Some Complex Moral Ideas Page 1 of 25 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy ). Subscriber: University of Hong Kong Libraries; date: 18 July 2014 University Press Scholarship Online Oxford Scholarship Online Value Judgement: Improving Our Ethical Beliefs James Griffin Print publication date: 1998 Print ISBN-13: 9780198752318 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003 DOI: 10.1093/0198752318.001.0001 Some Complex Moral Ideas James Griffin (Contributor Webpage) DOI:10.1093/0198752318.003.0008 Abstract and Keywords Turns to more complex moral norms than the ‘simple’ ones discussed in Ch. 5: e.g. the prohibition ‘Don’t deliberately kill the innocent’ and the injunction ‘save more people's lives rather than fewer’. Some morality consists ultimately of various independent moral norms; or is there some system behind this variety? The chapter expresses doubts about three major systematic traditions in ethics: utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics. It ends with the proposal of a less systematic alternative, one that takes seriously the limits of human motivation and knowledge, along with the demand that ethics be effective in society, and constrains the content of moral norms and the extent of the system. Keywords: deontology, moral norms, utilitarianism, virtue ethics 1. Where Do Moral Norms Come From?
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Some Complex Moral Ideas
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UniversityPressScholarshipOnline
OxfordScholarshipOnline
ValueJudgement:ImprovingOurEthicalBeliefsJamesGriffin
Printpublicationdate:1998PrintISBN-13:9780198752318PublishedtoOxfordScholarshipOnline:November2003DOI:10.1093/0198752318.001.0001
SomeComplexMoralIdeas
JamesGriffin(ContributorWebpage)
DOI:10.1093/0198752318.003.0008
AbstractandKeywords
Turnstomorecomplexmoralnormsthanthe‘simple’onesdiscussedinCh.5:e.g.theprohibition‘Don’tdeliberatelykilltheinnocent’andtheinjunction‘savemorepeople'slivesratherthanfewer’.Somemoralityconsistsultimatelyofvariousindependentmoralnorms;oristheresomesystembehindthisvariety?Thechapterexpressesdoubtsaboutthreemajorsystematictraditionsinethics:utilitarianism,deontology,andvirtueethics.Itendswiththeproposalofalesssystematicalternative,onethattakesseriouslythelimitsofhumanmotivationandknowledge,alongwiththedemandthatethicsbeeffectiveinsociety,andconstrainsthecontentofmoralnormsandtheextentofthesystem.
Keywords:deontology,moralnorms,utilitarianism,virtueethics
1.WhereDoMoralNormsComeFrom?
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Onesourceofmoralnormsisindividualgoods.Wehavethemoralnorm,Don'tdeliberatelykilltheinnocent,becausewevaluelife.
Butappealtothevalueoflifeexplainsonlysomuch.Itwouldgiveusthesimplernorm,Don'tkill,whichistoobroadandtooindiscriminate.Eventhenorm,Don'tdeliberatelykilltheinnocent,istooindeterminate.Itshouldnotbeinterpretedasapplyingtoacaseofthefollowingsort.(Iamnowgoingtoconsiderseveralwell‐wornexamples;1thoughtheyareold,Iwantintheendtosaysomethingnewaboutthem.)Arunawaytrolleyrollsdownahillheadingforapartyoffivestandingonthetrack,unlessyouthrowtheswitchnexttoyou,therebydivertingitdownanothertrackonwhichonlyonepersonisstanding.Ofcourse,youmustthrowtheswitch,andthereasonis:onedead,fivesaved.Thevalueoflifegivesusaquitedifferentnormforthiscase:Limitthedamage.
Butthenshouldsurgeonslimitthedamagebykillingonepersononthesly—arecluse,say,whowouldnotbemissed—tousetheorganstosavethelivesoffivedesperatelyillpatients?2Thenumbersarethesame:onedies,fivelive.Overallvaluehasbeenpromoted.Still,mostofusholdthatourdutytorespectthelifeoftherecluseisstrongerthanreferencesimplytothenumberoflivesatstakewillexplain.Theprohibitionagainstkilling,wethink,applieshere,thoughnotinthetrolleycase.Butwhy?
2.HumanLimitationsandtheProblemofScopePartoftheanswer,Ithink,isthis.Ifyouarestandingbytheswitchasthetrolleyroarsdowntheslope,yourmoralsituationisvery(p.99) simple:isthedamagetobesmall(onedead)orlarge(fivedead)?Thesalientpolicyinthesituation,theonlyrationalpolicy,is,Limitthedamage.Thesameistrue,forinstance,ifmyplaneisgoingtocrash,andallIcandoiseitherletitcarryontowardatownorsteeritintothecountryside;morallifeis,atthatpoint,exceedinglysimple:betterfewerdead.Andthepolicy,Limitthedamage,ismodestintwoways.Itmakesnogreatdemandsonknowledge:thepolicyisobvious.Anditinvolvesnoambitiousprogrammeofaction:werespondwhenever,inexceptionalcircumstances,ourhandisforced.
Thereisnothinglikethatmodestyinthetransplantcase.Insteadofreacting,whenforced,thesurgeons'policyistogooutintotheworldtofindopportunitiestolimitthedamage—thatis,topromotepreservationoflifegenerally.Andapolicylikethatmakesenormousdemandsonknowledge.Italsospreadsnaturallythroughlife.Ifthesurgeonsdoittoday,whynottomorrow?Ifthisgroupofsurgeonsdoesit,whynotothers?Ifsurgeonsdoit,whynot,say,politicianswhentheirmoralsumscomeoutthesame?And,typically,wecannotknowinthetransplantcase,eventoareliabledegreeofprobability,whatwillmostpromotevalues.Thecaseisfarfromsimple.Thesurgeonscannotknowtheconsequencesofkillingtherecluse.Theycannotknowwhether,orhowwidely,peoplewilllearnwhattheyhavedone.Theycannotknowhowmuchfearandmistrustthatknowledgewillproduce.Theycannotdothecalculationoftotalbenefitsagainsttotalcosts.Inanycase,weareconcernednownotwithaparticularcasebutwithapolicy.Todothecalculationsofcostsandbenefitsifeveryone—othergroupsofsurgeons,politicians,andtherestofus—becameentrepreneursinlifepromotionisfarbeyondus.AnyonewhoaspirestoamorallifebasedonsuchcalculationsaspirestoGod‐likeknowledge.‘Ought’
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implies‘can’.Moralityisconfinedtothesphereofhumancapability.Weareusedtothefactthatourphysicalandpsychologicalcapacitiesarelimited,butsoisourunderstanding.Moralnormsareshapedforagentswithallthoselimitations.Soitisnotsurprisingthatweshouldusethenorm,Limitthedamage,inthetrolleycaseandthenorm,Don'tdeliberatelykilltheinnocent,inthetransplantcase.Thosearetheappropriatenormsforthelikesofus.
Onethingthatalarmsusaboutthetransplantcase,Isay,isthatthesurgeonswouldbe‘playingGod’.Whywouldyounotalsobe(p.100) ‘playingGod’ifyouthrewtheswitchforthetrolley?Yourroleinthetrolleycasewouldbe,Isay,arelativelymodest,un‐God‐likeone.Youarechoosing,itistrue,whowilldie,whichseemsaprettyGod‐likethingtodo,butyouarenotarrogatingtoyourselfanythingapproachingomniscience.Theprinciple,Limitthedamage,ismodestjustbecauseofitssalience,itsobviousreasonableness,inthosecases.Thetransplantcaseisdifferent,Ithink,notjustbecausethesurgeonsaredecidingwhoistodie(thathappensinthetrolleycasetoo),butbecause,insodoing,theyarepretendingtoknowthatthisisthebestpolicy.Theyaresettingthemselvesupasomniscientdispensersofjusticeinasituationinwhichthereisnosalient,obviouslyreasonablepolicy.Noone,shortofGod,couldseethebestpolicy—evenifthebestcamedownsimplytowhatproducedmostgoodforsocietyatlargeandinthelongrun.Somysuggestionisthis.Onethingthatisobjectionableaboutthesurgeons'behaviourisnottheirinterventioninthenaturallyunfoldingcourseofevents,buttheirpretensiontobedispensingjusticeindoingso.Moralnormsareshapedforus,withallourlimitations.Therearenomoralnormsoutsidetheboundarysetbyourcapacities.Ethics,particularlytheethicsstudiedinmodernuniversities,strikesmeasoftentooambitious.Itusuallyfailstooperatewitharealisticconceptionofhumanagency.Ethicscannotdobetterforusinthetransplantcasethancomeupwithnormsforagentslikeusintheworldsofarasweareabletoknowit.Onesuchnormis,Don'tdeliberatelykilltheinnocent.Andittakesanextremecase—somecase,forinstance,thatissimpleenoughforanothermoralpolicytobesalient(thoughnoterror‐proof)—forustobejustifiedinsettingthatnormaside.Itwouldtakearunawaytrolley,oraplaneheadedforacrash.
3.AnObjectionThereisanobviousobjectiontowhatIhavejustsuggested.Grantedthatweneedtoconductourmorallifelargelybyappealtonorms(theobjectiongoes),andthattheymustcommandapsychologicallydeeprespect,andthatthenorm,Don'tdeliberatelykilltheinnocent,isoneofthem.Nearlyeveryoneacceptsthat.Whatiscontentious,though,ishowexceptionstothenormarise.Itisnotimpossiblethat,bysomefluke,thesurgeonsdidknowthatnoone(p.101) wouldeverdiscoverthattheyhadkilledtherecluse.Therecluse,letussay,isillalready,isonthesurgeons'operatingtableforahigh‐riskoperation,andcanbefinishedoffwithoutarousingtheleastsuspicion.True,theirjustificationforkillingthereclusecouldnotstopthere.Theirjustificationisthepromotionofmostvalue,sothesurgeonswouldneedtoknowthevaluesinprospectwellintothepossiblefuturesofeachofthesixpersonsinvolved.Butthat,thoughincreasingthefluke,isnotquiteimpossibleeither;thesurgeonsmightknowsomethingaboutthequalityoflife
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ofthesix—theyare,afterall,theirpatients.Andanyway,ourknowledgeinthetrolleycaseisfarfromcomplete.ThefivestandingontheonetrackmightbenotoriousMafiahitmen,andtheoneontheothertrackmightbeMotherTeresa.Itis,nonetheless,rightforyoutothrowtheswitch,becausetheprobabilitiesofyoursuccessfullylimitingthedamagearesohigh.Butbyflukethesurgeons'knowledgecouldbeevenmorereliable.So,itcannotbelimitationsonknowledgethatmakethedifferencebetweenthetwocases.
Nowthisobjectiondirectsourattentiontoafluke—thesurgeons'happeningtoknowthecostsandbenefits.Butthenatureofourmorallifeisnotdeterminedbyflukes.Hardcasesmakebadlaw;theyalsomakebadmoralnorms.Thenorm,Don'tdeliberatelykilltheinnocent,arisesinitiallyfromthegreatvaluethatweattachtolife.Butthereisthefurtherquestionastohowvaluessuchaslifecanenterhumanthoughtandaction.Giventhenatureofagents,theroleforthesevaluesinourlivesisforusgenerallytorespectthem,notpromotethem.By‘respecting’lifeImeanprimarily,butnotsolely,notoneselftakinginnocentlife;by‘promoting’lifeImeanbringingaboutitspreservationbyanymeansopentoone.3Wetypicallycannotknow,eventoareliabledegreeofprobability,whatwillmostpromotelife.SuchGod‐likedisposaloftheaffairsoftheworldisnotourrole.Oursisthemoremodestoneofrespectinglife.Thatmustbeourgeneralapproach,andoncewemakeitthat,wecannotenterintoandexitfromsuchrespectatwill.Morallife,incertainways,isboundtobedeeplyconservative.Itwillbeconservativebecauseofthecentralityofdeepfeelingsandattitudes.Anditwillbeconservativebecauseofthelimitationsofknowledge.Influkecircumstancesinwhichwethinkwecandeterminethecostsandbenefits,westillonlythinkthatweknowthem.Weareheldbackbyboth(p.102) deepfeelingsanddeepscepticism.Wethereforedemandthatanyexceptionstoanimportantnormhaveanespeciallyclearjustification.Wedonothavetopitchthestandardsofjustificationsohighthatonlysomethingasthoroughlyobviousasthetrolleycaseortheplanecasewilldo.Wemightbepreparedtoaccepteuthanasiaincertaincircumstancesorobstetricians'sometimeskillingthebabytosavethemother.Butthesecasesarestillalongwayfromjustifyingthesurgeons'killingtherecluseinthetransplantcase.
4.OtherCasesTherewill,ofcourse,becaseslessobviousthanthetrolleyandplanecases.Butthecasesinwhichwecandecidethatitwouldbeallrighttosetasidethenorm,Don'tdeliberatelykilltheinnocent,wouldbeclosetothetrolleyandplanecasesintheirrelativesimplicity.Thinkofthefewsituationsinwhichagoodpersonmightdeliberatelytakeaninnocentlife:4forinstance,smotheringababywhosecrieswouldgiveawayourhiding‐placetotheGestapo,oreatingthecabin‐boytokeepatleastsomeofthesurvivorsoftheshipwreckalive(inoneversionbecausethecabin‐boyhappenstohavetheworstchanceofsurvival,inanotherbecausehehappenstodrawtheshortstrawinalotterytowhichtheyallagree).Thesecasesarenotassimpleasthetrolleyorplanecases.Thecabin‐boycaseisquiteabitmorecomplex:iftheGestapofindthehiding‐place,everyone,thebabyincluded,willdie,whereasthesurvivorsoftheshipwreckarenotcertaintodie(theymightbespottedintimebyapassingship).Butthesituationsmaybesimpleenough,andtheprobabilitiesextremeenougheveninthecabin‐boycase,forthepolicyoflimitingthe
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damagetoapply.
Therearemoredifficultcases.Inboththesmotheredbabycaseandthecabin‐boycase,allthepersonsinvolvedare,ifnotcertaintodie,atleastseriouslythreatened.Butimagineasituationclosertothetransplantcase.(Itisavariationonanotherscenarioofrecentmoralcasuistry.)Arockfallblockstheexittoagrotto,trappingsixtouristsinside,andtherisingtidethreatenstodrownthem.Theyfindasmallholeintheroof,butthefirstoftheirpartytoreachitisthefattest,whogetsstuckandcannotmovebackwardorforward.Workersoutsidehavenoequipmenttosave(p.103) themapartfromasmallstickofdynamite,notenoughtoblastanewhole,butenoughtoblastthefattouristoutoftheoldhole.(Ononevariationoftheexample,therearenoworkersthere,butoneofthetrappedtouristshasthedynamite.)Thefattouristwouldnototherwisedie;withenoughtimetheworkerscouldfetchdrillstoenlargethehole,butthewaterisrisingtoofastforthattohelptheothers.Thefattouristpleadsnottobeblownup;theotherfivepleadtobesavedastherisingwatersreachtheirnecks.Shouldtheworkerskillonetosavefive?Theywouldprobablybeparalyzedbytheverythoughtofblowingupthefattourist.Itwouldbeexcusable,inwaysevenadmirable,iftheycouldnotbringthemselvestodoit.Butwoulditbemorallywrongiftheydidit?Unlikethetransplantcase,thereisnopolicyatstakehere.Theworkers'dilemmaisuniqueintheirlives,andismostunlikelyevertooccurinours,whereasthesurgeons'opportunityisalltoorepeatable.Itisprobablybecausethegrottocasepresentsnoneofthoseworriesthatwearemoreinclinedtothinkthatitwouldnotbemorallywrong,evenifappalling,toblowupthefattourist.
5.ThePossibilityofSystem:(A)UtilitarianismIhavebeenspeakingoftwomoralnorms,oneaprohibition,Don'tdeliberatelykilltheinnocent,andtheotherapositiveinstruction,Limitthedamage.Eachisunderstoodinawaythatkeepsitfromtrespassingontheterritoryoftheother.ThestoryofthesenormsthatIhavetoldsofarhasdrawnonlyonanaccountofwell‐beingandaconceptionofagentsandtheirsocialsetting.Itishardtodetectinthestorysofaranysingle,ultimateprincipleunderlyingallmoralnorms,asutilitariansfind,oranyoneconsideration,suchasthesortofrationalrequirementthatKantiansfind,thatmightbringsystemtoethics.
Butthatiscountingwithoutphilosophy.Doesitnotintroducesystem?Thesamefactsaboutagents,Ithink,underminecertainimportantethicalsystems.Iwanttotakeaquicklooknowatthreemajortraditionsinmoralphilosophy:utilitarianism,deontology,andvirtueethics.ButbeforeIdo,IwanttomakeclearthespiritinwhichIshalldoit.Onecannotsayanythingdefinitiveaboutarichphilosophicaltraditioninafewpages—orinabook,forthat(p.104) matter.Richtraditions,bydefinition,havetoomanyresourcesforthat.Thephilosopher'sself‐indulgenceisover‐generalization;wegetabrightcriticalideaaboutoneortwoformsofsomeview,andelevateitintoaknock‐downargumentagainstallforms.Rationalcriticismiscertainlypossibleinethics;itisjustnoteasytobeconclusivewithtraditionsthatarebothsodeepandsoincompletelyformulated.Iamtemptedtosaythat,forsecularethics,itisearlydays,exceptformyinabilitytoseehowlaterdayswillbesodifferent.Wherewilltherevolutioninourpositioncomefrom?Still,it
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istruethatwelacksatisfactorystatementsofouroptionsinethics.Sofarasutilitarianismgoes,weareonlynowagainquestioningwhatanadequateaccountofhumanwell‐beingmightbe,andthedistinctionbetweendirectandindirectutilitarianismwasdrawninanyexplicitwayonlyrecently,andremainsinsufficientlyexplored.Asfordeontologyandvirtueethics,theyareinaworsestate;theyhavebeenformulatedinonlythescrappiestway.Wefindithardtoknowwhatwearemeanttochooseamong.Atthisstage,wecanhopeonlythatcriticismmightgiveusabetter,ratherthanaworse,hunchaboutwhereitismostpromisingtolook.Iwantmerelytoexplainthesourceofmyowndoubtsaboutthesethreetraditionsandwhy,onbalance,Iprefertolookelsewhere.
First,then,utilitarianism.Anobviousdoubtaboutadirectformofutilitarianismiswhetherpersonscanhavethecommitmenttotheirfamily,theirpursuits,andtheircommunitythattheymusthaveforprivateandpubliclifetogowell,yetbeabletodropthesecommitmentswheneverutilitycalculationbeckons.Westandlooseenoughfromsomeundertakingstoretainthatdegreeoffreedom,butnotfromthecentralcommitmentsofourprivateandpubliclives.Somecommitmentsdonotleaveusable,occasionbyoccasion,havingreviewedallactionsthatareinsomesensewithinhumancapacitybeforedispositionshavebeenformed,tochoosethebest;somewillnotleaveuswithtimetonoticechancesfordoingmoregood;others,especiallytootherpersons,willnotleaveusabletotakesuchchancesevenifweseethem.Directutilitarianscanrespondtothesefactsoflifebyincludingamongtheiroptionsbecomingdeeplycommitted.Buttooptthatwaywouldbe,forthem,subversive;itwouldundercut,overalargeswatheofthemoraldomain,theirdistinctiveformofdeliberation.
Bycontrast,anindirectformofutilitarianismcanconcedethat(p.105) themoralnormsandrelationsthatforthemostpartgovernourlivesaremuchliketheonesthatwefindincommon‐sensemorality;allthatitmustinsistonisthattheybesanctionedbythehighest‐levelmoralconsideration,theimpartialpromotionofinterests.Itproposesthatweshouldactinaccordwiththenorms,orfromthefeelings,thatwouldpromoteinterestsinthewholesocietyinthelongrun.Butmydoubtaboutindirectutilitarianismiswhetherwecouldoftenperformthetremendouslylarge‐scalecost–benefitcalculationsthatitrequires,orevenoftenarriveatprobabilitiesreliableenoughforaction.Wecandothesecalculationsinfairlyextremeorfairlysmall‐scalecases,butusuallynototherwise.5Somethingelsewillthenhavetobeatworkproducingdeterminatemoralnormsandrelations.Suchnormsandrelationsmustbetailoredtofitthehumanmoraltorso.Theyarenothingbutwhatsuchtailoringproduces.Therearenomoralnormsoutsidetheboundarysetbyourcapacities.Therearenotsomesecond‐beststandards,standardsmadeforeverydayusebyagentslimitedinknowledgeandwill,andthen,underlyingthemandsanctioningthem,truestandards,standardsthatmakenocompromisewithhumanfrailty.Amoralstandardthatignoreshumancapacitiesisnotan‘ideal’standard,butnostandardatall.
Utilitariansmight,atthispoint,objectthatimpartiallypromotinginterestsisnot,inanycase,meantasanaction‐guidingprinciple.Thereisanimportantdistinctionbetweenadecisionprocedure(howweshouldgoaboutdecidinghowtoact)andacriterion(what
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intheendmakesanactrightorwrong).Perhapsadoctorisbestadvisedtofollowcertainproceduresindiagnosingandtreatingpatients—bestadvisedbecausethoseprocedureshavebestresultsoverall,thoughnotnecessarilyineachcase.Butthecriterionforsuccessfulmedicalpractice—health—isclear,andisindependentofanysensiblediagnosticprocedures.Perhaps,similarly,theimpartialpromotionofthegoodisproperlyseennotastheconsiderationthatweusetodecidewhattodo,butasthecriterionofourmoralpractice.
ButIdoubtthatthisreplyhelpsutilitarianism.Althoughcriterionanddecisionprocedurecanindeeddiverge,theymaynot,Ithink,getfarapartfromoneanother.Ourdecisionprocedureswill,ofcourse,berestrictedbyourcapacities,butanycriterionforahumanpracticecannotbecometooremotefromthemwithoutlosingitsstandingasacriterion.Healthcanbeacriterionfor(p.106) medicalpractice,becausedoctorscanusuallybothacttobringitabout,orcomeasclosetoitaspresenttechniquesallow,andintimefindoutwhethertheyhavesucceeded.Inpartsofmorallifewecanalsoeventuallyfindouttheimportantconsequencesofouracts,butinmanyotherpartsweneverdo.Whatmostpromotesinterestsisoftenpermanentlybeyondourreach.Thenawould‐be‘criterion’likethatcanplaynorole,noteventhatofacriterion.Ourmorallifecannotstartfromsuchanall‐sanctioningbackgroundprinciple.Wehavetoconductitwithwhatiswithinourreach.Onemight—andthecapacity‐blindobjectiviststhatIspokeofinthelastchapterdo—flatlydenymyclaimthatthereareknowledgeconstraintsonacriterion.Thecriterioninmorals,theysay,isindependentofhumancapacities;itisthesortofthingtobediscoveredbyus;wemayhopethatitdoesnotoutstripourpowersofknowledge,butthatcanonlybeahope.Butthisformofobjectivismseemstometolacksupport.6Andifthecriterionweretooutstripourknowledge,thenitcouldplaynoroleinourmorallife;itwouldleaveindirectutilitarianisminneedofsomenew,yetunknown,standardforsanctioningtherulesofourdecisionprocedure.Thisobjectivistmoveissodrasticthatitpunchesalargeholeinutilitarianismthatthetheoryhasnoobviousresourcestofill.
Thisiswhytheobviousutilitarianreplytomylineofthoughtisnot,Ithink,strongenough.Thereplygoeslikethis.Weutilitariansareperfectlyabletoacceptanyfactsabouthumannatureortheworkingsofsociety,including(iftheyturnouttobetrue)yourclaims.Wecan,forinstance,acceptthatmorallifehastobeconductedbyappealtofairlyspecificstandards,injustthewaysyousayandforjustthereasonsyougive.Weshallsimplyincorporateallthisintheutilitariancalculation.Ourquestionthenbecomes:Whatsetofrulesanddispositionswillmostpromoteinterests,givenagentsofsuch‐and‐suchanatureandasocietythatworksthus‐and‐so?ButthisreplydoesnotmeetthestrengthoftheclaimthatIhavemade.Mysuspicionisthatthiscalculationisbeyondus,andthatourmorallifecannotthereforerestonit.UtilitarianscannotadmitthatourignorancejustifiesthesortofrelianceupontraditionthatIhavedefended.Thatconcedestoomuch;itconcedesthatevenindirectutilitarianthoughtisoutofplaceinmuchofthecentreofmorallife.Thecruxishowoftenutilitarianthoughtissqueezedout.Afewtimeswouldnotmatter;(p.107) oftenwould.Ifitissqueezedoutofquitealargepartofmorallife,ifthereprovetobemanysituationsinwhichthecalculationofutilitiescannotbedonetoasufficientdegreeofreliability,thendoesenoughremaintobecalled
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‘utilitarianism’?Thatisnotarhetoricalquestion.Itseemsclearthatsometimesutilitycalculation,eventoareliabledegreeofprobability,isbeyondus.Andinmorallifeitmaynotbeofmuchusethatwecaninfutureextendourknowledge,saybytrialanderror.Ifittakesvirtuallyone'swholelifetoestablishthatonehastriedthewrongpolicy,onecannotliveone'slifeagain.Andifone'serrorhashurtothers,theycannotlivetheirlivesagaineither.Whatwehavetodecideisjusthowoftentolerablyreliableutilitycalculationsarebeyondus,andhowcentralthosefailuresareinmorallife.Whatonefindswill,tosomeextent,dependuponthekindofutilitarianoneis.Ifonethinks(asIdo)thatthemostplausibleformofutilitarianismisahighlyindirectone,thenatthecentreofone'smoralthoughtwillbesomesuchquestionas:Whatsetofrulesandwhatsetofdispositionswould,iftheyweretoprevailinone'ssociety,producemostutilityoversocietyatlargeandinthelongrun?Butthatisjustthesortofquestionlikelytodefeatanswer.Wemayknowenoughtoidentifyfairlyobviouslyinadequaterulesanddispositions,buttherewillbemanyleftthatwecannotrank.Anditisinthewidebandthattheywouldconstitutethatmanyofthehardchoicesinmorality—choices,say,abouttheparticularformthatrespectforlifeshouldtake—wouldhavetobemade.Utilitarianismseemstoturnethicsintoaprojectthatfitsbadlytheagentswhoaremeanttocarryitout.Theambitionsofutilitarianrationalityseemtoogreat.7
6.(b)DeontologyItisbettertoacceptthatsomemoralnormsandrelationshaveanauthorityoftheirown,independentoftheirpromotingthegood.Thatisapointthatdeontologists—correctly,Ithink—insiston.Buttheyexplainitbyintroducingafurthermoralstandard:theysaythat,inadditiontopromotingindividualgoods,andinadditiontoanyoverarchingmoralconsiderationsuchasgivingeachpersonhisdue,thereareunderivativeandfairlyspecificmoralpermissionsandprohibitions,oratleastmoralconsiderationspro(p.108)andcon.Andsomedeontologistsaddthatwecanoftengaugetherelativemoralweightoftheseconsiderations,thusopeningupprospectsofsystem.
Oneworryaboutdeontology,aworrythatmanydeontologistsshare,isthenumberofplaceswhereitsaccountturnsmysterious.Howdoweidentifythesedeontologicalstandards?Anoldansweris:byintuition.Butdeontologistshavetoshowthattheseidentificationsaredifferentfromarbitraryexpressionsoflikeanddislike.Thereisthesameproblemwiththeidentificationofprudentialvalues,asIdiscussedearlier.Weneedstandardsofcorrectness,aswellasanerrortheory,foridentifyingbothprudentialvaluesanddeontologicalstandards.Thoughtheprojectforprudentialvaluesisinaprimitivestage,thereisareasonablehopethatitcanbecarriedout.Itismuchlessclearthatitcanbeinthedeonto‐logicalcase.Andnobodyseemstoknowquitehowtohandledeontologicalconstraints,howtheyworkwithotherelementsofmoralthought.Theythreatenabreakdowninmoralreasoning.Tomaketheseconstraintsabsolutewouldbepuzzling;wecannotseewhytheseconsiderationsshouldhavesupremeweight.Buttomakethemlessthanabsoluteleavesuswiththepuzzleoftheturning‐point:ifenoughgoodjustifiesputtingtheconstraintaside,howmuchisenough?Ofcourse,mysteryisnottheprimedefectoftheory;betteramysteriousadequateaccountthananon‐mysteriousinadequateone.
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Still,onemysterythatdeontologistscannotallowtostandishowwearetoidentifytheindependent,fairlyspecificmoralstandardsthattheyposit.Deontologistsofallsortspositsuchstandards:absolutists,whoidentifyexceptionlessprohibitions;nearabsolutists,whoidentifyprohibitionsthatonlyacatastrophecansetaside;pluralists,suchasW.D.Ross,whoidentifyseveralpotentiallyconflictingprima‐facieduties,one'sdutyoverallbeingthemoststringentoneinthecircumstances;andpluralistswhoidentifynotthesortofgeneralprinciplesthatRosshadinmind(which,forRoss,alwayshaveweight),butmoralfeaturesthatarisefromandmustbebalancedinaparticularcase.
Somedeontologists,therefore,identifyactsthatareprohibitedinvirtueoftheirkind.8Andtheyseektodispelthemysterybybringingthekindunderadescriptionthatwillitselfhelpmakeclearwhatiswrong.Butinmanycasesithasprovedextremelyhardtofindasatisfactorydescription.Inthetransplantkindof(p.109) casethedescriptionusuallyofferedis‘deliberatelykillingtheinnocent’.Yetthesailorsdeliberatelykilltheinnocentcabin‐boy,andtheworkersdeliberatelydynamitetheinnocentfattourist.Perhapsthemostcommonapproachistoidentifyprohibitedkindsandthenofferafurtheraccountofexceptions—say,competingobligationsthatoutweightheprohibition.Butwecannotrespondthatinthecabin‐boyandgrottocasesthewrongnessoftheactisoutweighedbytheamountofgoodatstake,becausetheamountofgood,fivelivessaved,mightbethesameasinthetransplantcase.Anditishardtoidentifyanyotherkindthatdoesbetter.Onecould,forinstance,usetheterms‘murder’9or‘unjustkilling’10foranycaseofdeliberatelykillingtheinnocentthathadtherequiredmoralstatus.Butthenthedescriptions‘murder’and‘unjustkilling’wouldnotidentifythegroundofitshavingthatstatus,butwouldpresupposeagroundthatwasstillunidentified.
Somedeontologiststakeadifferenttack.Insteadofidentifyingakindofact,theyidentifyakindofintention.Whatareprohibitedareactsthatproceedfromanevilintention,thatviolate,say,moralrespectforpersons.11Thatapproachmaybeabletodistinguishthetransplantcasefromthetrolleycase:perhapsindivertingthetrolleyyoucanbesaidtoforeseethedeathoftheonepersonstandingonthetrackbutnottointendit,whereasthesurgeonsintendtherecluse'sdeath.Heretheapproachistogiveasensitiveenoughaccountoftheprohibitedkindthatwhatonotheraccountswouldbeexceptionsarenotprohibitedinthefirstplace.Still,thesailorsintendthecabin‐boy'sdeath,andtheworkersintendthefattourist'sdeath.Boththedoctrineofdoubleeffectandtheprincipleofrespectforpersonshavebeendevelopedwithaningenuitythathasextendedtheirapplicationtoawiderangeofcases.Butmyownbeliefisthatthereremaincasesthattheycannotexplainadequately,andthat,atsomepointinextendingtheirapplication,itbeginstolookverymuchasifwhetheranactisjustifiedisdeterminingwhethertherequiredsortofintentionorrespectispresent,andnot,asdeontologyneeds,theotherwayaround.12
Somedeontologiststryyetanothertack.Whatdistinguishesthetransplantcasefromthetrolleycase,theypropose,istheviolationofaright.13Thesurgeonsinfringetherecluse'srighttolife,whereasyoudonotinfringetherightoftheonepersonstandingonthetrackbydivertingthetrolley.Isupposethatthereissuchathing(p.110) asaright
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tolife,butitscontentisnotoriouslyunclear.Manywouldsaythattherighttolifeisinfringedifthesurgeonskillthereclusebutnotif,instead,theylettheirfivepatientsdie.ButistherightinfringedifIdonotbothertotossalifebelttoadrowningchild?Perhapstherightisnotinfringedinthesmothered‐babyorcabin‐boycases,simplybecausetheprobabilityissohighoftheiralldyingotherwise,babyandcabin‐boyincluded,thatthesecases,likethetrolleycase,fitunderthenorm,Limitthedamage.Butthefattouristwouldcertainlysurvive;inthatwaythegrottocaseislikethetransplantcase.Manywouldalsosaythatthefattourist'srighttolifewouldbeviolatediftheworkersresortedtodynamite,butthattherightwouldbeoverriddenbytheotherfivelivesatstake.Butifthatisso—ifthatiswhereweshoulddrawthelinearoundtherighttolife—thenitcannotbetherightthatexplainsthemoraldifferencebetweenthegrottocaseandthetransplantcase,becausethesameoverridingconditionispresentinboth.Whatweneedisasubstantivetheoryofrightsthatwillcomeoutwiththeresultthattherighttolifeisinfringedinthetransplantcasebutnotinthecabin‐boyorgrottocases.Noonehasyetdevelopedsuchasubstantivetheory,andImyselfcannotseehowanydevelopmentwouldeverendupthere.14
Butwhatexactlywouldbewrongifdeontologistsweretosticktotheirguns?Whatiftheywereperfectlypreparedtolivewiththeconsequencesofaprohibitionondeliberatelykillingtheinnocent:onemustnoteatthecabin‐boy,orsmotherthebaby,orblowupthefattourist?
What,tomymind,wouldbewrongisthatwecouldnotthensupplythebackgroundthattheprohibitionneedsinordertobeintelligible.Tobeintelligible,itmusthavesomelinks,eveniftenuousandindirect,withinterests.15Wecouldnotunderstanditasaprohibitionapartfromthegreatvaluethatweattachtolife.Thisisnotatallaspecificallyutilitarianpoint;itisageneralrequirement.Whatcommandsprotectionmustbeabletostrikeusasworthprotecting.Whatdemandsrespect,wemustbeabletoseeasrespectable.Howcouldmurderacquiremoralstatusindependentlyofthehavocitwreaksinhumanlives?Itistheideaofdeontologicalconstraintsfloatingentirelyfreeofintereststhatisbaffling,evenincredible.Somewritershavetriedtoanchortheseconstraintsbyappealnottointerests,buttothenaturallyrepellentcharacterofevil.IfbymurderingonepersonIcouldsave(p.111) two,andifIsimplyweigheduptheinterestsatstake(onelifeagainsttwo),thenIshould,theythink,beignoringtheintrinsicallyrepellentcharacterofevil;Ishouldbeswimming‘headonagainstthenormativecurrent’.16Buttalkofevildoesnotlessenthebafflement;evilcannotbefree‐floatingeither.Itmustconnectwithinterests,ifonlytousethemasonepartofamany‐sidedaccountofwhyeachseparatepersondemandsrespect.Anddeontologistsmustalsoexplainwhyprohibitionsdifferinstrength—why,forinstance,abanonkillingismorestringentthanabanontheft,theobviousexplanationbeingthatlifeisgenerallyofgreatervaluethanproperty.
Ithinkthatmostdeontologistswouldbepreparedtoacceptthisloosesortoflinkbetweenprohibitionsandinterests.Whatischaracteristicofdeontologyisitsdenialthatwearemerelytopromotetherelatedvalues:onemaynotdeliberatelykilltheinnocent,
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evenifmorelivescouldbesavedthereby.Valuesmayhavetoenterthepicturetomakeprohibitionsintelligible,butsomevaluesaretoberespected,notpromoted.
Butthereistroublehere.Sometimesthevaluenowacknowledgedtobenecessaryforaprohibition'sintelligibilitydisappears.Forinstance,incertaincircumstances,nothingofwhatmakeslifevaluableistobefound.Apersonneardeathmaybesufferingsointenselythateverythingelseisblottedout—relationswithotherpeople,autonomy,reflection,dignity.Yeteuthanasiacomesundertheban;itisdeliberatelykillingtheinnocent.Itisnotthatonecannotmakeabanoneuthanasiaintelligibleinsomeotherway—say,byappealtoGod'swill.Butthatwayofmakingsenseofitisnotavailabletoasecularethics.Forasecularethics,thedeonto‐logicalaccountisleft,atleastforthepresent,withlargeholes.Merelyshiftingfromabsolutetonon‐absolutedeontologydoesnothingatalltofillthattheoreticalgap;itjustaddsafurtherproblem,theproblemoftheturning‐point.
Ihavehardlyexhaustedthevarietyofformsofdeontology,butletmestophere.Likeutilitarianism,deontologyseemstometobeover‐ambitious.Inbothitssystematicanditsunsystematicforms,itassumesthatacertainkindofrationalitycanbediscoveredinmorality:thatwecanfindfeaturesoftheactortheagenttorationalizegoodconduct—that,forinstance,wecanfindaformula,suchas‘deliberatelykillingtheinnocent’,toexplainthedifferencebetween,ontheoneside,thetransplantcaseand,on(p.112) theother,thetrolleyandcabin‐boyandgrottocases.Andinitsmoresystematicforms,itassumesthattherearemoralconsiderationstowhichwecanattachweightsthatcanbebalancedagainstoneanother;indeed,initsmostcommonvariety,thatthereisaturning‐pointatwhichthegoodbecomeslargeenoughtooutweightheprohibition.Intheend,thethingtosayaboutthisprojectis:itlooksliketootallanorder.Itasksformorethanwehavenow,andalsoformorethanwehaveanyreasontoexpecttoacquireinfuture.
7.(c)VirtueEthicsMorallifemustbealifethatthelikesofuscanlead.Thelikesofus,Ihavesaid,mustlivebycertainnorms:prohibitions,instructions,permissionsthataretailoredtoagentswithourcapacities.But,forthesamereasons,asItouchedonearlier,wemustlargelyactfromtheinformedfeelingsthatmakeupsomuchofourmorallife:sympathy,respect,loyalty,fidelity.Thesethoughtsmoveusintothegeneralneighborhoodofvirtueethics.
Unlesswefindourselvesinextremecircumstances,welivewithinthenetworkofmoralrelationsthatsuchinformedfeelingsasloyaltyandrespectdefine.Suchrelationsmustalsogosomewaytowardexplainingtheforceoftheprohibitioninthetransplantcase.Thenorm,Don'tdeliberatelykilltheinnocent,restsonourrespectingthegreatvalueoflife.Butwhatisatstakeinthetransplantcaseisnotjustrespectforlife,butrespectfortherecluse'sstandingasacentreofchoice,asadeterminerofwhathappensintheworld,asanautonomousagent.Indenyingthereclusethat,thesurgeonswouldbedenyinghimavalueinthesameleagueaslifeitself.
Thiscaseforthecentralityofmoraldispositionsandrelationsdoesnotmakethemsecond‐best.Itisnotthatweuseconsequentialistrationalitywheneverwecanandfall
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backondispositionsandrelations,forlackofanythingbetter,whenthatrationalityrunsout.Respectforvalues—forlife,forinstance—istheonlyformthatmorallifecantakeoverafairamountofitsdomain;consequentialistrationalitycanenteronlyhereandthere.Moraldispositionsandrelationshavestandingnotbecausetheyaresanctionedbyanall‐pervasivebackgroundconsequentialistrationality;(p.113) tothinksoisgreatlytoexaggeratethepowersofconsequentialistrationality.Inextremecircumstancesitmaybemorallyallowedtobetrayatrustordeliberatelykilltheinnocent.Itmaybethat,inthoseextremecircumstances,anothermoralstandardbecomesrelevant,asIsuspectitdoes,forinstance,inthetrolleyandcabin‐boyandgrottocases.Butthefactthatrespectforagreementsandrespectforlifedonotgettheirimportancesolelyfrompromotinginterestsexplainsafurtherbeliefofcommon‐sensemorality:namely,theseformsofrespectdonotlosetheirimportancewhen,forthesakeofpromotinginterests,oneisallowedtofailinrespect.Onewhofailsinrespect,evenwhenmoralitypermitsit,stillpartlyfailsmorallyandmayrightlyfeeltheneedforregret,apology,oramends.
Thesethoughtsmoveus,asIsay,intothegeneralneighbourhoodofvirtueethics,thoughnotyet,Ithink,allthewaytoit.Mostmoralviews—indeed,allplausibleones—makethevirtuesimportant.Sothatisnotenoughtoqualifythoseviewsasaformofwhatwenowadayscall‘virtueethics’.Whatisdefinitiveofvirtueethics,Itakeit,isthatitmakesvirtuesnotjustimportantto,butalsoinsomesensebasicin,themoralstructure:theyaresodeepinthestructurethattheycanbesaidtogenerateortoanimatetherestofit.17Itneednotmakevirtuesfundamentalinthewholestructureofvalues—thatpositiononemightregardasreservedforthehumangoodorflourishing,byreferencetowhichthevirtuesaredefined.Butitplacesvirtuesdeepinthemoralstructure,inthestructureofourthoughtaboutwhatconsiderationweowetoothersinparticularcircumstances:itmakestheassessmentofagentsmorebasicthantheassessmentofactions.Itexplainswhatitistoactrightlyinsomesituationintermsofdoingwhatavirtuouspersonwoulddo.18
Thecriterionforcorrectchoiceproposedbyvirtueethics,therefore,isnotaslateofgeneralprinciples,butaperson:ourstandardisapersonwithinformeddispositionsinwisebalance.Butthiscriterioncriesoutforclarificationattwopoints.Ifvirtuesaredispositionsoftherightsort,howdowedecideontherightsort?Andhowdowedecideontherightbalancebetweenthem?
Moralfeelings,suchassympathy,compassion,andlove,arewellknowntobeabletoleadusastray.Compassioncanbejustsoft‐heartedness;onecanlendahandwhenitwouldhavebeenbettertoletthepersoncopealone.Sothedispositionsthatarealliedto(p.114) virtuesmust,asvirtueethicsitselfsays,gothroughmuchcriticalrefinement.Ifcompassionisavirtue,itmustbedifferentfromsoft‐heartedness.Butifwemustfindtherightdispositionsintherightbalancewithoneanother,thenthecriteriaforrightthreatentooccupythegroundfloorinthemoralstructure,kickingvirtuesupstairs.
Considerhowthesearchfortherightbalanceactuallygoesinaparticularcase.Wehaverespectforlife(thatiswhatshouldmakethesurgeonsstaytheirhandinthetransplantcase).Wehaveconcernforothers(thatiswhatshouldmakeyouthrowtheswitchinthe
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trolleycase).Respectforlife,though,ifitistobeofanyuseinethics,mustbemadefairlydeterminate—vastlymoredeterminatethanthephrase‘respectforlife’makesit.Wemustknowmoreaboutwhenitimposesdemandsonusandtheformtheytake.Itis,forinstance,potentiallyincompetitionwithourconcernforothers,sowemustgetsomefullerideaoftheproperdomainofeach.Wecannothopetogetalotmorehelpoutofthebackgroundideaofwhathumansneed,individuallyandsocially,forthespeciestoflourish.Forittoflourish,weclearlyneedrespectforoneanother'slivesandbenevolence.Butthenotionofhumanflourishing,havingdelivereditselfofthesetwodomainsofexcellence,doesnotseemabletotakeusmuchfurthertowardfixingtolerablydeterminateboundariesforthem.Howwouldwegetfurther?Well,whatshouldwedoifwehaveadyingpatientinagony,forwhompain‐killershavestoppedworking?Weshouldhavetobalancetherespectforlifethatgenerallystaysourhandwiththecompassionforsufferingthatgenerallymovesit.Butthewayweshouldgoaboutstrikingthebalanceisbyansweringcertainquestions.Whatisinthepatient'sinterest?Didthepatientleaveanyinstructions?Asthisisnotaone‐offcase,whatchangesinthedoctor/patientrelationwouldbelikelytofollowfromanewpolicy?Whatlimitsshouldthenewpolicyhave?Cantheyeverbeformulatedinawaythatthelikesofuscansatisfactorilyfollow?Andsoon—thatisjustthestartofthelist.Reliableanswerstothosequestionsmightwellrefinefurtheroursometimesconflictingdispositionsofrespectandcompassion.Butwhatwouldhavedonealltheworkarenotourdispositions,buttheanswerstothequestions.Andtheycentreonmanyofthesameconsiderationsatworkinexemptingthecabin‐boyandgrottocasesfromthebanondeliberatelykillingtheinnocent:namely,thepromotionof(p.115) humaninterests,theneedtolivelargely,butnotalways,bynorms,andthevitalroleofthelimitsofknowledge.Itishardtosee,inwhatIhavemanagedtosingleoutsofaraboutthesecases,anyreasonforthinkingthatthevirtuesarefundamentalinthewholemoralstructure.
What,inparticular,isimplausibleistheformofvirtueethicsthatclaimstheretobeanideallyvirtuousperson,whosedispositionsareinperfectbalanceandwhothereforeisbetterabletoperceivesituationscorrectly,includingfeaturesthatgeneralprinciplesoftenfailtocapture.Thisisanotherpieceofover‐ambitioninethicaltheory:theassumptionthatthelikesofuscouldeverbecomesensitiveenoughtoallthemoralconsiderationsatworkinparticularcasesandtotheirproperweightforthatsensitivitytobeuptoguidingouractions.Thisexaggeratesbothoursensitivitiesandthedeterminatenessofthemoralconsiderationsavailableforustobesensitiveto.Thereisalimittowhatwecanhopeforfromaperceptionofparticularmoralfeaturesofcases:suchdeterminatefeaturescanrunoutbeforewehaveasolution,andleaveusclingingtoageneralnorm.Thebestwecandointhetransplantcaseistosticktothepolicyofrespectinglife.Thebestwecandointhecaseofeuthanasiaistofindaformulathatcanbeappliedbythelikesofus,allowingustherebytoshiftcertaincasesfromtheambitofthenorm,Don'tdeliberatelykilltheinnocent,tothenorm,Limitthedamage.
Letmestopherewithvirtuetheory.Thisdiscussion,liketheearlierones,ismuchtooquicktobeconclusive.Imakeonlyasuggestion.Idonotthinkthattheprospectsofcarryingouttheprogrammesofutilitarianismordeontologyorvirtueethicsarebright.I
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thinkthatweareleftwithsomethingmuchclosertocommon‐senseethicsthanthey—atleastintheirmoresystematicorreductiveversions—claim.Ithinkthatweareleftwiththesortofaccountof,say,theprohibition,‘Don'tdeliberatelykilltheinnocent’,thatIgaveearlierinthischapter.
Butthereisanobviouschallengetomaketomyownposition.Inraisingdoubtsaboutotherpositions—utilitarianism,virtueethics,andespeciallydeontology—haveInotresortedtopiecemealappealtointuition?Ibeganthisbookbysayingthatweshouldhopeforabettermethodthanthat,andintheprocessofconstructingwhatIseeasabettermethod,Ihavedepended,itseems,ontheworseone.ButIthinkthatIhavenot,inanyculpableway.(p.116) Mypointaboutpiecemealappealtointuition,inanycase,wasnotthatitshowsnothing,butthatitisunclearhowmuchitshows,andthatweshouldnotresignourselvestoitasoursoleformofcriticismunlesswehaveto.Someofmydoubtsaboutdeontologyappealtointuitions;othersdonot.Ihaveattimesappealedtocoreprudentialvaluesandtomoralstandardssoclosetothemastobe,ineffect,partofthecore.ButforthemostpartIhaveappealedtostandardsofknowledgeandtothenatureofagents.Mymainpointaboututilitarianism,deontology,andvirtueethicsisnotthattheysometimesgivebadadvice(thoughthatmayalsobetrue),butthattheyconstituteprogrammesthatcannotbecarriedout.Theyare,inonewayoranother,unrealistic.Icannotseehowethicscanbeallthattheywantittobe.
8.MyProposalMyownviewisthatphilosophershavenotyetpaidnearlyenoughattentiontothenatureofhumanagents.Whenwedo,wefind,Ithink,anexplanationofthemoralstandardswehavebeentalkingaboutthatgivesthemastandingthatutilitarianismdoesnot,butwithoutresortingeithertothefurthermoralstandardsthatdeontologypositsbuthastroublefindingortotheprimacyofmoraldispositionsthatvirtueethicsclaimsbuthastroublejustifying.
Ihavesaidthatthenorm,Don'tdeliberatelykilltheinnocent,holdsswayinallbutextremecases,becauseitistheonlynormsuitableasageneralpolicyforagentslikeus.Myguessisthatoneobstacletoouracceptingthatconclusionisthemythofthemorallyrightanswer.Wedonotexpectpositivelawalwaystohaveananswer:asituationmaybesounusualthatnolawfitsit,eventhatnolegislator'sintentionfitsit.Wearepreparedtoacceptthepositivelawasaninadequate,incompletehumancreation,notalwaysuptocopingwiththecomplexitiesoflife.Butunderlyingpositivelaw,wethink,thereisanidealformoflaw,morallaw,endlesslyrefinable,universallyapplicable,andneveratalossforananswer(thoughwemaybeatalosstomakeitout).Butmorallawislimitedinmuchthesameway,andformanyofthesamereasons,aspositivelaw.Themythisthatthereisalwaysthemorallyrightanswer.Sometimesmoralnormsconflict,andthereisnobackgroundmoralrationalitytoresolvetheconflict.Sometimes(p.117) wejusthavetosticktoamoralnorm,suchas,Don'tdeliberatelykilltheinnocent,despiteallthenaggingand,inasense,rationalworriesweighinginontheotherside—asinthetransplantcase—becausethatistheonlykindofmorallifeopentous.
Thereissomethingelse,Ithink,holdingusback:themythofthesufficiencyofthemoral.
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Purelymoralconsiderationsoftenleaveuswellshortofdeterminatestandardsforaction,andotherconsiderations,forexample,socialagreementorconvergenceortradition,havetobebroughtintofillthegap.Forinstance,humanrightshavetheirmoralgrounding,Ishouldsay,inthegreatvaluethatweattachtoourstatusaspersons,asagents.Aspersons,wedeliberateaboutandchooseourends,andthenacttorealizethem.Humanrightsarebestseen,onthisEnlightenmentconceptionofthem,asprotectionsofthevaluesassociatedwithpersonhood:namely,ourautonomouslychoosingacoursethroughlife,ourhavingthebasicwherewithaltoachieveit,andothersnotblockingus.Soonehumanrightisarighttobodilyintegrity,becauseunlesswehavesomesecurityinourownbodies,weshallhavenosecurityofaction.Butwhereisthelinedefiningthatrighttobedrawn?Doesthatrightbarthestatefromforciblytakingoneofmykidneysfortransplant?Doesitalsobaraparticularlyaccommodatingstatefromdemandingapintofmyblood,which,itsays,itwilltakeinmyownhousewhileIsleep,leavingmetowakethenextmorningnonetheworseforit?Whatisclearisthat,onitsown,therelevantmoralconsideration—namely,thevalueofpersonhood—isnotuptofixingadeterminateline.Thepersonhoodconsiderationwouldnotprotectmeagainsttheaccommodatingstatethatwasaftermyblood.Itisnotclearthatitwouldprotectmeevenagainstthestatethatwasaftermykidney;afterall,whatIshouldlosefromakidneyextractionisonlyafewweeksforconvalescence(ifmyremainingkidneypacksin,thereisabankofthemformetohaveatransplant),andafewweeksconvalescencewillhardlydestroymypersonhood.Butthetroubleisthatthepersonhoodconsideration,unsupplemented,drawsnothingevenapproachingadeterminateline.Andifthelineisveryfuzzy,wemayevenbereluctanttosaythatarightyetexists.Itsexistencemust,tosomeextent,dependuponitsbeingamanageable,sociallyeffectiveclaimonothers.Sowhatsortofthingmustweaddtomakeitmoredeterminate?Alotofpracticalconsiderationsmustgointofixingtheline—suchashow(p.118) threateninglyinterventionistthepoliticaltraditionofourparticularsocietyis,whetherhumannatureissuchthatweshouldbewell‐advisedtoleavealargesafetymargin,howsimpleandobviousthelinehastobe,andsoon.
Soweshouldnotthinkthattherearealwaysdeterminatemoralnormsunderlyinglawsorothersocialstandards,whichprovideuswiththeidealtowhichlawsorsocialstandardsmustmeasureup.Itisnotthattherewillbenorationalgroundsforassessinglawsandsocialstandards,butthattheywillnotbeentirelymoralincontent.Theymight,instead,beintermsofsocialorpsychologicalprobabilities.Iaminclinedtosaythatitisoftentheotherwayaround:thatmoralnorms—thatis,normsasfaraspurelymoralconsiderationstakethem—areoftenhighlyindeterminate,andneedsomerealisticpictureofasatisfactoryformofsocialagreementaddedtothemtogivethemshape.Sometimesitisthelawitselfthatwillgivethemshape.19Moreoften,though,itissomenon‐legal,moralconsensus—orrealisticprospectofconsensus.Inthisfurtherway,moralnormsarelikelaws.Itisoftensociety,throughitsconventionsandconvergencesanddecisions,thatdefinesthem,andsobringsthemintoexistence.
Wefollowthenorm,Don'tdeliberatelykilltheinnocent,unlesswefindatolerablyclearareaofexception—asthereiswithcasescoveredbythenorm,Limitthedamage.And
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theremustbeanotherareaofexception,thoughitsboundariesarehardtodraw,foreuthanasia.Legislatorsdefiningapolicyoneuthanasiahavetofaceuptothefactthatitwillbeappliedbylimited,temptablehumans.Anylegislationisboundtobeamessycompromisewithhumannatureandsocialneeds.Butitisnotthatbehindalegislator'smessydeliberationthereisamoralist'spurerthought.Thetwodeliberationswillbevirtuallythesame:thesameproblems,thesamecompromises,thesamevaguenessandincompleteness.
Iamsayingthatmoralnormsarelikepositivelawsnotintheircontent,butratherinthemodesofthoughtusedtoarriveatthem,andintheconsiderationscentraltothatthought,especiallythelimitationsofagentsandthesolutionstoactualsocialproblems.Onthecontrary,onewouldhopethatthecontentofmoralnormswouldoftendivergefromthatofpositivelaws.Onewantsmoralnormstoprovidegroundsforcriticizinglaws;andsotheycanifthosewhothinkaboutethicskeepasteportwoaheadoflegislators.Itisjustthatwhenthoseinterestedinethicsthink(p.119) abouthumanrightsorabortionoreuthanasia,theyshallhavetothinkaboutthesamemessyvarietyofconsiderationsthatalegislatordoes.Ourjobinethicsisnottohavethoughtsradicallydifferentfromtheirs,butearlieron,orcarriedfurther,thantheirs.Forinstance,thereisnothingtostopusfromreachingafeasiblenormabouteuthanasiabeforelegislatorsdo(atleast,legislatorsintheUnitedKingdomandtheUnitedStates);andwecancarryourdeliberationtothehighlyspecificorparticular(say,inthecabin‐boycase),whereasthey,giventhenatureofthelegislativeexercise,cannot.
WhatIamsuggestingisthatthereisnodomainofthemoral—thatis,akindofthinkingthatappealstopurelymoralconsiderationsandiscapableonitsownofproducingabodyofdeterminateconclusionsthatcanguidelife.Afewdeterminateconclusionscanbearrivedatthatway;thenorm,Don'tbecruel,issimpleenoughtobeone.Butmanyothermoralnorms,andimportantones,willbetooindeterminatetoserveeffectivelyasnormsuntilweaddvariouspracticalities.Thenthereisonlyawiderdomain—akindofthinkinginwhichtheconsiderationsaremuchmoreheterogeneous,moreconcernedwiththepossible,andmoresubjecttocompromise—thedomainofthesocial.
9.EthicalConservatismWehavetomakedowithouttheextensivebackgroundrationalitythatmostutilitariansandsomedeontologiststhinkisavailabletous.Theythinkthatunderlyingourvariousmoralstandardstherealwaysis,inprinciple,aprocedureforweighingtheoverallamountofgoodatstakeortherelativestringencyofthedutiesinplay.Butthesesortsofall‐pervasivebackgroundrationality,Ithink,proveimpossible.Atpointswehavetofallbackonnaturalsentiment,onavarietyofwell‐entrenchedbutunsystematicnorms,andontradition,whichhavetorecommendthemthattheycarryusfromwhereanexclusivelymoralrationalitydropsustowherewemustget.
Thesourceofthemoralprohibitionswehavebeenconsideringislocated,notexclusivelybutinnosmallmeasure,inthenatureofagents.Aconsequenceofthisisthatwearerighttoattachmoralweighttocertaincommon‐sensedistinctions—forinstance,(p.120)betweenactingandomitting,doingandlettinghappen,dutiesnottoharmanddutiesto
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aid.Weliveby,andcanonlyliveby,themoralnormsandrelationsthatIhavebeenspeakingof,andtheyembodyaformofthesedistinctions.Butthesourceofthedistinctionlies,Isuspect,inthenatureofagents,notinthenatureoftwokindsofbehaviour—actingandomitting,doingandlettinghappen,andsoon.20Andthesamesourceyieldsthecommon‐sensedistinctionbetweendutyandsupererogation.Anyethicsworkswithaninevitablyrough,arbitrarypictureofthelimitsofthewill.Oftenthebestwecandoistoadoptacorrespondinglyrough,arbitrarypolicy:say,picksomelevelofcontributiontocharityandabidebyit,thosedoingmarkedlymorethusgoingbeyondthecallofthisill‐definedduty.
WhatIamsaying,despitemyinvocationoftraditionandcommonsense,isnotespeciallyconservative.Itiscertainlynotanythinglikeawholesaledefenceofcommon‐senseethics,whichhasalwayshaditsinadequaciesinthepast,andmusthavethemstill.Wehavepowerfulformsofcriticismavailabletous:appealstoutilities,torights,tothenatureofagentsandofsociety.Thatthereisnosupremebackgroundprinciplecapableofbringingsystemtoethicsdoesnotmeanthattherearenoless‐than‐supremebackgroundprinciplescapableofsustainingimportantcriticismofourprevailingbeliefs.Toamplifythispoint,letmesaysomethingaboutthefirstofthesecriticalresources,appealtoutilities.
Utilitiesareatthecentreoftheissueabouteuthanasia,andeuthanasiaisoneplacewherecommon‐senseethicssorelyneedschange.Somecasesofeuthanasiaare,Ithink,quitesimple.Whenlifehasnovalue,whenitisreducedtonothingbutsuffering,theprohibitionondeliberatelytakingitlosesitsintelligibility.Insimplesituations,traditionorcommonsensenotwithstanding,therightthingtodoisclear.Butmanyothersituationsarenotatallsimple,especiallyfordoctors.Adoctor'slife‐and‐deathdecisionsoftenhaveenormouslycomplexconsequences—fortrustbetweendoctorandpatient,forpressuresfeltbyoldpeople,andsoon.Theconsequencesaresocomplex,indeed,thattheytakeusrightuptotheedgeofourabilitytocalculatethemtoareliabledegreeofprobability.Doctorsneedapolicythatwillbothfitawiderangeofcasesandsuitablydefineadoctor'sroleinsociety.Doctorsthereforefaceadilemma:obviousmoralconsiderations,especiallythereliefofsuffering,impeladoctortoaction;complex(p.121) consequencesofsuchactionramifyingthroughsociety,manyofthemdamaging,restrainadoctorfromaction.Itisnaturalthatinthisdilemma,doctorsshouldlooktoothersfortheirconcurrence,partlybecausemanyheadscanbebetterthanone,butmoreimportantlybecauseweareallinthistogether,and,astheissueissoopaque,weshouldallhaveahandinframingthepolicytowhichwemayonedaybesubject.Societywilltherebydefinethispartofadoctor'srole,and,ifitdoesnotdoitbadly,alsodefineforuswhatisrightandwrongabouteuthanasiainthesehighlycomplexcases.Moraldecisionheremergeswithsocialdecision.Andhereourmorallifewouldbelivedoutnotonlyinsociety,butalsothroughit.Itmaysoundundulyconservativetosay,asIhavesaid,that,givenhumannature,ourgeneralapproachtoavaluesuchaslifeinfixingapolicyaboutkillinghastobethemodestoneofrespectingit,nottheGod‐likeoneofpromotingit.Butthatclaimiscompatiblewithabeliefthatweshouldworktobringyetmorecases—suchaseuthanasia—underthecompetingnorm,Limitthedamage.Anditiscompatibleaswellwiththebeliefthatweoughttopromotelifeinotherways—say,byhelpingthestarvinga
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gooddealmorethanwedonow.
10.TheMetaethicalStandingofTheseNormsWhatforcesshapethecomplexmoralstandardsIhavebeenlookingat?Theprotectionofinterestsisonesuchforce.Buttherearesomanyothersthatwecannotjustassumethatthemetaethicalstandingofinterestswillsimplybetransferredtothesecomplexmoralstandards.
Thenorm,Don'tdeliberatelykilltheinnocent,seemsverydifferentfromthenormthatIlookedatearlier,Don'tbecruel.Lifeisacorevalue,requiringthatinsomeformorotherwebothrespectandpromoteit.Thepreciseformthattherespectandpromotionshouldtake,however,needstobesettled,notleastbecauserespectandpromotioncanconflict.Thejudgement,‘That'scruel’,restingasitdoesonaclaimaboutpainandanagent'sintentions,isespeciallyreliable;itisajudgementaboutacorevalueandfairlyaccessiblefactsaboutpersons.Life,too,isacorevalue,sotheremustbeaparallel,equallyreliablejudgementaboutit.Thejudgement,‘That'smurder’,mustsometimesalsobe(p.122)especiallyreliable:itwillbereliableinaclearcasewhenitrestsonacompoundclaimroughlytotheeffectthatalifehasbeentakenwithcertainintentions.Butthesituationisdifferentwithnorms.Normshavedomains,areasofapplication;theboundariesoftheirdomainsaresettlednotjustbytheinterestsatstake,butalsobyconventions,traditions,andconceptionsofthelimitsofagents.Conventions,traditions,andconceptionsofhumanlimitsaretosomedegreearbitrary.Differentsocietiesmayworkwithmorethantriviallydifferentones,andthoughtheymaynotbeequallybeneficial,wewilloftennotbeabletotell.Andinmostsocietiesthedomainsofnormsarecontinuallyopentochallengeandrevision—asisthenormagainstdeliberatelykillingtheinnocentinthecaseofeuthanasia.Butthesejudgementsarehighlyrisky.
Couldthenorm,Don'tdeliberatelykilltheinnocent,beespeciallyreliable?Itisnotstrictlyabelief;itisapolicyorstandard.Ithasarelatedbeliefform:Deliberatelykillingtheinnocentiswrong.Ifwehaveaplain,paradigmaticcaseinmind,weshouldbepreparedtosaythatitistrue.Itwouldbevirtuallythejudgementweconsideredamomentago,‘That'smurder’,saidinaclearcase.Butweshouldhavesomehesitationaboutsayingthatitistruewithouttheserestrictions;therearetoomanyexceptionsthatfitundertherelatednorm,Limitthedamage.Thatjustraisesagainthequestionofthedomainofthenorms.Andweknowthatthedomainofthenorm,Don'tdeliberatelykilltheinnocent,isnotnecessarilyfixedforever.Ourpresentpolicymight,forgoodreason,change.Policiesdonothaveatruth‐valueintheplainsensethatstatementsaboutthenaturalworlddo;buttheydohavearationale,andsoareopentocriticism.Andnormsdonotpasstherealist'scausaltestinanysatisfactoryway.Ifthereisaconvergencebetweenusinthisstandardorpolicy,itisnotbestexplainedintermsofourallcomingtorecognizehowthingsareintheworld.Theconvergencecanbepartlyexplainedinthoserealistterms—namely,intermsofourrecognizingcertaininterestsandintentions—butitalsohastobeexplainedintermsoftheconventionsandtraditionsthathaveemergedinoursocietyandofthelimitstotheareaofapplicationofthenormthatwe—thoughnotnecessarilyallofus—accept.
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Notes:
(1.)Some,orall,ofthesecaseshavebeendiscussed,e.g.,byPhilippaFoot,‘TheProblemofAbortionandtheDoctrineoftheDoubleEffect’,inFoot1978;byJonathanBennett(1981:esp.75–7);JudithJarvisThomson(1975–6;1990:esp.chs.5–7);ShellyKagan(1989:esp.chs.3and4).Thecabin‐boycaseisbasedonanactualnineteenth‐centuryincident,theaftermathofthesinkingoftheMignonette(seeSimpson1984).
(2.)Todayweusethisexampleagooddealmoreuneasilythandiditsoriginators.Whatwasmeantasafantasticcaseisnowprobablyreality.ArecentjudicialinvestigationinArgentinastudiedevidencethatdoctorsatamentalhospitaloutsideBuenosAireshadmurderedpatientsinordertoselltheirbloodandorgans.From1976to1991nearly1,400patientswereclassedbythehospitalashaving‘dis‐appeared’,presumablyescaped,butnonehaseverreappeared.Thebodyofonepatient,MarcelloOrtiz,atotallyparalyzed16‐year‐oldsaidbythehospitaltohaveescaped,wasfoundinawellnearthehospitalwithhiseyesmissing(reportinTheGuardian,14Apr.1992).TheBBCreportsthatinChinaorgansaretakenfromexecutedprisoners,supposedlywiththeirconsent,forsalefortransplant,raisingthefearthatbenefitfortheailingrichandpowerfulwillinterferewithclemencyfortheoffenders.Itreportstooonabrisktradeinorgans,especiallywithArabcountries,inIndia,wherethepoorselltheirkidneystoescapefromdebt(thegoingpriceisaboutthreetimestheirannualincome)(Assignment:TheGreatOrganBazaar,BBC2,23June1992).Whenimportantmoralinhibitionsareingoodrepair,wecantalkaboutthesecaseswithoutmisgiving.Butnowwewonderwhether,orhow,philosophymayhavecontributedtotheirpresentdisrepair.Seealson.4below.
(3.)Iborrowthedistinctionbetween‘promoting’and‘respecting’valuesfromPhilipPettit(1991),thoughheusestheterms‘promoting’and‘honouring’.Seealson.7below.
(4.)Andwouldbemorallyrighttodoit?If,allthingsconsidered,somethingisthereasonablethingtodo,isitthenmorallypermitted?Ormightone,allthingsconsidered,havereasontodosomethingimmoral?Isaythefirst,asIthinkmostphilosophersdo.Ifthatall‐things‐consideredjudgementwerenotbroughtintothemoralsphere,weshouldjustneedalargersphereofthepermitted.Butthewaywechoosetotalkaboutthisbearsonthequestionofkeepingimportantmoralinhibitionsingoodrepair.Ourmoralinhibitionsmightgetinbadrepairbyourmakingthinkable(amatterofargument,calculation,weighing)whatshouldnotbe.Mightitbebettertoseetheproblemfacingtheshipwreckedsailorsinthecabin‐boycasenotasamoralone,butasawrenchingconflictbetweenthedemandsofmoralityandthedemandsofsurvival?Toseetheprohibitiononkillingthecabin‐boyasanimmenselyhighbarrier,withoutanymoralladdersavailabletohelp,wouldhavetheeffectofdrivingthesailorstotheextremesofpracticalingenuity,ofnotgivinginuntileverythingelsewasexhausted.Yes,theanswerwillbe,butsupposeeverythingelsehasbeenexhausted.Itis,ofcourse,atheoreticalpossibility;butoneeffectofstressingthistheoreticalpossibilitymightbetomakeusmovemorebrisklytothisextremepointinpractice.WerethedoctorsinArgentinaalreadydoingthat(seen.2)?IammuchindebtedtoSusanKhinZawforcorrespondenceonthispoint.Ishallcome
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backtothecrucialmatterofkeepinginhibitionsinrepairlaterinthechapter.
(5.)Thereisthelargequestionofrationalstrategiesinthefaceofgreatignorance.Whenweanswerthatquestion,mightwenotfindindirectutilitarianismreappearing?Ismypointabout,say,afairlysatisfactoryinstitutionofpropertysimplythat,givenhowlittleweknowaboutthecostsandbenefitsatstakeinhighlycomplexsocialinstitutions,thebestpolicyis‘Betterthedevilyouknow’.Thatlookslikeindirectutilitarianism,becauseitlooksliketheplausiblethoughtthatourparticularinstitutionofpropertyhasatleaststoodthetestoftime.Ifthatissimplythethoughtthatwehavetoabandonmaximizationinthesecases,thenitiswellshortofindirectutilitarianism.Butifitisthethoughtthatourabandoningmaximizationisultimatelythemaximizingthingtodo,thenIdoubtthatwecantell.
(6.)Hereisoneattemptatgivingitsupport.Whatintereststhereareisanobjectivematter.Allthatoneneedsinordertomovefromtheseobjectivegoodstomoralrightisafunctionattachingweightstothegoodofdifferentindividuals.Onefunction,maximization,issalient;itrestsonthetruthoftheprinciple:Ifx(say,pleasureorhappiness)isgood,moreisbetter.Thisyieldsacriterionofmoralrightandwrong,independentofourknowledgeofit.
Butmaximization,asIhavearguedelsewhere(Griffin1986:Ch.IX),isnotinthiswaysalient.Therearemanyfunctionsallcapableofcarryingusfromobjectivegoodstomoralright(maximization,equalization,Rawls'sdifferenceprinciple,etc.)andallwithsomeintuitiveappeal.Maximizationcanlooksalientbecauseitcanbeconfusedwiththeprincipleabove:Ifxisgood,moreisbetter.Onthattruisticinterpretation,though,maximizationismerelyastandardforrankingoutcomes:ithasnotyetgotenoughcontenttobeamoralstandardforaction.Forittobethat,onehastotakeafurther,fatefuldecisionastowhenbenefitingonepersonjustifiesharminganother—when,say,Ihaveareasontohelpyouatthecostofhelpingmychildren.Oneneedsmorethanthatprincipletogetustoadecisiononthismatter.Andthatoneneedsmoreopensupacrucialspaceinwhichhumancapacitiesmightplayarole.
(7.)Iwanttoaddsomething,evenifequallyspeedily,aboutconsequentialism.Consequentialismdiffersfromutilitarianism,oneofitsspecies,mainlyinthegreaterbreadthofitsvaluetheory.Utilitariansassessoutcomesbylookingatindividualwell‐being.Consequentialistslookeitheratwell‐beingoratmoralgoods,suchasequality,respectforrights,fidelitytoone'sword,andsoon,orindeed,andcommonly,atboth.
Evenonthismuchbroadenedvaluetheory,thereremainsanimportantdifferencebetweenconsequentialistsandnonconsequentialists.Consequentialists,asIputitearlier,holdthatvaluesaretobepromoted(e.g.maximized),whereasnon‐consequentialistsholdthatsomevaluesaretoberespected.Forinstance,aninnocentperson'srightnottobekilledisoneofthevaluesthatcouldfallunderthebroadenedconsequentialistconception.Consequentialistsrespondtothisvaluebybringingaboutitsrespectgenerally—say,byminimizingviolationsoftherightinsocietyatlarge—thatis,bypromotingit.Non‐consequentialistsrespondbyrespectingitthemselvesintheirownbehaviour.(Itisnot
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easy,however,tofindacomprehensive,entirelytrouble‐freeformulationofthedistinctionbetweenconsequentialismandnon‐consequentialism.Fortroubleswiththeformulationintermsofpromotingandrespecting(orpromotingandhonouring,asPhilipPettitputsit—seen.3),seeMcNaughtonandRawlings1991–2.Therearetroublestoo,Ithink,withformulatingthedistinctionintermsofagent‐neutralandagent‐relativereasonsorobligations.Inanycase,IshalltrytoformulatethetwoformsofconsequentialismthatIwantshortlytodiscussinspecificenoughtermstomakethedifferencebetweeneachofthemanditscorrespondingformofnon‐consequentialismtolerablyclear.)
Despitetheirdifferences,myearlierdoubtsaboututilitarianismcarryovertoconsequentialism.Letmelookfirstatabroadformofconsequentialism,andnextatanarrower—and,tomymind,muchmoreplausible—form.
Someconsequentialistsbroadentheconceptionofgoodtoincludeactsoffairness,ofpromise‐keeping,ofrespectforrights,andsoon.Aconsequentialistofthistype,thatis,adoptsthegoalofpromotingtheseactsgenerally,whoseevertheyare.Thisseemstomeagoodplacetostart,becauseitshows,Ithink,howeasilynowadayswewriteintoethicsgoalsthatconnectsotenuouslytoourcapacities.
Admittedly,onepersonmightjustbeabletoviolatesomeone'srighttolifeinawaythatleadsmanyothersautonomouslytorespecttherightwhen,otherwise,theywouldnothave.Itwould,though,havetobeathoroughlyexceptionalsituation.SupposethataleadingMafiahitmanwithachangeofheartrealizesthatifheweretomakeonelast,spectacularlybrutalhit,hecouldsodisgustenoughofhisfellowhitmenthathewouldreduceMafiamurdersoverall.Hemightbeabletoworkakindofconversion.Buthowoftenaresuchconversionswithinone'spower?ItwouldprobablybeauniquechancefortheMafiahitman,soitwouldbeunreasonableofhimtoelevatehisresponsetothisonecasetoapolicyforhiswholemorallife.IdoubtthatIhaveeverbeeninsuchaposition,eveninpromotingmoreeverydaymatterssuchasactsoffairnessorpromise‐keeping.Nor,Isuspect,havemostpeople.Normalagentsarenot.IfI,situatedasIam,weretobreakapromiseoractunfairlywiththeaimofbringingaboutmorecasesofautonomouspromise‐keepingorfairness,then,unliketheMafiahitman,IshouldmerelybedroppingmyactintoacausalstreaminwhichsomanyothereddiesandcurrentsandundertowsareatworkthatIcouldhave,atbest,onlythefaintesthopeofproducingthedesiredeffect.Thus,thoughsuchconversionsarenotpsychologicallyimpossible,theyaresorare,sounlikelyevertopresentthemselvesinthecourseoflife,somuchaflukeoffate,as,forallpracticalpurposes,nottofigureintheformationofourgoalsinlife.‘Ought’implies‘can’.Allmoraltheoriesworkimplicitlywithapictureofwhatlieswithinhumancapacity.Butactssuchasmaximizingtheuniversalobservanceofpromise‐keepingoroffairnessaresimplynotinourrepertoire.Ourmorallifeisnotsomuchamatterofwhatwedoasofwhatwechoosetodo.Idonothavetobe100percentsureofbringingitoff.Ican,forinstance,choosetogotoLondonfirstthingtomorrowmorning,althoughBritishRailmightletmedown.Butifthechancesareonlyoneinseveralmillionofmycarryingsomethingoff,thenIcannotbesaidtochoosetodoit.Icanchoosetohavea
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flutterontheNationalLottery,butnottowinit.Winningmayentermyhopesandplans,butnotmyintentions.Thechancesofmypromise‐breakingoractingunfairlymakingothers(plural)autonomouslykeeptheirpromisesoractfairlyapproachNationalLotteryproportions.Thereis,therefore,somethingquiteunrealinconsequentialists'choosingasoneoftheirgoalsinlife,Promotepromise‐keepingimpartially,Promotejustactsimpartially.Itisnotthesortofaction‐guidinggoalthatonewouldevergiveto,oradoptas,anagent.
Still,breakingone'sownpromiseoractingunfairlyoneselfisnottheonlymeansatone'sdisposalforinfluencingothers.Onecanpersuadeorindoctrinate.Butthisadditiontoourcausalresourcesmaymarginallyexpand,butdoesnotradicallyalter,ourprospectsofsuccess.Fewofusareinapositiontopersuadeorindoctrinateeffectively.Iwaswhenmychildrenwereyoung,butaperson'smoralcharacterisprettymuchfixedinchildhood,andlittle,certainlynotsermonsorlectures,islikelytochangeitafterward.TheMafiahitman'smakingaspeechinfavourofrespectforlifewouldhavelittlechanceofsuccess.Mymakingasimilarspeechwouldhaveevenless.Thestrangenessofthegoalremains.
Whatisstrangeis,precisely,thesebroadconsequentialists'choosingasgoalsinlifethepopulation‐widepromotionofautonomousactsofpromise‐keeping,actsofjustice,respectforrights,andthelike.Itisnotatallstrangethatopportunitiesforconversionsarerare.Afterall,opportunitiesforsavingbabieswhofallfacedownintopuddlesareraretoo.Still,onecanchooseasagoalhelpingothersindistresswhenthecosttooneselfissmall,andsavingababyinapuddlefitsunderthisheading.Althoughthatparticularcaseisrare,casesofthatkindcertainlyarenot,andactsofcompliancewiththeprinciplearewithinourpowers.Whatmakesamoralprinciplestrange,however,isnottherarityofoneparticularinstantiationofthekindofsituationitregulates(thereisnothingstrangeinthat),buttheunlikelihoodofbeingabletocomplywithitatall.Whychooseastandardformoralactionsoremotelyconnectedwithwhatonecando?Ofcourse,‘strange’doesnotimply‘wrong’.But‘ought’doesimply‘can’.Action‐guidingprinciplesmustfithumancapacities,ortheybecomestrangeinadamagingway:namely,pointless.
Ofcourse,broadconsequentialists,likeutilitarians,haveresourcesforreply.Theycould,inparalleltoamovethatutilitariansmake,saythattheirpromotionofactsoffairnessandofpromise‐keepingismeantnotasadecisionprocedure,butasacriterionofrightandwrong.ButIdoubtthatthisisanymoresuccessfulwithconsequentialismthanitwaswithutilitarianism.Ispokeinthelastchapteraboutstrongdemands(say,Jesus'ssaying:‘Beyethereforeperfect’)thatmaygotoofarbeyondourcapacityeventobemoralcriteria.Incertainrespects,thepromotionofpromise‐keepingorfairnessismoreremotefromhumancapacitiesthanisperfection.Inseekingperfection,theproblemistomakeone'sownrecalcitrantwillconform.Inpromotingpromise‐keepingorfairness,theproblemistomakeanaltogethermoreindependentworldconform.Ifitisstrainedtosaythatone‘intends’topromotepromise‐keepingoractsoffairness,itisalsostrainedtosaythatonewill‘try’topromotethem.Unlessonecanaffordtobuyagreatnumberoftickets,onecannot‘try’towintheNationalLotteryeither.
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Thatisnottheendofabroadconsequentialist'sreplies,butletme,nonetheless,stophere.Ihavewrittenmoreaboutitelsewhere(Griffin1992a).Thereisabadfitbetweentheideaofpromotingvaluegenerallyandthesemoralvalues—suchasactsofpromise‐keeping—thatgetaddedinthewideningprocessthatdefinesbroadconsequentialism.Itinvolvesaveryoddconceptionofagency.Itishardenoughtokeepone'sownmoralinhibitionsingoodrepair;itishardenoughtobehavehalf‐waydecentlyoneself.Totakeasone'saimthepromotionofgoodbehaviourinhumanityatlargeseemsbothtomistakethemainethicalbattlegroundandtomakedefeattheremorelikely.Thisbroadsortofconsequentialismseemstoturnethicsintoaprojectthatill‐suitstheagentswhoaremeanttocarryitout.Besides,quiteapartfromthecapacityofagents,thereissomethingquiteoddaboutwishingtopromoteactsoffairness,ofpromise‐keeping,andtherest.Wouldanyonecareaboutthenumberofsuchactsinabstractionfromtheirimportance?Forinstance,isitbettertohavetenfairthingsdoneratherthanfive,ifthetenconcernminormattersandthefivemajorones?Dowenot,ifwearedecent,wanttopromoteourownandotherpersons'goalsfairly,andperhapsalsofairnessitself,ratherthanactsoffairness?
Themuchmoreplausibleformsofconsequentialismarenarrowerones—ones,inparticular,thatdroptheemphasisonpromotingacts.Theymightincludeamonggoods,besidesprudentialvalues,suchmoralstatesofaffairsasfairproceduresandequaldistribution.Whatseemstomeaparticularlyappealingformwouldincludealsoopportunitiestorealizeprudentialvalues.Forinstance,anattractivesolutiontothefree‐riderproblemcanbefoundbyadoptingasone'saimequalizingpeople'schancesatwell‐being(seee.g.Griffin1986:Ch.X,sects.3–5).Or,insteadofmakingequalitypartofthemaximand,onecouldmakeitanalternativetomaximizing.Onecouldconfinewhatistobepromotedtowell‐being,asutilitariansdo,butbroadentherangeoffunctionsthatcanbeusedtomovefromgoodtoright:theymightinclude,besidesmaximizingwell‐being,equalizingitamongpeople,orequalizingitexceptwheninequalitiesworktotheadvantageoftheworstoff,orraisingpeopletosomeminimumacceptablelevelofwell‐beingabovewhichobligationscease,andsoon.Thesenarrowerformsofconsequentialismmakeequalityandfairnessintoentirelyfeasiblegoals.IcanwriteachequetoOxfam.Icancampaignwiththerestofyouagainstracialdiscrimination.Thereisnothingimpossibleaboutanyofthat.
Butthesenarrowerformsofconsequentialismstillraisedoubts—thesamesortsofdoubtsthatutilitarianismdoes.Canwedotheextraordinarilycomplexcalculationsofcostsandbenefitsattheircentreoftenenough,andtoasufficientdegreeofreliability,forthewholeprojecttobefeasible?Thereisanenormousnumberofpossibleformsofconsequentialism,soitisevenmorepertinenttoitthantoutilitarianismthatthestrengthofthisworrydependsupontheparticularforminquestion.Apossibleformofconsequentialism,thoughnotaparticularlycompellingone,wouldconcentrateexclusivelyonpromotingequality,andwiththatgoaltheburdenofcalculationwouldbeeased.Onewouldneedtoidentifyonlydifferencesinwelfarebetweenpeople,andthatwouldnotrequirecalculatingevenindividualwelfarelevels.Butthemostplausibleformofconsequentialism,Ishouldsay,isonethataimsatpromotingavarietyofgoods,including
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notonlyequality,butalsofairnessandwell‐being(agoodexampleisScanlon1978).Eventhemuchmoredemandingcalculationsthatthissortofconsequentialismrequireswillsometimesbepossibletoareliabledegreeofprobability.Butsometimes,also,theywillnotbe.Andwehavetodecidewhetherthefailuresincalculationoccuroftenenough,andatcentralenoughpointsinourmorallife,fornarrowconsequentialismtoloseanyclaimtobetheoverallformofmoralrationality.Thepressuresonustoadoptanindirectformofutilitarianismwouldrecurheretoo.Sothecentralquestioninmoralitywouldbesomethingalongtheselines:Whatsetofrulesanddispositionswould,oversocietyatlargeandinthelongrun,mostpromotewell‐being,fairness,andequality,andhowarethesecompetinggoodstobeweighedagainstoneanother?Likeutilitarianism,consequentialistsystemis,tomymind,tooambitious.Itcannotbetheuniversal,overarchingformofmoralreasoning—noteventheall‐sanctioningbackgroundformofthatreasoning.
Thereare,ofcourse,stillotherformsofconsequentialism.Itmaybethat,inpushingthepromotionofgoodintothebackgroundbymakingitthecriterionofrightandwrong,wehavenotpusheditquitefarenoughorbacktotherightplace.Themostinterestingformsofconsequentialisminfuture,Ithink,willbethosethatgiveitadifferentbackgroundplace,withoutpushingitsofarintothebackgroundthatnothingworthcalling‘consequentialism’remains.Itisadifficultbalancetostrike.Forpossibilities,seeWarnock1971andMackie1977,whoregardthebettermentofhumanlifeastheobjectofthewholeapparatusofmorality,ratherthanasthegoalofmoralaction,thoughthismaygotoofartobeanykindof‘consequentialism’.ButseealsotheviewthatAllanGibbardshowssomesympathywithinthefinalchapterofGibbard1990.
(8.)ElizabethAnscombeconsidersthisidentificationafeatureof‘theHebrew–Christianethic’:‘ithasbeencharacteristicofthatethictoteachthattherearecertainthingsforbiddenwhateverconsequencesthreaten,suchas:choosingtokilltheinnocentforanypurpose,howevergood....Theprohibitionofcertainthingssimplyinvirtueoftheirdescriptionassuch‐and‐suchidentifiablekindsofaction,regardlessofanyfurtherconsequences,iscertainlynotthewholeoftheHebrew–Christianethic;butisanoteworthyfeatureofit’(Anscombe1968a:197–8).SeealsoSidgwick1907:200.Andonecan,likeW.D.Ross,holdthatcertainkindsofactsarealwayswrong(e.g.lying,breakingpromises),whileallowingthatconsequencescanalsohaveweight;seeRoss1930:16–22;alsoRoss1939:134.
(9.)SeeAnscombe1968a:198.
(10.)SeeAnscombe1968b:287.
(11.)ThomasNageldefendsthissortofdeontologyinhis1986:ch.IX,sect.5.
(12.)SeeKagan1989:176:‘Thatiswhytheargumentfromrespectmustfail:ittriestoclaimthatacertainkindofact'sbeingdisrespectfulisthebasisofitsbeingunjustified.ButIbelievethatthereverseisclosertothetruth.’
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(13.)ThisisJudithJarvisThomson'sapproach;seeher1990:ch.VII.
(14.)Bya‘substantivetheory’Imeanonethatwouldsupplytheexistenceconditionsforaright.Ontheneedforsuchatheory,seeGriffin1984.AsubstantivetheoryiswhatJudithThomsonneedsforherargumentinThomson1990,which,itseemstome,intheendshedoesnotsupply.Inthisconnection,seeCarlWellman's(1992)reviewofherbook.
(15.)IsaymoreaboutthislinkinCh.VIII,sect.1.
(16.)Nagel1980:131–3.
(17.)Forthischaracterizationofvirtueethics,seeSlote1992:xiv,xix,89;Hursthouse1987:220.
(18.)SeeMacIntyre1992:1277.
(19.)Thisideahasbeendevelopedindependently,andquitedifferently,inHonoré1993.
(20.)ImportantmoderndiscussionsoftheseissuesareBennett1981;Bennett1995;andKagan1989:esp.chs.3and4.
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