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Great Leap Forward

Traditional Chinese 大躍進

Simplified Chinese 大跃进

Literal meaning "Great Leap Forward"

Transcriptions

Standard Mandarin

Hanyu Pinyin Dà yuè jìn

Wade–Giles Ta4 yüeh4 chin4

IPA [tâ y ̯ ê tɕîn]

Yue: Cantonese

Jyutping Daai6 joek 3 zeon3

Yale Romanization Daaih yeuk jeun

Southern Min

Tâi-lô Tuā io ̍ k tsìn

Great Leap ForwardFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Great Leap Forward (Chinese:大跃进; pinyin: Dàuè jìn) of the People's Republic of China (PRC) was an

economic and social campaign by the Communist Partyof China (CPC) from 1958 to 1961. The campaign wasled by Mao Zedong and aimed to rapidly transform thecountry from an agrarian economy into a socialist societythrough rapid industrialization and collectivization.However, it is widely considered to have caused theGreat Chinese Famine.

Chief changes in the lives of rural Chinese included theincremental introduction of mandatory agriculturalcollectivization. Private farming was prohibited, andthose engaged in it were persecuted and labeled counter-

revolutionaries. Restr ictions on rural people wer eenforced through public struggle sessions and social

pressure, although people also experienced forced

labor.[1] Rural industrialization, officially a priority of thecampaign, saw "its development... aborted by the

mistakes of the Great Leap Forward."[2]

The Great Leap ended in catastrophe, resulting in tens of

millions of deaths,[3] estimated from 18 million to 32.5[4] or 45 million.[5] Historian Frank Dikötter asserts

that "coercion, terror, and systematic violence were the foundation of the Great Leap Forward" and it"motivated one of the most deadly mass killings of human history".[6]

The years of the Great Leap Forward actually saw economic regression, with 1958 through 1962 being theonly period between 1953 and 1985 in which China's economy shrank. Political economist Dwight Perkinargues, "enormous amounts of investment produced only modest increases in production or none at all. ... I

shor t, the Great Leap was a very expensive disaster."[7]

In subsequent conferences in Mar ch 1960 and May 1962, the negative effects of the Great Leap Forwardwere studied by the CPC, and Mao was criticized in the party conferences. Moderate Party members like

Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping rose to power, and Mao was marginalized within the party, leading him toinitiate the Cultural Revolution in 1966.

Pro-communist sources dispute the number of deaths in the Great Chinese Famine and deny that it was

caused by the Great Leap Forward,[8] saying the campaign was successful in its aim to accelerate stateindustrialisation.

Contents

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Leap_Forward 2

1 Background1.1 Agricultural collectives and other social changes1.2 Hundred Flowers Campaign and Anti-Rightist Campaign1.3 Surpass the UK and US

2 Organizational and operational factors2.1 People's communes2.2 Industrialization2.3 Backyard furnaces

2.4 Irrigation2.5 Crop experiments2.6 Treatment of villagers2.7 Lushan Conference

3 Consequences3.1 Famine

3.1.1 Famine deaths3.1.1.1 Methods of estimating the death toll and sources of error

3.1.2 Causes of the famine and responsibility3.2 Deaths by violence3.3 Impact on economy

3.4 Modes of resistance3.5 Impact on the government

4 See also5 References6 Bibliography and further reading7 External links

Background

In October 1949 after the defeat of the Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party), the Chinese CommunistParty proclaimed the establishment of the People's Republic of China. Immediately, landlords and wealthie

peasants had their land holdings forcibly redistributed to poorer peasants. In the agricultural sectors, cropsdeemed by the Party to be "full of evil", such as opium, were destroyed and replaced with crops such asrice.

Within the Party, there was major debate about redistribution. A moderate faction within the party andPolitburo member Liu Shaoqi argued that change should be gradual and any collectivization of the

peasantry should wait until industrialization, which could provide the agricultural machinery for mechanized farming. A more radical faction led by Mao Zedong argued that the best way to financeindustrialization was for the government to take control of agriculture, thereby establishing a monopolyover grain distribution and supply. This would allow the state to buy at a low price and sell much higher,thus raising the capital necessary for the industrialization of the country.

Agricultural collectives and other social changes

Before 1949, peasants had farmed their own small pockets of land, and observed traditional practices—

festivals, banquets, and paying homage to ancestors.[1] It was realized that Mao's policy of using a statemonopoly on agriculture to finance industrialization would be unpopular with the peasants. Therefore, it

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Sending government officials to work in thecountryside, 1957.

was proposed that the peasants should be brought under Party control by the establishment of agriculturalcollectives which would also facilitate the sharing of

tools and draft animals.[1]

This policy was gradually pushed through between1949 and 1958 in response to immediate policy needs,first by establishing "mutual aid teams" of 5-15households, then in 1953 "elementary agriculturalcooperatives" of 20-40 households, then from 1956 in"higher co-operatives" of 100-300 families. From 1954onward peasants were encouraged to form and joincollective-farming associations, which wouldsupposedly increase their efficiency without robbing

them of their own land or restricting their livelihoods.[1]

By 1958 private ownership was entirely abolished andhouseholds all over China were forced into state-operated communes. Mao insisted that the communes mu

produce more grain for the cities and earn foreign exchange from exports.[1] These reforms (sometimes noreferred to as The Great Leap Forward ) were generally unpopular with the peasants and usuallyimplemented by summoning them to meetings and making them stay there for days and sometimes weeksuntil they "voluntarily" agreed to join the collective.

Apart from progressive taxation on each household's harvest, the state introduced a system of compulsorystate purchases of grain at fixed prices to build up stockpiles for famine-relief and meet the terms of itstrade agreements with the Soviet Union. Together, taxation and compulsory purchases accounted for 30%of the harvest by 1957, leaving very little surplus. Rationing was also introduced in the cities to curb'wasteful consumption' and encourage savings (which were deposited in state-owned banks and thus

became available for investment), and although food could be purchased from state-owned retailers themarket price was higher than that for which it had been purchased. This too was done in the name of discouraging excessive consumption.

Besides these economic changes the Party implemented major social changes in the countryside includingthe banishing of all religious and mystic institutions and ceremonies and replacing them with politicalmeetings and propaganda sessions. Attempts were made to enhance rural education and the status of women (allowing them to initiate divorce if they desired) and ending foot-binding, child marriage andopium addiction. The old system of internal passports (the hukou) were introduced in 1956, preventinginter-county travel without appropriate authorization. Highest priority was given to the urban proletariat fo

whom a welfare state was created.

The first phase collectivization resulted in only modest improvements in output. Famine along the mid-Yangzi was averted in 1956 through the timely allocation of food-aid, but in 1957 the Party's response wasto increase the proportion of the harvest collected by the state to ensure against further disasters. Moderatewithin the Party, including Zhou Enlai, argued for a reversal of collectivization on the grounds that theclaiming the bulk of the harvest for the state had made the people's food-security dependent upon theconstant, efficient, and transparent functioning of the government.

Hundred Flowers Campaign and Anti-Rightist Campaign

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In 1957 Mao responded to the tensions in the Party by promoting free speech and criticism under theHundred Flowers Campaign. In retrospect, some have come to argue that this was a ploy to allow critics ofthe regime, primarily intellectuals but also low ranking members of the party critical of the agricultural

policies, to identify themselves.[9] Some claim that Mao simply swung to the side of the hard-liners once h policies gained strong opposition. Once he had done so, at least half a million were purged under the Anti-Rightist campaign, which effectively silenced any opposition from within the Party or from agriculturalexperts to the changes which would be implemented under the Great Leap Forward.

By the completion of the first 5 Year Economic Plan in 1957, Mao had come to doubt that the path tosocialism that had been taken by the Soviet Union was appropriate for China. He was critical of Khrushchev's reversal of Stalinist policies and alarmed by the uprisings that had taken place in EastGermany, Poland and Hungary, and the perception that the USSR was seeking "peaceful coexistence" withthe Western powers. Mao had become convinced that China should follow its own path to communism.According to Jonathan Mirsky, a historian and journalist specializing in Chinese affairs, China's isolationfrom most of the rest of the world, along with the Korean War, had accelerated Mao's attacks on his

perceived domestic enemies. It led him to accelerate his designs to develop an economy where the regime

would get maximum benefit from rural taxation.[1]

Surpass the UK and US

In November 1957, to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution, party leaders of thecommunist countries gathered in Moscow. The first Secretary of the Central Committee Khrushchev

proposed a goal to not only catch up with but exceed the United States in industrial output in the next 15ears through peaceful competition. Mao Zedong was so inspired by the slogan that China put forward its

own objective: to catch up with and surpass the UK in 15 years.

"Comrade Khrushchev has told us, the Soviet Union 15 years later will surpass the United

States of America. I can also say, 15 years later, we may catch up with or exceed the UK." [10]

Organizational and operational factors

The Great Leap Forward campaign began during the period of the Second Five Year Plan which was

scheduled to run from 1958 to 1963, though the campaign itself was discontinued by 1961.[11][12] Maounveiled the Great Leap Forward at a meeting in January 1958 in Nanjing.

The central idea behind the Great Leap was that rapid development of China's agricultural and industrialsectors should take place in parallel. The hope was to industrialize by making use of the massive supply ofcheap labour and avoid having to import heavy machinery. The government also sought to avoid both socistratification and technical bottlenecks involved in the Soviet model of development, but sought political

rather than technical solutions to do so. Distrusting technical experts,[13] Mao and the party sought toreplicate the strategies used in its 1930s regrouping in Yan'an following the Long March: "mass

mobilization, social leveling, attacks on bureaucratism, [and] disdain for material obstacles."[14] Maoadvocated that a further round of collectivization modeled on the USSR's "Third Period" was necessary inthe countryside where the existing collectives would be merged into huge People's Communes.

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In the beginning, commune members were

able to eat for free at the communecanteens. This changed when food

production slowed to a halt.

People in the countryside working at night to produce steel.

People's communes

An experimental commune was established at Chayashan inHenan in April 1958. Here for the first time private plots wereentirely abolished and communal kitchens were introduced. Atthe Politburo meetings in August 1958, it was decided thatthese people's communes would become the new form of economic and political organization throughout rural China. Bythe end of the year approximately 25,000 communes had beenset up, with an average of 5,000 households each. Thecommunes were relatively self-sufficient co-operatives wherewages and money were replaced by work points.

Based on his fieldwork, Ralph A. Thaxton Jr. describes the people's communes as a form of "apartheid system" for Chinesefarm households. The commune system was aimed atmaximizing production for provisioning the cities andconstructing offices, factories, schools, and social insurancesystems for urban-dwelling workers, cadres and officials.Citizens in rural areas who criticized the system were labeled"dangerous." Escape was also difficult or impossible, and thosewho attempted were subjected to "party-orchestrated public

struggle," which further jeopardized their survival.[15] Besides agriculture, communes also incorporatedsome light industry and construction projects.

Industrialization

Mao saw grain and steel production as the key pillars of economic development. He forecast that within 15ears of the start of the Great Leap, China's steel

production would surpass that of the UK. In the August1958 Politburo meetings, it was decided that steel

production would be set to double within the year, mostof the increase coming through backyard steel

furnaces.[16] Major investments in larger stateenterprises were made in 1958-60: 1,587, 1,361, and1,815 medium- and large-scale state projects were

started in 1958, 1959, and 1960 respectively, more ineach year than in the first Five Year Plan.[17]

Millions of Chinese became state workers as aconsequence of this industrial investment: in 1958, 21million were added to non-agricultural state payrolls,and total state employment reached a peak of 50.44million in 1960, more than doubling the 1957 level; the urban population swelled by 31.24 million

people.[18] These new workers placed major stress on China's food-rationing system, which led to increase

and unsustainable demands on rural food production.[18]

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Backyard furnaces in China during the

Great Leap Forward era.

During this rapid expansion, coordination suffered and material shortages were frequent, resulting in "ahuge rise in the wage bill, largely for construction workers, but no corresponding increase in manufactured

goods."[19] Facing a massive deficit, the government cut industrial investment from 38.9 to 7.1 billion yuan

from 1960 to 1962 (an 82% decrease; the 1957 level was 14.4 billion).[19]

Backyard furnaces

With no personal knowledge of metallurgy, Mao encouragedthe establishment of small backyard steel furnaces in everycommune and in each urban neighborhood. Mao was shown anexample of a backyard furnace in Hefei, Anhui in September

1958 by provincial first secretary Zeng Xisheng.[20] The unit

was claimed to be manufacturing high quality steel.[20]

Huge efforts on the part of peasants and other workers weremade to produce steel out of scrap metal. To fuel the furnacesthe local environment was denuded of trees and wood taken

from the doors and furniture of peasants' houses. Pots, pans,and other metal artifacts were requisitioned to supply the"scrap" for the furnaces so that the wildly optimistic productiontargets could be met. Many of the male agricultural workerswere diverted from the harvest to help the iron production aswere the workers at many factories, schools and even hospitals.Although the output consisted of low quality lumps of pig ironwhich was of negligible economic worth, Mao had a deepdistrust of intellectuals who could have pointed this out, and

placed his faith in the power of the mass mobilization of the

peasants.

Moreover, the experience of the intellectual classes followingthe Hundred Flowers Campaign silenced those aware of the folly of such a plan. According to his privatedoctor, Li Zhisui, Mao and his entourage visited traditional steel works in Manchuria in January 1959where he found out that high quality steel could only be produced in large-scale factories using reliable fuesuch as coal. However, he decided not to order a halt to the backyard steel furnaces so as not to dampen therevolutionary enthusiasm of the masses. The program was only quietly abandoned much later in that year.

Irrigation

Substantial effort was expended during the Great Leap Forward on large-scale, but often poorly plannedcapital construction projects, such as irrigation works often built without input from trained engineers. Mawas well aware of the human cost of these water-conservancy campaigns. In early 1958, while listening to report on irrigation in Jiangsu, he mentioned that:

"Wu Zhipu claims he can move 30 billion cubic metres; I think 30,000 people will die. ZengXisheng has said that he will move 20 billion cubic metres, and I think that 20,000 people will

die. Weiqing only promises 600 million cubic metres, maybe nobody will die."[21][22]

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Commune members working fields at night using lamps.

Though Mao "criticized the excessive use of corvée for large-scale water conservancy projects" in late

1958,[23] mass mobilization on irrigation works continued unabated for the next several years, and claimed

the lives of hundreds of thousands of exhausted, starving villagers.[21] The inhabitants of Qingshui and

Gansu referred to these projects as the "killing fields."[21]

Crop experiments

On the communes, a number of radical and controversial agricultural innovations were promoted at the behest of Mao. Many of these were based on the ideas of now discredited Soviet agronomist TrofimLysenko and his followers. The policies included close cropping, whereby seeds were sown far moredensely than normal on the incorrect assumption that seeds of the same class would not compete with each

other.[24] Deep plowing (up to 2 m deep) was encouraged on the mistaken belief that this would yield planwith extra large root systems. Moderately productive land was left unplanted with the belief thatconcentrating manure and effort on the most fertile land would lead to large per-acre productivity gains.Altogether, these untested innovations generally led to decreases in grain production rather than

increases.

[25]

Meanwhile, local leaders were pressured into falsely reporting ever-higher grain production figures to thei political superiors. Participants at political meetings remembered production figures being inflated up to 1times actual production amounts as the race to please superiors and win plaudits – like the chance to meetMao himself – intensified. The state was later able to force many production groups to sell more grain than

they could spare based on these false production figures.[26]

Treatment of villagers

The ban on private holdings ruined peasant life at its most basic level,according to Mirsky. Villagers wereunable to secure enough food to go onliving, because they were deprived bythe commune system of their traditionalmeans of being able to rent, sell, or use

their land as collateral for loans.[1] Inone village, once the commune wasoperational the Party boss and his

colleagues "swung into manic action,herding villagers into the fields to sleepand to work intolerable hours, and

forcing them to walk, starving, to distant additional projects."[1]

Edward Friedman, a political scientist at the University of Wisconsin, Paul Pickowicz, a historian at theUniversity of California, San Diego, and Mark Selden, a sociologist at Binghamton University, wrote abouthe dynamic of interaction between the Party and villagers:

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Beyond attack, beyond question, was the systemic and structured dynamic of the socialist state

that intimidated and impoverished millions of patriotic and loyal villagers.[27]

The authors present a similar picture to Thaxton in depicting the Communist Party's destruction of thetraditions of Chinese villagers. Traditionally prized local customs were deemed signs of "feudalism" to beextinguished, according to Mirsky. "Among them were funerals, weddings, local markets, and festivals. Th

Party thus destroyed "much that gave meaning to Chinese lives. These private bonds were social glue. Tomourn and to celebrate is to be human. To share joy, grief, and pain is humanizing."[28] Failure to

participate in the CPC's political campaigns—though the aims of such campaigns were often conflicting

—"could result in detention, torture, death, and the suffering of entire families."[28]

Public criticism sessions were often used to intimidate the peasants into obeying local cadres; theyincreased the death rate of the famine in several ways, according to Thaxton. "In the first case, blows to th

body caused internal injuries that, in combination with physical emaciation and acute hunger, could inducedeath." In one case, after a peasant stole two cabbages from the common fields, the thief was publicly

criticized for half a day. He collapsed, fell ill, and never recovered. Others were sent to labor camps.

[29]

Frank Dikötter writes that beatings with sticks was the most common method used by local cadres androughly half of all cadres regularly pummeled or caned people. Other cadres devised harsher means tohumiliate and torture those who failed to keep up. As mass starvation set in, ever greater violence had to binflicted in order to coerce malnourished people to labor in the fields. Victims were buried alive, thrown

bound into ponds, stripped naked and forced to labor in the middle of winter, doused in boiling water,forced to ingest excrement and urine, and subjected to mutilation (hair ripped out, noses and ears loppedoff). In Guangdong, some cadres injected salt water into their victims with needles normally reserved for

cattle.[30] Around 6 to 8 percent of those who died during the Great Leap Forward were tortured to death or

summarily killed.[31]

Benjamin Valentino notes that "communist officials sometimes tortured and killed those accused of failing

to meet their grain quota."[32]

However, J. G. Mahoney, Professor of Liberal Studies and East Asian Studies at Grand Valley StateUniversity, has said that "there is too much diversity and dynamism in the country for one work to capture... rural China as if it were one place." Mahoney describes an elderly man in rural Shanxi who recalls Maofondly, saying "Before Mao we sometimes ate leaves, after liberation we did not." Regardless, Mahoney

points out that Da Fo villagers recall the Great Leap as a period of famine and death, and among those who

survived in Da Fo were precisely those who could digest leaves.[33]

Lushan Conference

The initial impact of the Great Leap Forward was discussed at the Lushan Conference in July/August 1959Although many of the more moderate leaders had reservations about the new policy, the only senior leaderto speak out openly was Marshal Peng Dehuai. Mao responded to Peng's criticism of the Great Leap bydismissing Peng from his post as Defence Minister, denouncing Peng (who came from a poor peasant

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China's birth and death rate.

family) and his supporters as "bourgeois," and launching a nationwide campaign against "rightistopportunism." Peng was replaced by Lin Biao, who began a systematic purge of Peng's supporters from thmilitary.

Consequences

The failure of agricultural

policies, the movement of farmers from agricultural toindustrial work, and weather conditions led to millions of deaths from severe famine.Many also died from quota-

based executions instituted bygovernment officials. Theeconomy, which had improvedsince the end of the civil war,

was devastated. In response tothe severe conditions, there wasresistance among the populace.

The effects on the upper levelsof government in response to thedisaster were complex, with Mao purging the Minister of National Defense Peng Dehuai in 1959, thetemporary promotion of Lin Biao, Liu Shaoqi, and Deng Xiaoping, and Mao losing some power and

prestige following the Great Leap Forward, which led him to launch the Cultural Revolution in 1966.

Famine

Despite the harmful agricultural innovations, the weather in 1958 was very favorable and the harvest promised to be good. Unfortunately, the amount of labour diverted to steel production and construction projects meant that much of the harvest was left to rot uncollected in some areas. This problem wasexacerbated by a devastating locust swarm, which was caused when their natural predators were killed as

part of the Great Sparrow Campaign.

Although actual harvests were reduced, local officials, under tremendous pressure from central authoritiesto report record harvests in response to the innovations, competed with each other to announce increasingly

exaggerated results. These were used as a basis for determining the amount of grain to be taken by the Statto supply the towns and cities, and to export. This left barely enough for the peasants, and in some areas,starvation set in. A 1959 drought and flooding from the Yellow River in the same year also contributed tofamine.

During 1958–1960 China continued to be a substantial net exporter of grain, despite the widespread faminexperienced in the countryside, as Mao sought to maintain face and convince the outside world of thesuccess of his plans. Foreign aid was refused. When the Japanese foreign minister told his Chinesecounterpart Chen Yi of an offer of 100,000 tonnes of wheat to be shipped out of public view, he was

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The Eurasian tree sparrow was the most notabletarget of the Four Pests Campaign.

rebuffed. John F. Kennedy was also aware that theChinese were exporting food to Africa and Cuba duringthe famine and said "we've had no indication from theChinese Communists that they would welcome any

offer of food."[34]

With dramatically reduced yields, even urban areassuffered much reduced rations; however, massstarvation was largely confined to the countryside,where, as a result of drastically inflated productionstatistics, very little grain was left for the peasants toeat. Food shortages were bad throughout the country;however, the provinces which had adopted Mao'sreforms with the most vigor, such as Anhui, Gansu andHenan, tended to suffer disproportionately. Sichuan,one of China's most populous provinces, known inChina as "Heaven's Granary" because of its fertility, isthought to have suffered the greatest absolute numbers of deaths from starvation due to the vigor withwhich provincial leader Li Jinquan undertook Mao's reforms. During the Great Leap Forward, cases of cannibalism also occurred in the parts of China that were severely affected by famine. [35][36]

The agricultural policies of the Great Leap Forward and the associated famine continued until January1961, when, at the Ninth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee, the restoration of agricultural

production through a reversal of the Great Leap policies was started. Grain exports were stopped, andimports from Canada and Australia helped to reduce the impact of the food shortages, at least in the coastacities.

Famine deaths

The exact number of famine deaths is difficult to determine, and estimates range from 18 [4] to upwards of

42 million people.[5] Because of the uncertainties involved in estimating famine deaths caused by the GreaLeap Forward or any famine, it is difficult to compare the severity of different famines. However, if a midestimate of 30 million deaths is accepted, the Great Leap Forward was the deadliest famine in the history o

China and in the history of the world.[39][47] This was in part due to China’s large population; in the Great

Irish Famine, approximately 1 million[48] of a population of 8 million people died, or 12.5%. In the GreatChinese Famine approximately 30 million of a population of 600 million people died, or 5%.

The Great Leap Forward reversed the downward trend in mortality that had occurred since 1950,[38] thoug

even during the Leap, mortality may not have reached pre-1949 levels.[49] Famine deaths and the reduction

in number of births caused the population of China to drop in 1960 and 1961.[50] This was only the third

time in 600 years that the population of China had decreased. [51] After the Great Leap Forward, mortality

rates decreased to below pre-Leap levels and the downward trend begun in 1950 continued.[38]

The severity of the famine varied from region to region. By correlating the increase in death rates of different provinces, Peng Xizhe found that Gansu, Sichuan, Guizhou, Hunan, Guangxi, and Anhui were thworst-hit regions, while Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tianjin, and Shanghai had the lowest

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Great Leap Forward famine deathestimates

Deaths(millions)

Author(s) Year

23 Peng[37] 1987

27 Coale[38] 1984

30 Ashton, et al. [39] 1984

30 Banister [40] 1987

30 Becker [41] 1996

32.5 Cao[42] 2005

36 Yang[43] 2008

38 Chang and Halliday[44] 2005

38 Rummel[45] 2008

42 minimum Dikötter [5] 2010

43 to 46 Chen[46] 1980

increase in death rate during the Great Leap Forward

(there was no data for Tibet).[52] Peng also noted that theincrease in death rate in urban areas was about half the

increase in rural areas.[52] Fuyang, a region in Anhui witha population of 8 million in 1958, had a death rate that

rivaled Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge;[53] more than

2.4 million people perished there over three years.[54] In

Gao Village in Jiangxi Province there was a famine, butno one actually died of starvation.[55]

Methods of estimating the death toll and sources of error

The number of famine deaths during Great Leap Forwardhas been estimated by different methods. Banister, Coale,and Ashton et al. compare age cohorts from the 1953,1964, and 1982 censuses, yearly birth and death records,

and results of the 1982 1:1000 fertility survey. Fromthese they calculate excess deaths above a death rateinterpolated between pre- and post-Leap death rates. Allinvolve corrections for perceived errors inherent in the

different data sets.[56][57][58] Peng uses reported deathsfrom the vital statistics of 14 provinces, adjusts 10% for under reporting, and expands the result to cover alof China assuming similar mortality rates in the other provinces. He uses 1956/57 death rates as the

baseline death rate rather than an interpolation between pre- and post-GLF death rates.[59]

Cao uses information from "local annals" to determine for each locality the expected population increase

from normal births and deaths, the population increase due to migration, and the loss of population betwee1958 and 1961. He then adds the three figures to determine the number of excess deaths during the period

1959–1961.[60] Chang and Halliday use death rates determined by "Chinese demographers" for the years1957–1963, subtract the average of the pre-and post-Leap death rates (1957, 1962, and 1963) from thedeath rates of each of the years 1958–1961, and multiply each yearly excess death rate by the year's

population to determine excess deaths.[61]

Chen was part of a large investigation by the System Reform Institute think tank (Tigaisuo) which "visited

every province and examined internal Party documents and records."[62]

Becker, Rummel, Dikötter, and Yang each compare several earlier estimates. Becker considers Banister'sestimate of 30 million excess deaths to be "the most reliable estimate we have".[41] Rummel initially took

Coale's 27 million as a "most likely figure",[63] then accepted the later estimate of 38 million by Chang and

Halliday after it was published.[64] Dikötter judged Chen's estimate of 43 to 46 million to be "in all

likelihood a reliable estimate."[65] Yang takes Cao's, Wang Weizhi's, and Jin Hui's estimates ranging from32.5 to 35 million excess deaths for the period 1959–1961, adds his own estimates for 1958 (0.42 million)and 1962 (2.23 million) "based on official figures reported by the provinces" to get 35 to 37 million, and

chooses 36 million as a number that "approaches the reality but is still too low." [43]

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Estimates contain several sources of error. National census data was not accurate and even the total

population of China at the time was not known to within 50 million to 100 million people.[66] The statistic

reporting system had been taken over by party cadre from statisticians in 1957,[67] making politicalconsiderations more important than accuracy and resulting in a complete breakdown in the statistical

reporting system.[67][68][69][70][71] Population figures were routinely inflated at the local level, often in orde

to obtain increased rations of goods.[65] During the Cultural Revolution, a great deal of the material in the

State Statistical Bureau was burned.[67]

Under-reporting of deaths was also a problem. The death registration system, which was inadequate before

the famine,[72] was completely overwhelmed by the large number of deaths during the famine.[72][73][74] Inaddition, many deaths went unreported so that family members of the deceased could continue to draw thedeceased's food ration. Counting the number of children who both were born and died between the 1953

and 1964 censuses is problematic.[73] However, Ashton, et al. believe that because the reported number of

births during the GLF seems accurate, the reported number of deaths should be accurate as well.[75]

Massive internal migration made both population counts and registering deaths problematic,[73] though

Yang believes the degree of unofficial internal migration was small[76] and Cao's estimate takes internal

migration into account.[60]

Coale's, Banister's, Ashton et al. 's, and Peng's figures all include adjustments for demographic reportingerrors, though Dikötter believes that their results, as well as Chang and Halliday's, Yang's, and Cao's, are

still underestimates.[77] The System Reform Institute's (Chen's) estimate has not been published and

therefore it cannot be verified.[60]

Causes of the famine and responsibility

The policies of the Great Leap Forward, the failure of the government to respond quickly and effectively tofamine conditions, as well as Mao's insistence on maintaining high grain export quotas in the face of clear evidence of poor crop output were responsible for the famine. There is disagreement over how much, if atall, weather conditions contributed to the famine. Also there is considerable evidence the famine wasintentional or due to willful negligence.

Yang Jisheng, a long-time communist party member and a reporter for the official Chinese news agency

Xinhua, puts the blame squarely on Maoist policies and the political system of totalitarianism, [36] such asdiverting agricultural workers to steel production instead of growing crops, and exporting grain at the same

time.[78][79] During the course of his research, Yang uncovered that some 22 million tons of grain was held

in public granaries at the height of the famine, reports of the starvation went up the bureaucracy only to beignored by top officials, and the authorities ordered that statistics be destroyed in regions where population

decline became evident.[80]

Economist Steven Rosefielde argues that Yang's account "shows that Mao's slaughter was caused inconsiderable part by terror-starvation; that is, voluntary manslaughter (and perhaps murder) rather than

innocuous famine."[81] Yang notes that local party officials were indifferent to the large number of peopledying around them, as their primary concern was the delivery of grain, which Mao wanted to use to pay

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back debts to the USSR totaling 1.973 billion yuan. In Xinyang, people died of starvation at the doors of

grain warehouses.[82] Mao refused to open the state granaries as he dismissed reports of food shortages and

accused the peasants of hiding grain.[83]

From his research into records and talks with experts at the meteorological bureau, Yang concludes that the

weather during the Great Leap Forward was not unusual compared to other periods and was not a factor.[84

Yang also believes that the Sino-Soviet split was not a factor because it did not happen until 1960, when th

famine was well under way.[84]

Chang and Halliday argue that "Mao had actually allowed for many more deaths. Although slaughter wasnot his purpose with the Leap, he was more than ready for myriad deaths to result, and had hinted to his to

echelon that they should not be too shocked if they happened."[85] Democide historian R.J. Rummel had

originally classified the famine deaths as unintentional.[86] In light of evidence provided in Chang andHalliday’s book, he now believes that the mass dyings associated with Great Leap Forward constitute

democide (murder).[87]

According to Frank Dikötter, Mao and the Communist Party knew that some of their policies were

contributing to the starvation.[88] Foreign minister Chen Yi said of some of the early human losses in

November 1958:[89]

"Casualties have indeed appeared among workers, but it is not enough to stop us in our tracks.This is the price we have to pay, it's nothing to be afraid of. Who knows how many people have

been sacrificed on the battlefields and in the prisons [for the revolutionary cause]? Now wehave a few cases of illness and death: it's nothing!"

During a secret meeting in Shanghai in 1959, Mao demanded the state procurement of one-third of all grainto feed the cities and satisfy foreign clients, and noted that "If you don't go above a third, people won't

rebel." He also stated at the same meeting:[90]

"When there is not enough to eat people starve to death. It is better to let half of the people dieso that the other half can eat their fill."

Benjamin Valentino writes that like in the USSR during the famine of 1932–33, peasants were confined to

their starving villages by a system of household registration,[91]

and the worst effects of the famine weredirected against enemies of the regime.[32] Those labeled as "black elements" (religious leaders, rightists,rich peasants, etc.) in any previous campaign were given the lowest priority in the allocation of food, and

therefore died in the greatest numbers.[32] According to genocide scholar Adam Jones, "no group suffered

more than the Tibetans", with perhaps one in five dying from 1959 to 1962.[92]

Ashton, et al. write that policies leading to food shortages, natural disasters, and a slow response to initial

indications of food shortages were to blame for the famine.[93] Policies leading to food shortages includedthe implementation of the commune system and an emphasis on non-agricultural activities such as backyar

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steel production.[93] Natural disasters included drought, flood, typhoon, plant disease, and insect pest.[94]

The slow response was in part due to a lack of objective reporting on the agricultural situation,[95] includin

a "nearly complete breakdown in the agricultural reporting system".[69]

This was partly caused by strong incentives for officials to over report crop yields.[96] The unwillingness othe Central Government to seek international aid was a major factor; China's net grain exports in 1959 and

1960 would have been enough to feed 16 million people 2000 calories per day. [94] Ashton, et al. conclude

that "It would not be inaccurate to say that 30 million people died prematurely as a result of errors of internal policy and flawed international relations."[95]

Mobo Gao suggested that the Great Leap Forward’s terrible effects came not from malign intent on the parof the Chinese leadership at the time, but instead relate to the structural nature of its rule, and the vastnessof China as a country. Gao says "the terrible lesson learnt is that China is so huge and when it is uniformly

ruled, follies or wrong policies will have grave implications of tremendous magnitude".[55]

The PRC government's official web portal places the responsibility for the "serious losses" to "country and people" of 1959–1961 (without mentioning famine) mainly on the Great Leap Forward and the anti-rightis

struggle, and lists weather and cancellation of contracts by the Soviet Union as contributing factors. [97]

Deaths by violence

Not all deaths during the Great Leap were from starvation. Frank Dikötter estimates that at least 2.5 millio

people were beaten or tortured to death and 1 to 3 million committed suicide.[98] He provides someillustrative examples. In Xinyang, where over a million died in 1960, 6-7 percent (around 67,000) of thesewere beaten to death by the militias. In Daoxian county, 10 percent of those who died had been "buriedalive, clubbed to death or otherwise killed by party members and their militia." In Shimen county, around

13,500 died in 1960, of these 12% were "beaten or driven to their deaths." [99] In accounts documented byYang Jisheng,[36][43] people were beaten or killed for reporting the real harvest numbers, for soundingalarm, for refusing to hand over what little food they had left, for trying to flee the famine area, for begginfood or as little as stealing scraps or angering officials.

Impact on economy

During the Great Leap, the Chinese economy initially grew. Iron production increased 45% in 1958 and acombined 30% over the next two years, but plummeted in 1961, and did not reach the previous 1958 leveluntil 1964.

The Great Leap also led to the greatest destruction of real estate in human history, outstripping any of the

bombing campaigns from World War II.[100] Approximately 30 to 40 per cent of all houses were turned to

rubble.[101] Frank Dikötter states that "homes were pulled down to make fertilizer, to build canteens, torelocate villagers, to straighten roads, to make place for a better future beckoning ahead or simply to punish

their owners.”[100]

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In agrarian policy, the failures of food supply during the Great Leap were met by a gradual de-collectivization in the 1960s that foreshadowed further de-collectivization under Deng Xiaoping. Politicalscientist Meredith Jung-En Woo argues: "Unquestionably the regime failed to respond in time to save thelives of millions of peasants, but when it did respond, it ultimately transformed the livelihoods of severalhundred million peasants (modestly in the early 1960s, but permanently after Deng Xiaoping's reforms

subsequent to 1978.)"[102]

Despite the risks to their careers, some Communist Party members openly laid blame for the disaster at thefeet of the Party leadership and took it as proof that China must rely more on education, acquiring technicaexpertise and applying bourgeois methods in developing the economy. Liu Shaoqi made a speech in 1962 Seven Thousand Cadres Conference criticizing that "The economic disaster was 30% fault of nature, 70%

human error."[103]

Modes of resistance

There were various forms of resistance to the Great Leap Forward. Several provinces saw armed

rebellion,[104][105] though these rebellions never posed a serious threat to the Central Government.[104]

Rebellions are documented to have occurred in Henan, Shandong, Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, Fujian, andYunnan provinces and in the Tibetan Autonomous Region.[106][107] In Honan, Shandong, Qinghai, Gansu,

and Sichuan, these rebellions lasted more than a year.[107] Aside from rebellions, there was also occasional

violence against cadre members.[105][108] Raids on granaries,[105][108] arson and other vandalism, train

robberies, and raids on neighboring villages and counties were common.[108]

According to over 20 years of research by Ralph Thaxton, professor of politics at Brandeis University,villagers turned against the CPC during and after the Great Leap, seeing it as autocratic, brutal, corrupt, an

mean-spirited.[1] The CPC's policies, which included plunder, forced labor, and starvation, according to

Thaxton, led villagers "to think about their relationship with the Communist Party in ways that do not bodewell for the continuity of socialist rule."[1]

Often, villagers composed doggerel to show their defiance to the regime, and "perhaps, to remain sane."During the Great Leap, one jingle ran: "Flatter shamelessly—eat delicacies.... Don't flatter—starve to death

for sure."[28]

Impact on the government

Many local officials were tried and publicly executed for giving out misinformation.[109]

Mao stepped down as State Chairman of the PRC in 1959, though he did retain his position as Chairman ofthe CCP. Liu Shaoqi (the new PRC Chairman) and reformist Deng Xiaoping (CPC General Secretary) werleft in charge to change policy to bring about economic recovery. Mao's Great Leap Forward policy cameunder open criticism at the Lushan party conference. The attack was led by Minister of National DefensePeng Dehuai, who, initially troubled by the potentially adverse effect of the Great Leap Forward on themodernization of the armed forces, also admonished unnamed party members for trying to "jump intocommunism in one step." After the Lushan showdown, Mao defensively replaced Peng with Lin Biao.

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However, by 1962, it was clear that the general orientation of the party had changed to become more openlcritical of the extremist ideology that led to the Great Leap Forward. Throughout 1962, the party held anumber of party conferences and rehabilitated the majority of the deposed comrades who had criticizedMao in the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward. The event was again discussed, with much self-criticism,with the contemporary government calling it a "serious [loss] to our country and people" and blaming thecult of personality of Mao.

In particular, at the Seven Thousand Cadres Conference in January - February 1962, Mao made a self-

criticism and re-affirmed his commitment to democratic centralism. In the years that followed, Mao mostlyabstained from the operations of government, making policy largely the domain of Liu Shaoqi and DengXiaoping. Maoist ideology consequently took a back seat in the Communist Party, and only regained itsfoothold after Mao launched the Cultural Revolution in 1966, which marked Mao's political comeback.

See also

Ryazan miracleThe Black Book of Communism

Virgin Lands Campaign, contemporary program in the Soviet Union

References

1. Mirsky, Jonathan. "The China We Don't Know (http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/feb/26/the-chinawe-dont-know/)." New York Review of Books Volume 56, Number 3. February 26, 2009.

2. Perkins, Dwight (1991). "China's Economic Policy and Performance" (https://books.google.com/books?id=WpS3nInK6aAC&pg=PA483&dq=degree+of+disruption+in+the+Great+Leap&hl=en&ei=5SiaTPefEYKclgf

jPWBAQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCsQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=degree%20of%0disruption%20in%20the%20Great%20Leap&f=false). Chapter 6 in The Cambridge History of China, volume15, ed. by Roderick MacFarquhar, John K. Fairbank and Denis Twitchett. Cambridge University Press.

3. Tao Yang, Dennis (2008). "China's Agricultural Crisis and Famine of 1959–1961: A Survey and Comparison toSoviet Famines." (http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ces/journal/v50/n1/full/ces20084a.html) PalgraveMacMillan, Comparative Economic Studies 50, pp. 1–29.

4. Gráda, Cormac Ó (2011). "Great Leap into Famine". UCD Centre For Economic Research Working Paper Serie9.

5. Dikötter, Frank. Mao's Great Famine: The History of China's Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958-62. Walker &Company, 2010. p. xii ("at least 45 million people died unnecessarily") p.xiii ("6 to 8 per cent of the victims wetortured to death or summarily killed - amounting to at least 2.5 million people.") p.333 ("a minimum of 45million excess deaths"). ISBN 0-8027-7768-6.

6. Dikötter, Frank (2010). pp. x, xi. ISBN 0-8027-7768-67. Perkins (1991). Pages 483-486 for quoted text, page 493 for growth rates table.

8. [1] (http://monthlyreview.org/commentary/did-mao-really-kill-millions-in-the-great-leap-forward/)9. Chang, Jung and Halliday, Jon (2005). Mao: The Unknown Story, Knopf. p. 435. ISBN 0-679-42271-4.

10. Nikita Khrushchev赫鲁晓夫 (1970). Khrushchev's Memoirs [赫鲁晓夫回忆录]. Little Brown & company. pp. 250–257. ISBN 0316831409.

11. Li, Kwok-sing (1995). A glossary of political terms of the People's Republic of China. Hong Kong: The ChinesUniversity of Hong Kong. Translated by Mary Lok. Pages 47–48.

12. Chan, Alfred L. (2001). Mao's crusade: politics and policy implementation in China's great leap forward .Studies on contemporary China. Oxford University Press. p. 13. ISBN 978-0-19-924406-5. Retrieved 2011-10-2.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-19-924406-5https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Numberhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oxford_University_Presshttps://books.google.com/books?id=9pPxwn6EvR4C&pg=PA13https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0316831409https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Numberhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nikita_Khrushchevhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0679422714https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfred_A._Knopfhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mao:_The_Unknown_Storyhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jon_Hallidayhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jung_Changhttp://monthlyreview.org/commentary/did-mao-really-kill-millions-in-the-great-leap-forward/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0802777686https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0802777686https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palgrave_MacMillanhttp://www.palgrave-journals.com/ces/journal/v50/n1/full/ces20084a.htmlhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cambridge_University_Presshttps://books.google.com/books?id=WpS3nInK6aAC&pg=PA483&dq=degree+of+disruption+in+the+Great+Leap&hl=en&ei=5SiaTPefEYKclgfmjPWBAQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCsQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=degree%20of%20disruption%20in%20the%20Great%20Leap&f=falsehttp://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/feb/26/the-china-we-dont-know/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_Unionhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virgin_Lands_Campaignhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Black_Book_of_Communismhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ryazan_miraclehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cultural_Revolutionhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_centralismhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-criticismhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cult_of_personalityhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-criticism


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13. Lieberthal, Kenneth (1987). "The Great Leap Forward and the split in the Yenan leadership". The People's Republic, Part 1: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1949–1965. The Cambridge History of China. 14, pt1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 301. ISBN 978-0-521-24336-0. Retrieved 2012-03-14. "Thus, th[1957] Anti-Rightist Campaign in both urban and rural areas bolstered the position of those who believed that

proper mobilization of the populace could accomplish tasks that the 'bourgeois experts' dismissed as impossible14. Lieberthal (1987). p.304.15. Thaxton, Ralph A. Jr (2008). Catastrophe and Contention in Rural China: Mao's Great Leap Forward Famine

and the Origins of Righteous Resistance in Da Fo Village (https://books.google.com/books?

id=14A1qPQOgQMC&source=gbs_navlinks_s). Cambridge University Press. p.3. ISBN 0-521-72230-6.16. Alfred L. Chan (7 June 2001). Mao's Crusade : Politics and Policy Implementation in China's Great Leap

Forward . Oxford University Press. pp. 71–74. ISBN 978-0-19-155401-8.17. Lardy, R. Nicholas; Fairbank, K. John (1987). "The Chinese economy under stress, 1958–1965". In Roderick

MacFarquhar (ed.). The People's Republic, Part 1: The Emergence of Revolutionary China 1949–1965.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 367. ISBN 978-0-521-24336-0.

18. Lardy and Fairbank (1987). p.368.19. Lardy and Fairbank (1987). pp.386–87.20. Li Zhi-Sui (22 June 2011). The Private Life of Chairman Mao. Random House Publishing Group. pp. 272–274,

278. ISBN 978-0-307-79139-9.21. Dikötter, Frank (2010). p.33.22. Weiqing, Jiang (1996). Qishi nian zhengcheng: Jiang Weiqing huiyilu. (A seventy-year journey: The memoirs o

Jiang Weiqing) Jiangsu renmin chubanshe. p.421. ISBN 7-214-01757-1 is the source of Dikötter's quote. Mao,who had been continually interrupting, was speaking here in praise of Jiang Weiqing's plan (which called for moving 300 million cubic meters). Weiqing states that the others' plans were "exaggerations," though Mao woulgo to criticize those cadres with objections to high targets at the National Congress in May (see p.422).

23. MacFarquhar, Roderick (1983). The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, Vol. 2 Columbia University Press. p.15ISBN 0-231-05717-2.

24. Dikötter (2010). p.39.25. Hinton, William (1984). Shenfan: The Continuing Revolution in a Chinese Village. New York: Vintage Books.

pp. 236–245. ISBN 0-394-72378-3.26. Hinton 1984, pp. 234–240, 247-24927. Friedman, Edward; Pickowicz, Paul G.; and Selden, Mark (2006). Revolution, Resistance, and Reform in Villag

China. Yale University Press.28. Mirsky, Jonathan. "China: The Shame of the Villages

(http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2006/may/11/china-the-shame-of-the-villages/)," The New York Review of Books, Volume 53, Number 8 · May 11, 2006

29. Thaxton 2008, p. 21230. Dikötter (2010). pp.294-296.31. Jasper Becker. Systematic genocide (http://www.spectator.co.uk/books/6296363/part_2/systematic-

genocide-.thtml). The Spectator, September 25, 2010.32. Valentino (2004). p. 128.33. Mahoney, Josef Gregory (2009). SpringerLink - Journal of Chinese Political Science, Volume 14, Number 3,

pp.319-320. (http://www.springerlink.com/content/b86930487m358224/) Mahoney reviews Thaxton (2008).

34. Dikötter, Frank (1991). pp.114-115.35. Bernstein, Richard. Horror of a Hidden Chinese Famine (http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A0CE3D71E3DF936A35751C0A961958260). New York Times February 05, 1997. Bernstein reviewsHungry Ghosts by Jasper Becker.

36. Branigan, Tania (1 January 2013). "China's Great Famine: the true story". The Guardian. Retrieved 15 February2016.

37. Peng Xizhe (1987). Demographic Consequences of the Great Leap Forward in China's Provinces. Population anDevelopment Review Vol.13 No.4 (Dec. 1987). pp.648-649.

38. Coale, J. Ansley (1984). Rapid Population Change in China, 1952–1982. National Academy Press. WashingtonD.C. p.7. Coale estimates 27 million deaths: 16 million from direct interpretation of official Chinese vitalstatistics followed by an adjustment to 27 million to account for undercounting.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ansley_J._Coalehttp://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/01/china-great-famine-book-tombstonehttp://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A0CE3D71E3DF936A35751C0A961958260http://www.springerlink.com/content/b86930487m358224/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Spectatorhttp://www.spectator.co.uk/books/6296363/part_2/systematic-genocide-.thtmlhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jasper_Beckerhttp://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2006/may/11/china-the-shame-of-the-villages/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0-394-72378-3https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Numberhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vintage_Bookshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_H._Hintonhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0231057172https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/7214017571https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-307-79139-9https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Numberhttps://books.google.com/books?id=VyU6fwmdjf8C&pg=PA278https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-521-24336-0https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Numberhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-19-155401-8https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Numberhttps://books.google.com/books?id=9pPxwn6EvR4C&pg=PA69https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0521722306https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cambridge_University_Presshttps://books.google.com/books?id=14A1qPQOgQMC&source=gbs_navlinks_shttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-521-24336-0https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Numberhttp://histories.cambridge.org/extract?id=chol9780521243360_CHOL9780521243360A008


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39. Ashton, Hill, Piazza, and Zeitz (1984). Famine in China, 1958-61. Population and Development Review, Vol. 10 No. 4 (Dec., 1984). p.614.

40. Banister, Judith (1987). China's Changing Population. Stanford University Press. pp.85,118.41. Becker, Jasper (1998). Hungry Ghosts: Mao's Secret Famine. Holt Paperbacks. p.270,274. ISBN 0-8050-5668-42. Dikötter (2010) pp.324-325. Dikötter cites Cao Shuji (2005). Da Jihuang (1959–1961):nian de Zhongguo renkou

(The Great Famine:China's Population in 1959–1961). Hong Kong. Shidai guoji chuban youxian gongsi. p.28143. Yang Jisheng (2012). Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 1958-1962 (Kindle edition). Farrar, Straus and

Giroux. p.430. ISBN 9781466827790.44. Chang and Halliday (2005). Stuart Schram believes their estimate "may well be the most accurate." (Stuart

Schram, "Mao: The Unknown Story". The China Quarterly (189): 207. Retrieved on 2007-10-07.)45. Rummel, R.J. (2008-11-24). Reevaluating China’s Democide to 73,000,000

(http://democraticpeace.wordpress.com/2008/11/24/reevaluating-chinas-democide-to-73000000/). Retrieved12Feb13.

46. Becker (1996) pp.271-272. From an interview with Chen Yizi.47. Yang, Jisheng (2010) "The Fatal Politics of the PRC's Great Leap Famine: The Preface to Tombstone"

(http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10670564.2010.485408) Journal of Contemporary China. Vol.19Issue 66. pp.755-776. Retrieved 3 Sep 2011. Yang excerpts Sen, Amartya (1999). Democracy as a universal value. Journal of Democracy 10(3), , pp. 3–17 who calls it "the largest recorded famine in world history: nearly30 million people died".

48. Wright, John W. (gen ed) (1992). The Universal Almanac. The Banta Company. Harrisonburg, Va. P.411.

49. Li, Minqi (2009). The Rise of China and the Demise of the Capitalist World Economy. Monthly Review Press. p.41 ISBN 978-1-58367-182-5. Li compares official crude death rates for the years 1959 - 1962 (11.98, 14.59,25.43, and 14.24 per thousand, respectively) with the "nationwide crude death rate reported by the Nationalistgovernment for the years 1936 and 1938 (27.6 and 28.2 per thousand, respectively).

50. Ashton (1984) p.615, Banister (1987) p.42, both get their data from Statistical Yearbook of China 1983 publishe by the State Statistical Bureau.

51. Banister, Judith (1987). ‘’China’s Changing Population’’. Stanford University Press. Stanford. p.3.52. Peng (1987) pp.646-64853. Dikötter, Frank (2010-10-13).Mao's Great Famine (Complete) (http://asiasociety.org/video/countries-

history/maos-great-famine-complete). Asia Society. Lecture by Frank Dikötter (Video).54. Dikötter (2010). p.317.

55. Gao, Mobo (2007). Gao Village: Rural life in modern China. University of Hawaii Press. ISBN 978-08248319256. Banister (1987). P.118-120.57. Coale (1984) pp. 1, 7.58. Ashton, et al. (1984) pp. 613, 616–619.59. Peng (1987) pp. 645, 648–649. Peng used the pre-Leap death rate as a base line under the assumption that the

decrease after the Great Leap to below pre-Leap levels was caused by Darwinian selection during the massivedeaths of the famine. He writes that if this drop was instead a continuation of the decreasing mortality in the yea

prior to the Great Leap, his estimate would be an underestimate.60. Yang Jisheng (2012). Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 1958–1962 (Kindle edition). Farrar, Straus and

Giroux. p. 427. ISBN 9781466827790.61. Chang and Halliday (2005) p. 438

62. Becker (1996) pp. 271–272.63. Rummel (1991) p. 248.64. Reevaluated democide totals for 20th C. and China (http://www.ciolek.com/spec/rummel-on-democide-

2005.html) Rudy J. Rummel Retrieved 25 August 201465. Dikötter (2010) p. 333.66. Rummel (1991). p. 235.67. Banister (1987) p. 13.68. Peng (1987) p. 656.69. Ashton, et al. (1984) p. 630.70. Dikötter (2010) p. 132.71. Becker (1996) p. 267.

http://www.ciolek.com/spec/rummel-on-democide-2005.htmlhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/9781466827790https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/9780824831929https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Hawaii_Presshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asia_Societyhttp://asiasociety.org/video/countries-history/maos-great-famine-completehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/9781583671825https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monthly_Review_Presshttp://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10670564.2010.485408http://democraticpeace.wordpress.com/2008/11/24/reevaluating-chinas-democide-to-73000000/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stuart_Schramhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/9781466827790https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0805056688


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72. Banister (1987) p. 85.73. Becker (1996) pp. 268–269.74. Dikötter (2010) p. 327.75. Ashton et al. (1984) p. 617.76. Yang (2012) p. 430.77. Dikotter (2010) p. 324. (Dikötter does not mention Coale on this page).78. Yu, Verna (2008). "Chinese author of book on famine braves risks to inform new generations

(http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/18/world/asia/18iht-famine.1.18785257.html?pagewanted=all)." The New YorTimes, November 18, 2008. Yu writes about Tombstone and interviews author Yang Jisheng.

79. Applebaum, Anne (2008). "When China Starved (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/11/AR2008081102015.html)." The Washington Post , August 12, 2008. Applebaumwrites about Tombstone by Yang Jishen.

80. Link, Perry (2010). "China: From Famine to Oslo" (http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/jan/13/chinafamine-oslo/). The New York Review of Books, December 16, 2010.

81. Rosefielde, Steven (2009). Red Holocaust . Routledge. p. 114. ISBN 0-415-77757-7.82. O'Neill, Mark (2008). A hunger for the truth: A new book, banned on the mainland, is becoming the definitive

account of the Great Famine. (http://en.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=18328#) South China Morning Post , 2008-7-6. Archived(https://web.archive.org/web/20120210190821/http://en.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=18328#)February 10, 2012, at the Wayback Machine.

83. Becker, Jasper (1998). Hungry Ghosts: Mao's Secret Famine (https://books.google.com/books?id=iC4g0gXBmIkC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Hungry+Ghosts:+Mao%27s+Secret+Famine#v=onepage&q=&

=false). Holt Paperbacks. p.81. ISBN 0-8050-5668-8.84. Johnson, Ian (2010). Finding the Facts About Mao's Victims

(http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2010/dec/20/finding-facts-about-maos-victims/). The New York Reviewof Books (Blog), December 20, 2010. Retrieved 4 Sep 11. Johnson interviews Yang Jishen. (Provincial andcentral archives).

85. Chang ang Halliday (2005). p. 457.86. Rummel (1991). pp. 249–250.87. Rummel, R.J. (2005-11-30). "Getting My Reestimate Of Mao's Democide Out". Retrieved 2007-04-09.88. Dikötter, Frank. Mao’s Great Famine, Key Arguments (http://web.mac.com/dikotter/Dikotter/Famine_2.html).

89. Dikötter (2010). p. 70.90. Dikötter (2010). p. 88.91. Valentino, Benjamin A. (2004). Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Century

(https://books.google.com/books?

id=LQfeXVU_EvgC&pg=PA127&dq=soviet+union+mao+system+of+household+registration#v=onepage&q=

oviet%20union%20mao%20system%20of%20household%20registration&f=false). Cornell University Press. p.127. ISBN 0-8014-3965-5.

92. Jones, Adam (2010). Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction. Routledge, 2nd edition (August 1, 2010). p. 96.ISBN 0-415-48619-X.

93. Ashton, et al. (1984) p. 624, 625.94. Ashton, et al. (1984) p. 629.

95. Ashton, et al. (1984) p. 634.96. Ashton, et al. (1984) p. 626.97. Chinese Government's Official Web Portal (English). China: a country with 5,000-year-long civilization

(http://english.gov.cn/2005-08/06/content_20912.htm). retrieved 3 Sep 2011. "It was mainly due to the errors of the great leap forward and of the struggle against "Right opportunism" together with a succession of naturalcalamities and the perfidious scrapping of contracts by the Soviet Government that our economy encounteredserious difficulties between 1959 and 1961, which caused serious losses to our country and people."

98. Dikötter (2010). pp.298 & 304.99. Dikötter (2010). pp.294 & 297.

100. Dikötter (2010). pp. xi & xii.101. Dikötter (2010). p.169.

http://english.gov.cn/2005-08/06/content_20912.htmhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/041548619Xhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Routledgehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adam_Jones_(Canadian_scholar)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0801439655https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cornell_University_Presshttps://books.google.com/books?id=LQfeXVU_EvgC&pg=PA127&dq=soviet+union+mao+system+of+household+registration#v=onepage&q=soviet%20union%20mao%20system%20of%20household%20registration&f=falsehttp://web.mac.com/dikotter/Dikotter/Famine_2.htmlhttp://democraticpeace.wordpress.com/2008/11/24/getting-my-reestimate-of-maos-democide-out/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_New_York_Review_of_Bookshttp://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2010/dec/20/finding-facts-about-maos-victims/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0805056688https://books.google.com/books?id=iC4g0gXBmIkC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Hungry+Ghosts:+Mao%27s+Secret+Famine#v=onepage&q=&f=falsehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jasper_Beckerhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayback_Machinehttps://web.archive.org/web/20120210190821/http://en.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=18328#http://en.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=18328#https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0415777577https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Routledgehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steven_Rosefieldehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_New_York_Review_of_Bookshttp://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/jan/13/china-famine-oslo/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Washington_Posthttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/11/AR2008081102015.htmlhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anne_Applebaumhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_New_York_Timeshttp://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/18/world/asia/18iht-famine.1.18785257.html?pagewanted=all


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This article incorporates public domain text from the United States Library of Congress CountryStudies. – China (http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cntoc.html)

Bibliography and further reading

Ashton, Hill, Piazza, and Zeitz (1984). Famine in China, 1958-61. Population and Development Review, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Dec., 1984), pp. 613–645.Bachman, David (1991). Bureaucracy, Economy, and Leadership in China: The Institutional Originof the Great Leap Forward . New York: Cambridge University Press.[Bao] Sansan and Bette Bao Lord (1964), Eighth Moon: The True Story of a Young Girl's Life inCommunist China, New York: Harper & Row.Becker, Jasper (1998). Hungry Ghosts: Mao's Secret Famine (https://books.google.com/books?

id=iC4g0gXBmIkC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Hungry+Ghosts:+Mao%27s+Secret+Famine#v=on page&q=&f=false). Holt Paperbacks. ISBN 0-8050-5668-8Jung Chang and Jon Halliday. (2005) Mao: The Unknown Story, Knopf. ISBN 0-679-42271-4Dikötter, Frank (2010). Mao's Great Famine: The History of China's Most Devastating Catastrophe1958-62. Walker & Company. ISBN 0-8027-7768-6Li, Wei; Tao Yang, Dennis (2005). "The Great Leap Forward: Anatomy of a Central PlanningDisaster". Journal of Political Economy 113 (4): 840–877. doi:10.1086/430804.Li, Zhisui (1996). The Private Life of Chairman Mao. Arrow Books Ltd.Macfarquhar, Roderick (1983). Origins of the Cultural Revolution: Vol 2. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.Short, Philip (2001). Mao: A Life (https://books.google.com/books?id=HQwoTtJ43_AC&dq=mao+a+life&ei=EU6QScfyKYK2kwT0zqg2). Owl Books. ISBN 0-8050-6638-1Tao Yang, Dennis. (2008) "China's Agricultural Crisis and Famine of 1959–1961: A Survey andComparison to Soviet Famines." (http://www.palgrave-

journals.com/ces/journal/v50/n1/full/ces20084a.html) Palgrave MacMillan, Comparative EconomicStudies 50, pp. 1–29.Thaxton. Ralph A. Jr (2008). Catastrophe and Contention in Rural China: Mao's Great Leap

Forward Famine and the Origins of Righteous Resistance in Da Fo Village(https://books.google.com/books?id=14A1qPQOgQMC&source=gbs_navlinks_s). CambridgeUniversity Press. ISBN 0-521-72230-6

102. Woo-Cummings, Meredith (http://www.lsa.umich.edu/orgstudies/people_detail.asp?id=422) (2002). The Politica Ecology of Famine: The North Korean Catastrophe and Its Lessons

(http://www.adbi.org/files/2002.01.rp31.ecology.famine.northkorea.pdf) PDF (807 KB), , ADB Institute ResearchPaper 31, January 2002. URL Accessed 3 July 2006.

103. Twentieth Century China: Third Volume. Beijing, 1994. p.430.104. Dikötter (2010) p.226-228.105. Rummel (1991) p.247-251.106. Dikötter (2010) p.226-228 (Qinghai, Tibet, Yunnan).107. Rummel (1991) p.247-251 (Honan, Shantung, Qinghai (Chinghai), Gansu (Kansu), Szechuan (Schechuan),

Fujian), p.240 (TAR).108. Dikötter (2010) p.224-226.109. Friedman, Edward; Pickowicz, Paul G.; Selden, Mark; and Johnson, Kay Ann (1993). Chinese Village, Socialis

State. Yale University Press. p. 243. ISBN 0300054289/ As seen in Google Book Search(https://books.google.com/books?vid=ISBN0300054289&id=GN2cXHxg_6oC&pg=PA243&lpg=PA243&dq=wu+zhipu+henan+xinyang&sig=N8jvDEZe3NvS64YO0qa492A32k).

https://books.google.com/books?vid=ISBN0300054289&id=GN2cXHxg_6oC&pg=PA243&lpg=PA243&dq=wu+zhipu+henan+xinyang&sig=N8jpvDEZe3NvS64YO0qa492A32khttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0300054289http://www.adbi.org/files/2002.01.rp31.ecology.famine.northkorea.pdfhttp://www.lsa.umich.edu/orgstudies/people_detail.asp?id=422https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0521722306https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cambridge_University_Presshttps://books.google.com/books?id=14A1qPQOgQMC&source=gbs_navlinks_shttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palgrave_MacMillanhttp://www.palgrave-journals.com/ces/journal/v50/n1/full/ces20084a.htmlhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0805066381https://books.google.com/books?id=HQwoTtJ43_AC&dq=mao+a+life&ei=EU6QScfyKYK2kwT0zqg2https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philip_Shorthttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Private_Life_of_Chairman_Maohttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Li_Zhisuihttps://dx.doi.org/10.1086%2F430804https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_object_identifierhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0802777686https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0679422714https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfred_A._Knopfhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mao:_The_Unknown_Storyhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jon_Hallidayhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jung_Changhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0805056688https://books.google.com/books?id=iC4g0gXBmIkC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Hungry+Ghosts:+Mao%27s+Secret+Famine#v=onepage&q=&f=falsehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jasper_Beckerhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_People%27s_Republic_of_Chinahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bette_Bao_Lordhttp://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cntoc.htmlhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_of_Congress_Country_Studieshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_domain


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Wikimedia Commons hasmedia related to Great LeapForward .

Wertheim, Wim F (1995). Third World whence and whither? Protective State versus Aggressive Market. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis. 211 pp. ISBN 90-5589-082-0E. L Wheelwright, Bruce McFarlane, and Joan Robinson (Foreword), The Chinese Road toSocialism: Economics of the Cultural Revolution.Yang, Dali (1996). Calamity and Reform in China: State, Rural Society, and Institutional Change

since the Great Leap Famine. Stanford University Press.Yang, Jisheng (2008). Tombstone (Mu Bei - Zhong Guo Liu Shi Nian Dai Da Ji Huang Ji Shi).Cosmos Books (Tian Di Tu Shu), Hong Kong.

Yang, Jisheng (2010). "The Fatal Politics of the PRC's Great Leap Famine: The Preface toTombstone". Journal of Contemporary China 19 (66): 755–776. doi:10.1080/10670564.2010.48540Gao. Mobo (2007). Gao Village: Rural life in modern China. University of Hawaii Press. ISBN 9780-8248-3192-9Gao. Mobo (2008). The Battle for China's Past . Pluto Press. ISBN 978-0-7453-2780-8Li. Minqi (2009). The Rise of China and the Demise of the Capitalist World Economy. MonthlyReview Press. ISBN 978-1-58367-182-5

External links

Ball, Joseph. Did Mao Really Kill Millions in the Great LeapForward? (http://monthlyreview.org/commentary/did-mao-really-kill-millions-in-the-great-leap-forward). Monthly

Review. September 21, 2006Chinese Government’s Official Web Portal (English). China: a country with 5,000-year-longcivilization (http://english.gov.cn/2005-08/06/content_20912.htm).Damiani, Matteo A tragic episode of cannibalism during the famine of the Great Leap Forward(http://www.china-underground.com/magazine/a-tragic-episode-of-cannibalism-during-the-famine-of-the-great-leap-forward-graphic-content). November 2012.Dikotter, Frank. Mao's Great Leap to Famine (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/16/opinion/16iht-eddikotter16.html?_r=3), New York Times. December 15, 2010.Johnson, Ian. Finding the Facts About Mao’s Victims(http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2010/dec/20/finding-facts-about-maos-victims/). The NewYork Review of Books (Blog), December 20, 2010.McGregor, Richard. The man who exposed Mao’s secret famine.(http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/6a148d26-7432-11df-87f5-00144feabdc0.html#axzz16P9rrOuy) TheFinancial Times. June 12, 2010.Meng, Qian, and Yared (2010) The Institutional Causes of China's Great Famine, 1959-1961(http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/pyared/papers/famines.pdf) (pdf).Wagner, Donald B. Background to the Great Leap Forward in Iron and Steel(http://donwagner.dk/MS-English/MS-English.html) University of Copenhagen. August 2011.

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