Getting Serious about Stakeholder Analysis Piloting Political Science Methods in World Bank Operational Work
Getting Serious about Stakeholder Analysis Piloting Political Science Methods in World Bank Operational Work.
Mar 27, 2015
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Getting Serious about Stakeholder Analysis
Piloting Political Science Methods in World Bank Operational Work
Why Do We Need Stakeholder Analysis?
Experience suggests many Bank-supported reforms fail because of low client commitmentUnderstanding the dynamics of potential support and opposition for different policy measures can help reformers design programs that will “work” politically
What If? Gorbachev had developed a strategy to defuse opposition to his program to transform political and economic structures in the USSR?
Hillary Clinton had been able to manage friends and foes in her efforts to push radical reform on health care in the U.S.?
George Bush had analyzed stakeholder positions before going to a vote in the UN Security Council on the war in Iraq?
Could Stakeholder Analysis have changed history…..???
Stakeholder AnalysisBackground
Potential winners and losers of policy reforms can actively influence reform outcomesTo account for role of politics, Bank has performed intuitive analyses of stakeholder preferencesNeed for more systematic political stakeholder analysisPilot studies conducted by EASPR using the Expected Utility Stakeholder Model
Stakeholder AnalysisObjectives of Pilot Study
1. Operationally useful analytic tool that factors politics into Bank’s understanding and design of interventions
2. Insights to help Bank staff make informed decisions about operational priorities
3. Share modeling findings with country clients (subject to comfort level of country and regional management)
Stakeholder AnalysisEast Asian Pilot Program
Pilot Program Analyzed Politics of High Profile Governance Issues in 2 East Asian Client (Low and Middle-Income) Countries
Country A (Low-income): Anti-corruption (Broad reform initiative plus customs and procurement reform)Civil Service Pay and Employment Reform
Country B (middle-income):Anti-corruption (Broad reform initiative plus customs, procurement, and revenue reforms)
Stakeholder AnalysisOperational Questions for the Bank
What was the likelihood of movement on desired governance reforms?
Which reform areas should Bank emphasize or de-emphasize in its programs?
Which actors were pivotal in reform process?
How should the Bank position itself in the reform process and debate?
Stakeholder AnalysisWhat the Model Can Do
Identify stakeholder positions on policy reform, weigh their potential influence and assess the strength of their commitmentSimulate round-by-round negotiations to gauge whether proposed reforms are feasible as designedDetermine possible strategic options for optimizing reform levels using knowledge about political dynamics
How the Model WorksData Collection Process
Interviews with country expertsExplain context and relationships related to reform issuesDefine reform steps in order of difficultyDescribe stakeholders and place them along this continuum according to their preferencesNot opinions or predictionsCross-checked for internal consistency and comparability
How the Model WorksData Components
Defined policy issueSteps in the reform processList of stakeholders with an interest in the policy outcome and those with a vetoEach stakeholder’s initial bargaining positionRelative power of each stakeholder on this issueSalience of issue to each stakeholder
How the Model WorksSimulation Bargaining Process
Stakeholders try to influence each other to secure an outcome they see as favorableModel provides a round-by-round simulation of prospective political bargainingPredicts how key stakeholders will shift their positions Assesses the level of consensus in support of a particular outcome
How the Model WorksDetermination of Expected Outcome
Objective assessment of likely outcome for a reform issue
Extent of reform to be attainedLevel of support for this outcome
Model can estimate effect of different initial stakeholder positions on likelihood of reform success and level of policy consensus
Extreme stakeholder position
Opposite extreme stakeholder position
Stakeholder A position
Stakeholder C position
Stakeholder B position
Round x: Stakeholder positions and influence are analyzed to determine the winning outcome based on each stakeholder’s expected utility.
Model goes through risk propensity, stakeholder perceptions, policy proposals, and stakeholder policy shifts to simulate bargaining process.
Iteration
Negotiations stop if stakeholders see nofurther gains from continuing discussions
Outcome forecast, predicted timeframe
Stakeholder influence = stakeholder resources * stakeholder salience
Case Study – Country AMacro Anti-corruption Agenda
Corruption a high profile issuePrime Minister
Veto playerNo reforms without PM approvalAdopting a cautious approach to reform
Government has outlined a broad anti-corruption strategy Basis for issue definition
Country A – Anti-CorruptionStep One: Defining the Issue
Policy Steps of the Reform Process
0No Reform
10Implement Code of Ethics
15Media/Public Awareness Campaign
30Publish Fees for Basic Services
50Draft Anti-Corruption Legislation
85Passage of Freedom of Info/Press
100Passage of Tax Reform
135Passage of Customs Reform
185Implement Customs Reform
220Pass & Implement Asset Decl. Law
Country A – Anti-Corruption Step Two: Positions and Influence
Infl
uenc
e E
xert
ed(P
ower
* S
alie
nce)
Low
Hig
h
PMDominantParty(Anti-Reformists)MinJusticeCustomsAdmin
JuniorCoalitionParty
Large Business
MinInteriorStaffSmall BusinessPolicyThinkTank
WBIMFEU
UnionsAcademics
Impl
emen
tC
ode
of E
thic
s
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in P
ublic
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Supp
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ax R
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Pas
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t Ass
etD
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0 10 15 30 50 85 100 135 185 220
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No
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aw
0 10 15 30 50 85 100 135 185 220
Position Advocated
No
Ref
orm
Country A – Anti-Corruption Step Three: Bargaining Dynamics
1 2 3 4 5 6Time
Implement Code of Ethics
Begin Public & Media awareness campaign
Publish fees for basic services
Begin drafting anti-corruption legislation in National Assembly
Pass & Implement Freedom of Press/Information
Support Tax Reform
Support Customs Reform
Support Implementation of Procurement Law
Pass & Implement Asset Declaration Law
WB, Donors & OppositionParty
NGOs
DomPartyPro-reform
Military, AdminReformUnit
PM & Judiciary
MoJ & DominantParty-Anti-Reform
MoE
JuniorCoalitionParty, Business
CoM
Country A – Anti-Corruption Step Four: Anticipated Outcome
Infl
uenc
e E
xert
ed(P
ower
* S
alie
nce)
Low
Hig
h
Large BusinessPolicyThinkTankMinInteriorStaff
MinJusticeDominantParty(Anti-Reformists)
Impl
emen
tC
ode
of E
thic
s
Beg
in P
ublic
& M
edia
awar
enes
s ca
mpa
ign
Pub
lish
fees
for
basi
c se
rvic
es
Beg
in d
raft
ing
anti
-co
rrup
tion
legi
slat
ion
in N
atio
nal A
ssem
bly
Pas
s &
Im
plem
ent
Free
dom
of
Pre
ss/I
nfor
mat
ion
Supp
ort T
ax R
efor
m
Supp
ort C
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ms
Ref
orm
Supp
ort
Impl
emen
tati
onof
Pro
cure
men
tL
aw
Pas
s &
Impl
emen
t Ass
etD
ecla
ratio
n L
aw
0 10 15 30 50 85 100 135 185 220
Position Advocated
No
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orm
Impl
emen
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s
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in P
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edia
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-co
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Supp
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Position Advocated
No
Ref
orm
PM
WBIMFEU
UnionsAcademics
Small Business
Domestic support for reform is too limited to expect substantive progress on the overall agenda.
Country A – Anti-Corruption Step Five: Potential for Further Reform
Re-analyzed using various donor starting positions above and below current positionsResults suggest that changes to current Bank policy would be unproductiveCan get PM to agree to higher reform, but not without lowering domestic reform consensus
Case Study – Country ACustoms Reform
High priority for reformPervasive corruptionLow capacity
Government has initiated customs reform, including draft customs codePrime Minister desires a slow and steady approach – favors quiet consultations with key stakeholders
Country A – CustomsStep One: Defining the Issue
Policy Steps of the Reform Process
0No Reform
5Upgrade Computers & Telephones
25New Customs Code to Council of Ministers
60New Customs Code to Parliament
70Strengthen Anti-Smuggling Task Force
120Streamline Customs Administration
160Implement Modern Customs Authority
Country A – CustomsStep Two: Positions and Influence
Infl
uenc
e E
xert
ed(P
ower
* S
alie
nce)
Low
Hig
h
PMMilitaryMinEconomicsCouncilMinistersLargeBusiness
TeachersStudentsMinJusticeJudiciary
CivilServAdminNGOs
WBRegDevBankIMFUNUnionsMedia
Upg
rade
com
pute
r an
dco
mm
unic
atio
nsin
fras
truc
ture
Subm
it ne
w C
usto
ms
code
toC
oMfo
r re
view
Subm
it ne
w C
usto
ms
code
to N
atio
nal
Ass
embl
y fo
r pa
ssag
e
Stre
ngth
en a
nti-
smug
glin
g ta
sk f
orce
& b
udge
t
Beg
in s
trea
mlin
ing
cust
oms
adm
inis
trat
ion
Org
aniz
atio
nre
stru
ctur
ing
& H
Rde
velo
pmen
t
0 5 25 60 70 120 160
Position Advocated
No
Ref
orm
Upg
rade
com
pute
r an
dco
mm
unic
atio
nsin
fras
truc
ture
Subm
it ne
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usto
ms
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Subm
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usto
ms
code
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atio
nal
Ass
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Stre
ngth
en a
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orce
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udge
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oms
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inis
trat
ion
Org
aniz
atio
nre
stru
ctur
ing
& H
Rde
velo
pmen
t
0 5 25 60 70 120 160
Position Advocated
No
Ref
orm
Country A – Customs Step Three: Bargaining Dynamics
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 Round 8
Time
Upgrade computer and communications infrastructure
Submit new Customs code to CoM' for review
Submit new Customs code to National Assembly for passage
Strengthen anti-smuggling task force & budget
Begin streamlining customs adminstration
Organization restructuring & HR development OppositionParty
WB & Donors
Customs Staff
NGOs
DominantParty - ProReform
DominantParty – AntiReform
Customs Administrators & Tobacco
JuniorCoalitionParty, MoE, Judiciary & MoJ
Petrol
PM, MEF, Business, MoC, Military, CoM &
AdminRfm
Country A – Customs Step Four: Anticipated Outcome
Infl
uenc
e E
xert
ed(P
ower
* S
alie
nce)
Low
Hig
h
PMCouncilMinisters
MinJusticeJudiciary
LargeBusinessTeachersStudents
MilitaryMinEconomics
CivilServAdminNGOs
WBRegDevBankIMFUNUnionsMedia
Upg
rade
com
pute
r an
dco
mm
unic
atio
nsin
fras
truc
ture
Subm
it ne
w C
usto
ms
code
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oMfo
r re
view
Subm
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usto
ms
code
to N
atio
nal
Ass
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ssag
e
Stre
ngth
en a
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sk f
orce
& b
udge
t
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oms
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inis
trat
ion
Org
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stru
ctur
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Rde
velo
pmen
t
0 5 25 60 70 120 160
Position Advocated
No
Ref
orm
Upg
rade
com
pute
r an
dco
mm
unic
atio
nsin
fras
truc
ture
Subm
it ne
w C
usto
ms
code
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view
Subm
it ne
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usto
ms
code
to N
atio
nal
Ass
embl
y fo
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ssag
e
Stre
ngth
en a
nti-
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sk f
orce
& b
udge
t
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oms
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trat
ion
Org
aniz
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Rde
velo
pmen
t
0 5 25 60 70 120 160
Position Advocated
No
Ref
orm
Pro-reform stakeholders pressure PM to move agenda forward. New customs code and strengthened anti-smuggling measures likely.
Country A – Customs Step Five: Potential for Further Reform
Re-analyzed using various donor starting positions above and below current positionsResults suggest that changes to current Bank policy would be unproductiveCan make small gains in policy outcome by pushing for most comprehensive reform target (modern customs authority)But only at the cost of societal consensus
Case Study – Country ASummary
Despite comprehensive anti-corruption agenda, little domestic support for more than cosmetic reformMore potential for progress in specific, targeted interventions (i.e. customs reform)Resources not best spent on general anti-corruption initiatives
Benefits of the Model (1)Why We Liked It
Wide applicabilityHas been used to analyze a diverse set of negotiated issues from business to economics to politicsCan be applied to broad range of Bank issues – not just governance
Track Record of Accuracy More accurate than traditional methods using expert opinion (approximately 90% in real-time prediction of thousands of cases since 1981)
Benefits of the Model (2)Tighter Approach than Existing Methods
Structured format for data collectionOffers more systematic results than expert opinions or predictionsFacilitates clear definition of the issues and the scale of potential outcomesProvides consistent format to summarize experts’ views of current power structureAllows quantification of estimates, enabling scientific analysis and comparison across experts
Benefits of the Model (3)Analysis is Nuanced –Permits Small Calibrations in Bank Policy
Dynamic analysis – Can estimate how bargaining behavior will play out over time Predicts the types of coalitions that may form in support of different levels of policy reform (e.g. not just thumbs-up or down on first-best solutions; can help steer support to small but significant steps along the way)Allows dual analysis of a macro issue along with its component policy parts for better reform targeting (e.g. broad anti-corruption or specific procurement measures)
Limitations of the Model (1)What We Didn’t Like
Garbage in, garbage out Quality of data collection is critical
Shortage of qualified experts on some issuesNeed for in-depth country knowledge greater than expectedAccess to country-based informants awkward; extensive interviews required with busy people
Limitations of the ModelWhat We Didn’t Like
Ability to forecast has not yet been tested for Bank-related policy issuesOperational utility depends on close alignment with country program tasksNo in-house capacity to run the modelWorks best on narrowly focused issue; commonly confronted Bank problems often multivariate, complex
Internal Challenges to Mainstreaming this Approach
Fear of leaks – Worry that explicit material will get out in country or international pressQuestions of access within the Bank: How closely held should results be and at what hierarchical level?Lack of comfort, familiarity with methods, jargon from political scienceUncertainty about what to do with findingsFunding political stakeholder analysis is low priority when competing with traditional Bank tasksQuestions about how to fit stakeholder analysis into Bank knowledge and operational cycle (CAS, projects, AAA, one-off initiative)
Seriously Getting SeriousNext Steps
Establish framework within country and regional operations for ongoing application of these techniques)Embed this tool in broader field-based, political analysis approaches Pilot studies on additional countries/issuesDevelop in-house modeling capacityAssess further experience, including accuracy of forecasts and recommendations
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