global governance

Šabič – Global Governance

23.10.12

Dawid Friedrich – EU after Lisbon – The crisis and democracy in the EU

- Empty chair crisis – 1966, De Gaulle ne hodinasestankeSveta- EU – crisis as normality of European integration

o There is a “EU-is-collapsing-literature” throughout the whole integration process

o Unsuccessful political integration in the 50s, only economic integration- Understanding of EU

o As a peace project that fosters freedom and democracyo Or as an economic project, guaranteeing wealth and growtho Or as a stronghold against neo-liberal globalizationo Or as a neo-liberal project killing welfareo Or as the only chance of the EU countries not to lose any power and influence

in an emerging multi-power worldo Or as a threat to democracy

Transfer of decision-making away from countries- Contradictory normative expectations signify the special character of the EU- Questions arising from the current crisis

o Future of the modern nation-stateo The primacy of political vis-à-vis the marketo The future of modern democracy in Europe

Conceptual issues

- What is national democracyo Collective decision-making practices and collective policy integration

Policy integration – often overlooked, democracy is more than merely voting, it is about policy integration – different policies have different goals – economic policies or social policies, different goals, a multitude of goals – there needs to be a space to integrate these policies

- What is Global Governance(!)o Deficit of democracyo Some problems can’t be solved within a nation stateo The decision-making power of a national executive is functionally limited

o Decisions going to a supranational actoro It can have positive or negative aspects for democracy

Strengthening and weakening democracy - The idea of post-democracy

o Colin Croucho When a system is not about the input but when it is merely about the output

legitimacyo System doesn’t loose democratic institutions, they still stay, but we are only

simulating democracy, the substance of democracy is decreasingo The competencies of elected official move to experts, MNC, technocratso The people are not the main sovereign, but it would be the task of politics to

make people accustomed to market needso IMF, WTO, etc – signs of entering a post-democratic state, with all the

democratic institutionso Democracy as a subsystem of the market system, the primacy of the market

Methodological issues

- How to measure democracy?- Plea for modesty in research

o Normative (democratic) legitimacyo Not democracyo Democracy is more than normatively valuable fragments

- There is no one concept of democracy- Core values of democracy

o Political autonomy, political equality, public control, freedom

Legitimacy check

- Chain of democratic legitimacyo We are authorizing our representativeso Representatives are accountable

- Participation of citizenso The longer the chain of legitimacy is, the thinner it getso Participation should be stronger so not to loose legitimacy

- The primacy of politicalo The politics does not succeed in keeping its own temporality against other

societal subsystemso In such case democracy is impossible to upholdo Tensions between the temporality of politics and temporality of others

(markets)- Contribution of the Lisbon treaty to these aspects of legitimacy check

o Classical chain of legitimacyo Aim was to keep most of the substance of the failed constitutional treaty

o One of the key aim was to put democracy of the EU on a stronger basis Two meta-standards: representation and political equality

o Institutional developments Fosters representation in a multi-level perspective Stronger role of the EU Parliament A stronger role of the national parliaments with the early-warning

mechanism But no pan-European intermediary system (parties) – European

elections have national lists of candidates, no parties that would be represented everywhere

o The chain of legitimacy is not yet fully developed The EP does still not have all competencies of a national parliament The EP can’t decide on the executive – can’t withdraw its power It also does not have main competencies on the budget Chain of legitimacy weak on these issues

o Two meta-standards – the Treaty doesn’t clarify what does it mean by that or who shall be represented – a citizen (individual) or a country

Countries or citizens equal between each othero The state is included and often in contradiction to the equal representation of

the individuals Nr of seats for each country in EP as an example

o The role of the citizen is weakened on a national level and not addressed on the EU level

o The crisis is increasing the deficit towards the rule of the fewo Lisbon Treaty strengthens consultation of functional interests as a means for

creating legitimacy European citizens initiative – an innovation

If the ECI is successful, the Commission must think about that issue

Is rather a means of consultationo Political equality not given, public control if existent, than only non-

transparento EP is heavily marginalized

Crisis – citizens just spectatorso Discursive figure of “crisis as a chance to win lost ground back”o G20 didn’t achieve a strong agreement on strengthening regulation of financial

capitalismo EU – attempts to strengthen the political increases post-democratic

exclusiveness of informal decision-making groups (Euro-group, Frankfurt group)

These groups sign of fear vis-à-vis the markets, rather than streghtening

Conclusions

- Lisbon fail to tackle problem of policy integration

30.10.12 -gostujoči Nina Pfifer

- 3 weaknesses/3 strenghtso S1 – flexibility or adaptabilityo S2 – curiouso S3 – razgledanost – o W1 – not specialized, yet still specialo W2 –no experienceo W3 – da ne znamo poiskat weakness-ov, premalo samozavestni

- Where blab la 5 yearso NGO v Afriki, reševalisvet

- What are you goalso Najtidelo, ki bi teizpolnjevalo, imelo added value

- If you’d be an animal, which one?o Zooplankton –

- Why should I hire you?o Willing to work hard, not a union member, o

- How much vacation in the first year?o Kolkorzakonskopripada

8.11.12

- What are networks- Advocacy networks- NGO – imajonek status, HQ, nekoagendo – to jihrazlikuje od networks

o Network set the agenda or influence the agenda- Kerk, Sinkink

o Introduction to the role of networkso Model how to research networks

- F. neki – Anti-tobacco članeko Contributes to the conceptual debate

- Scientist networkso Can be source of ideaso Specially social scientists meet often on conferences – there various ideas are

being exchanged and are put on offer to states to pick and chooseo Chicago school, Kissinger – itd, they are influential

- Slaughter – New world order

o Stop imagining a world of stateso Disaggregated stateso Globalization paradox

Need for more government on a global scale but we don’t want the centralization of decision-making power

- Global networks are a subject worth analyzing – on formal and informal levelo Both contribute to global governance as they contribute to the accumulation of

rules and practices that are eventually accepted by the international community

Global public policy networks

BIERSTEKER PON 19.11., 9-12

Global governance and the development of global international organizations

- Most institutions created 60 years ago – strong period of institutionalization 1944-49- UN is profoundly state-centric in its design

o But they also constantly adaptedo Rates of reform in different institutions vary

Global governance

- Definingo Often in negative – what is it not

It’s not global government It’s not chaos and anarchy

o Rosenau – an order that lacks centralized authority with a capacity to enforce decisions on a global scale

o Oxford English dictionary Governance as steering, somebody that is directing Originally from latin – gubernator – a person who steers and as a self-

acting contrivance (like an engine that keeps itself from overheating, self-regulating)

Idea of controlling, directing influence as being controlled Power of governing Manner in which something is governed General conduct of life, behavior – normative aspect of governance

- Biersteker definition : GLOBAL GOVERNANCEo Patterned regularity

Recurring basis, order at global level Regular pattern of behavior It’s a necessary but not defining aspect

o Purposive There must be some purpose of the governance Achievement of some goals GG is order + intentionality at a global level

o System of rules Formal, embodied in treaties Could be informal, a recognition or acknowledgment It resides intersubjectively There is some entity that governs and other entities that are being

governed Defines expectations at a global level

o Authoritative There is a relationship between authority claims by some body and

acceptance of this claims of those subject to that authority Relation between the governed and some governing authority Dependent on intersubjective meaning Governance is not the same as government, but it embodies functions

of government (Rosenau) – governance associated with functions of government and not existence of government

o Steering To steer, regulate the process but with the possibility to self-regulate

o Self-regulating A market or a market-like mechanism can be set to govern Example – global bonds markets constitute a part of global governance,

regulating and self-controlling - GG is intersubjectively recognized, system of authoritative rules, functioning on a

global level- Defining global level

o Doesn’t mean it’s universalo It simply requires that the rules and practices are widely shared on at least 3

continents- Multilateral governance

o Coordination Go beyond 3 or more actors that coordinate It is coordination between 3 or more states in accordance with certain

principleso There must be a social basis of meaning, some general principles

- Contemporary global governanceo There is no single dominant form of governance todayo Different issues differently governedo Governance is not a single unitary system, there are multiple government

arrangements that coexist in different issue areaso These arrangements can even conflict between each other

o There is a density of governance arrangements – does it help or hurt? Overlapping institutions

o Governance is not necessarily a “good” thing or normatively desirable An issue domain can be governed poorly

- Criteria for evaluating governanceo Inclusivenesso Representativeness

Difference from being included and being actively represented Question of legitimacy Do you have some influence on the core agenda

o Adaptability Can it accommodate changes in global power distribution

o Efficiencyo Fairness

- Potential trade offs:Inclusiveness versus short-term efficiency and long-term effectivenessAdaptability versus assountabilityOthers?

- Not all governance is good governance- Forms of governance and the place of IOs

o Governance is not equal to IOs, although they can have a strong or leading roleo Inis Claude – book Power and IR – continuum

Differentiated 3 heuristic ways to manage power in IR There is a continuum –

On one side you have balance of power On the other side you have global government In between you have collective security arrangements

From the least institutionalized (balance) to most formalized (global g.) In the middle of the continuum the collective security arr. Representation of forms of governance in security Each is a system of authoritative rules, intersubjectively recognized etc

o Adam Watson – Typology of systems Spectrum of international systems On one end absolute independence of states On the other the absolute empire He argued that order promotes peace, but it does it on the expense of

independence The more order, the less freedom

Independence brings insecurity – military, economy – so it seeks alliances

Different degrees of institutionalizationo Kenneth Waltz – States as analogous to firms interacting in a market

It’s self-regulating, you are like an individual firm operating on a market

States pursue survival in the system – as firms on the marketo Different period of times associated with different forms of governance

- Balance of power as a system of governanceo It is a system of governance but it is less institutionalizedo Late 19th century, were a system of governanceo Schroeder: two 19th century systems

Argument that 1815 was the introduction of the “concert” system Powers met on periodical conferences, dealing with various issues Concert system started to hinder in around 1850 The second half of 19th century – competitive balance of powers,

competitive imperialisms The concert was more institutionalized than the competitive system at

the end of the century There were informal rules

o Purposes Preserve the independence of the units Preserve the concert system itself Block preponderance of power of any single member

o Mechanisms Vigilance Concert and communication Alliance formation Intervention – in foreign territory Mediation – by a 3rd party Military preparedness Compensation – territorial compensation Preservation of members Periodically you maintain balance by going to WAR

o Critiques of the balance of powers Alliance politics

The system of balance of power was responsible for WWI Alliances themselves foster fear, mistrust, arms races, spread

and spiral of military escalation Arms races Alliances are symptoms of insecurity

They don’t provide security to states They bring new commitments and dangers

It’s out of date, fallacious Metaphor itself is misleading

o The Wilsonian Critique Low standards of political morality Anti-liberal, involved in selfish rivalry among cliques, it encouraged

devious maneuvering Sacrificing interest of peoples to the ambitions of militaristic tyrants It should be open diplomacy, self-determination, open economic

system A morally-based system that would stress the basic harmony of interest

between like-minded states Therefore you needed to have a more predictive system of collective

security Collective security operates the same as balance of power – but

there is pooling of military capabilities in one entity Against preponderance of power Security for all – for weaker powers, states

- Concept of collective securityo Security for all, by collective action of all against all challenges of status quoo Types of collective action

Engage in making moral argument, critique Issue a formal diplomatic statement – condemnation Economic measures Collective military action – a wide range of actions

o Deterrent threat of preponderance of forceo Peace is indivisibleo Advantages for the small and weako Status quo implications

Collective security is fundamentally status quo orientedo Embodied in the League of Nations – failure of LN

Critical states never joined – USSR, Germany, USA… Collective decision-making on use of force was never institutionalized Major powers never took it seriously Unable to act in crises

o UN designed to address deficiencies of the League Universal membership

UN doesn’t expel its members Universal membership one of the core values

Veto Outlaws inter-state war Limited collective security Broad agenda: Development and HR

Purposes and functions of IO

- Is the density of IO creating “forum shopping”?o US can’t bomb Serbia through UN so they chose another international forum

like NATO – need for legitimization of their actionso US shopped around – if we can’t make it through UN, we might do it through

some other IOo The density of IO increased to such an extent that it creates opportunities for

forum shopping – finding another forum to make something happen- Why do states join IO, why do they participate?

o Constrain great powerso Promote rule of lawo Achieve equal standingo Solve collective action problems

- Potential disadvantageso Costs of complianceo Limitations on sovereigntyo IOs can be used to extend Great Power hegemony

- Differences in postwar settlementso Treatment of defeated powers

After WWII defeated powers changed their political system – consequence of total war –

Firstly they changed the polity and then reconstructed its economy From punishment of WWI

o UN as universal membership organizationo Security council vetoo Liberal basis for economic ordero More institutionalized and constitutionalizedo More globalo More issues

- Options available to US after WWIIo Dominationo Abandonmento Self-restraining engagement

- Competing conceptions in the US – different strategic arguments in the US on the post-war order

o Global governance o Open trading systemo Alliance of North Atlantic democracieso Maintain access to markets and raw materialo Idea of a third force in EU to counter Soviet Union / meaning European

cooperation, eventually it became the EUo Bipolar balancing of the Soviet Union

- How institutions constrain great powerso They evolve and developo Governing language can be applied in different contextso Cost of leaving exceeds cost of restraint

- Ruggie: Embedded Liberalism- What is a regime: principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures

o Affect state behavior indirectlyo Alter interests and preferences of key actors directlyo Vehicles for international learningo What do regimes do

Lower cost of cooperation Provide forum for bargaining Increase information Affect the reputation of states Provide linkages that enable trade-offs

o Why is Keohane optimistic about regimes Adaptable to a post-hegemonic era Cooperation dependes on expectations, transaction costs and

uncertainty Institutions can change and mold interests Institutional legacy is significant Regimes are fragile but of great value

o Factor conducive to regime formation Shared interests Previous regimes Self-interest Small number of actors

Building a CFT regime after 9/11

- Counter-financing-terrorism- UNSCR 1373

o Every state on the globe must criminalize terrorismo Countries need to report on the compliance

- Expansion of 1267 mandateo The Al Qaeda Committee

o Anyone associated with terrorism- FATF 8 special recommendations on CFT- IMF and IBRD- UNODC- All institutions start to adhere to CFT- Egmont Group – financial intelligence units- Private banks voluntarily - A fairly robust regime created in a short period of time

o Expansion of mandates + IOs- Core principles

o Widely shared belief about the importance of following the money Following transactions to reconstruct a network of financing

- Normso Obligations from implementation of formal UN resolutionso General consensus on best practices

- Ruleso Specific rules to complyo For example to inform financial institutions in a country about these

obligations- Decision-making procedures

o Periodic meetings, group of 8 meetings…o Global, regional organizationso Private firms, banks, are at the end individual enforcers

- Internalization by financial institutions – it became routine- Phases of regime development

o Roughly 4 phaseso 1. Construction

2001-02 Bush administration provided leadership Falls under realist arguments UNSCR 1373 and the CTC process

Counter-terrorism-committee: calling ambassadors in to report on country actions against terrorism

Expanding the 1267 sanction scope From a few to more than 500 people

FATF’s 8 special recommendations Al Qaeda continues to attack – facilitates the creation of the regime High levels of compliance

High political will behind it Other institutional developments

o 2. Institutionalization 2003-04 1267 for the first time de-lists some people

CTED was created – Counter-terrorism executive director – institutionalized CTC – providing training to countries how to comply with the regime

UNSCR 1540 – on proliferation sensitive material Calls upon the criminalization of proliferation of nuclear

material to non-state actors Subject of nuclear+terrorism Every country must monitor and report on the implementation It’s global legislation (chapter 7)

CTAG – count. Ter. Action group established FATF 9th special recommendation – mustn’t have more than 10.000€

on flights Institutional overlap & coordination problems

o 3. Fatigue 2003-07 Fall-out from US-led invasion of Iraq

There is much less sympathy, more dissent Legal challenges from individuals – posing a fundamental challenge to

the regime – what is the criteria of the sanctions list, what about notifications, there is no due process, no appeal

Reporting fatigue A lot of reports and so on

CTED stalls Al Qaeda changes strategy – regime was successful

They stopped using the formal sector Private sector doubts about efficacy Institutional innovations

o 4. Maintenance challenges 2006-12 Reporting fatigue Legitimacy challenge – is it overreaching? Legal cases – Qadi at ECJ, Nada at ECHR Parliamentary queries in CH, UK, NL Public criticism – big brother critiques UNSCR reforms

o Conclusion UN provided the legal basis for the global regime Growing democratic deficit threatens entire UN targeted sanctions

regime Limited capacity for intelligence gathering

UN knows only what national intelligence services tells them IOs have limited enforcement power Regime successes, but requires moral authority

Biersteker 20.11.12

Institutional and organizational behavior of IOs

- Different theories of institutional and organizational behavior- Mearsheimer – The false promise of international institutions (article)

o Realisto Institutions as a reflection of the distribution of power

Reflect global power distributiono Dismissive comment on UN

IOs operate at the margins of IR They are not really important, don’t really affect states’ behavior Voluntary principle – states chose to obey IOs or they don’t

o All states posses military capabilitieso States can never be sure about the intentions of other stateso Primary goal is survival for stateso States can’t rely on others for their securityo Principle aim of states to maximize their relative power o Relative gains

But states don’t always worry about relative gains, absolute also mattero IOs are created by powerful states

IOs are vehicles for pursuit of national interesto IOs have limited agency

Limited independence, states control them, states are principal- Liberal institutionalist view

o States are self-interested, but states rationally choose IOs to achieve goals Like create regimes IOs can harmonize policies that can maximize absolute gains for all

stateso IOs lower costs, provide forums, increase information and decrease

uncertainty, provide legal framework…- The rational design of institutions

o States design institutions to further their goalso 5 dimensions of design – institutions between each other vary in these 5

Membership Scope of issues Centralization of tasks Rules for controlling the institution Flexibility

o Membership is highly contested Who is allowed to join and who isn’t How many are involved How large can it be

Will it be limited or not The more members you have the more heterogeneous the group is and

the more issues will come to the agenda Scope increases with number of members

o Size has implications for decision-making rule More members, less individual states can control the process This is why many UN bodies work with a consensus – effective veto

o States are risk averse – prefer veto To protect themselves from unpredictable consequences Can lead to institutional paralysis

o Some states are more equal than others Some states are still more important, if not because of else, some have a

bigger government and are active on all fields Role and influence proportional to contribution – financial or

operationalo Institutional flexibility will decrease with the increase in number of members

Larger number increase costs of flexibility more than its benefits- Public choice perspectives

o IOs are bureaucracieso IOs contain unelected, over-paid civil servantso Subject to interest group pressure – collusiono Interested in maximizing their powero National governments assign IOs unpleasant taskso Like all organizations, IOs interested in survival

- Why are IOs self-interestedo Personal: keep the job, or get promotion

Personal advancemento Institutional prideo Incentives to expand mandateo Just like elected officials want to stay in the office, IOs want to keep goingo Increase budgets, staff, space, flexibility

You can expand by taking on new mandates Increase freedom of action

o More pronounced in IOs – less accountableo National quotas worsen these tendencieso Interests in protecting turf – mandateso Success defined as growth in all of the above

- How IOs ensure their survival and expansiono Constant adaption – mission creep

Mission always evolving from the starting point Unforeseen circumstances To maintain survival

New institutions encounter suspicion, institutional sabotage, o Challenge any encroachments

New institutions are challenged Oppose being coordinated

o Protect institutional turf – mandate- Organizational theories

o Decision-makers do not optimize, but satisfice from existing policy repertoireo Individuals in IOs are analytically parsimonious o Dealing with complexity requires reduction2o Complexity requires short-cutso Short-cuts = existing policy repertoireo To simplify, agree on broad definitions

Example – peace-buildingo Organizations are broken down into departments, issue areas, projectso Range of policy responses is constrained

Attention is limited by time and resources As a result, policy alternatives are limited

o Lack of institutional capacity to determine whether a policy is optimal- Constructivist approaches

BIERSTEKER 22.11.12

- Constructivist approaches to IO behavioro Emphasize how over time IOs develop agency of their owno They exercise power autonomouslyo Independent agency! o Legal authority of IO gives them certain amount of power independent from

stateso IOs over time become more than reflection of state preferenceso IOs can create actors, specify responsibilities, define what actors do, and give

it meaningo Take a sociological approacho Explore the content of institutions, their legitimacy concerns, norms that guide

their behavior and shape interestso IOs become autonomous because

Legitimacy of their rational-legal authority Control over technical expertise and information Develop rules and routines – appear apolitical

o Three types of IOs power Power of classification

It can classify problems, situations, which gives them power Fix meanings Articulate and diffuse norms

o Pathologies of IOS Institutions are “sticky” Dysfunctional Internal cultures dominate Means can become ends

Like efforts to create democratic institutions – having an election becomes equated with democracy, but can also loose site of the goal

Existing data drives definition and judgement Data sources, data itself confines and drives definitions and

measurements of certain goals Bureaucratic universalism Disproportionate influence of recent experience Normalization of deviance Insulation Cultural contestation

o Other institutional issues Forms of representation Voting rules Institutional learning Cycles of institutional development

Design Adaptation Independence

Institutional cultures Institutional leadership

UN peacebuilding commission

- Peace is more than just cessation of war, it must be sustainable, is something that is built

- This entity is a product of GA and SC togethero It was founded so to address the democratic deficit – cooperation of the GA

- Tasked with complex challengeso Broad mandate

- It faces all predictable institutional challengeso About membershipo Scope of authorityo Coordinationo How will it organize and staff itself

- At time of establishing the expectations of the UNPBC were extremely higho It came in the time of disappointing performance of the UNHRC and other

institutions- Realist view of the UNPBC

o UNPBC reflects underlying tensions between SC and GA – both claim jurisdictional authority

o The compromise is: consensus-based, advisory body that is subsidiary entity of both GA and SC

o Membership Of course the P5 The ones that are paying the most and providing the most (so money

and troops) Japan, Germany, Brazil, India … all this countries were not included

permanently in the permanent seat of SC as the reforms failedo Debates over procedures

How is it going to manage its activities Procedure means bureaucracy

o It is easier to create new institutions than change existing oneso Bureaucratic specializations likely to remain strong

- Liberal institutionalist view of the UNPBCo It was created to solve specific problems – fill the institutional gap, peace-

buildingo Membership would be contested – therefore large – 31 members

Membership it includes states that themselves went through the process of peace-building after civil wars – first chairs Angola and El Salvador

Donor countries – more important to the institution – will dominate committee chairs – more wealthy countries

o Institutional flexibility will suffer because of a bigger membership- Public choice on UNPBC

o UNPBC predictably eager to take on “dirty business” of peace-buildingo It will encounter suspicion and resistanceo Geneva-based UN institutions fear “political” NY UN institutions

Closer to security and politicso Everyone is in favor of coordination

But no one wants to be “coordinated”- Organization theory & UNPBC

o UNPBC was a way to “muddle through” Means to generate greater coordination

o Complexity requires reduction and simplificationo Means-driven policyo Everybody agree that something had to be done – so UNPBC

- Constructivist view UNPBCo Stem from growing unease over the lack of coordination

In any conflict zone you will have simultaneously a few organizations or agencies deployed by the UN

o Big problem + lack of coordination = new entity

o Classification – common cause = peace-buildingo Fixing the meaning of peacebuilding as “immediate aftermath of conflict”

Diffuse this norm – in the first 2 years after the conflicto Normalization of deviance

First recipients of UNPBC assistance were no longer in immediate aftermath of conflict

First one was Sierra Leone where conflict already ended and more than 2 years ago

o UN introduced a terminology – peacebuilding – not employed by most member states

No counterpart departments or agencies on national levelso Blueprints for “one size fits all” are officially shunned

But Working groups on lessons learned searching for just that – dysfunctionally

- Conclusionso Theories identify predictable constraints faced by new institutionso UNPBC likely to remain large and confront challenges of scope and limited

flexibilityo Leadership can make a difference – look to institutional entrepreneurs o Use working group on lessons learned to generate new ideas

Private Authority in Contemporary Global Governance and the Revival of the UN

- Global public domain- States remain central- Joined by NGOs- Begin to play authoritative role- Transnational advocacy networks

o Networks of activists motivated by a cause – principled ideas and valueso Networks = voluntary, reciprocal and horizontal forms of organization

- How do TANs worko Information politicso Symbolic politicso Leverage politics – on IGOs and states

Put pressure on powerful actorso Accountability politics

- When do TANs have influence?o Issue formation and agenda settingo Discursive changeo Influence on international procedureso Influence on policy change in targets – states, firms, IOso Influence on state behavior

- Issue characteristics

o Bodily harm Appealing to universal empathy

o Indiscriminate nature of effectso Legal equality of opportunityo Recognizable responsibility

Specific responsibility, who is to blame

Trans-governmental networks

- Types of TGNo Regulatorso Judgeso Parliamentarianso Others

- Networks of governmental officials working on the same issueo Across different states and IOs

Relationships between TANs, TGNs, & IOs

- Who takes the lead?- How independent are NGOs?

Emergence of private authority

- IPE increasingly governed by private sector- Why does private authority emerge?

o States abandono Technology is complexo States lack effective capacity

- Why do states abandon some areas?o Globalizationo Liberal ideologyo Private actors more capableo Costs savings

- Definition of private authorityo Independent of stateo Not publico NGOs

- How private sector becomes authoritative?o By virtue of expertise in a virtue domaino Historical practiceo Delegation

Biersteker 23.11.12

- Revival of the UN after the Cold Waro Rapid increase in sanctions by UN, increase in peace-keeping o Security Council Report – dobervirza SC

“What’s in blue” – what’s happening in the SC day by dayo Ideas – the Agenda for Peaceo Expanding conception of what constitutes threat to international peace and

security- Principal challenges facing the UN today

o Performance deficits A lot of examples where you can point to UN failures – Rwanda,

scandals with peace-keeping forceso Democratic deficito Incorporating the emerging powerso Global transnational challenges

Stalemate on environment, Doha round – trade, disarmamento Failure of post-colonial state-building

- UN reformo UNSC membership – add new members, vetoo Operational reform – good management

Financial accounting Hiring – redundancies, SG staffing Grievance procedures To better efficiency

o Procedural reform United for peace Reform how SC committees work

Subsidiary bodies of the council Calls for transparency Idea – that if you use the veto you have to explain why you used it

And why you used it in terms of the Charter Idea – that current P5 couldn’t veto in cases of genocide, crimes against

humanity, war crimes- Conclusion

o Challenges facing UN are dauntingo Concern for over-extension – of peace-keeping, proliferation regime in crisis,

climate changeo Crisis of legitimacy – can it live up to the expectationso Demoralization of the staff – due to financial cutbacks

Most agencies and secretariat are firingo Leadership question – Ban Ki Moon is not the most dynamico But if we wouldn’t have the UN we would have to invent it

It’s easy to blame UN Given the most difficult tasks

Designing UN targeted sanctions

- Increasingly utilized by UNSC- There are diamond sanctions, timber, cocoa sanctions - Can be against a region of a country

o DRC sanctions only against the eastern provinces- No comprehensive sanctions since 1994- Applied to a broad range of threats to IP’n’S- Defined – intended to be different from comprehensive sanctions- Targeted sanctions began and took off during comprehensive sanctions against Iraq

o High humanitarian consequences of such sanctionso Why does a farmer in Basra suffer for Saddam’s actionso Such sanctions are unfair, penalize the whole population o Oil for food because of the humanitarian crisiso At the end of 90s constant kršenje sanctions

- Targeted sanctions are more adaptable and can be calibratedo Comprehensive more blunto You can impose sanctions on only one part, deterrent for another

- Scholarly and popular debate largely unchangedo All sanctions since 1994 were targeted in some wayo Arguments that sanctions don’t worko 20+ years of experience with targeted sanctions – the first were imposed

against Yugoslaviao Yet, no comprehensive, systematic analysis of their impacts or effectiveness

- Targeted sanctions consortiumo Biersteker + Watson institute + graduate institute Geneva…o Scholars, academics, plus policy actorso First comprehensive, systematic and comparative assessment of UN targeted

sanctionso Conceptual innovationo Case episodes within broader country cases

Case episode – is every time the council changes the mix of measures, increases the number of targets – substantial change in the nature of sanctions

Or if the target changes behavioro Unit of analysis not country case but case episodeo Purposes of the sanctions

Not always to coerce, often also to constrain Iran sanctions are clearly constraining – the targets are individuals,

corporations, scientists involved in the program, banks that provide support

UN sanctions on Iran aren’t coercive, but constraining The other purpose is to send a signal

Sanctions are useful for looking at norms – the SC with passing of a resolution is involved in sending the signal

Other regimes in the region can be the target of the signal when for example Gadafi was sanctioned

Signaling is always part of a sanctiono Project team

40+ scholars and policy practitioners from around the world 16 different research teams located in Africa, Asia, EU, N. Am.

o Scope of project 16 UN targeted sanctions regime 56 case episodes identified Produced a quantitative database of 286 variables coded for each case

episode More than 16.000 cells

- Principal findingso Targeted sanctions are effective about 1/3 of the timeo Sanctions are more effective in constraining and signaling than coercing a

change in target behavior- Measuring effectiveness

o Policy outcome + sanctions contribution to that outcomeo Policy outcome on a 5 point scale

Coercive 1 = intransigence 5 = full compliance with UNSCR

Constrain 1 = none observable 5 = significant, increase in costs to target

Signal 1 = unclear and no stigma 5 = norms clear and full stigma

o Sanctions contribution on 6 point scale Negative = 0 – target increases activity None = 1 – no sanction contribution Minor = 2 – other measures most significant Modest = 3 – sanctions reinforced Major = 4 – necessary, but not sufficient Significant = 5 – single most important factor

- General findingso Targeted sanctions are never applied alone

Always combined with other measures and never applied in isolation Methodological problem

o Targeted sanctions consist of a variety of types and differences in degree of discrimination

Discrimination as to what extent do the targets discriminate between innocents and targets of sanctions

From individual to diplomatic to arms embargo to commodity sanctions to oil and financial sector sanction comprehensive sanctions – non-discriminatory

o Commodity sanctions are highly effective Like diamond or timber sanctions

o UN sanctions are enhanced by regional groups (EU) UN is usually following in the sanctions regimes, not leading UN follows regional initiatives

o Most sanctions of the UN remain largely targeted With the exception of Libya II

- Additional findingso Targeting is important, and the list of targets should reflect the purposes of the

sanctions Too many, to few, or the wrong list undermines credibility

o Secondary sanctions, although applied relatively infrequently, appear to be highly effective

It’s better to put secondary sanctions on those that violate sanctions than to expand the existing set

Like for Iran, sanction Dubai rather than cripple even more its population

o Sometimes it’s better to hit the re-start button Start over with a new UNSCR rather than continue to add new

requirements to an existing sanctions regime Retain focus Renews political will

Predstavitev GG and underdevelopment of Africa

- Deconstruct myths on Africa- Single story on Africa – presented and seen only as poverty and wars- Nelson Mandela kot success story of African leadership- Global competitiveness report

o Published by World Economic Forumo 144 countries

- Neoliberal order put pressure on leaders to reform into liberal democracies?- Ubuntu – philosophy in Africa – individualism and collectivism at the same time;

o Western cultures imply only individualismo Ubuntu: individuals exist only through interactions and living with others

- New partnership for Africa’s development – NEPAD – now integrated into African Union

o Goals – sustainable development, poverty reduction, stop marginalization of Africa in the globalization process

o African peer review mechanism Periodic reviews of the policies and practices of participating countries

- Common African market – beneficial to all African countries?- EU conditionality – effects on Africa

Maruša& co – Environment, NGO

Tomič& co – Whose GG

Cyber warfare – primer stuxnet

Kaj pol je to cyber terrorism kigaizvajadržava?

Cyberterrorism – napad ki gre iz virtualnega na pravo infrastrukturo, proti non-combatants, clandestine agents