Gonzalez Reconfiguration JAC

Agroecological Reconfiguration:Local Alternatives to Environmental

Degradation in Mexico

HUMBERTO GONZÁLEZ

Agroecological reconfiguration alternatives are programmes of action developed by local andregional organizations seeking to reverse environmental degradation produced by intensiveindustrialized farming. Growers who take part in them recognize their interdependence withthe ecosystem and are aware of the need to act collectively in order to regain the productivityand competitiveness that have been lost through the degeneration of natural resources.Thevaried patterns of production developed by those promoting these alternatives are mixed, andhave to demonstrate technical and economic viability; they must also justify themselvesthrough commitment to a sustainable environmental and social development of the region.The diverse public and private actors involved share a sense that the ecosystem is a commonheritage that must be safeguarded. Today, agroecological reconfiguration alternatives are themost effective initiatives for the environmental governance of agriculture in Mexico._357 484..502

Keywords: environmental degradation, agroecology, environmental governance,sustainability, agrosystem and local responses

INTRODUCTION

The 1980s saw the consolidation of a process of economic restructuring of agriculture in mostcountries of the world, in which we can identify three factors that have led to a degradationof ecosystems. First, the integration of markets on a global scale and the increased demand forcertain agricultural goods have led to an intensification of production without taking intoaccount the depletion of natural resources and the creation of contaminating residues (Lemosand Agrawal 2006). Second, transnational corporations have responded to these world marketforces by adopting models of production the principal goal of which is to increase productivityand improve competitiveness, without considering the impact of these changed practices indamaging the environment and in depleting natural resources and sources of non-renewableenergy. Nor do these corporations consider the impact of their production practices on the lossof inherited cultural capital.This cultural capital is what made it possible in the past for peopleto develop various sustainable agricultural systems in different parts of the world, and create theforms of social organization and conviviality needed to support them in rural areas (Toledo

Humberto González, Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social (CIESAS), Córdoba2715, Col. Providencia, Gudalajara, Jal. 44630, Mexico. E-mail: [email protected]

I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful criticisms, comments and suggestions, andNicholas Barrett for his editing. During the time when I wrote this paper, I was aVisiting Scholar at the Universityof Luxemburg. While there, I had a valuable academic exchange with Carmen Maganda and Harlan Koff of theRISC Consortium and of the Laboratory of Political Science; and also, with Oliver Petit of CNRS – Universityof Lille, France. I acknowledge the financial support of FNR of Luxembourg and of CONACYT of Mexico.Anyerrors or omissions in this work remain my own responsibility.

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Journal of Agrarian Change, Vol. 12 No. 4, October 2012, pp. 484–502.

© 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

1993; Losch 2004).Third, the commitment by nation-states to sustainable agricultural and socialdevelopment has been limited and ineffective. This factor is due, on the one hand, to the lossof sovereignty by states that accompanied multilateral treaties of cooperation and free tradesigned with other countries, and the predominance of international institutions (the Interna-tional Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment) in the regulation of the world economy (McMichael 2005); and, on the other,because of the proactive role of the state responsible for developing public policy, throughwhich it imposes the market as a self-regulating mechanism of economic activity.The result ofthese external and internal policies is not, as promised, a ‘deregulation’ of the economy, but a‘neo-regulation’ (Pechlaner and Otero 2010, 180). In fact, the nation-state has transferred toindividuals and corporations the governance of economic activity and has limited its actions tostimulating the growth of businesses and, in some cases, also to promoting individual respon-sibility in the management of public goods (such as environmental resources), as well asencouraging individuals rather than the state to work for the achievement of commonobjectives that will benefit society as a whole (Rose and Miller 1992).

In short, there is growing evidence that the hegemonic model of worldwide industrialagriculture degrades ecosystems, on many occasions irreversibly, without solving the problem offood supply, or that of employment in rural areas; instead, it creates enormous social inequalitieson a global and national scale (Altieri and Rojas 1999; Gliessman 2007; González and Macias2007). In response to the effects of degradation, alternatives seeking to redesign the worldagri-food system on sustainable bases have arisen from agroecology.

AGROECOLOGICAL RECONFIGURATION

Agroecology studies the interdependencies between agriculture – an activity that is sociallyorganized to produce foods and industrial inputs – and the ecosystems, where a collection ofliving creatures inhabit an established physical place.1 In order to do this, agroecology needs tolink the contributions of the agronomic, ecological and social sciences to the knowledgepossessed by those who practise agriculture and are committed to developing it in harmonywith the environment (Dalgaard et al. 2003).We can understand agroecology according to thedefinition of Francis et al. (2003, 8) as being ‘the integrative study of the ecology of entire foodsystems, encompassing ecological, economic and social dimensions’. Today, agroecology maybe thought of as a new discipline, but also as a practice seeking to develop food and fibreproduction in a sustainable manner: at the same time, it is a broader social movementintegrating politically the social actors who promote institutional and social changes towardssustainable agriculture (Wezel et al. 2009).

When agricultural activity has drastically altered the ecosystem where it is practised andfarmers are finding it difficult to keep producing, various group initiatives arise to deal with theproblem. I shall refer to the various collective practices undertaken to reverse the degradationof an ecosystem and recover productivity and profitability, on the basis of a sustainable form ofproduction that takes responsibility for present and future generations, as agroecological reconfigu-ration.This concept will allow me to study very different collective practices the aim of whichis to rehabilitate an agrosystem and implement new forms of environmental governance. LikeLemos and Agrawal (2006, 298), I understand environmental governance to be ‘the set of

1 According to the Convention on Biological Diversity, the ecosystem is ‘a dynamic complex of communities ofvegetables, animals and microorganisms and their inanimate environment which interact as a functioning unit’(United Nations 1993).

Agroecological Reconfiguration in Mexico 485


regulatory processes, mechanisms and organizations through which political actors influenceenvironmental actions and outcomes. Governance is not the same as government. It includesthe actions of the state and, in addition, encompasses actors such as communities, businessesand NGOs.’

The new practices are developed into a political field,2 in which various social actors(individuals, groups and institutions) compete to regulate the usufruct of natural resources thatare considered public goods. The competition between these actors is developed in the midstof a multitude of conceptions of rights of access to public natural resources, making it necessaryfor the authorities and the interested parties to justify the criteria on the basis of which theirpositions are held, and to reach an agreement in order to overcome their differences (Boltanskiand Thévenot 1999); it also takes place in the framework of institutional and normativedispositions that are always interpreted by the social actors in the course of their actions andinteractions, and may be accepted or modified by them during the process (Long 2007).

I propose in this work to undertake a multidimensional study of the agroecological recon-figuration alternatives (AERA), which will allow us to explain their complexity in the totalityof the food and fibre production system, and to incorporate the theoretical and methodologicalsupport given by different scientific disciplines (natural and social) to that provided by anothersource of human knowledge (Francis et al. 2008;Toledo 1998). I shall identify five dimensions:the territorial, historical, agroecological, political and ethical.

The territorial dimension of the AERA is what allows us to characterize these collectivepractices in spatial terms, as those promoting them seek to confront the degradation of theecosystem that is affecting the productivity and competitiveness of agriculture in a particularfarming region. The alternatives that they develop start from a coordinated concern byproducers who are interested in a sustainable agriculture. The producers may be linked toconsumer groups in local cities and in metropolitan areas in their own nation or abroad.Cosmopolitan consumers recognize the investment of money, time and organization that thegrowers have made in order to supply them with healthy foodstuffs and natural products freeof toxic residues, and they are willing to pay extra to permit their continued production.Whilethe AERA are locally and regionally sited, those who are involved in them know that they area constituent and transforming part of the process of national and global agri-food develop-ment. The local initiatives develop productive, commercial and governance strategies withdifferentiated reaches and results that it is important to define, and that may range from a localto a global scale. The promoters are not isolated from initiatives that may be taking placeelsewhere, in other regions of the country or the world; nor are they unaware of these activities.Through workshops, publications and the Internet, the local promoters keep up with thecommunication of experiences and successes that enrich them and empower them in theirproject of achieving a more sustainable agri-food production.As we shall see in this work, thesealternatives have arisen in both developing and developed nations. In the case of England, forexample, there are regional initiatives that have managed to reactivate rural areas on the basisof the sustainable production of good safe food, and at the same time, remain competitivein a market in which conventional agriculture predominates. Further, these initiatives havegenerated new institutional forms that lead to endogenous spillover impacts on regionaldevelopments, and have had impacts on national and European Union policies (Marsden andSonnino 2005).

2 Van Velzen (1973, 9) defines a political field ‘as the totality of relations among actors oriented towards the samepolitical prize or ideology’.

486 Humberto González


The second dimension of the AERA is the historical, which takes account of the antecedentsand, especially, the projection and the impact, of organizational initiatives and patterns of cropgrowing that lead to a reversal of environmental degradation.The projection of initiatives maybe marked on a scale showing the short-term and the long-term impact that they have on localand regional history; however, when associated with organizations from elsewhere, their pro-jection may acquire both a larger territorial and a longer historical dimension. Those creatingAERA justify their initiatives in terms of both the present and future generations.

The third dimension is called the agroecological because it is the aspect of an AERA thatallows the correlation of production practices to be analysed in the frame of reference of theecosystem in which they are developed.The promoters of an AERA combine a great diversityof patterns of knowledge and production practices, which we can situate between organic andsustainable agriculture, on the one hand, and industrialized agriculture; the latter developsmonocultures and makes intensive use of agricultural machinery, agrochemicals and pesticides.But, by studying examples of AERA we can find patterns of mixed production, which are theresult of a ‘technological syncretism’ (González 1994a). Pragmatically, producers combinevarious kinds of knowledge and practices of production and organization of work, on the basisof their technical, economic, commercial and political viability. Knowledge of traditionalagriculture is a reference point for growers as they travel within the country and abroad,working in fields of intensive industrialized farming. Farmers imbued in traditional agriculturepractices constantly enrich their own experience through access to mass communicationsources and by interacting with highly diverse actors (extensionists, technologists, academics,agrochemical sales representatives etc.). Syncretism even applies to the producers who make acommitment to consumers to adopt organic standards that require them to grow healthy foodin a safe manner. Finally, this syncretism can be characterized on a scale from sustainable tounsustainable production, where the bottom-line criteria are to increase productivity, incomesand welfare for the producer.

The fourth dimension for studying the AERA is the political and is the aspect that takesenvironmental governance into account explicitly. The AERA are politically hybrid, becausepublic and private actors converge in them to set up action programmes for reversingdegradation, developing agriculture on sustainable bases, and/or producing foods without toxicresidues and at a fair price for producers.The power of the AERA to start initiatives in local,regional or national agri-food governance depends on the level of participation and thecohesion of those associated with them, and on the effectiveness of the collective actions thatthey choose to take to deal with agri-food problems. Higgins and Lawrence (2005, 10) speakof ‘new hybrid organizational institutions’ that arise in spaces vacated by nation-states, who donot intervene, due to technical or economic limitations or because of their political ideologies.As we shall see, in the composition of different agroecological reconfiguration alternatives,there are producers on very different scales, as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs),academics and public officials who are generally from the lowest ranks of the public institutions.Even though public officials do not take part as members of the organization, the organizedpromoters of the AERA establish a permanent interaction with them so as to be able todemand their support, and require their commitment to initiatives seeking sustainable man-agement of the natural resources that are in the public domain, which should be guaranteed bythe state. These initiatives may be characterized on a scale from private management to thepublic governance of public environmental resources.

Finally, the fifth dimension is the ethical. The relation of ethics to agriculture is justified bythe role that agriculture plays in guaranteeing the survival and well-being of society (Altieri1999); therefore, it is justifiable to link agriculture, and food in general, with fundamental



human rights.The relation of ethics to agriculture is sustained by a sense of community, on thebasis of which the collective initiatives of reconfiguration are formed. Problems of environ-mental degradation lead producers to go beyond the private parcel autonomy sustained byindividual property rights, to consider the ecosystem as a common good that ought to berehabilitated and sustainably usufructed.The new agroecological and collective awareness comesto consider the ecosystem as a common inherited capital, guaranteeing the means of survival tocurrent producers and to their descendants. The right of everyone to survive justifies theregulatory measures taken by the collectivities who promote an AERA.The right to life is aninalienable ethical principle of universal validity and is guaranteed by the constitutions ofnations and by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This principle also allows actorsinvolved in an AERA to demand commitment, transparency and accountability from thevarious levels of government (Mechlem 2004, 645–6) and, additionally, offers a basis forjustifying citizen initiatives that take over from the state when the state fails to guarantee thecommon good. Finally, this right – to which the AERA appeal either directly or indirectly –is used to justify the other four dimensions mentioned above, which cover: local and regionalcollective action; the development of present and future generations; the effectiveness of amixed agroecological programme to reverse degradation of the ecosystem; and the politicalproject of regulating common environmental resources in favour of the general good.

In this work, I analyse comparatively three AERA that developed in the same agriculturalregion of Mexico. This area has had problems of natural resource degradation caused by anintensive industrial type of agriculture based on the farming of single crops destined for thedomestic and foreign markets. These AERA are geographically and historically located in asingle region of Mexico; however, their study allows us to analyse multidimensionally thediversity of local collective practices that attempt to reverse environmental degradation. In thispaper, I present different AERAs in a historical narrative of the study area. The first of theseinitiatives of agroecological reconfiguration was developed by Mexican agro-exporting pro-ducers, the second by horticultural businesses selling in the domestic market, and finally thethird by small-scale producers selling to the regional (local) and national markets. The multi-dimensional analysis in the study area is illustrated in Figure 1.

The regional case study presented covers a period of 50 years, and the information on eachof the experiences described comes from periodical ethnographic field work recording changesin the region over 21 years. I have also reviewed published works and graduate and post-graduate dissertations by students from various disciplines who have conducted research on theregion.

THE RISE AND FALL OF INTENSIVE AGRICULTURE IN THE VALLEY OFAUTLÁN, EL GRULLO AND EL LIMÓN

Starting in the late 1940s, the Government of Mexico has built large hydraulic projects in thebasins of the rivers that originate in the Eastern and Western Sierra Madre, increasing the areathat is irrigated and permitting the development of an intensive system of agriculture directedat the domestic and foreign markets (Melville 1997). Government work in the valley of Autlán– El Grullo – El Limón (VAGL), situated on the Transversal Volcanic Sierra of the WesternSierra Madre, developed a well-used irrigation system. The area of the VAGL is 963 squarekilometres and it forms part of the river basin of Ayuquila-Armería (Figure 2). In 1960, theTacotán dam was built and in 1995, 15 kilometres down river, the Trigomil dam was com-pleted. Between them, they allowed 4,116 hectares (just over 400 square kilometres, some 43per cent of the area) of the VAGL to be irrigated (SEMARNAT/DGIRA 2007).



Figure 1 A multidimensional matrix of the AERAs in the study area

Figure 2 The Valley of Autlán, El Grullo and El Limón, 2008



When the irrigation system was opened, principally three crops were cultivated to meetconsumer demand at home and abroad: melon (cantaloupe and honeydew, not watermelon),tomato and sugar cane.These occupied most of the irrigated area, consumed most of the waterand displaced the mixed cultivation of maize, beans and squash directed at local and regionalhuman and animal consumption. On a smaller scale, they also displaced crops such as chilli,chick-pea and peanut. The AERAs that I identify in the valley were collective responses byproducers to the degrading effects of the three monocultures.

The AERA of Agro-Export Producers

In 1968, when most of the canals had been built, the first of several representatives of companiesproducing and selling fruits and vegetables arrived in El Grullo from the south of Texas, andcontacted local producers to get them to grow cantaloupe. He provided them with hybridseeds he had brought from the United States (USA), and instructed them in the application offertilizers and pesticides to control problems with pests. This was the start of a change in theagriculture and the economy of the valley.Year by year, the number of producers increased, asthe production of cantaloupe for export brought them more profits than they were able to getfrom locally marketed crops.

By 1971, the area used to grow cantaloupe covered 1,499 hectares, representing 40 per centof the total production of that fruit in the state of Jalisco (Archive V-DDR).The average yieldper hectare was 14 tonnes. Eleven years earlier, in 1960, the total area sown with cantaloupe inJalisco had been 230 hectares, with an average yield of 4.8 tonnes per hectare (INEGI 1960).

The cultivation of cantaloupe continued until the farmers realized that productivity wasdecreasing, the costs of pesticides were increasing and their profits were diminishing along withthe quality of the fruit. The pests and diseases affecting the crops had become uncontrollable,even though pesticides were applied more frequently and in larger doses. By the end of the1980s, the cultivation of cantaloupe in theVAGL had virtually disappeared (Figure 3).When theUS companies noticed the first signs of a fall in production, they looked for new areas in whichto produce cantaloupe, in the states of Guerrero, Oaxaca, Chiapas and Colima, and on the coastof Michoacán; and they also extended production to Guatemala, Honduras and Costa Rica(González and Calleja 1998).

As the productivity of melon growing declined, the local agro-export producers took upother crops.The great majority of small-scale producers, with less than 10 hectares of irrigation,planted sugar cane. Producers with more land replaced melon with tomato, squash, cucumberand various types of chilli. In 1988–9, four local companies, out of a total of 44, planted 73 percent of the area in the VAGL that was used for fruits and vegetables (producing mostly tomato)(González 1994a). Two of these,Vergeles and Bonanza, had acquired warehouses in McAllen,Texas, and had commercialized their production, and that of other medium-sized and smalllocal growers, in the USA (ibid.).

The growth model used for tomato was the same as that which had been used forcantaloupe and consisted of: (a) the intensive use of agricultural machinery; (b) the use ofimproved seeds brought over from the USA, instead of the sowing of local varieties; (c) theapplication of chemical fertilizers, sometimes mixed with animal manure; and (d) the use ofpesticides to control pests and diseases.

The result of using the ‘new’ technological production model for tomato was to increaseproductivity by hectare to a level never before seen in the region, and this allowed the localagro-export producers to earn handsome profits.The Agriculture and Livestock Census of 1960recorded an average yield in the state of Jalisco for tomatoes of 7 tonnes per hectare. Eleven



years later, the yield in Autlán was 32 tonnes per hectare (Archive V-DDR).The tasks involvedin growing tomato, harvesting and packing, were done by hand, requiring an abundance oflabour. Quite soon, the farm labourers living in the valley were not enough for the job and itwas necessary to ‘enlist’ workers from the poorest parts of Mexico and Central America to pickthe fruit. Some of these workers stayed to live permanently in Autlán. In the 1970s and 1980s,the population of the municipality of Autlán grew at an annual average rate of 3.2 per cent and2 per cent, respectively (INEGI 1970, 1980, 1990).

In terms of area cultivated and productivity, the tomato followed the same rising and fallingcurve as the melon (Figure 3). The principal problem encountered by the local agro-exportproducers was, once again, pests and diseases produced mainly by viruses.This problem becamecritical in 1986, with a fall in production caused by viruses transmitted by insects that attackedthe plants and dried up the fields. The horticultural companies of the VAGL found that theyhad a sanitary problem that was just as serious as the one they had encountered with themonoculture of the cantaloupe before they abandoned it.

The alternative solution for dealing with the problem of plant health in theVAGL was basedon a management programme that would require the cooperation of all the valley’s producersof fruits and vegetables. For the first time, a majority of the growers regarded the health of thevalley as a collective good, which they themselves realized had become degraded. In addition,they understood the need to accommodate their differences and undertake collective action ifthey were to continue in the ‘tomato business’.

On the initiative of local agro-export producers, in 1986 the ‘Autlán Committee of Fruitand Vegetable Producers for the Control of Virosis’ (CPHCVA in Spanish) was formed. Local

Figure 3 The area and volume of production of cantaloupe melon and tomato in the District of ElGrullo, Jalisco, 1974–2009

Source: Archive V-DDR, annual production statistics.



agency officials of the Distrito de Desarrollo Rural (DDR), from the federal government, wereinvited to their meetings, in order to ensure that the producers agreed to the compulsorymeasures that were needed in the ‘management plan’ to control the virosis. The plan wasdesigned and supervised by a Mexican phytopathologist with proven experience in therehabilitation of agricultural areas with serious sanitary problems caused by viruses (Martínezet al. 1986). His fees were paid jointly by all the growers, according to the size of the areacultivated by each in the winter 1987 planting cycle.This measure led the big producers, whowere paying more for the programme, to feel that they should have more say in the decisionstaken by the CPHCVA, and that they could define the roles to be played by local governmentsanitary officials.

The plan to improve the health of plants in the valley consisted of establishing a closedseason of two months (May and June) during which there would be no planting of fruit orvegetables in the municipality of Autlán. Through this measure, it was hoped that the repro-ductive cycle of the insects transmitting the virus could be interrupted. It was also proposed thatin the closed season the wild plants growing on the edges of the fields, on the paths and onthe ridges of the furrows should be cut down, to prevent their becoming food supply for theinsects transmitting and hosting the viruses. Once the crops were growing, insect traps wereused to monitor them, and to choose the appropriate insecticides and decide the right dose ofeach for combating them.Vegetable and mineral oils were applied to reduce the transmission ofthe virus and to diminish the use of pesticides. It was agreed that all fields should be ploughedover once the chilli and tomatoes had been picked for the last time, so as not to leave theabandoned plants, some of them infected with the virus, to become points of contagion for thefields of the VAGL that were still in production. Additional measures were also taken.

Some small producers refused to attend the workshops. They did not agree to the closedseason and did not apply the management programme.They argued that no one could obligethem to solve a problem of which they were not the cause. In order to get over this resistance,officials from the DDR intervened, invoking the law and the Vegetable Health Regulations,which allowed them to sanction those breaking the rules.

The management programme reduced the proportion of plants infected by the virus in thevalley. The growers of Autlán, especially the exporters, thought that now they had found asolution to the problem, they would be able to continue to increase the area used for growingtomatoes. In the years 1988 and 1989, the area planted with tomato broke previous records, at1,901 and 1,952 hectares, respectively (Figure 3). However, three of the four Autlán exportingcompanies had decided to go back to producing tomato in what they called the ‘short season’,which started in January and ended in June.With the ‘short season’ reinstated, the positive effectof the closed season, which all the growers had applied the year before, was nullified. Indiscussions with the other growers and the authorities, the three companies that kept plantingall year round argued that their fixed costs and financial expenses would increase if they did notkeep their hired personnel employed and their productive infrastructure operating during thespring to summer season. Moreover, they argued that they would lose market share if theyinterrupted the supply to their customers. Without demonstrating any scientific evidence, thelarge growers said that the problem of virosis had been controlled by means of the managementprogramme, and that the area they were going to cultivate in the ‘short season’ was smaller thanthat of the autumn and winter cycle and as a result would not affect the other growers.

Although the directors of the DDR were able to predict the harmful effects of this actionon the plant health of theVAGL, they adopted a passive role.The CPHCVA did not meet againand the application of the programme for controlling the virosis was left to the initiative ofeach grower.The sense of co-responsibility and community upon which the organization was



founded, and which had been the justification for intervention by the local authority in theenvironmental governance of the region, was broken.

In 1989 and in the following years, the virosis problem worsened. The area used to growtomato in the VAGL diminished rapidly, until in 1994 it was reduced to 197 hectares. To thisagroecological disaster was added the financial collapse of the growers who had applied forloans for drilling, in order to improve their infrastructure and continue growing tomatoes in thevalley.The local elite sought recourse to their political connections, but without success.Theymet with the Federal Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of the Tax Office, and with thegovernor of the state of Jalisco, asking them for help in renegotiating their debts to the privatebanks, which would make it possible for them to continue to be ‘the principal source ofemployment’ in the VAGL. They received no support, because there had been a change ineconomic policy by the Mexican state. From the middle of the 1980s, the state reduced itsinvestment in the countryside, especially the provision of loans for agriculture; the nationalborders were opened to imports of agricultural products from other countries (with theexception of maize and beans), and the concession to monitor and regulate the production andexport of fruits and vegetables was taken away from the growers’ organizations (González1994b).The opening of the domestic market to fruits and vegetables imported from the USAaffected the producers of Autlán.

By 1991, most of the growers were unable to pay back their bank loans and had no chanceof being able to keep producing on the scale to which they had become accustomed. Theagro-export producers of Autlán, like the US companies before them, moved to other agri-cultural areas, in the states of Jalisco, Michoacán, Colima, Coahuila and Quintana Roo. In spiteof great financial difficulties, they continued to produce tomato and other fruits and vegetablesin these places, but on a smaller scale than they had been able to do in Autlán. In these regions,the companies applied the management programme that they had boycotted in Autlán, and oneof them in particular directed the formation of a Local Board of Plant Health (LBPH) to avoidthe development of virosis (Macías 2006).

The collapse of investment in horticulture – the principal economic engine of Autlán, andone of the two most important in the VAGL – produced a collapse in the economy of theregion. Unemployment increased and there was a great migration of workers to the USA andto urban population centres in Mexico. Activities in the service sector were affected (theagrochemical business, agricultural machinery and transport vehicles, repair workshops, restau-rants etc.) and also in the secondary sector (a factory for making wooden crates, the liquidfertilizer plant and workshops producing agricultural tools all went bankrupt).The bonanza wasover and the economic success of the region had vanished, leaving a serious environmentalproblem that had to be solved.The average annual rate of increase in the population inhabitingAutlán declined during the 1990s, to 0.6 per cent (INEGI 1990, 2000).

The AERA of Producers Selling to the Domestic Market

By 1990 the majority of the local growers, who had planted between 1 and 16 hectares oftomatoes, were overwhelmed by debts, and they either stopped or reduced the production oftomato for a while. They concentrated their investments in sugar cane, hot chilli, sorghum,agave for tequila and livestock, which meant less investment and less risk.The banks confiscatedthe agricultural machinery and the lands of those who were unable to pay their debts.

Since the CPHCVA – which, years before, had implemented the programme to control thevirosis – had fallen into disrepute, a group of local producers formed the LBPH in Autlán.Theproduction of chilli, genetically of the same family as the tomato, increased, as it was more



resistant to the virosis. Between 1990 and 1999, the size of the area used to grow this cropincreased on average at an annual rate of 4.7 per cent in the VAGL and adjoining regions(Archive V-DDR).

In the founding act of the LBPH, the principal environmental problem that they wished toaddress was clearly set out, along with the contributing causes: ‘. . . the introduction ofmonoculture, the leaving of stalks and stems [after the harvest], anarchy in the dates for sowingcrops, the use of chemical pest controls and their excessive application’ (Archive LBPH for1991).To deal with the problem of ‘anarchy’ mentioned in the founding act, it was imperativeto limit the autonomy of individual plots; that is, the right of the producer or tenant todetermine their productive strategy without outside intervention.

The producers took 5 years to turn the LBPH into an institution that could influence theenvironmental governance of the region. The posts of president, secretary and treasurer werehonorary and were occupied by local horticultural producers who were interested in continu-ing to grow tomato. They persuaded the state government to pay the salaries and expenses oftwo agronomists, who oversaw the crops and advised local growers. Quotas per hectare chargedto growers were used to pay the salary of a (female) administrator, to rent a building in whichto meet and to purchase a computer.

The LBPH was joined by two researchers from the University of Guadalajara at Autlán(CUCSUR-UdeG) and one from the National Institute for Research into Forestry,Agricultureand Livestock (Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Forestales, Agrícolas y Pecuarias, INIFAP). Theyconducted agronomic research in the VAGL, held workshops and gave scientific backing to theprogramme of virosis management. Finally, the participation of a public official from the DDR,who did an important job mediating between the LBPH and the agencies of the nationalgovernment and the State of Jalisco, was of great importance. This hybrid organization (theLBPH) more than any other managed to take an active part in the environmental governanceof the region.

It was not until 1997 that the LBPH was able to require all the horticultural producers oftheVAGL to obtain a permit to grow crops and to inform the authorities in writing of the areato be cultivated, the crops to be planted and the dates on which they were to be transplantedto the field; additionally, they had to pay a quota to the LBPH on the basis of the number ofhectares declared.The management programme picked up all the points of the former AERAinitiative and introduced new measures such as the biological control of pests in theVAGL, andgave advice to the growers on a permanent basis.

An important point about this AERA was that the management programme and the quotaswere legislatively supported by the 1994 Law of Plant Hygiene (Ley de Sanidad Vegetal) and bythe regulations issued by the Departments of Agriculture and of the Environment (ArchiveLBPH). For this programme, the standard published by the federal government in 1988, entitledNorma Fitosanitaria 020, was important as it provided the association with the necessary supportfor its campaign against ‘whitefly’, the principal vector of viruses in theVAGL. Later, the NormaFitosanitaria 081 was also important, as it provided support to the society for keeping the closedseason closed, reordering the dates for planting, and requiring the destruction of plant leftoversonce the crops had been harvested. On the basis of these regulations, the LBPH made theproposed measures compulsory and could justify imposing sanctions on those who failed tocomply. For the first time in the region, producers who did not want to adopt the proposedmeasures were fined. In the second half of the 1990s, the area used for growing tomatoes startedto increase and productivity improved (Figure 3).

The LBPH, which originally held jurisdiction only in Autlán, extended its reach to all themunicipalities of the valley and the society’s directors took an active part in the formation of



the District Council of Sustainable Rural Development for the Sierra de Amula Region(CDDRS-Amula). A case that clearly shows the active participation of the LBPH in regionalenvironmental governance presented itself when a company from Nayarit rented land to grow100 hectares of tobacco – another plant from the tomato family – as a trial.There was concernamong local producers that tobacco plants infected with the virus might be introduced into theVAGL. So before planting had begun, the company was visited by a technician from the LBPH,who informed them they would need to apply for a permit to plant tobacco, and that theywould have to apply the programme to protect the hygiene of plants in the valley. Theapplication by this firm was handled by the CDDRS-Amula, who asked the tobacco grower torespect the management programme and to pay a bond that would cover the costs of destroyingthe grower’s crops if they should turn out to pose a risk for the plant health of the VAGL(Archive LBPH). Surprised by this move, the grower presented his bond and a signed documentin which he accepted that he would comply with the management programme, and autho-rizing the LBPH to raze his plot if it should become a health hazard.There was no second yearof growing tobacco, as growing in the area did not bring the entrepreneur the results he hadanticipated.

The formation of the LBPH shows how it was possible on the basis of the initiative of someproducers to form a network of actors that modified the regional environmental governance.According to Callon and Latour (1981), there are two elements that make it possible to formthis ‘actor-network’. First, those who promoted this association managed to translate the desiresand wishes of very heterogeneous individuals into a single interest and get them to actcollectively – or become a collective actor, one that could speak and act on behalf of them all.3

The instruments used by the LBPH throughout were argument, persuasion, dissuasion, nego-tiation and sanctions. Getting the various actors to associate into a network became a solidand lasting achievement to the extent that resistance was overcome. For example, eventuallyit became unnecessary to reconsider the attributions of the LBPH, once it was possible toestablish inescapable and indisputable procedures, and to have a ‘chronology’ or timetable ofactions to be undertaken (ibid.). Second, this ‘networked actor’ grew stronger the more itsucceeded in getting other actors and networks of actors to associate with it through alliances,coalitions, pacts and conventions, and was able to keep them indissolubly united.The associationbecame a dynamic process in which actors in the network would develop the necessary skillsfor defining themselves and transforming themselves, in accordance with their growth and thecircumstances that presented themselves (Callon 1986, 36).The power that the LBPH obtainedto influence regional environmental governance was the result of the actions it undertook – andsuch power is, of course, never stable or permanent (Latour 1987).

The solidity and permanence of actors and networks of actors in the network depend ontheir capacity for ‘translating’ and ‘associating’. From this point of view, there are no essentialdifferences between the macro actors such as the state and the micro actors, such as the LBPH.Similarly, the supposed power of a state institution, whatever its history, its size, its attributes andthe resources it handles, derives from its capacity for translating and associating networks ofactors. In so far as ‘. . . the modern state rules, it does so on the basis of an elaborate networkof relations formed amongst the complex of institutions, organizations and apparatuses thatmake it up, and between state and non-state institutions’ (Rose and Miller 1992, 176). From thispoint of view, it is possible to understand how networks of local, private and public actors, have

3 In this work, the use of the term ‘actor’ is limited to designating individuals or collectivities capable of pursuinggoals and interests identified by themselves. I do not consider here the proposal of symmetry, made by the authorsof ‘Actor-network Theory’ (Latour 1996), which would lead to conceding agency to technology and the physicalmedium.



the capacity to modify the course taken by the neoliberal policies of the nation-state at localand national levels (Cheshire and Lawrence 2005, 36).

While the AERA of the vegetable growers aiming to sell their produce in the nationalmarket concentrated principally on plant hygiene, they ignored the depletion of the groundwater, and the damage to human health and the ecosystem that was caused by chemicalfertilizers and pesticides.The lowering of the water table affected only some producers, and upto now it has not had a critical effect on the productivity and competitiveness of most of theproducers of the VAGL. Damage to human health due to agrochemicals is not immediate, andit manifests in different forms according to the individual who has been exposed to pesticides.The local health authorities have been unwilling to recognize that this is a problem of labourhealth and public health.There are no statistical records in local hospitals of workers intoxicatedby pesticides, or any national statistics that would allow the size of the problem to be madeknown. Consulting the records of the workers who we knew had been taken to hospital foremergency treatment, we found a register of the symptoms (dizziness, nausea, vomiting,irritation of the eyes etc.), but no mention of the cause.

It has not been possible to solve the problem of plant health in the VAGL in spite of themeasures applied, and local growers have continued to pay the economic price of environ-mental degradation. In 2008, when it was assumed that the problem of virosis was undercontrol, 514 hectares were sown with tomatoes in the VAGL (Archive LBPH). According toLBPH technicians, all the fields of tomato became infected with the virus and two-thirds of thefields had to be razed a few weeks after planting out; the rest produced fruit of indifferentquality and gave only 40–70 per cent of the expected yield. In 2009, the area sown withtomatoes decreased to 121 hectares. The local producers felt that they were paying for theenvironmental expenses incurred by companies most of whom had left the valley.

Reconfiguration of Small-Scale Producers

The crop that was most developed in the VAGL irrigation system was sugar cane. Productionincreased in 1972 when the federal government built the Melchor Ocampo sugar plant, whichwent on to become a parastatal company. Sugar production was part of a government plan tosupply the national market with an item of primary necessity.

For this agro-industry to work at full capacity and fulfil its objectives, it was necessary formost of the producers with a parcel of land to grow cane.The attraction for them was that theyknew that the refinery would buy the whole crop, would give financial aid to the producersand would guarantee them a higher profit than they could obtain from cereals and legumes.With sugar cane came technical advice from the refinery and from the DDR, and thetechnicians introduced a production model that made intensive use of agricultural machinery,fertilizers and pesticides. In the VAGL, the area devoted to sugar cane became the main user ofthe irrigation system. In the second half of the 1990s, the Melchor Ocampo Refinery wasprivatized, like most of the parastatal companies of the federal government. In the same decade,the operation of the irrigation system passed into the hands of the users.

We can see the effects of the monoculture in Figure 4, from 1995 onwards. The yieldstended to go down and the increased volume of sugar cane production was due to the largerarea used to grow it. From 1975 to 1994, the volume of production of sugar cane per hectaregrew at an average annual rate of 1.9 per cent, while from 1995 to 2009 the rate fell to –1 percent (Archive V-DDR).

A recent study by the Ministry of Agriculture (SAGARPA 2009, 3), on the soils of the areasupplying the refinery, highlights the inappropriate management practices that led to a decrease



in productivity. It refers to compacting, aeration and erosion of the soil in the area sown withcane; to bad fertilizing practices; and also to the serious problem of pollution of the RiverAyuquila. On this problem in particular, specific studies have been made by interdisciplinaryteams, who have certified the extremely serious contamination of the river and of sources offresh water, as well as damage done to the ecosystem and to the inhabitants of settlements inthe basin (Graf et al. 2006).The sugar refinery has introduced some secondary changes thanksto the mobilization of local ecological groups, and as a response to pressure from the hybridCDDRS-Amula organization.

In the second half of the 1990s, groups were formed amongst small-scale producers pursuinglong-term sustainable and profitable production. This collection of small cells was linkedtogether by promoters connected to institutions of higher education and to NGOs. Theseproducers were convinced of the need for radical changes to the agro-industrial productionmodel that dominated the region and the country. They adopted crop diversification, limitedthe intensive use of agricultural machinery and progressively reduced the use of imported stock,such as ‘improved’ seeds, and the use of agrochemicals. They re-evaluated food production fora local and regional market, reconsidered consumption of healthy food by households, andrediscovered the flavours of past times in dishes prepared according to ancient customs.A groupof 20 growers initially organized a street market (Tiangüis Orgánico) in the city of Autlán to sellorganic produce.4

González-Figueroa et al. (2007, 9–10) explain that this ‘agroecological’ type of productionfollows a model that seeks to regenerate and conserve the soil, through the addition of organicmaterial, the planting of live hedges and the digging of ditches to prevent soil erosion. Growers

4 In ordinary speech, street markets in towns and cities, which play an important role in produce distribution,have kept the name tianguis, which is derived from the Nahuatl tianquiztli, meaning ‘a market’.

Figure 4 The area planted and production by hectare of sugar in the Rural Development District ofEl Grullo, 1975–2009

Source: Archive V-DDR, annual production statistics.



also practise systematic crop rotation in their fields and have recovered old agricultural practicesthat they had learned from their parents, such as combining in one cycle, on the same plot, theproduction of several basic crops for feeding the family and their domestic animals, and forsupplying the market. They keep orchards with various different types of fruit tree, whichprovide them with food for consumption by the family and for selling in the market for mostof the year; they also alternate the use of machinery with animal-drawn transport and usemanually operated tools (Gerritsen et al. n.d.).

These small-scale producers, who are organic or on the way to becoming so, use familylabour, but not exclusively; they combine the cultivation of fruits and vegetables with the raisingof small and large livestock, and complement their income with the sale of subproducts suchas eggs and cheese, but above all with remittances from the paid employment of a familymember in non-agricultural activities in Mexico and in the USA.

There are also producers who have continued to plant sugar cane as well as other crops, andhave undertaken actions to improve the soil. They make their compost using animal manureand vegetable matter and have introduced the culture of earthworms.The result of improvingtheir soil for 5 years has been to reduce production costs due to the use of fewer products fromoutside, and to achieve a higher than average yield. One of the producers received a prizeawarded by the refinery to the grower with the best sugar cane seed – in the 2008 harvest, thisproducer obtained a record yield locally, of 200 tonnes of cane per hectare.The technicians ofthe sugar plant and the DDR, who support conventional agriculture, are taking an interest inthese mixed experiences of reconfiguration, which show medium-term and long-term eco-nomic and environmental viability.The impact on environmental governance of the producersin this AERA and of their organizations is small, but effective.

These local initiatives are not separate from other groups and networks of actors in otherregions and urban centres of the country, with whom they establish exchanges of informationor of cooperation.The Tianguis de Autlán open-air market followed the Tianguis de Guadalajarathat was organized in 1986 by the Jalisco Ecologist Group, and since the turn of the centuryhas been frequented on a weekly basis by organic producers from the metropolitan zone ofGuadalajara and shoppers who are willing to pay extra for food free of pesticides (Juárez 2010).The option of regional commercialization without intermediaries is sustained in part on apersonal basis by the confidence between producers and consumers; and in part by theconviction that it is worth having healthy food for the family while contributing to better careof the environment (ibid.).

In the present century, a regional NGO called La Red de Alternativas Sustentables Agropecuarias,or RASA (‘Network of Sustainable Farming Alternatives’; see Gerritsen and Morales 2007), hasbeen formed in the state of Jalisco, and has encouraged organic farmers – and those who areon their way to becoming organic – to share their experiences of production and commer-cialization (Juárez 2010).This organization makes it possible to propose projects to internationalorganizations and NGOs, and to obtain resources to support organizations of local organicproducers.

Experiences of alternative trade such as these are multiplied in various regions of Mexicoand have demonstrated their economic and social viability (Gómez et al. 2006; González andNigh 2007). Organizations and confederations of agroecological groups, formed by producersand consumers, have developed on the margins of government policy, as they are officiallyexcluded, and the government does not value their potential for reconfiguring agriculture inMexico agroecologically, or for promoting sustainable regional development.The fact is that theeconomic policy of the Mexican state excludes all small-scale producers, even though theygenerate the largest number of rural jobs (Fox and Haight 2010; Scott 2010).



CONCLUSIONS

According to the case studies presented in this work, the AERA are developed by local andregional organizations of growers who recognize their interdependence with the ecosystem, andthe need for collective action to recover lost productivity and competitiveness.The patterns ofproduction developed are agroecologically mixed, and it must be possible to demonstrate theirtechnical and economic viability, and justify these models in terms of guaranteeing the meansof survival to current producers and to their descendants.The AERA are developed by hybridorganizations integrating a diversity of private and public actors, who justify their initiatives onthe basis of commitment to an environmentally and socially sustainable development of theplace and the region in which they live.Their actions are grounded in a sense of commonalitythat considers the ecosystem as a common inheritance – one that needs to be safeguarded sothat natural resources can be enjoyed by current and future generations.

To date, the AERA are the principal and the most effective initiative in the environmentalgovernance of agriculture in Mexico. The failure of the state to make a commitment tosustainable agriculture limits the growth and the strengthening of the AERA. They have todevelop themselves in conditions of unfair competition, where the majority of producingcompanies can continue to degrade the ecosystems.

On the basis of studies of the alternatives of reconfiguration in the area study, I propose atypology with which to define the motives of producers and the logic of their actions whendealing with the problems of degraded ecosystems:

1. Foreign companies promoting an agriculture that aims to satisfy the demand of the exportmarket have been developing practices that are very harmful to the regions in which theagro-exporters operate.They do not develop alternatives of reconfiguration.When they detectthe first signs that environmental degradation is affecting the profitability of their farmingoperations, they move to other regions of the country, without modifying their productionmodel. These companies take advantage of public investments in infrastructure, mainly forirrigation, and do not develop a sense of community with the local or regional society.

2. The national agro-export producers, whose investments are tied to the region in which theylive, are at the forefront of the AERA and do not hesitate to invest their economic andpolitical capital to develop it quickly. Projects started on their initiative, however, are focusedexclusively on the environmental disequilibrium that increases their costs of production,and are short term. They have recourse to the local authorities, and appeal to the law andto regulations to make adherence to the agroecological management plans compulsory;however, they have no compunction in restricting the actions of local authorities, or inbreaking the rules and the law when it suits their interests to do so.They do not create, forthe medium and long term, groups with a strong sense of solidarity and a commitment tothe ecosystem and to local development. Finding the AERA that they have promoted to beonly partly effective, they walk away just as their foreign competitors did – the onlydifference being that when they start up production in new areas, they try to reverse theeffects of environmental degradation.

3. The businesses whose economic strength lies in the diversification of production, and whodirect most of their produce to the national market, start AERA to recover the productivityof crops with the highest commercial value, allowing them to maintain the standard of lifeto which they aspire.Their outlook is medium term and they undertake a larger number ofagroecological actions than the agro-exporters; however, most of their efforts and invest-ments go into dealing with problems that limit their strategy of diversification. Because they



are based in the region, they can create a hybrid organization that has co-responsibility forthe sustainable development of the region. They are the most successful in using theeconomic and legal resources of the state to modify the environmental governance of theregion. They form a group with a sense of solidarity, and they make links to networks ofactors seeking to rehabilitate and conserve the regional ecosystem.

4. Small-scale growers develop their AERA as a chosen way of life. Unlike other producers,they participate in networks that extend beyond the region, through which they sharetechnological, economic and political experiences. These networks lead them to createinstitutionalized channels in the local and regional markets, and to act together as aconfederation, with a judicial personality. Their strength and the impact of their initiativesreside in their local organizations, and in their capacity for association amongst the growersand with networks of actors at the national level. They do not incorporate public officialsinto their associations, but they do negotiate with them for facilities to help with developingtheir initiatives, such as the urban markets.They have a sense of community that allows themto associate with urban consumer groups and to offer a radical reconfiguration of society inthe nation as a whole. It is in these initiatives, which do not make profits for shareholders,or grow foods on a large scale for a growing urban population, that the fundamentalelements are found for a profound reconfiguration of agriculture in Mexico.

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