8/14/2019 Greece Israel http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/greece-israel 1/31 Jacob Abadi is professor of history at the United States Air Force Academy. Constraints and Adjustments in Greece’s Policy toward Israel Jacob Abadi Greek-Israeli relations have been cordial over the years, for the most part. However, it was not until 1990 that Greece decided to establish full diplo- matic relations with Israel, making it the last country in the European Com- munity (EC) to do so. Observers have offered several possible reasons for this belated recognition of the Jewish state. They have suggested that Greece’s concern about its ties with the Arab states, whose support it needed on the Cyprus issue, was a major deterrent. In addition, they have argued that Greece’s concern for the fate of its nationals in Arab countries and its depen- dence on Arab oil and investment had dissuaded it from upgrading its rela- tions with Israel. Valid as these factors were, they are only a few pieces of a big jigsaw puzzle. So far, no systematic attempt has been made by analysts to explore all the reasons for this anomaly. Why Athens thwarted all attempts by the Israeli Foreign Ministry to upgrade bilateral ties is the question that I attempt to answer in this essay. The main argument presented here is that Greek policy makers were con- strained by a unique combination of domestic and external pressures, which prevented them from responding favorably to Israel’s overtures. I also argue that Greek policy toward Israel was far less hostile than the media in the West, in Israel, and in the Arab states portrayed it. Greek policy began to change in the mid-1980s, when the enormous pres- sure exerted by the Greek opponents of rapprochement decreased consider- ably and the tension in the Arab-Israeli conflict began to subside. Moreover, the changing global environment, which resulted from the collapse of the
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clergy. Yet the Greek government refrained from taking any steps that could
be interpreted as inimical to Arab interests. Consequently, all appeals from
Israeli Foreign Ministry officials to upgrade ties continued to fall on deaf
ears in Athens.According to a 1952 report by the British consulate general in Jerusalem,
Greece was negotiating a treaty to protect its Greek subjects in Egypt and
therefore did not consider the time appropriate for granting Israel de jure
recognition. However, as a sop to the Israelis, it considered the possibility of
nominating a diplomatic representative. When the Greek government sus-
pended the conclusion of a treaty of commerce and civil aviation with Israel,
as a result of intense Arab pressure, the Israelis asked the British to assist in
the negotiations. Officials at the Greek Foreign Ministry responded favorablyto British mediation in this matter. They reassured the Israelis that the treaty
of commerce would be signed at the appropriate time.5 However, they made
it clear that Greece would not grant de jure recognition to Israel before the
issue pertaining to the Greek colony in Egypt was resolved.
In a letter to the Foreign Office, the British ambassador explained that
Israel was keenly interested in upgrading bilateral relations with Greece
because it sought to cultivate relations with all Mediterranean countries that
were susceptible to Arab pressure. Besides, Israel was interested in thefuture defense of the region and in minimizing the effect of the Arab Boycott.6
Aware of Israel’s efforts to upgrade its ties with Greece, the Arab states
embarked on a strategy aimed at preventing such a possibility. A summer
1956 invitation from Damascus to the king of Greece to visit Syria was part
of a deliberate attempt to keep Greece and Israel apart.7 Arab diplomats,
speaking to their Greek counterparts in the UN, made it clear that any
Greek attempt to upgrade ties with Israel would not be well received by
their governments. Although Arab diplomats had always argued that Greek-
Arab relations were anchored in tradition and common heritage, British
diplomats who became involved in Middle East affairs were hardly con-
5. Gallsworthy to Wardrop, PRO FO/371, 98796, R10319/3, 20 March 1952.
6. Judd to Sheringham, PRO FO/371, 82516, ER1023/13, 11 July 1950; Wadrop to Foreign Office,
PRO FO/371, 98796, ER10319, 22 February 1952; Chadwick to Foreign Office, PRO FO/371, 98796,
ER10319/2, 17 March 1952.
7. Gardner to Foreign Office, PRO FO371, 123859, Ra10389/1, 4 June 1956.
Abadi: Constraints and Adjustments in Greece’s Policy 45
vinced about such outlandish assertions. In a 1956 letter to Foreign Secre-
tary Selwyn Lloyd, Anthony Lambert wrote from Athens: “They [the Greeks]
remain firmly Western and anti-Communist in outlook. . . . Greek ties of
friendship with the Arab world consist only of the presence of a large Greekcolony in Egypt, and a coincidence of views on ‘colonialism.’ In almost all
other respects their interests are diametrically opposed.”8
Greek-Egyptian relations underwent a serious crisis in early 1957 when
Egypt’s president Gamal Abdal Nasser approved legislation for the “Egyp-
tianization” of Greek enterprises. The Greek ambassador protested the Egyp-
tian government’s decision to confiscate Greek property. There was much
talk about a massive emigration of Greeks from Egypt, and the Greek press
reported that the days of the Greek community there were numbered. Seek-ing to avoid confrontation with Egypt, Greece refused to attend the first Suez
conference, which convened in London in February 1957 to discuss the con-
sequences of Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal.9
Explaining why Greece continued to maintain cordial relations with
Egypt despite the confiscation of Greek property, a British journalist said,
“Not unnaturally, the presence of this large Greek community and concern
for its welfare have steadily prejudiced Greek foreign policy in favor of
Egypt. This prejudice is now strengthened by Greece’s need for Arab sup-port for her annual appeals on Cyprus in the UN.” In addition, Egypt had a
debt of £4 million to Greece. And what complicated matters even further was
the fact that Egypt had rejected a Greek proposal that the sum should be
used in offsetting Greek payments of canal tolls. Egypt’s decision to restrict
imports of luxury goods from Greece had aggravated tensions even more.10
When Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis and Foreign Minister
Evangelos Averoff-Tositsas of the National Radical Union, which dominated
Greek politics from 1955 to 1963, visited Cairo in August 1957, both coun-
tries reaffirmed their desire to strengthen bilateral ties. However, when the
two ministers inquired about the fate of the Greek community in Egypt,
Nasser disappointed them by saying that the Egyptian government had yet
to decide what to do about foreigners.
8. Lambert to Selwyn Lloyd, PRO FO/371, 123850, Ra1021/1, 29 August 1956.
9. British Embassy in Athens to Selwyn Lloyd, PRO FO/371, 130018, RG10316, 8 February 1957.
Abadi: Constraints and Adjustments in Greece’s Policy 47
Athens’s unwillingness to harm its ties with the Arabs had often resulted in
steps that were harmful to Israel. For example, when Israel concluded a deal
for the purchase of the first Super-Mystère aircraft from France in March
1960, Greece did not allow their passage through its air space. Shimon Peres,who was Israel’s deputy defense minister and very involved in the purchase,
recalled in his diary how the pilot of one aircraft, which was detained by the
Greeks, lost his bearings and almost fell into Egyptian hands.13
In a meeting with Greek diplomats in 1962, Israel’s minister of education
and culture, Abba Eban, who spoke on behalf of Foreign Minister Golda
Meir, raised the issue of diplomatic relations with Greece. In those meet-
ings, the Greeks argued that three factors stood in the way of normalization:
the existence of twenty thousand to thirty thousand Greek nationals inEgypt; the need to persuade the Egyptian government to compensate those
who had lost their property; and the need to enlist Arab support on the
Cyprus issue.
Despite intense efforts on the part of Israeli officials, Greek policy did not
change during the early 1960s. The rise of pan-Arabism and Nasser’s popular-
ity in the Arab world made it difficult for the Greek government to contemplate
better relations with Israel. Such steps would alienate not only Egypt but all
pro-Nasser elements in the Arab world. So susceptible were the Greeks topressure from the Arabs at that time that they agreed to Arab demands to
lower the diplomatic rank of the Israeli representative in Athens.14
When the Greeks invited Israel’s president Zalman Shazar to participate
in the marriage ceremony of the king in February 1966, the Arabs protested,
saying that there was no justification for a formal invitation since Greece rec-
ognized Israel only de facto. Yet despite its desire to pacify the Arab states,
the Greek government preferred to avoid a confrontation with Israel, particu-
larly in matters affecting its national security. When Israel planned to fly a
helicopter from France to Israel in spring 1966, the Greeks allowed it free
passage over the demilitarized zone in the Dodecanese Islands.
13. Matti Golan, Shimon Peres: A Biography (New York: St. Martin’s, 1982), 98 –9.
14. The Arabs insisted that the Israeli representative be placed under the chargé d’affaires ad interim
rather than under the chargé d’affaires en pied. Sykes to Dodson, PRO FO/371, 180852, ER103119/1,
Other events had demonstrated that there were further limits to Greek
compliance with Arab pressure. When the Arabs, who supported Greece on
the Cyprus issue, pressured the Greeks to remove Israel’s name from the list
of the diplomatic corps in Athens and asked that the Israeli representativenot be called “diplomatic,” the Greek Foreign Ministry flatly refused. Greek-
Egyptian relations underwent another period of coolness in summer 1966,
when the Greek government asked for compensation much larger than the
Egyptians were willing to pay to those whose property was confiscated.15
What made it so difficult to decide on rapprochement with Israel was the
fact that there was no agreement among Greek politicians regarding the pol-
icy that their government should adopt. For example, Andreas Papandreou
accused Foreign Minister Stavros Costopoulos of trying, without the primeminister’s knowledge, to pass a decree in the parliament allowing Israel to
appoint an ambassador in Athens. As it turned out, Costopoulos’s orders had
come from the palace. Papandreou was against upgrading relations with
Israel. He attacked the government and the leaders of the Radical Party for
putting Greek-Arab relations in jeopardy. Moreover, he argued that Arab
support on the Cyprus issue was crucial and managed to revoke the decree.16
A thorough perusal of the documents available in the Israel State Archive
reveals that Israeli Foreign Ministry officials attached great importance torelations with Greece. The centrality of Greek-Israeli relations becomes very
clear from the comments made by Israeli Foreign Ministry official Nahum
Eshkol, who firmly believed that Israel should not give up the struggle to win
Athens’s good will.17 In one of his letters to the Israeli ambassador in Athens
he wrote the following:
It is true that the issue of full recognition of Israel and the level of repre-
sentations are currently subjects of contest between the government andthe opposition, but we should not underestimate the importance of the
15. Shai to Foreign Ministry, Israel State Archive (ISA), 4029/24, 8 February 1966; Gilad to Foreign
Ministry, ISA 4029/24, 8 April 1966; Shai to Foreign Ministry, ISA 4029/32, 27 May and 24 June
1966.
16. Andreas Papandreou was the son of Prime Minister George Papandreou. Costopoulos was the for-
eign minister in George Papandreou’s government and later became defense minister. Shai to Foreign
Ministry, ISA 4029/24, 21 July 1966.
17. Nahum Eshkol, interview with the author, Jerusalem, 14 June 1995.
interrogated and humiliated them before they were released.23 Consequently,
the Greek attitude toward Israel became friendlier. Greek officials were quite
genuine when they argued that despite the absence of full diplomatic rela-
tions they were far from being hostile to Israel. Not only did they allow theU.S. Sixth Fleet to use Crete during the Six Day War to assist Israel, they
also allowed Israeli helicopters to land on the island of Rhodes.
Aware of the junta’s pro-U.S. orientation, the Israelis asked American offi-
cials to act on their behalf in Athens. At the same time, however, Greek offi-
cials made an attempt to appear as honest brokers in the Arab-Israeli con-
flict and were still reluctant to take a step that might be regarded as inimical
to the Arab cause. Greek foreign minister Panayotis Pipinelis told the Israeli
ambassador that in his opinion Israel could safely withdraw from the Araboccupied territories and rely on guarantees by the Great Powers. At the same
time, sources in the Greek embassy in Bonn argued that the Greek govern-
ment was compelled to maintain a pro-Arab policy. This was due not only to
its concern for the Greek communities in the Arab world but to the need to
use Nasser’s influence in Afro-Asian countries in order to obtain their sup-
port on the Cyprus issue. Therefore, these sources said that Israel could not
expect a change in Greek policy in the foreseeable future. Moreover, they
indicated that Greece would continue to vote against Israel in the UN,despite the fact that the Greek people identified with Israel.
Shortly after the Six Day War, Greece became vulnerable to terrorist
activities carried out by Palestinian commandos, which made it quite impos-
sible for the junta to remain indifferent to the Arab-Israeli conflict. When
Palestinian terrorists carried out an attack against an El Al airliner in
Athens in December 1968, the Greek prime minister and minister of the
interior, Stylianos Pattakos, was presented with a major dilemma. While the
Israelis expected an explicit condemnation of the attack, the Palestinians
expected a statement of sympathy to their cause. In a meeting with an Israeli
envoy, Pattakos said that he regretted the death of the Israeli passenger.
However, while condemning the attack, the junta instructed the press to
avoid portraying the Palestinian commandos as terrorists. Nevertheless, the
23. L’Algérie détient des marins grecs, ISA 4029/32, 28 July 1967; Yaish to Foreign Ministry, ISA
4029/24, 31 October 1967; Vered to Arnon, ISA 4029/24, 31 October 1967; Shai to Foreign Ministry,
ISA 4029/24, 28 November 1967; Ben Yaacov to Foreign Ministry, ISA 4029/32, 5 December 1967.
Abadi: Constraints and Adjustments in Greece’s Policy 53
Greek press remained generally sympathetic to Israel, and when Israel was
condemned for its invasion of Lebanon, some newspapers implied that the
Greek government had criticized the Israeli invasion while avoiding con-
demnation of the Palestinian attack.It was largely as a result of its desire to mend fences with the United
States that the junta eventually decided to move somewhat closer to Israel.
In 1969, diplomatic representatives were appointed in both countries. Both
had the rank and the role of ambassador. However, the de facto recognition
remained in force. This was largely because Pipinelis remained influential
when Papadopoulos came to power in 1967. Greek Middle East policy was
constrained by American officials who pressured Greece to move closer to
Israel. At the same time, however, the Arab states expected the junta to showsympathy to the Palestinian cause. Despite strict control by the Greek gov-
ernment on the activities of Palestinian commandos, the terrorist attacks on
Greek soil continued and thus caused the junta embarrassment.
The junta continued to maintain the image of neutrality in the Arab-
Israeli conflict by allowing the Greek Red Cross to ship relief supplies to
Jordan, Syria, and Israel. The junta found itself in a great dilemma in Sep-
tember 1970 when U.S. officials asked it to grant facilities for refueling
airplanes sent to evacuate American citizens from Jordan and to allowreconnaissance plans to fly to the region. The junta vacillated and thus antag-
onized the Arabs while failing to substantially improve its relations with
Israel. What kept the junta from granting de jure recognition to Israel was
not only the fear of possible Arab reaction but also the anti-Semitic tenden-
cies of Greek reactionary media, such as the newspaper Estia and especially
the overtly fascist magazine Fourth of August , which often published virulent
anti-Semitic material.24
Although many Israelis and Greeks were friends at the personal level, the
junta continued to resist pressure to grant Israel de jure recognition. For-
mally, diplomatic representatives Yehuda Gaulan in Athens and Dimitris
Petrou in Jerusalem were ambassadors in rank but not in title. When
approached by their Israeli counterparts, Greek officials continued to claim
24. Maariv (Tel Aviv), 27 December 1968; New York Times, 31 December 1968; A. G. Xydis, “The
Military Regime’s Foreign Policy,” in Greece under Military Rule, ed. Richard Clogg and George
Yannopoulos (New York: Basic, 1972), 204, 205, 207, 209.
Abadi: Constraints and Adjustments in Greece’s Policy 55
prime minister in October 1973, Spyros Markezinis said that “many ties
connect us with Arab countries, but nothing divides us from the state of
Israel, which has also the right to have a place under the sun.”27 Moreover,
Greece offered its territory for Arab-Israeli peace talks following the YomKippur War. According to a Greek political exile, Elias P. Demetracopoulos,
the United States did nothing to prevent the ousting of George Papadopoulos
due to the Greek government’s refusal to allow U.S. aircraft to use Greek air-
space in order to deliver weapons to Israel.28
Following the Yom Kippur War, the Palestinian issue assumed greater
importance in the Arab-Israeli conflict and complicated matters even fur-
ther. It was nearly impossible for the Greek government to demonstrate sym-
pathy toward the Palestinians without alienating Israel. The Greek govern-ment’s decision of May 1974 to free two Arab terrorists was not well received
in Jerusalem and caused further friction in bilateral relations.
The New Democratic Party and the Bilateral
Relations with Israel
In 1962 Greece was given associate status with the EC. Afterward, its for-
eign policy became increasingly pro-Western. Nevertheless, the New Demo-cratic Party (ND), which came to power in 1974, was reluctant to reverse the
junta’s policy toward Israel. Despite past grievances, the new government
expressed sympathy with Egypt, and its criticism of Israel intensified. The
Greek press did not approve of U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger’s
shuttle diplomacy, and some newspapers claimed that his Jewish origin
stood in the way of a fair settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In addition,
editorials compared the plight of the Palestinian refugees with Greek Cypriots
driven from their homes by the Turks.29 However, the ND proved more prag-
matic than its official statements suggested, and after a while it toned down
its criticism and increased its cooperation with Israel. In January 1977,
27. “Israel’s Place under the Sun,” Jerusalem Post, 9 October 1973.
28. “France Seeks Key Role in Peace Talks,” Jerusalem Post , 23 October 1973; “Exiled Greek Politi-
cian Says: U.S. Didn’t Help Papadopoulos because of His Mid-East Stand,” Jerusalem Post, 29
November 1973.
29. “Greece Frees Terrorists,” Jerusalem Post, 4 May 1974; “Israel Is the ‘Main Culprit’ Greek Hos-
tility to U.S. Focuses On,” Jerusalem Post, 12 December 1974.
Abadi: Constraints and Adjustments in Greece’s Policy 59
This wave of anti-Israeli sentiments in Greek government circles cannot
be explained without taking into consideration the political dynamics inside
PASOK. Upon their rise to power, PASOK’s leaders came under the influ-
ence of a powerful faction within the party, which pressured it to pursue non-alignment in foreign policy. This was referred to as tritokosmiko, or “Third-
worldism,” and it became an article of faith during PASOK’s first term in
office. Warming up to the Arabs was an essential part of this trend. In addi-
tion, the Greek Communist Party pressured PASOK to sever Greece’s rela-
tions with Israel. Even the media was affected by this trend, and some news-
papers tended to be overtly anti-Israel. One report on the Greek press
claimed that the progovernment daily Ethnos was financed and operated in
cooperation with the Soviet KGB, accounting for its anti-Israel bias.41
Like previous regimes, PASOK competed with Turkey in its attempt to
find favor in the eyes of the Arab states, whose support on the Cyprus and
Aegean issues it deemed essential. In addition, PASOK’s leaders hoped that
Arab investments in Greece would increase substantially. This was the rea-
son why they sought to cultivate relations not only with the PLO but also
with radical states such as Libya and Algeria. This was also the reason why
Papandreou went to the extent of denouncing Israel’s invasion to Lebanon in
such harsh terms.Papandreou continued to denounce Israel on every possible occasion and
rejected the pressure exerted by the EC to normalize relations with it. When
approached by EC officials, who asked him to call on his government to
establish diplomatic relations with Israel, a Greek government official avoided
the topic by saying, “The only competent body that could make decisions on
foreign policy is the Greek government.”42 Nevertheless, PASOK was not as
anti-Israeli as its official pronouncements might suggest. Athens’s contacts
with the Arab world had increased considerably already when the ND was
in power, although it is true that this trend intensified when PASOK came to
power. Both Greek parties condemned Israel’s occupation of Arab land after
the Six Day War. However, when PASOK was faced with resolutions that con-
tained more than a general denunciation of Israel, it voted in favor of the
41. “Russia Suggests That Arabs Consider Using Oil Weapon,” Jerusalem Post, 18 July 1982; “KGB
Finances Largest Greek Daily,” Jerusalem Post, 23 June 1983.
42. “Greece Refuses EC Call for Relations with Israel,” Jerusalem Post, 22 May 1983.
The Israelis were enthusiastic about military cooperation with Greece,
but they had to be careful not to antagonize the Turkish government. When
the Greek Defense Ministry extended an invitation to Israel’s defense minis-
ter Yitzhak Mordechai to visit Greece, sources in the Defense Ministrystated that the situation required extreme caution due to the traditional
friendship that Greece maintained with the Arab states and so that the visit
would not impact the next Israel-Turkey pact. The Greeks did not conceal
their concern about the Israeli-Turkish rapprochement. Therefore, when
Mordechai was planning his visit to Greece, officials in the Defense Ministry
tried to find a Jewish event that could provide a good excuse for the visit.
Mordechai chose to visit Greece during the Hanukah holiday, which com-
memorates the Jewish victory over the ancient Greeks.64
Greek-Israeli relations underwent another period of tension in the late
1990s, when the Greek Cypriots expressed concern over reports that Israel
was spying in Cyprus on Turkey’s behalf. According to Mordechai, the
Greeks became suddenly interested in implementing the strategic alliance
signed by Rabin in 1994.65 The commander of the Greek air force, Lieu-
tenant General Giorgos Antonezis, visited Israel in December 1998 in an
effort to conclude an agreement regarding strategic cooperation.
Israel’s defense ties with Turkey left the Greeks suspicious.66 In his meet-ing with journalists in Cairo, Pangalos said, “This is an alliance of wrong-
doers that brings us to the Cold War situation.”67 Israel issued a formal
protest against Pangalos’s remarks, saying that its cooperation with Turkey
was not directed against any third party and that such comments were not
constructive.68 However, anxious not to harm bilateral relations with Greece,
64. “Smashing Plates for Peace,” Jerusalem Post, 26 December 1997; “Mordechai Is Searching for aConvenient Timing for a Trip to Greece in Order Not to Anger Turkey,” Haaretz, 16 September 1998;
“Greek Air Force Chief to Fly Israeli Fighter Jet,” Jerusalem Post, 2 December 1998; Arieh O’Sulli-
van, “Mordechai to Visit Greece Next Month,” Jerusalem Post, 27 November 1998; “Greece to Invite
Mordechai to Visit,” Jerusalem Post, 15 September 1998.
65. Arieh O’Sullivan, “Somebody in Cyprus Wants to Make It Difficult for Israel,” Jerusalem Post, 9
November 1998.
66. Andrew Borowiec, “Greece Nurtures Ties with Israel,” Washington Post, 7 December 1998;
Thomas O’Dwyer, “Dangerous Liaisons,” Jerusalem Post, 19 February 1999.
67. “News in Brief,” Jerusalem Post, 24 February 1998.
68. Jay Bushinski, “Israel Protests Greek Assault on Jlem-Ankara Links,” Jerusalem Post, 26 Febru-