Greifswald October 2006 The National Offender Management Service (NOMS): implementation and evaluation Peter Raynor University of Wales, Swansea
Dec 20, 2015
Greifswald October 2006
The National Offender Management Service (NOMS): implementation and evaluation
Peter Raynor
University of Wales, Swansea
What I will talk about:
Background: the ‘What Works’ experiment in Britain
The results of research on effective practice Reasons for developing integrated offender
management Evidence and politics in penal reform Proceed with caution
The world’s biggest experiment in evidence-based rehabilitation
Probation services and prisons in England and Wales
Now approximately ten years’ experience Large scale: targets for completions of offending
behaviour programmes in 2005 were 15,000 for the Probation Service and 7,000 for prisons.
(Prisons started earlier but numbers expanded more slowly)
Why did the experiment start?
In the mid-1990s we had: Limited evidence of any impact on re-
offending Politicians who were sceptical about
rehabilitative services Some new ideas about effective corrections
from meta-analyses and pilot projects
For example: STOP (Straight Thinking On Probation)
Mid Glamorgan 1991-5: evaluated pilot of ‘Reasoning and Rehabilitation’
72-hour cognitive-behavioural group programme
Implemented for those at high risk of custody Required consent Two PO tutors per group
Evaluation showed:
Probation officers could deliver this The ‘right’ people were on it Crime-prone attitudes and personal problems
were reduced Some reduction in reconviction for
programme completers (and high completion rate)
Reduction in seriousness and reincarceration
Reconvictions in one year:
STOP completers:
Custodial comparison:
Expected rate 42%
Actual35%
Expected rate 42%
Actual49%
Seriousness:
Stop completers: 8% had a serious reconviction by 12 months
2% returned to prison on first reconviction Custodial comparison group: 21% had
serious reconviction within 12 months 15% returned to prison on first reconviction
Other results:
Crime-prone attitudes decreased Self-reported problems decreased Project members described what they had
learned They reported changes in thinking, e.g. they
had become less impulsive
Exit interview quotes:
‘It’s helped me to solve problems and get them through to people better. Prevents me from jumping off the handle. I listen more, I think about problems more and discuss things. It takes a lot of stress off my head because I Iisten to others.’
More:
‘It’s made me realise . . It’s learnt me to put myself in other people’s places if they’d been burgled . . Guilty’s the word . . It’s out of order. It’s opened my mind and I look at a subject from all different angles . . Not just jumping the gun. With problems I can clear them up more easily.’
Meanwhile: a crisis for probation
In 1993 the Conservative Government appointed a new Home Secretary, Michael Howard, who:
Announced that ‘prison works’ Reduced spending on the probation service Abolished training for probation officers Would the probation service survive?
Why a new probation strategy was needed
In 1995 the Home Office issued a circular on ‘critical success factors’. In 1996 the Inspectorate’s survey found:
267 ‘effective programmes’ claimed by Chief Officers, of which:
109 claimed to be evaluated 50 were left after meaning of evaluation explained 33 had some documented results Only 4 had adequate evaluation and positive results Something needed to be done!
What we knew by mid-90s: effective programmes . . .
Target risk Focus on criminogenic
need Are structured Use direction Use cognitive-
behavioural methods Are (best) located in the
community
Are delivered with high integrity
Have committed management
Have appropriately trained staff
Have adequate resources
Have integral evaluation
The ‘What Works’ strategy
The ‘New Labour’ government was elected in 1997 and announced its support for evidence-based policy.
For probation this meant: Pathfinder projects Integration of areas into national Service (by 2001)For probation and prisons: Some new resources Accreditation of programme designs Evaluation
Accreditation: promoting quality
Prison Service General and Sex Offender Treatment Programme Accreditation Panel set up 1996
Joint Prisons/Probation Services Accreditation Panel set up 1999
Renamed Correctional Services Accreditation Panel To approve programme designs and quality control
arrangements
Accreditation criteria for programmes
(In 2002 when evaluated by Home Office):
Clear model of change Selection of offenders Targeting dynamic risk
factors Range of targets Effective methods Skills orientated
Sequencing, intensity, duration
Engagement and motivation Continuity of programmes
and services Ongoing monitoring Ongoing (plans for)
evaluation
What the panel did and didn’t do:
Accredited approx. 28 programmes Did not control:
– Targets– Timing of roll-out– OASys– National Standards and enforcement– Whether evaluation took place– Relations with sentencers and communities– Resources and management generally
Some results of evaluation so far: Prisons
Three evaluations of offending behaviour programmes: First (2002) shows positive effect for medium risk Second (2003) shows no significant effect Third (2003) shows positive effects for completers All show problems of matching comparison groups
More results: probation
Programme completers reconvict less than comparison group offenders
Programme non-completers reconvict more Low completion rates (21% - 38% in the main
studies) make evaluation difficult, as we cannot distinguish between programme effects and selection effects
(completion rates are improving but still only a minority complete)
More results: resettlement of prisoners
The resettlement pathfinders (phase 1) looked at seven projects (ABCDEFG) of which three (led by voluntary organisations: EFG) aimed mainly to address ‘welfare problems’ while the four probation-led projects (ABCD) aimed also to address attitudes, thinking, behaviour
Resettlement pathfinder phase 1:
Seven projects A B C D E F G
Rank on continuity: + A B C D E F G - Impact on attitudes: + C B A D G E F - Impact on problems: + C D A G B E F -
ABCD consistently better: why?
Results of the resettlement pathfinders
When projects addressed both practical problems and thinking:
Greater positive change in attitudes Improvement in self-reported problems Greater continuity of contact with helpers Higher continuity associated with lower
reconviction NB use of cognitive-motivational programme
Why?
‘In the case of criminal behaviour, factors in the social environment seem influential determinants of initial delinquency for a substantial proportion of offenders . . . but habitual offending is better predicted by looking at an individual’s acquired ways of reacting to common situations’ (Zamble and Quinsey 1997)
Persistent offenders need practical help and changes in thinking
Overall, the results of first-wave studies so far are ‘mixed’
Some good outcomes: correctional services are now committed to reducing re-offending; many hundreds of staff now understand principles of effective practice
What do we learn? Lessons for: Theory Research Implementation
These problems are not unusual – e.g. Lipsey 1999:
Compared 205 ‘demonstration’ (pilot) and 196 ‘practical’ (routine) interventions with young offenders
‘Practical’ interventions were half as effective (6% decrease compared to 12%)
57% of the ‘practical’ interventions had no effect
What should we expect from rapid roll-out?
Lessons for theory
International research continues to support effectiveness of cognitive-behavioural programmes
UK research suggests need to improve impact through motivation, negotiating meaningful goals with offenders and case management
The programme is part of the correctional experience: the impact comes from the whole experience
No case for a return to ‘nothing works’
Lessons for research:
Design pilot projects and early stage roll-outs as experiments, to be evaluated
Build in proper comparison/control groups by improving quasi-experimental methodology or, if feasible, random allocation
Collect fuller information including dynamic risk factors
Motivate staff to provide good quality information by building a culture of curiosity
Lessons for implementation I
Don’t set non-evidence-based targets (high initial targets of 30,000 led to pressure to fill programmes regardless of suitability)
Assess risks and needs in correctional populations before deciding programmes and scale (not possible because of delays in OASys)
Don’t rely on managerialism to change staff culture Don’t go too fast Expect initial reduction in effectiveness of roll-out
(Lipsey 1999) Don’t over-enforce or drift down-tariff
Lessons for implementation II
Case management, supervision and follow-up are an integral part of effective programmes
They require Core Correctional Practices i.e.
Effective authority
Pro-social modelling
Good relationship quality: open, warm, empathic, optimistic, structuring, motivating
(Dowden and Andrews 2004)
Impact of CCP:
Mean effect sizes are higher when CCPs are present
They make significant differences when other principles of effectiveness (risk, need, responsivity) are also followed
Effective interventions and staff skills are mutually beneficial – neither replaces the other
BUT:
‘Clearly these CCPs were rarely used in the human service programs that were surveyed in this meta-analysis . . . These results suggest that the emphasis placed on developing and utilizing appropriate staff technique has been sorely lacking within correctional treatment programmes.’ (Dowden and Andrews 2004)
All this suggests that offender management can work well if we have:
Sound assessment of risks and needs Resources to match needs ‘Relationship skills’ to understand, build trust,
motivate and challenge ‘Structuring skills’ to clarify expectations,
requirements, controls High continuity Prisons and probation working together
Lessons for implementation III
Offender management also needs to address the full range of problems which offenders experience.
The Social Exclusion Unit’s report in 2002 on Reducing Re-offending by Ex-prisoners identified several areas of concern which became the ‘Seven Pathways’ in the national and regional ‘reducing re-offending’ plans:
Seven pathways
Accommodation Education, training and employment Mental and physical health Drugs and alcohol Finance, benefits and debt Children and families of offenders Attitudes, thinking and behaviour
For example (from SEU report): prisoners are:
13 times more likely to have been in care 13 times as likely to be unemployed 15 times as likely to be HIV positive 80% have writing skills, 65% numeracy skills
and 50% reading skills at or below 11 yr old level
60% to 70% using drugs before imprisonment
20% of male and 37% of female sentenced prisoners have history of suicide attempts
Half had no GP Twenty times more likely to have been excluded
from school 80% of drug users have never had contact with
treatment services A third lose accommodation in prison, two-thirds lose
their job, one fifth have money problems and two fifths lose family contact.
Integrating services:
The Criminal Justice Act 2003 introduced new sentences, including:
A single community sentence A new hybrid sentence, combining a short
period of prison with a longer period of supervision in the community (‘Custody Plus’) to improve resettlement for short-sentence prisoners
Also in 2003:
The Carter Report (Managing Offenders, Reducing Crime) prepared by Patrick Carter for the Prime Minister recommended:
Limiting the prison population (to 80,000) End-to-end management of offenders (linking prison
and probation, as in Custody Plus) A National Offender Management Service (NOMS) ‘Contestability’, market testing, private sector
involvement
But the political context changes:
2006: New Home Secretary, John Reid, wants to be seen as ‘tough on crime’
8,000 new prison places ‘Custody Plus’ is cancelled NOMS is still not running Staff are unhappy Private sector involvement is a political
priority
Lessons to learn from the UK:
Developing evidence-based effective offender management is a slow and gradual process
Politicians want quick results Evidence tends to be used selectively to support
policies already chosen for other reasons We now know more about what to do: will we be
allowed to do it? Proceed with caution