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Government Regulation Government Regulation and Intervention and Intervention Part 1 Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights and Industry Studies, Southwestern Cengate 2010
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Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

Mar 30, 2015

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Page 1: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

Government Regulation Government Regulation and Interventionand Intervention

Part 1Part 1

Vivian Ho

Health Economics

This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights and Industry Studies, Southwestern Cengate 2010

Page 2: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

IntroductionIntroduction

Causes and consequences of government intervention in health care.

Types of government intervention. Case studies

– Cigarette taxes.– Price ceilings on health care services.– Hospital antitrust litigation.

Page 3: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

Criteria for perfect Criteria for perfect competition competition

All firms and consumers are price takers.

Consumers and firms have perfect information.

All firms produce an identical product. Firms can freely enter an exit an

industry.

Page 4: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

Market imperfections may lead to inefficient Market imperfections may lead to inefficient or inequitable distribution of resources.or inequitable distribution of resources.

Imperfect consumer information Monopoly Externalities

Government intervenes to restore efficiency and/or equity.• “Public interest theory.”

Page 5: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

An opposing theory: The amount and types An opposing theory: The amount and types of government intervention are determined of government intervention are determined by supply and demand.by supply and demand.

Vote-maximizing politicians “supply” legislation.

Wealth maximizing special interest groups are the buyers.

Successful politicians stay in office by satisfying special interest groups.

Page 6: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

““Special interest group theory”Special interest group theory”

Examples:Examples:

Extended patent protection for brand name drugs.

Rejection of national health insurance in favor of private insurance companies.

Page 7: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

Special interest group theory claims that special Special interest group theory claims that special interest groups gain at the expense of the general interest groups gain at the expense of the general public. public.

Consumers are diverse, fragmented, more costly for them to organize.

Inefficient, inequitable resource allocation by government.

Which theory do you believe? C-B analysis is needed to identify

winners and losers.

Page 8: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

Types of Government InterventionTypes of Government Intervention

Provide public goods.

Correct for externalities

Impose regulations. Enforce antitrust laws. Sponsor redistribution

programs. Operate public

enterprises.

Fund medical research.

Tax cigarettes, pollution.

FDA Bar hospital mergers. Medicare and Medicaid.

VA hospitals

Page 9: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

Public GoodsPublic Goods

>1 individual simultaneously receives benefits from the good. i.e., no rivalry in consumption.

Costly to exclude nonpayers from consumption of the good.

Private firms unwilling to produce and sell public goods.

Are most medical services public goods?

Page 10: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

ExternalitiesExternalities

Definition: An unpriced byproduct of production or consumption that adversely affects another party not directly involved in the market transaction.

Cigarette smoking Pollution Medical treatment for cyclists who don’t

wear helmets Drunk drivers

Page 11: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

Demand-side externality: Marginal Social Benefit Marginal

Private Benefit

Supply-side externality: Marginal Social Cost Marginal Private

Cost

Page 12: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

Cigarette smoking is an example of a Cigarette smoking is an example of a (negative) demand-side externality.(negative) demand-side externality.

Smokers impose work-related costs on nonsmokers.

Health insurance, pensions, sick leave, disability, group life insurance financed collectively by smokers and nonsmokers. But smokers, die earlier, pay less taxes,

premiums.

Page 13: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

Smokers also impose health care Smokers also impose health care costs on nonsmokers.costs on nonsmokers.

Smokers usually incur higher health care costs. But nonsmokers die prematurely from

passive smoking, smoking-related fires.

The total external costs of cigarette smoking are estimated to be 15¢ per pack. (Manning et al., 1991)

Page 14: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

Keep in mind:Keep in mind:

The problem which calls for government intervention is external costs, not internal costs.

The full extent of external costs must be measured using a lifetime approach.

Page 15: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

Manning et al.’s methodsManning et al.’s methods

Numerator takes into account life expectancy for smokers and the costs (savings due to early death) incurred each year.

smokedpacksostscexternalLifetime

#15 4

Page 16: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

External Cost ComponentsExternal Cost Components

Covered medical costs. Covered work loss and disability. Group life insurance. Widow’s social security bonus. Covered nursing home costs. Pensions. Taxes on earnings. Fires.

Page 17: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

At Q0 MSC0 > MSB0

Cigarettes are being over-consumed.

Cigarette Packs

$ per

pack

D=MPB

MSB

S=MPC=MSC

Q0

MSC0

MSB0

Q1

Page 18: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

Government can use taxes and subsidies to Government can use taxes and subsidies to alter economic incentives, correct for alter economic incentives, correct for externalities.externalities.

Charge a tax on cigarettes that reduces consumption to the socially optimal level Q1.

Levy a per-unit tax T on cigarette makers equal to vertical distance between MPB and MSB at Q1.

Page 19: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

Cigarette packs

$ per pack

D=MPB

MSB

MPC0=MSC

MPC0+ T

Q0Q1

P0

P2

P1

Page 20: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

With tax:With tax:

Market price of cigarettes = P1

Cigarette manufacturers receive P2 per pack.

Tax burden Consumer pays P1 - P0

Seller pays P0 - P2

Page 21: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

The relative tax burden on consumers vs. The relative tax burden on consumers vs. producers depends on price elasticities for producers depends on price elasticities for supply and demand.supply and demand.

If demand for cigarettes is inelastic, consumers bear a larger?/smaller? Share of the tax burden.

Page 22: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

Further issuesFurther issues

The current tax per pack exceeds external costs. Is this “OK”?

Should smokers or cigarette companies be responsible for the external costs of smoking?

“Thank you for smoking.” Is this moral??

Page 23: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

RegulationsRegulations

Government can attempt to control price, quantity, or quality of health care products.

Example: Price Ceilings in The Canadian Health Care System.– Consumers are fully insured by the

government.– The government fixes the price the

physician receives for each visit.

Page 24: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

RegulationsRegulations Because consumers are fully insured,

they will demand the number of visits as if the price per visit = 0.

Assume that the government sets a reimbursement rate for physician visits equal to PC.

Page 25: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

Physician visits

Price

D

S

QDQS

PC

Page 26: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

With full insurance, consumers want QD visits.

But the government has fixed the price of visits at PC.

– Only QS visits will be provided.

Shortage of physician visits = QD - QS.

Page 27: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

ConsequencesConsequences

1)Physicians may treat patients on 1st-come, 1st-served basis, regardless of severity/urgency.

2)Patients will have to queue for care/not receive care.

3)Unethical doctors may take bribes from patients trying to jump the queue.

Page 28: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

Lesson: There is no free lunch under cost Lesson: There is no free lunch under cost containment. Price ceilings can lead to:containment. Price ceilings can lead to:

1) Shortages.

2) Longer waiting lines.

3) Nonprice rationing.

4) Poorer health outcomes.

Page 29: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

Antitrust: Sherman Antitrust ActAntitrust: Sherman Antitrust Act

Section 1:

Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states or with foreign nations, is hereby declared illegal.

Page 30: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

Section 2:

Every person who shall monopolize, or conspire with any other person or persons to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

Page 31: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

The Act prohibits anticompetitive business The Act prohibits anticompetitive business practices that promote inefficiency and practices that promote inefficiency and inequity in the marketplace, such as:inequity in the marketplace, such as:

Price fixing - when business rivals enter a collusive agreement to refrain from price competition; fix the price of a good or service. Hospitals in a given city cannot jointly

establish the price of various hospital services.

Page 32: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

Boycott - agreement among competitors not to deal with a supplier or a customer. Physicians in an area can’t collectively

agree to deny services to a particular managed care organization.

Market allocation - when competitors agree to compete with one another in specific market area. Hospitals in the same city can’t collectively

set geographic service boundaries.

Page 33: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

Price fixing, boycotting, and market allocations are illegal per se. The plaintiff must only prove these actions

took place for the defendant to be in violation of the Act.

In contrast, rule of reason doctrine is used to evaluate horizontal mergers under the Act. While horizontal mergers may force price

above the competitive level, they may also create benefits which could be passed on to the customer.

Page 34: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

RedistributionRedistribution

The government often taxes one group and uses the revenues to subsidize another. Why?

Interdependent utility functions. Donors get utility from increasing the

welfare of recipients. Why is the government involved?

“free rider” problem.

Page 35: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

Two notions of equity in redistribution Two notions of equity in redistribution programsprograms

Vertical equity “Unequals should be treated unequally.” People who earn more should pay higher

taxes. Horizontal equity

“Equals should be treated equally.” Two persons with the same income level

should pay the same in net taxes.

Page 36: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

Vertical equity in practiceVertical equity in practice

How much more in taxes should higher income people pay?

Suppose high income households pay $4,000 in taxes on average, and low income households pay $2,000. Is this equitable?

Page 37: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

If the high income household makes $100,000, they pay a 4% tax.

If the low income household makes $10,000, they pay a 20% tax.

The notion of equity in taxation depends not just on total tax revenues, but on income levels and tax rates as well.

Page 38: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

In practice, vertical equity is achieved when the net tax system is sufficiently progressive. Taxes as a fraction of income rise with

income. Federal income tax system.

Page 39: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

Other forms of redistributionOther forms of redistribution Proportional.

The fraction of income going to taxes is constant as income rises.

The Medicare tax is a fixed % of payroll income.

Regressive. The fraction of income going to taxes falls

as income rises. Sales tax

Page 40: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

Implementing redistributionImplementing redistribution

Supply-side subsidies Government funding aimed at reducing the

costs of producing a consumer good or service.

Subsidy to a public hospital. Tuition for nurses or doctors.

Potentially violates notion of vertical equity if all persons have equal access to the

subsidized product.

Page 41: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

Demand-side subsidies - government funding for consumers.

In-kind: vouchers or reimbursements for specific services. Food stamps, Medicare, Medicaid

Cash: government-provided income that people can use at their own discretion. AFDC, Supplemental Security Income

Keep in mind: It is difficult to guarantee horizontal equity with multiple programs in operation.

Page 42: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

Consumer Groups Accuse U.S. of Negligence on Food Safety

– The New York Times, October 15, 2002

Page 43: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

Back to the StartBack to the Start

Does government intervention correct for market imperfections, or is it ruled by special interest groups?

Page 44: Government Regulation and Intervention Part 1 Vivian Ho Health Economics This material draws heavily from Santerre & Neun: Health Economics, Theories Insights.

A Final CaveatA Final Caveat

Market failure is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for government intervention.

It may cost the government $10m to correct a problem in the marketplace, which imposes $8m in damages.

While markets may fail and impose societal costs, the costs of government intervention may be greater.