INPRO Di l F Gl b lN l E S i bili L P f N l E i Global Trends Prospects and Challenges for INPRO Dialogue Forum on Global Nuclear Energy Sustainability: Long-term Prospects for Nuclear Energy in the Post-Fukushima, 27-31 August 2012, COEX, Seoul, Republic of Korea Global Trends, Prospects and Challenges for Innovative SMRs Deployment Dr. M. Hadid Subki Technical Lead, SMR Technology Development Nuclear Power Technology Development Section, Division of Nuclear Power, Department of Nuclear Energy IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
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INPRO Di l F Gl b l N l E S i bili L P f N l E i
Global Trends Prospects and Challenges for
INPRO Dialogue Forum on Global Nuclear Energy Sustainability: Long-term Prospects for Nuclear Energy in the Post-Fukushima, 27-31 August 2012, COEX, Seoul, Republic of Korea
Global Trends, Prospects and Challenges for Innovative SMRs Deployment
Dr. M. Hadid SubkiTechnical Lead, SMR Technology Development, gy p
Nuclear Power Technology Development Section, Division of Nuclear Power, Department of Nuclear Energy
IAEAInternational Atomic Energy Agency
Outline• What’s new in global SMR development?• Roles of IAEA on SMR Technology Development• Roles of IAEA on SMR Technology Development• Status of Countries on Nuclear Energy Initiatives• Global Status of SMR Development and Deployment• Global Status of SMR Development and Deployment• Options of SMR Design & Technology
Percei ed Ad antages and Challenges• Perceived Advantages and Challenges• Newcomer Countries’ Considerations
C t N C t i ’ Pl• Current Newcomer Countries’ Plan• Identified Issues from Fukushima Nuclear Accident
S• Summary
IAEA 2
What’s New in Global SMR Development?
SMARTOn 4 July, the Korean Nuclear Safety and Security Commission issued the Standard Design Approval for the 100 MWe SMART – the first iPWR
i d tifi tireceived certification.
NuScalemPowerW SMR
US-DOE funding of 452M$/5 years for two (2) out of the four (4) US competing iPWR based SMRs Some have utilities to adopt in specific sitesW-SMR
Hi-SMURcompeting iPWR based SMRs. Some have utilities to adopt in specific sites
KLT-40sSVBR-100
2 modules marine propulsion-based barge-mounted KLT-40s are in construction, 90%; The lead-bismuth eutectic cooled SVBR-100 deployed by
SHELF, ; p y y
2018, SHELF seabed-based started conceptual PWR-SMR design
Flexblue DCNS originated Flexblue capsule, 50-250 MWe, 60-100m seabed-moored, 5-15 km from the coast, off-shore and local control rooms5 15 km from the coast, off shore and local control rooms
CAREM-25 Site excavation for CAREM-25 was started in September 2011, construction of a demo plan starts soon in 2012
4S Toshiba had promoted the 4S for a design certification with the US NRC for application in Alaska and newcomer countries.
IAEAHTR-PMACP-100
2 modules of HTR-PM are under construction; CNNC developing ACP-100 conceptual design 3
Roles of IAEA on SMR Development
• Facilitate efforts of Member States in identifying key y g yenabling technologies in development and addressing key challenges in deployment;
• Establish and maintain international networks with Member States, industries, utilities, stakeholders;
• Ensure coordination of Member State experts by planning and implementing training programme and knowledgeand implementing training programme and knowledge transfer through technical meetings and workshops
D l i t ti l d ti d id• Develop international recommendations and guidance focusing on specific needs of newcomer countries
IAEA 4
Status of Countries on NE Initiatives
Which countries deploy SMRs?
Technology developer countries (NPPs in operation)(NPPs in operation)
Countries with NPPs
Newcomer countries
Asia
Europe
IAEA 5
Africa
Latin America
Definition
• IAEA:• Small sized reactors: < 300 MW(e)• Small-sized reactors: < 300 MW(e)• Medium-sized reactors: 300 700 MW(e)• Regardless of being modular or non modular• Regardless of being modular or non-modular• Covers all reactors in-operation and under-development
with power up to 700 MWep p• Covers 1970s technology post 2000s innovative
technology• Several developed countries:
• Small reactors: < 300 MW(e)• Emphasize the benefits of being small and modular• Focus on innovative reactor designs under-development
IAEA 6
Concept of Integral PWR based SMRsSMART Westinghouse
SMR
pressurizer
CRDM
Steamgeneratorspumps
CRDM
g
Steamgenerators
CRDM
pumps
core + vessel
core + vessel
IAEA 7
Integral Primary System ConfigurationCourtesy: Westinghouse Electric Company LLC, All Rights Reserved
XXXXXXXX XXXX
XX
XXXXXX
XXBenefits of integral vessel configuration: • eliminates loop piping and external components, thus enabling
compact containment and plant size reduced cost
IAEA 8
• Eliminates large break loss of coolant accident (improved safety)
Light Water Cooled SMRs
CAREM-25Argentina
IMRJapan
SMARTKorea Republic of
VBER-300Russia
WWER-300Russia
KLT-40sRussiaArgentina Japan Korea, Republic of Russia Russia Russia
mPowerUSA
NuScaleUSA
Westinghouse SMR - USA
CNP-300China Peoples Republic of
ABV-6Russia
IAEA 9
USA USA SMR - USA China, Peoples Republic of
How “small” are the iSMR vessels?Ø3.6 x 22 m
Ø3 7 24 7
Ø2.7 x 40 m
Ø2.7 x 13.7 m
Ø3.7 x 24.7 m
NuScale (NuScale)45 MWe
mPower (B&W)180 MWe Westinghouse SMR
225 MWe
IAEA 10
225 MWe
SMR-160(Holtec)
Heavy Water Cooled SMRs
EC6Canada
PHWR-220, 540, & 700India
AHWR300-LEUIndia
IAEA 11
Liquid Metal Cooled SMRs
CEFRChina
4SJapan
PFBR-500India
SVBR-100Russian Federation
PRISMUSA
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Gas Cooled SMRs
PBMRSouth Africa
HTR-PMChina
GT-MHRUSA
EM2
USA
IAEA 13
Motivations – U.S. Case
• Economic AffordabilityL f t it l t
Plants >50 yr old have capacitiesLess than 300 MWe
U.S. Coal Plants
– Lower up-front capital cost– Better financing options
• Load demand– Better match to power needs– Incremental capacity for regions
with low growth rateg– Allows shorter range planning
• Site requirements– Lower land and water usageLower land and water usage – Replacement for aging fossil plants– Potentially more robust designs
• Grid stability• Grid stability– Closer match to traditional power generators– Smaller fraction of total grid capacity
Potential to offset variability from renewables
IAEA 14
– Potential to offset variability from renewables
Motivations – U.S. Case
• Carbon Emission 2005 U.S. CO2 Emissions (Tg)
− Reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions 17% by 2020…83% by 20502050
− Reduce federal GHG emissions 28% by 2020
• Energy and Economic Security− Pursue energy security through a gy y g
diversified energy portfolio− Improve the economy through
innovation and technologyinnovation and technology leadership
IAEA 15
Advanced Reactor Requirements
• Enhanced safety• Address lessons-learned from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident
removal system in the secondary side; y yhorizontally mounted RCPs; intended for sea water desalination and electricity supply in newcomer countries with small grid
IAEA• Design status: Standard Design Approval
just granted on 4 July 2012
SMART – Safety Systems• Inherent Safety
• No Large Break : vessel penetration < 2 inch• Large Primary Coolant Inventory per MW • Low Power Density (~2/3)• Large PZR Volume for Transient Mitigation• Low Vessel Fluence• Large Internal Cooling Source (Sump-integrated IRWST)
• Engineered Safety Featuresg y• Passive Residual Heat Removal System (50 % x 4 train)
IAEA 27S/P type C/V, reinforced concrete with stainless steel liner, 0.5 MPa Design Pressure
CAREM-25 –Severe Accident Prevention and Mitigationg
• Severe Accident Prevention:• A grace period extension, under the hypothesis of SBO longer than 72 hrs.,
by autonomous systems (fire extinguishing external pumps);• Water injection into the PRHRS pool;• Water injection into the PRHRS chamber;• Suppression pool cooling;
• Severe Accident Mitigation:• Severe Accident Mitigation:• In-vessel Corium retention: RPV external cooling by gravity;• Hydrogen passive autocatalytic recombiners.y g p y
• Passive safety system adoption and extended grace period result in very low frequency of core meltdown, the provision
id d f D f i D th L l 4considered for Defence-in-Depth Level 4.
IAEA 28
SMR for Near-term DeploymentNuScaleNuScaleNuScaleNuScale
• Full name: NuScaleFull name: NuScale• Designer: NuScale Power Inc., USA• Reactor type: Integral Pressurized Water
• Reactor Vessel steam is vented th h th t t lthrough the reactor vent valves (flow limiter)
• Steam condenses on containment• Condensate collects in lower
containment region • Reactor Recirculation Valves open p
to provide recirculation path through the core
• Provides 30+ day cooling followed
IAEA
y gby indefinite period of air cooling.
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Implications of Fukushima on NuScale
• No major impact to the NuScale design is currently ti i t danticipated.
• The NuScale design fully addresses decay heat removal for prolonged station blackout.
• As a result of the Fukushima event, NuScale will• Add long term air-cooling test to NuScale Integral System Test Matrix and
SIET d h t l t t t d t t ff ti f i iSIET decay heat removal tests to demonstrate effectiveness of passive air-cooling with an empty reactor building pool.
• Review Spent Fuel Pool Cooling capability under air-cooled conditions.• Examine role of “Island Mode” operation for multi-module plant.• Confirm adequacy of existing seismic design basis for NuScale (0.5g ZPA)
and ensure efforts are consistent with ongoing industry efforts.g g y• Review NRC recommendations when they become available and determine
applicability to NuScale.
IAEA 32
SMR for Near-term Deployment:mPowermPowermPowermPower
• Full name: mPowerDesigner Babcock & Wilco Mod lar• Designer: Babcock & Wilcox Modular Nuclear Energy, LLC(B&W), United States of AmericaR t t I t l P i d W t• Reactor type: Integral Pressurized Water Reactor
530 MW(t) / 180 MW(e)( ) ( )• Fuel Cycle: 48-month or more• Salient Features: integral NSSS, CRDM
inside reactor vessel; Passive safety thatinside reactor vessel; Passive safety that does not require emergency diesel generator
• Design status: Design Certification application expected in 4th Quarter of 2013
IAEAapplication expected in 4 Quarter of 2013
mPower – Inherent Safety Features
• Low Core Linear Heat Rate:• Low power density reduces fuel and clad temps during accidents• Allows lower flow velocities that minimizes flow induced vibration
effectseffects
• Large Reactor Coolant System Volume:• Allows more time for safety system response in the case of accidentAllows more time for safety system response in the case of accident• More coolant is available during SBLOCA providing continuous
cooling to protect the core
• Small Penetrations at High Elevations:• Increase the amount of coolant left in the vessel after a SBLOCA
R d t f l t t i t lti i l• Reduce rate of energy release to containment resulting in lower containment pressures
R t l (t ff t• Reactor vessel (trap effect by sodium)
• Containment• Containment• Guard vessel• Top domeTop dome• Mitigation of sodium fire by
nitrogen gas inside the top domedome
• Reactor buildingGuard
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Guard vessel
4S – Severe Accident Prevention and Mitigation Approachesg pp
Safety Related Issues 4S’s safety design to mitigate and prevent from severe accident
Station black out (SBO)Core damage is avoidable without any emergency power supply by passive decay heat removal system with natural circulation, not necessary the pump. There is no limitation for duration time.
Spent fuel poolNo need for spent fuel pool due to long-term cooling (about 1 year) after the long-term operation (i.e., 30 years) and then stored in dry cask for the 10MWe-4S.
Final heat sink in emergency situations
Air is the final heat sink (RVACS and/or IRACS), not depends on water and any emergency power (passive decay heat removal system).
Containment system reliability Containment system is consisted of top dome and guard vesselContainment system reliability Containment system is consisted of top dome and guard vessel.
Earthquakes Supporting the reactor building by seismic isolator.
Redundant shutdown system and passive decay heat removal
Tsunami / Flood
Redundant shutdown system and passive decay heat removal system without external power supply and emergency power system. Reinforced reactor building to protects from massive water invasion by keeping its water-tightness.
IAEA 40
Aircraft hazard Constructed under ground.
SMR for Immediate DeploymentSVBRSVBR--100100SVBRSVBR 100100
Di ti i hi F t Cl d l• Distinguishing Features: Closed nuclear fuel cycle with mixed oxide uranium plutonium fuel, operation in a fuel self-sufficient mode
Current Newcomer Countries PlanA paradox of SMR Deployment in Newcomer countries
Country Grid Capacity in GWe
Current Deployment Plan
A paradox of SMR Deployment in Newcomer countries
in GWeBangladesh 5.8 2 x 1000 MWe PWRs in Rooppur in 2018Vietnam 15.19 4 x 1000 MWe PWRs in Ninh Thuan #1 by 2020
4 x 1000 MWe PWRs in Ninh Thuan #2 by 2025Jordan 2.6 2 x 1000 - 1100 MWe PWR in + possible
interest in SMRUAE 23.25 4 x 1400 MWe PWR in Braka by 2018Belarus 8.03 2 x 1200 MWe PWR in Ostrovets by 2018Turkey 44.76 4 x 1200 MWe PWR in Akkuyu by 2022Malaysia 25.54 2 x 1000 MWe LWRs, 1st unit by 2021Indonesia 32 8 2 x 1000 LWRs with potential interest ofIndonesia 32.8 2 x 1000 LWRs, with potential interest of
deploying Small Reactors for industrial process and non-electric applications by 2024
IAEA 44
Commercial Availability limits Newcomer Countries in SMR Technology Selection
New entrants with active participation in IAEA’s Programme on SMRin IAEA s Programme on SMR
Country Grid Capacity in GWe
Current Plan Rationales(in addition to the small grid capacity)
Mongolia 0.83 Potential for future SMR deployment Energy supply security + non-electric application(s)
Egypt 24.67 Had considered 1000 MWe Class LWR and/or SMR
Energy supply security + non-electric application(s)
Ghana 1.99 Potential for future SMR deployment Energy supply security
Kenya 1.71 Potential for future SMR deployment Energy supply security
Morocco 6.16 Potential for future SMR deployment Energy supply securityMorocco 6.16 Potential for future SMR deployment Energy supply security
Nigeria 5.9 Potential for future SMR deployment Energy supply security + non-electric application(s)
Sudan 2.34 Potential for future SMR deployment Energy supply security + non-electric application(s)
Tunisia 3.65 Potential for future SMR deployment Energy supply security + non-electric application(s)
Algeria 10.38 Potential for future SMR deployment Energy supply security + non-electric application(s)
Albania 1.6 Potential for future SMR deployment Energy supply security
Croatia 4.02 Potential for future SMR deployment Energy supply security
IAEA 45
Jamaica < 3 Potential for future SMR deployment Energy supply security
Uruguay 2.25 Potential for future SMR deployment Energy supply security
Reactors Under Construction with SMR category
Country ReactorModel
Output(MWe)
Designer Number of units
Site, Plant ID, and unit #
CommercialStart
I di PHWR 700 640 NPCIL 2 K k 3 d 4 6/2015 d 12/2015India PHWR 700 640 NPCIL 2 Kakrapar 3 and 4 6/2015 and 12/2015
PHWR 700 640 NPCIL 2 Rajashtan units 7 and 8 6/2016 and 12/2016
PFBR 500 500 IGCAR 1 PFBR Kalpakkam 2015(LMFBR)
p
Pakistan CNP-300 300 CNNC -China
2 Chasnupp 3 and 4 12/2016
Romania CANDU-6 620 AECL 3 Chernavoda units 3 4 and 5 2016 2017 2018Romania CANDU-6 620 AECL 3 Chernavoda units 3, 4 and 5 2016, 2017, 2018
Argentina CAREM 25 27 CNEA 1 Formosa unit 1 2017 2018Argentina CAREM-25(a prototype)
27 CNEA 1 Formosa unit-1 2017 ~ 2018
IAEA 46
Identified Issues from Fukushima Nuclear Accident
• Expanded scenario of Design Basis Accident (DBA) Multiple external initiating events and common cause failuresinitiating events and common cause failures
• Station blackout mitigation• Ultimate heat sink for core and containment cooling in post severe accident• Reliability of emergency power supply• Optimization of the grace period (i.e. operator coping time)
E h d t i t h d d i t th• Enhanced containment hydrodynamic strength• Hybrid passive and active engineered safety features• Safety viability of multiple-modules – first of a kind engineeringSafety viability of multiple modules first of a kind engineering• Accident management, emergency response capability and costs• Seismic and cooling provisions for spent fuel pool • Hydrogen generation from steam-zirconium reaction; recombiner system• Environmental impact assessment and expectation
C t l h bit bilit i t id t t i tIAEA
• Control room habitability in post accident transient47
IAEA Response to the Global Trend
• Project 1.1.5.5:C T h l i d I f SMRCommon Technologies and Issues for SMRs
• Objective: To facilitate the development of key bli t h l i d th l ti f blienabling technologies and the resolution of enabling
infrastructure issues common to future SMRsA ti iti (2012 2013)• Activities (2012 – 2013):• Formulate roadmap for technology development incorporating
safety lessons-learned from the Fukushima accidentsafety lessons learned from the Fukushima accident• Review newcomer countries requirements, regulatory infrastructure
and business issues• Define operability-performance, maintainability and constructability
indicators• Develop guidance to facilitate countries with planning for SMRs
IAEADevelop guidance to facilitate countries with planning for SMRs technology implementation
48
2014 – 2017 Vision, Challenges .. etc
• Enhanced understanding on prioritized various safety action plans on Post F k shima (in depth elaboration)action plans on Post-Fukushima (in-depth elaboration)
• Operational Issues for SMRs – Overcoming Constraints:• Licensability of non LWR technologies in newcomer countries• Licensability of non-LWR technologies in newcomer countries• Control room staffing and human factors• Connection to the gridg• Site specific exclusion zones and EPZs
• Deploying SMRs in Developing / Newcomer Countries• Integrated infrastructure development• International regulatory frameworks
F l l i• Fuel cycle preparations• First of a kind cost estimate• Integration with renewable energy resources
IAEAIntegration with renewable energy resources
• Does SMR help Public Acceptance after Fukushima accident?49M. Hadid Subki (NENP/NPTDS) - SMR
Technology Development
Summary• SMR is an attractive option to enhance energy supply
security in newcomer countries with small grids and y gless-developed infrastructure;
• SMRs have the potential to provide significantly enhanced plant robustnessenhanced plant robustness
• Innovative SMR concepts have common technology development challenges:
• licensability, competitiveness, control room staffing for multi-modules plant, and so forth.
• Needs to address lessons-learned from the F k hi id t i t th d i d l t dFukushima accident into the design development and plant deployment
• The key is: SMR Deployment must demonstrate commitment toThe key is: SMR Deployment must demonstrate commitment to nuclear safety
IAEA 50
… Thank you for your attention.… Thank you for your attention.
IAEA For inquiries, please contact: Dr. M. Hadid Subki <[email protected]> 51
2011 IAEA Major Workshops on Advanced Reactor Technology Developmentgy p
• Interregional Workshop on “Advanced Nuclear Reactor Technology for Near Term Deployment” on 4 - 8 July 2011Deployment on 4 8 July 2011 http://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Technology/Meetings/2011-Jul-4-8-ANRT-WS.html
• Technical Meeting on “Options to Enhance Energy Supply Security with NPPs basedTechnical Meeting on Options to Enhance Energy Supply Security with NPPs based on SMRs” on 3 - 6 October 2011 http://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Technology/Meetings/2011-Oct-3-6-SMR-TM.html
• INPRO Dialog Forum on Nuclear Energy Innovations: “Common User Considerations for SMRs” on 10 – 14 October 2011 http://www.iaea.org/INPRO/3rd_Dialogue_Forum/index.html
• Workshop on “Technology Assessment of SMR for Near-Term Deployment” on 5 – 9 December 2011http://www iaea org/NuclearPower/Technology/Meetings/2011 Dec 5 9 WS SMR htmlhttp://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Technology/Meetings/2011-Dec-5-9-WS-SMR.html
Please click the links to download the detailed presented materials.