G.R. No. L-35546 Aquino Jr vs Enrile 1974

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http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1974/sep1974/gr_l_35546_1974.html 1/374

TodayisSaturday,June20,2015

RepublicofthePhilippinesSUPREMECOURT

Manila

ENBANC

G.R.No.L35546September17,1974

INTHEMATTEROFTHEPETITIONFORHABEASCORPUSOFBENIGNOS.AQUINO,JR.,RAMONMITRA,JR.,FRANCISCORODRIGO,ANDNAPOLEONRAMA,petitioners,vs.HONJUANPONCEENRILE,SECRETARYOFNATIONALDEFENSEGEN.ROMEOESPINO,CHIEFOFSTAFF,ARMEDFORCESOFTHEPHILIPPINESANDGEN.FIDELV.RAMOS,CHIEF,PHILIPPINECONSTABULARY,respondents.


INTHEMATTEROFTHEPETITIONFORHABEASCORPUSOFJOAQUINP.ROCES,TEODOROM.LOCSIN,SR.,ROLANDOFADUL,ROSALINAGALANG,GOENGGUAN,MAXIMOV.SOLIVEN,RENATOCONSTANTINO,ANDLUISR.MAURICIO,petitioners,vs.THESECRETARYOFNATIONALDEFENSETHECHIEFOFSTAFF,ARMEDFORCESOFTHEPHILIPPINESTHECHIEF,PHILIPPINECONSTABULARY,etal.,respondents.


INTHEMATTEROFTHEPETITIONFORHABEASCORPUSOFJOSEW.DIOKNO,CARMENI.DIOKNO,*1petitioner,vs.JUANPONCEENRILE,THESECRETARYOFNATIONALDEFENSEROMEOESPINO,THECHIEFOFSTAFF,ARMEDFORCESOFTHEPHILIPPINES.respondents.


MAXIMOV.SOLIVEN,NAPOLEONG.RAMA,ANDJOSEMARIVELEZ,petitioners,vs.HON.JUANPONCEENRILE,SECRETARYOFNATIONALDEFENSEHON.FRANCISCOTATAD,PRESSSECRETARYANDGEN.FIDELV.RAMOS,CHIEF,PHILIPPINECONSTABULARY,respondents.

G.R.No.L35547September17,1974*2

ENRIQUEVOLTAIREGARCIAII,petitioner,vs.BRIG.GEN.FIDELRAMOS,CHIEF,PHILIPPINECONSTABULARYGEN.ROMEOESPINO,CHIEFOFSTAFF,ARMEDFORCESOFTHEPHILIPPINESANDHON.JUANPONCEENRILE,SECRETARYOFNATIONALDEFENSE,respondents.


INTHEMATTEROFTHEPETITIONFORHABEASCORPUSOFVERONICAL.YUYITUNGANDTANCHINHIAN,petitioners,vs.JUANPONCEENRILE,SECRETARYOFNATIONALDEFENSELIEUT.GEN.ROMEOESPINO,CHIEFOFSTAFF,ARMEDFORCESOFTHEPHILIPPINESANDBRIG.GEN.FIDELV.RAMOS,CHIEFOFTHEPHILIPPINECONSTABULARY,respondents.


INTHEMATTEROFTHEPETITIONFORHABEASCORPUSOFAMANDODORONILAJUANL.MERCADO,

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HERNANDOL.ABAYA,ERNESTOGRANADA,LUISD.BELTRAN,TANCHINHIAN,BRENGUIAO,RUBENCUSIPAG,ROBERTOORDOEZ,MANUELALMARIOANDWILLIEBAUN,petitioners,vs.HON.JUANPONCEENRILE,SECRETARYOFNATIONALDEFENSELIEUT.GEN.ROMEOESPINO,CHIEFOFSTAFF,ARMEDFORCESOFTHEPHILIPPINESANDBRIG.GEN.FIDELV.RAMOS,CHIEF,PHILIPPINECONSTABULARY,respondents.

G.R.No.L35571September17,1974.*3

INTHEMATTEROFTHEPETITIONFORHABEASCORPUSOFBRENZ.GUIAO,TERESITAM.GUIAO,petitioner,vs.JUANPONCEENRILE,THESECRETARYOFNATIONALDEFENSELT.GEN.ROMEOESPINO,CHIEFOFSTAFFOFTHEARMEDFORCESOFTHEPHILIPPINES:ANDBRIG.GEN.FIDELV.RAMOS,CHIEFOFTHEPHILIPPINECONSTABULARY,respondents.


ERNESTORONDON,petitioner,vs.HON.JUANPONCEENRILE,SECRETARYOFNATIONALDEFENSEGEN.FIDELV.RAMOS,CHIEF,PHILIPPINECONSTABULARYANDMAJORRODULFOMIANA,respondents.

MAKALINTAL,C.J.:p

Thesecasesareallpetitionsforhabeascorpus,thepetitionershavingbeenarrestedanddetainedbythemilitarybyvirtueofthePresident'sProclamationNo.1081,datedSeptember21,1972.

Attheoutsetawordofclarificationis inorder.This isnotthedecisionoftheCourt inthesensethatadecisionrepresentsaconsensusof the requiredmajorityof itsmembersnotonlyon the judgment itselfbutalsoon therationalizationof the issuesandtheconclusionsarrivedat.Onthefinalresult thevote ispracticallyunanimousthis is a statement ofmy individual opinion aswell as a summary of the voting on themajor issues.Why noparticularJusticehasbeendesignatedtowritejustoneopinionfortheentireCourtwillpresentlybeexplained.

Atonepointduringourdeliberationson thesecases itwassuggested thatasChief Justice I shouldwrite thatopinion. The impracticability of the suggestion shortly became apparent for a number of reasons, only two ofwhichneedbementioned.First,thediscussions,astheybegantotouchonparticularissues,revealedalackofagreement among the Justices as to whether some of those issues should be taken up although it was notnecessary to do so, they being merely convenient for the purpose of ventilating vexing questions of publicinterest,orwhetherthedecisionshouldbelimitedtothoseissueswhicharereallymaterialanddecisiveinthesecases.Similarly, therewas no agreement as to themanner the issues should be treated and developed. Thesamedestinationwouldbereached,sotospeak,butthroughdifferentroutesandbymeansofdifferentvehiclesofapproach.ThewritingofseparateopinionsbyindividualJusticeswasthusunavoidable,andunderstandablysoforstillanotherreason,namely,thatalthoughlittleovertreferencetoitwasmadeatthetime,thefutureverdictofhistorywasverymuchafactorinthethinkingofthemembers,noothercaseofsuchtranscendentalsignificanceto the life of the nation having before confronted this Court. Second and this to me was the insuperableobstacleIwasandamoftheopinion,whichwassharedbysixotherJustices1atthetimethequestionwasvotedupon, thatpetitionerJoseW.Diokno'smotionofDecember28,1973towithdrawhispetition(G.R.No.L35539)shouldbegranted, and therefore I was in no position to set down the ruling of theCourt on each of the arguments raised by him,exceptindirectly,insofarastheyhadbeenraisedlikewiseintheothercases.

ItshouldbeexplainedatthispointthatwhentheCourtvotedonDiokno'smotiontowithdrawhispetitionhewasstill under detentionwithout charges, and continued to remain so up to the time the separate opinions of theindividualJusticeswereput infinalformpreparatorytotheirpromulgationonSeptember12,whichwasthelastday of Justice Zaldivars tenure in the Court. 2 Before they could be promulgated, however, a major developmentsupervened:petitionerDioknowasreleasedbythePresident inthemorningofSeptember11,1974.Inviewthereofall themembersof thisCourtexceptJusticeCastroagreed todismissDiokno'spetitionon theground that ithadbecomemoot,with those who originally voted to grant the motion for withdrawal citing said motion as an additional ground for suchdismissal.

Thepetitionersintheothercases,exceptBenignoAquino,Jr.(G.R.No.L35546),eitherhavebeenpermittedtowithdrawtheirpetitionsorhavebeenreleasedfromdetentionsubjecttocertainrestrictions.3InthecaseofAquino,formalchargesofmurder,subversionandillegalpossessionoffirearmswerelodgedagainsthimwithaMilitaryCommissionon August 11, 1973 and on the following August 23 he challenged the jurisdiction of said Commission as well as hiscontinueddetentionbyvirtueofthosechargesinapetitionforcertiorariandprohibitionfiledinthisCourt(G.R.No.

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L37364).ThequestioncameupastowhetherornotAquino'spetitionforhabeascorpusshouldbedismissedonthegroundthat thecaseas tohimshouldmoreappropriatelyberesolved in thisnewpetition.Of the twelveJustices,however,eightvotedagainstsuchdismissalandchosetoconsiderthecaseonthemerits.4

OnDiokno'smotiontowithdrawhispetitionIvotedinfavorofgrantingitfortworeasons.Inthefirstplacesuchwithdrawal would not emasculate the decisive and fundamental issues of public interest that demanded to beresolved, for theywerealso raised in theothercaseswhichstill remainedpending.Secondly, since itwas thispetitioner'spersonallibertythatwasatstake,Ibelievedhehadtherighttorenouncetheapplicationforhabeascorpusheinitiated.EvenifthatrightwerenotabsoluteIstillwouldrespecthischoicetoremovethecasefromthisCourt's cognizance, regardless of the fact that I disagreedwithmany of his reasons for so doing. I could notescapeasenseof irony in thisCourt's turningdown theplea towithdrawon theground,soheallegesamongothers, that this isno longer theCourt towhichheoriginallyapplied for reliefbecause itsmembershavetakennewoathsofofficeunderthe1973Constitution,andthenrulingadverselytohimonthemeritsofhispetition.

ItistruethatsomeofthestatementsinthemotionareanaffronttothedignityofthisCourtandthereforeshouldnotbeallowedtopassunanswered.Anyanswer,however,wouldnotbeforeclosedbyallowingthewithdrawal.Formypart,sincemostof thosestatementsareofasubjectivecharacter,beingmattersofpersonalbeliefandopinion, Iseenopoint inrefutingthemin thesecases. Indeedmy impression is that theywerebeamedlessatthisCourtthanattheworldoutsideanddesignedtomakepoliticalcapitalofhispersonalsituation,asthepublicitygiven to them by some segments of the foreign press and by local underground propaganda news sheetssubsequentlyconfirmed. Itwas in fact from thatperspective that Ideemed itproper to respond inkind, that is,fromanonjudicialforum,inanaddressIdeliveredonFebruary19,1974beforetheLAWASIA,thePhilippineBarAssociationandthePhilippineLawyers'Association.JusticeTeehankee,itmaybestated,isoftheopinionthatasimple majority of seven votes out of twelve is legally sufficient to make the withdrawal of Diokno's petitioneffective,onthetheorythattherequirementofamajorityofeightvotesappliesonlytoadecisiononthemerits.

In any event, as it turned out, after petitionerDioknowas released by thePresident onSeptember 11 all themembersofthisCourtexceptJusticeCastrowereagreedthathispetitionhadbecomemootandthereforeshouldno longer be consideredon themerits. This notwithstanding, someof the opinionsof the individualmembers,particularlyJusticesCastroandTeehankee,shouldbetakeninthetimesettinginwhichtheywereprepared,thatis,beforetheorderforthereleaseofDioknowasissued.

TheCases.

Theeventswhichformthebackgroundoftheseninepetitionsarerelated,eitherbrieflyor ingreatdetail, intheseparate opinions filed by the individual Justices. The petitionerswere arrested and held pursuant toGeneralOrderNo.2ofthePresident(September22,1972),"forbeingparticipantsorforhavinggivenaidandcomfortintheconspiracytoseizepoliticalandstatepowerinthecountryandtotakeovertheGovernmentbyforce..."

General Order No. 2 was issued by the President in the exercise of the powers he assumed by virtue ofProclamationNo.1081 (September21,1972)placing theentirecountryundermartial law.Theportionsof theproclamationimmediatelyinpointreadasfollows:

xxxxxxxxx

NOW,THEREFORE,I,FERDINANDE.MARCOS,PresidentofthePhilippinesbyvirtueofthepowersvesteduponmebyArticleVII,Section 10,Paragraph (2) of theConstitution, do herebyplace theentirePhilippinesasdefined inArticle I,Section1of theConstitutionundermartial lawand, inmycapacityastheirCommanderinChief,doherebycommandtheArmedForcesofthePhilippines,tomaintainlawandorderthroughoutthePhilippines,preventorsuppressallformsoflawlessviolenceaswellasanyactofinsurrectionorrebellionandtoenforceobediencetoallthelawsanddecrees,ordersandregulationspromulgatedbymepersonallyoruponmydirection.

In addition, I do hereby order that all persons presently detained, as well as all others whomayhereafter be similarly detained for the crimesof insurrectionor rebellion, andall other crimesandoffensescommitted in furtheranceoron theoccasion thereof,or incident thereto,or inconnectiontherewith, for crimes against national security and the law of nations, crimes against public order,crimesinvolvingusurpationofauthority,rank,titleandimproperuseofnames,uniformsandinsignia,crimescommittedbypublicofficers,andforsuchothercrimesaswillbeenumeratedinordersthatIshallsubsequentlypromulgate,aswellascrimesasaconsequenceofanyviolationofanydecree,orderor regulationpromulgatedbymepersonallyorpromulgateduponmydirectionshall bekeptunderdetentionuntilotherwiseorderedreleasedbymeorbymydulydesignatedrepresentative.

Theprovisionofthe1935Constitutionreferredtointheproclamationreads:"thePresidentshallbecommanderinchiefofallarmedforcesofthePhilippinesand,wheneveritbecomesnecessary,hemaycalloutsucharmedforces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion,insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, hemay suspend the

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privilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus,orplacethePhilippinesoranypartthereofundermartiallaw."

1.ThefirstmajorissueraisedbythepartiesiswhetherthisCourtmayinquireintothevalidityofProclamationNo.1081.Statedmoreconcretely,istheexistenceofconditionsclaimedtojustifytheexerciseofthepowertodeclaremartiallawsubjecttojudicialinquiry?Isthequestionpoliticalorjusticiableincharacter?

JusticesMakasiar,Antonio,Esguerra,FernandezandAquinoholdthat thequestion ispoliticalandtherefore itsdetermination isbeyond the jurisdictionof thisCourt.The reasonsaregivenat length in theseparateopinionstheyhaverespectivelysigned.JusticeFernandezaddsthatasamemberoftheConventionthatdraftedthe1973Constitutionhebelievesthat"theConventionputanimprimaturonthepropositionthatthevalidityofamartiallawproclamationanditscontinuationispoliticalandnonjusticiableincharacter."

JusticeBarredo,ontheotherhand,believesthatpoliticalquestionsarenotpersebeyondtheCourt'sjurisdiction,thejudicialpowervestedinitbytheConstitutionbeingplenaryandallembracing,butthatasamatterofpolicyimplicit in the Constitution itself the Court should abstain from interfering with the Executive's Proclamation,dealingasitdoeswithnationalsecurity,forwhichtheresponsibilityisvestedbythecharterinhimalone.ButtheCourtshouldact,JusticeBarredoopines,whenitsabstentionfromactingwouldresult inmanifestandpalpabletransgressionoftheConstitutionprovenbyfactsof judicialnotice,noreceptionofevidencebeingcontemplatedforpurposesofsuchjudicialaction.

Itmaybenotedthatthepostulateofnonjusticiabilityasdiscussedinthoseopinionsinvolvesdisparatemethodsofapproach.JusticeEsguerramaintainsthatthefindingsofthePresidentontheexistenceofthegroundsforthedeclarationofmartial laware finalandconclusiveupon theCourts.Hedisagreesvehementlywith the ruling inLansangvs.Garcia,42SCRA448,December11,1971,andadvocatesareturntoBarcelonvs.Baker,5Phil.87(1905),andMontenegrovs.Castaeda, 91Phil. 882 (1952). JusticeBarredo, for his part, holds that Lansangneednotbeoverturned,indeeddoesnotcontrolinthesecases.HedrawsadistinctionbetweenthepowerofthePresidenttosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus,whichwastheissueinLansang,andhispowertoproclaimmartial law,callingattentiontothefactthatwhiletheBillofRightsprohibitssuspensionoftheprivilegeexcept in the instances specified therein, it places no such prohibition or qualification with respect to thedeclarationofmartiallaw.

JusticeAntonio,withwhomJusticesMakasiar,FernandezandAquinoconcur,findsthatthereisnodisputeastotheexistenceofastateofrebellioninthecountry,andonthatpremiseemphasizesthefactorofnecessityfortheexercisebythePresidentofhispowerundertheConstitutiontodeclaremartiallaw,holdingthatthedecisionastowhetherornotthereissuchnecessityiswhollyconfidedtohimandthereforeisnotsubjecttojudicial inquiry,hisresponsibilitybeingdirectlytothepeople.

ArrayedonthesideofjusticiabilityareJusticesCastro,Fernando,TeehankeeandMuozPalma.Theyholdthatthe constitutional sufficiency of the proclamationmay be inquired into by theCourt, andwould thus apply theprinciplelaiddowninLansangalthoughthatcasereferstothepowerofthePresidenttosuspendtheprivilegeofthe writ of habeas corpus. The recognition of justiciability accorded to the question in Lansang, it should beemphasized,isthereexpresslydistinguishedfromthepowerofjudicialreviewinordinarycivilorcriminalcases,andislimitedtoascertaining"merelywhetherhe(thePresident)hasgonebeyondtheconstitutionallimitsofhisjurisdiction,nottoexercisethepowervestedinhimortodeterminethewisdomofhisact."ThetestisnotwhetherthePresident'sdecision iscorrectbutwhether, insuspendingthewrit,hedidordidnotactarbitrarily. Applyingthis test, the finding by the Justices just mentioned is that there was no arbitrariness in the President'sproclamationofmartiallawpursuanttothe1935ConstitutionandIconcurwiththeminthatfinding.Thefactualbasesforthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus,particularly inregardtotheexistenceofastateof rebellion in thecountry, hadnotdisappeared, indeedhadbeenexacerbated,asevents shortlybeforesaid proclamation clearly demonstrated. On this Point the Court is practically unanimous Justice Teehankeemerelyrefrainedfromdiscussingit.

InsofarasmyownopinionisconcernedthecleavageintheCourtontheissueofjusticiabilityisofnotmuchmorethanacademicinterestforpurposesofarrivingatajudgment.IamnotundulyexercisedbyAmericasdecisionsonthesubjectwritteninanotherageandpoliticalclime,orbytheoriesofforeignauthorsinpoliticalscience.Thepresentstateofmartial law in thePhilippines ispeculiarlyFilipinoand fits intono traditionalpatternsor judicialprecedents.

InthefirstplaceIamconvinced(asaretheotherJustices),withoutneedofreceivingevidenceasinanordinaryadversary court proceeding, that a state of rebellion existed in the country when Proclamation No. 1081 wasissued.Itwasamatterofcontemporaryhistorywithinthecognizancenotonlyofthecourtsbutofallobservantpeopleresidinghereatthetime.Manyofthefactsandeventsrecitedindetailinthedifferent"Whereases"oftheproclamationareofcommonknowledge.Thestateof rebellioncontinuesup to thepresent.Theargument thatwhilearmedhostilitiesgooninseveralprovincesinMindanaotherearenoneinotherregionsexceptinisolatedpockets inLuzon, and that therefore there is noneed tomaintainmartial lawall over the country, ignores thesophisticatednatureandramificationsofrebellioninamodernsetting.Itdoesnotconsistsimplyofarmedclashesbetween organized and identifiable groups on fields of their own choosing. It includes subversion of themost

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subtle kind, necessarily clandestine and operating precisely where there is no actual fighting. Undergroundpropaganda, through printed news sheets or rumors disseminated in whispers recruitment of armed andideological adherents, raising of funds, procurement of arms and material, fifthcolumn activities includingsabotageand intelligenceall thesearepart of the rebellionwhichby their natureareusually conducted farfromthebattlefronts.Theycannotbecounteractedeffectivelyunlessrecognizedanddealtwithinthatcontext.

Secondly,myview,whichcoincideswiththatofothermembersoftheCourtasstatedintheiropinions,isthatthequestion of validity of Proclamation No. 1081 has been foreclosed by the transitory provision of the 1973Constitution [Art. XVII, Sec. 3(2)] that "all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated,issued, or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land and shall remain valid, legal,bindingandeffectiveevenafter...theratificationofthisConstitution..."Tobesure,thereisanattemptinthesecasestoresuscitatetheissueoftheeffectivityofthenewConstitution.All that,however, isbehindusnow.ThequestionhasbeenlaidtorestbyourdecisioninJavellanavs.ExecutiveSecretary(L36142,50SCRA30,March31,1973),andofcoursebytheexistingpoliticalrealitiesbothintheconductofnationalaffairsandinourrelationswithothercountries.

On theeffectof the transitoryprovisionJusticeMuozPalmawithholdsherassent toanysweepingstatementthat thesame ineffectvalidated, in theconstitutionalsense,all "suchproclamations,decrees, instructions,andacts promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent President." All that she concedes is that the transitoryprovisionmerelygivesthem"theimprimaturofalawbutnotofaconstitutionalmandate,"andassuchtherefore"aresubjecttojudicialreviewwhenproperundertheConstitution.

Finally,thepoliticalorjusticiablequestioncontroversyindeed,anyinquirybythisCourtinthepresentcasesintothe constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases for the proclamation ofmartial lawhasbecomemoot andpurposelessasaconsequenceofthegeneralreferendumofJuly2728,1973.Thequestionpropoundedtothevoterswas:"Underthe(1973)Constitution,thePresident,ifhesodesires,cancontinueinofficebeyond1973.DoyouwantPresidentMarcostocontinuebeyond1973andfinishthereformsheinitiatedunderMartialLaw?"Theoverwhelming majority of those who cast their ballots, including citizens between 15 and 18 years, votedaffirmativelyontheproposal.ThequestionwastherebyremovedfromtheareaofpresidentialpowerundertheConstitutionandtransferredtotheseatofsovereigntyitself.Whatevermaybethenatureoftheexerciseofthatpower by thePresident in the beginningwhether or not purely political and therefore nonjusticiable thisCourtisprecludedfromapplyingitsjudicialyardsticktotheactofthesovereign.

2.Withrespecttothepetitionerswhohavebeenreleasedfromdetentionbuthavenotwithdrawntheirpetitionsbecausetheyarestillsubjecttocertainrestrictions,5therulingof theCourt is that thepetitionsshouldbedismissed.Thepowertodetainpersonsevenwithoutchargesforactsrelatedtothesituationwhichjustifiestheproclamationofmartiallaw,suchastheexistenceofastateofrebellion,necessarilyimpliesthepower(subject,intheopinionoftheJusticeswhoconsider Lansang applicable, to the same test of arbitrariness laid down therein), to impose upon the released detaineesconditions or restrictions which are germane to and necessary to carry out the purposes of the proclamation. JusticeFernando,however, "is foreasing the restrictionson the right to travel of petitionerRodrigo"andothers similarly situatedandsotothisextentdissentsfromtherulingofthemajoritywhileJusticeTeehankeebelievesthatthoserestrictionsdonotconstitute deprivation of physical liberty within the meaning of the constitutional provision on the privilege of the writ ofhabeascorpus.

Itneedonlybeaddedthat,tomymind,implicitinastateofmartiallawisthesuspensionofthesaidprivilegewithrespect to personsarrestedor detained for acts related to thebasic objectiveof theproclamation,which is tosuppressinvasion,insurrection,orrebellion,ortosafeguardpublicsafetyagainstimminentdangerthereof.Thepreservation of society and national survival take precedence. On this particular point, that is, that theproclamation ofmartial law automatically suspends the privilege of the writ as to the persons referred to, theCourt is practically unanimous. JusticeFernando,however, says that tohim that is still anopenquestion andJustice Muoz Palma qualifiedly dissents from the majority in her separate opinion, but for the reasons shediscussesthereinvotesforthedismissalofthepetitions.

INVIEWOFALLTHEFOREGOINGANDFORTHEREASONSSTATEDBYTHEMEMBERSOFTHECOURTINTHEIR SEPARATE OPINIONS, JUDGMENT IS HEREBY RENDERED DISMISSING ALL THE PETITIONS,EXCEPTTHOSEWHICHHAVEBEENPREVIOUSLYWITHDRAWNBYTHERESPECTIVEPETITIONERSWITHTHEAPPROVALOFTHISCOURT,ASHEREINABOVEMENTIONED.NOCOSTS.

Makasiar,Esguerra,Fernandez,MuozPalmaandAquino,JJ.,concur.

PrefatoryNote

(writtenonSeptember12,1974)

My separate opinion below in the nine cases at bar was handed to Chief Justice Querube C. Makalintal onMonday,September9,1974,forpromulgation(togetherwiththeindividualopinionsoftheChiefJusticeandtheotherJustices)onSeptember12(today)asagreeduponbytheCourt.

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On September 11 the petitioner JoseW. Diokno was released frommilitary custody. The implications of thissuperveningeventwere lengthilydiscussedby theCourt in itsdeliberations in theafternoon.Elevenmembersthereafter voted to dismiss Diokno's petition as being "moot and academic" I cast the lone dissenting vote.Althoughperhaps in the strictest technical sense that accordswith conventional legalwisdom, thepetition hasbecome"moot"becauseDioknohasbeenfreedfromphysicalconfinement,Iamnonethelesspersuadedthatthegrave issuesof lawhehasposedandthehighly insultingandderogatory imputationsmadebyhimagainst theCourtanditsmembersconstituteaninescapableresidueofquestionsoftranscendentaldimensiontotheentirenationanditsdestinyandtothefutureoftheCourtquestionsthatcannotandshouldnotbeallowedtoremainunresolvedandunanswered.

Ihavethusnotfounditneedfulnorevenadvisabletorecastmyseparateopinionorchangeawordofit.

Iinvitethereadertoassessmy38pageseparateopinionwhichimmediatelyfollows,inthelightoftheforegoingcontextandfactualsetting.

FREDRUIZCASTROAssociateJustice.

SEPARATEOPINION(writtenbeforeSept.9,1974)L35539,L35546,L35538,L35540,L35567,L35556,L35571,L35573,andL35547

SeparateOpinions

CASTRO,J.:

I

Theseninecasesareapplicationsforwritsofhabeascorpus.ThepetitionsaverinsubstancethatonSeptember21, 1972 the President of the Philippines placed the country under martial law (Proclamation 1081) that onvarious dates fromSeptember 22 to September 30, 1972, the petitioners or the persons in whose behalf theapplicationsweremadewerearrestedbythemilitaryauthoritiesanddetained,someatFortBonifacioinMakati,Rizal,othersatCampAguinaldoandstillothersatCampCrame,both inQuezonCityand that thearrestanddetentionofthepetitionerswereillegal,havingbeeneffectedwithoutavalidorderofacompetentcourtofjustice.

WritsofhabeascorpuzwereissuedbytheCourtdirectingtherespondentsSecretaryofNationalDefense,ChiefofStaffoftheArmedForcesofthePhilippines,andChiefofthePhilippineConstabulary,toproducethebodiesofthe petitioners in Court on designated dates and to make returns to the writs. In due time the respondents,through the Solicitor General, filed their returns to the writs and answers to the petitions. Admitting that thepetitionershadbeenarrestedanddetained,therespondentsneverthelessjustifiedsucharrestanddetentionashavingbeen legallyorderedby thePresidentof thePhilippinespursuant tohisproclamationofmartial law, thepetitionersbeingregardedasparticipantsorashavinggivenaidandcomfort"intheconspiracytoseizepoliticalandstatepowerandtotakeoverthegovernmentbyforce."Therespondentstraversedthepetitioners'contentionthattheirarrestanddetentionwereunconstitutional.

HearingswereheldonSeptember26and29andOctober6, 1972,atwhich thepetitionerswereproduced inCourt.Thereafterthepartiesfiledmemoranda.

Meanwhile, someof thepetitioners,with leaveofCourt,withdrew theirpetitions1 others, without doing so, weresubsequentlyreleasedfromcustodyundercertainrestrictiveconditions.2EnriqueVoltaireGarciaII,thesolepetitionerinL35547andoneofthosereleased,havingdiedshortlyafterhisrelease,theactionwasdeemedabatedastohim.

AsofthisdateonlyJoseW.Diokno,inwhosebehalfthepetitioninL35539wasfiled,andBenignoS.Aquino,Jr.inL35546,arestillinmilitarycustody.

OnAugust23,1973thepetitionerAquinofiledanactionforcertiorariandprohibitionwiththisCourtallegingthatonAugust11,1973chargesofmurder,subversionandillegalpossessionoffirearmswerefiledagainsthimwithamilitarycommissionthathistrialbythemilitarycourtwhichwastobeheldonAugust27,29and31,1973wasillegal because the proclamation of martial law was unconstitutional and that he could not expect a fair trial

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becausethePresidentofthePhilippines,havingprejudgedhiscase,couldreverseanyjudgmentofacquittalbythemilitarycourtandsentencehimtodeath.Thataction,docketedasL37364andentitled"BenignoS.Aquino,Jr.vs.MilitaryCommissionNo.2,"isstillpendingconsiderationanddecision.

On theotherhand,JoseW.Diokno,onDecember28,1973, filedamotion towithdraw thepetition filed inhisbehalf,imputingdelayinthedispositionofhiscase,andasseveratingthatbecauseofthedecisionoftheCourtintheRatificationCases3andtheactionofthemembersoftheCourtintakinganoathtosupportthenewConstitution,hecannot "reasonablyexpect toget justice in thiscase."Therespondentsoppose themotionon thegrounds that there isapublic interest in thedecisionof thesecasesand that the reasonsgiven for themotion towithdrawareuntrue,unfairandcontemptuous.

II

ThethresholdquestioniswhethertoallowthewithdrawalofthepetitioninL35539filedinbehalfofDiokno.Inhislettertohiscounsel,whichisthebasisofthemotiontowithdraw,Dioknostates the following considerations: first, the delay in the disposition of his case second, the dismissal of thepetitionsintheRatificationCases,contrarytotheCourt'srulingthatthe1973Constitutionwasnotvalidlyratifiedandthird,theactionofthemembersoftheCourtintakinganoathofallegiancetothenewConstitution.Dioknoassertsthat"aconsciencethatallowsamantorotbehindbarsformorethanoneyearandthreemonthswithouttrialofcourse,withoutanychargesatallisaconsciencethathasbecomestunted,ifnotstultified"andthat"inswearingtosupport thenew'Constitution,' thefivemembersoftheCourtwhohadheldthat ithadnotbeenvalidlyratified,havenotfulfilledourexpectations."Hegoesontosay:"Idonotblamethem.IdonotknowwhatIwouldhavedoneintheirplace.But,atthesametime,IcannotcontinuetoentrustmycasetothemandIhavebecomethoroughlyconvincedthatourquestforjusticeinmycaseisfutile."

Asalreadynoted,theSolicitorGeneral,inbehalfoftherespondents,opposesthewithdrawalofthepetitionontheground of public interest, adding that themotion towithdraw cannot be granted by theCourtwithout in effectadmittingthe"unfair,untrueandcontemptuous"statementscontainedtherein.

Withoutpassingontheliabilityofanypartyinthiscaseforcontemptuousstatementsmade,theCourt(byavoteof5to7)deniedthemotion.

IvotedforthedenialofthemotiontowithdrawforinescapablereasonsthatInowproceedtoexpound.

Thegeneralruleisthatintheabsenceofastatuteexpresslyorimpliedlyprohibitingthewithdrawalofanaction,thepartybringingsuchactionmaydismissitevenwithouttheconsentofthedefendantorrespondentwherethelatter will not be prejudiced, although it may be necessary to obtain leave of court. But there are recognizedexceptions:whenthepublicinterestorquestionsofpublicimportanceareinvolved.5Forexample, the fact that afinaldeterminationofaquestioninvolvedinanactionisneededorwillbeusefulasaguidefortheconductofpublicofficersor tribunals isasufficient reason for retaininganactionwhichwouldorshouldotherwisebedismissed.Likewise,appealsmayberetainedifthequestionsinvolvedarelikelytoarisefrequentlyinthefutureunlesstheyaresettledbyacourtoflastresort.

Thus,inGonzalesvs.CommissiononElections,6anactionfordeclaratoryjudgmentimpugningthevalidityofRepublicActNo.4880whichprohibitstheearlynominationofcandidatesforelectiveofficesandearlyelectioncampaignsorpartisanpolitical activities became moot by reason of the holding of the 1967 elections before decision could be rendered.Nonetheless theCourt treated the petition as one for prohibition and rendered judgment in view of "the paramount publicinterestandtheundeniablenecessityforaruling,thenationalelections[of1969]beingbarelysixmonthsaway.

InKrivenkovs.RegisterofDeeds,7theCourtdeniedthepetitiontowithdraw,anappealinviewofthepublicimportanceof the questions involved, and lest "the constitutional mandate [proscribing the sale of lands to aliens] ... be ignored ormisconceivedwithalltheharmfulconsequences...uponthenationaleconomy."

The petitioner Diokno has made allegations to the effect that the President has "arrogated" unto himself thepowersofgovernmentby "usurping" thepowersofCongressand "ousting" thecourtsof their jurisdiction, thusestablishinginthiscountrya"virtualdictatorship."DioknoandhisCounselhaveinfactstressedthatthepresenttrendofeventsinthiscountrysincetheproclamationofmartial lawbearsaresemblancetothetrendofeventsthatledtotheestablishmentofadictatorshipinGermanyunderHitler.Thereisthusaprofoundpublicinterestintheresolutionofthequestionsraisedinthecasesatbar,questionsthat,inthephraseofChiefJusticeMarshallinMarburyvs.Madison,8are "deeply interesting to the nation." I apprehend that in view of the import of the allegationsmadebyDioknoandhis counsel, incalculableharmor, in the very least, greatdisservicemaybecaused to thenationalinterest if thesecasesarenotdecidedon themerits.As theSolicitorGeneralhasobserved,"petitioner's [Diokno's]arrestanddetentionhavebeensoexploitedinthehatecampaignthattheonlywaytoprotecttheintegrityofthegovernmentistoinsist on a decision of this case in the forum inwhich the petitioner had chosen to bring them.Otherwise, like festeringsores,theissuesstirredupbythislitigationwillcontinuetoagitatethenation."

Prescindingfromthepolicyconsiderationsjustdiscussed,IamgladdenedthattheCourthasnotshuntedaside

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what I regardas the inescapablemoralconstraints in thepetitionerDiokno'smotion towithdrawhispetition forhabeascorpus.9TheCourt repudiated the facile recourseofavoidingresolutionof the issueson thepretext thatDioknoinsists onwithdrawing his petition. It is thus not amere happenstance that, notwithstanding that sevenmembers of theCourtareoftheviewthatDioknohasanabsoluterighttowithdrawhispetition,theCourthasconfrontedtheissuesposedby him, and now resolves them squarely, definitively and courageously. No respectable legal historian or responsiblechroniclerofthenation'sdestinywillthereforehaveanyreasontoleveltheindictmentthatonceuponagravenationalcrisistheCourtabdicated itsconstitutionalprerogativeofadjudicationandforsworethesacredtrustreposed in itas thenation'sultimatearbiterontranscendental,farreachingjusticiablequestions.

Withrespecttothereasonsgivenforthemotiontowithdraw,theCourtismindfulthatithastakensometimetoresolvethesecases.Inexplanationletitbesaidthattheissuespresentedforresolutioninthesecasesareoftheutmost gravity and delicateness. No question of the awesome magnitude of those here presented has everconfrontedtheCourtinallitshistory.Iamnotawarethatanyothercourt,exceptpossiblytheCircuitCourtinExparteMerryman, 10 has decided like questions during the period of the emergency that called for the proclamation ofmartiallaw.

But then inMerrymantheCourt thereheld thatunder theU.S.FederalConstitution thePresidentdidnothavepowertosuspendtheprivilegeof thewritofhabeascorpus.Otherwise,where thequestion involvednotpowerbutrathertheexerciseofpower,courtshavedeclinedtoruleagainstthedulylasted.AsCourtGlendonSchubertnoted,theU.S.SupremeCourt"wasunwillingto[doso]untilthewarwasoverandLincolnwasdead."

Thus, inEx parte Milligan, 11 the decision voiding the petitioner's trial by a military court was not announced untilDecember14,1866,aftertheCivilWarwasover.TheCivilWarbeganonMay3,1861withthecaptureofFortSumterbyConfederate forces. Lambdin Milligan was charged before a military commission with aiding rebels, inciting insurrection,disloyal practicesand violationof the lawsofwar.His trial ran fromSeptember toDecember1862 hewas convictedonOctober21,1864andorderedexecutedonMay19,1865.OnMay10,1865heappliedforawritofhabeascorpusfromtheCircuit Court of Indianapolis. OnMay 11, Justice Davis and JudgeMcDonald certified that they differed in opinion and,therefore, pursuant to the statute of 1802, elevated their questions to the Supreme Court. On June 3, 1865 the deathsentence was commuted to life imprisonment by President Johnson who had succeeded to the Presidency after theassassinationofLincoln.TheSupremeCourtheardtheparties'argumentsforeightdays,onMarch5,6,7,8,9,12and13,andApril3,1866.OnDecember14,1866thedecisionoftheSupremeCourtvoidingMilliganstrialwasannounced.

InInReMoyer,12martialrulewasproclaimedinColoradoonMarch23,1904.Applicationforawritofhabeascorpuswasfiled with the State Supreme Court on April 14, 1904, seeking the release of Moyer who had been detained under theColoradogovernor'sproclamation.OnJune6, 1904 the complaintwasdismissedand thepetitionerwas remanded to thecustody of themilitary authorities. The Court held that as an incident to the proclamation ofmartial law, the petitioner'sarrestanddetentionwerelawful.MoyersubsequentlybroughtanactionfordamagesforhisimprisonmentfromMarch30toJune15,1904.ThecomplaintwasdismissedbytheCircuitCourt.Onwritoferror,theU.S.SupremeCourtaffirmed,holdingthat "So long as such arrests aremade in good faith and in the honest belief that they are needed in order to head theinsurrectionoff,thegovernoristhefinaljudgeandcannotbesubjectedtoanactionafterheisoutofoffice,onthegroundthathehadnoreasonablegroundforhisbelief."13

Finally,inDuncanvs.Kahanamoku,14Hawaiiwasplacedundermartial ruleonDecember7,1941,after theJapanesesneakattackonPearlHarbor.ThepetitionerDuncanwas triedbyaprovost court onMarch2,1944,and foundguiltyonApril 13 of assault on twomarine sentries. The other petitioner,White, was charged on August 25, 1942, also before aprovostcourt,withembezzlingstocksbelongingtoanothercivilian.WhiteandDuncanquestionedthepowerofthemilitarytribunals inpetitionsforhabeascorpusfiledwiththeDistrictCourtofHawaiionMarch14andApril14,1944,respectively.WritsweregrantedonMay2,1944,andafter trial theDistrictCourtheld themilitary trialsvoidandordered thereleaseofDuncan and White. On October 24, 1944 the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was restored and martial law wasterminated in Hawaii. On appeal, the decision of the District Court was reversed. 15Certiorariwas granted by the U.S.SupremeCourtonFebruary12,1945.16OnFebruary25,1946 theCourtheld that the trialsofWhiteandDuncanby themilitarytribunalswerevoid.

In truth,as theCourt inMilliganrecognized, itsdecisioncouldnothavebeenmadewhile theCivilWar lasted.JusticeDaviswrote:

DuringtheWickedRebellion,thetemperofthetimesdidnotallowthatcalmnessindeliberationanddiscussionsonecessarytoacorrectconclusionofapurelyjudicialquestion.Then,considerationsofsafety were mingled with the exercise of power and feelings and interests prevailed which arehappilyterminated.Nowthatthepublicsafetyisassured,thisquestionaswellasallothers,canbediscussedanddecidedwithoutpassionortheadmixtureofanclementnotrequiredtoforma legaljudgment.Weapproachedtheinvestigationofthiscasefullysensibleofthemagnitudeoftheinquiryandtheoffullandcautiousdeliberation.17

No doubt there is a point, although controversial, in the observation that in the instances just examined asuccessfulchallengewaspossibleonlyretroactively,afterthecessationofthehostilitieswhichwouldunderanycircumstanceshavejustifiedthejudgmentofthemilitary.18

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Nordid it offendagainst principleorethics for themembersof thisCourt to takeanoath to support the1973Constitution. After this Court declared that, with the dismissal of the petitions questioning the validity of theratification of the new Constitution, there was "no longer any judicial obstacle to the new Constitution beingconsidered in force and effect," 19 it became the duty of the members of the Court, let alone all other governmentfunctionaries,totakeanoathtosupportthenewConstitution.Whileitistruethatamajorityofsixjusticesdeclaredthatthe1973Constitutionwasnotvalidlyratified,itisequallytruethatamajorityofsixjusticesheldthattheissueofitseffectivitywasapoliticalquestion,whichtheCourtwasnotequippedtodetermine,dependingasitdidonfactorsforwhichthejudicialprocesswas not fit to resolve. Resolution of this questionwas dispositive of all the issues presented in theRatificationCases.ItthusbecameuntenableforthemembersoftheCourtwhoheldcontraryopinionstopresstheiroppositionbeyondthedecisionofthosecases.FundamentalrespectfortheruleoflawdictatedthatthemembersoftheCourttakeanoathtoupholdthenewConstitution.Thereisnothinginthatsolemnoaththatdebasestheir individualpersonal integrityorrendersthem unworthy or incapable of doing justice in these cases. Nor did the environmental milieu of their adjuration in anymannerdemeantheirhighofficesordetractfromthelegitimacyoftheCourtasthehighestjudicialcollegiumoftheland.

III

From itsAngloSaxonoriginand throughout itsslowevolution, theconcept,scopeandboundaries,application,limitationsandotherfacetsofmartiallawhavebeenthesubjectofmisunderstanding,controversyanddebate.20Tothelegalscholarinterestedinsetlegalprinciplesandprecisedistinctions,martiallawcouldbeafrustratingsubject.Onthematterofitsdefinitionalone,itisknowntohaveasmanydefinitionsastherearenumerousauthorsandcourtdecisions(nottodiscountthedissentingopinions)onthesubject.Thedoctrinaldevelopmentofmartiallawhasreliedmainlyoncaselaw,21and there have been relatively few truly distinctive types of occasionswheremartial law, being the extraordinaryremedythatitis,hasbeenresortedto.

In thePhilippines, theonlyothernotable instancewhenmartial lawwasdeclaredwasonSeptember22,1944,perProclamationNo.29promulgatedbyPresidentJoseP.Laurel.Butthiswaspursuanttotheconstitutionoftheshortlived Japanese Occupation Republic, and the event has not been known to be productive of anyjurisprudentialpronouncementsemanatingfromthehighcourtoftheland.

Notwithstanding theconfusedstateof jurisprudenceon thesubjectofmartial law inEnglandand in theUnitedStates,and,consequently,inthePhilippines,ausefulknowledgeofthelawonthesubjectcanfairlybehadfroma study of its historical background and its rationale, its doctrinal development, applicable constitutional andstatutoryprovisions,andauthoritativecourtdecisionsandcommentaries.

LegalscholarstracethegenesisofmartiallawtoEnglandstartingfromtheageoftheTudorsandtheStuartsinthe 14th century when it was first utilized for the suppression of rebellions and disorders. It later came to beemployed in theBritishcoloniesanddominionswhere its frequentexerciseagainstBritishsubjectsgaverise tothecriticismthatitwasbeingexploitedasaweapontoenhanceBritishimperialism.22

IntheUnitedStates,martial lawwasdeclaredonnumerousoccasionsfromtherevolutionaryperiodtotheCivilWar,andafter the turnof thecentury.Oneof theearliest instances inAmericanhistorywas thedeclarationofmartial lawbyGen.AndrewJacksonbefore theBattle ofNewOrleans in 1814.Fearing that theNewOrleanslegislaturemight capitulate to the British, he placed the State under "strictmartial law" and forbade the Statelegislature toconvene.Martial lawwas liftedafter theAmericanvictoryoverBritisharms.TheCivilWarperiodsawthedeclarationofmartial lawonmanyoccasionsbyboththeConfederateandtheUnionauthorities.Ithasalso been resorted to in cases of insurrection and rebellion, as exemplified by theWhiskey rebellion (1794 inPennsylvania andVirginia) and theDorr's rebellion (1842 inRhode Island).Martial law has also been utilizedduring periods of disaster, such as the San Francisco earthquake and fire of 1906, and in industrial disputesinvolvingviolenceanddisorder.Ithaslikewisebeenvariouslyinstitutedtopoliceelections,totakechargeofticketsalesatafootballgame,topreventtheforeclosureofmortgagestoclosearacetrack.Inanextremecase,thegovernorofGeorgiaproclaimedmartial lawaroundagovernmentbuildingtoexcludefromitspremisesapublicofficialwhomhewasenjoinedfromremoving.23

AtthecloseoftheWorldWarI,theterm"martiallaw"waserroneouslyemployedtorefertothelawadministeredinenemyterritoryoccupiedbythealliedforcespendingthearmistice.21WilliamWinthropstatesthattheearlierconfusionregardingtheconceptofmartiallaw,resultingpartlyfromthewrongdefinitionofthetermbytheDukeofWellingtonwhohad said that "it is nothingmorenor less than thewill of thegeneral," hadmisledeven theSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates.25IntheleadingcaseofExParteMilligan,26however,ChiefJusticeChase,inhisdissentingopinion,clarifiedandlaiddowntheclassicdistinctionsbetweenthetypesofmilitaryjurisdiction inrelationtotheterms"martiallaw,""militarylaw"and"militarygovernment,"whichtoagreatextentclearedtheconfusionintheapplicationoftheseterms.

These distinctionswere later incorporated in theManual forCourtsMartial of theUnitedStatesArmy, 27 afterwhichtheManualforCourtsMartialoftheArmedForcesofthePhilippines,promulgatedonDecember17,1938pursuanttoExecutiveOrderNo.178,waspatterned.Inessence,thesedistinctionsareasfollows:

a.Military jurisdiction in relation to the termmilitary law is that exercised by a government "in the

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executionofthatbranchof itsmunicipal lawwhichregulatesitsmilitaryestablishment."(IntheU.S.and the Philippines, this refers principally to the statutes which embody the rules of conduct anddisciplineofmembersof their respectivearmed forces. In thePhilippineswehave for thispurposeCommonwealthActNo.408,asamended,otherwiseknownas"TheArticleofWar").

b.Militaryjurisdictioninrelationtothetermmartiallawisthatexercisedintimeofrebellionandcivilwarbyagovernmenttemporarilygoverningthecivilpopulationofalocalitythroughitsmilitaryforces,withouttheauthorityofwrittenlaw,asnecessitymayrequire.28

c.Militaryjurisdictioninrelationtothe termmilitarygovernment is that"exercisedbyabelligerentoccupyinganenemy's territory."29 (A familiar example of amilitary governmentwas, of course, that established andadministeredbytheJapanesearmedforcesinthePhilippinesfrom1942to1945).

What is the universally accepted fundamental justification ofmartial law?Wiener inAPracticalManualMartialLaw,30venturesthisjustification:"MartialLawisthepubliclawofnecessity.Necessitycallsitforth,necessityjustifiesitsexistence,andnecessitymeasurestheextentanddegreetowhichitmaybeemployed."

Martial law is founded upon the principle that the state has a right to protect itself against those who woulddestroy it, and has therefore been likened to the right of the individual to selfdefense. 31 It is invoked as anextrememeasure,andrestsuponthebasicprinciplethateverystatehasthepowerofselfpreservation,apowerinherentinallstates,becauseneitherthestatenorsocietywouldexistwithoutit.32

IV

Inowproceedtodiscusstheissuesposedinthesecases.

InProclamation1081,datedSeptember21,1972,thePresidentofthePhilippinesdeclaredthatlawlesselements,supported by a foreign power, were in "armed insurrection and rebellion against the Government of thePhilippines in order to forcibly seize political and state power, overthrow the duly constituted government andsupplantourexistingpolitical,social,economicandlegalorderwithanentirelynewone...basedontheMarxistLeninistMaoistteachingsandbeliefs."Heenumeratedmanyandvariedactsofviolencecommittedinpursuanceof the insurrectionandrebellion.He thereforeplaced thePhilippinesundermartial law,commanded thearmedforcestosuppresstheinsurrectionandrebellion,enforceobediencetohisdecrees,ordersandregulations,andarrest and detain those engaged in the insurrection and rebellion or in other crimes "in furtherance or on theoccasionthereof,orincidenttheretoorinconnectiontherewith."ThePresidentinvokedhispowersunderarticleVIIsection10(2)ofthe1935Constitution"tosavetheRepublicandreformoursociety."33

ByGeneralOrderNo.2thePresidentdirectedtheSecretaryofNationalDefenseto"forthwitharrestorcausethearrest... theindividualsnamedintheattachedlistsforbeingparticipantsorforhavinggivenaidandcomfort intheconspiracy toseizepoliticalandstatepower in thecountryand to takeover thegovernmentby force ... inordertopreventthemfromfurthercommittingactsthatareinimicalorinjurious..."TheSecretarywasdirectedtohold in custody the individuals so arrested "until otherwise so ordered by me or by my duly designatedrepresentative."Thearrestanddetentionofthepetitionersinthesecasesappeartohavebeenmadepursuanttothisorder.

IcannotblinkawaythestarkfactofacontinuingCommunistrebellioninthePhilippines.TheCourthasrepeatedlytakencognizanceof this fact inseveraleasesdecidedby it. In1971, inLansangvs.Garcia, 34 the Court, afterreviewing thehistoryof theCommunistmovement in thecountrysince the1930s,concluded:"Weentertain, therefore,nodoubtsabout theexistenceofasizeablegroupofmenwhohavepublicly risen inarms tooverthrow thegovernmentandhavethusbeenandstillareengagedinrebellionagainsttheGovernmentofthePhilippines."Itaffirmedthisfindingin197235insustainingthevalidityoftheAntiSubversionAct(RepublicAct1700).TheActisitselfacongressionalrecognitionandacute awareness of the continuing threat of Communist subversion to democratic institutions in this country. Enacted in1957,ithasremainedinthestatutebooksdespiteperiodicagitationinmanyquartersforitstotalexcision.

Attimestherebellionrequirednomorethanordinarypoliceaction,coupledwithcriminalprosecutions.Thusthe1932CommunisttrialsresultedintheconvictionofthewellknownCommunistsoftheday:CrisantoEvangelista,Jacinto G. Manahan, Dominador J. Ambrosio, Guillermo Capadocia, Ignacio Nabong and Juan Feleo, amongothers,forcrimesrangingfromillegalassociationtorebellionandsedition.36

TheendofWorldWar II saw the resurgenceof theCommunist rebellion.Nowwithanarmy forgedoutof theformer Hukbalahaps (the armed resistance against the Japanese) and renamed Hukbong Mapagpalaya ngBayanorHMB,thethreattothesecurityofthestatebecamesomalevolentthatonOctober22,1950,PresidentElpidioQuirinowasimpelledtosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus.ThisenabledtheGovernmentto effect the apprehension of top Communist Party leaders Guillermo Capadocia, Flavio Nava, Amado V.Hernandez,JesusLava,JoseLava,AngelBakingandSimeonRodriguez,amongothers.37When challengedbyoneofthosedetainedunderthePresidentialproclamationthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpuswas

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sustainedbytheCourt.38

The beginning of the 1970swasmarked by the rise of student activism. This phenomenon swept around theglobe, and did not spare our own colleges and universities. Soon the campuses became staging grounds forstudentdemonstrationsthatgenerallyendedinbloodyandnotinfrequentlylethalstreetriots.

InNavarrovs.Villegas,39inupholdingthepoweroftheMayorofManilatodeterminetheplaceandtimefortheholdingofpublicassemblies,thisCourtnoted

That experiences in connection with present assemblies and demonstrations do not warrant theCourt'sdisbelievingrespondentMayor'sappraisalthatapublicrallyatPlazaMiranda,ascomparedtooneattheSunkenGardensashesuggested,posesaclearerandmoreimminentdangerofpublicdisorders, breaches of the peace, criminal acts, and even bloodshed as an aftermath of suchassemblies,andpetitionerhasmanifestedthatithasnomeansofpreventingsuchdisorders

That, consequently, every time that such assemblies are announced, the community is placed insuchastateof fearand tension thatofficesareclosedearlyandemployeesdismissedstorefrontsboardedup,classessuspended,andtransportationdisruptedtothegeneraldetrimentofthepublic.

Ridingonthecrestofstudentunrest,theCommunistrebelliongainedmomentum.AstheCourtnotedinLansangvs.Garcia,40

[T]he reorganized Communist Party of the Philippines has, moreover, adopted Mao's concept ofprotracted people's war, aimed at the paralyzation of the will to resist of the government, of thepolitical, economic and intellectual leadership, and of the people themselves that conformably tosuchconceptthePartyhasplacedspecialemphasisuponmostextensiveandintensiveprogramofsubversionby theestablishmentof frontorganizations inurbancenters, theorganizationofarmedcitypartisansandtheinfiltrationinstudentgroups,laborunions,andfarmerandprofessionalgroupsthat theCPPhasmanaged to infiltrateorestablishandcontrolnine (9)major labororganizationsthatithasexploitedtheyouthmovementandsucceededinmakingCommunistfrontsofeleven(11)major student or youth organizations that there are, accordingly, about thirty (30) massorganizations actively advancing the CPP interests, among which are theMalayang Samahan ngMagsasaka (MASAKA) the Kabataang Makabayan (KM), the Movement for the Advancement ofNationalism (MAN), theSamahangDemokratikongKabataan (SDK), theSamahangMolave (SM),andtheMalayangPagkakaisangKabataangPilipino(MPKP)that,asofAugust,1971,theKMhadtwohundredfortyfive(245)operationalchaptersthroughoutthePhilippines,ofwhichseventythree(73)wereintheGreaterManilaArea,sixty(60)inNorthernLuzon,fortynine(49)inCentralLuzon,fortytwo(42)intheVisayasandtwentyone(21)inMindanaoandSuluthatin1970,thePartyhadrecordedtwohundredfiftyeight(258)majordemonstrations,ofwhichaboutthirtythreei33)endedin violence, resulting in fifteen (15) killed and over five hundred (500) injured thatmost of theseactionswereorganized,coordinatedorledbytheaforementionedfrontorganizationsthattheviolentdemonstrationsweregenerally instigatedbyasmall,butwelltrainedgroupofarmedagitatorsthatthenumberofdemonstrationsheretoforestakedin1971hasalreadyexceededthosein1970andthat twentyfour(24)of thesedemonstrationswereviolent,andresulted in thedeathof fifteen(15)personsandtheinjuryofmanymore.

Themounting levelof violencenecessitated thesuspension, for thesecond time,of theprivilegeof thewritofhabeascorpusonAugust21,1971.TheGovernment'sactionwasquestionedinLansangvs.Garcia.ThisCourtfound that the intensification and spread of Communist insurgency imperiled the state. The events after thesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritconfirmedthealarmingextentofthedangertopublicsafety:

Subsequenteventsasreportedhavealsoproventhatpetitioner'scounselhaveunderestimatedthethreattopublicsafetyposedbytheNewPeople'sArmy.Indeed,itappearsthat,sinceAugust21,1971,ithadinNorthernLuzonsix(6)encountersandstagedone(1)raid,inconsequenceofwhichseven(7)soldierslosttheirlivesandtwo(2)otherswerewounded,whereastheinsurgentssufferedfive(5)casualtiesthatonAugust26,1971,awellarmedgroupofNPA,trainedbydefectorLt.VictorCorpus,attackedtheverycommandpostofTFLAWINinIsabela,destroyingtwo(2)helicoptersandone (1)plane,andwoundingone (1)soldier that theNPAhad inCentralLuzona totalof four (4)encounters,with two(2)killedandthree(3)woundedonthesideof theGovernment,one(1)KMSDK leader, an unidentified dissident, and Commander Panchito, leader of dissident group, werekilled that on August 26, 1971, there was an encounter in the Barrio of San Pedro, Iriga City,CamarinesSur,betweenthePCandtheNPA,inwhichaPCandtwo(2)KMmemberswerekilledthat the current disturbances in Cotabato and the Lanao provinces have been rendered morecomplex by the involvement of the CPP/NPA for, in mid1971, a KM group headed by JovencioEsparagoza,contactedtheHigaonantribes,intheirsettlementinMagsaysay,MisamisOriental,andofferedthembooks,pamphletsandbrochuresofMaoTseTung,aswellasconductedteachinsin

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thereservationthatEsparagozawasreportedlykilledonSeptember22,1971,inanoperationofthePCinsaidreservationandthattherearenowtwo(2)NPAcadresinMindanao.

It should, also, be noted that adherents of the CPP and its front organization are accordingly tointelligence findings, definitely capable of preparing powerful explosives out of locally availablematerials that the bomb used in the Constitutional Convention Hall was a 'clay more' mine, apowerfulexplosivedeviceusedbytheU.S.ArmbelievedtohavebeenoneofmanypilferedfromtheSubicNavalBaseafewdaysbeforethatthePresidenthadreceivedintelligenceinformationtotheeffect that therewasaJulyAugustPlan involvingawaveofassassinations,kidnappings, terrorismandmissdestructionofpropertyandthatanextraordinaryoccurrencewouldsignalthebeginningofsaideventthattheratherseriousconditionofpeaceandorderinMindanao,particularlyinCotabatoand Lanao, demanded the presence therein of forces sufficient to cope with the situation that asizeable part of our armed forces discharges other functions and that the expansion of the CPPactivities from Central Luzon to other parts of the country particularly Manila and its suburbs theCagayanValley,Ifugao,Zambales,Laguna,QuezonandBicolRegion,requiredthattherestofourarmedforcesbespreadthinoverawidearea.41

By virtue of these findings, the Court, led by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, unanimously upheld thesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus.TheCourtsaid:

ConsideringthatthePresidentwasinpossessionoftheabovedataexceptthoserelatedtoeventsthathappenedafterAugust21,1971whenthePlazaMirandaprompting,tookplace,theCourtisnotpreparedtoheldthattheExecutivehadactedarbitrarilyorgravelyabusedhisdiscretionwhenhethenconcludedthatpublicsafetyandnationalsecurityrequiredthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewrit,particularly if theNPAwere tostrikesimultaneouslywithviolentdemonstrationsstagedby thetwo hundred fortyfive (245) KM chapters, all over the Philippines, with the assistance andcooperationofthedozensofCPPfrontorganizations,andthebombingofwatermainsandconduits,aswellaselectricpowerplantsandinstallationsapossibilitywhich,nomatterhowremote,hewasboundtoforestall,andadangerhewasunderobligationtoanticipateandatrest.

Hehadconsultedhisadvisersandsought theirviews.Hehadreasontofeel that thesituationwascriticalas,indeed,itwasanddemandedimmediateaction.Thishetookbelievingingoodfaiththat public safety required it. And, in the light of the circumstances adverted to above, he hadsubstantialgroundstoentertainsuchbelief."42

ThesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritwasliftedonJanuary7,1972,butsoonthereafterchaosengulfedthenationagain.A largeareaof thecountrywas inopen rebellion.Theauthorityof theGovernmentwas frontallychallenged by a coalition of forces. It was against this backdrop of violence and anarchy thatmartial lawwasproclaimedonSeptember21,1972.

PersonallyItakenoticeofthiscondition,inadditiontowhattheCourthasfoundincasesthathavecometoitfordecision,andthereisnocogentreasonformetosayasamatteroflawthatthePresidentexceededhispowersindeclaringmartial law.NordoIbelievethattheSolicitorGeneral'smanifestationofMay13,1974totheeffectthatwhileon thewhole themilitarychallenge to theRepublichasbeenovercome therearestill largeareasofconflictwhichwarrantthecontinuedimpositionoflaw,canbesatisfactorilycontrovertedbyorbyanyperceptiveobserverofthenationalscene.

AsIwillpointoutinthisopinion,thefactthatcourtsareopenbeacceptedasproofthattherebellionandwhichcompellinglycalledforthedeclarationofmartiallaw,nolongerimperilthepublicsafety.Norarethemanysurfaceindicia adverted to by the petitioners (the increase in the number of tourists, the choice of Manila as theconferencesandofaninternationalbeautycontest)toberegardedasevidencethatthethreattopublicsafehasabated.Thereisactualarmedcombat,attendedbythesomberpanoplywar,raginginSuluandCotabato,nottonot mention the region and Cagayan Valley. 43 I am hard put to say, therefore, that the Government's claim isbaseless.

Iamnotinsensitivetothepleamadehereinthenameofindividualliberty.ButtoparaphraseExparteMoyer,44ifitwerethelibertyaloneofthepetitionerDioknothatis.inissuewewouldprobablyresolvethedoubtinhisfavorandgranthisapplication.ButtheSolicitorGeneral,whomustbedeemedtorepresentthePresidentandtheExecutiveDepartmentinthis case, 45 has manifested that in the President's judgment peace and tranquility cannot be speedily restored in thecountry unless the petitioners and others like themmeantime remain inmilitary custody. For, indeed, the centralmatterinvolvedisnotmerelythelibertyofisolatedindividuals,butthecollectivepeace,tranquilityandsecurityoftheentirenation.V.

The1935ConstitutioncommittedtothePresidentthedeterminationofthepublicexigencyorexigenciesrequiringtheproclamationofmartiallaw.ItprovidedinarticleVII,section10(2)that

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ThePresident shall becommanderinchiefofall armed forcesof thePhilippinesand,whenever itbecomesnecessary,hemaycalloutsucharmedforcestopreventorsuppresslawlessviolence,46invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or eminent danger thereof,when thepublicsafety requires it,hemaysuspend theprivilegesof thewritofhabeascorpus,or place thePhilippinesoranypartthereofundermartiallaw.47

In the1934ConstitutionalConvention itwasproposed tovest thepower tosuspend theprivilegeof thewritofhabeascorpusintheNationalAssembly.Theproposal,sponsoredbyDelegateAraneta,wouldgivethispowertothe President only in cases where the Assembly was not in session and then only with the consent of theSupremeCourt.ButthemajorityofthedelegatesentertainedthefearthattheGovernmentwouldbepowerlessinthefaceofdanger.48TheyrejectedtheAranetaproposalandadoptedinsteadtheprovisionsof theJonesLawof1916.TheframersoftheConstitutionrealizedtheneedforastrongExecutive,andthereforechosetoretaintheprovisionsoftheformerorganicacts,49which,adaptedtotheexigenciesofcolonialadministration,naturallymadetheGovernorGeneralastrongExecutive.

Construing a similar provision of the Philippine Bill of 1902 which authorized the Governor General, with theapprovalof thePhilippineCommission, tosuspendtheprivilegeof thewritofhabeascorpus"when incasesofrebellion, insurrection,or invasion thepublicsafetymayrequire it," thisCourtheld that theGovernorGeneral'sfindingastothenecessityforsuchactionwas"conclusiveandfinal"onthejudicialdepartment.50This rulingwasaffirmedin1952inMontenegrovs.Castaeda,51thisCourtstatingthat

the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring, the suspension belongs to thePresidentand'hisdecisionisfinalandconclusive'uponthecourtsanduponallotherpersons.

It is true that inLansang vs.Garcia 52 there is language that appears to detract from the uniform course of judicialconstructionoftheCommanderinChiefClause.Butaclosereadingoftheopinioninthatcaseshowsthatinthemaintherewasadherence toprecedents.Tobesure, theCourt thereasserted thepower to inquire into the "existenceof the factualbases [for thesuspensionof theprivilegeof thewritofhabeascorpus] inorder todetermine thesufficiency thereof,"ButthisbroadassertionofpowerisqualifiedbytheCourt'sunambiguousstatementthat"thefunctionoftheCourtis,merelytochecknot tosupplanttheExecutive,or toascertainmerelywhetherhehasgonebeyond theconstitutional limitsofhis jurisdiction,not toexercise thepowervested inhimor todetermine thewisdomofhisact."For this reason thisCourtannounced that the testwasnotwhether thePresident actedcorrectlybutwhether he acted arbitrarily. In fact thisCourtreadBarcelonandMontenegroasauthorizingjudicialinquiryinto"whetherornottherereallywasarebellion,asstatedintheproclamationthereincontested."

OfcoursethejudicialdepartmentcandeterminetheexistenceoftheconditionsfortheexerciseofthePresident'spowersand isnotboundby the recitalsofhisproclamation.Butwhether in thecircumstancesobtainingpublicsafetyrequiresthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusortheproclamationofmartial lawisinitially for thePresident to decide.Considerationsof commitment of thepower to theexecutivebranchof theGovernmentandthelackofacceptedstandardsfordealingwithincommensurablefactors,suggestthewisdomofconsidering thePresident's findingas tonecessitypersuasiveupon thecourts.Thisconclusionresults fromthenatureofthepowervestedinthePresidentandfromtheevidentobjectcontemplated.Forthatpowerisintendedto enable the Government to cope with sudden emergencies and meet great occasions of state undercircumstancesthatmaybecrucialtothelifeofthenation.53

The fact thatcourtsareopenand in theunobstructeddischargeof their functions ispointed toasproofof theabsenceofanyjustificationformartiallaw.TherulinginMilligan54andDuncan55isinvoked.InbothcasestheU.S.SupremeCourt reversed convictions bymilitary commissions. InMilligan theCourt stated that "martial law cannot arisefrom a threatened invasion. The necessitymust be actual and present, the invasion real, such as effectually closes thecourtsanddeposes theciviladministration." InDuncanasimilarexpressionwasmade: "Thephrase 'martial law' ...whileintendedtoauthorizethemilitarytoactvigorouslyforthemaintenanceofanorderlycivilgovernmentandforthedefenseofthe Islands against actual or threatened rebellion or invasion,was not intended to authorize the supplanting of courts bymilitarytribunals."

ButMilliganandDuncanweredecidedonthebasisofawidelydisparateconstitutionalprovision.Whatismore,totheextentthattheymayberegardedasembodyingwhatthepetitionerscallan"opencourt"theory,theyareofdoubtfulapplicabilityinthecontextofpresentdaysubversion.

Unlike thedetailed provisionof ourConstitution, theU.S.FederalConstitution doesnot explicitly authorize theU.S. President to proclaim martial law. It simply states in its article II, section 2 that "the President shall beCommanderinChiefof theArmyandNavyof theUnitedStates,andof theMilitiaof theseveralStates,whencalled into the actual Service of the United States. ..." On the other hand, our Constitution authorizes theproclamation ofmartial law in casesnot only of actual invasion, insurrection or rebellion but also of "imminentdanger"thereof.

ItistruethatinDuncantheU.S.SupremeCourtdealtwithaU.S.statutethatintermswassimilartothePhilippine

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Constitution. Section 67 of the HawaiianOrganic Act provided that "[the Territorial Governor] may, in case ofinvasion,or imminentdangerthereof,whenpublicsafetyrequiresit,suspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus, or place the Territory, or any part thereof undermartial law until communication can be hadwith thePresident[oftheUnitedStates]andhisdecisionthereofmadeknown."InfacttheHawaiianOrganicAct,thatofPuertoRico,andtheJoneslawof1916,fromwhichlatterlaw,asIhaveearliernoted,theCommanderinChiefClause of our Constitution was adopted, were part of the legislation of the U.S. Congress during the colonialperiod.But again, unlike the Jones Law, theHawaiianOrganicAct also provided in its section 5 that theU.S.FederalConstitution"shallhavethesameforceandeffect intheterritory[ofHawaii]aselsewhereintheUnitedStates.ForthisreasonitwasheldinDuncanthat"imminentdanger"ofinvasionorrebellionwasnotagroundforauthorizingthetrialofciviliansbyamilitarytribunal.HadDuncanbeendecidedsolelyonthebasisofsection67ofthe Hawaiian Organic Act and had the petitioners in that case been tried for offenses connected with theprosecutionofthewar,56theprisonsentencesimposedbythemilitarytribunalswouldinallprobabilityhadbeenupheld.As a matter of fact those who argued in Duncan that the power of the Hawaiian governor to proclaim martial lawcomprehended not only actual rebellion or invasion but also "imminent danger thereof" were faced with the problem ofreconciling, thetwopartsof theHawaiianOrganicAct.Theycontendedthat"ifanypaintofsection67wouldotherwisebeunconstitutionalsection5mustbeconstruedasextendingthe[U.S.]ConstitutiontoHawaiisubject tothequalificationsorlimitationscontainedinsection67."57

Forsooth,ifthepowertoproclaimmartiallawisatallrecognizedinAmericanfederalconstitutionallaw,itisonlybyimplicationfromthenecessityofselfpreservationandthensubjecttothenarrowestpossibleconstruction.

NoristhereanyStateConstitutionintheUnitedStates,astheappendedlist indicates(seeAppendix),which inscope and explicitness can compare with the CommanderinChief Clause of our Constitution. The AlaskaConstitution, for example, authorizes the governor to proclaimmartial lawwhen thepublic safety requires it incaseofrebellionoractualorimminentinvasion.Buteventhenitalsoprovidesthatmartiallawshallnotlastlongerthantwentydaysunlessapprovedbyamajorityofthelegislatureinjointsession.Ontheotherhand,thepresentConstitutionofHawaiidoesnotgranttotheStategovernorthepowertosuspendthewritofhabeascorpusortoproclaimmartiallawasdiditsOrganicActbeforeitsadmissionasaStatetotheAmericanUnion.

An uncritical reading ofMilliganandDuncan is likely to overlook these crucial differences in textual conceptsbetween the Philippine Constitution, on the one hand, and the Federal and State Constitutions of the UnitedStates, on the other. In our case then the inclusion of the "imminent danger" phrase as a ground for thesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusandfor theproclamationofmartial lawwasamatterofdeliberate choiceand renders the languageofMilligan ("martial law cannot arise froma threatened invasion")inappositeandthereforeinapplicable.

ThePhilippineBillof1902providedinitssection2,paragraph7

that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless when in cases ofrebellion,insurrection,orinvasionthepublicsafetymayrequireit,ineitherofwhicheventsthesamemaybesuspendedbythePresident,orbytheGovernorGeneralwiththeapprovalofthePhilippineCommission,whereverduringsuchperiodthenecessityforsuchsuspensionshallexist.

TheJonesLawof1916substantiallyreenactedthisprovision.Thussection3,paragraph7thereofprovided:

That the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases ofrebellion,insurrection,orinvasionthepublicsafetymayrequireit,ineitherofwhicheventsthesamemaybesuspendedby thePresidentorby theGovernorGeneral,whereverduringsuchperiod thenecessityforsuchsuspensionshallexist.

Inaddition,theJonesLawprovidedinitssection21that

... [TheGovernorGeneral]may, incaseofrebellionor invasion,or imminentdangerthereof,whenthepublicsafetyrequiresit,suspendtheprivilegesofthewritofhabeascorpusorplacetheIslands,oranypartthereof,undermartiallaw:ProvidedThatwhenevertheGovernorGeneralshallexercisethis authority, he shall at once notify thePresident of theUnitedStates thereof, togetherwith theattendingfactsandcircumstances,andthePresidentshallhavepowertomodifyorvacatetheactionoftheGovernorGeneral.

Note thatwith respect to thesuspensionof theprivilegeof thewritofhabeascorpus, section 21mentions, asground therefor, "imminent danger" of invasion or rebellion. When the Constitution was drafted in 1934, itsframers, as I have already noted, decided to adopt these provisions of the Jones Law.What was section 3,paragraph7,intheJonesLawbecamesection1(14)ofarticleIII(BillofRights)oftheConstitutionandwhatwassection 21 became article VII, section 10(2) (CommanderinChief Clause). Thus, the Bill of Rights provisionreads:

The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion,

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insurrection,orrebellion,whenthepublicsafetyrequiresit,inanyof'whicheventsthesamemaybesuspendedwhereverduringsuchperiodthenecessityforsuchsuspensionshallexist.

Ontheotherhand,theCommanderinChiefClausestates:

ThePresident shall becommanderinchiefofall armed forcesof thePhilippinesand,whenever itbecomes necessary, hemay call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,invasion,insurrection,orrebellion.Incaseofinvasion,insurrection,orrebellion,orimminentdangerthereof, when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privileges of the writ of habeascorpus,orplacethePhilippinesoranypartthereofundermartiallaw.

The attention of the 1934 Convention was drawn to the apparent inconsistency between the Bill of RightsprovisionandtheCommanderinChiefClause.Somedelegatestriedtoharmonizethetwoprovisionsbyinsertingthe phrase "imminent danger thereof" in the Bill of Rights provision, but on reconsideration the ConventiondeletedthephrasefromthedraftoftheBillofRightsprovision,atthesametimeretainingitintheCommanderinChiefClause.

Whenthisapparentinconsistencywasraisedinasuit58questioningthevalidityofPresidentQuirinosuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus,thisCourtsustainedthePresident'spowertosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritevenonthegroundofimminentdangerofinvasion,insurrectionorrebellion.ItheldthatastheCommanderinChiefClausewaslastintheorderoftimeandlocalpositionitshouldbedeemedcontrolling.ThisrationalizationhasevokedthecriticismthattheConstitutionwasapprovedasawholeandnotinparts,butinresultthedecisioninthatcaseiscertainlyconsistentwiththeconceptionofastrongExecutivetowhichthe1934ConstitutionalConventionwascommitted.

The 1973Constitution likewise authorizes the suspension of the privilege of thewrit ofhabeas corpuson thegroundofimminentdangerofinvasion,insurrectionandrebellion.

The socalled "open court" theory does not apply to the Philippine situation because our 1935 and 1973Constitutions expressly authorize the declaration ofmartial law evenwhere the danger to public safety arisesmerely from the imminenceof invasion, insurrection,or rebellion.Moreover, the theory is toosimplistic forourday,whatwiththeuniversallyrecognizedinsidiousnatureofCommunistsubversionanditscovertoperations.

IndeedthetheoryhasbeendismissedasunrealisticbyperceptivestudentsofPresidentialpowers.

CharlesFairmansays:

Thesemeasuresareunprecedentedbutsoisthedangerthatcalledthemintobeing.Ofcoursewearenotwithoutlaw,evenintimeofcrisis.Yetthecasestowhichoneiscitedinthedigestsdisclosesuch confusion of doctrine as to perplex a lawyer who suddenly tries to find his bearings. HastyrecollectionofExparteMilligan recalls thedictum that 'Martial rulecannotarise froma threatenedinvasion.Thenecessitymustbeactualandpresenttheinvasionreal,suchaseffectuallyclosesthecourtsanddeposestheciviladministration.'NoteventheaerialattackuponPearlHarborclosedthecourtsorofitsownforcedeposedtheciviladministrationyetitwouldbethecommonunderstandingofmenthatthoseagencieswhicharechargedwiththenationaldefensesurelymusthaveauthorityto takeon thespotsomemeasureswhich innormal timeswouldbeultravires. Andwhilst collegesophomoresaretaughtthatthecasestandsasaconstitutionallandmark,thehardfactisthatoflategovernorshavefrequentlydeclared'martiallaw'and'war'andhavebeenjudiciallysustainedintheirmeasures.Undoubtedly,manyofthesecasesinvolvingthesuspensionofstrikerswentmuchtoofar.But justascertainlyso itwillbearguedherethedoctrineof themajority inExparteMilligandoesnotgofarenoughtomeettheconditionsofmodernwar.59

ClintonRossiterwrites:

Itissimplynottruethat'martiallawcannotarisefromathreatenedinvasion,'orthatmartialrulecanneverexistwhere thecourtsareopen.'ThesestatementsdonotpresentanaccuratedefinitionoftheallowablelimitsofthemartialpowersofthePresidentandCongressinthefaceofalienthreatsofinternaldisorder.NorwasDavis'dictumonthespecificpowerofCongress in thismatteranymoreaccurate.And,howevereloquentquotablehiswordsontheuntouchabilityoftheConstitutionintimeofactualcrisis,anddidnotthen,expresstherealitiesofAmericanconstitutionallaw.60

WilliamWinthropmakesthesethoughtfulobservations:

Ithasbeendeclaredby theSupremeCourt inExparteMilligan thatmartial law' is confined to thelocalityofactualwar,'andalso that it 'canneverexistwhen thecourtsareopenand in theproperandunobstructedexerciseoftheirjurisdiction.'Butthisrulingwasmadebyabaremajorityfiveof the court, at a timeof great political excitement and theopinionof the four othermembers, asdeliveredbytheChiefJustice,wastotheeffect thatmartial lawisnotnecessarily limitedtotimeof

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war,butmaybeexercisedatotherperiodsof 'publicdanger,'andthat the fact that thecivilcourtsareopenisnotcontrollingagainstsuchexercise,sincethey 'mightbeopenandundisturbed in theexecutionoftheirfunctionsandyetwhollyincompetenttoavertthreateneddangerortopunishwithadequatepromptitudeandcertaintytheguilty.' It istheopinionoftheauthorthattheof theviewoftheminorityofthecourtisthesounderandmorereasonableone,andthatthedictumofthemajoritywasinfluencedbyaconfusingofmartiallawproperwiththatmilitarygovernmentwhichexistsonlyatatimeandonthetheaterofwar,andwhichwasclearlydistinguishedfrommartial lawbytheChiefJustice in thedissentingopinion the first complete judicialdefinitionof thesubject.61 (emphasissupplied)

InQueen vs. Bekker (on the occasion of the Boer War) Justice Maasdorp categorically affirmed that "theexistenceofcivilcourtsisnoproofthatmartiallawhasbecomeunnecessary.62

VI

Giventhenthevalidityoftheproclamationofmartiallaw,thearrestanddetentionofthosereasonablybelievedtobeengagedinthedisorderor in formenting it iswellnighbeyondquestioning.Negatethepowertomakesucharrestanddetention,andmartiallawwouldbe"mereparade,andratherencourageattackthanrepelit."63Thus,inMoyervs.Peabody,64theCourtsustainedtheauthorityofaStategovernortoholdtemporarilyincustodyonewhomhebelieved tobeengaged in formenting trouble,anddenied recoveryagainst thegovernor for the imprisonment. Itwassaidthat,asthegovernor"maykillpersonswhoresist,"hemayusethemildermeasureofseizingthebodiesofthosewhomheconsiders in thewayof restoringpeace.Sucharrestsarenotnecessarily forpunishment,butarebywayofprecaution topreventtheexerciseofhostilepower.Solongassucharrestsaremadeingoodfaithandinthehonestbeliefthattheyareneededinordertoheadtheinsurrectionoff,theGovernoristhefinaljudgeandcannotbesubjectedtoanactionafterheisoutofofficeonthegroundthathehadnoreasonablegroundforhisbelief."

ItistruethatinSterlingvs.Contantin65thesameCourtsetasidetheactionofaStategovernortakenundermartiallaw.But the decision in that case rested on the ground that the action set aside had no direct relation to the quelling of theuprising.TherethegovernorofTexasissuedaproclamationstatingthatcertaincountieswereinastateofinsurrectionanddeclaringmartiallawinthatterritory.TheproclamationrecitedthattherewasanorganizedgroupofoilandgasproducersininsurrectionagainstconservationlawsoftheStateandthatthisconditionhadbroughtsuchastateofpublicfeelingthat iftheStategovernmentcouldnotprotectthepublic'sinteresttheywouldtakethelawintotheirownhands.Theproclamationfurther recited that itwasnecessary that theRailroadCommissionbegiven time tomakeorders regardingoilproduction.When the Commission issued an order limiting oil production, the complainants brought suit iii the District Court whichissuedrestrainingorders,whereuponGovernorSterlingorderedGeneralWoltersoftheTexasNationalGuardstoenforcealimitonoilproduction.ItwasthisorderoftheStategovernorthattheDistrictCourtenjoined.OnappealtheU.S.SupremeCourt affirmed. After assuming that the governor had the power to declare martial law, the Court held that the orderrestrictingoilproductionwasnotjustifiedbytheexigenciesofthesituation.

... Fundamentally, the question here is not the power of the governor to proclaim that a state ofinsurrection,or tumultor riot,orbreachof thepeaceexists,and that it isnecessary tocallmilitaryforcetotheaidofthecivilpower.Nordoesthequestionrelatetothequellingofdisturbanceandtheovercomingofunlawfulresistancetocivilauthority.ThequestionbeforeusissimplywithrespecttotheGovernor'sattempt to regulatebyexecutiveorder the lawfuluseofcomplainants'properties intheproductionofoil.Insteadofaffordingthemprotectionintheexerciseoftheirrightsasdeterminedbythecourts,hesought,byhisexecutiveorders,tomakethatexerciseimpossible.

On theotherhand,what is involvedhere is thevalidityof thedetentionorderunderwhich thepetitionerswereorderedarrested.Suchorder is, as I havealready stated, a valid incident ofmartial law.With respect to suchquestionConstantinheld that "measures, conceived in good faith, in the face of the emergency and directlyrelatedtothequellingofthedisorderorthepreventionofitscontinuance,fallwithinthediscretionoftheExecutiveintheexerciseofhisauthoritytomaintainpeace."

In thecasesatbar, the respondentshave justified thearrestanddetentionof thepetitionerson thegroundofreasonablebeliefintheircomplicityintherebellionandinsurrection.ExceptDioknoandAquino,allthepetitionershave been released from custody, although subject to defined restrictions regarding personal movement andexpressionofviews.Asthedangertopublicsafetyhasnotabated,IcannotsaythatthecontinueddetentionofDioknoandAquinoandtherestrictionsonthepersonal freedomsof theotherpetitionersarearbitrary, justasIamnotpreparedtosaythatthecontinuedimpositionofmartialruleisunjustified.

AstheColoradoSupremeCourtstatedindenyingthewritofhabeascorpusinMoyer:66

Hisarrestanddetentioninsuchcircumstancesaremerelytopreventhimfromtakingpartoraidinginacontinuationoftheconditionswhichthegovernor,inthedischargeofhisofficialdutiesandintheexerciseoftheauthorityconferredbylaw,isendeavoringtosuppress.

VII

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Whilecourtsmayinquireintoortakejudicialnoticeoftheexistenceofconditionsclaimedtojustifytheexerciseofthe power to declaremartial law, 67 the determination of the necessity for the exercise of such power is within theperipheryoftheconstitutionaldomainofthePresidentandaslongasthemeasureshetakesarereasonablyrelatedtotheoccasioninvolved,interferencebythecourtsisofficious.

IamconfirmedinthisconstructionofPresidentialpowersbytheconsensusofthe1971ConstitutionalConventiontostrengthentheconceptofastrongExecutiveandbytheconfirmationofthevalidityofactstakenordoneaftertheproclamationofmartiallawinthiscountry.The1973Constitutionexpresslyauthorizesthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusaswellas the impositionofmartial lawnotonlyontheoccasionofactualinvasion, insurrectionorrebellion,butalsowherethedangerthereofis imminent.68Acrimoniousdiscussiononthismatterhasthusbecomepointlessandshouldthereforecease.

ThenewConstitutionaswellprovidesthat

All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by theincumbentPresidentshallbepartof the lawof the land,andshall remainvalid, legal,binding,andeffective even after lifting of martial law or the ratification of this constitution, unless modified,revoked,orsupersededbysubsequentproclamations,orders,decrees,instructions,orotheractsofthe incumbent President, or unless expressly aid explicitly modified or repealed by the regularNationalAssembly.69

TheeffectivityofthenewConstitutionisnowbeyondallmannerofdebateinviewoftheCourt'sdecisionintheRatificationCases70aswellasthedemonstratedacquiescencethereinbytheFilipinopeopleinthehistoricJuly1973nationalreferendum.

VIII

It is thus evident that suspension of the privilegeof the writ of habeas corpus is unavoidable subsumed in adeclaration ofmartial law, since one basic objective ofmartial rule is to neutralize effectivelyby arrest andcontinueddetention(andpossiblytrialattheproperandopportunetime)thosewhoarereasonablybelievedtobe in complicity or are particeps criminis in the insurrection or rebellion. That this is so and should be so isineluctabletodenythispostulateistonegatetheveryfundamentalofmartiallaw:thepreservationofsocietyandthesurvivalofthestate.Torecognizetheimperativenessandrealityofmartiallawandatthesametimedissipateits efficacy by withdrawing from its ambit the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is apropositionIregardasfatuousandthereforerepudiate.

Invasionandinsurrection,bothofthemconditionsofviolence,arethefactualprerequisitesofmartiallaw...Therightsofpersonandpropertypresentnoobstructiontotheauthoritiesactingundersucharegime, if the actswhich encroach upon themare necessary to the preservation or restoration ofpublicorderandsafety.Princepset respublicaex justacausapossunt remmeamauferre.All theprocedureswhicharerecognizedadjunctsofexecutivecrisisgovernment...areopentothepersonswhobearofficialauthorityundermartiallaw.Thegovernmentmaywieldarbitrarypowersofpolicetoallaydisorder,arrestanddetainwithouttrialallcitizenstakingpart inthisdisorderandevenpunishthem(inotherwords, suspend the [privilegeof the]writ of habeascorpus), institute searches andseizures without warrant, forbid public assemblies, set curfew hours, suppress all freedom ofexpression, institutecourtsmartial for thesummary trialofcrimesperpetrated in thecourseof thisregimeandcalculatedtodefeatitspurposes...71(emphasissupplied)

Thepointhere iswhethermartial law issimplyashorthandexpressiondenoting thesuspensionofthewrit,orwhethermartiallawinvolvesnotonlythesuspensionofthewritbutmuchmorebesides.... The latter view is probably sounder because martial law certainly in the present state of itsdevelopment, isnotatalldependentonasuspensionofthewritofhabeascorpus. ...Where therehasbeenviolenceordisorderinfact,continueddetentionofoffendersbythemilitaryissofarproperastoresultinadenialbythecourtsofwritsreleasingthosedetained....72

IX.

Althoughtherespondents,intheirreturnstothewritsandintheiranswerstotheseveralpetitions,haveinsistedonadisclaimerofthejurisdictionofthisCourt,onthebasisofGeneralOrdersNos.3and3A,73theirsubsequentmanifestationsurgingdecisionofthesecasesamounttoanabandonmentofthisdefense.InpointoffactPresidentMarcohas written, in unmistakable phrase, that "Ourmartial law is unique in that it is based on the supremacy of the civilianauthorityoverthemilitaryandoncompletesubmissionofthedecisionoftheSupremeCourt....Forwhoisthedictatorwhowould submit himself to a higher body like the Supreme Court on the question of the constitutionality or validity of hisactions?" 74 Construing this avowal of the President and the repeated urgings of the respondents in the light of theabovequotedprovisionofthe1973Constitution(Art.XVII,sec.3(2)),itismysubmissionthatGeneralOrdersNos.3and3A must be deemed revoked in so far as they tended to oust the judiciary of jurisdiction over cases involving the

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constitutionalityofproclamations,decrees,ordersoractsissuedordonebythePresident.

X

Insumandsubstance,Ifirmlyadheretotheseviews:(1)thattheproclamationofmartiallawinSeptember1972bythePresidentwaswellwithintheaegisofthe1935Constitution(2)thatbecausetheCommunistrebellionhadnotabatedand instead theevil fermentofsubversionhadproliferated throughout thearchipelagoand inmanyplaces had exploded into the roar of armed and searing conflict with all the sophisticated panoply ofwar, theimpositionofmartiallawwasan"imperativeofnationalsurvival"(3)thatthearrestanddetentionofpersonswhowere"participantsorgaveaidandcomfortintheconspiracytoseizepoliticalandstatepowerandtotakeoverthegovernmentbyforce,"werenotunconstitutionalnorarbitrary(4)thatsubsumedinthedeclarationofmartiallawisthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus (5) that the fact that theregularcourtsof justiceare open cannot be accepted as proof that the rebellion. and insurrection, which compellingly called for thedeclarationofmartial law,nolongerimperilthepublicsafety(6)thatactualarmedcombathasbeenandstill israging in Cotabato, Lanao, Sulu and Zamboanga, not to mention the Bicol Region and Cagayan Valley, andnationwideCommunist subversioncontinuesunabated (7) that thehostof doubts thathadplagued thisCourtwith respect to the validity of the ratification and consequent effectivity of the 1973 Constitution has beencompletely dispelled by every rational evaluation of the national referendumof July 1973, atwhich the peopleconclusivelyalbeitquietly,demonstratednationwideacquiescencein.thenewConstitutionand(8)thattheissueofthevalidityandconstitutionalityofthearrestanddetentionofallthepetitionersandoftherestrictionsimposeduponthosewhoweresubsequentlyfreed, isnowforeclosedbythetransitoryprovisionof the1973Constitution(Art,XVII.Sec.3(2))whichefficaciouslyvalidatesallactsmade,doneortakenbythePresident,orbyothersuponhisinstructions,undertheregimeofmartiallaw,priortotheratificationofthesaidConstitution.

XI

ItisnotameresurrealsuspiciononthepartofthepetitionerDioknothattheincumbentmembersofthishighestTribunalofthelandhaveremovedthemselvesfromalevelofconsciencetopassjudgmentuponhispetitionforhabeascorpusoraffordhim relief fromhispredicament.Hehasactuallyarticulated itasa formal indictment. IventuretosaythathisobsessionalpreoccupationontheabilityofthisCourttoreachafairjudgmentinrelationtohim has been, in no small measure, engendered by his melancholy and bitter and even perhaps traumaticdetention.And even as hemakes this serious indictment, he at the same timewouldwithdrawhis petition forhabeascorpushopingtherebytoachievemartyrdom,albeitdubiousandamorphous.Asacommentaryonthisindictment, Ihere that formypartandIampersuadedthatall theothermembersof thisCourtaresituatedsimilarly I avow fealt to the full intendment andmeaning of the oath I have taken as a judicialmagistrate.UtilizingthemodestendowmentsthatGodhasgrantedme,Ihaveendeavoredinthepasteighteenyearsofmyjudicialcareerandinthefuturewillalwaysendeavortodischargefaithfullytheresponsibilitiesappurtenanttomyhighoffice,neverfearing,waveringorhesitatingtoreachjudgmentsthataccordwithmyconscience.

ACCORDINGLY,Ivotetodismissallthepetitions.

APPENDIXtoSeparateOpinionofJusticeFredRuizCastro

STATECONSTITUTIONALPROVISIONSREGARDINGMARTIALLAW

ALASKACONST.,art.III,sec.20:

Sec.20.MartialLaw.Thegovernormayproclaimmartiallawwhenthepublicsafetyrequiresitincaseofrebellionoractualorimminentinvasion.Martiallawshallnotcontinueforlongerthantwentydayswithouttheapprovalofamajorityofthemembersofthelegislatureinjointsession.

MAINECONST.,art.I,sec.14:

Sec.14.Corporalpunishmentundermilitarylaw.Nopersonshallbesubjecttocorporalpunishmentundermilitarylaw,exceptsuchasareemployed in thearmyornavy,or in themilitiawhen inactualservice in timeofwarorpublicdanger.

MARYLANDCONST.,art.32:

Art.32.MartialLaw.Thatnopersonexceptregularsoldiers,marines,andmarinersintheserviceofthisState,ormilitia,wheninactualservice,oughtinanycase,tobesubjectto,orpunishablebyMartialLaw.

MASSACHUSETTSCONST.,art.XXVIII:

Art.XXVIII.Citizensexempt fromlawmartial.Nopersoncan inanycasebesubjected to lawmartial,or toanypenalties or pains, by virtue of that law, except those employed in the army or navy, and except themilitia in

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actualservice,butbyauthorityofthelegislature.

NEWHAMPSHIRE,PtII,arts.34and51:

Art.34th.Martiallawlimited.Nopersoncan,inanycase,besubjectedtolawmartial,ortoanypainsorpenaltiesbyvirtueofthatlaw,exceptthoseemployedinthearmyornavy,andexceptthemilitiainactualservice,butbyauthorityofthelegislature.

Art.51st.Powersanddutiesofgovernorascommanderinchieflimitation.Thegovernorofthisstateforthetimebeing.shallbecommanderinchiefofthearmyandnavy,andallthemilitaryforcesofthestatebyseaandlandandshallhavefullpowerbyhimself,orbyanychiefcommander,orotherofficer,orofficers,fromtimetotime,totrain, instruct,exerciseandgovern themilitiaandnavyand for thespecialdefenseandsafetyof thisstate, toassembleinmartialarray,andputinwarlikeposture,theinhabitantsthereof,andtoleadandconductthem,andwiththemtoencounter,repulse,repelresistandpursuebyforceofarms,aswellbyseaasbyland,withinandwithoutthelimitsofthisstate:andalsokill,slay.destroy,ifnecessary,andconquerbyallfittin

G.R. No. L-35546 Aquino Jr vs Enrile 1974

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