), pp. 5-28. 2 I
am primarily building off of: Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999). Other
relevant texts are: Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (New
York: Free Press, 1973); and Quincy Wright, The
Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace (London: Longmans,
Green and Co, 1935). 3 I specifically use: James Fearon, Domestic
Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes
in
The American Political Science Review, Volume 88, No. 3
(September 1994): pp. 677-92; Signaling Foreign Policy Interests:
Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs in The Journal of Conflict
Resolution, Volume 41, No. 1 (February 1997), pp. 68-90; Signaling
versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a
Crisis Bargaining
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signaling of intentions must be made. In addition, a realistic
assessment of states interests and
intentions must be calculated in order to create a realistic
threat-assessment of any given
situation.4 With a realistic assessment of different states
interests and projected actions, states
can then develop proper policy responses. If states were to do
this on a consistent basis, then
manyif not allconflicts could be prevented.
The Iraq-Kuwait conflict is a classic example of the ways
signaling errors, misperception,
and intentions combine to create an unnecessary war. The various
actors involvedIraq,
Kuwait, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and O.P.E.C.sent
different signals about their
intentions and interests before and during the conflict. These
signals shaped other actors
behaviors, which, combined with their competing interests and
agendas, created the conditions
necessary for a conflict. Although this piece will consider all
of the actors involved in the
conflict, the key actorsthe U.S. and Iraqwill be the primary
focus of this piece. This piece
will consider these causes while also pointing out moments in
time when alternative choices
could have been made to preempt or deescalate the conflict.
The other issues at the heart of this conflict are economics,
oil concerns, and the inability
to negotiate a settlement of grievances. While there has been a
great deal of scholarship that has
tried to explain these different causes5, there has been no
systematic attempt to tie these causes
into the key moments in time when the conflict could have been
averted or deescalated.
Model in The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 38, No. 2
(June 1994): pp. 236-69; and Robert Jervis, Perception and
Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1976). 4 I specifically use: James Fearon,
Rationalist Explanations for War in International Organization,
Volume 49,
No. 3 (Summer 1995): pp. 379-414. 5 Some of the key pieces on
the causes of the conflict are: Shahram Chubin, Regional Politics
and the Conflict in
International Perspectives on the Gulf Conflict, 1990-91, ed.
Alex Danchev and Dan Keohane, (New York: St.
Martins Press in association with St. Antonys College, Oxford,
1994), pp. 1-22; Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf
Conflict, 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1993); Walid Khalidi, The Gulf Crisis: Origins
and Consequences in Journal of Palestine Studies, Volume 20, No. 2
(Winter 1991), pp. 5-28; and Peter Sluglett, The Resilience of a
Frontier: Ottoman and Iraqi Claims to Kuwait, 1871-1990 in The
International History Review, Volume 24, No. 4 (December 2002), pp.
783-816.
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Although it may seem like a difficult task given the limited
scope of this analysis, this piece will
nevertheless attempt to grapple with these issues and will, at
the very least, provide some
tentative answers that could be expanded with future
scholarship. Therefore, this piece will
follow the development of different actors actions and
intentions before and during the conflict,
and demonstrate how this conflict could have been prevented.
Furthermore, this piece will also
consider how the conflict could have been resolved through
concerted diplomacy and economic
pressure. To put it another way, this piece will look at how and
why the Iraq-Kuwait conflict
happened, the process by which it escalated, and how it could
have been avoided.
These issues are discussed in five parts. The first section
deals with the theoretical
framework that is at the root of this analysis. It begins by
considering some of the key
historiographical workswritten by Walid Khalidi, Efraim Karsh,
Lawrence Freedman, Peter
Slugget, and Shahram Chubinthat have informed this piece. It
then considers the rationalist
explanations for war as explained by James Fearon. It goes on to
explain Fearon and Jessica
Weekss work on signaling, Robert Jerviss work on misperception,
and how they relate to
understanding this conflict. It will then consider the role of
myths, particularly building off of
Jack Snyders work on mythmaking. Finally, a discussion of how
Iraqs actions can be viewed
from both a defensive realistas exemplified by the work of
Kenneth Waltzand an offensive
realist perspectiveas exemplified by the work of John
Mearsheimerwill be discussed.
The next section deals with the historical background to the
conflict. This section outlines
the historical development of both Iraq and Kuwait from Ottoman
rule to British control, and
finally independence. It also discusses the United States
history in the Middle East from
President Franklin D. Roosevelt to President Ronald Reagan. The
section will highlight some of
the key themes of U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East
during this period, particularly its
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attempts to contain the Soviet Union, protect Israel, and secure
oil resources.6 The goal of this
section will not be to give an exhaustive historical background,
but rather to establish the basic
information needed to understand the subsequent analysis.
The next section considers the prelude to the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait. It starts with an
analysis of the period from the end of the Iran-Iraq War to June
1989 and then moves on to look
at the July Crisis. The period before the July Crisis was the
gestation period of the conflict. It
was during this time that Iraq began to suffer serious economic
problems, while it also failed at
its attempts to air and rectify its grievances towards other
Arab states. The July Crisis was the
critical period during which Saddam clearly signaled his
intentionsas did the United States
and was a lost moment for a responsible, diplomatic resolution
to the Iraq-Kuwait dispute.
The penultimate section considers the immediate series of events
after Iraq invaded
Kuwait and how this shaped the crisis. This section considers
the initial reaction to the invasion
of Kuwait, the first week of the conflict, American
considerations, and the escalation of the
conflict. The initial reaction to the invasion was international
condemnation without a set policy
for dealing with Iraqs aggression. The first week after the
invasion was the critical formative
period in the conflict. Regional actors were unable to resolve
the dispute diplomatically and
increasingly turned to the United States for direction. The U.S.
had to consider the international
and regional implications of the Iraqi invasion and quickly
developed a hard-line strategy to deal
with Iraqs aggression. This strategy was articulated in
President George H.W. Bushs speech to
6 Richard K. Herrmann, US Policy in the Conflict in
International Perspectives on the Gulf Conflict, 1990-91, ed.
Alex Danchev and Dan Keohane, (New York: St. Martins Press in
association with St. Antonys College, Oxford, 1994), p.107.
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the nation on August 8, 1990, which escalated the conflict to
the point where a military
confrontation was made all but inevitable.7
The final section posits an alternative, diplomatic approach to
dealing with the crisis.
This section looks at how preventive diplomacy could have
preempted an Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait, and then how mixed diplomacy could have been used once
the conflict was already
underway. The key aspects of preventive diplomacy that should
have been employed were
aggressive diplomatic negotiations over the outstanding issues
between Iraq and its neighbors,
and clear signaling from the United States that it would not
tolerate an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
Once the conflict was underway, a regional resolution should
have been more aggressively
pursued and backdoor diplomacy by the United States should have
also been tried. Finally,
sanctions should have been given more time to produce results.
Although numerous critics
such as Robert Papehave challenged the efficacy of sanctions,
this would have been a
preferable alternative to the use of force to eject Iraq from
Kuwait.
To recapitulate, it is the argument of this piece that every
major actor is to blame for the
Iraq-Kuwait war and that misperception, signaling errors, and
competing intentions caused this
conflict. It is clear that Iraqs invasion of Kuwait was an
unjustifiable attempt to resolve an inter-
state dispute through the use of military force. It is also true
that both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia
could have more aggressively dealt with their outstanding
disputes with Iraq before the conflict
spiraled out of control. More importantly, if the United States
had changed its uniform policy of
signaling neutrality towards Iraq before its invasion of Kuwait
it could havecoupled with
vigorous diplomacyprevented this conflict. If either the United
Statesthrough back channel
7 By taking a hard stand on this issue, I argue that President
Bush passed what James Fearon calls a unique event
horizon, i.e. he passed a level of escalation after which the
audience costs were too high to back down. This issue will be
discussed at length later on in this piece. For more on this issue
see Fearons article, Domestic Political Audiences and the
Escalation of International Disputes.
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diplomacyor regional actors had seriously attempted to limit the
extent of the conflict once it
was underway and before policy positions had ossified, then it
would have been possible to eject
Iraq from Kuwait without the use of force. This piece aims to
both dispel the myths surrounding
the conflict and also show how diplomacy, proper signaling, and
a realistic assessment of states
intentions could have solved this conflict peacefully. The more
ambitious goal of this piece is to
argue that soft power can not only be a more effective policy of
statecraft than hard power, but
that its costs are significantly less, particularly since the
unknown blowback of military
intervention can have devastating consequences. The opportunity
for a peaceful, diplomatic
resolution to inter-state disputes is an increasingly important
task in our unipolar world.
Theoretical Framework
This piece is based on a theoretical framework developed by
several different political
scientists and historians. In this section, their arguments will
be outlined and relevance to this
piece will be explained. The key historiographical pieces this
work builds off of will be
discussed first, followed by a discussion of the rationalist
explanations for war. Next, there will
be a discussion of the importance of signaling and misperception
in this conflict. Finally, the role
of mythmaking will be considered as well as the realist
perspectives on the conflict.
Historiography
There has been considerable debate over why Iraq decided to
invade Kuwait. The most
significant cause of the invasion was because of Iraqs debt
crisis. On top of that, there were
geopoliticial considerations, the actions of regional and
international actors, and the failure of
diplomacy. This section will consider the reasons why Iraq chose
to invade Kuwait from the
perspectives of the historian Walid Khalidi, the Middle East
experts Efraim Karsh and Lawrence
Freedman, the historian Peter Slugget, and the scholar Shahram
Chubin. It will conclude by
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situating this piece with the works of these authors, and
explain how this piece develops an
additional framework for understanding this conflict.
On the broadest level, Walid Khalidi takes the A. J. P. Taylor
approach to analyzing the
conflict, namely that it has profound and particular causes.8 In
his article, The Gulf Crisis:
Origins and Consequences, he lays out four general cause and two
particular causes for the
conflict. In terms of the general causes, he lists the failure
of democracy in the Arab world, the
failure over the past two decades of the Arab political system,
the absence of a moral center of
gravity in the Arab world, and the extreme military imbalance
between Iraq and Kuwait. As for
the particular causes, he lists the mood of Saddam after the
Iran-Iraq war and the interaction of
his mood with the grievance held by Iraq against Kuwait. His
analysis tracks the causes and
alternatives to the conflict and provides the most
comprehensiveand succinctanalysis that
has been written on the conflict thus far.
Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh discuss in their book, The
Gulf Conflict 1990-91,
the causes, alternatives, and strategies of the conflict. The
strongest arguments in this work are
their analysis of the complex signals the U.S. sent to Iraq
prior to the conflict and the economic
problems crisis in Iraq. Whereas the relationship between Saudi
Arabia and Iraq is difficult to
understand given the dearth of public records between the
countries, the massive collection of
public documents on U.S.-Iraqi interactions provided excellent
data on the relationship between
these two countries. Their central pointand one that is
reiterated in this pieceis the strong
economic reasons for why Iraq invaded Kuwait.
Peter Slugget describes the baseless claims on Kuwait made first
by the Ottoman Empire
and then Iraq in his article, The Resilience of a Frontier:
Ottoman and Iraqi Claims to Kuwait,
8 Khalidi, The Gulf Crisis: Origins and Consequences, p. 5.
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1871-1990. He explains in detail how Kuwait developed as a small
port city, became a nominal
sub-district of Basra under Ottoman control from 1871-99, and
then became essentially a British
protectorate until independence. He explains how Iraq repeatedly
lodged claims on Kuwait in
1938, 1961, and 1990 and how these claims were dubious at best,
and represent the porous
nature of Arab nationalism in the post-Ottoman era.
Shahram Chubin analyzes the regional determinants of the war in
his article, Regional
Politics and the Conflict. He argues that a regional environment
can be seen as permissive,
constraining, or neutral. He ultimately argues that regional
politics and the balance-of-power
encouraged Iraq to attack Kuwait.9 He points out that Iraqs
goals were regionally based, namely
money and access to the Gulf. He makes a persuasive case that
Saddams logic on the regional
level was sound, and that his strategy could have worked had he
guaranteed a steady supply of
oil and not threatened Saudi Arabia. He concludes that Iraq
could have been successful in its
attack against Kuwait, but that Iraqs bid for regional hegemony
was undermined by other
regional actorsnamely Saudi Arabia and Kuwaitthat appealed to
outside actors for support.
This piece draws heavily from each of these writings. This work
will build off Khalidis
explanation of the causes of the conflict and show how they
could have been dealt with
differently, and how a peaceful resolution to the conflict could
have been possible. The
importance of economics as described in Freedman and Karshs book
is a central argument of
this piece. This work will also demonstrate the illegitimacy of
Saddams ex post facto claims on
Kuwait based on Peter Slugetts article. Finally, this piece will
develop the arguments from
Chubins piece and demonstrate how this conflict could have been
resolved regionally. This
piece will go beyond all of these works by using different
international relations theoriesthat
9 Chubin, Regional Politics and the Conflict, p. 2.
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will be discussed in subsequent sectionsto help explain how this
conflict happened and how it
could have been prevented or deescalated.
Rationalist Explanation for War
One of the foundational premises of this piece is the
rationalist explanation for war as
posited by the political scientist, James Fearon, in his piece,
Rationalist Explanations for War.
A basic assumption of that piece is that leaders are rational,
and that since it is costly and risky to
wage war, states prefer negotiated settlements to conflicts.
Fearon explains that there have
traditionally been five accepted rationalist explanations for
war: 1) anarchy; 2) expected benefits
greater than expected costs; 3) rational preventive war; 4)
rational miscalculation due to lack of
information; 5) rational miscalculation or disagreement about
relative power.10
He argues that
none of these arguments adequately explain the rationalist
reasons for war and instead argues
that there are three fundamental mechanisms that do: 1) leaders
have private information about
relative capabilities or resolve and incentives to misrepresent
such information; 2) commitment
problems where mutually preferable bargains are unattainable
because one or more states has an
incentive to renege on the terms of a particular agreement; 3)
issue indivisibility, where
compromise on a specific issue is unacceptable. He puts
particular emphasis on the first two
causal mechanisms as the central rationalist explanations for
war.
The first explanation offered by Fearoni.e. that leaders have
private information about
relative capabilities or resolve and incentives to misrepresent
such informationis the most
relevant point for this piece. As will be shown, private
information shared between the U.S. and
Iraq was critical in Iraqs planning against Kuwait. For example,
the June 25th private meeting
between the U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie and Saddam Hussein was
viewed by Iraq as a
10
Fearon, Rationalist Explanations for War, p. 381.
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green light to invade Kuwait. This private information was used
as a critical component of
Iraqs cost/benefit analysis on whether or not to invade
Kuwait.
The foundational assumption that rational actors will not wage
war if the risks are too
high is used throughout this analysis. Events like the Glaspie
interview made it appear to Iraq
that the costs of waging war against Kuwait were manageable,
particularly since the U.S.
appeared to give its tacit approval. However, if the U.S. had
made it clear to Iraq that the costs of
invading Kuwait would have been higher than the benefits, then
it is highly probable that Iraq
would have preferred a negotiated settlement to the crisis.
Signaling and Misperception
Another key issue is the role that signaling and misperception
played in shaping this
conflict. Signaling is a key part of how states project their
actions to other states, what states
interests are, and how states are likely to react to others. A
variety of factors are involved in
determining how and why states act in a particular way; however,
what is important to recognize
are the consequences of signaling. By explaining the costs
associated with signaling for both
democracies and autocracies, this section will show the
importance it played for the United
States and Iraq. Furthermore, the role of misperception in
shaping conflicts will also be
considered.
One way to gauge the significance of signaling is to consider
the extensive work done on
this issue by James Fearon.11
In his article, Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation
of
International Disputes, Fearon discusses how leaders decide to
respond to crises. He argues that
leaders have three choices to deal with crisesattack, back down,
or escalateand that whoever
11
For more see Fearon: Domestic Political Audiences and the
Escalation of International Disputes.; Signaling Foreign Policy
Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs.; and Signaling versus
the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis
Bargaining Model.
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backs down suffers audience costs. The audience cost refers to
the domestic political cost of
choosing one of these options. If a crisis goes too far, backing
down can have serious domestic
political repercussions. One of the key consequences of Fearons
argument is that democracies
signal their foreign policy intentions better than autocracies,
primarily due to the audience cost of
backing down. His argument directly applies to the way the U.S.
reacted to Iraqs invasion. By
the time President Bush delivered his speech on August 8th
, 1990, he signaled that the U.S.
would sustain its pressure against Iraq until it made a full and
unconditional withdrawal from
Kuwait. By drawing this line in the sand, President Bush made
the audience cost of backing
down from his position too high. Therefore, by this point in
time, it was inevitable that the U.S.
would remain involved in the Iraq-Kuwait conflict until Iraq had
made a full withdrawal. As
Fearon pointed out, a crisis can only go so far before the
horizon costi.e. the level of escalation
after which neither side will back down because the audience
costs are too highmakes war
inevitable.12
Signaling also plays an important role in determining the
audience costs of autocratic
regimes. In her article, Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type
and Signaling Resolve,
Jessica Weeks explains that autocracies also face audience
costs, specifically from domestic
elites who function in the same way that voting publics do in
democracies.13
Her argument is that
there are strong audience costs for autocratic leaders who back
down from publicly declared
positions. This directly applies to the situation in Iraq.
Saddam gradually escalated his
confrontation with Kuwait and, once he had publically committed
to dealing with Kuwait
through hard power, the domestic audience costs of de-escalation
would have been too high to
12
Fearon, Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of
International Disputes, p. 577. 13
Jessica L. Weeks, Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and
Signaling Resolve in International Organization, Volume 62, No. 3
(Winter 2008), p. 36.
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prevent a war. Furthermore, once President Bush delivered the
ultimatum for an unconditional
withdrawal, the domestic audience costs for Saddam to withdraw
were too high to prevent a
conflict.
The role that misperception of intentions plays in causing
conflict is another significant
issue. Misperception of intentions played one of the most
important roles in causing this
particular conflict and is best understood by considering Robert
Jerviss seminal work on this
issue. In his book, Perception and Misperception in
International Politics, Jervis explains how
perception shapes politics. On the most basic level, perception
consists of images, beliefs and
intentions, and it plays the key role in the decision-making
process of states. Perception is
formed based on the information a state has on other states
reaction to their actions.
Misperception of other actors intentionsas caused by either
purposeful or unintentional
misreading of informationis a central cause for conflict.
Saddams interpretation of U.S.
signaling before the invasion of Kuwait appears to be an
unintentional misreading of
information, while it is indeterminate whether or not the U.S.
interpretation of Saddams
signaling was unintentional or purposeful misreading of
information.
Myths
The role that myths play in causing conflict is also discussed
in this piece using some of
Jack Snyders arguments in Myths of Empire. Snyder attempts to
explain why so many industrial
great powers have attempted to seek security through expansion.
He explains that overexpansion
occurs because of the relationship between strategic concepts
and their functions as ideologies in
domestic politics. Snyder basically argues that some
statesparticularly industrializing great
powersseek security through expansion based on imperial myths.
He puts an emphasis on how
domestic politics and affect states actions in the international
system. He explains that elites
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have material reasons for imperial expansion and that they
manipulate ideology to justify their
expansion. Myths are created to justify expansion and these in
turn eventually take on a life of
their own.
The relevance of his work to this piece lies in two areas.
First, although Iraq was not a
major power, it still sought security through expansion, and had
a material reason for doing so.
Iraq purposefully ignored the countervailing tendencies of
balance-of-power politics because of
its desire for security, and its desire for material gain
through expansion. Second, mythmaking
played a key role in shaping different actors actions, which
served to exacerbate tensions and
escalate the conflict.
A secondary level of analysis running throughout this piece will
be to consider and
debunk some of the popular myths that surround this
conflict.14
This analysis will pave the way
for a better understanding of each actors perceptions and
decision-making processes and the
ways it impacted the development of this crisis. One of the most
popular myths propagated by
the U.S. government and mass media was that Saddam Hussein was
an irrational tyrant who was
determined to attack Kuwait.15
This piece will show that not only was Saddam a rational
actor,
but that his actions toward Kuwait were consistent with his
belief that inactionprimarily
because of the economic crisis that Iraq facedwas an existential
threat to his regime. A realistic
assessment of Saddams intentions prior to the invasion further
buttresses this point and shows
that his behavior and actions are consistent with the offensive
realist perspective of a rational,
14
As discussed previously, part of my discussion will be based on:
Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics
and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1991). 15
There are numerous examples that I could cite, but to merely
represent this issue see: Flora Lewis, Fruits of Appeasement, The
New York Times, August 4, 1990. This is the earliest article that I
have found that makes an explicit comparison between Saddam Hussein
and Adolph Hitler. For example, here is the quote from the article
that
makes the Hitler comparison: That is why [Saddams] invasion of
Kuwait, proving his insatiable ambition, has led to so many
European commentators to remember Hitler. By portraying Saddam as
Hitler, the media and government were attempting to demonstrate
that he was an irrational expansionist and that, therefore, it
was
important for the United States to forcefully respond to his
actions.
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power-maximizing actor. Another myth propagated by the U.S.
government and mass media was
that Saddam was a committed expansionist who was either planning
an attack on Saudi Arabia,
or could possibly have done so in the future.16
This piece will demonstrate that Saddam had only
limited territorial ambitions and was not a realistic long-term
threat to Saudi Arabia. Based on
the documentary evidence that will be provided, it seems highly
unlikely that he was planning an
immediate attack on Saudi Arabia or had any future plans to
attack the Kingdom. If this myth is
false, then this undermines one of the central reasons for the
U.S. response to the invasion of
Kuwait, namely the protection of Saudi Arabia. The corollary to
this mythwhich was also
propagated by the U.S. government and media17was that Saddam
could not have been
contained.18
It will be shown that Saddam could have been contained and that
it is at least
possible that sanctions could have worked to eject Iraq from
Kuwait given enough time and
pressure. Another myth that will be dispelled is Saddams ex post
facto historical claim on
Kuwait. It will be shown that this claim was an invented
anachronism that was a false attempt to
16
As with the pervious myth, there are numerous examples that I
could cite to illustrate this point. For a good
example of this, see: Michael R. Gordon, Iraq Bolsters Invasion
Force, Adding to Worry on Saudis, The New York Times, August 4,
1990. This description in the piece shows that the U.S. was already
playing up fears of the
potential for Iraqi aggression against Saudi Arabia and that
this was a major strategic concern for the U.S.
government: There were conflicting reports about the size of the
Iraqi military force in Kuwait, but one Pentagon official estimated
late today that it was approaching 100,000 troops, far more than
Iraq needs to pacify and occupy
Kuwait. The new deployments and other Iraqi moves heightened
concern among American officials that the Iraqi
President, Saddam Hussein, might be contemplating an attack on
Saudi Arabia, despite an Iraqi announcement today
that it plans to begin withdrawing troops from Kuwait on Sunday.
An intelligence estimate reviewed by Pentagon
officials has concluded that the scale of Iraqs attack on Kuwait
suggests that it has not ruled out military moves against Saudi
Arabia. Another good example can be found in: Richard Haass, War of
Necessity, War of Choice (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009). In
particular, on page 72 he said, If the Iraqis had so chosen, [early
August] was their moment for gaining control of some or even all of
Saudi Arabia. 17
As with all of these myths, there are numerous examples that
could be cited. For a good example, see: Editorial,
Enlisting the Saudis in Their Own Defense, The New York Times,
August 7, 1990. The article notes that: No policy to contain Saddam
Hussein, let alone force Iraq to resume the status quo ante in
Kuwait, can work without
active support from Saudi ArabiaAppeasement may work in the
short run. Over the long term, either Iraq or some other ambitious
neighbor will kick down a house so weak that it fears to defend
itself even with substantial help. The
West could never successfully prop up such an ally, and
eventually Saudi Arabia would find itself alone. If the
Saudis want to preserve their independence, they need to stand
with their friends, now. 18
This issue was revived in the run-up to the second Gulf War.
See: John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, Can Saddam Be Contained?
History Says Yes, Paper, Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, November 12, 2002. That piece demonstrated
systematically how Saddam was a rational actor who constantly
weighed the
costs and benefits of any actions before making any
decision.
-
15
gain a veneer of legitimacy for his illegal annexation of
Kuwait. Finally, this piece will challenge
the myth perpetuated by some U.S. government officials that the
United States sent mixed
signals to Iraq before it invaded Kuwait.19
In actuality, the U.S. sent consistent signals to Iraq
that it would stay out of a conflict between Iraq and Kuwait
during the run-up to its invasion,
signals that were consistent from every branch of the U.S.
government.20
Realist Perspective
The Iraq-Kuwait conflict can fit into several different
theoretical frameworks. One of the
most popular frameworks for understanding this conflict has been
to describe it in terms of
defensive realism and offensive realism.21
This section will outline the key arguments in this
interpretation of the conflict.
Realism is a theory based on belief that anarchy reigns supreme
in international politics.
The defensive realist Kenneth Waltz explains in his book, Theory
of International Politics, that
because of the anarchical nature of international politics,
states central focus is to survive. War
is a natural feature of this system, particularly since there is
no single state that can prevent other
states from going to war. The key to survival is either internal
state balancingthrough
economic growth or military buildupor external balancingsuch as
through the formation of
alliances. Power is the central influence in the system and
states try to increase their power if
19
There was a wide-ranging discussion in the media and U.S.
government about this issue. For an example, see
Andrew Rosenthal, Did U.S. Overtures Give Wrong Idea to Hussein,
The New York Times, September 18, 1990. 20
This issue will be discussed extensively later on in this piece.
In particular, the key focus will be on a few
particular events such as the State Departments statement on
July 24, 1990 that the U.S. had no defensive treaty with Kuwait; on
the 25
th the U.S. Ambassador April Glaspies meeting with Saddam
Hussein; the letter sent by
President Bush on the 28th
calling for strong ties with Iraq; and the C.I.A.s prewar
assessment of Iraqi intentions. 21
See: Hamdi A. Hassan The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Religion,
Identity and Otherness in the Analysis of War and
Conflict (London; Sterling, Virginia: Pluto Press, 1999). In
this book, he discusses conflict from a realist,
institutional, and reflective perspective. He explains that the
realist framework for interpreting this conflict
extensively in Chapter 2 of the book.
-
16
possible. Weak states are at a disadvantage in this system since
the powerful states can affect
them through coercion.
Were Iraqs actions towards Kuwait rational from Waltzs defensive
realist perspective?
The answer is no. Waltz bases his perspective on a
balance-of-power theory where states first
concern is to maintain their position in the system, not to
maximize power.22
The reason for this
is that states can seldom afford to make maximizing power their
goal; thus, states attempt to
balance power instead.23
From this perspective, Saddams actions were irrational because
he was
purposefully upsetting the balance-of-power in favor of a power
maximizing position. When a
state tries to maximize its power, other states balance against
it. Therefore, it was natural for the
U.S. to reset the balance-of-power to the status quo ante.
The offensive realist position argues that the structure of the
system causes war and
competition. John Mearsheimer explains in his book, The Tragedy
of Great Power Politics, that
the best way for states to achieve survival is to be the
dominant state. States are inevitably in
conflict with one another and the ability to possess offensive
military capabilities allows for
states to achieve power maximization. Not only do states want to
survive, but they also want to
be the dominant state in the system. But since most states cant
become the dominant state in the
entire system, they will try to aim for regional hegemony.
Were Iraqs actions towards Kuwait rational from Mearsheimers
offensive realist
perspective? The answer is yes. Mearsheimer bases his
perspective on a balance-of-power theory
where states would ideally like to be the hegemon in the
system.24
States look for opportunities
to alter the balance-of-power by acquiring additional increments
of power at the expense of
22
Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading,
Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1979), p.
126. 23
Ibid., p. 127. 24
John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New
York: Norton, 2001), p. 34.
-
17
potential rivals through a variety of ways, such as through
economic, diplomatic, and military
leverage.25
From this perspective, Saddams actions were rational because he
was trying to alter
the balance-of-power in his favor, and the benefits seemed to
outweigh the costs. As Hassan
Hamdi describes it:
First, the relationship between Iraq and Kuwait could fit
perfectly into a power
preponderance framework, in the sense that Kuwait, as a much
weaker and vastly richer
neighbor, seemed at one point to be attractive booty for its
resentful, egoistic, power-
maximizing neighbor. Thus, for the Iraqi leadership harsh
economic problems are on the
way towards being solved; a geostrategic outlet to the deep
water of the Persian Gulf, and
the achievement of the much-longed-for political hegemony in the
Gulf region and the
Arab world, seemed to be imminent and forthcoming.26
From this perspective, it would seem that Iraqs actions were the
natural objective that any
rational offensive realist would choose to pursue.
Iraqs invasion of Kuwait can be interpreted differently
depending on which realist
perspective one takes. From the defensive realist perspective,
Iraqs actions could be viewed as a
mistake because it upset the balance-of-power by trying to
maximize its power. From the
offensive realist perspective, Iraqs actions were reasonable,
particularly since it was trying to
maximize its power and felt the benefits of its actions
outweighed its costs. Both perspectives
rely on a self-help interpretation of international relations,
but view states actions differently
depending on which theoretical framework they operate under.
Ultimately, even if Saddam
believed he was taking a calculated risk in attempting to
achieve power maximization, the
consequence was a countervailing coalition against his invasion
that reestablished the status quo
ante.
Historical Background
25
Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 34. 26
Hassan, The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Religion, Identity and
Otherness in the Analysis of War and Conflict, p. 6.
-
18
The conflict between Iraq and Kuwait has deep historical roots.
Both countries share a
common heritage of being ruled, first by the Ottoman Empire and
then by the British Empire.
After World War I, both countries developed into nascent
nation-states. Iraq gained its
independence from Britain in 1932 and Kuwait gained its
independence in 1961. Iraqi
nationalists, starting in the 1920s, called for the unification
of Iraq and Kuwait based on their
shared historical, cultural, ethnic, religious and linguistic
heritage. This call for unity was never
realized and was blocked, first by Britain, and later by a
U.S.-led multinational coalition.
This section considers the deep historical background to the
Iraq-Kuwait conflict. Since
Saddam Husseins ex post facto claim on Kuwait was based on
alleged historical ties between
the two countries, it is critical to understand the actual
historical link between these two states,
and whether or not there was any merit to his claims.
Furthermore, many of the disputed issues
between Iraq and Kuwait derive from this historical period,
particularly issues surrounding state
boundaries and territory. This section will first consider the
regions development from Ottoman
control through British domination. Next, it will consider Iraq
and Kuwaits history from July
1958 to August 1988. Finally, it will briefly analyze the
overarching themes of American policy
towards the Middle East in general.
From Ottoman Control to British Domination
The Ottoman Empire ruled the areas that would become Iraq and
Kuwait with varying
degrees of control for about four centuries. The key Ottoman
administrative cities that would
make up Iraq were Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul. Kuwait, on the
other hand, was founded in 1705
and was only nominally under Ottoman control during parts of the
nineteenth century. The
territory was a sub-district of Basra towards the end of the
nineteenth century, but it gradually
moved away from the Ottomans in favor of a closer relationship
with the British.
-
19
Britains grand strategy towards the Middle East in the decades
prior to World War I
focused on considerations towards India and oil. Both Iraq and
Kuwait played into these vital
interests. In terms of Iraq, Britains interests lay in its
ability to protect the route to India and,
later, its oil resources.27
In terms of Kuwait, Britains primary interest was to maintain
control
over the Persian Gulf waterway.28
It is important to emphasize, however, that British oil
interests
were quite limited on this point. The first major British oil
company in the region, the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company, was formed in 1909 and the discovery and
exploitation of oil as a
commercial resource developed very slowly over the next
decade.29
The dynamics of the region radically changed due to World War I.
Britain invaded Iraq
and fought against the Ottoman Empire across the Middle East.
The ruler of Kuwait sided with
Britain and decided Kuwait was to be 'recognized as an
independent principality under British
protection.30 In 1916, the British and French agreed in the
secret Sykes-Picot agreement to
divide the Middle East between them after the conclusion of the
war. Although the British had
made a series of promises to Arab nationalists that they would
support their independence after
the war, the reality was that Britain wanted to retain control
over the Middle East for as long as
possible in order to buttress its empire. Consequently, Britain
was given a mandate after the war
over several Arab countries, including Iraq.
During the 1920s, the boundaries for the states of Iraq and
Kuwait were drawn. In 1921,
Iraq was created out of the union of the Baghdad and Basra
territories and Mosul was added five
years later. As for Kuwait, the 1922 Treaty of Uqair set Kuwaits
border with Saudi Arabia.
27
Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq since 1958: From
Revolution to Dictatorship (3rd
Ed.; New York:
I.B. Tauris, 2001), p. 8. 28
Sluglett, The Resilience of a Frontier: Ottoman and Iraqi Claims
to Kuwait, 1871-1990, p. 797. This policy was not just aimed at
Kuwait but also other small Persian Gulf states such as Qatar and
the U.A.E. 29
Ibid., p. 798. 30
Francis H. Hinsley, British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1977), p. 439.
-
20
Between February and April of 1923, the northern frontier was
created with Iraq and the two
main islands, Bubiyan and Warba, were assigned to Kuwait.31
The nature of British control over Iraq and Kuwait changed in
the 1930s. Iraq gained
independence from Britain in 1932 and, at the same time, there
was a debate over the future of
Kuwait. Iraq wanted it incorporated into its newly independent
state but the rulers of Kuwait
were split on the issue. They eventually decided not to join
Iraq and to remain under the
protection of Britain. However, over the next couple of years,
Iraq would try to pressure Kuwait
to join it. In September 1938, on a visit to London, the Iraqi
foreign minister, Tawfiq al-
Suwaydi, requested that Kuwait be incorporated into Iraq;
however, his request was denied.32
This would be the last time Iraq would push for the
incorporation of Kuwait into its territory
until 1961.
Iraq and Kuwait from July 1958 to August 1988
The Hashemite monarchy that ruled Iraq was overthrown in a
military coup in July of
1958. These popular uprisings brought Brigadier General Abdul
Karim Qassim to power and he
remained in control of Iraq until 1963. During this period, Iraq
maintained cordial relations with
Kuwait until 1961.
Kuwait had historically preferred a strong relationship towards
Great Britain, but during
the worldwide decolonization movement, it too gradually moved
towards independence from
Britain. Kuwait was granted independence on June 19, 1961, which
was a turning point in its
relations with Iraq. By June 25, 1961, Iraq had decided to annex
Kuwait and did so based on an
alleged historical claim. However, these claims were extremely
weak as the Ottoman historian
Frederick F. Anscombe notes:
31
Sluglett, The Resilience of a Frontier: Ottoman and Iraqi Claims
to Kuwait, 1871-1990, p. 800. 32
Ibid., p. 805.
-
21
[O]n the fundamental issue of political status, Kuwait was
indeed Ottoman but was neither integrated into, nor dependent upon,
Ottoman Iraq. Kuwait did have social and
economic links to southern Iraq - but they were just part of a
wider network of relations
that also tied Iraq to much of the Arabian Peninsula, the rest
of the Gulf, and India.33
It is important to note that these same claims would be
reiterated by Saddam Hussein in August
of 1990 when he tried to annex Kuwait. In 1961, Britain sent
troops to defend the territorial
integrity of Kuwait and later Arab League troops came for
support. Because of British and Arab
support for Kuwait, Iraq was forced to renounce its claims on
Kuwait. By 1963, Iraq had
formally recognized Kuwait and established full diplomatic
relations with it.
In 1963, a nationalist coup in Iraq overthrew the Qassim regime
and the Baath Party
come to power. In 1968, Saddam Hussein participated in a coup
that overthrew the government
and installed Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr as the President of Iraq,
with Saddam as his deputy.
Saddam was the key power broker in Iraq and eventually became
President in July 1979. Upon
gaining full control of the country, he launched a purge of the
Baath party and established a
highly authoritarian regime based on a cult of personality. At
the same time, the Iranian
revolution was seen as a destabilizing factor for his regime,
particularly since revolutionary
Shiite Iran was thought to be supporting radical Shiite elements
in Iraq. The perceived threat of
Iran led Saddam to launch a preventive war against it on
September 22, 1980.
The Iran-Iraq War provides excellent insight into the psychology
of Saddam Hussein.
Saddam was extremely reluctant to go to war with Iran, but felt
that the only way to contain it
was to exploit Irans temporary weakness following the Iranian
revolution.34 Saddam took a
calculated risk with limited political goalsnamely to capture
the Shatt al-Arab and a small
portion of Khuzistanbecause he believed that Iran was both an
existential threat to Iraq and
33
Frederick F. Anscombe, The Ottoman Gulf: The Creation of Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia, and Qatar (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1997), p. x. 34
Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, Saddam Hussein: A Political
Biography (New York: Grove Press), p. 147.
-
22
vulnerable because of the revolution. He perceived that his
political survival lie in the balance
and looked at the immediate threat as he saw it.35
From Saddams perspective, he was acting as a
rational actor as the political psychologist Jerold M. Post
notes:
When [Saddam] pursues a course of action he pursues it fully,
and if he meets initial resistance he struggles all the harder,
convinced of the correctness of his judgments. But
if circumstances demonstrate that he miscalculatedwhich he often
hashe is capable of reversing course.36
With the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam realized early on that he had
grossly miscalculated. On
September 28, 1980, less than a week after the outbreak of
hostilities, he offered peace talks with
Iran.37
He did so in response to UN Security Council Resolution 479 that
called for an immediate
cease fire, which Saddam accepted and Iran rejected.38
By 1982, he actively tried to sue for
peace with the Iranians and had withdrawn his forces to the
internationally recognized border
between the two countries. By that point, however, things
spiraled beyond his control and the
Iran-Iraq War would continue on for another six long,
devastating years.
During the expensive conflict, Kuwait and other Arab states
provided loans to Iraq.
Kuwait had been the key provider and loaned it $35 billion over
the course of the war.39
In
comparison, Saudi Arabia had loaned Iraq $27 billion.40
By the end of the war, Iraq had incurred
an enormous amount of debt and was in severe financial
difficulties. In total, Iraq had compiled
an estimated $80 billion dollars in foreign debt.41
35
Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography, p. 149.
36
Jerrold M. Post, The Defining Moment of Saddams Life: A
Political Psychology Perspective on the Leadership and Decision
Making of Saddam Hussein During the Gulf Crisis in The Political
Psychology of the Gulf War: Leaders, Publics, and the Process of
Conflict, ed. Stanley A. Renshon, (Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press,
1993), p. 52. 37
Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography, p. 157.
38
Nasser I. Rashid and Esber I. Shaheen, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf
War (Joplin, Missouri: International Institute of
Technology), p. 120. 39
Chubin, Regional Politics and the Conflict, p. 9. 40
Rashid and Shaheen, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf War, p. 121.
41
Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq (2nd
Ed.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 248.
-
23
American Policy in the Middle East
The United States has a long history in the Middle East and its
primary interest in the
region has historically been oil. At the beginning of the
twentieth century, several U.S. firms
such as Standard Oil of California (SoCal)signed agreements with
different oil producing
states in the Middle East. The major firm that acted as the
successor to SoCal, the Arabian-
American Oil Company (Aramco), established a series of important
oil agreements with Saudi
Arabia. These agreements bound American oil interests with the
Saudi Arabian regime. The
House of Saud was explicitly supported by President Franklin D.
Roosevelt and oil became the
backbone of the nascent Saudi-U.S. strategic relationship.42
After World War II, the Middle East
gained a new prominence for U.S. policy makers.
The three key objectives that determined U.S. policy in the Cold
War era were oil,
protecting Israels security, and containing Soviet influence.43
There has been much debate over
which of these issues was most important for U.S. policy makers.
At different points in time, one
issue or another gained prominence, but each played an important
role in shaping U.S. policy
towards the region.
As for oil, it became the vital export that fundamentally shaped
U.S. policy in the region.
The Middle East went from providing only 10 percent of the
worlds oil production in 1945 to 25
percent by the 1960s.44
Oil was of such vital strategic concern that the C.I.A. even
sponsored a
1953 coup in Iran against the democratically elected government
leader, Mohammed
42
For more see: Robert Vitalis, Americas Kingdom: Mythmaking on
the Saudi Oil Frontier (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).
43
Herrmann, US Policy in the Conflict, p. 107. 44
Peter R. Odell, The Significance of Oil in Journal of
Contemporary History, Special Middle East Issue, Volume 3, No. 3,
(July 1968), p. 96.
-
24
Mossadegh, because he had threatened to nationalize Irans oil
resources.45 By 1970, President
Richard Nixon developed a new strategic policy toward the Middle
East in his National Security
Study Memorandum 66 entitled, Future U.S. Policy in the Persian
Gulf.46 This memorandum
established a twin pillars policy in which the U.S. would
provide arms and support to both
Saudi Arabia and Iran in order to keep stability in the region.
After the Iranian revolution,
President Carters administration promulgated a new doctrine in
his State of the Union address:
Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside
force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded
as an assault on the vital interests of the United
States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any
means necessary, including
military force.47
The Carter Doctrine was used in part to justify the United
States use of force against Iraq in the
first Gulf War.
The U.S. also actively tried to curb Soviet influence in the
region. The U.S. defined some
regional regimes as moderate and others as radical, depending on
their level of support for
U.S. or Soviet interests.48
The U.S. worked to support the moderate regimes and undermine
the
radical regimes. In order to support moderate regimessuch as
pre-revolutionary Iranthe
U.S. sent arms, aid and advisers to those countries. To counter
radical regimessuch as Nassers
Egyptthe U.S. aimed to contain their influence and actively
supported opposition groups
within those countries. The United States held primary supremacy
over the Soviet Union in the
region throughout the Cold War, a fact that was particularly
evident after the 1973 Arab-Israeli
War.
45
For more see: Mark J. Gasiorowski, The 1953 Coup Detat in Iran
in International Journal of Middle East Studies, Volume 19, No. 3
(August 1987), pp.261-268; Stephen Kinzer, All the Shahs Men
(Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2003). 46
Future U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf, Secret Report NSSM 66,
February 5, 1970, 36 pp. 47
Jimmy Carter, State of the Union Address 1980, January 23, 1980.
48
Herrmann, US Policy in the Conflict, p. 107.
-
25
Support for Israel has always been a fundamental policy
objective for the United States.
The U.S. supported the creation of Israel and has consistently
supported Israeli policies,
particularly since the 1960s. The U.S. has provided extensive
diplomatic support for Israel and
has vetoed dozens of UN Security Council resolutions against
it.49
Furthermore, the U.S. has
provided billions of dollars of military and economic aid. As
Henry Kissinger noted:
The survival and security of Israel are unequivocal and
permanent moral commitments of the United States. Israel is a loyal
friend and a fellow democracy, whose very
existence represents the commitment of all free peoplesWe will
never abandon Israeleither by failing to provide crucial assistance
or by misconceived or separate negotiations or by irresolution when
challenged to meet our own responsibility to
maintain the global balance of power."50
This open declaration of unequivocal support has been sustained
and strengthened since then. As
John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt note in their book, The Israel
Lobby and U.S. Foreign
Policy, support for Israel in American politics is sacrosanct.
They note that the powerful Israel
Lobby has made unconditional support for Israel a fundamental
component of U.S. foreign
policy. They explain that:
Since the Six-Day War of 1967, a salient featureand arguably the
central focusof Americas Middle East policy has been its
relationship with Israel. For the past four decades, in fact, the
United States has provided Israel with a level of material and
diplomatic support that dwarfs what it provides to other
countries. That aid is largely
unconditional: no matter what Israel does, the level of support
remains for the most part
unchanged.51
Israel has long been viewed as Americas most strategic ally in
the region and has received
consistent American support.
49
Saliba Sarsar, The Question of Palestine and United States
Behavior at the United Nations in International Journal of
Politics, Culture, and Society, Volume 17, No. 3 (Spring 2004), p.
466. 50
Henry Kissinger, Israel and the United States, address before
the American Jewish Congress, April 4, 1976, in The Arab-Israeli
Conflict: Readings and Documents, ed. John Norton Moore,
(Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1977), pp. 871-872. 51
John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S.
Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, 2007), p. 7.
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26
Prelude to War
By the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraqs economy was shattered and
in desperate need of
rebuilding. Saddam began to argue that he had contained the
Persian threat for the other Arab
states and was now turning to them for help. Although the
historical record suggests his claims
were dubious at best, he made this argument to elicit both moral
and financial support from other
Arab states. The desperate economic situation was viewed as an
existential threat to Saddams
regime and he moved aggressively to counter this threat, with
the most belligerent steps being
taken against Kuwait.
This section aims to consider the prelude to the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait. This was the
critical period when the push for war was made and numerous
opportunities for peace were
missed. Understanding how and why Iraq decided to go to war
against Kuwait is fundamental to
understanding how easily this war could have been avoided. This
section will first look at the
period from August 1988 to June 1989. It will then analyze the
numerous missteps during the
July Crisis, with a particular emphasis on Iraqi considerations
for invading Kuwait and signaling
errors made by the U.S.
August 1988-June 1989
Upon the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq began to rebuild
its devastated economy.
Economic considerations dominated Iraqs political posturing and
its actions were consistent
with an effort to revive its beleaguered economy. This picture
can best be seen when considering
the state of Iraqs economy, its political reengagement with
other Middle Eastern countries, and
growing tensions with some Arab states during this period.
The state of Iraqs economy in 1988 was deplorable. As the Middle
East experts Karsh
and Rautsi describe it:
-
27
The Iraqi economy was wrecked. Economic estimates put the cost
of reconstruction at $230 billion. Even if one adopted the most
optimistic (and highly unrealistic) assumption
that every dollar of oil revenues would be directed to the
reconstruction effort, it would
require nearly two decades to repair the total damage. As things
stood a year after the
termination of hostilities, Iraqs oil revenues of $13 billion
did not even suffice to cover ongoing expenditures: with civilian
imports approximating $12 billion (of which $3
billion was for foodstuffs), military imports exceeding $5
billion, debt repayments
totaling $5 billion, and transfers by foreign workers topping $1
billion, the regime needed
an extra $10 billion per annum to balance its current deficit,
before it could embark on
the Sisyphean task of reconstruction.52
The economic devastation of Iraq cannot be underestimated. As
these figures show, Iraqs
budget deficit was high, oil revenues were insufficient to pay
its ongoing expenditures, and it
faced a crippling debt crisis. Furthermore, during the war, Iraq
had gone through a period of
economic liberalization that led to high levels of inflation,
unemployment, shortages in basic
foods, growing and highly visible economic inequality, and the
emergence of a brisk black
market in foreign currencies.53 The liberalization of the
economy was coupled with illegal
borrowing strategies that led to a drying up of foreign credit
after the conclusion of the war.54
Without the ability to get credit from other states or
international institutions like the
International Monetary Fund, Saddam felt the acute economic
pressure that threatened his rule.
The economic crisis was seen as an existential threat that could
lead to a revolution or coup
against the regime and thus pushed Saddam into a corner. He had
no choice but to turn to
regional allies for support.
Saddam re-engaged many Arab states after the end of its war with
Iran, but opposed
others. Saddam moved towards a strong engagement with the Arab
League and even received
52
Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography, pp.
201-202. 53
Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, "On the Way to Market: Economic
Liberalization and Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait," in Middle
East Report, No. 170 (May-June 1991), p. 17. 54
Ibid., p. 23.
-
28
their support to block a UN inquiry into the use of chemical
weapons by Iraq.55
Iraq moved
towards greater economic integration with local states such as
Egypt, Jordan and Yemen by
forming the Arab Cooperation Council.56
This was formed in opposition to the Gulf Cooperation
Council, which was led by Saudi Arabia.
Iraq had strained ties with other regional statesparticularly
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and
the United Arab Emiratesover two primary issues: debt and oil
pricing. Iraq wanted these
stateswho held the vast majority of Iraqi debtto forgive its
debt and raise the price of oil.
Saddam calculated that if this happened, Iraq would be able to
avert financial collapse and bring
in more revenue to the state coffers. In order to achieve these
goals, Iraq dealt with each of these
states in different ways. Iraq essentially neutralized any
military threat from Saudi Arabia by
signing a non-aggression pact with it. This allowed Iraq to turn
its attention towards the UAE
and Kuwait, smaller states that were more vulnerable to
coercion. By May of 1990, Iraq was
strongly pressuring both Kuwait and the UAE on the issue of oil
overproduction, and was
ratcheting up its rhetoric and demands against these
countries.
July Crisis
Tensions between Iraq and Kuwait reached a boiling point by July
1990. Iraq was facing
severe economic privations and was loudly proclaiming that
Kuwait was the central cause. The
July Crisis began as a war of words that eventually spun out of
control. The major issues that
destabilized this crisis were oil, Iraqi demands, the Arab and
Kuwaiti response to these demands,
U.S. signaling, and Iraqi intentions.
55
Clyde Haberman, Iraqs Right to Chemical Arms Upheld by Official,
The New York Times, September 16, 1988. 56
Alan Cowell, Arabs are Forming 2 Economic Blocs, The New York
Times, February 17, 1989.
-
29
The price of oil had been fluctuating wildly during 1990. In a
June 1989 meeting of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Kuwait
declared that it wanted to
increase its production output and would not be constrained by a
quota.57
As Geoff Simons
notes:
The other OPEC members, including Iraq, were incensed at the
Kuwaiti attitude, and
over the following months used argument and threat in a vain
attempt to bring Kuwait
back in line. The overproduction continued and in early 1990 the
price dropped to below
$18 for the first time since the previous summer. Following
further efforts by Saddam
Hussein to stabilize oil prices, the Kuwaiti oil minister
declared that OPEC quotas should
be scrapped as soon as possible. Both Saddam and King Hussein of
Jordan continued to
lobby other OPEC members, but to no avail. Kuwait and the UAE
continued to produce
as they wished, to the point that the price per barrel sank to
$11 in June 1990. At this
level, Iraqi revenues were such that they could scarcely service
current expenses, much
less repay foreign loans or fund the required national
reconstruction.58
Saddam tried to resolve the dispute with Kuwait over oil
production by diplomatic means.
Although Kuwait was fully within its rights to produce unlimited
amounts of oil, it defeated the
fundamental premise behind OPEC to take that stance. OPEC was
founded as an oil cartel to
regulate the price of oil in the market by regulating the
production quotas of each of its member
states. That way, the price and amount of oil on the market
would remain stable and benefit all
members of the cartel. With Kuwait and the UAE disregarding this
quota, the price of oil
naturally dropped. Iraq, however, badly needed oil prices to
rise so that it could continue to meet
its basic financial obligations, to say nothing of its need to
rebuild its economy. With no
resolution to this issue by July, the possibility of Iraq
defaulting on its loan obligations became a
distinct possibility. Saddams economic desperation led to the
development of a hard-line
approach towards Kuwait.
57
Geoff Simons, Iraq: From Sumer to Saddam (New York: St. Martins
Press, 1994), p. 340. 58
Ibid., p. 341.
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30
Iraq decided to formally articulate its problems with Kuwait,
the UAE, and other Arab
states. On July 15th, Iraqs Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz,
declared Iraqs four central demands:
1) An increase in the price of oil to $25 a barrel.
2) Repayment of $2.4 billion dollars worth of oil stolen from
the Rumaila oil field by
Kuwait.
3) Reduction of Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates oil
production quotas.
4) An Arab version of the Marshall plan for Iraq.59
In addition to these far reaching demands, Iraq requested that
all Arab states forgive Iraqs war
debt. Iraq took a particularly hard-line approach towards
Kuwait. Saddam declared that Kuwaits
actions amounted to an economic war against his country. Saddam
backed up his rhetoric by
sending thousands of troops to the Iraq-Kuwait border. Iraq was
sending a strong signal to
Kuwaitand its neighborsthat if the dispute could not be resolved
peacefully, then Saddam
would be willing to resort to the use of force.
The Arab and Kuwaiti response to these statements was mixed. On
July 24th
, Egyptian
President Hosni Mubarak launched a round of surprise shuttle
diplomacy to both Iraq and
Kuwait to ease tensions between the two countries.60
OPEC responded by agreeing to raise the
target price of oil from $18 to $21 at a meeting in Geneva on
July 26th
.61
Most importantly, both
Kuwait and the UAE agreed to abide by OPEC oil quotas.62
Kuwait, on the other hand, took a
stand against Iraq on other issues and refused to forgive its
debt, address the Rumaila oilfield
dispute, or resolve its other outstanding disputes with Iraq.
These signals and the inability to
resolve the key issues in this conflict were a missed
opportunity for preventive diplomacy.
59
Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography, p. 212.
60
Caryle Murphy, Mubarak Tries to Ease Crisis in Gulf, The
Washington Post, July 25, 1990. 61
Patrick Cockburn, Threats of Conflict in Gulf Grows as Talks
Collapse, The Independent (London), August 3, 1990. 62The
Associated Press, Iraqi Invasion, Step by Step, The New York Times,
August 3, 1990.
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31
The inconsistent response by Arab states was in stark contrast
to U.S. actions. The United
States, through a series of actions and statements, clearly
signaled to Iraq that it would not
intervene in a conflict between Iraq and Kuwait. This signaling
can be seen in State Department
comments on the dispute, the meeting between the U.S. Ambassador
April Glaspie and Saddam
Hussein, the CIA assessment of Iraq before its attack on Kuwait,
and the letter sent by President
Bush to Iraq four days before its invasion.
On July 24, when Margaret D. Tutwiler, the State Department
spokeswoman, was asked
whether the United States had any commitment to defend Kuwait,
she said, ''We do not have any
defense treaties with Kuwait, and there are no special defense
or security commitments to
Kuwait.''63
This statement is important to note because, at the time, the
U.S. already knew that
Iraq had massed thousands of troops on its border with Kuwait.
Although the official was noting
the simple fact that the U.S. had no special security commitment
to Kuwait, this statement could
be perceived by the Iraqi government as an indication that the
U.S. would not intervene on behalf
of Kuwait if Iraq attacked it.
The next day, the U.S. Ambassador was summoned to a meeting with
Saddam Hussein.
Saddam went on a lengthy tirade against Kuwait, delivered a
message to President Bush, gave
his version of the history of the region, and sent strong
signals that Iraq was planning on
attacking Kuwait. Saddam was searching for indirect assurances
from Glaspie that the U.S.
would not intervene in the case of war between Iraq and Kuwait.
Glaspie responded by saying
"We have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border
disagreement with Kuwait."64
Some people like Richard Haass have read this statement as an
indication that the U.S. wanted to
63
Elaine Sciolino with Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Gave Iraq Little
Reason Not to Mount Kuwait Assault, The New York Times, September
23, 1990. 64
The Glaspie Transcript: Saddam Meets the U.S. Ambassador, July
25, 1990, in The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions, ed.
Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, (New York: Times Books, 1991),
p. 130.
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32
remain outside of a border dispute with Kuwait. However, if this
was the case, then Glaspie
would have avoided giving other signals to Saddam that the U.S.
would not intervene. When
Saddam indirectly inquired about whether or not the U.S. was
likely to respond with economic
sanctions in the event of war, Glaspie responded by saying:
Mr. President, not only do I want to say that President Bush
wanted better and deeper relations with Iraq, but he also wants an
Iraqi contribution to peace and prosperity in the
Middle East. President Bush is an intelligent man, he is not
going to declare an economic
war against Iraq.65
It seemed to Saddam that the Ambassador was strongly signaling
that the U.S. would not
intervene in a conflict between Iraq and Kuwait. This was the
best diplomatic response he could
have hoped for and believed that Iraq had received a green light
to invade.
While Glaspie met with Saddam, the CIA was evaluating whether or
not war was going
to break out. The CIA issued a warning on July 25th
that war was possible.66
The assessment was
that if Iraq invaded, it would only seek small territorial
gains, rather than try to capture all of
Kuwait.67
The intelligence community misread Saddams intentions and thus
the U.S. continued
to ignore the real possibility of war.
Was Glaspie signaling that the U.S. wouldnt intervene based on
the assumption that Iraq
would only seek small territorial gains? From the complete
transcript of the discussion, the
answer seems to be a clear no. The transcript makes clear the
U.S. was signaling that it would
not get involved in the conflict regardless of Saddams actions.
So, for example, Glaspie noted
that we see the Iraqi point of view that the measures taken by
the U.A.E. and Kuwait [are], in
65
The Glaspie Transcript: Saddam Meets the U.S. Ambassador, p.
129. 66
Haass, War of Necessity War of Choice, p. 57. 67
John Diamond, The CIA and the Culture of Failure: U.S.
Intelligence from the end of the Cold War to the
Invasion of Iraq (Stanford: Stanford Security Series, 2008), p.
113.
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33
the final analysis, parallel to military aggression against
Iraq68 She followed this statement by
asking what Saddam was planning on doing in regards to Kuwait.
He responded by saying that
he would pursue diplomatic venues first, but if diplomacy
failed, then he would resort to war. If
the U.S. thought that it was merely signaling a green light for
a border adjustmentwhich, in
itself, is an incredibly irresponsible thing to dothat was
definitely not what Saddam perceived.
On July 28th
, President Bush sent a personal letter to Saddam Hussein
stating the United
States desire for an improved relationship with Iraq. He sent
this letterwhich reinforced
Glaspies statementsin spite of the fact that the intelligence
community thought an invasion
was possible. In the letter, President Bush stated:
I also welcome your statement that Iraq desires friendship
rather than confrontation with the United States. Let me reassure
you, as my ambassador, Senator Dole, and others
have done, that my administration continues to desire better
relations with Iraq. We will
also continue to support our friends in the region with whom we
have had long-standing
ties. We see no necessary inconsistency between these two
objectives.69
For President Bush to be signaling this kind of support for Iraq
shows the consistency of support
that Saddam received prior to the invasion. Although Bush did
note that the U.S. would continue
to support regional friends, he did not specify which countries
he was talking about, nor did he
specify what that support would actually entail. Given Americas
historical relationship to both
Israel and Saudi Arabia, it seems likely that President Bush was
referring to these states in
particular, especially since the U.S. had no formal defense
treaty with Kuwait. All of this made it
appear as though the U.S. was sending a fairly strong message to
Saddam that if he invaded
Kuwait, the U.S. would not intervene.
So how important was signaling to this crisis? Signaling errors
were central to the
escalation of this conflict and was a majorperhaps the
majorreason for an escalation of the
68
The Glaspie Transcript: Saddam Meets the U.S. Ambassador, p.
130. 69
Haass, War of Necessity War of Choice, p. 58.
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34
conflict. Iraq interpreted U.S. actions as the green light for
an invasion of Kuwait. In addition to
these signals, Saddam felt that the U.S. had a credibility gap.
He felt America suffered from what
President Bush would later term the Vietnam Syndromewhich is the
perception that while
American military power remained formidable, military authority
had collapsed.70
He felt the
U.S. would not be willing to risk losing soldiers in a fight
against Iraq on behalf of Kuwait, a
relatively minor state. Furthermore, since the U.S. had provided
covert intelligence to Iraq during
the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam believed the U.S. would remain
uninvolved at an overt level, just as it
had done then.
In terms of this crisis, were the perceptions of the actors
correct given the information
they had? In retrospect, the answer is clearly no. But in
context, each state looked at the
information it had about the intentions of the other states in
order to formulate a responsible
policy. Iraq thought the U.S. had signaled it would remain
neutral in a conflict between Iraq and
Kuwait. The U.S. did not think Iraq would take over all of
Kuwait, but might take some of the
disputed border areas, and hence signaled what appeared to be
neutrality towards an Iraq-Kuwait
border dispute. Kuwait did not think Iraq would actually invade,
so it did not try to aggressively
resolve its problems with Iraq through diplomacy.
Saddam Hussein took what he perceived to be a calculated risk
against Kuwait. Since he
had a non-aggression pact with Saudi Arabia, he felt that there
would be no regional power that
could force him out of Kuwait. Since the U.S. had strongly
signaled it would not militarily
respond to an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and Americas willingness
to wage war was significantly
diminished due to Vietnam Syndrome, Iraq felt as though it could
get away with attacking
Kuwait. Saddam felt that he had enough legitimate reasons to
invade Kuwait, and that the
70
Harry G. Summers, On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the
Gulf War (New York: Dell Publishers, 1992), p. 7.
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35
economic crisis in Iraq was an existential threat to his regime.
He therefore decided to take a risk
and attack Kuwait.
War
On August 2, 1990 at 2:00 local time, Iraq launched its invasion
of Kuwait.71
Saddam had
made good on his threats to attack Kuwait and punish it for its
economic warfare against Iraq.
Saddam believed that his actions would not receive too harsh of
an international response and
that he had to take action because of Iraqs dire economic
situation. While the initial reaction to
the invasion seemed to confirm Saddams projections, a rapid
succession of events led to an
internationalization of the conflict.
This section aims to consider the reaction to the Iraqi invasion
and how the conflict was
internationalized. Just as there were a series of events in July
that could have prevented the war,
there were another series of events that could have diffused the
conflict. This section will first
look at the initial reaction to the invasion of Kuwait. It will
then analyze the series of events that
escalated the conflict from August 2nd
to August 7th
. It will then move on to look at American
considerations during this period. Finally, it will consider how
the conflict escalated past the
point of a diplomatic solution.
Initial Reaction to the Invasion of Kuwait
The initial reaction to the invasion of Kuwait was firm, but not
dramatic. While Kuwait
was quickly over-run by Iraq, the response to the invasion
varied from the regional to the
international level. The most important responses to the
invasion came from regional actors, the
international community, the United States, and Iraq.
71
Reuters, In Two Arab Capitals, Gunfire and Fear, Victory and
Cheers, The New York Times, August 3, 1990.
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36
The regional reaction to the invasion was divided. The
Organization of Islamic
Conference was holding a meeting in Cairo at the time and the
Arab Foreign Ministers met on
the sidelines to discuss a response. Most Arab capitals ignored
Kuwait's appeal for support in the
wake of Iraqs massive attack and instead urged foreign powers to
avoid involvement so as to
provide time for an Arab diplomatic settlement to the
crisis.72
Saudi Arabia issued a
condemnation of the invasion, but refrained from offering any
military support to Kuwait, in
spite of its security agreement with Kuwait based on its
membership in the six-nation Gulf
Cooperation Council. Israel called for immediate diplomatic and
economic sanctions and the
Defense Minister, Moshe Arens, said, Iraq will be looking around
for other targets, not just
Israel[and Iraq is] a danger to the entire world."73 Overall,
however, the regional diplomatic
response was uneven, and there was no consensus on the best
response to Iraqs aggression.
The international reaction was considerably harsher. The U.N.
Security Council held an
emergency session and passed Resolution 660 against Iraq which
condemned the Iraqi
invasion and called for an immediate and unconditional
withdrawal.74 This resolution passed
14-0-1 (with Yemen abstaining) and was a distinct indication of
the new multilateral post-Cold
War order. With both the Soviet Union and China supporting this
resolution, this show of
international solidarity against the Iraqi invasion left Iraq
diplomatically isolated. Due to their
support for this resolution, it became impossible for Iraq to
play off the old Cold War great
power rivalry between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
It is important to note that in spite of a U.N. Security Council
resolution that condemned
Iraqs invasion, this didnt necessarily mean that the conflict
would be a major international
72
William Drozdiak, Arab Voices Are Muted as World Reacts, The
Washington Post, August 3, 1990. 73
Jackson Diehl, Israel Calls For Sanctions Against Iraq, The
Washington Post, August 3, 1990. 74
The U.N. Resolutions: The Complete Text, in The Gulf War Reader:
History, Documents, Opinions, ed. Micah L. Sifry and Christopher
Cerf, (New York: Times Books, 1991), p. 137.
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37
issue. The U.N. Security Council has historically passed
numerous resolutions against states
such as Israel, Indian, Pakistan, Burma, etc.which have
routinely been ignored. More often
than not, these toothless resolutions are not backed up by
concerted international pressure to
implement them. On security issues, it is only when the United
States has put its full political
clout behind that U.N. that these resolutions have been
implemented. For example, the U.S. used
U.N. Security Council resolutions to gain international support
for the South Korean government
during the Korean War (1950-53). In contrast, after the 1967
Arab-Israel War, the U.S. did not
push for the implementation of U.N. Security Resolution 242,
which called upon Israel to
withdraw from the occupied territories.75
As has historically been seen, it is only when the U.S.
decides to put it political clout behind U.N. Security Council
that its actions become
internationally relevant.
The U.S. reaction was less severe. Although the U.S. took action
against Iraq in the U.N.,
President Bush, in his first public statement on the invasion
said, Were not discussing
intervention.76 In Richard Haasss memoir on the two Gulf Wars,
War of Necessity War of
Choice, he describes how the immediate internal meetings at the
White House on the invasion
were focused on containing Saddam, not on intervention. He
explained that at the first National
Security Council meeting on the morning of August 2nd
, the general mood was there was
nothing we could do about [the invasion] and that instead the
focus of U.S. policy ought to be on
making sure Saddam did not go any farther and do to Sa