Guba and Lincoln - Competing Paradigms

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.RESEARCH

6.

Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research

EGaN G. GUBAYVONNA S. LINCOLN

Idigm dialog. In

dialog (pp. 17-

~ theoreticalelson, & P. A.

iFp. 277-294).

'ultural Stud-

988). Marxism-ana: Univer- IN this chapter we analyze four paradigms that

currently are competing,or have until recently com-peted, for acceptance as the paradigm of choice ininforming andguidinginquiry,especiallyqualitativeinquiry: positivism, postpositivism, critical theoryand related ideological positions, and constructiv-ism. We acknowledgeat once our own commitmentto constructivism (which we earlier called "natural-istic inquiry"; Lincoln & Guba, 1985); the readermay wish to take that fact into account in judgingthe appropriateness and usefulness of our analysis.

Although the title of this volume, Handbook ofQualitative Research, implies that the term qualita-tive is an umbrella term superior to the term para-digm (and, indeed, that usage is not uncommon), itis our position that it is a term that ought to bereserved for a descriptionof types of methods.f!:2m..our perspective, both Qualitative and qJlantitativemethods ma be used a ro ria . e-search aradi m. estions of meth co -darv to Questionsof paradigm, which we define asthe basic belief svstem or worldview that guides theTnvesti ator not nl in choices of metho but'nontologically and eoistemo ol!1cally fundamental w1\Ys..

It is certainly the case that interest in alternativeparadigms has been stimulated by a growing dissat-isfaction with the patent overemphasis on quantita-tive methods. But as efforts were made to build a

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New York:

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of philosophy.~ss.

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case for a renewed interest in qualitativeapproaches,it became clear that the metaphysical assumptionsundergirding the conventional paradigm (the "re-ceived view") must be seriously questioned. ~the emphasis of this chapter is on paradigms, theirassumptions, and the implications of those assump-tions for a variety of research Issues. npt on therelative utility of Qualitative versus Quantitative~ Nevertheless, as discussions of para-digms/methods over the past decade have often be-gun with a consideration of problems associatedwith overquantification, we will also begin there,shifting only later to our predominant interest.

The Quantitative/QualitativeDistinction

Historically, there has been a heavy emphasison quantification in science. Mathematics is oftentermed the "queen of sciences," and those sci-ences, such as physics. and chemistry, that lendthemselves especially well to quantification aregenerally known as "hard." Less quantifiable are-nas, such as biology (although that is rapidlychanging) and particularly the social,$ciences, are

AUTHORS' NOTE: We are grateful to Henry Giroux and Robert Stake for their very helpful critiques of an earlierdraft of this chapter.

105

, of the/' krstand

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:]>racti->aandwhen

r differ-

106

referred to as "soft," less with pejorative intentthan to signal their (putative) imprecision andlack of dependability. Scientific maturity is com-monly beliefed to emerge as the degree of quan-tification found within a given field increases.

That this is the case is hardly surprising. Iill;."received view" of science (positivism,transformedover the course of this century into postpositiv-ism; see below) focuses on efforts to verify (oosi-tivism) or falsify (postpositivism) a priori hy-{?otheses. most usefully stated as mathematical(quantitative) propositions or propositions thatcan be easily converted mto recise mathematical_ormu as expressing nctional re atJonshlps. or-mulaic precision has enormous utilitv W11ei1iiieaim of science is the prediction and control ofnatural phenomena. Further, there is already avail-able a powerful array of statistical and mathemati-

'cal models. Finally, there eXists a widespreadconviction that only Quantitative data are ulti-mately valid, or of high Quality (Sechrest, 1992).

John Stuart Mill (I 843/1906) is said to have beenthe first to urge social scientists to emulate theirolder, "harder" cousins, promising that if his advicewere followed, rapid maturation of these fields, aswell as their emancipation from the philosophicaland theological strictures that limited them, wouldfollow. Social scientists took this counsel to heart(probably to a degree that would greatly surpriseMill ifhe were alive today) for other reasons as well.They were the "new kids on the block"; if quantifi-cation could lead to the fulfillment of Mill's prom-ise, status and political leverage would accrue thatwould enormously profit the new practitioners. Imi-tation might thus lead both to greater acceptance andto more valid knowledge.

Critiques of the Received View

In recent years, however, strong counterpressuresagainst quantification have emerged.Two critiques,one internal to the conventional paradiw (that is,in terms of those metaphysical assumptions thatdefine the nature of positivist inquiry) and one ex-ternal to it (that is, in terms of those assumptionsdefining alternativeparadigms), have been mountedthat seem not only to warrant a reconsiderationofthe utility of qualitative data but to question the veryassumptions on which the putative superiority ofquantification has been based.

Internal (Intraparadigm) Critiques

A variety of implicit problems have surfaced tochallenge conventional wisdom; several of these aredescribed below.

MAJOR PARADIGMS AND PERSPECTIVES Competing Part

Contextstripping. Precisequantitativeapproachesthat focus on selected subsets of variables neces-sarily "strip" from consideration, through appro-priate controls or randomization, other variablesthat exist in the context that might, if allowed toexert their effects, greatly alter findings. Further,such exclusionary designs, while increasing thetheoretical rigor of a study, detract from its rele-vance, that is, its applicability or generalizability,because their outcomes can be properly appliedonly in other similarly truncated or contextuallystripped situations (another laboratory, for exam-ple). Qualitative data, it is argued, can redress thatimbalance by providing contextual information.

External (Extral

The intrapara,a weighty challogy, but could Irated, by great(critics of the reethat point; henc(tative inputs halevel accommodlenge has beenproposed alternonly qualificatieadjustments in 1inquiry altogethview can be ju(Bernstein, 198:coIn & Guba, gchief among the

Exclusion of meaning and purpose. Human be-havior, unlike that of physical objects, cannot beunderstood without reference to the meanings andpurposes attached by human actors to their activi-~ Qualitative data, it is asserted, can providerich insight into human behavior. The theory-ll

approaches to f(or falsificationpendence of thguages. If an inqmust be stated iJway in which tcollected. But itjection that theOJent-that is, thatheoretical frametion of the recei'hypotheses and"facts" can be ,"window" and 0

Disjunction of grand theories with local con-texts: The etic/emic dilemma. The etic (outsideljtheory brought to bear on an inquiry by an inves-tigator (or the hypotheses proposed to be tested)

may-nave little or no mean!!!.&-within the emic(insider) view of studied Individuals, groups, so-cieties, or cultures. Qualitative data, it is affirmed,are useful for uncovering emic views; theories, tobe valid, should be qualitatively grounded (Glaser& Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Suchgrounding is particularly crucial in view of themounting criticism of social science as failing toprovide adequate accounts of nonmainstream lives(the "other") or to provide the material for acriticism of our own Western culture (Marcus &Fischer, 1986).

The underdetlem is also knoNot only are fatdow through wIferent theory wiported by the sabe possible, givdeduction whatpossible, givenby induction atdeed, it is thissuch as Poppe!theory verificatlfalsification. Wnever establishproposition thaswan can comp:sition of sciencmately converg(sharply into qUI

Inapplicability of general data to individualcases. This problem is sometimes described as thenomothetic/idiographic disjunction. Generaliza-tions, although perhaps statistically meaningful.have no applicability in the individual case (thefact, say, that 80% of Individuals presenting giyensymptoms have lung cancer is at best incompleteevidence that a particular patient presenting withsuch symptoms has lung cancer). Qualitative data,it is held, can help to avoid such ambiguities.

Exclusion of the discovery dimension in inquiry.Convention em hasis on the verification of s e-ci IC,a priori hypotheses glosses over the source ofthose hypotheses, usually arrived at by what is com-monly termed the discovery process. In the receiyedview only.empirical inquiry deserves to be called"science." Quantitative normative methodology isthus privileged over the insights of creative anddivergent thinkers. The call for qualitative inputsis expected to redress this imbalance.

The value-la.and facts are n<and facts. Inde,

.ECTIVES Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research

ve approaches-bles neces-

ugh appro-.1II::rvariablesif allowed to

-~s. Further,reasing the

,,<.1mits rele-

leralizabili ty,,-Iy appliedmtextually

I.J, for exam-.n redress thatFormation.

External (Extraparadigm) Critiques

I

'[!

The intraparadigm problems not~d above offera weighty challenge to conventional methodol-ogy, but could be eliminated, or at least amelio-rated, by greater use of qualitative data. Manycritics of the received view are content to stop atthat point; hence many of the calls for more quali-tative inputs have been limited to this methods-level accommodation. But an eyen weightier chal-lenge has been mounted by critics who haveproposed alternative paradigms that involye not'OnlyqualificatIOn of approaches but fundamentalao ustments in the basIc assum tlOns that gUIdeinquiry altoe:ethe(. Their rejection 0 the receivedvIew can be justified on a number of grounds(Bernstein, 1988; Guba, 1990; Hesse, 1980; Lin-coln & Guba, 1985; Reason & Rowan, 1981), butchief among them are the following. I

, Human be-:ts, cannot be:naanings and. '1eiractivi-

10provide

j local con-

I (outsider).by an inves-ta. be tested)I I the emic

roups, so-it is affirmed,>;J!1eories,toI ed (Glaser

90). Suchview of the

: as failingto["ream livesI rial for ae {Marcus &

The theory-ladenness of facts. Conventionalapproaches to research involving the verificationor falsification of hypotheses assume the inde-pendence of theoretical and observational lan-guages. If an inquiry is to be objective, hypothesesmust be stated in ways that are independent of theway in which the facts needed to test them arecollected. But it now seems established beyond ob-jection that theories and facts are auite inteT{kpetl{/:ent-that is. that facts are facts only within sometheoretical framework. Thus a fundamentalassump-tion of the received view is exposed as dubious. Ifhypotheses and observations are not independent,"facts" can be viewed only through a theoretical"window" and objectivity is undermined.

"( 'ndividual:cn bed as theGeneraliza-

-:aningful,J case (the'I>udnggivent incompleter-ting withI: .tive data,J_o.Jities.

I~ inquiry.a m of spe-C _ source ofwhat is com-I~ received

be called

t dology iscreative and

:ati.ve inputsThe value-ladenness of facts. Just as theories

and facts are not independent, neither are valuesand facts. Indeed, it can be argued that theories

107

~selves value statements. Thus putative"facts" are vIewed not only through a theory win-dow but through a value window as well.The value-tree posture ot the receIved vIew is compromised.

The interactive nature of the inquirer-inquiredinto dyad. The received view of science picturesthe inquirer as standing behind a one-way mirror;viewmg natural phenomena as they happen andrecording them objectively. The inquirer (whenusing proper methodolo ) does not influence thep enomena or vIce versa. But eVI ence suc asthe Heisenberg uncertainty principle and the Bohrcomplementarity principle have shattered that idealin the hard sciences (Lincoln & Guba, 1985); evengreater skepticism must exist for the social sci-ences. Indeed. the notion that findings are createdthrou~h the interaction of inquirer and phenome-non (which in the social sciences, is usually peo-ple) is often a more plausible description of theinquiry process than is the notion that findings arediscovered through objective observation "as theyreally are, and as they really work."

The intraparadigm critiques, although expos-ing many inherent problems in the received viewand, indeed, proposing some useful responses tothem, are nevertheless of much less interest-orweight-than the extraparadigm critiques, whichraise problems of such consequence that the re-ceived view is being widely questioned. Severalalternative paradigms have been proposed, someof which rest on quite unconventional assump-tions. It is useful, therefore, to inquire about thenature of paradigms and what it is that distin-guishes one inquiry paradigm from another.

The Nature of Paradigms

Paradigms as Basic Belief SystemsBased on Ontological, Epistemological,and Methodological Assumptions

108

1. Theontologicalquestion.What is the formand nature of reality and, therefore, what isthere that can beknown about it? For example,if a "real" world is assumed, then what can beknown about it is "how things really are" and"how things really work." Then only thosequestions that relate to matters of "real" exist-ence and "real" action are admissible; otherquestions, such as those concerning matters ofaesthetic or moral significance, fall outside therealm of legitimate scientific inquiry.

2. The epistemological Question. What is thenature of the relationship between the knoweror would-be knower and what can be known?The answer that can be given to this ques-tion is constrained by the answer alreadygiven to the ontological question; that is, notjust any relationship can now be postulated.So if, for example, a "real" reality is as-sumed, then the posture of the knower mustbe one of objective detachment or valuefreedom in order to be able to discover "how

things really are" and "how things reallywork." (Conversely, assumption of an ob-jectivist posture implies the existence of a"real" world to be objective about.)

3. The methodologicalquestion.How can theinquirer (would-be knower) go about findingout whateverhe or shebelieves can be known?

t-gain, the answer that can be given to thisquestion is constrained by answers already~iven to the first two questions~that is, not justany methodology is appropriate. For example,a "real" reality pursued by an "objective" in-quirer mandatescontrol of possible confound-ing factors, whether the methods are qualita-tive (say, observational) or quantitative (say,analysis of covariance). (Conversely,selectionof a manipulative methodology-the experi-ment, say-implies the ability to be objectiveand a real world to be objective about.) Themethodological question cannot be reduced to

MAJOR PARADIGMS AND PERSPECTIVES

a question of methods; methods must be fit-ted to a predetermined methodology.

These three questions serve as the major fociaround which we will analyzeeach of the fourparadigms to be considered.

Paradigms as Human Constructions

We have already noted that paradigms, as setsof basic beliefs, are not open to proof in anyconventional sense; there is no way to elevate oneover another on the basis of ultimate, founda-tional criteria. (We should note, however, thatthat state of affairs does not doom us to a radicalrelativist posture; see Guba, 1992.) In our opin-ion, any given paradigm represents simply themost informed and sophisticated view that itsproponents have been able to devise, given theway they have chosen to respond to the threedefining questions. And, we argue, the sets ofanswers given are in all cases human construc-tions; that is, they are all inventions of the humanmind and hence stibject to human error. No con-struction is or can be incontrovertibly fight; ad-.vocates of any particular construction must relyon persuasiveness and utilitv rather than Droofinarguing their position.

What is true of paradigms is true of our analysesas well. Everything that we shall say subsequentlyis also a human construction: ours. The reader can-not be compelled to accept our analyses, or ourarguments, on the basis of incontestable logic orindisputable eyidence; we can only hope to be per-suasive and to demonstrate the utility of our positionfor, say, the public policy arena (Guba & Lincoln,1989; House, 1977). We do ask the reader to sus-pend his or her disbelief until our argument is com-plete and can be judged as a whole.

The Basic Beliefs of Receivedand Alternative Inquiry Paradigms

We begin our analysis with descriptions of theresponses that we believe proponents of eachparadigm would make to the three questions out-lined above. These responses (as constructed byus) are displayed in Table 6.1, which consists ofthree rows corresponding to the ontological, epis-temological, and methodological questions, andfour columns corresponding to the four paradigmsto be discussed.The term positivism denotes the"received view" that has dominated the formaldiscourse in the physIcal and social sciences fors~me 400 years, whereas postpositivism repre-

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Competing Para6

TABLE 6.1 Basi

Item

Ontology no"I31

\

Epistemology d.fi

Methodology e:ITy-

h

qIT

sents efforts of tt!a limited way (1essentially the s:most problematiterm critical thEdenoting a set 0including additi(Marxism, feminitory inquiry. Ineusefully be divicstructuralism, pothese two. Whatmon breakawayis that of the vallJan epistemologiethese positions iment call; we VIindividual point:ism denotes an alaway assumptio'realism to ontolcwill become cle~

Two importanFirst, although VIparadigms we ~meaning even itences, we will neingly, our subse(stood to be limiSecond, we notlparadigms discusno final agreemeJ

:TIVES Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research 109

Item Positivism

TABLE 6.1 Basic Beliefs (Metaphysics) of Alternative Inquiry Paradigms

Constructivism

!ill:Ist be fit-

Post positivism Critical Theory et al.

major focithe four

Ontology naive realism-

"real" reality butapprehendable

critical realism-

"real" reality but onlyimperfectly and

probabilisticallyapprehendable

Epistemology dualist/objectivist;

findings true

__, as sets>of in anyw..vateone

founda-rer, that

o a radicalI-Ouropin-

Iply thethat its

given the0he three

sets ofmstruc-

the humanr No con-

ght; ad-ust rely

to proo/in

.- malyses

. :quentIyreadercan-;es, or our;logic or

,be per-'urposition& Lincoln,,-. to sus-

is com-

modified dualist/

objectivist; criticaltradition/community;findings probablytrue

historical realism-

virtual reality shapedby social, political,cultural, economic,ethnic, and gendervalues; crystallizedover time

relativism-local and

specific constructedrealities

----------------------------------------------transactionaU

subjectivist; value-mediated findings

transactionaU

subjectivist; createdfindings

Methodology herrneneuticaUdialecticalexperimentaU

manipulative;verification of

hypotheses; chieflyquantitativemethods

modified experi-

mental/manipulative;critical multiplism;falsification of

hypotheses; mayinclude qualitativemethods

dialogic/dialectical

sents efforts of the past few decades to respond ina limited way (that is, while remammg withinessentially the same set of basic beliefs) to themost problematic criticisms of positivism. Theterm critical theory is (for us) a blanket termdenoting a set of several alternative paradigms,including additionally (but not limited to) neo-Marxism, feminism, materialism, and participa-tory inquiry. Indeed, critical theory may itselfusefully 6e divided into three substrands: post-structuralism, postmodernism, and a blending ofthese two. Whatever their differences, the com-mon breakaway assumption of all these variantsIS that of the value-determined nature of in ui -an e istemolo di erence. Our grouping ofthese positions into a single category is a judg-ment call; we will not try to do justice to theindividual points of view. !he term constructiv-ism denotes an alternative paradigm whose break-away assumption is the move from ontologicalrealism to ontological relativism. These positionswill become clear in the subseQuent eXpOsition.

Two important caveats need to be mentioned.First, although we are inclined to believe that theparadigms we are about to describe can havemeaning even in the realm of the physical sci-ences, we will not defend that belief here.Accord-ingly, our subsequent comments should be under-stood to be limited to the social sciences only.Second, we note that except for positivism, theparadigms discussed are all still in formative stages;no final agreements have been reached even among

'~.l

digms

s of thes of each;tions out-I cted by

sists of:ical, epis-tions, and

:adigms( >testhehe formaliences for:r- repre-

their proponents about their definitions, mean-ings, or implications. Thus our discussion shouldbe considered tentative and subject to further re-vision and reformulation.

We will first look down the columns of Table6.1 to illustrate the positions of each paradigmwith respect to the three questions, followin witha 00 across rows to com are and contrast theposItions 0 t e paradigms. Limitations of spacemake it Impossible for us to develop our asser-tions in any depth. The reader will be able to findother evidence, pro and con, in other chapters ofthis volume, particularly in Chapters 7-11.

Intraparadigm Analyses(Columns of Table 6.1)

Column I: Positivism

Ontology: realism (commonly called "naive re-alism"). An apprehend able realIty IS assumed toexist, driven by immutable natural laws and mecha-nisms. Knowledge of the "way things are" IScon-ventionally summarized in the form of time- andcontext-free generalizations, some of which takethe form of cause-effect laws. Research can, in'principle, converge on the "true" state pf affairs.The basic posture of the paradigm is argued to beboth reductionist and deterministic (Hesse, 1980).

110

Epistemology: Dualist and obiectivist.The inves-tigator and the investigated "obiect" are assumed tobe independent entities, and the investigator to becapable of study.iiu!:the obiect withoutinfluencin~ itor being influenced by it. When influence in eitherdirection (threats to validity) is recognized, or evensuspected, various strategies are followed to reduceor eliminate it. Inquiry takes place as through aone-way mirror. Values and biases are preventedfrom influencing outcomes, so long as the pre-scribed procedures are rigorously followed. Repli-cable findings are, in fact, "true."

Methodolo!!.v: Experimental and manivulative.Questions and/or hypotheses are stated in propo-sitional form and subjected to empirical test toverify them; possible confounding conditions mustbe carefully controlled (manipulated) to preventoutcomes from bein!!:improperlv influenced.

Column 2: Postpositivism

Ontology: Critical realism. Reality is assumed toexist but to be only imperfectly apprehend able be-cause of basically flawed human intellectual mecha-nisms and the fundament . tractable nature ofp enomena. The ontology is labeled as critical real-ism (Cook & Campbell, 1979) because of the pos-ture of proponents that claims about reality must besubjected to the widest possible critical examinationto facilitate apprehending reality as closely as pos-sible (but never perfectly).

Methodolo!!.v: Modified experimentaVmanipu-lative. Emphasis is placed on "critical multiplisl!C

Q refurhj~hed version of trian!!:ulation}as a wayof falsifying (rather than verifying) hypotheses.The methodology aims to redress some of theproblems noted above (intraparadigm critiQue~by doing inquiry in more natural settings, collect-ing more situational information, and reintroduc-ing discovery as an element in inquiry, and, in thesocial sciences particularly, soliciting emic view-points to assist in determining the meanings andpurposes that people ascribe to their actions, aswell as to contribute to "grounded theory" (Glaser& Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Allthese aims are accomplished largely llirongh theincreased utilization of Qualitative techniques.

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MAJOR PARADIGMS AND PERSPECTIVES

Column 3: Critical Theoryand Related Ideological Positions

Ontology: Historical realism. A realitv is as-sumed to be apprehendable that was once plastic,but that was. over time, shaped by a congeries ofsocial, political, cultural, economic, ethnic, andgender factors, and then crystallized (reWed) intoa series of structures that are now (inappropri-.!!!ely)taken as "real," that is, natural and immu-table. For all practical purposes the structures are"real," a virtual or historical reality.

.E;pistemolovv' Transactional and subjectivist.J'he investigator and the investigated obiect areassumed to be interactively linked. with the val-ues of the investigator (and of situated "others")inevitably influencing the inquiry. Findings are

~refore value mediated. Note that this posture

effectively challenges the traditional dlstmctlOn '-'.J~..J' "" ~between ontology and epistemolo~y; what can be ~ N\

known IS mextricably intertwined with the inter- t C-o \.action between a particular investigator and a ~~ ~ ..particularobjector grou"p.The dashedline sepa-C~

· '-\rating the ontologicaland epistemologicalrows+v-. <I <->...J1of Table6.1 is intendedto reflect this fusion.

jMethodology:Dialogicand dialectical.The trans- ,actional nature of inQuiry requires a dialogue be-tween the investigator and the subjects of theinquiry; that dialogue must be dialectical in natureto transform ignorance and misapprehensions (ac-cepting historicall mediated structures as immu-ta le)"into more informe consciousness (seeinghow the structures might be changed and compre-hending the actions re uired to effec chan ), or,as ICOUX(1 88) puts it, "as transformative intel-lectuals, . . . to uncover and excavate those formsof historical and subjugated knowledges that pointto experiences of suffering, conflict, and collec-tive struggle; . . . to link the notion of historicalunderstanding to elements of critique and hope"(p. 213). Transformational inquirers demonstrate"transformational leadership" (Burns, 1978).

(For more discussion of critical theory, see thecontributions in this volume by Olesen, Chapter9; Stanfield, Chapter 10;and Kincheloe & McLaren,Chapter 8.)

I

IIIi"

II

!!

Column 4: Constructivism

II

iIII

1_ __ _

Competing Paradi

groups holding tl;1Iare not more or lesbut simply more 0ticated. Constructiassociated "realitietinguished from b(see Reese, 1980,jeral ideas).

Epistemology: 1The investigator aare assumed to be"findings" are litetion proceeds. Thetween ontology anin the case of cridline of Table 6.1 rt

Methodology: /;The variable and psocial constructio[structions can be e]interaction betweerespondents. Theseterpreted using cO!niques, and are COIa dialectical intercla consensus constand sophisticatedconstructions (inc]struction of the in'

(For more about cChapter 7, this vol

Cross-P

(Rov

Having noted blnents of each para<the three paradigmto look across row:positions among tl

Ontology

Moving from Ienote the move frOJ

1. positivism'ssuming an 0which inquir

2. postpositivisassumes an (

114

fact (or probable fact) serving as a kind of build-ing block that, when placed into its proper niche,adds to the growing "edifice of knowledge." Whenthe facts take th~form of generalizations or cause-effect linkages".they may be used most efficientlyfor prediction and control. Generalizations maythen be made, with predictable confidence, to apopulation of settings.

Critical theory. Knowledge does not accumu-late in an absolute sense; rather, it grows andchanges through a dialectical historicalreVISIOnt at contInuously erodes ignorance andmIsapprehensions and enlarges more informedinsight,s. Generalization can occur when the mixof socIal, political, cultural, economic, ethnic,and gender circumstances and values is similaracross settings.

Constructivism.)(nowledge accumulates only ina relative sense through the formation of ever moreinformed and sophisticated constructions via thehermeneuticaVdialectical process, as varying con-structions are brought into juxtaposition. One im-portant mechanism for transfer of knowledge fromone setting to another is the provision of vicariousexperience, often supplied by case study reports (seeStake, Chapter 14, this volume).

Row 4: What criteria areappropriate for judging thegoodness or quality of an inquiry?

Positivism and postpositivism. The appropriatecriteria are the conventional benchmarks of "rigor":internal validit'i (isomorphism of findings withreality), external validity (generalizability), reli-ability-(in the sense of stability), and objectiVitY(distanced and neutral observer). These cntenadepend on the realist ontological position; with-out the assumption, isomorphism of findings withreality can have no meaning, strict generalizabil-ity to a parent population is impossible, stabilitycannot be assessed for inquiry into a phenomenonif the phenomenon itself can change, and objec-tivity cannot be achieved because there is nothingfrom which one can be "distant."

Critical theory. The appropriate criteria are his-!Qricalsituatedness of the inquirY(i.e., that it takesaccount of the social, political, cultural, economic,ethnic, and gender antecedents of the studied situ-ation), the extent to which the inquiry acts to erodeignorance and misapprehensIOns,and the extent towhich it provides a stimulus to action, that is, to thetransformation of the existing structure.

Constructivism. Two sets of criteria have beeproposed: the trust""worthinesscntena of credibil-

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MAJOR PARADIGMS AND PERSPECTIVES Competing Paradigm

duct and human subjerealist ontology underjvides a tilt toward theis argued in certain cmine how "things reasake of some "higher struth" (Bok, 1978, 198

Critical theory. Etlto this paradigm, as irignorance and misapIaccount of values anthe inquiry process. 1the inquirer be revel3

. ing of "fully informeceptive. Of course, tprevent unethical belsome process barrier!

Row 5: What is therole of values in inquiry?

Constructivism. Etdigm also because ofvalues in the inquiryexisting constructiorcreased informationconstructions as welltion). There is an inlrevelation; hiding thetive of the aim of uncstructions. In additiotical methodology itsinfallible safeguard ~the close personal i:methodology may prcproblems of confidewell as other interpeLincoln, 1989).

Positivism and postpositivism. In both theseparadigms values are specifically excluded; in-

. deed, the paradigm is claimed to be "value free"by virtue of its epistemological posture. Valuesare seen as confounding variables that cannot beallowed a role in a putatively objective inquiry(even when objectivity is, in the case of postpo-sitivism, but a regulatory ideal).

Critical theory and constructivism. In both theseparadigms values have pride of place; they areseen as ineluctable in shaping (in the case ofconstructivism, creating) inquiry outcomes. Fur-thermore, even if it were possible, excluding val-ues would not be countenanced. To do so wouldbe inimical to the interests of the powerless andof "at-risk" audiences, whose original (emic) con-structions deserve equal consideration with thoseof other, more powerful audiences and of theinquirer (etic). Constructivism, which sees theinquirer as orchestrator and facilitator of the in-quiry process, is more likely to stress this pointthan is critical theory, which tends to cast theinquirer in a more authoritative role.

Row 7: What "voice'in the inquirer's. acti'especially those dire,

Positivism and povoice is that of theforming decision mak,agents, who indepenformation, at least ifjustify actions, polic

Critical theory. TIthe "transformativewho has expanded (position to confrontsions. Change is faci:greater insight into(the nature and exteare stimulated to act

Row 6: What is theplace of ethics in inquiry?

Positivism and postpositivism. In both theseparadigms ethics is an important consideration,and it is taken very seriously by inquirers, but itis extrinsic to the inquiry process itself. Henceethical behavior is formally policed by externalmechanisms,-such as professional codes of con-

Constructivism. Tthe "passionate part

---

PECTIVES Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research

, reality is as-LSonce plastic,

-congeries of, ethnic, and

u (reified) into1/ (inappropri--I and immu-

tructuresare

groups holding the constructions. Constructionsare not more or less "true," in any absolute sense,but simply more or less.informed and/or sophis-ticated. Constructions are alterable, as are theirassociated "realities." This position should be dis-tinguished from both nominalism and idealism(see Reese, 1980, for an explication of these sev-eral ideas).

Lsubjectivist.d object are

. 1/ith the val-ated "others")

~indings arethis postureI distinction

y; what can bemth the inter-

gator and a:d line sepa-

ological rows.his fusion.

Methodology: Hermeneutical and dialectical.The variable and personal (intramental) nature ofsocial constructions suggests that individual con-structions can be elicited and refined only throughinteraction between and among investi ator andrespon ents. These vacymg constructions are in-terpreted using conventional hermeneutical tech-niques, and are compared and contrasted througha dialectical interchange. The final aim is to distilla consensus construction that is more informedand sophisticated than any of the predecessorconstructions (including, of course, the etic con-struction of the mvestigator).

Il.The trans-1dialogue be-Mects of the

cal in nature~nsions (ac-

ures as immu-Isness (seeing-lnd compre-

:hange), or,.rmative intel-:ethose forms-~s that point

and collec-I uf historicalue and hope"-emonstrate

1978).

(For more about constructivism, see also Schwandt,Chapter 7, this volume.)

Cross-Paradigm Analyses(Rows of Table 6.1)

Having noted briefly the positions that propo-nents of each paradigm might take with respect tothe three paradigm-defining questions, it is usefulto look across rows to compare and contrast thosepositions among the several paradigms.1eory, see the

''"On, ChapterI 1cMcLaren,

i.' Ontology

Moving from left to right across Table 6.1, wenote the move from

'e apprehend-}'>ible mental

I ally based,_ 1 elements

lividuals andle.nt for their

, persons or

l. positivism's position of naive realism, as-suming an objective external reality uponwhich inquiry can converge; to

2. postpositivism's critical realism, which stillassumes an objective reality but grants that

III

it can be apprehended only imperfectly andprobabilistically; to

3. critical theory's historical realism, whichassumes an apprehendable reality consist-ing of historically situated structures thatare, in the absence of insight, as limiting andconfining as if they were real; to

4. constructivism's relativism, which assumesmultiple, apprehendable, and sometimes con-flicting social realities that are the productsof human intellects, but that may change astheir constructors become more informedand sophisticated.

It is the ontological position that most differentiatesconstructiV1sm from the other three paradIgms.

Epistemology

We note the move from

l. positivism's dualist, objectivist assumptionthat enables the investigator to determine"how things really are" and "how thingsreally work"; to

2. postpositivism's modified dualist/objectivistassumption that it is possible to approximate(but never fully know) reality; to

3. critical theory's transactional!subjectivist as-sumption that knowledge is value mediatedand hence value dependent; to

4. constructivism's somewhatsimilarbut broadertransactional/subjectivist assumption that seesknowledge as created in interaction amonginvestigator and respondents.

It is their epi<tt>AUlh1g;,..,,1positions that most dif-~rentiate critical theory and constructivism fromthe other two paradigms.

Methodology

We note the move from

1. positivism's experimental/manipulativemeth-odology that focuses on verification of hy-potheses; to ,

2. postpositivism's modified experimental!manipulative methodology invested in criticalmultiplism focusing on falsification of hy-potheses; to '

112 MAJOR PARADIGMS AND PERSPECTIVES

Issue

TABLE 6.2 Paradigm Positions on Selected Practical Issues

Critical Theory et al.

Competing Paradil

Constructivism

quite different. Fin:training, accommoddeemed especiallyponents; they reprceived view is consThe entries in the Ipublic positions, ~been addressed bysome cases, therefthat we believe fometaphysical (ontlmethodological) ptake one exampleaddressed directly Ibut we believe theis one that wouldwere they to be ch

An immediately:ble 6.1 and Table 6case it was possiblecell, in the case ofoverlap within rowand postpositivist (issues in which thedifferent, the diffecontrast, one may rbetween these two Iand constructivistdiffer among them:

We have form\)which follow.

Positivism Post positivism

Inquiry aim.,

explanation: prediction and control critique and trans-formation; restitution

and emancipation

understanding;reconstruction

Nature of

knowledgeverified hypothesesestablished as factsor laws

nonfalsified hypoth-

eses that are probablefacts or laws

structuraVhistorical

insights

individual reconstructionscoalescing aroundconsensus

Knowledgeaccumulation

accretion-"building clocks" adding to"edifice of knowledge"; generalizations

and cause-effect linkages

historical revisionism;

generalization by

similarity

more informed and

sophisticatedreconstructions;

vicarious experience

Goodness or

quality criteriaconventional benchmarks of "rigor":

internal and external validity, reliability,and objectivity

historical situatedness; trustworthiness anderosion of ignorance authenticity

and misapprehensions;action stimulus

Values excluded-influence denied included-formative

Ethics extrinsic; tilt toward deception intrinsic; moral tilttoward revelation

intrinsic; process tilttoward revelation;

special problems

Voice "disinterested scientist" as informer of

decision makers, policy makers, and changeagents

"trans formativeintelIectual" as

advocate and activist

"passionate participant"as facilitator of multi-

voice reconstruction

Training technical and

quantitative;substantive theories

technical; quantitativeand qualitative;substantive theories

resocialization; qualitative and quantitative;history; values of altruism and empowerment

Row I: What isthe aim or purposlAccommodation commensurable incommensurable

Hegemony in control of publication, funding,promotion, and tenure

Positivism and

paradigms the aimWright, 1971), uItand control of phhuman. As Hesse (criterion for progncapability of "scishould improve O'determinism implnoted. The inquiresituation that seemunmerited, priviIe~

seeking recognition and input

3. critical theory's dialogic/dialectical meth-odology aimed at the reconstruction of pre-viously held constructions; to

4. constructivism's hermeneutic/dialectic meth-

odology aimed at the reconstruction of pre-viously held constructions.

Implications ofEach Paradigm's Position

on Selected Practical Issues(Rows of Table 6.2)

Differences in paradigm assumptions cannot bedismissed as mere "philosophical" differences;

'1Critical theory.

tique and transfo.cultural, economithat constrain andment in confront:rion for progress:emancipation shoand activism are kin the role of instthat the inquirer Iformations are m

L- -

ECTIVES Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research

quite different. Finally, the last four issues (voice.training, accommodation, and hegemon

eemed especially important by alternative pro-onents; they re resent areas on which the re-

ceive view is considered particularly vulnerable.The entries in the table are based only in part onpublic positions, given that not all issues havebeen addressed by all paradigms' proponents. Insome cases, therefore, we have supplied entriesthat we believe follow logically from the basicmetaphysical (ontological, epistemological, andmethodological) postures of the paradigms. Totake one example, the issue of voice is rarelyaddressed directly by positivists or postpositivists,but we believe the entry "disinterested scientist"is one that would be given by those proponentswere they to be challenged on this matter.

An immediately apparent difference betweenTa-ble 6.1 and Table 6.2 is that whereas in the formercase it was possible to makea distinct entry foreverycell, in the case of Table 6.2 there is considerableoverlap within rows, particularly for the positivistand pOStpOSltiVIStcolumns. Indeed, even for thoseissues in which the entries in those two columns aredifferent, the differences appear to be minor. Incontrast, one may note the major differences foundbetween these two paradigms and the critical theoryand constructivist paradigms, which tend also todiffer among themselves.

We have formulated the issues as questions,which follow.

.tivism

ding;cion

reconstructions

uround

rmed andlted

)ns;perience

liness and

ehensions;

l .cess tiltvelation;ohIems

I Jarticipant"tor of multi-

IDstruction

I ~tjtative;npowerment

Row 1; What is

the aim or purpose of inquiry?

input Positivism and postpositivism. For both theseparadigms the aim of inquiry is exvlanation (vonWright, 1971), ultimately enabling the vredictionand control of phenomena, whether physical orhuman. As Hesse (1980)has suggested, theultimatecriterion for progress in these paradigms is that thecapability of "scientists" to predict and controlshould improve over time. The reductionism anddeterminism im lied b this position should benoted. The inquirer is cast In e role of "expert," asituation that seems to award special, perhaps evenunmerited, privilege to the investigator.

ons have im-;-;onduct ofI IIIof find-lected to dis-ent issues.IstS of foura digms and;uc:::S,summa-implications.!Jur issues

.nowledge: au10ng those}sitivists and:1- issues on

I: 'requentlys _nd ethics)uadigms, al-'r--1onses are

.Critical theory. The aim of inquiry is the cri-tique and transformation of the social, political,cultural, economic, ethnic, and gender structuresthat constrain and exploit humankind, by engage-ment in confrontation, even conflict. The crite-rion for progress is that over time, restitution andemancipation should occur and persist. Advocacyand activism are key concepts. The inquirer is cast!!t the role of instigator and facilitator, implyingthat the inoUirer understands a priori what trans-formations are needed. But we should note that

113

some of the more radical stances in the criticalistcamp hold that iudgment about needed transfor-mations should be reserved to those whose livesare most affected bv transformations: the inquiryparticipants themselves (Lincoln, in press).

Constructivism. The aim of inquiry is under-standin and reconstruction of the constructions thatpeople (including the inquirer lrutia y 0 d, amlingtoward consensus but still open to new interpreta-tions as information and sophistication improve. Thecriterion for progress is that over time, everYOneformulates more informed and sophisticated con-structions and becomes more aware of the content

and meaning of competing constructions. Advocacyand activism are also key concepts is this view. Theinquirer is cast in the role of participant and facilitatorin this process, a position that some critics havefaulted on the grounds that it expands the inquirer'srole beyond reasonable expectations of expertise andcompetence (Carr & Kemnlis, 1986).

Row 2: What isthe nature of knowledge?

Positivism. Knowledge consists of verified hy-potheses that can be accepted as facts or laws.

Postpositivism. Knowledge consists of nonfal-sified hypotheses that can be regarded as probablefacts or laws.

Critical theory. Knowledge consists of a seriesof structural/historical insights that will b~-formed as time passes. Transformations occurwhen ignorance and misapprehensions give wayto more informed insights by means of a dialec-tical interaction.

Constructivism. Knowledge consists of thoseconstructions about which there is relative con-~susJor at least some movement toward con-sensus) among those competent (and, in the caseof more arcane material, trusted) to interpret thesubstance of the construction. Multiole "knowl-edges" can coexist when equaily com etent ortruste In erp e ers Isa ree, an r de endinon social. po ltica , cultural, economic, ethnic,and gender factors that differentiate the interp~t-gs.. These constructions are subject to continuousrevision, with changes most likely to occur whenrelatively different constructions are brought intojuxtaposition in a dialectical context.

Row 3: How does knowledge accumulate?

Positivism and postpositivism. Knowledge ac-cumulates bv a process of accretion, with each

.~

TI ES Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research

:ra~jtyI (: :al-a}1jng, 1985);ltcW>gi-ct IS),u er-

authen-entidty9). 'he)Iv hef1theselIelism:t. hecr :al:he twoIUthen-ru v-fu: ~r

duct and human subjects committees. Further, therealist ontology undergirding these paradigms pro-vides a tilt toward the use of deception, which, itis argued in certain cases, is warranted to deter-mine how "things really are and work" or for the,sake of some "hi!!"hersocial good" or some "clearertruth" (Bok, 1978, 1982;Diener & Crandall, 1978).

Critical theory. Ethics is more nearly intrinsicto this paradigm, as implied by the intent to erodeignorance and misapprehensions, and to take fullaccount of values and historical situatedness inthe inquiry process. Thus there is a moral tilt thatthe inquirer be revelatory (in the rigorous mean-ing of "fully informed consent") rather than de-ceptive. Of course, these considerations do notprevent unethical behavior, but they do providesome process barriers that make it more difficult.

~)e

Constructivism. Ethics is intrinsic to this para-digm also because of the inclusion of participantvalues in the inquiry (startmg with respondents'existing constructions and working toward in-creased information and sophistication in theirconstructions as well as in the inquirer's construc-tion). There is an incentive-a process tilt-forrevelation; hiding the inquirer's intent is destruc-tive of the aim of uncoverin~ and improving con-

Structions. In addition, the hermeneuticaIJdialec-tical methodology itself provides a strong but notinfallible safeguard against deception. However,the close personal interactions required by themethodology may produce special and often sticky.£!oblems of confidentiality and anonymity, aswell as other interpersonal difficulties (Guba &Lincoln, 1989).

n-'-~tl"ce"

Values-Ie

1 tl ;eey _.e1se of;. Fo-r_

Ig' 1-wed;s and:)COD-th e

)f e~s thehe in-pc t

st

Row 7: What "voice" is mirroredin the inquirer's. activities,especially those directed at change?

Positivism and postpositivism. The inquirer'svoice is that of the "disinterested !;cientisC in-forming decision makers,policymakers, and changeagents, who independently use this scientific in-formation, at least in part, to form, explain, andjustify actions, policies, and change proposals.I

f.1 Critical theory. The inquirer's voice is that of

the "transformative intellectual" (Giroux, 1988)who has expanded consciousness and so is in aposition to confront ignorance and misapprehen-sions. Change is facilitated as individuals developgreater insight into the existing state of affairs(the nature and extent of their exploitation) andare stimulated to act on it.

th(~Hit .

but Itlence

cc .Constructivism. The inquirer's voice is that of

the "passionate participant" (Lincoln, 1991) ac-

115

tively engaged in facilitating the "multi voice"reconstruction of his or her own construction aswell as those of all other participants. Change isfacilitated as reconstructions are formed and in-dividuals are stimulated to act on them.

Row 8: What are the implicationsof each paradigm for thetraining of novice inquirers?

Positivism. Novices are trained primarily intechnical knowledge about measurement, design,and quantitative methods, with less but substan-tial emphasIs on formal theories of the phenom-ena in their substantive specialties.

Postpositivism. Novices are trained in way~paralleling the positivist mOde,but with the addi-tion of qualitative methods, often for the purposeof ameliorating the problems noted in the openingparagraphs of this chapter.

Critical theory and constructivism.Novices mustfirst be resocialized from their early and usuallIntense exposure to the received view of science.That resocializationcannotbe accomplishedwithoutthorough schooling in the postures and techniquesof positivism and postpositivism. Students mustcome to appreciate paradigm differences (summa-rized in Table 6.1) and, in that context, to masterboth qualitative and quantitative methods. Theformer are essential because of their role in car-rying out the dialogic/dialectical or hermeneuticaIJdialectical methodologies; the latter because theycan playa useful informationalrole in allparadigms.They must also be helped to understand the social,

litical omic ethnic, and ender his-to and structure that serve as the surround or elrinquiries, and to incorporate e values of altruismand empowerment in their work.

Row 9: Are these paradigmsnecessarily in conflict?Is it possible to accommodatethese several views withina single conceptual framework?

Positivism and postpositivism. Proponents ofthese two paradigms, given their foundationalorientation, take the position that all paradi~mscan be accommodated-that is, that there exists:or will be found to exist, some common rationalstructure to which all questIOns ot dlqerence canbe referred tor resolutIOn. 1he posture IS reauc-tionist and assumes the possibility of point-by-point comparisons (commensurability), an issueabout which there continues to be a great deal ofdisagreement.

116

Critical theory and constructivism. Proponentsof these two paradigms join in affirmin~ the basicincommensurability of the paradigms (althoughthey would agree that positivism and pos~-Ism are commensurable, and would probably agreethat critical theory and constructivism are com-mensurable). The basic beliefs of the paradigmsare beheved to be essentially contradictory. Forconstructivists, either there is a "real" reality orthere is not (although one might wish to resolvethis problem differently in considering the physi-cal versus the human realms), and thus construc-tivism and positivismlpostpositivism cannot belogically accommodated anymore than, say, theideas of flat versus round earth can be logicallyaccommodated. For critical theorists and con-structivists, inquiry is either value free or it is not;again, logical accommodation seems impossible.Realism and relativism, value freedom and valueboundedness, cannot coexist in any internally con-sistent metaphysical system, which condition ofconsistency, it is stipulated, is essentially met byeach of the candidate paradigms. Resolution ofthis dilemma will necessarily await the emer-gence of a metaparadigm that renders the older,accommodated paradigms not less true, but sim-ply irrelevant.

Row 10: Which of theparadigms exercises hegemony overthe others? That is,which is predominantly influential?

Positivism and postpositivism. Proponents ofpositi vism gained hegemony over the past severalcenturies as earlier Aristotelian and theologicalparadigms were abandoned. But the mantle ofhe!!:emonyhas in recent decades graduallv fallenon the shoulders of the postpositivists, the "natu-ral" heirs of positivism. Postpositivists (and in-deed many residual positivists) tend to controlpublication outlets, funding sources, promotionand tenure mechanisms, dissertation committees,and other sources of power and influence. Theywere, at least until about 1980, the "in" group, andcontinue to represent the strongest voice in pro-fessional decision making.

Critical theory and constructivism. Proponentsof critical theory and constructivism are still seek-ing recognition and avenues for input. Over thepast decade, it has become more and more possi-ble for them to achieve acceptance, as attested byincreasing inclusion of relevant papers in journalsand professional meetings, the development ofnew journal outlets, the growing acceptability of"qualitative" dissertations, the inclusion of "quali-tative" guidelines by some funding agencies andprograms, and the like. But in all likelihood, criti-

MAJOR PARADIGMS AND PERSPECTIVES Competing Paradig,

cal theory and constructivism will continue toplay secondary, although important and progres-sively more influential, roles in the near future.

worlds within worlds,

paradigms. Infinitesim3. It is unlikely tha

would agree that our she or she thinks or d.have either the time c

they do in philosophicever, that these descistrokes, if not always.

Conclusion

The metaphor of the "paradigm wars" describedby Gage (1989) is undoubtedly overdrawn. De-scribing the discussions and altercations of thepast decade or two as wars paints the matter asmore confrontational than necessary. A resolu-tion of paradigm differences can occur only whena new paradigm emerges that is more informedand SOphiStIcatedthan any existing one. That isiiffi5nikely to occur if and when proponents ofthese several points of view come together todiscuss their differences, not to argue the sanctityof their views. Continuin!!:dialogue among para-digm proponents of all stripes will afford the bestavenue for movin!!:toward a responsive and con-genial relationship.

We hope that in this chapter we have illustratedthe need for such a discussion by clearly deline-ating the differences that currently exist, and byshowing that those differences have significantimplications at the practical level. Paradigm is-sues are crucial; no inquirer, we maintain, oughtto go about the business of inquiry without beingclear about just what paradigm informs and guideshis or her approach.

R

Bernstein, R. (1988).

ism. Philadelphia:Bok, S. (1978). Lies: ~

life. New York: JBok, S. (1982). Secn

and revelation. J

Burns, J. (1978). LeaCarr, W., & Kemmi:

Education, /enO}don: Falmer.

Cook, T., & Campbeltation: Design

tings. Chicago:Diener, E., & Cranda

behavioral rese

cago Press.

Gage, N. (1989). nmattJ: A "his tor

ing since 1989.Giroux, H. (1988). S

lic life: Critic.Minneapolis: l

Glaser, B. G., & Stra

grounded theosearch. Chicag

Guba, E. G. P981). (ness of naturali

nication and Te

Guba, E. G. (Ed.). (

bury Park, CAGuba, E. G. (1992;

22, 17-24.Guba, E. G., & Line-

evaluation. N(

Notes

1. Many of the objections listed here were first enun-

ciated by positivists themselves; indeed, we might ar-gue that the postpositivist position represents an attemptto transform positivism in ways that take account of

these same objections. The naive positivist position of

the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries is nolonger held by anyone even casually acquainted withthese problems. Although we would concede that thepostpositivist position, as enunciated, for example, byDenis Phillips (1987, 1990a, 1990b), represents a con-

siderable improvement over classic positivism. it failsto make a clean break. It represents a kind of "damagecontrol" rather than a reformulation of basic principles.The notion that these problems required a paradigmshift was poorly recognized until the publication ofThomas Kuhn's landmark work, The Structure of Sci-entific Revolutions (1962, 1970), and even then pro-ceeded but slowly. Nevertheless, the contributions of

pre-Kuhnian critics should be recognized and applauded.2. We are reminded by Robert Stake (personal com-

munication, 1993) that the view of paradigms that wepresent here should not "exclude a belief that there are

SPECTlVES Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research

.w..tlcontinue tot and progres-. near future.

worlds within worlds, unending, each with its ownparadigms. Infinitesimals have their own cosmologies."

3. It is unlikely that a practitioner of any paradigmwould agree that our summaries closely describe whathe or she thinks or does. Workaday scientists rarelyhave either the time or the inclination to assess whatthey do in philosophical terms. We do contend, how-ever, that these descriptions are apt as broad brushstrokes, if not always at the individual level.-ars" described

'erdrawn. De-v..:ations of thets the matter as-ry. A resolu-

;ur only when___ore informed

ing one. That is'"-")roponents of

e together to._.:e the sanctity:ue among para-/LIfford the best

sive and con-

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'"!.~:i~

t