Groups’ Resort to Arms in Negotiating Space in Nigeria: The Central Nigeria Exception?

Introduction

Nigeria is one hundred years old this year. The creationof the Nigerian state commenced with the conquest of Lagos in1851 and its annexation in 1861. These two steps arehistorical and symbolical. The first represented the firstapplication of military force by an alien power on anycommunity within what later became Nigeria. The secondrepresented the laying of the foundation stone for creation ofa Westphalia style state in the Nigeria area. The centenarywhich we celebrate began with the amalgamation of the Southernand Northern protectorates into one administrative area. Whilethis is the justification for the amalgamation, Nigeria wasnever governed as one administrative unit.

In the first place, the colonial authorities representingthe two halves of Nigeria resisted most attempts to bond thetwo communities as exemplified in their policies andpronouncements. This exclusivist tendency permeated the cropsof ‘Nigerians’ they tutored toward statehood. In the secondplace, the colonial tendencies of excluding relations betweenthe two halves chimed into the evolving ethos of separationthat modern politics represented. Nigerians, from both ends,adopted and refined these separatist tendencies preparatory toand following the attainment of flag independence. In thethird place, the two halves of colonial creation gave way tothe many halves of pre colonial era existence, in the absenceof any acceptable uniting formula, as local politics respondedto changes on the international scene. This consolidated themany tendencies that constitute a cog in the wheel of creatinga Nigeria state and nation, if there was any such attempt, inthe first place. Nigeria is therefore a work in progress onhow to forge unity out of diversity. This is the project forthe next centenary of Nigeria.

It is part of this separatist inclination that encouragedNigerians, in the many configurations that evolves withchanging tide, to take up arms and contest or negotiate forspace in the post colonial Nigerian state. Over the course offifty years of statehood, most regions of Nigeria have hadcause to confront the state in their demand for space. Unitingeither as region, ethnic nationality or religious group, the

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north, east, west and south southerners have adopted thismethod of seeking redress to perceived injustice. The Tivrevolt of 1964 represented this tide but within the decayingregional organising principle that became irrelevant followingthe counter coup of 1966. Therefore the central Nigerian areais the exception to this seeming rule of arms for redress inthe politics of Nigeria. Why is the area an exception? Is thearea truly an exception?

This paper examines groups resort to arms in seekingredress drawing on the seeming inability of the CentralNigerian area1 to tow this line in spite of injustice from theNigerian state. To accomplish this, the paper is structuredinto sections. They include the introduction which set out thework; laying the basis for contest situate falsehood andgovernance as framework of analysis; taking up arms againstthe state choreograph groups that have resorted to arms; atthe heart of the area’s crisis situate definition and identityas the area’s major setback; consolidating pawning in theabsence of organising principle; and the conclusion whichargues that reinventing governance is panacea to limiting theprospect of resort to arms.

Laying the Basis for Contest: Falsehood and Governance

Nigeria was constructed on the basis of falsehood andpoor governance. There are two phases involved in the processof constructing this falsehood. The first and the mostenduring phase is the colonial phase. It was instituted by thecolonial authority in the course of building the Nigerianstate. The second phase is led by the elite and it is a workin progress. It includes what the elite of the major groups,the premier beneficiaries of colonial legacy, inherited fromthe colonial authority and their refinement, addition andimprovement, of the process.

One outstanding foundation of falsehood is the divisionof Nigeria along three ethnic lines thus giving the impressionthat this situation was the norm prior to the intervention ofthe colonial authority. Thus the rest of the over four hundred1 The conception of this paper owe an invaluable debt to Mr. Daniel Richard. It was Mr. Richard, in one of his conversation with me, who drew attention to the fact that it is the only area in Nigeria that has not taken up arms against the Nigerian state.

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nationalities within the borders of the Nigerian state wereconveniently confined into the three regions. This experimentheld only as long as the colonial fiat subsisted and to alarge extent under the experiment of self rule and the FirstRepublic where the three mutually antagonistic regions kepteach other in check while they schemed. There were cracks inthe make believe unity instituted in each of the regions. Theearliest in the northern region was the Tiv revolt of 1964.The incident was the reflection of falsehood and poorgovernance prevalent in this part of the country.

Central Nigerians have demonstrated peculiar social,political and cultural disposition which put them at polar endwith their colonially imposed overlords. Their peculiarityensured that it was a marriage of inconvenience that was boundto implode. Governance which was built on falsehood providedthe litmus test for this implosion. Governance as theeffective and efficient identification, deployment andmanagement of human and material resources for the benefit ofNigerians has been inadequate and in some instance lacking inalmost all sectors. This is the situation since the attainmentof independence. It is also the source of most of the angst inmost regions of the country.

The state in Nigeria caters for its occupants at everyhistorical juncture. This may not be the case elsewhere. Othercountries, while retaining their hold on the state, attempt toprovide for the generality of people as a way of insulatingthe pressure that may likely emanate. In Nigeria, the reverseobtains. The hold on the state is tenuous and disperse asdifferent factions within the ruling elite control differentpart of the state to their own benefit. Thus groups’ interestin capturing the state is predicated on their need to accessdevelopment. It has been the case since the independence ofNigeria over fifty years ago. Quasi convention exist whichseek to alternate groups’ access to the state in order tostabilise the polity and reduce dangerous brinkmanship thatcould bring down the house.

We adopt governance perspective in an attempt to makesense of our intervention in group resort to arms innegotiating space in Nigeria. We attribute poor or weakgovernance to proliferating corruption which weaken or destroy

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institutions. We argue that institution is the life wire ofany organisation. In this discourse, there is an organicconnection between declining governance, non performinginstitutions and deepening corruption. We have argued, whenthe occasion presents itself, in different forums, thatgetting governance right is fundamental to addressing numerouschallenges confronting Nigeria. At the heart of the governancetravail is corruption. The primary goal of corruption is thedestruction of institutions. When institutions are weak ornonexistent, corruption thrives thus deepening the inabilityof governance to deliver the goods.

Governance is the effective and efficient use of men andmaterial for the benefit of people. Governance impliesadministrative and managerial skill and ability. Governance isthe exercise of political power to manage public affairs forpublic good. The developed partners’ concern with governance,in the developing countries, covered the technocratic and goodgovernance perspectives.2 This is informed by the wide ranginginterests3 that has emerged in the attempt to address theabsence and in some cases the often slow pace of developmentin most third world countries. While the World Bank’s focuswas administrative and managerial, Western governments, whilestressing administrative improvement, were more concerned withliberal political orientation. However, both are emphaticabout efficient utilisation of men and resource to addresshuman inadequacies.

Leftwich offered four explanations for Westerngovernments renewed interest in promoting good governance anddemocratic politics from the late 1980s. These were experienceof structural adjustment lending, the resurgence of neo-liberalism in the West, the collapse of official communistregimes and the rise of pro-democracy movements in thedeveloping world and elsewhere.4 The World Bank was constrained

2 See World Bank, Sub Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, Washington DC:The World Bank, 1989; World Bank, Governance and Development, Washington DC:World Bank, 1992; Thomas G. Weiss, “Governance, Good Governance and GlobalGovernance: Conceptual and Actual Challenges”, Third World Quarterly, Volume 12,Number 5, 2000: 795-8143 This includes governments, donor agencies, academic institutions andinternational organisations

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by its Article of Agreement5, to stay clear of politics in itslending to member states. The Bank’s only real alternativewas to respond in a managerial and administrative mode. This,in part, explains the Bank's interest in the limited,apolitical and technicist notion of governance which wasreflected in its concern for a more limited but more efficientstate, detached from its prior involvement in economicmatters. Such a state would undertake basic investment in, andmanagement of, essential physical and social infrastructure,while also monitoring and supervising the free play of marketrelations in an impartial, open and accountable manner.6 Whilethe World Bank was restrained from entering 'political'territory, no such constraints applied to Western governments.Furthermore, the four factors listed above persuaded thesegovernments to go beyond the call for improved public sectormanagement and to insist on the need for democratisation.

According to the World Bank, "underlying the litany ofAfrica's development problems is a crisis of governance”.7 TheBank is of the view that good governance is synonymous tosound development management whose features includes anefficient public service; an independent judicial system andlegal framework to enforce contracts; the accountableadministration of public funds; an independent public auditorresponsible to a representative legislature; respect for thelaw and human rights at all levels of government; apluralistic institutional structure, and a free press.

Nigeria’s declining rating in numerous index within andoutside is instructive of the condition of governance.Nigeria’s position has deteriorated in the Failed States Index(FSI) since 20058; in the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI)

4 Adrian Leftwich, “Governance, Democracy and Development in the ThirdWorld”, Third World Quarterly, Volume 14, Number 3, Democratisation in the ThirdWorld, 1993: 605-6245 IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), Articles ofAgreement, Washington DC: World Bank, 1989.6 World Bank, World Development Report 1991, New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 1991.7 World Bank, Sub Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, Washington DC: TheWorld Bank, 19898 Failed States Index, 2013. http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2013-sortable retrieved 11/09/13.

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where the sub-national calculation of prevalence of povertycoincides with the endemically unstable North East, North Westand North Central;9 the Multidimensional Poverty Indexvalidates the Nigerian Poverty Profiles on the prevalence ofpoverty in these areas10; others include the “Save theChildren” survey which included Nigeria in the over 500million children whose growth will be physically and mentallystunted in the next fifty years due to lack of sufficientfood.11 Nigeria’s lack of commitment in fighting corruption,replete in the proliferation of anti corruption institutions,is pristine. The more institutions fighting corruption thebetter it is to divert interest from the malaise. Of thecountries polled in the Afro barometer survey entitled“governments falter in the fight against corruption”, Nigeriatopped the list.12

The prevailing governance condition paves way forcorruption. Corruption, according to TI, is the abuse ofentrusted power for private gain. Entrusted power can be inthe public or private space. The abuse of this entrusted powermakes an individual corrupt a person. To this extent, we allare culpable--at some point. This is because at some point inour dealings whether in public or private space, we have abusethe trust reposed in us. Corruption destroys institutions inorder to thrive.

Institutions are sine qua non to governance. In fact,institutions strengthen governance. It is not surprising thatPresident Obama’s attention focused on building institutionswhen he visited the continent.13 According to President Obama,

9 Multidimensional Poverty Index, 2013. multidimensional poverty at thesub-national level, http://www.ophi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/nigeria-2013.pdf?7ff332 retrieved 13/09/13.10 Nigerian Bureau of Statistics (2012), ‘Nigerians living below $1per dayup 112.6m, says NBS’ http://www.momentng.com/en/news/6535/nigerians-living-below-1-per-day-up-1126m-says-nbs--.html retrieved 15/02/12.11 British broadcasting corporation (2012).http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-17034134 retrieved 15/02/12.12 See Samantha Richmond and Carmen Alpin, “Government Falter in Fight toCurb Corruption: the people give most a failinggrade”,http://www.afrobarometer.org/files/documents/policy_brief/ab_r5_policybriefno4.pdf accessed 19:11:1313 Presidents Obama and Mandela’s tenure represent the impact of stronginstitutions working against the expectations of their numerous

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Africa does not need strong leaders. Africa needs stronginstitutions. Nigeria has weak and non functional institutionswhich explain the challenges confronting the country.Nigeria’s anti corruption drive is insincere. The prevalenceof numerous anti corruption agencies reek of demonic sarcasm.It is the absence of strong institutions that promotes endemiccorruption impoverishing people. This destroys governance orsound public administration.

Poor or weak governance is the function of politics andthus the nature of state prevalent in Nigeria. Nigeria’spolitics14 is the type that generate, sustain and protect adependent capacity for governance at all levels. When leaders,whether in the public or private domain, emerge with agendaand proceed to implement this agenda in a coordinated fashionwithin a stipulated period of time, their agenda embraces theideal of planning. Nigeria’s enabling environment,particularly in the public arena, discourages this orderlyprocess. Most Nigerian leaders came to their position bychance.15 It is the consequence of the kind of politics andstate in existence. When individuals are railroaded intooffice by vested interests and maintain their officesanswerable to these interests, planning and implementationreside with the interests that facilitated their coming tothis position. This is an enabling environment that destroysinstitutions, proliferate corruption and undermine governance.

Until we get our politics right creating the kind ofstate that generates, sustains and protects an independent andeffective capacity for governance, the leadership willcontinue to bungle governance and in the process, both the ledand leadership will increase their reliance on falsehood andforce in negotiating space and managing challenges.

Taking up Arms against the State: From the Earliest to theRecent

constituencies.14 For perspective on this type of politics, see Adrian Leftwich,“Governance, Democracy and Development in the Third World”, Third WorldQuarterly, Volume 14, Number 3, Democratisation in the Third World, 1993:605-62415 See Olayemi Akinwumi, Before We Set the House Ablaze”: Let Us Consult Our Oracle(History),The Third Inaugural Lecture, Nasarawa State University, Keffi, 2009,p.18

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James O’Connell’s “the inevitability of instability”aptly captures the condition of post independence Nigeria. Thestate was built on the foundation of falsehood and poorgovernance. O’ Connell’s view derived from three assumptions.16

The first is that the boundaries of African state were drawnarbitrarily by the colonial masters and that the ethnically,culturally and politically diverse peoples grouped togetherunder these artificial boundaries were only held together bythe force of a powerful, authoritarian and external colonialpower. The second is that these ethnic categories andcleavages reasserted themselves very powerfully as thecompetition for state power and public resources intensifiedjust before and after independence.

The third is that the political elites who inheritedpower from the departing colonial rulers, having themselvesbeen tutored with the authoritarian tradition of the colonialstate and having assumed leadership of their respective statesvia ethnic tickets, lacked the competence, democratic skillsand managerial ability to handle conflicts associated withheterogeneous societies, and so relied on corruption and thepolitics of primordial tendencies to perpetuate themselves inpower.17

Britain was not surprised that four years after itinstalled the First Republic, there was a revolt in the BenueProvince, led by the Tiv ethnic group, against the NorthernRegional Government. It was equally not surprised that civilwar broke out seven years after it departed the country. Thistime, an unwieldy coalition called Nigeria was arraignedagainst the Igbo of Southeast. The secession drum did notoriginate from the Igbo. In fact, the north, in expressing itsfear of domination preparatory to independence, called for thedivision of the country, the so called Araba, as if what itinherited from the British had always been what it had priorto the coming of the British. The North’s preference forseparation against Southern domination was predicated on itsfalse belief that the minorities of central Nigeria will join16 J. O’Connell, “The Inevitability of Conflicts in Post-IndependenceAfrican Nations”, Journal of Modern African Studies, Volume 5. Number 2,1967, pp. 122-137 17 J. O’Connell, “The Inevitability of Conflicts in Post-IndependenceAfrican Nations”

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it in a union where it will call the shot. The Tiv Revolt wasthe opening salvo, if it required one, that the dream of aseparate country would be a costly enterprise.

As the build up to the civil war continued, particularlywith the pogrom against Igbos in northern cities and thefailed effort at brokering settlement, it was alleged that theYoruba, the third of the dominant group, had reached anunderstanding with the Igbos that if they successfullyseceded, they too will follow the path. This was not to be.What resulted was that the Yoruba backpedalled on thisunderstanding and presided over the effort to keep Nigeriatogether. The point here is that the three groups were in theforefront of calling for the balkanization of Nigeriaostensibly as they feared each other in their scheming todominate the polity. They had proceeded to doing this on themistaken belief that the minorities within their regions willacquiesce and support their intention. They did not consultthese groups when they took this decision. In any case, thereaction of minorities in the eastern region was indicative ofwhat awaited them had they succeed in their attempts to formseparate countries.

O’Connell’s assumption were at work in the conflicts thatengulfed the Nigerian state prior to and after independence.The boundaries drawn by the colonial authority were sources ofconflict for communities because they are arbitrary; ethnicconsideration remained a strong parameter for getting powerand controlling the state; since the basis for acquiring powerby the elites was their region of origin and not theircompetence as managers, this trend continued as mismanagementbecame the hallmark of governance. Consequently, Nigeria hasbeen graduating from one conflict to another. With the onsetof economic crisis in the 1980s, the years of incompetence ofthe managers of the state reached its peak. A state ofperpetual low and high intensity conflict became the normeverywhere. The priority of governance shifted to managing thecentrifugal forces working to dismember the Nigerian state.

Of the groups taking up arms against the Nigerian statesince independence, the Igbo in Civil War of 1967, the Yorubain the annulled presidential election of June 12 1993 and the

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emergence of OPC, the Niger Delta struggle againstexploitation and environmental degradation and the ongoingBoko Haram conflict stood out as class apart. The Tiv revoltof 1964 was in a class of its own.

The civil war of 1967 to 1970 was the culmination of thecontest for power between the Igbo, Hausa and Yoruba ethnicnationalities in the context of the regional contraption ofthe colonial era. It was the consequence of certain policiesand programmes pursued in the course of colonial rule. Thewar, as it turned out for the Igbo, was that of survival. TheHausa and Yoruba nationalities whipped up sentiment, amongother nationalities, against what they saw as Igbo ascendancyin national affair. In reality, it was a war meant to addresstheir specific fears and reservations about the Igbo group.The birth of the Movement for the Sovereign State of Biafra(MASSOB) in the late 1990s was a reminder that the issues werefar from resolved. The MASSOB engaged the forces of the statein battles particularly in the period of the Obasanjopresidency. The fallout of the war is with us as there are somany unresolved questions. The war was the first armedinsurrection against the Nigerian state by a dissatisfiedmember. It is by far the farthest attempt to dismember thecountry.

The issues that drove the Igbo ethnic nationality intotaking up arms against the state remain germane in thepolity. They are issues of governance, unfairness, injusticeand marginalisation. It was the case with the transitionprogramme of General Ibrahim Babangida in the late 1980s andearly 1990s. The military regime’s denial of the mandate ofNigerians, freely given to Chief Moshood Abiola, was thesource of the protracted crisis that pushed Nigeria to thebrink. The ostensible ground for annulling that election wasnational security concern. As a term, national security’scurrency depends on one’s position within the power hierarchy.Thus ask the dramatis personae in the annulment saga whatnational security threat the election and the mandate posed tothe country and there will be as many explanations as thehierarchy allow. The annulment was the culmination of thehistorical quarrel of the three ethnic nationalities againsteach other. Other Nigerians were pawn in the power play that

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pitched these groups. The emergence of the Oodua Peoples’Congress (OPC) owed much to the annulment as to the move todrive out the military from power. The OPC took up armsagainst the state and made life difficult for Nigeriansparticularly Hausas in the Southwest.

Taking up arms against the state became the affair of thethree ethnic nationalities. While the seeming arm struggle inthe west metamorphosed into the local equivalent of theinternational campaign to oust military rule from the bodypolity of Nigeria, the Northern and Eastern equivalent wasmore of a tit for tat campaign against the state. The statewas clearly rudderless as it was pummelled from within andwithout. Apart from the OPC, the Arewa Peoples’ Congress andthe Movement for the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) weregroups active in the campaign against the state.

The Niger Delta took up arms against the state as part ofthe attempt to put on the political agenda the environmentaldegradation that is the consequence of oil exploitation. Thecampaign attained international recognition under theleadership of Mr. Ken Saro Wiwa. The Movement for the Survivalof Ogoni People (MOSOP) was the platform for the campaign.However, the Nigerian state under General Sani Abacha andChief Olusegun Obasanjo, was belligerent. This belligerenceintroduced a militant edge to the struggle. Hence the birth ofgroups such as the Niger Delta Defence Force, Movement for theEmancipation of the Niger Delta, the Egbesu Boys. They waged asuccessful campaign against the state resulting in manyconcessions. This phase of the struggle attempt to connectwith the armed struggle waged by Major Isaac Adaka Boro in thecourse of the civil war.

The Boko Haram is the contemporary scourge of the statein Nigeria. It was the creation of northern elite in thecourse of their dissatisfaction with the administration ofChief Olusegun Obasanjo. It was the fallout of the processthat began with the annulment of the June 12 presidentialelection. It began as an attempt by the Islamic north toconnect to their Islamic heritage in calling for theimplementation of sharia legal system. The launch of thesharia penal system in Zamfara State created a domino effect

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in most northern states. The implementation of sharia dividedopinion in the north. On the one hand were those who favoursharia as a way of retaining political relevance in theirstate and in confronting the federal government as it was thenconstituted. On the other hand were the religiousestablishment who faulted the political objective imbued inthe clamour for sharia. The result was that the debate washijacked by many elements who saw in it an opportunity tobuild a base for themselves.

The emergence and prominence of Boko Haram represents onestrand of this opinion. Boko Haram has since committed itselfto destroying the Nigerian state through attacks oninfrastructure, schools, religious organisation and governmentfacilities. The North east of Nigeria where it originated isin a state of siege as most economic and social activitieshave been paralysed. The North west and North central are notimmuned from the activities of the sect. The Nigerian defenceand security establishment is currently powerless in checkingthe activities of the group. In spite of the existence ofnumerous military task forces and special budgetary provisionto tackle the latest challenge to the state, the Boko Haramgroup remains invincible. The powerlessness of armed forces isthe consequence of outdated methodology and corruption withintheir rank. Defence is a cottage industry in this phase of thecrisis of post colonial state in Nigeria.

This leaves the question where is the central Nigeriaamong groups taking up arms against the state? The area hasbeen host of numerous conflicts since the 1980s.18 Theseconflicts pitched groups within the area against each otherand groups from outside the area19. In deed as the paper18 Toyin Falola, Violence in Nigeria: The crisis of religious politics and secular ideologies, NewYork: University of Rochester Press, 1998; O Otite and I O Albert (eds)Community conflicts in Nigeria: management, resolution and transformation, Ibadan:Spectrum, 2001;T T Gyuse and O Ajene (eds) Conflicts in the Benue valley, Makurdi:CPDS, 2006; S G Best (ed) Introduction to peace and conflict studies in West Africa: areader, Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 2006; O Nnoli, Ethnic politics in Nigeria, Enugu:Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1978; O Akinwumi, S U Fwatshak O O Okpeh Jr(eds), Historical perspectives on Nigeria’s post-colonial conflicts, Lagos: HSN, 2007; OgohAlubo, Ethnic Conflicts and Citizenship Crises in Central Nigeria, Ibadan: PEFS, 201119 The trend of groups from outside the area heightened following theannulment of June 12 1993 election and the explosion of intoleranceparticularly among the Yoruba, Hausa and Igbo nationalities. One of the

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presented at the colloquium of the centenary of Nigeria on thearea demonstrated, conflicts along this line are set toescalate. This is due to environmental factors affecting boththe far north and the far south. In the far north is theincreasing desertification resulting in migration into centralNigeria.20 In the south is the incidence of ocean surge. Thus,central Nigeria is not only a hotbed of different conflictsgenerated internally and in some cases with externalinfluence21, the area is also set to host conflicts derivingfrom differences fuelled by land, chieftaincy, citizenship,indigeneship and politics and those deriving from communitiesfleeing from environmental crisis in other regions. Theupsurge of nomads and sedentary farmers’ clashes over grazingland and water, common in Nasarawa, Plateau and in recent timeBenue State, is demonstrative of the environmental crisis.

The examples of conflicts are a far cry from the typologyunder discourse in this paper. These conflicts prevail inthese other communities. However, it did not prevent thesecommunities from taking up arms against the state when therewas the need for it. Central Nigeria is perhaps distinctive inthe lack of resort to arms to challenge the state over issuesof development. Why is the central Nigeria a seeming exception

result was that the attacks orchestrated by militant wings of thisnationalities pushed people away from regions hostile to them. Most ofthese people found home in central Nigerian cities such as Jos. Thepersistent crisis in Plateau state is not unconnected with the fallout ofthis process. See Adoyi Onoja, “Rethinking the September 2001 Crisis inJos: the Transformation of the State and Deepening Alienation”, Departmentof History, Nasarawa State University, Keffi (Unpublished papers, 2013)20 Professor Monday Mangvwat’s paper entitled “The Middle Belt and Lugard’sAmalgamation: A Centenary Reflection”as well as Professor Ibrahim Bashir’spaper, “A Promise Unfulfilled: Economy and Society in 20th Century North-East”examined this. The lead paper ““Discordant Voices in the House thatLugard Roofed: Amalgamation Discourses in Nigeria’s First Centenary”set thetone of the discordant voices emanating from Nigerians as reflected in thepapers and sessions. Most papers from the colloquium which were grouped onthe basis of the six geopolitical regions touched on phenomenon thatbothered on the many unresolved political, cultural, social, economic andhistorical issues threatening the unity of the country. See HistoricalSociety of Nigeria Colloquium, “The House that Lugard Built: Perspectiveson Nigeria’s Centenary-The Gains, The Challenges and The Agenda for theFuture”, 20th February, 2014, Sheraton Hotel and Towers, Abuja21 For instances of these conflicts, see Ogoh Alubo, Ethnic Conflicts and CitizenshipCrises in Central Nigeria, Ibadan: PEFS, 2011

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from the rule? Is it really a question of exception or thelack of a uniting mechanism to channel grievances against thestate?

At the Heart of the Area’s Crisis: Definition and Identity

The answer to the preceding questions lies in thedefinition of the area. The narratives available on the areademonstrate that the primary problem confronting the area isthe absence of a definition and identity. To this extent, thearea lacked an acceptable view of itself making the areaporous and lacking in organising principle. The absence ofacceptable definition can be mirrored by the numerous views ofscholars concerning the area.22 The multiple perspectivesavailable on the area derive from culture, geography,politics, religion and economy. None of this is substantiveenough to confer on it the type of perception that areas suchas the east (Igbo), west (Yoruba), north (Hausa) and NigerDelta have.

In the first place, it is not even acceptable among itsinhabitants let alone its critics what name to use inidentifying the area. Thus it is variously called the middlebelt, central Nigeria and north central. Each of these namesadds or subtract elements from among its users. It is a pointof disagreement enough to add to the disagreement within. In apioneer work, Logams identified the Middle Belt groups toinclude Adamawa, Benue, Plateau, Southern Bauchi and SouthernKaduna. In what he viewed the political and social concept ofthe Middle Belt, Adamawa had 180 ethnic groups in theestimated 300 ethnic groups of the area. The area was alsopolitically distinct in the nature of the socio-politicalproblems characteristic of the Middle Belt groups andsocieties because it had one of the highest concentrations of

22 See S. G. Tyoden, The Middle Belt in Nigerian Politics, Jos: AHA Publishing House,1993; Y. Turaki, The British Colonial Legacy in Northern Nigeria: A Social Ethical Analysis of theColonial and Post Colonial Society and Politics in Nigeria, Jos: Turaki, 1993; O O Okpeh JrA Okau S U Fwatshak (eds), The middle belt in the shadow of Nigeria, Makurdi: OracleBusiness Limited, 2007; R K Udo, Geographical regions of Nigeria, London:Heinemann, 1970; Mvendaga Jibo, The middle belt and the federal project in Nigeria,Ibadan: JODAD, 2003; Adoyi Onoja, “Between inclusion and exclusion: themiddle belt in Northern power equation”, Jos Journal of Minority Studies 1:1 (2003):26-39.

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a colonizing Fulani ruling class and with a substantial Hausa-Fulani Islamic population.23 The Plateau groups followed withover 100 ethnic groups while the rest of the groups shared theremaining ethnic groups.

This initial Middle Belt area has since metamorphosedinto states and regions with the increasing demand byNigerians for political, economic and cultural space. Theyinclude Gombe, Taraba, Southern Kaduna, Nasarawa, Kogi etc. Itis important to note that the influence of Fulani and Hausaremains as important a factor in the narrative of the groupsidentity today as it was when it was first identifiedparticularly in Adamawa, Southern Bauchi, Southern Kaduna andsome Divisions in Plateau area. The pull of these divergentforces is instrumental to the wavering witnessed in the areaas far as the Middle Belt cause is concerned.

The Middle Belt or Central Nigeria’s northern identitywas the creation of British colonialism. To this extent, theidentification of the area with the north owes much to thiscolonial fiat than to any tradition or conquest claims.Britain’s primary task in its colonisation of Nigeriabeginning from 1861 was to deal with the major groups found inthe east, west and north. Thus while recognising the quasihistorical claims of these groups to territories where theypredominated, Britain foisted a version of history of relationof subordination and super ordination between these dominantgroups and the numerous minority groups that smacks ofsophistry. This version of relation has remained contested tothis very day. It was certainly not true that the numerousminorities found in these areas were subject to the suzeraintyof the major groups. The nature of relation alternated betweendomination and resistance in different spheres. It wasmutually interdependent. Not even the claim of domination andconquest often attributed to internal development such as thereligious movement of the 19th century in the north changedsignificantly the character of relation prior to colonialism.It was British colonialism that gave these major groups holdover these minority groups in all the years of their

23 Paul Chunun Logams, The Middle Belt Movement in Nigerian Political Development: A Study inPolitical Identity 1949-1967, Abuja: CMBS, 2004, pp. 285-343

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relation. This is the basis of the claim exercised by themajor groups over the minor groups in the Nigerian state.

The terms “middle” or “central” connotes geography and inparticular its location on the Nigerian map between the northand south. This “middle” role is assuming a character for thearea from the point of view of politics, culture, social andecology. The states identified as constituent part of the areainclude Benue, Kogi, Plateau, Kwara, Kaduna, Niger, Nasarawa,Taraba and the FCT.24 In this classification, Adamawa wasexcluded. It was suggested that the states in the area shouldinclude Benue, Plateau and Taraba. Alubo, in his studyidentifying over represented states in the table of flashpointof conflicts, equated the north central region to the middlebelt and include Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Plateau,Taraba, Southern Kaduna and Southern Bauchi states25 as itsconstituent parts.

The choice to include or exclude states from thedefinition of the middle belt, central Nigeria or northcentral is part of the shifting preferences of elites in thearea as their fortunes fluctuate in the politics of space inNigeria.26 There are phases of inclusion and exclusion in theaffairs of the constituent states, their northern behemoth andthe Nigeria state. It was applied by the elites inhabiting theregion as well as the northern elites and other occupants ofthe Nigerian state. For the elite of the region, it is meantto fit into the currency that sells at particular historicaljuncture-whether it is region, ethnicity or religion. For thenorthern behemoth, it is to whip up numbers, in theirtraditional contest with the south, over position or resource.This aspect subsists as long as the struggle lasted. Once thecontest is decided in favour of the north, exclusion clausewhich could be ethnicity or religion is used to appropriatethe benefit to the northern group.

24 See Patrick D. Dawam, “Aspect of the Geography of Central Nigeria Area”,in A.A. idrees and Y.A. Ochefu, Studies in the History of Central Nigeria Area Volume 1,Lagos: CSS, 200225 Ogoh Alubo, Ethnic Conflicts and Citizenship Crises in Central Nigeria, p.1126 For analysis of this, see Adoyi Onoja, “Between inclusion and exclusion:the middle belt in Northern power equation”, Jos Journal of Minority Studies 1:1(2003): 26-39.

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In the case of the occupant of the Nigerian state atparticular moment, usually one of the three major groups, theyused such appointment or distribution to antagonise eachother. The Chief Obasanjo presidency from 1999 to 2007witnessed this aspect of inclusion and exclusion. On thisnote, it was a replay of the north versus south contest alongthe line of the three major groups in Nigeria. ChiefObasanjo’s appointment of services chiefs, in his first term,demonstrates this on either side.27 The service chiefs on thisoccasion were appointed from the so called middle belt ornorthern minorities including Muslim and Christian. The farnorth cried marginalisation over the appointment.

Unlike the other regions of Nigeria, the areas’multiplicity of languages, religions, population type andregion of origin constitute setback in any attempt to adopt anorganising platform. The ability of the east to marshal herresource in the attempt to secede was made easier by theirlocation and concentration in one particular region, ethnicand religious homogeneity and above all the genuineness oftheir grievances against the Nigerian state. The west did relyon their sense of oneness derived from a common ancestry,language, location and concentration in one geo politicalarea. Of the major groups in Nigeria, the Yoruba’s religiousorientation is the most eclectic as it straddle the majorreligious groups as well as their strong adherence totraditional religion and culture. In fact, when the annulmentof the June 12 1993 election occurred, their ethnic andcultural allegiance superseded all other consideration intheir mobilisation for a common cause. For the Hausa, theirorganising principle is their religion. Islam is a source ofbond that binds the heterogeneity of cultures and peoplesidentified as Hausa. The Hausa culture’s enduring strength isits openness and reception as long as Islam is the religion.Their resolve to challenge the Obasanjo presidency usingsharia is demonstrative of the strength of their organisingprinciple. The Boko Haram insurgency owes its strength fromtheir religion.

27 For phases of inclusion and exclusion, see Adoyi Onoja, “Betweeninclusion and exclusion: the middle belt in Northern power equation”

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Nor is the Niger Delta uncommon in having an organisingprinciple in spite of their heterogeneity. The possession ofcommon ecology, common resource and a common destiny providesuch bond. Equally cementing this bond is their realisationthat the Nigerian state is determined to destroy theirenvironment in the name of oil and gas exploitation withoutcommensurate investment. This serves as the building blocksfor their struggle for survival. The struggle of the NigerDelta people is the struggle to rescue their ecosystem and wayof life against the onslaught of a bankrupt governance elitepresided by the major groups. Their struggle has resonance inhistory. Prior to the current dimension of oil exploitation,the area was the “oil rivers” for Britain in the exploitationof palm oil. The militants have been able to utilise theirenvironment to challenge the Nigeria state and emergevictorious. It is one phase of the struggle. There are manyother phases of the struggle as well as steely determinationon their part to accomplish this.28

The analysis leaves no one in doubt as to what is at theheart of the inability of central Nigeria to organise itself.Indeed, the preceding scenario offers a glimpse of what willemerge were Nigeria to go the Yugoslavian way. The Serbs,Croats and Muslim Republics will be represented by the Yoruba,Igbo and Hausa. The other fractious parts will include theNiger Delta and Central Nigeria.

The publication in 2008 of the United States intelligencereport predicting the breakup of Nigeria in 2015 did elicitreaction from across the country. An added impetus to thereaction was the war game in the program called ‘UnifiedQuest’ where a scenario of the possible response of the U.Sarmy to the breakup was played out. The reaction to UnifiedQuest was no less as diverse as the one that followed theprediction. It was typically a Nigerian elite reaction.Nigeria shared commonality with the former state ofYugoslavia. There are three distinct nationalities in Nigeriaand they include Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa. It was the case withthe defunct Yugoslavia with Bosnians, Croats and Serbs.

28 The presentation from the south south by Dr. CBN Ogbogbo in the centenarycolloquium organized by the Historical Society of Nigeria is demonstrativeof this resolve.

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Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa are embryonic states in the event ofthe prediction coming to pass.29

These are by no means the only nationalities in thesestates. There are numerous others with less clearly definedingredients of future states much as these also existed in thedefunct Yugoslavia. The central Nigerian communities alongside their Niger Delta neighbours hold out the prospect of acomplicated picture of statehood. When Slobodan Miloseviclaunched his attempt of creating a Greater Serbian nationwhich resulted in the wars that pitched Bosnian Muslims andCroats against their Serb neighbour, the contest was reallynot between the troikas as such but with the fate of theminorities such as Macedonia and Kosovo. The activeintervention of the west especially the United States helpedbring the enabling environment that not only sanctioned theexistence of the three states but also provided for thesecurity of Macedonia and especially the contentious Kosovo.30

Were this to happen in Nigeria and the three states ofYoruba, Igbo and Hausa established and knowing the legendaryaversion of the other minorities to associating with either ofthese states, what would be the picture of the states toemerge in these areas? Would there be a United States orEurope with the wherewithal to enable the tidy emergence of aform of compromise that would facilitate the emergence ofstate in central Nigeria and the Niger Delta? The combinedresource of central Nigeria and the Niger Delta has sustainedthe domination of the state by the three contestingnationalities. It would be expected that each of thenationalities would be keen in intervening in the contest incentral Nigeria and Niger Delta areas. Realizing that thecentral Nigerian communities are as divided as there arenationalities, what would be the shape of the states thatwould emerge? Islam, Christianity, ethnicity and shiftingelite preference are important indices in the lives of thesepeople and it would most definitely be the rallying pointwithin and especially from without.31 These indices constitute29Adoyi Onoja, “In the Event of Breakup of Nigeria: U.S. Prediction,Governance Crisis and the Implication for Central Nigeria”, Department ofHistory, Nasarawa State University, Keffi(unfinished manuscript, 2010)30 Adoyi Onoja, “In the Event of Breakup of Nigeria:31 Adoyi Onoja, “In the Event of Breakup of Nigeria:

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the areas’ bane as far as generating a rallying point isconcerned.

Consolidating Pawning in the Absence of Organising Principle

Without an organising principle, the area is open topawning from within and outside. The connivance of its eliteis instrumental to this. In the absence of any organisingprinciple, there is no prospect of the area ever taking uparms against the state to address its myriad of problem.

In the first place, there is no agreement on the statesthat constitute the area called the middle belt, centralNigeria or north central. From the pioneer work of Logams onthe area to the National Constitutional Conference in the mid1990s that introduced the six geo political regions, thetendency has been to include or exclude. The choice of thename middle belt, central Nigeria or north central reflectsthis inclusion or exclusion clauses in their use byindividuals, groups or communities. The use of north centralincludes states whose orientation counters what the adherentsof its ideals represented. One example is Kwara state. KwaraState stands on the frontiers of cultural and political pulls.The Yoruba cultural identity clashes with a pro northernpolitical inclination. The pull factors discountenance anypretence to supporting the middle belt cause.

In the second place, the prevalence of numerous religionsparticularly Islam and Christianity is one factor that checksany move towards having a united front in the region. Thereare as many Muslims as there are Christians. Indeed,Christianity is the ideological root of the Middle Beltorientation. The middle belt sense of the self derives fromthe oppression and marginalisation experienced after it wasgrafted into the Muslim heartland by British colonialism. Itsliberation from the clutches of northern imperialism owes muchto the liberating attributes of western education and itsprevalence in the armed forces and paramilitary establishment.What religion accomplished for the region is unlike what ithas in the east, north or the more eclectic west where the

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bond of culture diluted the polarising influence of multireligious orientation.

In the third place, the multiplicity of languages andcultures as a defining characteristics of the area complicateindividual and group understanding. Of the hundreds oflanguages found in Nigeria, the region is host to two third ofthis. Building bridges of solidarity across these differenceshas been and will remain a herculean task. Of note here is theinfluence of Hausa as language bridging this divide. The roleof Hausa in the area transcends the language bond it providesto those of culture and religion. The twin impact of Hausaculture and Islamic religion is undermining the identity ofthe many communities who subsume their individual identity forthe supranational identity provided by the Hausa way of life.This is evidently threatening of numerous civilisationsparticularly the small ones within the region.

In the fourth place, the middle of the road politicalorientation of the people while serving the national cause incrisis period such as the annulment of the June 12presidential election undermines the strength of the region.Here forces from outside the area exploit the areas’ potentialfor building bridges to their own benefit. It was used by theObasanjo presidency to antagonise the far north. This middleof the road political orientation finds resonance in thegeographical orientation where its condition provides havenfrom the extremity of the other regions of Nigeria. We notedearlier the increasing allusion to an environmentalcatastrophe waiting to happen in the far north and south ofNigeria and the implication this holds for the movement ofpopulation to the region. This was already the case as theextremely hostile political climate that emerged followingJune 12 annulment caused the movement of population from farnorth and south into the region. It was a destabilisingdevelopment in all ramifications as neither the states of theregion nor the region was prepared for its effect.32 Part of

32 See Adoyi Onoja, Rethinking the September 2001 Crisis in Jos: the Transformation of the State and Deepening Alienation, Department of History, Nasarawa State University, Keffi (under consideration for publication, 2013)

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the effect of the movement of population is the ongoing crisisin the region33 and particularly in Plateau state.

The cap on the icing is the role of elite of the regionin carving out space for themselves. These factors ofdefinition and identity help the elite to articulate theirinterest taking advantage of the loopholes in the region. Theelite of the region reflect the factors outlined in theanalysis. The push and pull factors constraining the unity ofthe area creates opportunity for the elite within and thosefrom outside to accomplish their objective. A few hypotheticalinstances of elite inclination will suffice in putting theinability to unite in perspective.

Take the case of Niger State, Dr. Aliyu Babangida andProfessor Jerry Gana may disagree on what constitutes the wayforward when it comes to the affair of the region. Theformer’s disposition is in tandem with his religiousorientation which puts him as a pro north factor within theregion. Indeed his gladiatorial role in championing the causeof the north in the current political dispensation is a point.The middle belt finds satisfaction in the presidency ofJonathan from the point of view of shared minority solidarityto which runs counter to Dr. Babangida’s orientation. InPlateau State, Alhaji Nasiru Mantu feels at home with thenorth and will definitely disagree with Chief Joshua Dariyewho will be inclined to promoting the middle belt cause; inBenue State, Alhaji Abubakar Tsav will disagree with ProfessorDavid Iornem if the former’s interest, tied to his religiousbelief and therefore his inclined northern sympathy, clasheswith the middle belt cause; similar result will be in theoffing if the interest of Senator Ameh Ebute and Alhaji UsmanAbubakar Dan Maishanu feature. In Nasarawa State, Mr. SolomonEwuga or Mr. Stanley Buba will disagree with the agenda ofAlhaji Abdullahi Adamu or Alhaji Tanko Al-Makura on issuesregarding the middle belt cause; in Kogi State, the Igala,Igbirra and Okun people stand at the crossroad of religion,culture and politics in their commitment to the middle beltquestion. Thus Prince Abubakar Audu may not agree with GeneralChris Alli on the way forward for the region.

33 Professor Alubo’s work document the crises in the region. See Ogoh Alubo,Ethnic Conflicts and Citizenship Crises in Central Nigeria

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The interest of the elite determines their commitment tothe middle belt cause. As has manifested repeatedly, thisinterest supersedes everything else. While religion is thebiggest source of pull for the region in the instances citedin the preceding, its primary role for the elite is to providejustification for the pursuit of their interest. It isreligion that also shapes their political allegiance. Theunwritten rule where political power rotates between the northand the south put religion squarely as the determinant of thatrule. Hence the primacy of religion to the patronage systemwhich influence the conduct of the elite in the region. Tothis extent, the middle belt cause is imperilled.

Conclusion: Towards Reinventing Governance

We conceded that the interest of elite in the region iscentral to the inability of the area to articulate itself letalone having a common agenda to pursue with the relevantauthority. We conceded that the area, lacking any organisingprinciple, seem closed to any possibility of arms strugglewhen compared with other regions. Those who took up armsagainst the state did so as a last resort in the face of theimperviousness of the state to incessant injustice. It was theinjustice perpetrated by the Northern regional government thatpushed the Tiv people into revolting in 1964.

It was injustice and the impervious Nigerian state thatdrove the Igbos into taking up arms first against their rivalsfor power and influence and later Nigerians; the annulment ofthe June 12 election, initially a pan Nigerian mandate, wasreinterpreted in the mould of the tripod power contest, andinformed the resort to arms by the O’odua Peoples’ Congress;Nigerians’ addiction to Niger Delta oil money without payingattention to their environment and the poverty it promotesnecessitated the peoples’ violent campaign of sabotage, kidnapand disruption against the state; it was the attempt of selectpolitical leaders of the north, to entrench their power base,that informed their formation of the militia, the nucleus ofwhat became the Frankenstein monster, Boko Haram. A favourableinternational environment underpinned by conflict withreligious undertone fertilised Boko Haram’s existence.

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Those who took up arms knew the consequences. Should webecause of the consequences conclude that the resort to armsstruggle is a thing of the past? Should we because of theseeming inability of the region to come together take theregion for granted? Until Boko Haram started, the notion ofsuicide bombing was a phenomenon associated withinsurgents/terrorists groups in the Middle East, Pakistan andAfghanistan. It was not possible in Nigeria, we all chorused.It is domiciled in Nigeria now. Would central Nigeria be theexception in the rule of taking up arms against the Nigerianstate?

In order to prevent the recourse to arms in negotiatingspace in Nigeria, numerous opportunities have been created toaddress the myriad of problems confronting ethnicnationalities inhabiting the space called Nigeria. A centuryafter the creation of Nigeria, discordant voices stillprevails in the house that Lugard roofed.34 Those opportunitiesincluding the constitutional conferences of the mid 1990s and2005 did not produce any workable solution because they lackedsincerity. The President and Commander-in-chief hasinaugurated another opportunity for Nigerians to talk andresolve their problem.35 Central to this problem is thequestion of reinventing governance believing, as we argue inthe paper’s framework, that peoples’ resort to arms is theconsequence of the failure of governance.

If governance is the effective and efficient utilisation

of men and material for the benefit of people, Nigeria hasbeen lacking in this respect since independence. Embeddedwithin the notion of governance is planning andimplementation. When leaders, whether in the public or private

34 See the lead paper, S.U. Fwatshak and J.M. Ayuba, “Discordant Voices inthe House that Lugard Roofed: Amalgamation Discourses in Nigeria’s FirstCentenary”. It was a reflection of the other papers presented by each geopolitical regions outlining their pains mostly, little gains and the hugeexpectation they harbour.35 See President Jonathan’s Inaugural Speech to the National Conferenceholding at the National Judicial Institute, Abuja,http://dailypost.ng/2014/03/17/full-text-president-jonathans-address-inauguration-national-conference/ (accessed 07:05:14)

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space, come with agenda and proceed to implementing thisagenda in a coordinated fashion within a stipulated period oftime, their agenda embraces the ideals of planning andimplementation. In Nigeria, we have an enabling environment,particularly in the public space, that discourages thisorderly ascension to power let alone having and implementingagenda.

Most Nigerian leaders came to their position by chance.36

In such a circumstance, they begin to plan on the job with itsattendant lapses.37 When individuals are railroaded into officeby vested interests and maintain their offices answerable tothese interests, planning and implementation reside with theseinterests. Vested interests have fought and are fighting everyeffort to reinvent governance.38 This is an enablingenvironment that proliferate corruption, undermineinstitutions and affect efficiency and effectiveness inplanning and implementation. It is lack of planning that isresponsible for the state of critical infrastructureparticularly power, transportation and housing in central,states and local governments; it is lack of planning thatunleashed the state of unemployment particularly youthunemployment resulting in the carnage witnessed at theNational Stadium venue of the Immigration Service recruitment;and it is lack of planning that ensures that Nigeria relies onpopulation projections in determining services to the people.

Weak governance proliferates corruption and destroysinstitutions thus necessitating the reliance on so calledstrong leaders to make things work. It is partly to blame forinsecurity in different parts of the country. Politicalleaders’ knowledge of security is limited to what they learnedfrom the miltary establishment in political power and theirself interest.39 In this instance, they fail to appreciate the36 See Olayemi Akinwumi, “Before We Set the House Ablaze: Lets Consult the Oracle(History)”. Inaugural Lecture, Nasarawa State University, Keffi, 2005.37Adoyi Onoja, “In Search of Security in Nigeria: A Note on Obasanjo,Yar’adua and Jonathan Administrations’ Agenda”: Studies in Humanities Volume 7,July-December 2013, Pp. 186-20238 Adoyi Onoja, “Revisiting the Power Probe in the Sixth Legislature and theMissed Opportunity for Reinventing Governance”: NSUK Journal of HumanitiesVolume 1, No 1 &2, 2011, Pp. 81-10739 Adoyi Onoja, “Regime Type and the Established Notion of Security inNigeria: Towards a Human Centred Security for Nigerians”, In Olayemi

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difference between security and defence in governance. In whatappears to be the emerging settlement between the politicaland military classes in the country’s politics, the politicalclass has willingly relinquished security governance to thedefence establishment whose professional training is limitedto defense and whose interest is not altogether altruistic.

The political class is acquiescing to the defenceestablishment’s need to access the national cake in return forstaying out of power. It is not surprising that the Boko Haramaffair in the north east is festering. The defenceestablishment has been outperformed40 by the operatives of thegroup regardless of the threat and explanation of the DefenceSpokesman, to the contrary, as occasioned by the embarrassingattacks on airbase, barracks supposedly protectedinfrastructures and the incessant attacks on Nigerians.41 Themotivation to serve as functionaries in the defenceestablishment is no longer to sacrifice lives in protecting

Akinwumi, Mamman Musa Adamu, Patrick Ukase, Nigeria at 50: The Challenges of NationBuilding, Zaria: Historical Society of Nigeria, 2012, pp. 83-108; AdoyiOnoja, Ismaila Y Usman and Margaret N. Abene, “Public Officials, SecurityKnowledge and Leadership in Nigeria since 1999: Soldiers in the 25th

February 2013 Nasarawa State University Crisis” Department of History,Nasarawa State University, Keffi(Unpublished paper, 2013)40 Considering the performance of the armed forces, there are pertinentquestions requiring answers in the security and defense sector. Is there anational security policy? Is there a national defense policy? Whoseresponsibility is it to draft the policies? The defense establishment? Isthe performance of the defense sector a product of a national policy? Isthe defense establishment conscious of the changes in the sector? Or merelyreacting to the situation? Is it aware of the notion of irregular warfare?Is the defense sector not confronting 21st century challenges with 20th

century methods? Is the sector not enmeshed in corruption to realize thechanges around it?41With the huge budget to line agencies in the defense sector and the hugeextra budgetary provision of over N920billion in 2012, Nigerians are notsaying too much if they question the commitment of the defenseestablishment to their role of defending Nigerians. That question asked bythe Governor of Borno State recently was the basis of the threat containedin General Chris Olukolade’s statement that the full weight of the law willbe visited on those who undermine the morale of troops with their comments.The morale of troops is not undermined by comments of Nigerians. There wasno morale in the first place as the motivation to join the defense sectoris anything other than professional fighting forces. The other part of thelack of morale is the corruption in the sector which debilitate thefighting spirit of the rank and file.

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Nigerians and Nigeria. The corruption in the defence sectorbeclouds the dynamism which would have been derived from itsunderstanding of the changing nature of threat,42 the need fora policy43 and the perennial review the policy requires toforecast and contain developing threat, in the emergingsecurity governance.44

It is therefore important to change the prevailinggovernance enabling environment which will lessen corruption,increase the function of institutions, decrease thesusceptibility of Nigerians to manipulation and thus resort toarms to access resources. Nigerians are not secured in theirdaily lives.45 What Nigerians need in their lives is increasingopportunity, on a rolling basis, that will add value to theirexistence. Their existence lacks essence and this is all themore glaring in the last thirty years. It is the provision ofthe basic necessities of living that will enhance theirwellbeing46, increase their patriotism and limit the prospectof becoming tools in the hand of elite for promoting their owngoals. There is the urgency for reorientation that shouldstraddle all levels of government. The reorientation shouldalso be structural. The focus to reinvent governance, at themoment, places emphasis on the role of the central government

42 There is a conceptual and thus policy confusion on where to situate Boko Haram. Is it terrorism or insurgency? Moises Naim, The End of Power: From Boardroom to Battlefield and Churches to States, Why Being in Charge Isn’t What it Used to Be, NewYork: Basic Books, 2013, see Chapter Six entitled Pentagon and Pirates: thedecaying power of large armies; John Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders and Bandits: How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped Our World, Lanham, MD: Ivan R. Dee, 2011,pp.xv-xvi;43 There is no national defense policy. Indeed there is no national securitypolicy which should have been the umbrella policy for the defense policy.44 For the concept of security governance, see Elke Krahmann, “Conceptualising Security Governance”, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 38 (1), 2003, pp. 5-26;_____________ “Security Governance and Networks: New Theoretical Perspectives in Transatlantic Security”. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 18 (1), 2005, pp. 19-34.45 Adoyi Onoja, “Defining and Situating Insecurity in the Nigerian Context:A Glimpse at Everyday Insecurities”, In P.U. Omeje and U. Okonkwo, NewPerspective on West African History: A Festschrift in Honour Prof S.C. Ukpabi, Enugu: MadonnaUniversity Press, 2013, pp. 437-47446 Adoyi Onoja, “Security in Nigeria Depends on Human Welfare, not State-Centric Bureaucratisation”: Open Security May 2012 http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/adoyi-onoja/security-in-nigeria-depends-on-human-welfare-not-state-centric-bureaucratis

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without calling into question those of the states and localgovernments.

In the last one hundred years of the existence of Nigeriaand particularly the last fifty years of independence, theNigerian state has been the single most important threat andsource of insecurity to the security of Nigerians. Theperpetual state of crises and conflicts in the countrydemonstrate this. If Nigeria is to survive another century andemerge as a nation and not the nations it is now, the stateneeds to promote the welfare and wellbeing of Nigerians inorder to prevent the catastrophe waiting to happen. Pursuingthis line is in tandem with the constitution of Nigeriaparticularly chapter II section 2a, 2b, 2c which put humanbeing first.47 In the last one hundred years, the primacy ofthe state has been prioritised against that of the people.48

The enduring way to guarantee the security of the state is toguarantee the security of its people against fears of allkind.49 It is this fears that drives people into taking up armsagainst the state. This is the task before Nigerians ifNigeria is to survive for another one hundred years.50

47 See 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria48 A conference examining this is scheduled for November in Nasarawa State University, Keffi. See flyer, “Politics between Nations: 100 Years of Security in Nigeria”, http://www.h-net.msu.edu/announce/show.cgi?ID=21133449 See Adoyi Onoja, “Regime Type and the Established Notion of Security in Nigeria: Towards a Human Centred Security for Nigerians”, p.10450 The National Conference or Dialogue holding in Abuja is another opportunity to reinvent governance and Nigeria

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