GLOBAL AUTO INDUSTRY GLOBAL AUTO INDUSTRY Dr. Clive Vlieland- Boddy
Mar 26, 2015
GLOBAL AUTO INDUSTRYGLOBAL AUTO INDUSTRYDr. Clive Vlieland-Boddy
Current Views
• To provide highly attractive and environmentally friendly products which satisfy global demand
• Ensure sustainability demand.
• Develop new technological standards.
• Ensuring competitiveness.
• Developing employment opportunities within a global market
Current Views
For the next years the following R&D areas are of major interest for the automobile industry:
• Urban Mobility and Transport • Safety Applications in Co-operative Systems• Alternative Fuels • Suitable Materials• Electrification of the Vehicle • Ecological and Efficient Manufacturing.
Urban Mobility and Transport
• Advanced driving-assisted vehicles
• Energy efficient transport of people and goods with improved logistics
• Safety of urban road transport
• Traffic management
• Market implementation of innovation.
Alternative Fuels
• Scenarios for alternative fuels and strategies for their market introduction
• Preparation of specifications for alternative fuels
• Optimisation of power-trains with alternative fuels
• Integrated safety of alternatively-powered vehicles
Electrification of the Vehicle
• Affordable and safe battery systems with improved performance
• Post Lithium-ion technologies• Efficient vehicle and energy management
system• High voltage systems and components• Connection to the infrastructure• Field tests and demonstrators• Road map for market penetration of the electric
vehicle.
Ecological and Efficient Manufacturing
• Innovative green painting processes• Green manufacturing of vehicles and sub-
systems• Affordable manufacturing of green vehicles• Digital manufacturing for integrated product and
process development• Virtual engineering for product and process
performance management over the whole lifecycle.
Who and Where!
• In 2007 just 10 OEMs were responsible for 75% of the world output
• Further consolidation is expected.
• New entrants from China and India will change the map.
Challenges
• Fuel Sources
• Improving technology creating longer lasting products.
• Market Saturation
Challenges
The declining fortunes of the Big Three
• Reflect the larger trend toward a U.S. economy based more on services and ideas and less on manufacturing.
• The forces of globalism where corporations with worldwide operations have moved manufacturing to places where labour is cheapest and where labour laws are least stringent.
• The big questions facing the Big Three is whether they can continue to operate with labour contracts that, despite recent modifications, largely reflect a bygone era of union strength.
The BIG 3
The automobile sector is currently facing 3 main problems
• The lack of funding creates difficulties for the consumer to finance the purchase of a new car;
• The markets are in overcapacity;
• The evolution towards an aging and a “no car” society is predictable on the structural long-term.
Responses to address these issues
• Government Financial Assistance in the short-term.
• Elaborate short-term schemes to try to stimulate demand.
• Restructure the sector on the long term.
• Finance R&D and clean cars.
• Promote efficient use of transportation.
The Big 3 are
NOWin Trouble
General Motors bailoutGeneral Motors bailoutheadline from headline from The New York The New York
TimesTimes
Thirteen years later . . .Thirteen years later . . .GM & Chrysler in bankruptcyGM & Chrysler in bankruptcy
The scale of the collapse: the The scale of the collapse: the industry drives off a cliffindustry drives off a cliff
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Detroit’s disproportionate suffering: the Detroit’s disproportionate suffering: the Big 3 hit hardestBig 3 hit hardest
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GM + Ford + Chrysler
Transplants and Imports
US Sales: Detroit share falls from 75% in 1985 to ~45% in 2009e
Detroit’s disproportionate suffering: 2 Detroit’s disproportionate suffering: 2 out of 3 file bankruptcyout of 3 file bankruptcy
• General Motors, after its bankruptcy, is now owned by a consortium of the US and Canadian governments, the UAW, and former bondholders
• Chrysler, after its bankruptcy, is now owned by a consortium of the US and Canadian governments, the UAW, and Fiat– Still burning cash, perhaps $500 mm per month?
• Ford avoided bankruptcy, but primarily by mortgaging itself in 2006– Roughly $25 billion raised; even the Blue Oval symbol
and trade names such as Mustang were pledged
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But shouldn’t we have seen this But shouldn’t we have seen this coming? In market share…coming? In market share…
Source: Ward’s AutoInfobank0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
YTD
2009
GM Ford Chrysler Korean European Toyota Honda
… … and in profits?and in profits?12
.8%
16.0
%16
.1%
15.0
%15
.4%
12.7
%9.
8%12
.5%
10.5
%4.
8%10
.2%
10.8
%9.
8%4.
0% 4.7%
9.2%
9.3%
8.2%
5.2%
-3.4
%0.
4%2.
6%8.
5%9.
8%7.
5%4.
9%8.
6% 9.2%
7.9%
1.7%
-3.2
%1.
8%3.
9%9.
0%7.
6%6.
2% 6.9%
6.2%
7.6%
5.6%
0.2%
2.9% 3.
7% 4.2%
-0.8
%-2
.0%
-1.1
%-7
.9%
-10%
-7%
-4%
-1%
2%
5%
8%
11%
14%
17%
20%
1961
1963
1965
1967
1969
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
Ope
ratin
g M
argi
n
Detroit Three Operating Margin
Source: Moody’s, Company Reports
Causes of the decline and fallCauses of the decline and fall
• Short-term factors: debt, debt, and more debt
• Medium-term factor: drunk on trucks?
• Long-term factor: outmoded basic beliefs
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Short-term factor: debt. The case of Short-term factor: debt. The case of General MotorsGeneral Motors
Companies facing cyclical markets should not carry a large burden of debt, in order to survive downturns.
GM’s debt exposure (year end 2007, prior to current crisis):
Owed to banks: long-term bonds: $33b
Owed to workers: retiree health care:$47b
Owed to workers: pensions: $11bOwed to suppliers: (negative) working capital:
$34bOwed to dealers: (US only) excess car inventory:
$15b… on revenue of some $180 billion
Source: company financial statements; all figures exclude financing captive (GMAC)
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Illustration of GM’s debt problem: Illustration of GM’s debt problem: Toyota comparisonToyota comparison
Toyota (and Honda similarly) can turn to its business partners for funding to get through a downturn; GM drew down all its sources, and so had to turn to Washington for funds.
Debt exposure (year end 2007, prior to current crisis):
GM Toyota• Owed to banks: $33 $4• Owed to workers: RHC $47 $0• Owed to workers: pensions: $11 $6• Owed to suppliers: $34 $13• Owed to dealers: $15 $0
… on GM revenue of some $180 billion, Toyota some $250 billion
… and GM equity of negative $35 billion, Toyota positive $115 billion
Source: company financial statements; all figures exclude financing captives; Toyota FY ending 3/2008
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Medium-term factor: the truck boom Medium-term factor: the truck boom
leads to a car bust.leads to a car bust. • The truck boom (SUVs and pickups)
earned the Detroit 3 vast profits…• … which they used to fund
“adventures” rather than reinvest in the core business…
• … leading to relatively neglected and uncompetitive car product lines, once the truck boom ended. Lack of R & D!
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The truck boom of 1990-2005The truck boom of 1990-2005It is hard to overstate the shift to light trucks in the USA over the
years (due to regulation, consumer preference, and marketing).
Source: Sean McAlinden from Ward’s data
Millions of units sold, US market
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The truck boom of 1990-2005The truck boom of 1990-2005
With profitability assured by the cash flow from trucks, Detroit’s Big Three spent much of the 1990s engaged in all sorts of adventures… not necessarily related to the core business of making cars.
• Ford bought Aston Martin, Jaguar, Land Rover, Volvo, and Hertz
• Embarked on a series of “downstream” business extensions (e.g. purchasing car maintenance companies, collision repair shops, and salvage yards
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The truck boom of 1990-2005The truck boom of 1990-2005
• GM started and then stopped EV-1, • Diverted large sums into fuel cell research, • Spun off Delphi, • Sold Hughes Aerospace, • Aggressively expanded GMAC into home
mortgages, • Bought Daewoo Motors*, g• Got into a deal with Fiat and then back out, • Starved most of its alliances (Suzuki, Isuzu, Saab)
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The truck boom of 1990-2005The truck boom of 1990-2005
• Chrysler of course “cashed out” (to the great benefit of its shareholders:
• The $36 billion paid would today buy Ford plus GM plus Daimler itself, with about $6 billion left over) by selling itself to an unsuspecting Daimler
Other Causes
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Styling as a differentiator: Styling as a differentiator: reduced impact?reduced impact?
They all look the SAME
Scale trumps efficiency Definition:
• economies of scale are the key to profitability
Strategy: • pursue capacity via organic growth or
acquisition; and for any given capacity, always produce the incremental unit
Successful when: • fixed costs of product development and
manufacturing are very high, market is in a growth phase, price discrimination is easy
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Economies of Scale are KING!Economies of Scale are KING!
Genesis of belief: • from the Model T onward into the 1980s:
production typified by:• inflexible large production lines, •product development manual and
complex,•market steadily growing, •external styling and branding to
conceal identical mechanicals under varying model names39
Past Beliefs of The IndustryPast Beliefs of The Industry
Market Saturation
• Once you have saturated the home market then you saturate all foreign emerging markets.
• Then WHAT!
• Now the move is to waste minimization and flexibility, from scale maximization;
• Developed markets have matured, reducing capacity to absorb excess units
• New competitors and smarter consumers break the pricing paradigm
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This belief no longer applies
• Maximizing production leads to a belief that all units are equal,
• Costs of complexity are ignored: • Example: GM sells fewer cars than
Toyota, but stocks roughly three times as many part numbers, at great cost.
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Impact of the belief in scaleImpact of the belief in scale
• OEMs push into developing markets, despite low per-car profits to offload excess capacity
• With a focus on units moved rather than on profits made, management lose sight of the fundamentals,
• This leads to “strategy by slogan” (e.g. “first mover advantage”);
• Evaluation of winners and losers by unit share, not by bottom line results;
• Where is the visionary CEO?43
Impact of the belief in scaleImpact of the belief in scale
• Pursuit of scale at all costs leads to• M&A activity in order to grow• But most M & A’s in this industry
FAIL
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Impact of the belief in scaleImpact of the belief in scale
The Poor Track Record of Western OEM The Poor Track Record of Western OEM Mergers (partial list)Mergers (partial list)
GM-Saab bankrupt
GM-Suzuki exit
GM-Fuji exit
GM-AmGen/Hummer exiting
Ford-Jaguar exit
Ford-Land Rover exit
Ford-Aston Martin exit
Ford-Volvo exiting
Ford-Mazda success1
Chrysler-Simca exit
Chrysler-AMC success
Fiat-Lancia failure
Fiat-Alfa Romeo failure
VW-Skoda success2
VW-Audi success3
VW-SEAT failure
BMW-Rover exit
Renault-AMC exit
Renault-Nissan success4
Renault-Dacia success
Daimler-Chrysler etc exit
PSA-Simca etc failure
Peugeot-Citroen success?
Notes:
1: only after many years
2: but Skoda was rebuilt from scratch
3: Piëch has suggested this is not so
4: an alliance, not a merger
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One qualified forecast for total NA One qualified forecast for total NA sales (CSM)sales (CSM)
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CSM projects a slow but steady recovery to historic levels
““No recovery” implies belief in trend No recovery” implies belief in trend reversal!reversal!
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SCRAPPAGE: At present new sales are running below annual scrapped for the first timesince World War II
Trend reversal?Trend reversal?
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VMT: Do we think that the current dip in vehicle miles traveled is an issue?
Trend reversal?Trend reversal?
0.7
0.9
1.1
1.3
1.5
1.7
1.9
2.1
2.3
1950 55 1960 65 1970 75 1980 85 1990 95 2000 5 749
OWNERSHIP: What might happen to end the growth in cars per household?
Trend reversal?Trend reversal?
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AFFORDABILITY: With any reasonable elasticity of demand assumed, sales seem likely to rise
Most affordable score since the index was first
computed in 1979!
What about the outlook for individual What about the outlook for individual OEMs? (1)OEMs? (1)
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All else being equal, nothing tracks/forecasts OEM market share as well as averageage of an OEM’s model lineup.
What about the outlook for individual What about the outlook for individual OEMs? (2)OEMs? (2)
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If this relationship holds, Detroit’s market share should continue to slip, all else being equal
Results by OEM, for 2013Results by OEM, for 2013
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Brand Current share %
Expected change
Resultant 2013 share %
Comments
GM 20 -5 15 Organic and M&A
Ford 16 +3 19 Newest line
Chrysler 10 -6 4 Viable? Fiat role?
USA 3 46 -8 38 Tied with J3
Toyota 16 +1 17 Slowing
Honda 11 +3 14 Efficient engines
Nissan 7 +1 8 Slowing
Japan 3 34 +5 39 Tied with USA 3
Hyundai/Kia 7 +3 10 Economical
Europeans 7 0 7 VW ↑ BMW, MB ↓
Other 6 0 6 Mostly Japanese
Total 100 0 100
Forecast summary:• Demand does return to “normal,” though it will take time• We will move from a Big 3 to a Big 6 (“Europeanization”): • More balance, more market share to/fro versus steady
trends• Finally, a focus on profits rather than on volumes• Hopefully, much clearer brand propositions (pull vs.
push)• As for Detroit, one view is that GM is okay unless it
backslides; Ford is likely to gain thanks to product offensive (kudos to Mazda?); Chrysler’s fate hangs on Fiat et al.
Lessons from the fall: Lessons from the fall: general business insightsgeneral business insights
• How we got here: eerily similar to the housing and financial crisis
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Industry Short Medium Long
Auto Excess debt
Truck boom Form trumps function; scale wins
Housing Excess debt
Long GDP b. House prices can only go up
Finance Excess debt
Derivative b. Markets are not correlated
The Rise of China
The “Million Units per Year Club”The “Million Units per Year Club”
Country Units Rank Units Rank % chg Gain LossChina 1,829,953 9 13,790,994 1 654% 11,961,041 Japan 9,895,476 2 7,934,516 2 -20% -1,960,960USA 13,024,978 1 5,708,852 3 -56% -7,316,126Germany 5,687,692 3 5,209,857 4 -8% -477,835South Korea 2,843,114 7 3,512,926 5 24% 669,812 Brazil 1,350,828 12 3,182,617 6 136% 1,831,789 India 818,193 2,632,694 7 222% 1,814,501 Spain 2,852,389 6 2,170,078 8 -24% -682,311France 3,180,193 4 2,047,658 9 -36% -1,132,535Mexico 1,549,925 11 1,561,052 10 1% 11,127 Canada 3,058,813 5 1,490,632 11 -51% -1,568,181Iran 119,419 1,395,421 12 1069% 1,276,002 UK 1,973,519 8 1,090,139 13 -45% -883,380Italy 1,701,256 10 843,239 -50% -858,017Russia 1,169,708 13 722,431 -38% -447,277Belgium 1,017,061 14 537,354 -47% -479,707
Source: OICA (Organisation Internationale des Constructeurs d'Automobiles)
1999 2009 Change
Beware the trendBeware the trend
Conclusions
Economic OutlookEconomic Outlook
• Auto production = jobs
• Jobs = political stability
• Stability = governments spend € £ ¥ $– Countries WITHOUT auto industry spend to get– Countries WITH auto industry spend to defend
• Excess investment = excess capacity
• Excess capacity = persistent overproduction
By 2020 it is likely the electric vehicle market will still be small
• An increasing proportion of cars will be hybrids.
• Further improvements in traditional combustion engines to make them even more fuel efficient
Lessons to be LearnedLessons to be Learned
• Lessons from all this might include:
– Watch your debt load and “stress test” it for extreme scenarios!
– Do not be distracted by the latest big trend (trends end)!
– Challenge beliefs that “everyone knows” are true: they may not be!
• Looking ahead – Industry requires vision
Winners & losersWinners & losers
• Challenge for future auto executives:
• Demand should = Production
• Customer loyalty is KEY
• There is a real need for VISION
• R & D is vital
Is this a SICK industry?
Bye for now! I’m ready forsome leisure time.
Please ensure you Prepare for next session