Global Briefing Booklet 2013

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1 CRISIS GROUP GLOBAL BRIEFING BRUSSELS 2013

Crisis Group | Global Briefing | Brussels | 24 25 October 2013

Global Brief ing2013

Background

information

ICG2013

GLOBAL

BRIEFING


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Page

5 Broken Promises? Conflict and Conflict Prevention

in 2013 and 2014

9 The European Union and Conflict Prevention

13 Colombias Moment of Truth

17 Tension in the China Seas

23 Stability in the Sahel: Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso

27 Syria and the Region

31 A Kurdish Spring? Turkey, Iraq, Syria and the Kurds

37 Militias and Peace Enforcement in Central Africa

41 The Troubled Caucasus

47 Democracy, Stability and Islam in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia

53 The Sudans: No Unity in Diversity

57 Make or break or more of the same? Afghanistan and

Pakistan in 2014

61 Crisis Group Board and Donors

Contents

Thursday

Friday


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A panel discussion that

will introduce some of

the conflicts and themes

that will feature in

subsequent sessions.


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help conflict prevention or complicate it? Does it inevitably mean deeper

international polarisation as being witnessed over Syria?

Might we now be seeing twin phenomena: of isolationism, at least in the

West; and growing nationalism, more broadly. Combined with both, there is

perhaps a sense that security despite the rhetoric of tackling root causes

and sustainable development is increasingly understood in narrow terms.

Hence the lure of drones; the appeal of special forces; the increasinglyfraught debates on immigration; and a seemingly limitless willingness to

compromise on individual freedoms.

Are shrinking aid budgets borne simply of financial woes? Or does this

austerity reflect a deeper malaise, a sense in the West that external forays

are not simply unaffordable but somehow unwise, too complicated, too inef-

fective, events abroad too divorced from immediate concerns?

This is not just a question of development; in matters military, too, we

appear to be entering a period of retrenchment. The West finances UN

peacekeeping but has become ever more reluctant to deploy its own troopsas blue helmets. The UK parliaments vote against intervention in Syria

was a landmark moment. The difficulties the White House clearly would

have faced in securing congressional support for the same were striking.

France intervened in Mali, true. But that took jihadi groups marching on the

capital, and perhaps serves more as a postscript on an interventionist era

than a reflection of its continuation. The ghosts of Iraq and Libya very much

agitate in the background. Clearly Western politicians and publics have

learnt from these adventures and Afghanistan, too. But have they drawn

the right conclusions?

If nationalism is the bedfellow of isolationism, we dont have to look far to

find traces of its presence. Western democracies are seeing the resurgence

of right-wing movements, suspicious of foreigners, emphasising security

threats, and questioning the wisdom of international engagement. In Asia


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nationalist tensions seem somehow more prominent, well-illustrated by the

rhetoric deployed by China and Japan in their current maritime feud. Africa

now flirts with a wholesale rejection of the international justice project.

At the same time many of todays deadliest conflicts whether over land,

resources or control of the state have a predominantly ethnic or sectarian

hue. From Myanmar, to Afghanistan, to Syria and Iraq to Africas Horn or the

Sahel, were seeing a surge in ethnic or sectarian tensions often violent which the old centralised state model so dear to great powers has been

unable to manage thereby rendering it less and less suitable for export. In

short, how atomised are we willing to become?

Amid all this, is it fair to say that national sovereignty remains, overwhelm-

ingly, the trump card? Is multilateralism, at least when it comes to matters

of peace and security, in serious decline? Will we see in its stead a prefer-

ence for informal alliances and bilateral arrangements? Are we witnessing

a fateful erosion of our commitment to the normative gains that have been

made in the pursuit of international human rights and justice protections?In short, are we witnessing the decline of the liberal peacebuilding model?

Certainly since the end of the Cold War, the prevailing drive of the inter-

national community in rebuilding states has been a focus often imperfect,

and with patchy commitment, but clear nonetheless on elections, with an

emphasis on the rule of law, and centralised states. Coupled with this has

been our growing comfort with the language of womens and minority rights

and a period of UN activism unprecedented in that organisations history.

Is this model still valid (assuming it ever was)?

Events over recent years show that democratisation, while probably best

for peace over time, can in the short term destabilise especially when elec-

tions leave little for losers. The same goes for the imperative of justice. We

want it. We rightly rail against the inequity and danger of impunity. But we

have yet fully to grapple with the risks and practical difficulties of impos-

ing judicial demands on complex and fragile transitions in which criminal

prosecutions can seem politicised, unrealistic or divisive.

Looking back to the headlines for our Global Briefing 2012 Syria, the

Sudans, the Sahel, Islamic extremism, the fragility of Europe, stasis on the

UN Security Council one could pretty much transpose them to the intro-

duction for this 2013 gathering. Indeed, when it comes to the countries and

issues in focus, theres a remarkable similarity between this year and last.

What does that reveal about our collective ability effectively to manage

crises? First, clearly, a year is not long in conflict prevention. But does it sug-

gest too that the system for addressing these challenges the means we

have for preventing or stopping violent conflict is, if not broken, in urgent

need of help? More fundamentally, was it ever adequate? Or does our ambi-

tion outstrip our collective capacity requiring us to dial down our aspirations

accordingly?


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27FLOOR

PLENARY11:1512:4524 OCT

The EUs record in foreign policy and conflict prevention in the

past year has reinforced its credibility as an international actor

while illustrating the constraints it still faces. In its immedi-

ate neighbourhood the EUs facilitation of the breakthrough

agreement on the normalisation of relations between Serbia

and Kosovo in April illustrated it could take the lead role in resolving a seem-

ingly intractable conflict. This achievement also demonstrated the leverageexercised by EU enlargement and the Eurozones financial troubles not-

withstanding the continued attraction of EU membership.

The EUs impact has continued to strengthen further east, where

Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia have sought deeper political and

economic integration, negotiating Association Agreements and a Deep and

Comprehensive Free Trade Area with the EU. While strong-arm diplomatic

and economic tactics by Russia derailed Armenias EU ambitions, Moscows

pressuring betrays concern over the EUs growing role in the region. When

it comes to post-Soviet Europes protracted conflicts, however, the EU hasfailed to gain real security leverage and advance conflict resolution. It has

played only a marginal role in the standoff between Armenia and Azerbaijan

over Nagorno-Karabakh. Its mediation and security mandate on Georgias

breakaway conflicts have failed to bring the parties closer together or tangi-

bly normalise daily life in the conflict zones. The EU is steadily losing trac-

tion with Turkey as its accession negotiations stall, weakening EU leverage

on issues from energy diversification to illegal migration to influence over

Turkeys critical policies on Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East.

On the international scene the European External Action Service (EEAS)

has played a more visible role. The High Representative for Foreign Affairs

The European Union andConflict PreventionWadah Khanfar (Board Member), Mark Malloch-Brown

(Board Member) and Pierre Vimont (Executive Secretary

General, European External Action Service). Moderated by

Natalie Nougayrde (Le Monde).


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and Security Policy Catherine Ashton heads the E3+3 (P5+1) talks with

Iran, and stepped up as a facilitator when the current political crisis erupted

in Egypt in July moves which have strengthened her diplomatic weight.

The EU deployed a military training mission (EUTM) in Mali in February in

the aftermath of the French military intervention there, and in May a civil-

ian border security mission in Libya (EUBAM). However, while the EU has

taken up post-conflict peacebuilding roles, the crises in Libya and Mali showthat individual states or NATO still lead conflict response and crisis man-

agement. Moreover, the EUs contribution in other major crisis and conflict

arenas where it has attempted to carve out a role, including the Middle East

peace process, is still unclear.

Foreign policy remains an area of intergovernmental decision-making

and a sovereign member state prerogative, though steps have been taken

to better coordinate the EUs and member states priorities and action. The

implementation of the recent EEAS review has the potential to bring more

coherence and focus to the EUs external action, streamline internal com-munication between the Commission and the EEAS and improve interac-


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tions between EU delegations and national embassies. Along with the

budget increase for the EEAS, this is a hopeful sign. Nonetheless, a strategic

vision of the EUs foreign policy mandate and the division of responsibilities

between the Union, its member states and other major international players

such as the UN and NATO is still lacking.

Difficulties in aggregating resources and lack of efficient crisis manage-

ment infrastructures compound these problems. The Common Securityand Defence Policy (CSDP) Summit in December this year will attempt to

address some of these issues. Supporters of a strong and effective EU role

in the worlds most pressing political and security challenges would hope

that the summit will send a clearer message about the EUs purpose and

interests as a global strategic actor.

This session will explore:

What can be done to strengthen the coherence and political clout of EU

foreign policy? What are the main challenges?

What are the EUs strategic security interests? What are the criteria for

where the EU should play a prominent role and take the lead in crises?

How can a strengthened EU role fit within member states foreign policy

agendas?

How is the EU perceived as a conflict prevention actor by the rest of the

world?

What reforms are needed to improve the effectiveness of the EUs for-

eign and security policy architecture and tools?

What can be expected from the December CSDP summit? What will be

the impact of this and the EEAS review on the EUs crisis management

capacity? Does the EU need a new security strategy?


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The desire to hold thousands

of FARC members accountablethrough criminal trials should

not be allowed to become an

insurmountable obstacle to

Colombias best chance to end a

conflict that has already cost

the lives of over 200,000

people and has displaced more

than five million.

Christian Voelkel and Anna Crowe, The Five Challenges

of Negotiating Transitional Justice in Colombia, Latin America

Crime and Politics, 19 September 2013


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26FLOOR

13

Colombias Moment of TruthLouise Arbour (President and CEO), Javier Ciurlizza (Latin

America Program Director) and Mark Schneider (Senior Vice

President and Special Adviser on Latin America). Moderated by

Frank Giustra (Board Member).

P

eace talks between the government and the Revolutionary

Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) that began in November

2012 offer the best chance yet of ending more than 50 years

of armed conflict. They are also testament to how far both sides

have come in their willingness to pursue peace. Negotia-

tors in Havana have agreed on the critical areas of rural development, andappear to be close to reaching agreement on FARCs participation in national

politics. However, negotiators face a diverse set of challenges: political spoil-

ers, public scepticism, approaching elections and their own state of denial

regarding responsibilities for serious crimes perpetrated during the conflict.

Finding common ground on transitional justice, crucial to the sustainabil-

ity of any peace deal, has proven particularly challenging. Sustainable peace

requires that negotiators produce an agreement that balances legal certain-

ties for the parties and the rights of victims to truth, reparation and justice.

Opponents of the peace talks, many of them aligned with ex-president Uribe,frame their criticism as a rejection of impunity for FARC and accuse the

government of sacrificing justice to satisfy short-term political imperatives.

The sides are under significant pressure to reach a final deal before elections

in early 2014, thus allowing parliament time to pass the necessary legis-

lation and avoid further politicisation, particularly of the transitional justice

issue, during the campaign.

Colombia faces other security challenges too. It remains unclear whether

the National Liberation Army (ELN), the countrys second largest guerrilla

group, will join peace talks. The Santos administration is also intensifying its

fight against New Illegal Armed Groups (NIAGs) and other criminal gangs

14:0015:3024 OCT


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Map courtesy of The General Library, The University of Texas at Austin.


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that run drugs, extort mining operations and commit widespread abuses

against civilians, often forcibly displacing them.

Any deal with the FARC will have to include effective measures to dis-

arm, demobilise and especially vital reintegrate its fighters, ensuring

they have alternative, legal ways of supporting themselves and their fami-

lies. The communities which have borne the brunt of the conflict must also

receive development support, especially since they are now likely to be hometo the bulk of FARC demobilisation. Without such measures, reintegration

will be difficult if not impossible and would raise the risks of former guerril-

las swelling the ranks of criminal gangs or forming new FARC fronts, posing

fresh challenges to security forces.


What are the obstacles and who are the spoilers of the peace process

and of implementing a peace agreement?

How can the government respond to those who say a peace agreement

will yield impunity for perpetrators for atrocities and crimes against

humanity?

Which constitutes a credible offer for victims, in terms of transitional

justice?

Can we be still moderately optimistic that the negotiators will reach a

peace agreement and that it can be implemented effectively?


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channel diplomacy between high-level politicians has waned; weakened

foreign ministries have proven incapable of dialogue beyond reciting official

statements. Attempts to establish new and more stable communication

channels have failed. With both sides constrained and internal dynamics

driving towards escalation, there is a real danger that they could become

stuck in a conflict neither side really wants. In the event of a clash between

law enforcement vessels patrolling the contested waters, heightened

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Copyright: Stratfor 2012. www.stratfor.com. Reproduced with permission.

nationalism, especially in China, could constrict the room for diplomatic

manoeuvres to de-escalate the situation.

In contrast, tensions from territorial disputes in the resource-rich South

China Sea (SCS) have shown signs of moderating. Beijing has begun mend-

ing fences with Vietnam and agreed to talks with ASEAN on a code of con-

duct in the area, although warning that the process will be long. Its relations

with the Philippines, however, remain contentious. China responded angrilyto the Philippines filing a complaint with a UN tribunal over the dispute, while

the Philippines has accused China of causing increased militarisation of

the SCS.

Maritime tensions in the Asia Pacific unfolded on the backdrop of the

U.S. rebalancing toward Asia, which is widely seen in China as an attempt

to contain its rise. Many in Beijing are convinced that Washingtons pivot

emboldened if not encouraged rival claimants to stir up troubles with


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China and prescribe vigorous pushbacks. Ironically, Chinas assertiveness

is driving U.S. allies, especially Japan and the Philippines, to seek tighter

alliances not only with Washington but also between each other.


What long-term impact will recent tensions have on the regions security

structure?

The region still has tremendous potential for furthereconomic integration.Will this encourage cooler heads to prevail, or is it more likely that ten-

sions resulting from territorial disputes and other grievanceswill disrupt

economic cooperation? What lessons can we learn from the fact that

decades of economic and people-to-people exchanges between China and

Japan seem to have done little to prevent the revival of the Diaoyu/Senkaku

dispute?

What concrete steps can leaders take to reverse rising nationalism?

Premier Li Keqiang recently talked about ushering in a diamond decade

between China and ASEAN. Is that still possible given the mistrust sown

by disputes in recent years?

What purpose do talks on a code of conduct serve for China and ASEAN

countries?

Given that resolution to any of the maritime territorial disputes in either the

South or East China Sea appears remote, is setting aside the disputes the

best option? What steps are necessary to achieve that?


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Cooperation on jointresource management inthe East China Sea while

setting aside but not

renouncing maritime

claims could be a practical

way to build mutual trust

and reap tangible benefits.

Crisis Group Asia Report N245, Dangerous Waters:

China-Japan Relations on the Rocks, 8 April 2013


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Malis challenges remain

legion. Failing to address them

systematically risks undoing

the good work done to date in

addressing the immediate

security crisis. This in turn will

pose dangers not just for Malis

stability but for the stability of

the entire Sahel.

The War in Mali Is Not Yet Won By Jonathan Prentice and

Jean-Herv Jezequel


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claimed by al-Qaeda offshoot Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West

Africa (MUJAO), while al-Qaeda splinter group Blood Signatories staged

a prison break in June freeing several suspected terrorists. Despite institu-

tions willing to protect democracy and rule of law, political tensions, corrup-

tion and the increasing marginalisation of those in rural areas also threaten

to erode the countrys fragile stability.

Thanks to its internal stability and a robust security apparatus, Burkina

Faso has thus far resisted the insecurity plaguing its neighbours. But it faces

a difficult period ahead. The constitution bars President Blaise Compaor,

in power for more than a quarter century, from contesting the presidency in

2015. Any attempt to amend it and seek another term could provoke unrest.

Even if he leaves power then, succession and a transition away from his

highly personalised rule are likely to prove challenging. Political turbulence

at home could make Burkina Faso vulnerable to the militant groups, drug

traffickers and arms proliferation that blight its neighbours. It could also

mean the loss of a key ally and a strategic base for France and the U.S., and

given President Compaors canny positioning of himself as an indispen-

sable mediator of West Africas conflicts it could reduce capacity to deal

with regional conflicts.


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This session will examine:

What unique security and stability challenges confront the Sahel coun-

tries? Are the threats really different from those faced by other West

African countries or by North Africa?

What has been the impact of the jihadi occupation of northern Mali and

the international military response on the progress of violent extremism

in the Sahel?

Is there a risk of prioritising security in the Sahel at the expense of socio-

economic development? What are the various manifestations of the

security and development agenda in individual countries?

What are the factors of stability in the countries of the Sahel and are

there reasons to be more optimistic about some more than others?

What are the biggest risks and dangers ahead for the new UN multina-

tional mission in Mali? What can it hope to achieve? What does an exit

strategy look like for UN peacekeeping?

How have developments since Malis crisis in January 2012 shaped

French security thinking on the Sahel? France has signalled its intention

to reduce its military presence in Mali by the end of the year, but will the

Malian army be in a position to secure the north by then?


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With incremental indecisive

interference from all sides, further

escalation is almost inevitable.

Syrias all-out civil war, if it comes tothat, will no doubt go down in

conventional wisdom as an outburst

of communal hatred, inevitable

within a mixed society. Nothing could

be further from the truth. It is the

product of an international standoff.

However much Syrians suffer, the

war in their country is not in their

hands: it is a conflict that disfiguresSyrian society more than reflects it.

Peter Harling and Sarah Birke, The Syrian Heartbreak, Middle East

Research and Information Project, 16 April 2013


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27

PLENARY 27FLOOR

Syria and the RegionPeter Harling (Iraq, Lebanon and Syria Project Director,

Senior Middle East and North Africa Adviser) and Ghassan

Salam (Board Vice-Chair). Moderated by Scott Malcomson

(Communications Director).

T

he conflict between the Assad regime and Syrias rebel groups,

now in its third year, continues to exact a horrific toll on Syrian

society and drag down the rest of the region. The regime and

the opposition, both kept afloat by support from their regional

and international allies, have evolved in ways that make both

military and negotiated solutions more elusive, while increasing prospectsfor escalation. Confident it has avoided the threat of U.S. military action fol-

lowing the largest chemical weapons attack yet that killed over a thousand

outside Damascus in August the regime has re-escalated its campaign

to drive rebels from remaining strongholds around Damascus. Its hopes for

Western intervention again disappointed, the political opposition is pushing

to establish a provisional government that will renew its relevance. Infight-

ing between factions within the rebel movement has worsened, with groups

shifting energy and resources toward confronting each other. Meanwhile

the spread of fighting across Syrias borders, and over two million refugeesfleeing the violence, places a burden that looks increasingly untenable on

its vulnerable neighbours.

What was once a Syrian conflict with a regional spillover has become

a regional sectarian struggle with a Syrian focus, drawing in regional and

international actors and generating a transnational arc of crisis. Lebanons

crippling political and confessional divide has deepened, giving rise to a

level of sectarian violence unseen since the civil war. Iraq has also seen

a dramatic surge in sectarian violence as Sunnis, marginalised since the

overthrow of Saddam Hussein, and empowered by the Syrian opposition,

demand more political participation in a system dominated by Shiites and

09:0010:3025 OCT


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Kurds. Syrias conflict is increasingly framed as an existential battle oppos-

ing a Shiite axis, encompassing Iran, Hizbollah, Iraq and Iraqi Shiite mili-

tants, against a Sunni Islamism reinvigorated by the Arab uprisings, with a

radicalised Sunni street, Islamist networks, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood,

Gulf states and Turkey taking leading roles.

The likeliest scenario for the foreseeable future is more of the same: the

regime and the rebels international allies give both sides enough support tosurvive but not prevail, perpetuating a proxy war, with Syrians as primary

victims, and the region further destabilised. A diplomatic solution driven

jointly by the U.S. and Russia, in which regime and opposition settle for a

power-sharing agreement with the acquiescence of their respective backers

in the region would be the best way out, but remains illusory in the current

climate. The UN Security Council resolution passed at the end of September

aimed at destroying Syrias chemical weapons ended two and a half years of

the Councils paralysis on Syria and laid the groundwork for a second peace

conference in November to discuss a political transition. However there is

no agreement going beyond bringing Syrians to the table, which in itself


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cannot achieve much. Until this changes, the focus should be on immediate

steps to de-escalate the conflict and on mapping out an endgame that could

serve as the basis for a diplomatic settlement a process which will entail

addressing questions over interim power-sharing arrangements, the nature

of the state and its institutions, and how to accommodate the concerns of

rival regional actors.

This session will discuss:

What does the failure to resolve the Syria conflict or prevent it from

escalating tell us about the international system?

What does the impact of the Syrian conflict on its neighbours tell us about

the state of the region?

What is coverage of the conflict not telling us about Syrian society?


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Peace talks between Ankara and the

PKK have stalled amid a heightening

of hostile rhetoric on both sides. The

PKK needs to do more to convince

Turks it wants a compromise peace;

the government needs to spell out a

comprehensive conflict-resolution

strategy, including democratic

reforms, not as a concession to

insurgents but because reforms

would both satisfy Kurds demands

and benefit everyone in the country.Crisis Group Europe Report N227, Crying Wolf: Why Turkish Fears

Need Not Block Kurdish Reform, 7 October 2013


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actor in Kurdish-speaking areas of Iraq and Syria. The PKK has used armed

struggle to try to force Ankara to extend greater rights to Kurds in Turkey,

while also laying claim to hegemony over all Kurdish populations, whereas

the KDP, using its dominance over Iraqi Kurds, has worked hard in recent

years to develop economic interdependence and political ties with Turkey to

reduce Iraqi Kurds dependence on Baghdad. In exchange for Turkeys politi-

cal and diplomatic support, the KRG in Erbil has cooperated with Ankara inits fight against the PKK, and in this context has engaged in an attempt to

win the hearts and minds of Syrian Kurds in direct competition with the PYD.

Developments in Syria keep Ankara and Erbil on the same page: both hope

for the collapse of the Assad regime and seek to roll back the PKKs influence

through the PYD. KDP leader Masoud Barzani sees the fall of the Assad

regime as an opportunity to increase Kurdish power throughout the region

under KDP patronage through the establishment of a KDP-sponsored

autonomous Kurdish region in Syria. Fo r its part Turkey fears that a PYD

stronghold on the other side of its border with Syria could provide a stag-

ing ground for PKK-backed militancy in Turkey. Barzani is currently trying

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Most Kurds still want a

settlement inside Turkey as

equal citizens, and the

government must take urgent

steps to get the majority on its

side. The greatest risk for the

AKP is not a possible loss of

marginal votes, but that the

process fails and the fighting

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to contain the PYD, and perhaps wean it from its traditional PKK sponsor,

by forging an alliance between the PYD and his own Syrian Kurdish allies.

Turkey, shunning direct military intervention against the PYD, has likewise

reached out to the groups leaders, and hopes that the peace process under-

way with the PKK though currently hanging by a thread will enable it to

resist spillover from the Syria crisis. However, though Turkey and Barzani

share common interests in the short term, eventually their goals seembound to conflict. Erbils vision is a Kurdish region in Syria consolidating a

broad, Kurdish-dominated area straddling the Iraqi-Syrian border; Ankara

will fear that such an outcome will inspire similar separatist sentiment

among its own Kurds.

It is easy to see how the Syrian Kurds push for greater rights risks get-

ting entangled in this broader regional battle over Kurdish independence.

However, their best chance of success in securing greater rights in Syrias

future political order might well lie in becoming full partners in this political

struggle, with like-minded allies inside Syria and with a common politicaland negotiating platform.


Will the Kurdish Spring lead to a pan-Kurdish dynamic for one of the

worlds larger nations without a state?

Could Turkeys increasingly intimate relationship with Iraqi Kurds, includ-

ing on the hydrocarbons front, lead to the break-up of Iraq, and what

would the implications of this be? By asking Barzani to control Kurds in Iraq and Syria as a way to roll back

the influence of the PKK over Kurds everywhere, is Turkey deepening its

perennial Kurdish problem or helping to resolve it?

Is Turkeys current PKK peace process sustainable, and how serious is

the risk of renewed conflict?


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But without an understanding

of local issues, the peace

process initiated by the UN,African Union (AU), Southern

African Development Com-

munity (SADC), International

Conference on the Great Lakes

Region (ICGLR) and regional

countries risks addressing

symptoms rather than causes

of conflict in the Kivus.Crisis Group Africa Report N206, Understanding the Conflict

in Eastern Congo (I): The Ruzizi Plain, 23 July 2013


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16 18 20 22 24 26

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CAMEROONDEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

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0

0 50 100 150 mi

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CENTRAL AFRICAN

REPUBLIC

The boundaries and names shown and the designationsused on this map do not implay official endorsement oracceptance by the United Nations.

National capital

Prfecture capital

Town, village

Major airport

International boundaryUndetermined boundary*

Prfecture boundary

Main road

Secondary road

Railroad

CENTRAL

AFRICAN

REPUBLIC

Map No. 4048 Rev. 4 UNITED NATIONSNovember 2011

Department of Field SupportCartographic Section

16 18 20 22 24 26

10

8

6

16 18 20 22 24

4

8

6

2

10

14

* Final boundary between the Republic of the Sudanand the Republic of South Sudan has not yet beendetermined.


39/64


40/64

With the approach of the Sochi Winter

Olympics, Moscow wants quick

solutions for Dagestan. Soft measures

and negotiations were working, butthey take time; presumably Moscow

was more comfortable returning to the

traditional heavy-handed approach.

But Dagestan is very different today

than even a few years ago. The

numbers of religious youth have grown

significantly. It is impossible to

suppress them all. Pushing them to

insurgency, however, would berelatively easy.

Ekaterina Sokirianskaia, Sowing Rebellion in Dagestan?,

Across Eurasia, 26 August 2013


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26FLOOR

41

The Troubled CaucasusLawrence Sheets (South Caucasus Project Director) and

Ekaterina Sokirianskaia (North Caucasus Project Director).

Moderated by Paul Quinn-Judge (Europe and Central Asia

Program Director).

Unrest in the North Caucasus is fuelled by religious and eth-

nic conflicts, political and economic grievances, pervasive

governance problems, and disputes over administrative

boundaries, land and resources all issues demanding

comprehensive, flexible policies. But with Vladimir Putins

return to the presidency in 2012 and the approaching Sochi Olympics,

small but promising moves towards more nuanced solutions to the insur-gency have ceased. Dagestan has rolled back its counter-insurgency model

based on targeted military operations and soft measures to integrate

moderate Salafis who do not advocate an armed struggle, which had been

credited with a reduction in violence. It has instead adopted the Chechen

model based on heavy-handed security measures a move which critics

say further alienates religious communities and is behind an escalation in

violence. Abusive behaviour by law enforcement personnel, combined with

sweeping impunity for human rights abuses, erodes citizens faith in state

institutions and the rule of law, and pushes them towards the insurgencyand the allure of an alternative, Islamist state model. The authorities are

increasingly concerned over North Caucasus and Central Asia militants

migrating to Afghanistan, and now increasingly to Syria to fight alongside

Islamist opposition militants, and who may return home with combat skills.

Very approximate Western figures speak of several thousand such radicals

in northern Afghanistan a mix of Central Asian and North Caucasus fight-

ers; in Syria a new grouping headed by a Chechen reportedly numbers over

a thousand North Caucasus insurgents.

Putin has also rolled back autonomy in Russias regions, creating ahighly centralised state in which North Caucasus residents feel estranged

14:0015:3025 OCT


42/64


from decision-making and have few means to hold authorities accountable

or meaningfully participate in political life. State legitimacy was further

undercut with Moscows reversal of a reform introducing direct elections

for regional leaders, instead proposing candidates for the republic assem-

blies to select a change which recently went into effect in Dagestan and

Ingushetia. Lack of accountability and transparency make the governance

system amenable to capture by informal networks based on kinship and

ethnic ties. Recent measures to tackle corruption and fight these networkscriminal activities give grounds for optimism, but only a comprehensive

anti-corruption effort will destroy the entrenched system.

Looking south, the twenty-year deadlock between Azerbaijan and Arme-

nia over Nagorno-Karabakh has entered a particularly unpredictable and

sensitive phase. The past year has seen a further uptick in military threats

and rhetoric, rendered more dangerous by heightened internal tensions as

Azerbaijan holds elections and Armenia struggles to balance its ties with

Russia and the EU. The danger is that military miscalculations or games-

manship could cause increasingly serious skirmishes between Armenianand Azerbaijani forces, entering into an upward spiral. Since mediation

M

ikeShand/InternationalCrisisGroup,

October2012

0 200 kilometers

Sochi

Nazran

Maikop

Grozny


Republic boundary

Disputed boundary

Regional capital

Derbent

Terekli-Mekteb

Bujnaksk

Leninaul

Kalininaul

Krasnodar Stavropol

Cherkessk

MakhachkalaVla dik avk az

Nalchik

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Elbrus

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Gudermes

B L A C K

S E A

S E A

O F

A Z O V

C A S P I A N

S E A

NorthOssetia

G E O R G I A

A Z E R B A I J A N

A R M E N I AT U R K E Y

R U S S I AKrasnodar Krai

Stavropol Krai

Dagestan

Chechnya

Kabardino-Balkaria

Karachay-Cherkessia

Adygea

Ingushetia

SouthOssetia

Abk haz ia

Uryan-Uba

Pyatigorsk

Karachaevsk


43/64


Despite the appearance of an

old dispute caught up in

historical resentments and a

military standoff reminiscent of

World War I trench warfare,

changing dynamics have

produced an increasingly fluid

and unpredictable situation in

an already tense region.

Crisis Group Europe Briefing N71,Armenia and Azerbaijan:

A Season of Risks, 26 September 2013


44/64


efforts and direct talks reached a deadlock in 2011, the arms race between

the sides has accelerated.

Georgias change of government in 2012 stoked optimism about the

chances of improving relations with Russia, a key campaign pledge of

Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvilis Georgian Dream coalition. However the

Geneva talks involving international mediators, Tbilisi and representatives

of the Moscow-backed entities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have reacheda total impasse. Efforts to forge a dialogue have stalled amid tension over

Russian troop demarcations or borderisation of the administrative bound-

ary lines between Georgia and its breakaway republics, and even Russian

charges that a U.S.-funded facility in Georgia set up to study epidemiological

issues is a threat to Russia. Georgias negotiation of association and free

trade agreements with the EU ahead of the EU Eastern Partnership summit

in November has further antagonised Russia, as has the new governments

continuing NATO aspirations.


What comes after Sochi? What are the implications of the turn to heavy-

handed security measures in the North Caucasus?

What are the solutions and scenarios for conflict in Dagestan?

What are the implications for regional security of North Caucasus fight-

ers in Syria?


45/64


46/64

The Muslim Brotherhood

failed in large part due to its

blind belief in majoritarian

politics; its putative

successors hardly can

succeed if they do the same.

Crisis Group Middle East/North Africa Briefing N35,

Marching in Circles: Egypts Dangerous Second Transition,

7 August 2013


47/64

47

27FLOOR

Democracy, Stabilityand Islam in Egypt, Libyaand TunisiaIssandr El Amrani (North Africa Project Director), Wadah

Khanfar (Board Member) and Bernardino Len (European

Union Special Representative for the Southern Mediterranean).

Moderated by Richard Atwood (Research Director).

Egypts transition appeared to go into reverse in early July as

the military leadership ousted President Mohamed Morsi afterpopular protests against his rule. The army claimed to be put-

ting Egyptian democracy back on track but has continued, if

not worsened, the exclusionary, confrontational politics that

marked the countrys first transition under Morsi. The polices violent dis-

persal of sit-ins organised by Morsis Muslim Brotherhood (MB) resulted

in an estimated 1,200 killed over the summer. Most of its national-level

leaders have been arrested and media outlets friendly to it closed down.

The organisation is now banned, with a court in late September freezing its

assets. The fate of its Freedom and Justice Party still hangs in the balance,

with the possibility that the most successful political party of post-Mubarak

Egypt will not be allowed to contest the next elections.

A transition of sorts is underway. A committee of 50 personalities

(mostly representing state bodies and corporatist interests, and including

only two Islamists) is considering a draft constitution prepared by a techni-

cal committee of scholars. The new constitution, once finalised, will be put

to a referendum, after which will come parliamentary and presidential elec-

tions, scheduled for 2014. Whether Minister of Defence Abdelfattah al-Sisi

will seek the presidency is much speculated upon, despite official military

denials.

14:0015:3025 OCT


48/64


49/64


Based on UN map

no. 3787 Rev. 7

(February 2012).

The town of Tawergha

has been added.

leaders killing prompted widespread protests and calls from the secular

opposition for the government led by the moderate Islamist party An-Nahda

to step down. The parties now appear on the verge of a breakthrough, basedon a proposal by the main trade union that bridges the Islamist-secular

divide by creating a national unity government and accelerating the process

of writing a new constitution before fresh elections. The government led by

the moderate Islamist An-Nahda has also agreed to label the Salafi Ansar

al-Sharia as a terrorist group, countering accusations that it is too tolerant

of hardliners.

Insecurity in post-Qadhafi Libya has continued to worsen. The country

risks fragmentation at the hands of tribal and militia forces allied to rival

political factions. With targeted assassinations, kidnappings and explo-sions continuing, and the government increasingly incapable of exercising


50/64


Map courtesy of The General Library,

The University of Texas at Austin.


51/64


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54/64


tests in Khartoum and other cities since 2012, prompting a hard security

response and few political concessions. As popular discontent, as well as

the threat from burgeoning extremist groups, grows in the run-up to elec-

tions in 2015, Bashir has sought to tighten his grip on power, rather than

making concessions and embarking upon reforms.

Over two years since independence, South Sudan is still struggling to

establish an effective and inclusive government. The economy, already

weak when independence was declared, is slowly recovering from last

years halt in oil production over disputed transit fees. Numerous armedgroups including rebels and a divided national army have meant little

improvement in human security; Jonglei is the most extreme example of

unresolved conflict. President Salva Kiirs increasing centralisation of power,

both in the SPLM and Juba most evident in the dismissal of the entire

cabinet, vice president and the suspension of the SPLM secretary general

in July threatens to cleave the political elite along ethnic lines ahead of the

2015 presidential polls.


55/64



What is the impact of increasing conflict in Sudans peripheries? Why

have past peace agreements failed, and what does this mean for current

efforts to stop the fighting?

How significant are the recent protests in Khartoum and other cities in

Sudan; how far did they further NCP divides and/or cement opposition

unity?

What is, or should be, the role of the UN, AU, EU and other bilateralpartners in peacebuilding efforts?

Does President Salva Kiirs summer clear-out of the cabinet indicate a

more decisive and cohesive government, or the narrowing of a ruling

clique?

There are continued reports that both Juba and Khartoum arm and assist

rebel groups in each others territory; will improved relations mean an end

to insurgencies in their peripheries?

Map No. 4450 Rev.1 UNITED NATIONSOctober 2011

Department of Field SupportCartographic Section

UPPER

NILE

JONGLEI

EASTERN EQUATORIA

CENTRAL

EQUATORIA

WESTERN

EQUATORIA

NORTHERN

BAHR

EL GHAZAL UNITY

LAKES

T

Abyei

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UPPER

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EASTERN EQUATORIA

CENTRAL

EQUATORIA

WESTERN

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NORTHERN

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EL GHAZAL UNITY

WARRAP

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WESTERN

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EL GHAZAL

U G A N D A

CENTRAL

AFRICAN

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E T H I O P I A

K E N Y A

DEM. REP.

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S U D A N

12

10

8

6

4

12

10

8

6

4

22 26 28 30 34 36

24 26 28 30 32 34 36

1000

0 100 mi

200 km

National capital

State (wilayah) capital

TownMajor airport


Undetermined boundary*

State (wilayah) boundary

Abyei region**

Main road

Railroad

SOUTH

SUDAN

The boundaries and names shownand the designations used on this mapdo not imply official endorsement oracceptance by the United Nations.

* Final boundary between the Republic of Sudanand the Republic of South Sudan has not yet

been determined.** Final status of the Abyei area is not yet

determined.

S O U T H S U D A N


56/64

The main forces that were

killing a lot of insurgents in

recent years are leaving.

The insurgents dont have a

whole load of incentive to

negotiate until they find out

where the military balance

lies after the withdrawal.

Graeme Smith in Afghanistan to begin peace talks

with Taliban in Qatar, The Telegraph, 18 June 2013


57/64

57

27FLOOR

Make or break or moreof the same? Afghanistanand Pakistan in 2014Samina Ahmed (South Asia Project Director, Senior Asia

Adviser), Asma Jahangir (Board Member) and Graeme Smith

(Afghanistan Senior Analyst). Moderated by Jonathan Prentice

(Chief Policy Officer).

Next year will mark a significant turning point in Afghani-

stans transition. As preparations get underway for presi-dential and provincial polls, NATOs scheduled withdrawal

is looming. Political parties, many still in the process of

shedding their legacy as armed groups, have unified in

their calls for electoral reform. But despite some signs of progress, Presi-

dent Karzais administration has yet to assure either political leaders in

Afghanistan or external observers that measures are in place to prevent

the disorganisation and manipulation that characterised past polls, most

recently in 2010. Nor has the government been willing or able to combat the

deep-rooted factionalism and corruption that has plagued its rule. Attempts

to begin peace talks with the Taliban have made no tangible progress, and

thus far little suggests the group is willing or even coherent enough to

make the compromises necessary for a peace deal. Instead, UN figures

suggest the conflict is escalating, with violence returning to peak post-2001

levels. As many states are already drawing down troops, and the full with-

drawal of U.S.-NATO forces is scheduled for 2014, national security will

soon rely on the Afghan National Security Forces whose ability to fill the

gap is still in question.

With much of Afghanistans insurgent leadership based in Pakistan,

Islamabads role will be crucial in determining stability and security in post-

16:0017:3025 OCT


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59/64


Qal'eh-ye Now

Zaranj

Meymaneh

Sheberghan

Gardeyz

Parachinar

Kunduz-

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Dadu

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Jiwani Gwadar

Turbat Bela

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Shikarpur

Khairpur

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Mirpur Khas

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Sanghar

Jacobabad

Saidu

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MuzaffarabadKargil

Sopur

Shujaabad

Skardu

GilgitChitral

Surab

Ratangarh

Barmer

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Palanpur

Jaisalmer

Qalat-

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Delaram- -Farah-

Tarin Kowt-

Shindand-

Chaghcharan-

Bamian- --

Dowshi-

Baghlan-

Taloqan- -

Feyzabad- -

Charikar- - -

Jalalabad- - -

Baraki-

Ghazni-

Sahiwal

SukkurLarkana

Dera GhaziKhan

Dera IsmailKhan

Nawabshaw

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-

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New Delhi

Kabol(Kabul)

-

- - -

B A L O C H I S T A N

S I N D

P U N J A B

PAKHTUNKHWA

KHYBER

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A F G H A N I S T A N

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TAJIKISTANTAJIKISTAN

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ISLAMIC

REPUBLIC OF

IRAN I N D I A

CHINA

Mt.GodwinAusten (K2)

8611 m

National capital

Provincial capital

Town, village

Airports


Provincial boundary

Main road

Secondary road

Railroad

PAKISTAN

Department of Peacekeeping OperationsCartographic Section

PAKISTAN

The boundaries and names shown and the designations usedon this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptanceby the United Nations.

Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Controlin Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan.The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not y et beenagreed upon by the parties.

0 25020050 150100 300 km

0 50 150100 200 mi

Line Of Control as promulgated inthe 1972 SIMLA Agreement

Line ofC

ontol

68 70 7266

34

32

30

28

26

24

22

38

36

72706866

6462

34

32

30

28

26

24

36

Based on UN Map No. 4181 Rev. 1 (January 2004), North-West Frontier has been changed to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

How will the presidential election, scheduled for April 2014, affect stabil-

ity? What will the results mean?

In Pakistan, what are the most pressing challenges confronting the tran-

sitions second phase? How well has the Sharif government performed

so far?

Why has the new government opted for a policy of dialogue with mili-

tants? What are the chances of success? Can it also change the direction

of Pakistans policy towards Afghanistan?

The Sharif government has made peace with India the focus of its foreign

policy. If it fails to deliver, what is the likely impact on regional stability?


60/64

International

Crisis Group Board

of Trustees

October 2013


61/64

CHAIR

Tom Pickering Former U.S. Under-

secretary of State; Ambassador to

the UN, Russia, India, Israel, Jordan,

El Salvador and Nigeria

PRESIDENT & CEO

Louise Arbour Former UN HighCommissioner for Human Rights

and Chief Prosecutor for the Inter-

national Criminal Tribunals for the

former Yugoslavia and Rwanda

VICE CHAIRS

Ayo Obe Legal Practitioner, Lagos,

Nigeria

Ghassan Salam Dean, Paris

School of International Affairs,

Sciences Po

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Cheryl Carolus Former South

African High Commissioner to

the UK and Secretary General of

the ANC

Maria Livanos Cattaui Former

Secretary General of the Inter-

national Chamber of Commerce

Frank Giustra President & CEO,

Fiore Financial Corporation

Mark Malloch-Brown Former

UN Deputy Secretary-General andAdministrator of the United Nations

Development Programme (UNDP)

George Soros Chairman, Open

Society Institute

Pr Stenbck Former Foreign

Minister of Finland

OTHER BOARD MEMBERS

Mort Abramowitz Former U.S.

Assistant Secretary of State and

Ambassador to Turkey

Kofi Annan Former Secretary-

General of the United Nations; Noble

Peace Prize (2001)

Nahum Barnea Chief Columnist for

Yedioth Ahronoth, Israel

Sandy Berger Chair, Albright

Stonebridge Group LLC; Former U.S.

National Security Adviser

Micheline Calmy-Rey Former

President of the Swiss Confedera-

tion and Foreign Affairs Minister

Wesley Clark Former NATO

Supreme Allied Commander

Sheila Coronel Toni Stabile Pro-

fessor of Practice in Investigative

Journalism; Director, Toni Stabile

Center for Investigative Journalism,

Columbia University, U.S.

Mark Eyskens Former PrimeMinister of Belgium

Joschka Fischer Former Foreign

Minister of Germany

Lykke Friis Former Climate &

Energy Minister and Minister of

Gender Equality of Denmark; Former

Prorector at the University of

Copenhagen

Jean-Marie Guhenno Arnold

Saltzman Professor of War and Peace

Studies, Columbia University; Former

UN Under-Secretary-General forPeacekeeping Operations

Lena Hjelm-Walln Former Deputy

Prime Minister and Foreign Minister

of Sweden

Mo Ibrahim Founder and Chair, Mo

Ibrahim Foundation; Founder, Celtel

International

Asma Jahangir President of the

Supreme Court Bar Association

of Pakistan; Former UN Special

Rapporteur on the Freedom of

Religion or Belief

Wadah Khanfar Co-Founder,

Al Sharq Forum; Former Director

General, Al Jazeera Network

Wim Kok Former Prime Minister of

the Netherlands

Ricardo Lagos Former President

of Chile

Joanne Leedom-Ackerman Former

International Secretary of PEN Inter-

national; Novelist and journalist, U.S.

Lalit Mansingh Former ForeignSecretary of India and Ambassador

to the U.S., High Commissioner to

the UK

Benjamin Mkapa Former President

of Tanzania

Laurence Parisot President, French

Business Confederation (MEDEF)

Karim Raslan Founder, Managing

Director and CEO of KRA Group

Paul Reynolds President & CEO,

Canaccord Financial Inc.

Javier Solana Former EU High

Representative for the Common

Foreign and Security Policy, NATO

Secretary General and Foreign

Minister of Spain

Liv Monica Stubholt Senior Vice

President for Strategy and Com-

munication, Kvaerner ASA; FormerState Secretary for the Norwegian

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Larry Summers Former Director of

the U.S. National Economic Coun-

cil and Secretary of the U.S. Treas-

ury; President Emeritus of Harvard

University

Wang Jisi Dean, School of Interna-

tional Studies, Peking University;

Member, Foreign Policy Advisory

Committee of the Chinese Foreign

MinistryWu Jianmin Executive Vice Chair-

man, China Institute for Innovation

and Development Strategy; Member,

Foreign Policy Advisory Committee

of the Chinese Foreign Ministry;

Former Ambassador of China to the

UN (Geneva) and France

Lionel Zinsou CEO, PAI Partners


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PRESIDENTS COUNCIL

A distinguished group of individual and corporate donors providing essential support and expertise to Crisis Group.

CORPORATE

BP

Investec Asset Management

McKinsey & Company

Shearman & Sterling LLP

White & Case LLP

INDIVIDUAL

Anonymous (3)

Stephen & Jennifer Dattels

Frank Holmes

Steve Killelea

Pierre Mirabaud

Ford Nicholson & Lisa Wolverton

Neil Woodyer

INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL

Individual and corporate supporters who play a key role in Crisis Groups efforts to prevent deadly conflict.

CORPORATE

Anglo American PLC

APCO Worldwide Inc.

Atlas Copco

BG Group plc

ChevronEquinox Partners

FTI Consulting

Lockwood Financial Ltd.

PTT Public Company Limited

Shell

Silk Road Finance

Statoil

Yap Merkezi Construction and

Industry Inc.

INDIVIDUAL

Anonymous

Ryan Beedie

Stanley Bergman & Edward

Bergman

David Brown & Erika FrankeNeil & Sandra DeFeo Family

Foundation

Neemat Frem

Seth & Jane Ginns

Rita E. Hauser

George Kellner

Faisel Khan

Zelmira Koch Polk

David Levy

Leslie Lishon

Harriet Mouchly-Weiss

Ana Luisa Ponti & Geoffrey R.

Hoguet

Kerry Propper

Michael L. RiordanNina Solarz

Horst Sporer

Stelios S. Zavvos

GOVERNMENT AND FOUNDATION DONORS

Crisis Group gratefully acknowledges the donors for their support and cooperation in 2013.

GOVERNMENTS

Australia(Agency for International

Development)

Austria (Austrian Development

Agency)

Belgium (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Canada (Canadian International

Development Agency; International

Development Research Centre)Denmark (Ministry of Foreign

Affairs)

European Union (Instrument for

Stability)

Finland (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

France (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Germany (Federal Foreign Office,

Deutsche Gesellschaft fr

Internationale Zusammenarbeit

GIZ)

Ireland (Irish Aid)

Liechtenstein (Office for Foreign

Affairs)

Luxembourg (Ministry of Foreign

Affairs)

The Netherlands (Ministry of

Foreign Affairs)

Norway (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Sweden (Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Switzerland (Federal Department ofForeign Affairs)

United Kingdom (Department for

International Development)

United States (U.S. Agency for

International Development)

FOUNDATIONS

Adessium Foundation

Carnegie Corporation of New York

Elders Foundation

William and Flora Hewlett

Foundation

Humanity United

Henry Luce Foundation

John D. and Catherine T.

MacArthur Foundation

Oak Foundation

Open Society Foundations

Open Society Initiative for West

Africa

Ploughshares Fund

Radcliffe Foundation

Rockefeller Brothers Fund

Stanley Foundation

Tearfund

The Charitable Foundation

Tinker Foundation Incorporated

Viva Trust

FOR MORE INFORMATION ABOUT SUPPORTING CRISIS GROUP, PLEASE CONTACT:

Bndicte Benoit, Director, Government & Foundation Relations [email protected] +32 (0)2 541 16 39

Trisha Tanner, Director, Private Sector Initiatives [email protected] +1 212 813 0820


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DESIGN:CRISIS

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International Headquarters

Avenue Louise, 149

1050 Brussels

BelgiumTel: +32 2 502 90 38

[email protected]

Washington Office

1629 K Street NW, Suite 450

Washington DC 20006

United States

Tel: +1 202 785 1601

[email protected]

New York Office708 3rd Avenue

Suite 1705

New York, NY 10017

United States

Tel: +1 212 813 0820

[email protected]

London Office

48 Grays Inn Road

London WC1X 8LT

United Kingdom

Tel: +44 207 831 1436

[email protected]

Moscow Office

Office number 113

Trekhprudny pereulok 4, Building 1

Moscow 123001Russian Federation

[email protected]

Regional Offices and Field

Representation

Crisis Group also operates out

of over 25 different locations

in Africa, Asia, Europe, the

Middle East and Latin America

Global Briefing Booklet 2013

Documents