CASE TITLE:G.R. No. 83896 February 22, 1991CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION, petitioner, vs.THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
respondent.TOPIC:
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION
FACTS:
These two (2) petitions were consolidated per resolution dated
August 9, 1988 1 and are being resolved jointly as both seek a
declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No.
284.
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive
Order No. 284 which allowed members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government
offices or positions in addition to their primary positions subject
to limitations set therein.
PETITIONERS CONTENTION:
The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that
such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is
being challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds
exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which
provides:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure,
directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate
in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with,
or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government
or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
their office.CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, the only exceptions
against holding any other office or employment in Government are
those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President
may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2),
Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio
member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1),
Article 8.
DEFENDANTS CONTENTION:
The Solicitor General counters that Department of Justice
opinion on EO No. 248 is "reasonably valid and constitutionally
firm," and construed the limitation imposed by E.O. No. 284 as not
applying to ex-officio positions or to positions which, although
not so designated as ex-officio are allowed by the primary
functions of the public official, but only to the holding of
multiple positions which are not related to or necessarily included
in the position of the public official concerned (disparate
positions).
ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
DECISION:
No, it is unconstitutional.It is clear that the 1987
Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding
during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the
government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution
itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without
additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by
law and as required by the primary functions of their office, the
citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples
during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down
for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal
opinions which cannot override the constitutions manifest intent
and the peoples understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in
relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO
284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of
positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant
secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not
more than 2 positions in the government and government
corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices
or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec
13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so,
unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
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CASE TITLE:G.R. No. 124360 November 5, 1997FRANCISCO S. TATAD,
petitioner, vs.THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, respondents.TOPIC:
PROPER PARTY (LOCUS STANDI)
TAXPAYERS SUIT - REQUISITES
FACTS:
Oil Deregulation Law
PETITIONERSCONTENTION:
Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history
shows that the government has always been finding ways to alleviate
the oil industry. The government created laws accommodate these
innovations in the oil industry. One such law is the Downstream Oil
Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180. This law allows that any
person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil
and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or
own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and
market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement,
subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy. Tatad
assails the constitutionality of the law. He claims, among others,
that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil
and imported refined petroleum products violates the equal
protection clause. Tatad contends that the 3%-7% tariff
differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and
discriminates against prospective investors in the downstream oil
industry who do not have their own refineries and will have to
source refined petroleum products from abroad.3% is to be taxed on
unrefined crude products and 7% on refined crude products.
DEFENDANTSCONTENTION:
Respondents, on the other hand, fervently defend the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392. In addition,
respondents contend that the issues raised by the petitions are not
justiciable as they pertain to the wisdom of the law. Respondents
further aver that petitioners have no locus standi as they did not
sustain nor will they sustain direct injury as a result of the
implementation of R.A. No. 8180. The Court then tries to resolve
the petitions on the merit. The petitions raise procedural and
substantive issues bearing on the constitutionality of R.A. No.
8180 and E.O. No. 392. The procedural issues are: (1) whether or
not the petitions raise a justiciable controversy, and (2) whether
or not the petitioners have the standing to assail the validity of
the subject law and executive order. The substantive
issuesconcerning its constitutionality.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi.
DECISION:
The SC declared that the effort of respondents to question the
locus standi of petitioners must also fall on barren ground. In
language too lucid to be misunderstood, this Court has brightlined
its liberal stance on a petitioner's locus standi where the
petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance
to the people.In KapatiranngmgaNaglilingkodsaPamahalaanngPilipinas,
Inc. v. Tan,the Court stressed:Objections to taxpayers' suit for
lack of sufficient personality, standing or interest are, however,
in the main procedural matters. Considering the importance to the
public of the cases at bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty,
under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other
branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of
the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the
discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside
technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of these
petitions.
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CASE TITLE:G.R. No. 88265 December 21, 1989SANTIAGO A. DEL
ROSARIO, GEORGE G. GACULA, EDGARDO G. SANTOS, ALBANO S. SIBAL,
ALBERTO C. REYES, NONITO P. ARROYO, EMMANUEL F. TERENCIO, DOMINGO
S. DE LEON, MODESTO O. LLAMAS, FARIDA U. ALONTO, ZENAIDA A.
FLOIRENDO, ISABEL A. MEJIA, LUZ P. MABANAG, RAMON H. RABAGO, JR.,
SAMUEL D. TROCIO and OSCAR M. BRION, petitioners, vs.HON. ALFREDO
R. BENGZON, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Health, respondent.TOPIC:
TESTS OF VALID EXERCISE (LIMITATIONS)
LAWFUL SUBJECT: PUBLIC INTEREST
FACTS:
The Philippine Medical Association is the national organization
of medical doctors in the Philippines. They assail the
constitutionality of some of the provisions of Generics Act of 1988
(Rep. Act 6675) and the implementation of Administrative Order No.
62. The law specifically provides that All government health
agencies shall use generic terminology or generic names in all
transactions related to purchasing, prescribing, dispensing, and
administering of drugs and medicines. It also includes medical,
dental and veterinary, private practitioners shall write
prescriptions using the generic name. PETITIONERS CONTENTION:The
petitioners main argument is the alleged unequal treatment of
government practitioners and those on the private practice. It is
because the former are required to use only generic terminology in
the prescription while the latter may write the brand name of the
drug below the generic name. It is allegedly a specie of invalid
class legislation. In addition, the petitioners gave a distorted
interpretation on RA 6675 and Admin Order No. 62 saying that the
salesgirl and or druggist have the discretion to substitute the
doctors prescription. The court says that the salesgirl at the
drugstore counter merely informs the customer, but does not
determine all the other drug products or brands that have the same
generic name and their prices. RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:Respondent
points out that the institution of generics in the Philippines will
compel physicians to prescribe drugs based on their therapeutic or
"active ingredient," instead of their well-known brand names.
Multiple medications which may produce potentially adverse, even
lethal, chemical reactions in the patient will thereby be avoided.
Patients with limited means will be able to buy generic drugs that
cost less but possess the same active ingredients, dosage form, and
strength as brand names, many of which are priced beyond the reach
of the common tao because the high costs of advertising, packaging,
royalties, and other inputs of production determine their pricing
for the market.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Generics Act is constitutional as to
the exercise of police power by the government.
DECISION:Petition Dismissed. The court has been unable to find
any constitutional infirmity in the Generics Act. It implements the
constitutional mandate for the State to protect and promote the
right to health of the people and to make essential goods, health
and other social services available to all the people at affordable
cost. The alleged unequal treatment of government physicians,
dentists and veterinarians on one hand and those in the private
practice in the other, is a misinterpretation of the law. The
salesgirl at the drugstore counter merely informs the customer of
all available products, but does not determine all the other drug
products or brands that have the same generic name and their
corresponding process. The penal sanction in violation of the law
is indispensable because they are the teeth of the law. Without
them, the law would be toothless. The Generics Act and the
implementing administrative orders of theSecretary of Health are
constitutional. The purpose of the Generics Act is to promote and
require the use of generic drugproducts that are therapeutically
equivalent to their brand name counterparts. The effect of the drug
does not depend on its brand but on the active ingredients which it
contains.
TITLE OF THE CASE: Dumlao v. COMELEC
TOPIC: Levels of Scrutiny; Bill of Rights; and Rights of the
Accused
FACTS:
Petitioners Contention: Petitioner Dumlao assails the
constitutionality of the first paragraph of section 4 of
BatasangPambansaBlg. 52 as being contrary to the equal protection
clause guarantee by the Constitution, and seeks to prohibit
respondent COMELEC from implementing the said provision.
Respondents Contention: Respondent COMELEC claims that the
purpose of special disqualification of section 4 of Batas
PambansaBlg. 52 is to infuse new blood in local governments which
accepted by majority. Said section 4 provides:
Sec. 4. Special Disqualification- In addition to violation of
Section 10 of Art. XII-C of the Constitution and disqualification
mentioned I existing laws, which are hereby declared as
disqualification of any of the elective enumerated in Section 1
hereof.
Any retired elective provincial, city municipal official who has
received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled
under law and who shall been 65 years of age at the commencement of
the term of the office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not
be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which
he has retired.
FACTS:
Patricio Dumlao petitioner was a former governor of Nueva
Viscaya. He has retired from his office and he has receiving
retirement benefits therefrom. He filed for reelection to the same
office for the 1980 local elections. On the other hand BP 52 was
passed providing disqualification for the likes of Dumlao.
Petitioner assailed the said provisions BP52 is unconstitutional as
it is contrary to the equal protection clause guaranteed by the
Constitution.
The petitioner case is within the jurisdiction of respondent
COMELEC and as provided by Sec.2, Art. XII-C, for the Constitution
the pertinent portions which reads:Section 2. The COMELEC shall
have the following power and functions.The sole judged of all
contest relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of
all the members of the National Assembly and elective provincial
and city officials.
The aforequoted provision must also be related to Section 11 of
Art. XII-C, which provides:Section 11. Any decision, order. Or
rulling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days from his receipt
of a copy thereof.
ISSUE (S): Whether or not the first paragraph of Section 4 of
Batas PambansaBlg. 52 is valid.
COURT DECISIONS:
Yes the Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg.52 is valid. In the case
of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a
provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify
him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as
provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood
assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work
is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the
retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable
for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of
mind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very reason
that inequality will neither result from the application of the
challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal
protection, neither does it permit of such denial.
The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal
classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is
arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not
violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial
distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of
the low and applies to all those belonging to the same class.
DISSENTING OPINION:
Teehankee, J., Sec.4 of Batas PambansaBlg. 52 Special
Disqualification is void. The claim of the respondent COMELEC as
accepted by majority, is that the purpose of the special
disqualification is to infuse new blood in local governments but
classification is not rational. It is not germane or relevant to
the alleged purpose of infusing new blood because such old blood
retirees may continue in local governments since they are not
disqualified at all to run at any other local elective office,
other than the local elective office from which they retired.
Furthermore, in the case of 65-year old local elective
officials, they are disqualified only when they have received
payment of the retirement benefits to which they are entitled under
the law. If they are not received such retirement benefit they are
not disqualified.
In addition, the mere fact that a candidate is less than 65 or
has young or new blood does not mean that he would be more
efficient, effective and competent than a mature 65-year old like
the petitioner who has experience on the job and who was observed
in the hearing to appear to be most physically fit.
CONCURRING OPINION:
Barredo, J., I concur. But as regards the matter of equal
protection, I reiterate my view of Peralta that Sec. 9 (1) Article
XII is more expensive than the equal protection clause.
Aquino, J., I concur in the result as to paragraph 1 of the
dispositive part of the decision. I dissent as to paragraph 2. In
my opinion, paragraph 2, section 4 of Batas PambansaBilang 52 is
valid, being similar to certain presumptions in Articles 217 and
315 of the Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885. See
U.S. v. Luling, 34 Phil. 725 and People v. Mingoa, 92 Phil.
856.
Abad Santos, J., I concur but wish to add that a judgment of
conviction as provided in Sec. 4, par. 2 of Batas PambansaBlg. 52
should be one which is final and unappealable.
CASE TITLE:In re Cunanan
PETITIONER: Albino Cunanan
RESPONDENT: Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag
TOPIC: Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful
Candidates
FACTS:
The Congress passed Republic Act 972, also known to be the
controversial Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 which has the title An Act
To Fix The Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and
Including1955.
Section 1. Republic Act 972 provides that any bar candidate who
obtained the following general average in their corresponding bar
examination year, without obtaining a grade below 50% in any
subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the oath of office
as member of the Philippine Bar: from 1946 to 1951-70%; 1952- 71%;
1953- 72%; 1954- 73%; and 1955- 74%.
Section 2. Republic Act 972 provides that any bar candidate who
obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject in any bar
examination after July 4, 1946 shall be deemed to have passed in
such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included
in computing the passing general average that said candidate may
obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take. The
Republic Act will benefit 1,094 examinees. Petitions were filed,
however, questioning the validity of Republic Act 972.
PETITIONER CONTENTIONS:Petitioner together with other bar
flunker believes himself or herself that they are fully qualified
to practice law as those reconsidered and pass by the SC and
feeling that they have discriminated against, unsuccessful
candidates who obtained a few percentage lower than those admitted
to the bar, went to the congress for, and secured in 1951 Senate
no. 12 for a consideration.
RESPONDENT CONTENTIONS:The President vetoed the said Bill after
he was given advice adverse to it. Not overriding the veto, the
senate then approved Senate Bill no. 372 embodying substantially
the provisions of the veto bill.
ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act 972 is constitutional.
HELD:The Court held Republic Act 972 to be partly
constitutional, declaring the portion in Section1referring to the
1946 to 1952 examinations and all of Section 2 as unconstitutional,
and declaring the remaining portions of the law as valid and shall
continue in force. First of all, Republic Act 972 was passed to
admit to the Bar those candidates who suffered from insufficiency
of reading materials and inadequate preparation because of the
aftermath of the Japanese occupation. The Court declared some parts
unconstitutional because:
1. Its declared purpose is to admit candidates who failed in the
bar examinations of 1946-1952, and who are certainly inadequately
prepared to practice law. It obliges the Tribunal to perform
something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner, and this
is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of
the Supreme Court.
2. It is a judgment revoking the resolution of the Court on the
petitions of the 810 candidates without having examined their
respective examination papers. In attempting to do it directly,
Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution.
3. Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter
and supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional
or amendatory rules are intended to regulate acts subsequent to its
promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate the practice of
law, and these are just considered minimum norms. It is therefore
the primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render
the ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue in
the practice of law according to existing rules.
4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of
candidates, which the law makes, is contrary to facts, which are of
general knowledge, and does not justify the admission to the Bar of
law students inadequately prepared. The pretended classification is
arbitrary. It is undoubtedly class legislation.
5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the
title of the law, contrary to what the Constitution enjoins, and
being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law
is void. Because of lack of votes, the portion pertaining to the
1953-1955 is declared valid and shall continue in force.
CONCURING AND DISSENTING OPINION:
LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting:The right to admit
members to the Bar is, and has always been, the exclusive privilege
of this Court, because lawyers are members of the Court and only
this Court should be allowed to determine admission thereto in the
interest of the principle of the separation of powers. The power to
admit is judicial in the sense that discretion is used in is
exercise. This power should be distinguished from the power to
promulgate rules, which regulate admission. It is only this power
(to promulgate amendments to the rules) that is given in the
Constitution to the Congress, not the exercise of the discretion to
admit or not to admit. Thus the rules on the holding of
examination, the qualifications of applicants, the passing grades,
etc. are within the scope of the legislative power. But the power
to determine when a candidate has made or has not made the required
grade is judicial, and lies completely with this Court.I hold that
the act under consideration is an exercise of the judicial
function, and lies beyond the scope of the congressional
prerogative of amending the rules. To say that candidates who
obtain a general average of 72 per cent in 1953, 73 per cent in
1954, and 74 per cent in 1955 should be considered as having passed
the examination is to mean exercise of the privilege and discretion
judged in this Court. It is a mandate to the tribunal to pass
candidates for different years with grades lower than the passing
mark. No reasoning is necessary to show that it is an arrogation of
the Court's judicial authority and discretion. It is furthermore
objectionable as discriminatory. Why should those taking the
examinations in 1953, 1954 and 1955 be allowed to have the
privilege of a lower passing grade, while those taking earlier or
later are not?I vote that the act in toto be declared
unconstitutional, because it is not embraced within the rule-making
power of Congress, because it is an undue interference with the
power of this Court to admit members thereof, and because it is
discriminatory.
CASE TITLE: PLDT v. NTC
TOPIC: Business Organization; Corporate Fiction; Franchise;
Right of Succession
FACTS:
In 1958, Congress a franchise to build radio stations (later
construed as to include telephony) granted Felix Alberto & Co.,
Inc (FACI). FACI later changed its name to Express
Telecommunications Co., Inc. (ETCI). In 1987, ETCI was granted by
the National Telecommunications Commission a provisional authority
to build a telephone system in some parts of Manila. Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Co. (PLDT) opposed the said grant as it
avers, among others, that ETCI is not qualified because its
franchise has already been invalidated when it failed to exercise
it within 10 years from 1958; that in 1987, the Albertos, owners of
more than 40% of ETCIs shares of stocks, transferred said stocks to
the new stockholders (Cellcom, Inc.? not specified in the case);
thatsuch transfer involving more than 40% shares of stocks amounted
to a transfer of franchise which is void because the authorization
of Congress was not obtained. The NTC denied PLDT. PLDT then filed
a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the NTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PLDTs petition should prosper.
COURT DECISION:
No. PLDT cannot attack ETCIs franchise in a petition for
certiorari. It cannot be collaterally attacked. It should be
directly attacked through a petition for quo warranto which is the
correct procedure. A franchise is a property right and cannot be
revoked or forfeited without due process of law. The determination
of the right to the exercise of a franchise, or whether the right
to enjoy such privilege has been forfeited by non-user, is more
properly the subject of the prerogative writ ofquo warranto.
Further, for any violation of the franchise, it should be the
government who should be filing a quo warranto proceeding because
it was the government who granted it in the first place.
The transfer of more than 40% of the shares of stocks is not
tantamount to a transfer of franchise. There is a distinction here.
There is no need to obtain authorization of Congress for the mere
transfer of shares of stocks. Shareholders can transfer their
shares to anyone. The only limitation is that if the transfer
involves more than 40% of the corporations stocks, it should be
approved by the NTC. The transfer in this case was shown to have
been approved by the NTC. What requires authorization from Congress
is the transfer of franchise; and the person who shall obtain the
authorization is the grantee (ETCI). A distinction should be made
between shares of stock, which are owned by stockholders, the sale
of which requires only NTC approval, and the franchise itself which
is owned by the corporation as the grantee thereof, the sale or
transfer of which requires Congressional sanction. Since
stockholders own the shares of stock, they may dispose of the same
as they see fit. They may not, however, transfer or assign the
property of a corporation, like its franchise. In other words, even
if the original stockholders had transferred their shares to
another group of shareholders, the franchise granted to the
corporation subsists as long as the corporation, as an entity,
continues to exist. The transfer of the shares does not thereby
invalidate the franchise. A corporation has a personality separate
and distinct from that of each stockholder. It has the right of
continuity or perpetual succession.DISSENTING OPINION:
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.,I share with the rest of the Court the desire
to have a "modern, efficient, satisfactory, and continuous
telecommunications service" in the Philippines. I register this
dissent, however, because I believe that any frustrations over the
present state of telephone services do not justify our affirming an
illegal and inequitable order of the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC). More so when it appears that the questioned order
is not really a solution to the problems bugging our telephone
industry.
A. CASE TITLE: City of Quezon v. Ericta
B. TOPIC: Eminent domain: Invalid taking under the police
power
C. FACTS:
Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled ORDINANCE REGULATING
THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL
TYPECEMETERYOR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY
AND PROVIDINGPENALTIESFOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF. The law basically
provides that at least six (6) percent of the total area of
thememorial parkcemeteryshall be set aside for charity burial of
deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon
City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by
competent City Authorities. QC justified the law by invoking police
power.Petitioners Contention: Petitioners argue that the taking of
the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of
police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is
intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further argue that
the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the
exercise of local police power, " to make such further ordinances
and resolutions not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry
into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this
Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for
the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals,
peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property
therein."Respondents Contention: Respondent Himlayang Pilipino,
Inc. contends that the taking or confiscation of property is
obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the
use of the property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable
purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his
property.The respondent also stresses that the general welfare
clause is not available as a source of power for the taking of the
property in this case because it refers to "the power of promoting
the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty
and property." The respondent points out that if an owner is
deprived of his property outright under the State's police power,
the property is generally not taken for public use but is urgently
and summarily destroyed in order to promote the general welfare.
The respondent cites the case of a nuisance per se or the
destruction of a house to prevent the spread of a
conflagration.
ISSUE: WON Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid
exercise of the police power. No.
A. COURT DECISIONS:Court of First Instance: declared Section 9
of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, of the Quezon City Council null and
void.Supreme Court: The petition for review is hereby DISMISSED.
The decision of the respondent court is affirmed.The SC held the
law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no reasonable
relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of
the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds
of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good
order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance
is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a
privatecemeteryto benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal
corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a publiccemeteryfor
this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.The
power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit and
confiscate.
1. Case Title: Gonzales v. COMELEC 21SCRA774Topic: Amendment and
Revision of the Constitution; Stages; Ratification Facts: On March
16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed Joint
Resolutions (a) to increase the membership of the House of
Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present
Constitution, to a maximum of 180 to be apportioned among the
several provinces; (b) to call a convention to propose amendments
to the present Constitution; and (c) to amend Section 16, Article
VI of the said Constitution so they can become delegates themselves
to the Convention.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill which became RA 4913,
providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the
aforementioned Resolutions be submitted, for approval by the
people, at the general elections which shall be held on November
14, 1967.
(1) Petitioner's Contention:Ramon A. Gonzales for G.R No.
L-28196Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) for G.R. No.
L-28224In this consolidated petition, petitioners Ramon A. Gonzales
and PHILCONSA seek to (a) declare RA 4913 unconstitutional and (b)
to restrain COMELEC from holding the plebiscite for the
ratification of the constitutional amendments proposed in Joint
Resolutions Nos. 1 and 3.
It is further contested that said resolutions are null and void
because: (1) The Members of Congress, which approved the proposed
amendments and the resolutions are, at best, de facto Congressmen;
(2) Congress may adopt either one of two alternatives-- propose
amendments or call a convention-- but may not avail of both at the
same time; (3) The election, in which proposals for amendment to
the Constitution shall be submitted for ratification, must be a
special election, not a general election.(2) Respondents
Contention:COMELEC; Director of Printing and Audito GeneralThat
they have done it in accordance with the provision of the
Constitution which does not specifically provides through a special
election but only "election".Issue:Whether or not Constitutional
Amendments be submitted for ratification in a General Election?
Court Decisions:(1) Lower Court: COMELECDismiss the petition of
non-iplementing of R.A. 4913 an act providing that the amendments
to the Constitution proposed in the House Resolutions No. 1 and 3
be submitted for approval by the people.(2) Appeallate Court: N.
A(3) Supreme Court:(a) Chief Justice Concepcion;There is nothing in
Section 1 Article XV of the 1935 Constitution that indicates
"election" therein referred to is a "special election" not general
election. The circumstance that three previous amendments to the
Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in
special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do
so under the circumstance then obtaining. It does not negate its
authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general
elections.(b) Concurring Opinion of Justice Makalintal;The
ratification of the amendments to the Constitution need not
necessarily be in a special election or plebiscite called for that
purpose alone. While such procedure is highly to be preferred, the
Constitution speaks simply of "an election" at which the amendments
are submitted to the people for their ratification.
(c) Concurring Opinion of Justice BengzonHad the framers of the
Constitution thought of requiring a special election for the
purpose only to proposed amendments, they could have said so, by
qualifying the phrase with some word such as "special" or "solely"
or "exclusively". They did not.
Dissenting Opinion:(a) Dissenting Opinion of Justice
Sanchez;That the proper submission of amendments to the people to
enable them to equally ratify them properly is the meat of the
constitutional requirement is reflected in the sequence of uniform
practices. The Constitution has been amended thrice in 1939, 1940
and 1947 of which through a special election.(b) Concurring the
opinion of Justice Sanchez, Justice JBL Reyes;The framers of the
Constitution, aware of the fundamental character thereof and of the
need of giving it as much stability as is practicable, could have
only meant that any amendments thereto should be debated,
considered and voted at an election wherein the people could devote
undivided attention to the subject, which means through a special
election.
Definition of Terms:
2. Case Title: Tarrosa v. Singson 232 SCRA 553
Topic: Requisites of Judicial Review; Necessity of Deciding the
Constitutional Question
Facts: This is a petition for prohibition filed by petitioner as
a "taxpayer," questioning the appointment of respondent Gabriel
Singson as Governor of the BangkoSentral Ng Pilipinas for not
having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The
petition seeks to enjoin respondent Singson from the performance of
his functions as such official until his appointment is confirmed
by the Commission on Appointments and respondent Salvador M.
Enriquez, Secretary of Budget and Management, from disbursing
public funds in payment of the salaries and emoluments of
respondent Singson.(1) Petitioner's Contention: JESUS ARMANDO A.R.
TARROSA
Petitioner argues that respondent Singson's appointment is null
and void since it was not submitted for confirmation to the
Commission on Appointments. The petition is anchored on the
provisions of Section 6 of R.A. No. 7653, which established the
BangkoSentral as the Central Monetary Authority of the Philippines.
Section 6, Article II of R.A. No. 7653 provides that the Governor
of the BangkoSentral shall be head of a department and his
appointment shall be subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments(2) Respondents Contention:GABRIEL C. SINGSON and HON.
SALVADOR M. ENRIQUEZ III
(a) Respondents claim that Congress exceeded its legislative
powers in requiring the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of the appointment of the Governor of the
BangkoSentral. They contend that an appointment to the said
position is not among the appointments which have to be confirmed
by the Commission on Appointments, as provided in Section 16 of
Article VII of the Constitution.
(b) Respondents also aver that the BangkoSentral has its own
budget and accordingly, its budgetary requirements are not subject
to the provisions of the General Appropriations Act.
Issue: Whether or not the question of constitutionality of
Section 6, Article II of R.A. No. 7653isindispensable for the
determination of the case filed by the petitioner
Court Decisions:(1) Lower Court: N.A(2) Appeallate Court: N.A(3)
Supreme Court:No, the court ruled that likewise, it is refrained
from passing upon the constitutionality of Section 6, R.A. No. 7653
in deference to the principle that bars a judicial inquiry into a
constitutional question unless the resolution thereof is
indispensable for the determination of the case (Fernandez v.
Torres, 215 SCRA 489 [1992]).
Dissenting Opinion:Definition of Terms:
3.Case Title: Republic v. La Orden de PP. Benedictinos de
Filipinas 1 SCRA 646Topic: Eminent Domain; Elements; Necessity of
the Exercise
Facts: To ease and solve the daily traffic congestion on Legarda
Street, the Government drew plans to extend Azcarraga street from
its junction with Mendiola street, up to the Sta. Mesa Rotonda,
Sampaloc, Manila. To carry out this plan it offered to buy a
portion of approximately 6,000 square meters of a bigger parcel
belonging to La Orden de PP. Benedictinos de Filipinas, a domestic
religious corporation that owns the San Beda College, a private
educational institution situated on Mendiola street. Not having
been able to reach an agreement on the matter with the owner, the
Government instituted the present expropriation proceedings.
(1) Petitioner's Contention:REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
It is to be observed that paragraph IV of the complaint
expressly alleges that appellant needs, among other properties, the
portion of appellee's property in question for the purpose of
constructing the Azcarraga street extension, and that paragraph VII
of the same complaint expressly alleges that, in accordance with
Section 64(b) of the Revised Administrative Code, the President of
the Philippines had authorized the acquisition, thru condemnation
proceedings, of the aforesaid parcel of land belonging to appellee,
as evidenced by the third indorsement dated May 15, 1957 of the
Executive Secretary.
(2) Respondents Contention:LA ORDEN DE PP. BENEDICTINOS DE
FILIPINAS
I. That the property sought to be expropriated is already
dedicated to public use and therefore is not subject to
expropriation.II. That there is no necessity for the proposed
expropriation.III. That the proposed Azcarraga Extension could pass
through a different site which would entail less expense to the
Government and which would not necessitate the expropriation of a
property dedicated to education.IV. That the present action filed
by the plaintiff against the defendant is discriminatory.V. That
the herein plaintiff does not count with sufficient funds to push
through its project of constructing the proposed Azcarraga
Extension and to allow the plaintiff to expropriate defendant's
property at this time would be only to needlessly deprive the
latter of the use of its propertyIssue: Whether or not the need to
open the extension of Azcarraga Street to ease and solve the
traffic congestion on Legarda Street is a valid necessity for the
exercise of expropriation by the government.
Court Decisions:(1) Lower Court:Dismiss the case in favor of the
respondents
(2) Appeallate Court: N.A
(2) Supreme Court:The Supreme Court did not rule on the subject
matter but decided that the case to be set aside and a present case
is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in order for
the parties to be given an opportunity to present their respective
evidence upon these factors and others that might be of direct or
indirect help in determining the vital question of fact
involved.
It is the rule in this jurisdiction that private property may be
expropriated for public use and upon payment of just compensation;
that condemnation of private property is justified only if it is
for the public good and there is a genuine necessity therefore of a
public character. Consequently, the courts have the power to
inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent
domain and to determine whether or not there is a genuine necessity
therefore (City of Manila vs. Chinese Community, 40 Phil. 349;
Manila Railroad Company vs. Hacienda Benito, Inc., 37 O.G.
1957)
Dissenting Opinion:Definition of Terms:
4. Case Title: EPZA v. Dulay 149 SCRA 305 (1987) (Reversing NHA
v. Reyes)Topic: Eminent Domain; Elements; Determination of Just
Compensation: Judicial FunctionFacts: The question raised in this
petition is whether or not Presidential Decrees Numbered 76, 464,
794 and 1533 have repealed and superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule
67 of the Revised Rules of Court, such that in determining the just
compensation of property in an expropriation case, the only basis
should be its market value as declared by the owner or as
determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.
(1) Petitioner's Contention:EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY
(2) Respondents Contention:HON. CEFERINO E. DULAY, in his
capacity as the Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, and SAN ANTONIO DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATIONIssue:Court Decisions:(1) Lower Court:(2) Appeallate
Court:(3) Supreme Court:Dissenting Opinion:Definition of Terms:
1. Case Title: Gonzales v. COMELEC 21SCRA774Topic: Amendment and
Revision of the Constitution; Stages; Ratification Facts: On March
16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed Joint
Resolutions (a) to increase the membership of the House of
Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present
Constitution, to a maximum of 180 to be apportioned among the
several provinces; (b) to call a convention to propose amendments
to the present Constitution; and (c) to amend Section 16, Article
VI of the said Constitution so they can become delegates themselves
to the Convention.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill which became RA 4913,
providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the
aforementioned Resolutions be submitted, for approval by the
people, at the general elections which shall be held on November
14, 1967.
(1) Petitioner's Contention:Ramon A. Gonzales for G.R No.
L-28196Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) for G.R. No.
L-28224In this consolidated petition, petitioners Ramon A. Gonzales
and PHILCONSA seek to (a) declare RA 4913 unconstitutional and (b)
to restrain COMELEC from holding the plebiscite for the
ratification of the constitutional amendments proposed in Joint
Resolutions Nos. 1 and 3.
It is further contested that said resolutions are null and void
because: (1) The Members of Congress, which approved the proposed
amendments and the resolutions are, at best, de facto Congressmen;
(2) Congress may adopt either one of two alternatives-- propose
amendments or call a convention-- but may not avail of both at the
same time; (3) The election, in which proposals for amendment to
the Constitution shall be submitted for ratification, must be a
special election, not a general election.(2) Respondents
Contention:COMELEC; Director of Printing and Audito GeneralThat
they have done it in accordance with the provision of the
Constitution which does not specifically provides through a special
election but only "election".Issue:Whether or not Constitutional
Amendments be submitted for ratification in a General Election?
Court Decisions:(1) Lower Court: COMELECDismiss the petition of
non-iplementing of R.A. 4913 an act providing that the amendments
to the Constitution proposed in the House Resolutions No. 1 and 3
be submitted for approval by the people.(2) Appellate Court: N.
A(3) Supreme Court:(a) Chief Justice Concepcion;There is nothing in
Section 1 Article XV of the 1935 Constitution that indicates
"election" therein referred to is a "special election" not general
election. The circumstance that three previous amendments to the
Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in
special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do
so under the circumstance then obtaining. It does not negate its
authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general
elections.(b) Concurring Opinion of Justice Makalintal;The
ratification of the amendments to the Constitution need not
necessarily be in a special election or plebiscite called for that
purpose alone. While such procedure is highly to be preferred, the
Constitution speaks simply of "an election" at which theamendments
are submitted to the people for their ratification.
(c) Concurring Opinion of Justice BengzonHad the framers of the
Constitution thought of requiring a special election for the
purpose only to proposed amendments, they could have said so, by
qualifying the phrase with some word such as "special" or "solely"
or "exclusively". They did not.
Dissenting Opinion:(a) Dissenting Opinion of Justice
Sanchez;That the proper subm,ission of amendments to the people to
enable them to equally ratify them properly is the meat of the
constitutional requirement, is reflected in the sequence of uniform
practices. The Constitution has been amended thrice in 1939, 1940
and 1947 of which through a special election.(b) Concurring the
opinion of Justice Sanchez, Justice JBL Reyes;The framers of the
Constitution, aware of the fundamental character thereof and of the
need of giving it as much stability as is practicable, could have
only meant that any amendments thereto should be debated,
considered and voted at an election wherein the people could devote
undivided attention to the subject, which means through a special
election.
Definition of Terms:
2. Case Title: Tarrosa v. Singson 232 SCRA 553
Topic: Requisites of Judicial Review; Necessity of Deciding the
Constitutional Question
Facts: This is a petition for prohibition filed by petitioner as
a "taxpayer," questioning the appointment of respondent Gabriel
Singson as Governor of the BangkoSentral Ng Pilipinas for not
having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The
petition seeks to enjoin respondent Singson from the performance of
his functions as such official until his appointment is confirmed
by the Commission on Appointments and respondent Salvador M.
Enriquez, Secretary of Budget and Management, from disbursing
public funds in payment of the salaries and emoluments of
respondent Singson.(3) Petitioner's Contention: JESUS ARMANDO A.R.
TARROSA
Petitioner argues that respondent Singson's appointment is null
and void since it was not submitted for confirmation to the
Commission on Appointments. The petition is anchored on the
provisions of Section 6 of R.A. No. 7653, which established the
BangkoSentral as the Central Monetary Authority of the Philippines.
Section 6, Article II of R.A. No. 7653 provides that the Governor
of the BangkoSentral shall be head of a department and his
appointment shall be subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments(4) Respondents Contention:GABRIEL C. SINGSON and HON.
SALVADOR M. ENRIQUEZ III
(c) Respondents claim that Congress exceeded its legislative
powers in requiring the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of the appointment of the Governor of the
BangkoSentral. They contend that an appointment to the said
position is not among the appointments which have to be confirmed
by the Commission on Appointments, as provided in Section 16 of
Article VII of the Constitution.
(d) Respondents also aver that the BangkoSentral has its own
budget and accordingly, its budgetary requirements are not subject
to the provisions of the General Appropriations Act.
Issue: Whether or not the question of constitutionality of
Section 6, Article II of R.A. No. 7653isindispensable for the
determination of the case filed by the petitioner
Court Decisions:(1) Lower Court: N.A(2) Appellate Court: N.A(3)
Supreme Court:No, the court ruled that likewise, it is refrained
from passing upon the constitutionality of Section 6, R.A. No. 7653
in deference to the principle that bars a judicial inquiry into a
constitutional question unless the resolution thereof is
indispensable for the determination of the case (Fernandez v.
Torres, 215 SCRA 489 [1992]).
Dissenting Opinion:Definition of Terms:
3.Case Title: Republic v. La Orden de PP. Benedictinos de
Filipinas 1 SCRA 646Topic: Eminent Domain; Elements; Necessity of
the Exercise
Facts: To ease and solve the daily traffic congestion on Legarda
Street, the Government drew plans to extend Azcarraga street from
its junction with Mendiola street, up to the Sta. Mesa Rotonda,
Sampaloc, Manila. To carry out this plan it offered to buy a
portion of approximately 6,000 square meters of a bigger parcel
belonging to La Orden de PP. Benedictinos de Filipinas, a domestic
religious corporation that owns the San Beda College, a private
educational institution situated on Mendiola street. Not having
been able to reach an agreement on the matter with the owner, the
Government instituted the present expropriation proceedings.
(3) Petitioner's Contention:REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
It is to be observed that paragraph IV of the complaint
expressly alleges that appellant needs, among other properties, the
portion of appellee's property in question for the purpose of
constructing the Azcarraga street extension, and that paragraph VII
of the same complaint expressly alleges that, in accordance with
Section 64(b) of the Revised Administrative Code, the President of
the Philippines had authorized the acquisition, thru condemnation
proceedings, of the aforesaid parcel of land belonging to appellee,
as evidenced by the third indorsement dated May 15, 1957 of the
Executive Secretary.
(4) Respondents Contention:LA ORDEN DE PP. BENEDICTINOS DE
FILIPINAS
I. That the property sought to be expropriated is already
dedicated to public use and therefore is not subject to
expropriation.II. That there is no necessity for the proposed
expropriation.III. That the proposed Azcarraga Extension could pass
through a different site which would entail less expense to the
Government and which would not necessitate the expropriation of a
property dedicated to education.IV. That the present action filed
by the plaintiff against the defendant is discriminatory.V. That
the herein plaintiff does not count with sufficient funds to push
through its project of constructing the proposed Azcarraga
Extension and to allow the plaintiff to expropriate defendant's
property at this time would be only to needlessly deprive the
latter of the use of its propertyIssue: Whether or not the need to
open the extension of Azcarraga Street to ease and solve the
traffic congestion on Legarda Street is a valid necessity for the
exercise of expropriation by the government.
Court Decisions:(3) Lower Court:Dismiss the case in favor of the
respondents
(2) Appellate Court: N.A
(4) Supreme Court:The Supreme Court did not rule on the subject
matter but decided that the case to be set aside and a present case
is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in order for
the parties to be given an opportunity to present their respective
evidence upon these factors and others that might be of direct or
indirect help in determining the vital question of fact
involved.
It is the rule in this jurisdiction that private property may be
expropriated for public use and upon payment of just compensation;
that condemnation of private property is justified only if it is
for the public good and there is a genuine necessity therefore of a
public character. Consequently, the courts have the power to
inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent
domain and to determine whether or not there is a genuine necessity
therefore (City of Manila vs. Chinese Community, 40 Phil. 349;
Manila Railroad Company vs. Hacienda Benito, Inc., 37 O.G.
1957)
Dissenting Opinion:Definition of Terms:
4. Case Title: EPZA v. Dulay 149 SCRA 305 (1987) (Reversing NHA
v. Reyes)Topic: Eminent Domain; Elements; Determination of Just
Compensation: Judicial FunctionFacts: The question raised in this
petition is whether or not Presidential Decrees Numbered 76, 464,
794 and 1533 have repealed and superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule
67 of the Revised Rules of Court, such that in determining the just
compensation of property in an expropriation case, the only basis
should be its market value as declared by the owner or as
determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.
(3) Petitioner's Contention:EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY
The petitioner maintains that the respondent judge acted in
excess of his jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in
denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and in setting
the commissioner's report for hearing because under P.D. No. 1533,
which is the applicable law herein, the basis of just compensation
shall be the fair and current market value declared by the owner of
the property sought to be expropriated or such market value as
determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. Therefore, there is
no more need to appoint commissioners as prescribed by Rule 67 of
the Revised Rules of Court and for said commissioners to consider
other highly variable factors in order to determine just
compensation. The petitioner further maintains that P.D. No. 1533
has vested on the assessors and the property owners themselves the
power or duty to fix the market value of the properties and that
said property owners are given the full opportunity to be heard
before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals and the Central Board
of Assessment Appeals. Thus, the vesting on the assessor or the
property owner of the right to determine the just compensation in
expropriation proceedings, with appropriate procedure for appeal to
higher administrative boards, is valid and constitutional
(4) Respondents Contention:HON. CEFERINO E. DULAY, in his
capacity as the Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, and SAN ANTONIO DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
The judiciary who has interpreted the eminent domain provisions
of the Constitution and established the meaning, under the
fundamental law, of just compensation and who has the power to
determine it.
Issue: Whether the courts under P.D. 1533, which contains the
same provision on just compensation as its predecessor decrees,
still have the power and authority to determine just compensation,
independent of what is stated by the decree and to this effect, to
appoint commissioners for such purpose.
Court Decisions:(1) Lower Court: The valuation in the decree may
only serve as a guiding principle or one of the factors in
determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court's
own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive
at such amount.
(2) Appellate Court: N.A
(3) Supreme Court:The determination of "just compensation" in
eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive
department or the legislature may make the initial determinations
but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of
Rights that private property may not be taken for public use
without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order
can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the
court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from
looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation.Dissenting
Opinion:
Definition of Terms: Just compensation means the value of the
property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full
equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the
condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements
and capabilities, should be considered.
A. Case Title: Cruz v. DENR [G.R. No. 135385]
B. Topic: Requisites of Judicial Review > actual case or
controversy
C. Facts of the case
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for
prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the
constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371
(R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act
of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(Implementing Rules).C.1 Petitioners contentiona) Sections 3(a) and
(b), 5, 6, 7, 8, 57 and 58 of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules
on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the
States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as
minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the
Regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution. b)Petitioners also content that, by providing for an
all-encompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral
lands which might even include private lands found within said
areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private
landowners. C.2 Defendants Contentiona)Chairperson and
Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP) ----- IPRA is constitutional and the petition be dismissed
for lack of merit.b)Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget
and Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General ----- IPRA
is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership
over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the
petition be granted in part.
D. Issue: Whether or not the petition raised has an actual case
or controversy. (Issue is based on the topic and concurring opinion
of Justice Mendoza)
E. Court DecisionsE.3 Supreme Court: ( no explanation why the
justices decided to dismiss or sustain the validity of IPRA, just
this.) Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition and to sustain the
validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Seven (7) other
members of the Court voted to grant the petition.As the votes were
equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not
obtained, the case was re-deliberated upon. However, after
re-deliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly,
pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the
petition is DISMISSED.
F. Concurring Opinion (Justice Mendoza)
The judicial power vested in this Court by Art. VIII, 1 extends
only to cases and controversies for the determination of such
proceedings as are established by law for the protection or
enforcement of rights, or the prevention, redress or punishment of
wrongs. In this case, the purpose of the suit is not to enforce a
property right of petitioners against the government and other
respondents or to demand compensation for injuries suffered by them
as a result of the enforcement of the law, but only to settle what
they believe to be the doubtful character of the law in question.
Such judgment cannot be executed as it amounts to no more than an
expression of opinion upon the validity of the provisions of the
law in question.
Indeed, the judicial power cannot be extended to matters which
do not involve actual cases or controversies without upsetting the
balance of power among the three branches of the government and
erecting, as it were, the judiciary, particularly the Supreme
Court, as a third branch of Congress, with power not only to
invalidate statutes but even to rewrite them. Yet that is exactly
what we would be permitting in this case were we to assume
jurisdiction and decide wholesale the constitutional validity of
the IPRA contrary to the established rule that a party can question
the validity of a statute only if, as applied to him, it is
unconstitutional. Here the IPRA is sought to be declared void on
its face.
Guanzon v. De Villa, 181 SCRA 623Ponente: GUTIERREZ, JR., J.The
Constitution and the Courts>Requisites of Judicial Review>No
Locus StandiFacts:This is a petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction to prohibit the military and police officers
represented by public respondents from conducting "Areal Target
Zonings" or "Saturation Drives" in Metro Manila. The forty one (41)
petitioners state that they are all of legal age, bona fide
residents of Metro Manila and taxpayers and leaders in their
respective communities. They maintain that they have a common or
general interest in the preservation of the rule of law, protection
of their human rights and the reign of peace and order in their
communities. They claim to represent "the citizens of Metro Manila
who have similar interests and are so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before this Court.Petitioners
Contention:The "areal target zonings" or saturation drives" are in
critical areas pinpointed by the military and police as places
where the subversives are hiding.The arrests range from seven (7)
persons during the July 20 saturation drive in Bangkusay, Tondo to
one thousand five hundred (1,500) allegedly apprehended on November
3 during the drive at Lower Maricaban, Pasay City.The petitioners
claim that the saturation drives follow a common pattern of human
rights abuses.Defendants Contention:First, the respondents have
legal authority to conduct saturation drives. And second, they
allege that the accusations of the petitioners about a deliberate
disregard for human rights are total lies.
Issue:WON the respective Petitioners have Legal Standing in
filing the case. Ruling:Not one of the several thousand persons
treated in the illegal and inhuman manner described by the
petitioners appears as a petitioner or has come before a trial
court to present the kind of evidence admissible in courts of
justice. Moreover, there must have been tens of thousands of nearby
residents who were inconvenienced in addition to the several
thousand allegedly arrested. None of those arrested has apparently
been charged and none of those affected has apparently
complainedWhere not one victim complains and not one violator is
properly charged, the problem is not initially for the Supreme
Court.Dissenting Opinions:CRUZ, J.,While acknowledging that the
military is conducting the saturation drives, the majority
practically blinks them away on mere technicalities. First, there
are no proper parties. Second, there is no proof. Therefore, the
petition is dismissed.The ruling that the petitioners are not
proper parties is a specious pretext for inaction. We have held
that technical objections may be brushed aside where there are
constitutional questions that must be met. There are many decisions
applying this doctrine. (Rodriguez v. Gella, 92 Phil. 603;
Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, 41 SCRA 702; Philconsa v.
Jimenez, 65 SCRA 479; Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481; Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA 835; Lagunsad v. Court of Appeals;
154 SCRA 199; Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208). Lozada was in fact
an aberration.I believe that where liberty is involved, every
person is a proper party even if he may not be directly injured.
Each of us has a duty to protect liberty and that alone makes him a
proper party. It is not only the owner of the burning house who has
the right to call the firemen. Everyone has the right and
responsibility to prevent the fire from spreading even if he lives
in the other block.SARMIENTO, J.,The petitioners, precisely, have a
grievance to raise, arising from abuses they pinpoint to the lower
offices of the Executive (which presumably has its imprimatur). To
make it an executive problem, so I hold, is to make the Executive
judge and jury of its own acts, and hardly, a neutral
arbiter.First, the facts are not "second-hand", they are
undisputed:There had been saturation drives. Second, the
petitioners have trooped to the highest court with a legitimate
grievance against the Executive (and military).
Occena v. COMELEC, 104 SCRA 1Ponente: Fernando, C.J.Amendments
and Revision>Stages>Proposal StageFacts:The challenge in
these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of
threeBatasangPambansa Resolutions proposing constitutional
amendments, goes further than merely assailing their alleged
constitutional infirmity.The rather unorthodox aspect of these
petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the
fundamental law. The following are the three resolutions:
Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own
a limited area of land for residential purposes; Resolution No. 2
dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet,
and the National Assembly; and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to
the Article on the Commission on Elections.The three resolutions
were approved by the InterimBatasangPambansa sitting as a
constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In the
BatasangPambansaBlg. 22, the date of the plebiscite is set for
April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the
Constitution.Petitioners Contention:Petitioners argue the
proposition that the amendments proposed are so extensive in
character that they go far beyond the limits of the authority
conferred on the Interim BatasangPambansa as Successor of the
Interim National Assembly.
Issue:WON the Interim BatasangPambansa can validly propose
amendments.
Ruling:The Interim BatasangPambansa, sitting as a constituent
body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a majority
vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert
that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative
body applies as well when it has been convened as the agency
through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a
requirement as far as a constitutional convention is concerned.Thus
any argument to the contrary is unavailing. As for the people being
adequately informed, it cannot be denied that this time, as in the
cited 1980 Occena opinion of Justice Antonio, where the amendment
restored to seventy the retirement age of members of the judiciary,
the proposed amendments have "been intensively and extensively
discussed at the Interim BatasangPambansa, as well as through the
mass media, [ so that ] it cannot, therefore, be said that our
people are unaware of the advantages and disadvantages of the
proposed amendment [ s ]."
Dissenting Opinion:TEEHANKEE, J.,The proposed amendments to be
valid must come from the constitutional agency vested with the
constituent power to do so, i.e. inthe Interim National Assembly
provided in the Transitory Article XVII which would then have to be
convened and not from the executive power as vested in the
President (Prime Minister) from whom such constituent power has
been withheld.The proposed amendments at bar having been adopted by
the Interim BatasangPambansa as the fruit of the invalid October,
1976 amendments must necessarily suffer from the same Congenital
infirmity.The three resolutions proposing complex, complicated and
radical amendments of our very structure of government were
considered and approved by the Interim BatasangPambansa sitting as
a constituent assembly on February 27, 1981. It set the date of the
plebiscite for thirty-nine days later on April 7, 1981 which is
totally inadequate and far short of the ninety-day period fixed by
the Constitution for submittal to the people to "sufficiently
inform them of the amendments to be voted upon, to conscientiously
deliberate thereon and to express their will in a genuine
manner."
Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 659Ponente: Cruz, J.Police Power>Test
of Valid Exercise>Lawful MeansFacts:The petitioner had
transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on
January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station
commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of Executive
Order No. 626-A. Which prohibited the interprovincial movement of
carabaos. Petitioners contention:That the penalty is invalid
because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be
heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due
process.
Defendants contention:They are just following the law.
Issue:WON there was a lawful means in the exercise of police
power pursuant to Executive Order No. 626-A.
Court Decision:Regional Trial Court of Iloilo Citysustained the
confiscation of the carabaos. Intermediate Appellate Court upheld
the Trial Court decision.Supreme Court:Under the challenged
measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the
property being transported is immediately impounded by the police
and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the
government.The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted
the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was
carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon
the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus
denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.To
sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid
exercise of the police power because the method employed to
conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of
the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated
because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right
to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and
punished.
A. Case Title: Eslaban v. De Onorio [G.R. No. 146062 June 28,
2001]
B. Topic: Eminent Domain > Just Compensation >
Definition
C. Facts of the caseRespondent Clarita Vda. deEnorio is the
owner of a lot in Barangay M. Roxas, Sto. Nio, South Cotabato with
an area of 39,512 square meters. The lot, known as Lot
1210-A-Pad-11-000586, is covered by TCT No. T-22121 of the Registry
of Deeds, South Cotabato. On October 6, 1981, Santiago Eslaban,
Jr., Project Manager of the NIA, approved the construction of the
main irrigation canal of the NIA on the said lot, affecting a
24,660 square meter portion thereof. Respondents husband agreed to
the construction of the NIA canal provided that they be paid by the
government for the area taken after the processing of documents by
the Commission on Audit. A right-of-way agreement was entered into
by the parties in which respondent was paid the amount of P4,
180.00 as right of way damages. Subsequently, respondent executed
an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and Fees which waives her rights
for the damage to the crops due to construction of the right of
way. After which, respondent demands that petitioner pay P111,
299.55 for taking her property but the petitioner refused.At the
pre-trial conference, the following facts were stipulated upon: (1)
that the area taken was 24,660 square meters; (2) that it was a
portion of the land covered by TCT No. T-22121 in the name of
respondent and her late husband (Exh. A); and (3) that this area
had been taken by the NIA for the construction of an irrigation
canal. D. Issue: Whether or not the value of just compensation
shall be determined from the time of the taking or from the time of
the finality of the decision.
E. Courts Decisions
Regional Trial Court held that the NIA should pay respondent the
amount of P107, 517.60 as just compensation for the 24,660 sq
meters that have been used for the construction of the canal.
Court of Appeals also affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Supreme Court:With respect to the compensation which the owner
of the condemned property is entitled to receive, it is likewise
settled that it is the market value which should be paid or that
sum of money which a person, desirous but not compelled to buy, and
an owner, willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a
price to be given and received therefor. Further, just compensation
means not only the correct amount to be paid to the owner of the
land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from
its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be
considered just for then the property owner is made to suffer the
consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being
made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the
amount necessary to cope with his loss.
Thus, the value of the property must be determined either as of
the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the
complaint, whichever came first. Even before the new rule, however,
it was already held in Commissioner of Public Highways v.
Burgosthat the price of the land at the time of taking, not its
value after the passage of time, represents the true value to be
paid as just compensation. It was, therefore, error for the Court
of Appeals to rule that the just compensation to be paid to
respondent should be determined as of the filing of the complaint
in 1990, and not the time of its taking by the NIA in 1981, because
petitioner was allegedly remiss in its obligation to pay
respondent, and it was respondent who filed the complaint.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to the extent
that the just compensation for the contested property be paid to
respondent in the amount of P16,047.61 per hectare, with interest
at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the time of
taking until full payment is made. Costs against petitioner.SO
ORDERED.
Case Title:Oposa vs. Factoran (G.R. No. 101083 | 1993-07-30)
Topic: Proper Party (locus standi) [under Topic C: The
Constitution and the Courts; subtopic 2: requisites of judicial
review]
Ponente: Justice Hilario G. Davide
Facts of the Case:Petitioners: minors and their respective
parents and the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc.Respondents:
Hon. Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., in his capacity as the Sec. of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (substituted by
Hon. Angel C. Alcala)
The petition stems from a civil case instituted by minors duly
represented and joined by their respective parents against
Fulgencio S. Factoran, the then Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The complaint was
instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the
plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines,
taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of
the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical
rainforests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are
equally concerned about the preservation of said resource. The
petitioners also aver that they represent their generation and
generations yet born (by virtue of inter-generational
responsibility and inter-generational justice.) In the said civil
case, the petitioners prayed to have all existing timber license
agreements (TLAs) cancelled and for the DENR Secretary to cease and
desist from approving new TLAs. They sought to prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests and arrest
the unabated hemorrhage of the countrys vital life-support systems
and continue rape of Mother Earth.
The case was dismissed by the lower court on the ground inter
alia that the plaintiffs were not proper parties, hencethe filing
of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 asking the
Court to set aside the judgment.
Petitioner's Contention:
1. The complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of
action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right
to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil
Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192
creating the DENR,Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151
(Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the
1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in
Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to
self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law.2.
The respondent has a correlative obligation, per Section 4 of E.O.
No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful
environment.3. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn, hence they are proper
parties.
Defendants Contention:On the matter of proper party, the
challenged RTC order stated that the complaint fell short in
alleging with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they
are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they
are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC).
Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with
vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data.
In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its
Complaint against the herein defendant.D. Issue: Whether or not the
petitioners have legal standing.E. Supreme Court DecisionThe
Supreme Court reversed the lower courts decision to dismiss the
case on the ground that the plaintiffs were not proper parties.
Petitioners have the legal standing. In fact, they can, for
themselves, for others of their generation, and for succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue on behalf
of succeeding generation can only be based on the personality
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to
a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.The complaint focuses
on a fundamental natural and legal right enshrined in the
Constitution. The same right and source of obligation can justify
the claimed inter-generational responsibility. Hence, they may
bring the matter at hand to court and be granted the proper
recognition.Section 16, Article II which recognizes above all: THE
STATE SHALL PROTECT AND ADVANCE THE RIGHT TO A BALANCED AND
HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY IN ACCORD WITH THE RHYTHM AND HARMONY OF NATURE.
Said provision is recognized as self executory and hence may be a
source of obligation upon the state without need of further
positive act from Congress.
A. Case Title:Tio v. VRB, 151 SCRA 208B. Topic: The Fundamental
Power of the State > Police Power >Tests of Valid ExerciseC.
Facts of the Case
Parties: VALENTIN TIO doing business under the name and style of
OMI ENTERPRISES (petitioner) vs.VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD,
MINISTER OF FINANCE, METRO MANILA COMMISSION, CITY MAYOR and CITY
TREASURER OF MANILA (respondents.)
This petition was filed on September 1, 1986 by petitioner on
his own behalf and purportedly on behalf of other videogram
operators adversely affected. It assails the constitutionality of
Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the
Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and
supervise the videogram industry (hereinafter briefly referred to
as the BOARD). The Decree was promulgated on October 5, 1985 and
took effect on April 10, 1986, fifteen (15) days after completion
of its publication in the Official Gazette.
On November 5, 1985, a month after the promulgation of the
abovementioned decree, Presidential Decree No. 1994 amended the
National Internal Revenue Code providing SEC. 134.
Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each processed
video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an
annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or
imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax.
Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms.
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the province
shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price
or rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or
disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion
picture or audiovisual program. Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds
of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and the other
fifty percent (50%) shall acrrue to the municipality where the tax
is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall
be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan
Manila Commission.xxx xxxxxx
C.1 Respondent's ContentionThe rationale behind the decree is
set out in its preambular clauses: 1. The proliferation and
unregulated circulation of videograms including, among others,
videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or
variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of
moviehouses and theaters, and have caused a sharp decline in
theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a
tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractor's specific,
amusement and other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses
estimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues;2.
Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million
per annum from rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and
such earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the
Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year;3. The
unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also
affected the viability of the movie industry, particularly the more
than 1,200 movie houses and theaters throughout the country, and
occasioned industry-wide displacement and unemployment due to the
shutdown of numerous moviehouses and theaters;4. In order to ensure
national economic recovery, it is imperative for the Government to
create an environment conducive to growth and development of all
business industries, including the movie industry which has an
accumulated investment of about P3 Billion;5. Proper taxation of
the activities of videogram establishments will not only alleviate
the dire financial condition of the movie industry upon which more
than 75,000 families and 500,000 workers depend for their
livelihood, but also provide an additional source of revenue for
the Government, and at the same time rationalize the heretofore
uncontrolled distribution of videograms;6. The rampant and
unregulated showing of obscene videogram features constitutes a
clear and present danger to the moral and spiritual well-being of
the youth, and impairs the mandate of the Constitution for the
State to support the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
the development of moral character and promote their physical,
intellectual, and social well-being;7. Civic-minded citizens and
groups have called for remedial measures to curb these blatant
malpractices which have flaunted our censorship and copyright
laws;8. In the face of these grave emergencies corroding the moral
values of the people and betraying the national economic recovery
program, bold emergency measures must be adopted with dispatch;
C.2. Petitioner's Contention1. Section 10 thereof, which imposes
a tax of 30% on the gross receipts payable to the local government
is a RIDER and the same is not germane to the subject matter
thereof;2. The tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive
and/or in unlawful restraint of trade in violation of the due
process clause of the Constitution;3. There is no factual nor legal
basis for the exercise by the President of the vast powers
conferred upon him by Amendment No. 6;4. There is undue delegation
of power and authority;5. The Decree is an ex-post facto law; and6.
There is over regulation of the video industry as if it were a
nuisance, which it is not.
D. Issue: Whether or not the tax imposed by the Decree is a
valid exercise of police power.
E. Supreme Court Decision: On the matter of whether or not the
decree is a valid exercise of police power, the court held that the
levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed
primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry,
particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant
violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of
pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the
DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid
imposition. The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if
the motive which impelled the legislature to impose the tax was to
favor one industry over another. It is inherent in the power to tax
that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has
been repeatedly held that "inequities which result from a singling
out of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no
constitutional limitation". Taxation has been made the implement of
the state's police power
A. Case Title: US v. Causby [ 328 US 256]
B. Topic: Eminent Domain > Elements > Taking
C. Facts of the caseRespondents own 2.8 acres near an airport
outside of Greensboro, North Carolina. It hason it a dwelling
house, and also various outbuildings which were mainly used for
raising chickens. The noise is startling. And at night the glare
from the planes brightly lights up the place. As a result of the
noise, respondents had to give up their chicken business.
C.1 Petitioners Contention. Under those statutes the United
States has 'complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the air
space' over this country. It is, therefore, argued that since these
flights were within the minimum safe altitudes of flight which had
been prescribed, they were an exercise of the declared right of
travel through the airspace. The United States concludes that when
flights are made within the navigable airspace without any physical
invasion of the property of the landowners, there has been no
taking of property.
C.2 Defendants Contention. Defendant argues that he owned the
airspace above his farm. By flying planes in this airspace, he
argued, the government had confiscated his property without
compensation, thus violating the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.
D. Issue.Whether respondents' property was taken within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment by frequent and regular flights of
army and navy aircraft over respondents' land at low altitudes.
E. Courts Decisions
The ancient doctrine of common law ownership of the landdoes not
control the present case. For the United States conceded on oral
argument that if the flights over respondents' property rendered it
uninhabitable, there would be a taking compensable under the Fifth
Amendment. Though it would be only an easement of flight which was
taken, that easement, if permanent and not merely temporary,
normally would be the equivalent of a fee interest. It would be a
definite exercise of complete dominion and control over the surface
of the land.The reason is that there would be an intrusion so
immediate and direct as to subtract from the owner's full enjoyment
of the property and to limit his exploitation of it. While the
owner does not in any physical manner occupy that stratum of
airspace or make use of it in the conventional sense, he does use
it in somewhat the same sense that space left between buildings for
the purpose of light and air is used. The superadjacent airspace at
this low altitude is so close to the land that continuous invasions
of it affect the use of the surface of the land itself. We think
that the landowner, as an incident to his ownership, has a claim to
it and that invasions of it are in the same category as invasions
of the surface.The airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above
the land, is part of the public domain. Flights over private land
are not a taking, unless they are so low and so frequent as to be a
direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the
land. For the findings of the Court of Claims plainly establish
that there was a diminution in value of the property and that the
frequent, low-level flights were the direct and immediate
cause.
Mr. Justice BLACK, dissenting.It is inconceivable to me that the
Constitution guarantees that the airspace of this Nation needed for
air navigation, is owned by the particular persons who happen to
ow