Gradualism in Saudi Arabian Reforms and the Role of Opposition

Gradualism in Saudi Arabian Reforms and the Role of

Opposition

Stanly Johny

In any of the Arab Gulf countries, we can’t see a

consolidated liberal democracy. Even in the larger West

Asia, most of the political systems, though some of them

have parliaments and elections, are authoritarian in nature

which do not respect the liberal political rights of

citizens. Saudi Arabia is not an exception. The Saudi

political system, legitimised by the strident version of

Wahhabi Islam, has, however, withstood several domestic and

regional challenges in the past. The country, named after

the ruling al-Saud family, has seen the rise of violent

Islamism, reformist movements, sectarian clashes, economic

breakdown etc over the last eight-and-a-half decades. The

regime has given in to both to the Islamists and the

reformists several times whenever its interests were at

stake. But it was not easy for the liberal ideas to take

root in a country where the traditional Wahhabi ideology and

practices were deep-rooted and institutionalised by the

state mechanisms. Therefore, process the evolution of the

liberal voice in Saudi Arabia, which played a major role in

the reform, was a very complicated process in the Kingdom.

The liberal’s first challenge was to develop a public

sphere, where they can engage in debates that were not

sponsored by the state. This public sphere has to play a

major role in the shaping of political system and social

order in any liberal society. In Saudi Arabia, this is still

in a nascent stage.

Legitimacy from Wahhabism

Though the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was founded only in 1932,

the al-Saud family has a long history of military and

political activity in the region. From their base in Najd,

the family made many efforts to expand its hegemony over the

Arabian Peninsula. Even as the puritanical Wahhabi movement

could capture many power centres in West Asia in 19th

century, the al-Saud continued to enjoy power in Riyadh till

the rival Rashidi family seized control with the Turkish

backing. However, the al-Saud, under the leadership of Abd

al-Aziz bin Abd al-Rahman al-Saud defeated the Rashidis and

regained the lost control of Riyadh in 1902. The 1902-1932

period saw Abd al-Aziz, who later known as Ibn Saud,

expanding his authority over adjacent provinces like al-Hasa

in the East, Asir in the South and Hijaz in the west. On 23

September 1932, both Riyadh and Hijaz were merged together

and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was formed.

Ever since the formation of the Kingdom, the al-Saud

family’s monopoly over power has not faced potential

challenges, though there were plenty of dissident voices.

Initially, Kind Abd al-Aziz used military power to silence

the local leaders who challenged his authority. The King

embraced the Wahhabi brand of Islam and the same became the

foundations of the country. The relationship between the

Wahhabi Islam and the Saudi state has been close and

supportive. As the al-Saud family drew legitimacy from

Wahhabism to rule the Kingdom and silence its opposition,

the puritanical ideology gained prominence across the

peninsula as the royal family built a state based on its

principles. Ever since, the ideas of the 18th century

religious cleric Ibn Abdal-Wahhab exerted a powerful hold

over the Saudi population and the Wahhabi clergy enjoyed

huge influence over the public affairs in the Kingdom. The

religious leaders have had a strong say in the shaping of

the society and they can directly involve in the educational

system, social conduct and several other issues. The regime

used several strategies like coercion, pressure and

inducement to dampen the internal challenges and win over

tribal leaders. The end result was a political system

founded on a narrowly defined social base that

institutionalised the Wahhabi ideology.

From 1932, the state had been ruled without a written

constitution, without an electoral system, and without any

political party, labour unions, parliament or any other

agencies that constitute the public sphere in liberal

societies. Any organisation outside the government control

was prohibited. This absolute monopoly over power in effect

did not let any dissident voice come out into the public for

over a long period. Though the founder King had promised a

Constitution and a Consultative Council in the initial days

of the unification of the country, that had never

materialised. Later the ruling class listed ideological and

religious reasons to legitimise the political system. The

government maintained that only Quran could be seen as the

Constitution. Similarly the absence of any legislative body

was explained by the argument that in Islam, Sharia was the

supreme law. In that context, the Ulama and the King issued

fatwas and Royal Decrees respectively from time to time,

supplementing the Sharia, to guide the government.1

The Rise of Liberal Voices

The 1940s was a crucial period in the history of the Kingdom

as major oil recoveries shot up the revenue of the state, a

development that helped the royal family centralise power

1 Dr.Rashed Aba-Namay (1998), “The New Saudi RepresentativeAssembly”, Islamic Law and Society, 5 (2), p 235

and amass wealth.2 The foundations of a welfare state had

also been laid during the same period, though the unequal

distribution of wealth at the initial stage and huge shares

kept aside for the royal family had increased the social

inequalities. Till the late 1950s, a major part of the oil

revenues was at the direct disposal of the King3. As the

royal family amassed huge wealth, the majority of the

population continued in poverty. This unequal distribution

of wealth, coupled with other socio-economic tensions,

created the conditions for an unsettled polity. Underground

movements like he National Reform Front and the Free Saudis

and the Free Officers came out in the public during this

period demanding reforms in the political system.4

The 1950s saw a major crisis evolving within the ruling

family with a power struggle between the second King, Saud,

and his younger brother Prince Feisel threatening the

political stability in the Kingdom. As Feisel grew as a

potential threat to his powers, King Saud aligned with the

liberal princes in the family and revived the talk of

2 Between 1938 and 1946, the annual government revenue had averaged$14-16 million. In 1948, it crossed $53 million. By 1950, it had passed$100 billion. See Harry St.John Bridger (1955), Saudi Arabia, London:Benn, p.355 3 The state budget for 1952-03 allocated almost one quarter of thetotal expenditure to an item called ‘Riyadh Affairs’. This was keptaside for the King’s personal treasury. See David Holden and RichardJonhs (1981), The House of Saud, London: Sidwick and Jackson, p:163 4 Alexander Bligh (1984), From Prince to King: Royal Succession in the House ofSaud, New York: New York University Press, p.62

democratic reforms. The regional developments like

establishments of the state of Israel, emergence of pan-

Arabism, calls for modernisation also had influence on the

royal family. The liberal lobby, known as ‘Free Princes’,

publicly demanded political reforms. Developments like the

formation of the United Arab Republic in 1958, the overthrow

of Hashimite Monarchy in Iraq in 1958 and the toppling of

Imam Yahya’s conservative regime in Yemen in 1962 sparked

debates that Saudi Arabia could not withstand the sweeping

changes taking place across the region. In 1960, there were

rumours that the King would introduce a nominated

parliament.5 In the same year, the Free Princes, led by

Prince Talal bin Abd-al Aziz, whose support the King

enjoyed, submitted a demand for a partially-elected body to

Prime Minister Feisel. However, their demand was turned

down. This triggered one of the worst power struggles within

the family that saw the Crown Prince resigning his prime

ministerial position, but only to return with more influence

later. Feisel’s resignation, however, did not help the

liberal lobby. After regaining powers, King Saud lost

interest to initiate reforms.

When Feisel resumed prime ministerial responsibilities in

1962, he announced a 10-point agenda, rekindling hopes among

the liberals. The Crown Prince said the government would

5 Ibid, p.66

promulgate a “fundamental law” that will “set down the basic

principles of the government” and also provide the “basic

rights of the citizens, including that of freedom of

expression within the limits of Islamic faith and public

policy”.6 Soon after he became the King in 1964, Feisel

constituted a committee compositing of several members of

the Council of Ministers to draft a constitution. But, there

were no major initiatives thereafter to take the pledges

ahead from the King’s side, thanks to the return of regime

stability and economic prosperity. The oil boom in late

1960s and 1970s helped the government build a welfare state

that caters to the material needs of the population. The

King also strengthened the ruling family’s ties with the

conservative Ulama and the tribal leaders.

The Rise of Islamist Opposition

According to many analysts, Islam remains a double-edged

sword for the al-Saudi family. Even as it legitimised the

rule, the puritanical Wahhabi ideology left ample space for

the hardliners to turn against the regime any time if they

think the rulers are drifting away from the ideological

commitments. If the founder King Abd-al Asis exploited

extremism against the Turks, expanded his influence to other

provinces with the help of the religiously-inspired Ikhwan

6 Quoted in Dr. Rashed Aba-Namay (1998), p.238

force and enjoyed huge influence over the Ulama, his

successors had to struggle to counter the challenges from

the extremist quarters. The decline of pan-Arabism and other

Arab modernisation movements in West Asia in the 1970s and

the emergence of extremism and Islamic revolutionism had an

extremely unnerving effect on the Gulf monarchies. Following

the 1979 Iranian Revolution, there was a dramatic seizure of

the Makkah Mosque and uprisings among the Shiites in the

eastern region of Saudi Arabia. The November 1979 seizure of

the Mosque that cost 177 rebel and 127 government lives

posed a fundamental, though symbolic, challenge to the

monarchy. The rebels, most of them from the Wahhabi sects,

believed that the royal family had become corrupt, the state

was promoting heresy and religious scholars were

collaborating with the royal family in spreading immoral

practices. This has in effect challenged the monopoly of the

state over religious affairs.7

The Saudi government responded cautiously to these

challenges. The government gave more power to the Islamists

on the one hand and revived the talk of a Majlis al-Shura or

Consultative Council on the other. The government let the

Islamists continue their influence in the curriculum and the

teaching practices and allotted more money to the religious7 Ziauddin Sardar (1 November, 2008), “The Battle at Islam’sHeart”, Newstatesman. For detailed information of the uprising, seeYaroslav Trofimov (2007), The Siege of Mecca: The Forgotten Uprising in Islam’s HoliestShrine and the Birth of al-Qaeda, New York: Doubleday

authorities and there were greater religious surveillance

over the population.8 At the same time, King Khalid

appointed an eight-man committee in 1980 under the

chairmanship of Interior Minister Prince Nayef to draft a

new constitution. Khalid’s successor Fahd also promised to

enact a constitution and set up a national assembly soon

after his accession to the throne in 1982, but there was no

headway was made in 1980s, a period that also saw Islamist

ideology gaining ground in the region. The return of Arab

Afghan mujahideens from anti-Soviet guerrilla war in

Afghanistan gave impetus to the Islamist groups in the

country. Around 12,000 Saudi men had gone to Afghanistan to

fight the Soviet troops in 1980s.9 By supporting the cause

of the Afghan mujahideens, the Saudi regime tried to

underpin its domestic Islamic legitimacy as well as

strengthen its claim to global Islamic leadership.

Constitutional Reforms

King Fahd’s Afghan policy also brought the US and Saudi

Arabia ever more closer. This alliance had far reaching

implications at the domestic level, particularly after the

Gulf war. King Fahd, who had supported Iraq throughout the

8 Gwenn Okruhlik, “Networks of Dissent: Islamism and Reform inSaudi Arabia,” Social Council Research Council, URL:http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/okruhlik.htm, Accessed on 15 March,2009. 9 Ibid

Iran-Iraq war, first urged for negotiations to encourage

Saddam Hussein to retreat from Kuwait. But following US

Defence Secretary Richard Cheney’s visit to the Kingdom, the

Saudi Arabian government officially requested assistance

from the US government on 7 August 1990 to solve the Gulf

crisis.10 As expected, the King’s decision invited the wrath

of the Islamists, who were already engaged in secret

campaigns against the ruling family. On the other side, the

liberals found it as an opportunity to air their views on

necessary political reforms. In October 1990, the Kuwaiti

ruler held the Kuwaiti People’s Conference in Jeddah, a two-

day mega event in which around 1,200 Kuwaiti citizens

participated to chalk out strategies to liberate their

country and initiate parliamentary democracy after the

liberation. Drawing inspiration from this, 43 Saudi

intellectuals submitted a petition to the King in December,

asking him to issue a codification of Islamic law that would

provide for fundamental reforms.11 When the Islamists, who

were pampered throughout 1980s voiced protests against the

King’s decision to allow non-Muslim troops to enter and

operate in the Arabian territory to attack a fellow Muslim

state, the liberals rallied to the King’s defence.12 10 Dauglas Martin (1 August, 2005), “Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd Dies;Abdullah Named New Leader”, The New York Times, Also see, Said K Alburish(1994) The Rise, Corruption and Coming Fall of the House of Saud, London: Bloomsbury,pp:175-178. 11 Judith Caesar (5 July 1991), “Liberals and Conservative PressRiyadh, The New York Times. 12 Richard Dekmejian (Summer 2003), “The Liberal Impulse in SaudiArabia”, The Middle East Journal, pp-402-403.

Like his predecessor, King Fahd also responded cautiously to

the separate demands for reforms and more strident laws. The

changing regional and domestic politics and the closer

alliance with the US left the government with not many

options but to initiate reforms. After an extra ordinary

session of the Council of Ministers on 1 March 1992, the

King announced a reform package that comprised three

constitutional documents – the Basic Law, establishment of a

Consultative Council within six months and administrative

reforms at the provincial levels. The Basic Law was the de

facto Constitution of the country. Since calling anything

but the Holy Quran Constitution is sacrilege in the Saudi

context, the first article of the Basic Law says Quran is

the Constitution of the Kingdom.13 The 60-member Majlis al-Shura

was set up early March 1993. All members f the Council will

be appointed by the King and they will have rights to

question the Council of Ministers, make suggestions on law-

making and submit them to the King. The council chairman

could submit a request to the King for relevant government

documents. The provincial councils, also promised in the

reform package, have more powers than the Consultative

Council. The provincial council members will be appointed by13 Article 1 says: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign ArabIslamic state with Islam as its religion; God's Book and the Sunnah ofHis Prophet, God's prayers and peace be upon him, are its constitution,Arabic is its language and Riyadh is its capital. The Basic Law isavailable on government website URL:http://www.the-saudi.net/saudi-arabia/saudi-constitution.htm, Accessed on March 20.

the Prime Minister in consultation with governors. The

council could determine the needs of the province,

prioritise them and propose them to include in the state

development plans.14

Though the Basic Law and creation of the Majlis were welcomed

as steps in the right direction, they were not a great leap

forward. The Basic Law underscores the ultimate authority of

the King and there is a continuing stress throughout the

document on the Islamic values underpinning social and

economic organisation. In a month after the promulgation of

the Basic Law, the King ruled out further democratising

steps, saying: “Our people's character and way of life are

different from the ways and traditions of the democratic

world... Free elections are not suitable for our country.”

During the inauguration of the Majlis, he made it further

clear: “Elections are found in various places in the world

and nobody objects to them, but we follow the path shown by

the Book of Allah the Almighty, His Apostle, and his wise

caliphs.”15

The regime’s reluctance to carry forward reforms made the

reformers upset. In 1993, a group of six prominent academics

and legal personalities set up an organisation, Committee

14 Tim Niblock (2006), Saudi Arabia: Power, Legitimacy and Survival, London:Routledge 15 Quotes in R. Raba Namay, p.244

for the Defence of Legitimate Rights (CDLR). Seeking to

eliminate injustice and support the oppressed, the committee

called for people to provide it with information about

injustices that had been occurring. The committee members,

who were highly respected religious scholars, did not pose

any threat to the Islamic system, but urged for a more

accountable government and increased awareness among the

people about their basic rights.16 Still, the CDLR was

banned, its members were dismissed from their jobs and

its office was closed. The increasing opposition to the

regime in the 1990s, both from Islamo-liberals and

Islamists, indicated the eroding legitimacy of the

government.17 The economy slipped into a crisis as oil

revenues fell and the welfare state was rapidly

deteriorating. When the liberals withdrew from the public

space in the second half of the 1990s, the Islamist critics

grew in popularity.

Post-September 11: Liberals Gaining Ground

If the first Gulf war and the subsequent changes in the

regional politics gave a big boost to the reform process in

Saudi Arabia, the 11th September terrorist attack on the US

16 Ibrahim Al-Rasheed (2002), A History of Saudi Arabia, Cambridge:Cambridge Univesity Press, pp.176-177. 17 Madawi al-Rasheed (Summer, 1996), “God the King and theNation: Political Rhetoric in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s”, TheMiddle East Journal, 50(3), p.371

opened new avenues of change in the country’s history. The

terrorist attack brought the Saudi leadership and the people

face to face many grave realities that were given less

attention over a period of time. The reports that 15 of the

19 suicide place hijackers were Saudi citizens threatened

the stability of the US-Saudi relationship. Several US

officials went in public to criticise the policies of the

Kingdom.18 Troubles in the US-Saudi relationship increased

after President George W. Bush’s policy to press for

democratic reforms in the region.19 Making his

administration’s stand clear, President Bush, in his

National Endowment for Democracy speech on 6 November 2003

said: "By giving the Saudi people a greater role in their

own society, the Saudi government can demonstrate true

leadership in the region"20.

The increasing pressure from the US, coupled with domestic

tensions, forced the Saudi leadership to ease the government

18 In October 2001, Senator Joseph Lieberman said the Saudis weretrying to "ride the back of al-Qaeda". Another Senator Joseph Bidenaccused the Saudis of "funding a significant portion of what we aredealing with now -- Islam gone awry”. Senator John Kerry, also DemocraticPresidential candidate, said “we cannot support” Saudi Arabia’scontinuing support for terror groups like al-Qaeda. See, “Can SaudiArabia Reform Itself?” ICG Middle East Report, 14 July, 2004. 19 For a detailed analysis of the changing currents in the in theUS-Saudi relationship in the immediate aftermath of the September 11attack, see Taufiq Subhan (September 13-19, 2003), “US-Saudi ArabiaRelations: Coming of Age”, Economic and Political Weekly, 38(37) pp. 3885-3887 20 “The Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative: Imperilledat Birth”, ICG Middle East Briefing, 7 June 2004.

control over public discourse. The idea of permitting public

dialogue was a policy of Crown Prince Abdullah, who had been

the de facto ruler since King Fahd fell ill in 1995. Though

Abdullah’s reformist agenda faced major challenges from

within the royal family, the domestic and regional situation

stood in favour of him.21 Finding the rise of extremist

violence a more potential threat, Abdullah believed that

giving more space to the Islamo-liberals would help the

regime ensure stability. The increasing bombing incidents

and other sort of violence by the extremists have sparked a

larger debate on the root cause of terrorism in the

country.22 The reformists argued that extremism grew in the

country because of the closed nature of Islam and called for

change. In January 2003, Crown Prince Abdullah received a

document entitled, "Strategic Vision for the Present and the

Future" signed by 104 professors, intellectuals, and former

officials. The petitioners raised five major demand in the

document: Separation of powers between executive, judicial21 The relations between Crown Prince Abdullah and his half-brotherPrince Nayef were always tense. Nayef reportedly opposed Abdullah’sreform-oriented domestic and pro-western foreign policies. See MichaelScott Doran (January-February 2004) , The Saudi Paradox, Foreign Affairs,83(1), pp:35-51 22 The 2003-04 period saw an unprecedented rise in Islamic violencein Saudi Arabia. The 12 May 2003 attack killed 35 people, while 17 werekilled in November bombing. The interior ministry building in Riyadh wastargeted by a car bomb 0n 21 April 2004, while the al-Kgobar siege on 29May left 22 people, most non-Saudis, dead. See Thomas Hegghammer,“Islamist Violence and Regime Stability in Saudi Arabia”, InternationalAffairs, 84(4), pp.701-715. For a detailed analysis of the Islamistopposition in Saudi Arabia and extremist violence, see Anthony H.Cordesman (2003), Saudi Arabia Enters the 21st Century: The Political, Foreign Policy,Economic and Energy Dimensions, London: Praeger.

and legislative branches, a representative Consultative

Council to be elected by citizens, an independent judiciary

based on Qaran and Sunna, guarantee human rights, including

freedom of speech, assembly, elections and participation and

establishment of civil society by permitting the formation

of economic, professional and cultural associations.23 This

was followed by another petition entitled “Partners in One

Nation”, signed by 450 Shiites and submitted to Abdullah in

April 2003. Describing the discrimination they face in the

country, the Shiites called for an announcement of the

country’s respect for all religions and also the appointment

of a national committee with the participation of the

Shiites to deal with the sectarian discrimination. The Crown

Prince got another petition in September, signed by 51

women. Titled as “Petition in Defence of the Nation, the

petition urged the authorities to implement the suggestions

made by the National Reform Documents, submitted in January.

Unlike the past, the regime took relatively open-mined

approach towards the liberals. The first concrete step taken

by the King in this regard was the organisation of the

national dialogue conference in June 2003 in Jeddah. Thirty

clerics, representing all religious sects – Salafi, non-

Salafi Sunnis, Sufis and Shiites – participated in the

deliberations, known as “National Gathering for Intellectual

23 Richard Dekmejian (Summer 2003), p. 406.

Dialogue”.24 The dialogue led to the adoption of a political

charter that emphasised the importance of political reforms.

The subsequent announcement that partial municipal elections

will be held in 2004 was a major achievement for the liberal

movement in the country.25 The October announcement was

followed by the second dialogue, held in Makkah under the

theme of “Extremism and Moderation: A Comprehensive

Approach”. So far the country had seven national dialogue

sessions, with the last being held in Qassem on 22-23 April,

2008 under the theme of “Work and Employment: Dialogue

Between Society and Work Related Institutions”.26 The

country has now started preparations for the eighth dialogue

entitled, “Health Services – Dialogue Between Society and

Health Institutions”.27

As announced earlier, the regime held Municipal elections

in February-April, 2005 to 178 councils, opening a new

chapter in the history of the Kingdom. When the election was

24 Stephane Lacroix (Summer, 2004), “Between Islamists and Liberals:Saudi Arabia’s New ‘Islamo-Liberal’ Reformists”, The Middle East Journal,58(3), pp:363-364 25 “Saudis Announces First Elections”, BBC, 13 October, 2003. 26 For detailed information on the seven national dialogues, visitthe website of King Abdul Aziz Centre for National Dialogue, URL:http://www.kacnd.org/eng/all_national_meetings.asp, Accessed on March18. 27 Abdullah Al-Qarni (19 March 2009), National Dialogue ParticipantsSlam Health Services, Saudi Gazette, Available on URL:http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentID=2009031932588&archiveissuedate=19/03/2009,Accessed on 20 March 2009).

a blow to the hardliners and also U-turn from King Fahd's

earlier position, the liberals welcomed it as a major step

in the right direction. However, Saudi women, who make up

more than 50 percent of the population, were barred from

voting.28 The officials cited logistical reasons behind the

exclusion, saying most women did not carry ID card and

therefore they could not vote. They, however, said women

would be allowed to participate in the next elections,

expected to be held in 2009.

Reforms under King Abdullah

The accent of Abdullah as the King after Fahd's death on 1

August 2005 was welcomed with great vigour by the liberal

lobby in the Kingdom. It was not a secret that the new King

had a reform agenda though he reportedly enjoyed less

support within the family for that. Making his plans clear,

while appearing before the Majlis al-Shura for the first time

as the King on 4 April 2006, Abdullah said: “We cannot stand

still while the world around us is changing; we will

continue the process of development, the national dialogue,

the economic liberalisation, the fight against corruption,

reducing government’s bureaucracy, increasing governmental

work efficiency, and employing the efforts of all sincere28 See Kim Ghattas, Saudis' first exercise with democracy”, BBCNews, 10 February, 2005,URL:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4252305.stm, Accessed 15March, 2009.

working men and women”.29 However, the regime did not go for

any radical reforms. Abdullah accepted a dual strategy: deal

with the militants with a high hand and the liberals with a

soft hand. The continuing national dialogues opened new

avenues for limited policy level criticisms, while increased

security measures have successfully countered the Islamist

violence.30

The King's announcement of judicial reforms and his decision

to set up an Allegiance Council to facilitate smooth

transfer of power indicated that he was serious about

initiating reforms in the Kingdom. In October 2006, the King

approved the new Judiciary and Court of Grievances Laws that

envisages setting up of a Supreme Court and labour

tribunals.31 The Allegiance Council, on the other hand, was

a crucial step given the pattern of succession in Saudi

Arabia. The Council, made up of senior sons and grandsons of

the founder of the Kingdom Abd-al Aziz, was set up aimed at

quelling internal power struggles between the younger

generation of princess who are in line of succession. If a29 The King is quoted in, Ali Alyami (25 April 2006) “Abdullah'sReforms Must Begin in the Palace”, The Henry Jackson Society: Project forDemocratic Geopolitics, URL: http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/stories.asp?id=339, Accessed on 18 March, 2009. 30 Praising the Saudi government's security policies, former CIAdirector Michael Hayden said in 2008: “Aggressive efforts by the Saudisecurity forces between 2003 and 2006 led to the death or capture ofmost al-Qaeda leaders and operatives within the Kingdom.” SeeChristopher Dickey (March 30, 2009), “The Monarch Who Declared His OwnRevolution”, Newsweek. 31 “Saudi Arabia approves long overdue judicial reforms”, The AssociatedPress, 5 October 2007.

King dies, the Council will officially name the Crown Prince

as the King. Within 10 days, the new King must send the name

of the person, whom he chose as the next Crown Prince. The

Commission has to nominate the name within 10 days it got

the King's letter.32 The council will meet only after

Abdullah's brother Crown Prince Sultan succeeded. But Sultan

is in his 80s and is very ill. This keeps the hope of many

reformists alive that a relatively younger prince may come

to the top level in the country, who could steer the country

towards modernity, tolerance and equality at a greater

pace.33

Although the judicial and educational reforms were struck

with several challenges, King Abdullah sent out a tough

message to the conservative religious establishment by

decreeing changes in the government 14 February, 2009. He

brought new faces in the top ministries, courts, the armed

forces, the central bank, religious police and the royally-

appointed 150-member Majlis al-Shura. The sweeping changes,

that raised the eyebrows of many, was the King’s decision to

induct a woman into the Council of Ministers for the first

time in the history of the country. Nora al-Fayez, an

American educated school administrator, was made the32 “Saudi king names members to a commission entrusted with pickingfuture kings”, The Associated Press, 10 December, 2007. 33 Simon Henderson (21 January 2009), “Saudi Leadership Crisis Looms:Health of Crown Prince falters”, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,URL:http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2994,Accessed on 6 March, 2009.

minister for female education.34 Abdullah also sacked the

head of the feared religious police and the conservative

minister of justice. According to reports, the first female

minister could work with the King’s favoured son-in-law, the

new Minister for Education Prince Faisal bin Abdullah bin

Mohammad, to speed up educational reforms and equalise the

education of women and men. Though the striking changes were

welcomed in the liberal quarters, many are still upset with

the snarl’s pace of reforms even after Abdullah’s ascendancy

to the throne.

Conclusion

Given the history of reforms in Saudi Arabia, one can assume

that the political system in the country should evolve if it

has to preserve the internal stability. Whenever there was a

crisis, the rulers have responded to the people with

rhetoric and limited actions. The strategy of the al-Saud

family was simple at the beginning. Draw legitimacy from the

Ulama for their rule and in turn ensue the supremacy of

conservative, less tolerant Wahhabi Islam. However, the

regime’s over-dependence on the conservative Islam was a

double-edged sword. The first major threats the regime faced

34 Abdullah Al-Asmari (17 February 2009), “Hopes Renewed from thereshuffle of Saudi Cabinet, Saudi Gazatte, URL:http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentID=2009021729534&archiveissuedate=17/02/2009 ,Accessed on 20 Mach, 2009.

were not from the so-called liberal lobby, but from the pan-

Islamist groups. Unlike the Iranian brand, the Islamists in

Saudi Arabia were not revolutionary in nature, who wanted to

bring out radical changes at home. Rather, they stood for

Islamic Puritanism and raised their voices against the Saudi

rulers, accusing them of not standing up to the Islamic

values. In 1980s and 1990s we can see the government giving

in to the Islamists many times. Following the Makkah

uprising of 1980s, the regime had actually given more powers

to the religious establishment and let Saudis go abroad and

fight for the cause of Islam. Though King Fahd had initiated

limited constitutional reforms, the regime was extra

cautious about the liberal dissident voices. The government

was ready to accommodate, to certain level, the Islamist

Sahwa critics, while it outrightly banned the Committee for

the Defence of Legitimate Rights (CDLR) and arrested few of

its members.

However, the September 11 terrorist attack and the

subsequent sweeping changes in the regional politics, have

influenced the domestic debate on conservative Islam, which

gave more space for the Islamo-liberals. The liberals did

not pose any radical challenge, but only demanded the regime

initiate steps to relax the strident laws, ensure equitable

distribution of wealth and set up a civil society. On the

other hand, the regime faced serious challenge from the

Islamists and also its global reputation was at stake

following the US allegation that 15 of the 19 September 11

terrorists were Saudi nationals. The monarch had to make a

choice between the liberals and the Islamists. Realising

that stability could not be ensured unless reforms were

initiated, Crown Prince Abdullah turned against the

Islamists with a heavy hand while taking steps to cheer the

reformers.

Many of his reform measures were greeted both at home and at

international level. But did he stand up to the expectations

of those who thought the monarch, who had a reputation for

probity, tolerance and humility would have steered reforms

at a greater pace? Saudi women are still awaiting the

permission to drive. Many of Abdullah’s educational and

judicial reforms were stalled due to opposition by the

conservative establishment. Though King Abdullah made

history by meeting with the Pope, the regime is still less

tolerant to faiths other than Islam. However, the pace of

reforms in the post-9/11 period, is faster than that in

1980s an 1990s. The public sphere is now stronger than ever

in the country which can stand for faster and qualitative

reforms in the future. The country is changing. But given

the hold of the conservative values and the religious

establishment, it is illogical to expect sudden changes or

democratisation of the polity. Like their rulers, the Saudi

population also seem to believe in gradualism.