FINANCIALS FUNDRAISING & TERM-SHEETS GITANJALI SWAMY 1
Sep 08, 2015
FINANCIALS FUNDRAISING & TERM-SHEETS GITANJALI SWAMY
1
STRATEGIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT Definition: the application of financial techniques to strategic decisions in order to help achieve the decision-maker's objectives
Strategy: a carefully devised plan of action to achieve a goal, or
the art of developing or carrying out such a plan
Finance: the business or art of managing the monetary resources of an organisation
Management: the organising and controlling of the affairs of an organisation or a particular sector of an organisation
2 Source: TBD
STRATEGY FROM HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL Fundamental to the success of any company and to any effort to develop strategy is having a proper goal for business clearly
Purpose: How will your organisation achieve its desired financial position?
To achieve this, you must ask:
WHAT future position do you aim to reach? WHERE are you now? HOW - are you going to get there?
3
BREAKING THE STRATEGY DOWN
Immediate needs
Short Term requirements
Medium/ Long Term Requirements
4
IMMEDIATE NEEDS
Cash Pressures: Income Flows; Expenditure; and Capital/ one off expenditure
Resources it can utilise
Current position ensure this is correct before moving on
5
SHORT TERM REQUIREMENTS 6-12 month plan
Action points to turn these into financial strategy
Realism
Cash and accrual budgets for next ,and following 5 years
Systems in place to support the strategy
Alignment of strategy with corporate plan
6
MEDIUM / LONG TERM REQUIREMENTS
Income streams new/ different?
Expenditure investment into future income streams. Address the imbalance of revenues and expenditure
Finance what type is most suitable?
Reporting and managing the strategy
7
TOOLS OF THE TRADE
8
KPIs
Financial Statements
Cash Flows
Forecasts
Project Budgets
Mment Reports
Budgets
Business/ corporate
plan
TOOLS
SALES FORECAST EXAMPLE Months Jan Feb Mar TotalProduct/Service #1
Units Sold 30 40 50 120Price per Unit $300 $300 $300 $300Total Sales $9,000 $12,000 $15,000 $36,000Product/Service #2Units Sold 70 70 80 220Price per Unit $500 $500 $500 $500Total Sales $35,000 $35,000 $40,000 $110,000Product/Service #3Units Sold 2 2 2 6Price per Unit $3,000 $3,000 $3,000 $3,000Total Sales $6,000 $6,000 $6,000 $18,000
Total-All Product/Service Sales $50,000 $53,000 $61,000 $164,000 9
COST OF PROJECTED PRODUCT UNITS SOLD BUDGET
Months Jan Feb Mar TotalProduct #1Units Sold 30 40 50 120Cost per Unit $45 $45 $45 $45Total Cost $1,350 $1,800 $2,250 $5,400Product #2Units Sold 70 70 80 220Cost per Unit $150 $150 $150 $150Total Cost $10,500 $10,500 $12,000 $33,000Product #3Units Sold 2 2 2 6Cost per Unit $300 $300 $300 $300Total Cost $600 $600 $600 $1,800
All ProductsTotal Cost $12,450 $12,900 $14,850 $40,200
10
GROWTH (OR START-UP) EXPENSES
11
A Cash Available Now1 Purchase fixed assets( Land, equip., building, vehicles)
(See Fixed Assets Acquisition Budget Worksheet)2 Remodeling costs (fixtures, signs, paint, cleaning)3 Installation fees (equip., phones, leased equip.)4 Deposits (utilities, lease, phone, leased equip.)5 Fees and licenses, certifications6 Special one-time legal fees (specifically for growth/start-up)7 Special accounting and/or other professional fees8 Pre-opening labor expense9 Pre-opening training costs
10 Beginning inventory of merchandise or materials11 Supplies (letterhead, forms, price tags)12 Promotion (grand opening, prizes, give-aways)13 Advertising (initial media, direct mail, coupons)14 Other rxpenses (one-time, specifically related to growth/start-up):
14a14b14c14dB. Total Growth (or Start-up) ExpensesC. (A - B ) Beginning Cash Balance
Cost
FINANCIAL WORKSHEETS COMPLETED
Salaries/Wages & Benefits (Fully loaded including payroll taxes) Consultants Marketing Budget Overhead Expense Miscellaneous Expense Sales Forecast Cost of Projected Product Units Sold Fixed Assets Growth (or Start-up) Expenses Existing Debt
12
FIXED EXPENSES (COSTS)
13
$0
$2,000
$4,000
$6,000
0 100 200 300 400
Number of Product/Service Units Sold
Fix
ed E
xp
ense
s (C
ost
s)
VARIABLE EXPENSES (COSTS)
14
$0
$500
$1,000
$1,500
$2,000
$2,500
0 100 200 300 400
Number of Product/Service Units Sold
Var
iab
le E
xp
ense
s (C
ost
s)
BREAK-EVEN
15
Past
Future We Create
Future We Accept
Present Traditional extrapolation
Future-based migration path
Stretch
Fit
Future Were Exposed to
WORK BACK FROM THE FUTURE
16
PUTTING IT TOGETHER: THE CASH FLOW CURVE
17
Cumulative Cash Flow in $
Time
Burn Rate
Date of First Cash Flow Positive
Maximum Financing Needs
Date of Cumulative Cash Breakeven
PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: SOURCES & USES
18
NEW VENTURE MODELS
19
Seed Product Dvpt. Market Dvpt.
Estabd. Business
Stages
Concept
Independent Start-Up
Business Unit Marketing Engineering
Self - funded Acquisition
Venture Capital Funding
Spinout Internal Joint Venture Strategic Alliance
Corporate Ventures
Source: TBD
WHAT IS PRIVATE EQUITY? Private Equity is an asset class consisting of securities in operating companies that are not publicly traded. Investments in private equity most often involve either an investment of capital into an operating company or the acquisition of an operating company.
20
Source: TBD
PRIVATE EQUITY VALUE ADD VS. STAGE
21
Research Seed/ Project Finance
Venture Early Stage
Mid/Late Venture
Growth Equity
Buyout Public Market
Pipe
Gui
danc
e Str
ateg
y &
Fu
ndra
isin
g
Prod
uct/S
ervi
ce
Man
agem
ent
Bus
ines
s D
evel
opm
ent
Sale
s
Mar
com
Fina
ncia
l En
gine
erin
g
Plan
ning
Cor
pora
te
Fina
nce
IP
Prod
uct
Plan
Ea
rly
Rev
enue
Pro
fit
Leve
rage
Ope
ratio
ns
P(success) = 30% Reqd IRR = 100%
P(success) = 40% Reqd IRR = 70%
P(success) = 50% Reqd IRR = 50%
P(success) = 80% Reqd IRR = 30%
Idea is Feasible
Technology Works
Customer Buys
Product Stable
Market Expansion
Valuation Risk Source: Dr. Gitanjali Swamy, MGMT-E2790 Lectures, Harvard University 2011
PRIVATE EQUITY
22
Venture Capital: Pre-protability, high growth or
disrup8ve technology Dominant posi8on - Typical 20-50%
ownership Pro-rata investment Use of term sheets to mi8gate risk
and guarantee return Board control Valua8on is what someone else will
pay for it
Growth Equity: Growth, Expansion Minority posi8on in high growth Growing, protable, rst ins8tu8onal Valua8on is typically based on more
conven8onal models
Leveraged Buyouts: Protable, Pre-leverage Control posi8on Typical 80-100%
ownership Use of commercial paper (debt)
Returns through levering capital structure to greater eciency (ITS etc.)
Leverage of 70-80%
Corporate VC: Strategic synergies: Strategic rather than nancial metrics Invest in companies Returns through parent market
advantage Minority or control
Others: Angel, Mezz Debt
MGMT-E2790, Harvard University, Alternatives: Private Equity, Dr. Gitanjali M. Swamy
INVESTMENT PROCESS
FILTER Investment Thesis Fit Financial Returns Analysis - Stage Risk/Return, IRR - P&L, Cashflow, EBITDA, Growth Firm fit - Stage - Leverage strength Readiness & Milestones
TARGET LIST
RE- EXAMINE PURSUE
DILIGENCE Quality: Pattern Recognition People: Evaluation Management team Opportunity Market size Competition Product Business Model Context Market timing Market growth Market disruption Deal Financials Price & Valuation Capitalization Structure
THESIS BUILDING
ZUCI PROPRIETARY & ADVISORY NETWORK
ACADEMIA
INTERMEDIARIES
LARGE COMPANIES ADVISORY INCUBATION
SOURCES
Investment Committee one pager Financial Risk/Return Evaluation Portfolio Strategy Fit
Investment Committee Diligence Go Ahead
Investment Committee/Team Presentation Deal team detailed investment proposal Investment Committee/Team Recommendations to Deal Team
Investment Committee Emergency Veto on Terms
NEGOTIATION Structure - Common equity - Convertible preferred - Common Debt - Convertible preferred Economics - Pre/Post Money Valuation - Cumulative dividends - Pro-rata investment Governance - Board seat - Veto and approval rights Downside Protection - Liquidation preference - Auto conversion - Redemption Exit -IPO/ Strategic Sale - Tag along rights
Final Decision: Deal Partner
23
TERM SHEET: STRUCTURE Common equity: Issue is investor protection
Suppose A takes $10M for biz plan from investor B for 50% Next day A liquidates company and distributes $5M to B !!
Convertible preferred: Most common
Key question is conversion price Typically conversion price is re-adjusted with dilution Many types of anti-dilutive strategies
Common Debt: Stringent interest rates
Typically converts at valuation of next round with interest rate
24
TERM SHEET: ECONOMICS Pre/Post Money Valuation
Pre-Money= before investment Post-Money=after investment Valuation is an art form
Cumulative dividends Dividends are rare in institutional Private Equity But buyback/dividends is an underutilized form of exit
Pro-rata investment Very common in VCs = Handcuffs Guarantees investor rights in future rounds Pro-rata = in proportion to current ownership
Interest rate and conversion: For debt structures
25
TERM SHEET: GOVERNANCE Board seat
Typically Private Equity Investors need at least one Often have representation in relation to ownership In extreme cases have board control But creates conflict and moral hazard if they are also subsequent
investors
Veto and approval rights Require special approvals on large expenditure > $50k Require veto rights allowing them to overturn board decisions on
certain key aspects such as CEO selection, dilution etc.
26
TERM SHEET: DOWNSIDE PROTECTION Liquidation preference
1x = Simple preference 2x = double dipping etc.
Anti-dilution provisions
Full ratchet = full preservation % of investor ownership Weighted average = partial preservation % of investor ownership
Auto conversion
Automatic conversion of preferred into common at IPO or acquisition
27
TERM SHEET: EXIT Registration Rights
Demand Rights: Require registration (for an IPO) after a certain period. May list S-3 registration or piggy-back rights on all company registration
Tag Along Rights: Enables the investor to tag along on any stock sale
Drag Along Rights: Enables the investors to force or drag the investor to sell their shares if needed
Right of First Refusal: The investor has the first right to buy any equity offered by the company at a price. Redemption Rights: Require that the company redeem or buy-back a certain % of preferred by specified date
28
TERM SHEET: OTHER Reserved or employee pools:
Typically set aside 10-20% and avoid investor dilution
NDA and Non-compete for employees, founders Key employee contracts and Key Man insurance Vestation clauses: typically 4-5 vestation of equity with a first year cliff vestation. Expenses and timelimits
29
MANAGEMENT DIRECTORS, INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS AND VC DIRECTORS Management directors (usually 1-2)
must maintain open communications provide timely, adequate and pertinent information delivering both good and bad news promptly in a balanced manner. prepare board meetings to enable in depth conversation respond positively to board input.
Independent directors
work as a team with fellow board members serve as a sounding board and mentor to the CEO. chair or participate on board committees mediate between management and investor directors serving as
disinterested directors.
30
MANAGEMENT DIRECTORS, INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS AND VC DIRECTORS VC Directors must
understand the competitive position maintain awareness of developments in industry sectors. help companies close business outside the board room, share company knowledge from the portfolio experiences contribute knowledge plus experience during liquidity events. lead role in financing. attract management team members It is critical for VC directors to understand and differentiate
between their responsibilities as directors and their role within a particular fund.
31
TRANCHES OF INVESTMENT
32
Round A B C D E F Date 20-Jan-95 20-Jan-95 30-Sep-95 30-Apr-96 24-Oct-97 31-Jul-98
Amount $ 600,025.00 $ 999,975.00 $ 1,000,002.00 $ 7,000,000.00 $ 11,750,000.00 $ 12,000,000.00 Price/common share N/A N/A $ 1.05 $ 1.62 $ 6.00 $ 6.75
In event of liquidation or sale
Paid out after Series B-F
Paid out after Series C-F
If not converted, paid out after Series D-F
If not converted, paid out after Series E & F
If not converted, paid out after Series F AND participates prorata in common
If not converted, paid out after liabilities AND participates prorata in common
In event of IPO No change No change Converts to common Converts to common Converts to common Converts to common Voluntary conversion to common Not convertible Not convertible
Convertible with >66 2/3% vote of round
Convertible with >80% vote of round
Convertible with >80% vote of round
Convertible with >80% vote of round
Dividend
Immediate quarterly payments of LIBOR + 1%
After Jan. 1, 2000, annual payments of 8% face value
After Jan. 1, 2000, annual payments of 8% face value
After Jan. 1, 2000, annual payments of 8% face value
After Jan. 1, 2000, annual payments of 8% face value
After Jan. 1, 2000, annual payments of 8% face value
Mandatory redemption?
Yes: 3 equal annual increments beginning January 17, 2000
Yes: 3 equal annual increments beginning January 17, 2000 No No No No
Anti-dilution Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demand registration rights
Demand rights granted upon request of >50% of Series A-D
Demand rights granted upon request of >50% of Series A-D
Demand rights granted at the earliest of (a) July 31, 1999, (b) six months after IPO or (c) the request of >50% of Series A-D
Demand rights granted at the earliest of (a) July 31, 1999, (b) six months after IPO or (c) the request of >50% of Series A-D
Demand rights granted at the earliest of (a) July 31, 1999, (b) six months after IPO or (c) the request of >50% of Series E
Demand rights granted at the earliest of (a) July 31, 1999, (b) six months after IPO or (c) the request of >50% of Series F
Source: Metapath Case, Harvard Business Review
CAPITALIZATION STRUCTURE
33
STOCK
Preferred Stock Common
Warrants & Options
Names C D E Total CE %
Bessemer 955,416 1,015,386 166,667 1,432,500 264,410 3,834,379 27.23% Norwest 2,461,542 435,833 260,282 3,157,657 22.42% Northwest Networks, Inc. 2,317,500 2,317,500 16.46% USVP 769,230 125,000 3,372 897,602 6.37% Michael Tennican 61,542 124,206 185,748 1.32% Other E Shareholders 1,230,832 1,230,832 8.74% Silicon Valley Bank 3,792 3,792 0.03% Stock Purchases under option plans 711,874 711,874 5.05% Outstanding Options 1,743,200 1,743,200 12.38%
TOTAL 955,416 4,307,700 1,958,332 4,461,874 2,399,262 14,082,584
Source: Metapath Case, Harvard Business Review
EXIT SCENARIOS
34
SALE Extra CE from participation Total CE % Value of holdings Multiple
Bessemer 143,334 3,977,713 25% $ 27,751,326 5.97 Norwest 374,819 3,532,476 22% $ 24,645,034 3.73 Northwest Networks, Inc. - 2,317,500 15% $ 16,168,510 161.64 USVP 107,501 1,005,103 6% $ 7,012,303 3.51 Michael Tennican - 185,748 1% $ 1,295,909 12.96 Other E Shareholders 1,058,522 2,289,354 15% $ 15,972,141 2.16 Silicon Valley Bank - 3,792 0% $ 26,456 Stock Purchases under option plans - 711,874 5% $ 4,966,534 Outstanding Options - 1,743,200 11% $ 12,161,789
Total 15,766,759 $ 110,000,000
Sale assumptions: Price of sale: 110 M ($)
Value of common w/o participation $ 7.81 Value of common w/ participation $ 6.98
(participation taken in stock)
Source: Metapath Case, Harvard Business Review
UNDERSTANDING VALUATION VCPE Investment Valuation is a combination:
Return requirements for PE fund Stage or Risk of Investment Use of Debt Capital Milestones/progress Comparables in PE market (Transactions) Comparables in Public market (IPOs) Comparables in M&A Negotiation capabilities of each party
35
VALUATION: VENTURE
36
Investment Rounds! Stage 1! Stage 2! Investment Amount! $5.0 ! $10.0 ! Required Stage 1 ROR! 50.0%! 30.0%! Years to Terminal Stage! 5.0 ! 3.0 ! Shares outstanding before investment! 1,000,000 ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! Terminal Stage!
Terminal Management Share! 10.0%! Terminal Sales! $100.0 !MM! Terminal Net Margin! 5.0%! Terminal PER! 20.0 !X! Terminal Value of Enterprise! $ 100.0 !MM Return of Stage 1 Principal! $0.0 !MM! Return of Stage 2 Principal! $0.0 !MM!
Terminal Calculations! Stage 1! Stage 2! Total!
Total Terminal Value ! $38.0 ! $22.0 ! $ 100.0 !MM Return of Principal ! $ - ! $ - ! ! Equity Value Required ! $38.0 ! $22.0 ! !
! ! ! ! Terminal Share! Stage 1! Stage 2! !
Equity Ownership ! 38.0%! 22.0%! ! Pre-Money Valuation ! 38.0%! 22.0%! !
! ! ! ! Management Terminal Value ! 10.0 ! ! !
UNDERSTANDING VALUATION
Simple Two Stage Investment!! ! ! ! !Shares Outstanding (000's)! Founder! Stage 1! Stage 2! Terminal!Founder! 1,000 ! 1,000 ! 1,000 ! 1,000 !Stage 1! ! 1,263 ! 1,263 ! 1,263 !Stage 2! ! ! 731 ! 731 !Management! ! ! ! 333 !Total! 1,000 ! 2,263 ! 2,994 ! 3,327 !! ! ! ! !Equity Ownership %! Founder! Stage 1! Stage 2! Terminal!Founder! 100.0%! 44.2%! 33.4%! 30.1%!Stage 1! ! 55.8%! 42.2%! 38.0%!Stage 2! ! ! 24.4%! 22.0%!Management! ! ! ! 10.0%!Total! 100.0%! 100.0%! 100.0%! 100.0%!! ! ! ! !Pre-Money Valuation ($MM)! ! Stage 1! Stage 2! Terminal!Founder! ! 4.0 ! 13.7 ! 30.1 !Stage 1! ! 5.0 ! 17.3 ! 38.0 !Stage 2! ! ! 10.0 ! 22.0 !Management! ! ! ! 10.0 !Total! ! 9.0 ! 41.0 ! 100.0 !! ! ! ! !Share Price! ! $3.96 ! $13.68 ! $30.06 !
37
VALUATION: BUYOUT
38
Source: Yell Acquistion Case, Harvard Business Review
Yell: Cross Border LBO Analysis Media, Buyout
Figures in $MM unless otherwise stated
Students of Finc-190, Gitanjali Swamy
Valua8on in pounds 1500
Uses of Funds $MM % Sources of Funds $MM % Mult. Base Drivers
Enterprise Value $2,185.5 95.2% Debt $1,584.5 69.0% 20.6x Interest Rate 8.0%
Transac8on Fees $109.3 5.0% Equity $710.3 31.0% 9.2x Apax/Hicks-Muse Preferred Return 0.0%
Total Uses $2,294.8 100.2% Total Sources $2,294.8 100.0% 29.8x Management Op8ons 10.0%
MulMples EBITDA Revenue Equity Sources $MM % Exit AssumpMons
-1 Entry Mult. 28.9x 1.9x Apax/Hicks-Muse Inv. $658.4 92.7% Exit Year 2007
2007 Exit Mult. 28.4x 1.8x Mgmt. Inv. $51.9 7.3% Exit Mul8ple 14.1x
Total Equity $710.3 100.0%
Revenue Compression 5.0% Investment MulMple 2.2 x
EBITDA Margin Compression 5.0%
VALUATION: BUYOUT
39
Actual ProjecMons Further 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Income Statement: Revenue 976.8 1,131.6 1,226.8 1,347.9 1,467.3 1,580.2 1,726.6 1,845.9 Growth, % 15.9% 8.4% 9.9% 8.9% 7.7% 9.3% 6.9%
EBITDA 61.5 75.5 77.0 99.0 126.2 132.8 157.3 180.5 Margin, % 6.3% 6.7% 6.3% 7.3% 8.6% 8.4% 9.1% 9.8%
Deprecia8on - 8.06 14.82 15.17 20.80 19.67 19.93 19.66 19.66
EBITA - 53.4 60.7 61.8 78.2 106.6 112.9 137.6 160.8
Interest Expense - - - 126.8 116.8 106.8 96.8 86.8 76.8
Pre-tax Income - 53.4 60.7 (64.9) (38.6) (0.2) 16.1 50.8 84.0
Taxes 37.5% - 20.0 22.8 - - - 6.0 19.1 31.5
Net Income - 33.4 37.9 (64.9) (38.6) (0.2) 10.1 31.8 52.5 Margin, % 3.4% 3.4% -5.3% -2.9% 0.0% 0.6% 1.8% 2.8%
Cash Flow Statement: Net Income - 33.4 37.9 (64.9) (38.6) (0.2) 10.1 31.8 52.5
Plus: Deprecia8on - 8.1 14.8 15.2 20.8 19.7 19.9 19.7 19.7 Less: Increase in Working Capital - 15.4 18.6 3.2 8.7 12.4 9.2 6.4 2.9 Less: Capital Expenditures - 14.5 21.2 25.5 22.9 21.6 21.2 19.7 19.7
Free Cash Flow to Pay Debt - 42.4 50.1 (72.1) (31.9) 10.2 18.0 38.1 55.5
Source: Yell Acquistion Case, Harvard Business Review
UNDERSTANDING PE VALUATION: BUYOUT
40
Actual ProjecMons Further 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Free Cash Flow to Pay Debt - 42.4 50.1 (72.1) (31.9) 10.2 18.0 38.1 55.5
Debt: BOY Net Debt 1,584.5 1,459.6 1,334.7 1,209.8 1,084.9 960.1 Debt Paydown 124.9 124.9 124.9 124.9 124.9 124.9 EOY Debt 1,459.6 1,334.7 1,209.8 1,084.9 960.1 835.2
% Interest Rate 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0%
Equity Returns - 2007: Exit Year EBITDA 180.5 180.5 180.5 180.5 180.5 180.5 180.5 180.5
Mul8ple 13.1 x 13.6 x 14.1 x 14.6 x 15.1 x 15.6 x 16.1 x 16.6 x Total Enterprise Value 2,359.5 2,449.7 2,539.9 2,630.2 2,720.4 2,810.6 2,900.9 2,991.1
Less: Net Debt 960.1 960.1 960.1 960.1 960.1 960.1 960.1 960.1 Less: Apax/Hicks-Muse Preferred Dividends - - - - - - - -
Common Equity Value 1,399.4 1,489.6 1,579.9 1,670.1 1,760.3 1,850.6 1,940.8 2,031.0 Apax/Hicks-Muse Equity 1,259.5 1,340.7 1,421.9 1,503.1 1,584.3 1,665.5 1,746.7 1,827.9 Mgmt. Op8ons 139.9 149.0 158.0 167.0 176.0 185.1 194.1 203.1 Apax/Hicks-Muse Total Proceeds 1,259.5 1,340.7 1,421.9 1,503.1 1,584.3 1,665.5 1,746.7 1,827.9 Mul8ple of Ini8al Equity 1.8 x 1.9 x 2.0 x 2.1 x 2.2 x 2.3 x 2.5 x 2.6 x
Source: Yell Acquistion Case, Harvard Business Review
EXIT STATISTICS
41
Exits 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 20060-100MM+ M&A 90 111 100 127 141 133 123 106 166 127 127100-250MM+ M&A 20 17 30 38 67 30 15 15 26 33 29250-500MM+ M&A 7 7 8 21 33 10 5 2 9 16 17500MM+ M&A 5 1 1 9 38 3 2 1 3 2 3
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 20060-100MM+ IPO 84 38 5 2 0 2 0 1 2 5 5100-250MM+ IPO 99 60 34 72 38 7 7 8 30 19 16250-500MM+ IPO 18 16 23 98 78 9 7 9 25 11 17500MM+ IPO 10 6 10 85 89 7 6 4 11 7 6
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 20060-100MM+ M&A/IPO 174 149 105 129 141 135 123 107 168 132 132100-250MM+ M&A/IPO 119 77 64 110 105 37 22 23 56 52 45250-500MM+ M&A/IPO 25 23 31 119 111 19 12 11 34 27 34500MM+ M&A/IPO 15 7 11 94 127 10 8 5 14 9 9
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006250MM+ M&A 12 8 9 30 71 13 7 3 12 18 20250MM+ IPO 28 22 33 183 167 16 13 13 36 18 23250MM+ IPO and M&A 37 30 40 213 236 28 19 16 47 31 39250MM+ IPO 3 Yr Rolling Sum 0 0 78 228 333 310 144 28 38 40 46
ALL MEDICAL DEVICE IPOS
Sort Id Company Name Close Date Year Series
Amount Raised (USD) Post Value (USD) Coding
179 Adeza Biomedical 10-Dec-04 2004 60 292.01 Medical Devices/Equipment
303 Align Technology 26-Jan-01 2001 130 629.05 Medical Devices/Equipment
428 Animas 20-May-04 2004 63.75 319.08 Medical Devices/Equipment
577 Aspect Medical Systems 27-Jan-00 2000 52.5 290 Medical Devices/Equipment
871 Bruker AXS 14-Dec-01 2001 58.5 366.69 Medical Devices/Equipment
917 Caliper Technologies 14-Dec-99 1999 72 390 Medical Devices/Equipment
1277 Conor Medsystems 14-Dec-04 2004 78 486.78 Medical Devices/Equipment
1400 CTI Molecular Imaging 21-Jun-02 2002 182.24 779.6 Medical Devices/Equipment
1520 DexCom 14-Apr-05 2005 56.4 338.41 Medical Devices/Equipment
2095 FoxHollow Technologies 28-Oct-04 2004 63 355.48 Medical Devices/Equipment
2343 Heartport 25-Apr-96 1996 105 492.3 Medical Devices/Equipment
2424 i3 Mobile 6-Apr-00 2000 81.6 406.15 Medical Devices/Equipment
2501 Illumina 28-Jul-00 2000 96 518.78 Medical Devices/Equipment
2747 IntraLase 7-Oct-04 2004 81.9 401.64 Medical Devices/Equipment
2759 Intuitive Surgical 13-Jun-00 2000 45 330.22 Medical Devices/Equipment
2893 Kyphon 17-May-02 2002 90 637.24 Medical Devices/Equipment
3620 Northstar Neuroscience 5-May-06 2006 106.5 391.38 Medical Devices/Equipment
3668 NuVasive 13-May-04 2004 71.5 284.87 Medical Devices/Equipment
3701 Ocular Sciences 5-Aug-97 1997 118.8 387.85 Medical Devices/Equipment
3837 ORATEC Interventions 5-Apr-00 2000 56 337.09 Medical Devices/Equipment
4543 Sequenom 31-Jan-00 2000 136.5 610 Medical Devices/Equipment
4690 Sonic Innovations 2-May-00 2000 50.4 300.8 Medical Devices/Equipment
4994 Therasense 12-Oct-01 2001 114 712.5 Medical Devices/Equipment
5518 Volcano 15-Jun-06 2006 54.4 297.36 Medical Devices/Equipment
5641 Wright Medical Group 13-Jul-01 2001 93.75 397.79 Medical Devices/Equipment 42
DISTRIBUTION OF LARGE M&A
250MM+ M&A (Carlyle Subsegment w /o Healthcare)
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Other
Physical Security
Information Services
Cons/Bus Services
Communications & Netw orks
Semiconductors
Storage
IT Security
Infrastructure Softw are
Application Softw are
Wireless
Consumer Internet and Media
43 Source: TBD
DISTRIBUTION OF LARGE IPOS
250MM+ IPO (Carlyle Subsegment w/o Healthcare)
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Other
Physical Security
Information Services
Cons/Bus Services
Communications & Netw orks
Semiconductors
Storage
IT Security
Infrastructure Softw are
Application Softw are
Wireless
Consumer Internet and Media
44
Capital
FUNDING TO MILESTONES AKA OLD-FASHIONED VENTURE CAPITAL
Risk ()
Valuation
Idea is Feasible
Technology Works
A Customer Buys
Seed Funding
R&D Capital
Go-to-Market Captial
Expansion Captial
P(success) = 30% Reqd IRR = 100%
P(success) = 40% Reqd IRR = 70%
P(success) = 50% Reqd IRR = 50%
P(success) = 80% Reqd IRR = 30%
45
Source: Vinod Khosla Presentation 2003
THE FULLY FUNDED FOLLY A Customer Buys
Fully Fund
IPO (.pray.)
Capital Risk ()
Valuation
Idea is Feasible
Technology Works
46
Source: TBD
Source: Vinod Khosla Presentation 2003
A GENERIC EARLY 90S MODEL Round Type Date Amount Raised (MM)
Pre-Money Valuation (MM) IRR Multiple
1 Seed Jan-90 $ 0.50 $ 2 101% 32.53 2 1st Jan-91 $ 3.00 $ 10 70% 8.13 3 2nd Jan-92 $ 8.00 $ 32 50% 3.30 4 3rd Jan-94 $ 13.50 $ 100 32% 1.32 5 IPO Jan-95 $ 150
Total Private Capital $ 25 Million
47
Source: Vinod Khosla Presentation 2003
A GENERIC LATE 90S MODEL Round Type Date Amount Raised (MM)
Pre-Money Valuation (MM) IRR Multiple
1 Seed Jan-97 $ 5 $ 35 79% 18.37 2 1st Jan-98 $ 10 $ 100 65% 7.35 3 2nd Jan-99 $ 25 $ 200 59% 4.04 4 3rd Jan-00 $ 60 $ 600 52% 1.52 5 IPO Jan-01 $ 1000
Total Private Capital $ 100 Million $200
?
48 Source: Vinod Khosla Presentation 2003
THOUGHT FOR THE DAY ON VALUATION
49
VCS VS. TRADITIONAL METHODOLOGIES
VCs Traditional Pre-Money/Post-Money Targets
Cost +/ Pre-Money/Post-Money Targets
Revenue Mul8ples Modied DCF Cost +/ M&A Value
Discount to IPO Revenue Mul8ples Modied DCF EBITDA Mul8ples Cost +/
EBITDA Mul8ples Price-Earnings Analysis
Secondary Market Price Less Blockage Factors
Pre-Money/Post-Money Targets Cost Approach
Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) Modied DCF (Venture) Transac8ons Analysis
DCF Transac8ons Analysis Public Company Comparables
DCF Transac8ons Analysis Public Company Comparables
Price/Earnings Analysis EBITDA Mul8ples
Secondary Market Price Less Blockage Factors
SEED
EARLY-STAGE
2nd/3rd ROUNDS
PRE-IPO
IPO
POST-IPO
Source: Tuck School, Dartmouth 2007 50
BEST VCPE: IT ISNT EASY - HUMILITY IS KEY Best Return: Google post IPO-$50Bil, 344x
Founders: Two graduate students (who didnt finish their Ph.D.s at Stanford)
Ceo: Former Ceo Novell (and he did finish his Ph.D. at Berkeley) Funder: Sequoia (Mike Moritz), Kleiner, GE Capital Growth: Organic
But Wait What if the Best VCPE firm is also the Worst VCPE firm?
51
WORST VCPE: IT ISNT EASY - HUMILITY IS KEY Biggest Loss in VC : Webvan lost $800Mil
Founders: Prior founder of Borders and Mercury Capital (MIT grad work) Ceo: Former Ceo Anderson (MBA Bradley) Funder: Sequoia (Mike Moritz), Benchmark, Goldman Growth: Organic + Acquisition
Other interesting contenders for VC Bombs Leader: Amped ($360Mil Highland Capital Partners), Procket ($272Mil - USVP ), Pets.com ($50Mil Hummer Winblad)
Biggest Loss in LBO: Washington Mutual lost $7Bil Funder: Texas Pacific Group
Other interesting contenders for LBO Bombs Leader: Capmark($2Bil KKR, Goldman) EMI ($2.7Bil Terra Firma)
52
SUMMARY Budgeting & Financials Fundraising Term sheet as a Roadmap Valuation
53